HC Deb 13 February 1821 vol 4 cc620-65
Mr. John Smith

, in rising to submit the motion of which he had given notice, begged to remind the House that some short time back he had the honour to present a petition from the merchants, bankers, and traders, of London, assembled at the Mansion-house. In that petition they had implored the House to adopt such measures as would restore that peace and tranquillity to the country which were so much wanted. He could now assure the House that he should speak the sentiments, and act upon the wishes, of that most respectable body in coming forward on this occasion; for there was no body of men to whom the peace and tranquillity of the country were more important than to them. In taking the present step, he declared most solemnly that the restoration of peace and tranquillity to the country was his only object. He conceived it his duty to look at past transactions fully and fairly, and he was determined to do so. He begged first to call the attention of the House to that period of the last year when his majesty's ministers had advised the omission of the Queen's name in the Liturgy. At that time, and on several occasions since, he had endeavoured to collect what were the real motives which had induced them to adopt that measure; for this purpose he had listened with attention to every thing which had passed in the House upon the subject. He had, indeed, heard some kind of explanation, and some motives stated, but, up to the present hour, he had not heard any precise reason given. So much had been already said upon the impolicy of that measure, that he did not now feel it necessary to press that further upon the attention of the House. There were, he knew, differences of opinion upon subsequent parts of the proceedings, but he solemnly protested, that he had never met any one who did, under all the circumstances, approve of the measure. He would admit, that it was the wish of his majesty's ministers, that the Queen should remain abroad. That he did not complain of; for he agreed, that if there was any chance whatever of the public tranquillity being interfered with by her return, it would have been better, and he could have wished, that she had remained abroad. But how did it happen, that with this desire on the part of ministers, they should have adopted the only measure which could render it impossible for her to continue abroad any longer? He had heard it said, that ministers were induced to take that step in consequence of the rumours and reports of foreigners and others who were travelling abroad. He himself had heard several rumours and scandalous reports. He had heard some of them in this country, and some of them in Paris; but he could assure the House, that not one of those scandalous rumours which he had so heard formed any part of the accusation which had been subsequently brought against her majesty. From this circumstance, he inferred, that the whole of those reports were unfounded and scandalous fabrications. Now it was hardly necessary to remark, that persons high in rank were often the objects of such scandalous attacks. They heard them not. They were not in the way of hearing them; and thus the most unfounded fabrications were passed into the world without refutation. Therefore, he conceived they ought never to have been made the subject of accusation.

It was not his intention, at present, to travel into the evidence which had been produced on the trial. It was too odious and disgusting to be again introduced, where it could possibly he avoided; but he begged the House would bear with him while he shortly adverted to the bill. It was brought to its last stage, and the third reading was carried, when the noble lord at the head of the administration found that it would not be prudent to press it farther with only a majority of nine. What the noble lord (Liverpool) had said upon that occasion, he could hardly recollect; but he understood it to have been, that he considered the preamble of the bill as fully proved, but that he did not think it would be proper, under the circumstance of having only ft majority of nine, to carry it further, and therefore he moved that it should be rejected. In that motion he considered that the noble lord had acted wisely; for how would that House endure to be told, if the bill had come down to them, that such a majority had expressed the sense of the House of Lords, when they considered how that House was constituted, and when it was borne in mind that there were so many who voted for the bill who had an interest in passing it? The noble lord was well aware, that under such circumstances the bill could not be said to have had the sense of the House in its favour, and he therefore abandoned it. Why! of that majority were there not nine individuals who acted in the triple capacity of accusers, jurors, and judges; and surely such a majority could never have been considered sufficient for such a measure.

He would say one or two words upon the opinion of that august tribunal; and he was induced to do so, by having heard doctrines in this House upon the subject, which he conceived in direct contradiction to the plain rules of justice. It was true, that a majority of nine peers had been in favour of the bill; but might he not suppose, that the influence of the Crown had some effect in producing that majority? He begged he might not be understood as meaning to cast any reflection on noble lords in the other House; but he would ask, were there not motives which were calculated to obscure and blind the judgment on many occasions? It was what we observed in every day's experience, that men's judgments were biassed and influenced on the most important questions, by motives which did not bear upon the strict examination of those questions. He would say first, that there was that confidence which many individuals reposed in the government. This might arise in some from the high opinion which they entertained of administration, and might be conscientious. He allowed for this opinion, though he could not concur in it; but certainly the confidence in measures proposed and advocated by government, was calculated to excite, of itself alone, a strong support. Another circumstance which might operate in giving a strong bias to the judgment was, a recollection of great favours conferred, and a natural wish for their continuance. That such a feeling should have a strong operation, no man who studied human nature could deny. As to the first ground, that of confidence in administration, he need not go out of that House for an example of the effects which it was calculated to produce. They saw constantly a number of gentlemen who relied implicitly upon government in every vote; and he believed so much so in some cases as to produce a sacrifice of individual opinions. When such was the fact—and no person could deny it to be the fact—was it not too much to infer the moral guilt of her majesty from the majority which had pronounced upon it? He maintained that assertions of I the mora! guilt of the Queen, which it had given him pain to hear, founded upon such a conclusion, were absurd and unjust. It could not fairly be said to have been proved, by such a majority. While on the subject of this majority, he was reminded of a circumstance which had once occurred in that House. Some years ago, a gentleman, a member for one of the Scotch boroughs, who was in the habit of supporting the ministers of that day, was drinking up stairs during the discussion of some very important question; being asked how he could give his support to such a measure, he answered, with great naiveté—"I never give myself any trouble about these matters; Mr. Pitt thinks for me." [Hear, hear.] He believed that the noble earl at the head of the government, and the noble lord opposite, were so far like Mr. Pitt, that they were frequently allowed to think for many of their supporters. When he recollected this, he could never bring his mind to believe that the majority of nine, or the other majority of four or five-and-twenty, gave any member of that House a right to infer and descant upon the moral guilt of the Queen. In fact, the whole of the proceeding appeared to him to be contrary to the common rules of justice; and yet, day after day he heard in that House of the moral guilt of her majesty! Would such conduct be endured if it were adopted towards other individuals who had been accused, and were acquitted (and acquitted her majesty was to all intents), that they should be afterwards daily accused of the same crime? Warren Hastings had been impeached by that House, and charged with several crimes; after a long trial, he had been acquitted: would it, he asked, be endured, after such acquittal, that any member should get up, accuse him of the plunder of the Begums, or any other of the crime of which he had before been charged? No doubt it would not; and if such an accusation were made, we should have hon. gentlemen get up in their places to defend the accused? Would any accusations be now endured, if made against lord Melville, who had been impeached by that House, and acquitted. He was certain, that if any such accusations were made, there would be a competition among the noble lord's countrymen in that House as to which should be first to get up and defend his character; and yet, day after day, and hour after hour, they had attacks and accusations of guilt against a woman and a Queen.

With respect to the important, and perhaps the most important part of the question, the legality or illegality of the erasure of her majesty's name from the Liturgy, he would not trouble the House, and he acted upon this principle—not that he had any doubts of the illegality of that measure, for he could solemnly assure the House that he had ever strongly held that opinion, but because he could not hope to discuss that question with that knowledge and professional skill which he had no doubt would be displayed by the hon. and learned gentleman who would do him the honour to second the motion with which he should conclude, and by another hon. and learned gentleman (Mr. Wetherell) whose admirable speech on a former motion gave him so much pleasure—a speech, by the way, which still remained unanswered. [Hear.] That hon. and learned gentleman was well able to defend the doctrines he had then advanced, and no doubt he would ably execute the task. To those and to the other learned gentlemen who might take part in the debate, he would leave the discussion of the question on legal grounds. The only motive which induced him at all to introduce the present motion to the attention of the House (for he could assure the House that it personally was very inconvenient to him in consequence of the state of his health) was, to put an end to the disturbance and distraction which prevailed in the country upon this subject; disturbance and distraction which, in his opinion, could not be appeased until the cause was removed. He had heard it stated by gentlemen on the other side, and certainly the statement excited no inconsiderable degree of surprise, that the public took no great interest in this question. If such a statement were to gain belief in the House, he could hope for very little effect from his present motion. He was astonished to hear such assertions; for if gentlemen would only open their eyes, they must perceive the intense interest with which the public considered the subject, and the intensity of feeling to which it had given rise throughout the whole country. The House were aware that her majesty had received several hundred addresses, signed by several hundreds of thousands of persons, all of whom sympathised with her sufferings, and poured forth earnest prayers for the restoration of her rights. He only mentioned this circumstance as a proof of the universal feeling of the people on the question now before the House. But it was not necessary to call the attention of the House to any other circumstances than those which happened to themselves with reference to the same subject; that had happened to the House on this occasion, which had never before occurred, at least in his memory—petitions had poured in, not merely from towns and villages, but from almost all the great cities and many of the most extensive counties in the kingdom, all breathing one prayer, and that an earnest one, for the restoration of her majesty's name to the Liturgy; all concurring in stating that such a measure only could restore the public tranquillity. Was not this a proof of the universal feeling of the people on this subject? He had witnessed one of the processions to which this subject had given rise. He had seen the countless multitudes who had attended her majesty on her visit to St. Paul's. Never had he seen such an immense assemblage. They were all in a state of perfect quiet and repose. They had by some means been impressed with the idea that any strong expression of their sentiments would be injurious to the object they had in view, and they repressed those feelings which, in every large assemblage, however respectable, were usually displayed. He was one of those who witnessed this immense assemblage, not less remarkable for its numbers than for their excellent conduct; and he thought that if such was the conduct of the people of this country, there was no object which they could not accomplish. If the public attempt to act with violence, they could be repressed; but when such large bodies were assembled and acted under the influence of reason, it was a proof of the great value and importance attached to the object they had in view. With respect to the petitions which had been presented, it should also be considered that there were, on this occasion, petitions not only from those places from which the House was accustomed to receive them on other occasions, but also from places which never before had taken any part in political affairs. When he saw this, he was astonished how any gentleman on the other side could deny that the people took more interest in the question respecting her majesty than they had done on-any former occasion. He had also heard with some surprise doctrines which had been urged on the other side. To him at least some of these were new. He had heard it said that though a portion of the public did evince a great interest, and show strong feeling on the subject of the Queen, yet that they were not the respectable portion of the public—that a great portion of them were persons hostile to government, and anxiously wishing by any means to bring about a change—that they were.—He would not repeat the nick-name which was applied, because he abhorred all nick-names, which, as applied to any portions of the people, were only calculated to excite irritation in the country; but he denied that there was any foundation for such statements. It was not the fact, that only a small, and that not a respectable, portion of the community took an interest in this important question. It was also said that some of the public meetings were composed of that class of persons to which he had alluded; and that gentlemen on his side of the House, were actuated only by interested motives in warmly advocating her majesty's cause. He might remind those who made such assertions, that only a small number of the gentlemen near him could gain by a change of the administration. He and many others must continue to remain in their present mediocrity, whatever change might take place; but he did not make this disclaimer for himself and many of his friends on the ground that there were none of them who would be unwilling to accept of office. He knew there were, and he was glad of it. It would indeed to him be a matter of deep regret to see the day when there should not be found men ambitious of public office, and fit to discharge its important duties. Several of his friends, he was glad to know, were not adverse to a change on this ground; but for himself and many of his hon. friends by whom he was surrounded, they had no such feeling: and if some of his hon. friends were to-day to get into office, he expected, he wished for nothing from them. Still he should be glad to see them enjoy that power of which, he had no doubt, they would make so good a use. He was attached to them because he had ever found them the able advocates for the best interests of the country He had seen them endeavour to gain for this country one of the greatest blessings—one which, in point of importance, was only second to the glorious Revolution. They had endeavoured to promote civil and religious liberty—they had endeavoured to do away with that bigotry which had caused more disaster, and the effusion of more blood, than almost any other evil to which a state was liable—they were shipwrecked in the attempt, and they lost their places by their honesty, but they had not lost, and could not lose, the admiration and affections of their country, which would ever preserve the recollection of the liberal and enlightened policy on which they had acted.

But to revert to the subject of the respectability of those who evinced a strong feeling on the present occasion, he could assure those hon. gentlemen who seemed to have a doubt on the subject, that the meeting to which he had alluded in the outset of his speech, was most respectable. He could also assure them that, to his own knowledge, some of the county meetings were highly respectable, and he had no doubt they were all so. He spoke their sentiments on the present occasion, and not only theirs, but he was convinced, the sentiments of the great majority of the people of England. Believing then, as he firmly did, from the irritation which had already prevailed upon this question, that universal disappointment and discontent would be the result, if the motion which he should submit were rejected, he did earnestly implore his majesty's government to give it their most serious attention; for he felt convinced that the country would not be tranquil until this question was satisfactorily set at rest, and that he was sure could never be the case while her majesty was excluded from the Liturgy. He had heard it said, that the noble lord (Castlereagh) had stated that he could not continue to hold office if the House should agree to the insertion of her majesty's name. If the noble lord had been so imprudent as to make such a declaration, that did not pledge the House. But he could not think that if the House agreed to his motion it would endanger the noble lord's place: on the contrary, he thought it would then be much more secure; the noble lord need have no fear from any party at that side of the House, provided he be- came instrumental in restoring tranquillity to the country.

Now, assuming, as he thought he might fairly do, that the tranquillity of the country would be further endangered by the refusal of this motion, he begged to ask the noble lord whether he was prepared to say, that the country was in such a state as that it could safely bear additional subject of irritation. Let the noble lord look at the subjects of dissatisfaction which existed from other causes. Let him look at the state of the agriculturists! He (Mr. Smith) was not among those who thought that agriculture was in a state of absolute ruin; but he admitted that those engaged in it were reduced to a state of very great distress; and he knew, from many farmers, that they were suffering the greatest calamities. Then, he asked, was it worthwhile to insult persons so depressed, by paying no attention to the prayers which they had so earnestly addressed to the legislature on the question before the house? Then let the noble lord look at the state of commerce. Here again he would say, that he did not think there was ground for despair, but beyond all question it was extremely low and distressed. Then look at the internal policy of the country. Could it be said that we were upon a bed of roses? Did not some of the most eminent men hold opinions strongly differing from that which was now pursued? Were there no other questions to require the utmost attention of parliament? Were there not the Poor laws demanding immediate attention, and requiring, when they should be considered, all the patient feeling and all the good sense that could be called into action? He should be glad too, if they could be quite sure that our foreign policy would not call for serious and deep attention. They had been told by the noble lord, that peace would continue to be preserved so far as this country was concerned: but it was obvious that two principles now existed, and were likely to continue a conflict throughout Europe;—a good principle and a bad principle—a principle of liberty and a principle of slavery. He doubted not, that ultimately the good principle would become prevalent: but who could say that this country could avoid being involved in confusion and conflict during the struggle? Would the noble lord say that it might not become the fate of this country to stand in the breach between civilized society and the slavery of barbarians? When those and similar subjects pressed upon their consideration, and required all the good sense, all the good humour, all the deliberate attention which parliament could bestow, nothing could be worse policy than to keep the country agitated when good humour was so necessary, both in parliament, and among the people. The processions, parades, addresses, meetings, disturbances, such as had been already so striking and so frequent, would continue and increase, till his majesty's ministers should accede to the universal wish of the nation. He had very little more to add, but to express the earnest prayer of his heart, that the Queen's name might be restored to the place in the Liturgy, which belonged to her, and that the whole kingdom might be rescued from the agitation which convulsed it, and restored to peace and good feeling. The hon. member, who had been listened to throughout with the deepest attention, concluded by moving "that this House, having taken into its consideration the circumstance of her majesty the Queen's name not being inserted in the collects, prayers, and litanies of the church; and also the numerous petitions from the people, addressed to this House, complaining thereof, is of opinion, that under all existing circumstances, it is highly expedient that her majesty's name should be inserted in the said collects, prayers, and litanies, and that such a measure would greatly tend to remove the discontents that exist on that subject in the public mind."

Mr. Tennyson

, in rising to second the motion, declared that he found himself impelled to do so by the strongest and most decisive impressions, and by au anxiety to discharge a correspondent duty to the Crown and the country. The subject before the House was one of extreme interest, involving moral and political consequences of no ordinary nature, and in no ordinary degree. It had, indeed, been so ably brought forward by his hon. friend who preceded him, that much of what he might otherwise have been disposed to address to the House, would now be withheld. He should abstain also from travelling over those extensive and important grounds, which, on a former occasion, were so effectually taken by his hon. and learned friend, the member for Oxford (Mr. Wetherell), in a speech which would never be forgotten by those who had the pleasure and advantage of hearing it. The inferences which his hon. and learned friend had then so conclusively drawn from the various Acts of Uniformity, and the limitation of the royal supremacy, which he had made so apparent with regard to the established form, of Common Prayer, required no farther enforcement.

Nothing, indeed, could be more clear, than that, although the king was undoubted head of the church, both by common law and by statute, yet that in spiritual as well as in temporal matters, he was bound by the statutes of the realm. This he conceived to be the language of the constitution, and a proposition against which the gentlemen opposite would not venture to contend. He should pass on, therefore, to the last Act of Uniformity, the statute of the 13th and 14th Charles 2nd, containing the clause which had occasioned so much discussion. By this act, the form of prayer annexed to, and constituting part of it, was enforced by the old penalties, as that which should thenceforth be exclusively used. The effect of which was, that if the king had promulgated any other form of prayer, or made alterations in this, without the sanction of parliament, any clergyman adopting it, would expose himself to those penalties. When, therefore, all was so strictly barred against any interference on the part of the Crown, it naturally occurred to the framers of the act, that events and circumstances would arise in the royal family,—marriages, births, and deaths,—requiring alteration from time to time in the prayers, litanies, and collects, which related to the king, queen, and royal progeny. For this purpose an express clause was deemed necessary, by which it was "provided and enacted, that in all those prayers, litanies, and collects, which do in any way relate to the king, queen, or royal progeny, the names be" (not, "may be," but "be") "altered and changed from time to time, and fitted to the present occasion, according I to the direction of lawful authority." This clause had no appearance of a reservation by way of caution, of a right in the Crown which it might have retained without it,—it was not in the nature of a saving clause,—it was a clause assuming to enable, and not merely enabling, but directing the king and privy council to I do, from time to time, certain acts. The necessity for such a clause proved, that without it, the Icing would have had no authority in this matter,—that such authority on the subject as he now had, was derived under it,—and that the exercise of that authority must he conformable to its terms. In point of fact, every Order in Council on the subject, since the statute, had recited this clause, and professed to act by virtue of the authority it bestowed.

Before he made any farther observations on the construction of the clause in question, he would entreat the House to bear in mind, that at the date of the statute, of which it was part, the usage of praying for the Queen-Consort,—and that distinctly and by name,—was fully estaolished. There was no instance of omission from the time of the Reformation. There had been no married king since that period, whose consort had not had the benefit of the prayers of the church nominatim. So confirmed was this usage, that it was recognized and corroborated by one of those canons of the church which were promulgated in 1603, the year of the accession of James 1st. With respect to these canons, he would appeal to the learned civilians in the House, whether they were not now completely binding upon the church, and whether their observance by its ministers might not now be enforced. There was no doubt of this; but he referred to them at present for another purpose. By the 55th canon, it was ordained, that "before all sermons, lectures, and homilies, the ministers should move the people to pray to this effect: 'Ye 'shall pray for Christ's holy catholic 'church, &c, and I require you most 'especially to pray for the king's most 'excellent majesty, our sovereign lord 'James, king of England, &c. Ye shall 'also pray for our gracious queen Anne, 'the noble prince Henry, and the rest of 'the king and queen's royal issue.'" With this settled precedent-usage, it could not occur to the framers of the act of Charles 2nd, to explain elaborately that the word "Queen," in that part of it under consideration, was intended to designate the Queen-Consort, as it unquestionably did, though some had thrown out doubts even on this point,—or that she must be prayed for by name. She had always been so prayed for, and she is in the act distinctively mentioned for that purpose. The words "king, queen, and royal progeny," were evidently adopted into the act from liturgies which had for a long period been in use, where they occurred in the same sequence, and with the practical application for which he contended. There was also an historical fact coincident with this statute, which might be deemed material to illustrate its meaning with respect to the matter before the House. King Charles 2nd was then on the point of marriage, and it so happened that upon the very day on which this act was passed, the 19th of May, 1662, Catherine of Portugal, his betrothed queen, arrived in England. This event was mentioned by all the historians, and referred to by sir Edward Turner, then Speaker of the Commons, in the speech which he addressed to the throne from the bar of the Lords, when in attendance there to hear the royal assent given to this very act of parliament.* Two days afterwards, Charles and Catherine were married, and it could not be doubted that the framers of the clause in question, had contemplated this projected alliance, and that the intended consort of Charles 2nd, was one of its more immediate objects. In point of fact, immediately after the marriage, the name of queen Catherine was inserted in the Liturgy, pursuant to the terms of this clause; and since that period, until the accession of his present majesty, the name of every queen consort had occupied the same position.

He was of course aware of the exception so much insisted on by the gentlemen opposite on a former night, and he would yield to them the whole benefit of that exception. It had been effectually disposed of by the hon. and learned member for Knaresborough (sir James Mackintosh), and others. There was every ground for supposing that George 1st was in fact divorced from Sophia Dorothea, before he ascended the British throne. But the noble lord opposite (lord Castlereagh), with all the Hanoverian archives at his command, and with that laudable anxiety, which, throughout the late transactions, had characterized the conduct of ministers, to ascertain beforehand how far the grounds they were about to take were tenable, was doubtless prepared to inform the House how the fact really stood. If the general impression of historians, that George 1st had contracted a left-handed marriage with the * See New Parliamentary Hist. Vol. 4, p. 244. duchess of Kendal, were correct, he must have been previously divorced, because, according to the laws of Germany, such a marriage would not otherwise have been valid, and he would not have ventured upon it. It was enough, however, for the present purpose, that the unfortunate Sophia Dorothea was never known or recognized as queen consort in this country. When she died, the king did not even go into mourning, and the event was not mentioned in-the Gazette of that day.

But it had been contended, he believed, by his hon. and learned friend the solicitor-general, that because in the Liturgy appended to the statute, blanks were left for the names and persons in the prayers, litanies, and collects, which had uniformly been devoted to the Queen-consort by name, and to the royal progeny, a full discretion devolved upon the Crown to supply those blanks as it might I think proper. But the clause to which he had adverted, recognized these as prayers for the queen-consort and royal progeny, and therefore, when the blanks were supplied, they must be in part devoted to the queen-consort, when there was a queen consort in existence. If, in point of fact, the Liturgy did provide prayers, litanies, and collects, for the queen-consort and royal progeny, as this clause stated that it did when it made a provision respecting such prayers, &c, as related to them—could any power be found to enable the king and council to destroy their effect? On the contrary, the king and council were simply enabled, and in the same breath directed to give them, from time to time, full effect and operation, by providing for contingencies. The words imparted no discretion, but were clearly imperative. It was not provided that the king might make any alterations from time to time, but that alterations be made so as to fit these prayers, &c. to the occasion. There was no power to omit or insert at pleasure, any of the existing personages for whom prayers were so provided, but a direction to alter the names, merely, of those personages, and that, not according to fancy or caprice, affection or prejudice, but so as to fit them to the present occasion,—to accommodate them to the actual existing fact. But could it be said, that a prayer designed for the queen-consort was fitted to the present occasion, if, contrary to the words of the statute where she is specified as one of the objects,—contrary to the usage at the time of the statute, as well as before and since,—the name of the queen-consort were omitted? With respect to the subterfuge,—for subterfuge it was,—that her majesty was virtually prayed for under the general term "royal family,"—he denied that there was any power in the act to use that term, except as a denomination for the royal progeny in its limited or extended sense, and in no other sense had it ever been used, as might be seen by reference to the orders in council on the table of the House. There were prayers for three distinct classes—king, queen, and royal progeny. They must have distinct denominations, and so they had ever had till the present moment. The term "progeny," admitted either of a general denomination, or of a particular selection, accompanied by a sweeping addition, such as "and all the royal issue," "progeny," or "family." The usage had been such both before and since the statute, and that usage had also supported either a sense of the word "progeny," limited to the issue of the existing king and queen, or a sense extended to the issue also of former kings of England. If, therefore, it were a question respecting the omissions of the duke of Cumberland, or Frederic prince of Wales, so much insisted upon in a former debate, it would be a satisfactory answer, that they were prayed for under the denomination of "royal family," and that they had no right to insist on a more specific designation; but as the only legal sense of that term in these prayers was, "royal progeny," it was absurd to say, that it included the Queen-consort, unless there was a subterfuge within a subterfuge, and it was to be contended that it included her, because, in this instance, she happened to be royal progeny, in the extended sense of that term. Unquestionably she was not prayed for as Queen-Consort under the term "royal family," in the sense in which it had always been used, and could only be received and construed in these prayers, and thus it was superabundantly manifest, that she ought to be prayed for as such specifically. She was one of the personages specified in the act, whose names were to be constantly adapted to the individuals so as to render these prayers specific: the words were clear to this effect, and if the slightest doubt could exist upon them, the constant usage before the statute of Charles 2nd, must be taken as governing their construction, and the constant usage since that statute, must be taken as expounding them.

If the true construction were that which he had thus pressed upon the consideration, of the House, the Order in Council of February last, had done no less than dispense with a solemn statute. When a statute enjoined any act upon the king and privy council, and the injunction was not complied with, it could not be said that the statute was violated; because, as the act of the king was mixed up with the act of the council, that form of speech would conflict with the invaluable constitutional maxim, that "the king could do no wrong But to disregard such an injunction, was to dispense with the statute. If he could not, therefore, call it a wrong before the law, it was a violent constitutional wrong. He knew pot from what period the privy council had furnished themselves with a precedent on this occasion. He had found none, except such as occurred in times from which he concluded that ministers, even in their present and late dispositions, would scarcely wish to be supposed to derive their sanctions. In December, 1662, indeed, Charles 2nd issued a declaration dispensing with this very Act of Uniformity which he had been discussing. The Commons of that day humbly represented to the king, the inconveniences which would result from such a step, and his majesty thought fit to abandon the declaration. Here was a precedent;—and as ministers had acted upon it in part, he hoped they would completely conform to it by now abandoning the Order they had so unadvisedly made. In 1672, Charles relapsed into his former error; he issued a new declaration of the same description. The Commons of 1673 remonstrated, and the king again yielded. On that occasion, said the historian, "the king sent for the declaration, and broke the seals with his own hands; the Commons expressed the utmost satisfaction with this measure, and the most entire duty to his majesty." He would not pursue the subject through the eventful and inauspicious reign of James 2nd; but if the noble lord and his colleagues would abandon that crooked and perverted policy by which they had been actuated throughout the late most unconstitutional and he was compelled to add, most disgraceful proceedings, and would rescind the fatal order of February last,—a sentiment similar to that which was expressed by the Commons of 1673, would now extend itself to all classes of the people; the ministers themselves might then possibly participate in the just popularity which he trusted would constantly attend upon their royal master, and which by such a step would be heightened into that enthusiastic affection, to which, personally, he was so well entitled.

Under any view of this subject which ministers might please to take, they could not consider it illegal to insert the Queen's name in the Liturgy. He was persuaded also that they must at least entertain grave doubts upon the law, and perceive that others might reasonably be influenced by them, to adopt the opinion which he had formed. When, indeed, he was willing to suppose that they had doubts, he could not go farther; he could not believe that they deemed the law to be clearly in their favour. He felt sure that they did not. However this might be, a great body of the people would remain persuaded, that a statute had been violated and treated with contempt, and a vast majority of those who would not undertake to form an opinion respecting the law,—on general grounds, condemned the omission.—Under such circumstances, what could be the imaginable object of ministers, when they persisted in a measure so loudly complained of? Was it to satisfy any abstract notions which they might entertain of criminal or moral justice? If so, was it to be endured that they should thus presume to carve for themselves, by refusing obedience to the voice of the law, or at least by willingly, if not wilfully, lending themselves to a gross perversion of its plainest injunctions?—Failing to obtain the desired verdict from the jury, to which, at their own time, after their own manner, in opposition to public feeling and to the protests of the illustrious accused, they had elected to refer their case against her majesty,—was it not repugnant to the very elements of universal justice, that they should now resort to collateral means for inflicting a punishment,—for a punishment it was, and as such it was designed,—which must appear to be the deliberate result of those irritated and vindictive feelings which discomfiture too frequently produced? The country at large did, in fact, consider this as an insult and all injury, proceeding from the dictates of disappointed vengeatice.—What might not be seriously apprehended as the effects of such an example upon the morals and conduct of the people! What insubordination—what breaches of and deviations from the law—what contempt of judicial decision—what resistance even, to the most solemn judgments of the highest tribunals in the land! God forbid that such example should be productive of consequences so fatal to the country! God forbid that the misconduct of the government should induce the people to fall into their path! Let the House at least avoid it. They only knew that the King had a Royal consort;—and if, in considering what was due to her they had any view to those atrocious calumnies—for such they were only at liberty to consider them—to those abortive charges—for such, in fact, they were—which had been levelled against the Queen, it should only be to compensate her majesty for the pain, the sufferings, to which they were now bound to assume she had been unjustly exposed. All that the House knew was, that her majesty's royal predecessors, for three hundred years, had constantly had the benefit of the prayers of the church;—that prayers were provided for her by statute; that there was a ministerial hand to insert her name, and if that hand refused the office, that a statute was dispensed with. At any rate, they knew that the law could not be violated by this insertion—it might be necessary in order to preserve the integrity of the law,—and the public tranquillity might depend upon it. If, at the risk of public tranquillity, his majesty's ministers continued to insist on the propriety of their perverted views on this subject, under the idle imagination,—the vainillusion,—that pertinacity in error was firmness and consistency; and that they were thus maintaining their own reputation and the dignity of the Crown: should the House of Commons lend itself to absurdities so culpable,—so fatal,—at the expense of justice, at the expense of decency, if not also at the expense, as in his judgment it clearly was, of the Queen's lawful rights, and of that constitution, of which they were the especial guardians? Would they not better discharge their duty to the King as well as to the country, by adopting the resolution which his hon. friend had recommended, and founding upon it an humble address, with which, in the language of faithful, truly loyal, and affectionate subjects, they might approach the throne, and respectfully entreat his majesty to remove the existing cause of public dissatisfaction.

His majesty's patriotic sentiments were too well and too generally known, to leave it for one moment in doubt that he was grossly deceived in this matter. He did not mean to insinuate that his ministers deceived him intentionally;—they were themselves deluded. He firmly believed that of those who heard him, there were very few who did not entertain this opinion; indeed, it was known that there was scarcely one who did not deplore the original ungracious omission of her majesty's name. He would ask those who concurred in this feeling, whether, in case that omission had never taken place, they would now, after the recent termination and abandonment of all proceedings against the Queen, desire to erase her name from the Liturgy. If they would, it was clear that they regretted the original omission, merely, because it precluded them from now inflicting upon her majesty a more decisive insult—a keener mortification. If they would not, under such circumstances, have desired the present erasure of her name,—then, deploring as they professed the original exclusion, he would ask them by what chain of casuistry they concluded by approving the continuance of that exclusion? Had not the peace of the country been already too long sacrificed,—the mind of the people too long distracted,—the Queen sufficiently agitated and tortured,—parliament and the ministers too long devoted to these exclusive objects? Would the ministers resolve to continue these evils, for continue they must, session after session, until either they receded or were forcibly driven from the supercilious position which they now ventured to occupy? The apology to the House for this omission, in the first instance, was, that if the Queen's name were inserted, and the proceedings terminated adversely to her majesty, the King would be exposed to the painful duty of erasing it. This implied and admitted the propriety of insertion in the event which has since occurred;—consistently with such admission, the insertion should have been made immediately after that event;—to abstain from making it with a view to permanent exclusion, was, in effect, to erase,—without the justification of that public duty which had been represented as so afflicting to discharge. Ministers, therefore, were now driven either to maintain that the Queen had been effectually convicted, or to admit that they had dealt disingenuously with the House, when the omission was first complained of.

Before he sat down, he would conjure the House to deal gravely with this matter.—It involved not merely questions of feeling, decency, and immediate expediency, but legal points—constitutional principles, of the first magnitude—of the most interesting importance. If to some it should appear nothing to act in contravention of the motive originally and exclusively assigned for this omission;—if it were nothing to deal with the acquitted as with the convicted;—if some could bring themselves, in defiance of that acquittal, to hold up the Queen to foreign countries, where they profess to wish she should reside, as interdicted—excommunicated;—to placard her, in effect,?in every church in Britain; to libel her, negatively at least, on every Prayer-book in the land, and thus to mingle political considerations and malignant passions with religious feelings, and abate the fervour of those prayers which ought to be devoutly offered up for the king;—if it were unimportant to treat prayers as an idle compliment, or to treat the Queen, for such was the only alternative, as unworthy of salvation:—if all this were nothing, yet it would undoubtedly be something to ensure the continuance of those commotions, whether moral or physical, which had so long agitated and distracted the country; it were something to risk a secession from the national church—an evil, the progress of which they had long deplored, and which, it appeared, from the statements made, and the petitions presented to the House that evening, was increasing from this cause. It must be important to arrive at a correct and just decision, whether, in fact, his majesty's ministers had either ignorantly, or advisedly, dispensed with a solemn statute; and to determine whether, in one case or in the other, they should now, in oblivion of some of the most important passages of our history, concede to the Crown so important a prerogative. The question was also, whether they should give permanence to that conviction which their late proceedings had so extensively produced, that no community of feeling remained between that House and the country at large; or, what was a still more dangerous impression, that, although community of feeling might exist, there was no community or sympathy of action. The people were looking to the division of this night, as that which would, in their judgment, decide whether, in point of fact, the noble lord and his colleagues retained within their grasp the Laws and the Constitution of England.—This might be considered strong language, at least from him, but the time was at length arrived when he believed it to be seasonable. It was at least the language of sincerity and strong conviction, and; language to which he found himself under an obligation to resort on so important an occasion, in the discharge of those high and sacred duties which he owed to his constituents, to the sovereign, and the country.

Mr. Legge

considered the erasure of her majesty's name from the Liturgy both ill-advised and inexpedient, although he was by no means disposed to concede that there was any force in the argument, that it was impossible to retain her majesty's name in the Liturgy, and yet institute the proceedings against her which had lately taken place. He did not see that there could have been any inconsistency in adopting such a line of conduct. The retaining her name was consistent with the custom which had so generally prevailed for years, and he did not imagine that its remaining in the place in which custom had assigned it, would have the effect of prejudging her case, or have created any strong prejudice in favour of her innocence, in the event of its being necessary to commence a criminatory proceeding against her. On the contrary, he was convinced that her exclusion from the Liturgy had created her a host of advocates out of doors, and some within that House. As to the Queen's right to have her name inserted, he thought it would be most inopportunely argued at present, after the able legal authorities which had been heard at length on that branch of the question. He might, perhaps, be disposed to say, that the omission was not in itself illegal; but he was at the same time not disposed to agree with those who insisted that her majesty was not prayed for by virtue of her being included in that general prayer for the royal family. He professed that he himself was actuated by no party feeling in the avowal of his sentiments on that occasion, and he thought that no man, except he was actuated by party motives, could for a moment imagine that any set of men would, in the nineteenth century, go so far back to seek an example in the sanguinary history of the dark ages, as to fabricate documents, and suborn evidence to overwhelm and condemn an innocent woman. He should ground his opposition to the motion of the hon. member upon the too celebrated Letter of her majesty to the king, and the answers she had given to the various addresses presented to her. It mattered not whether she herself in the one case violated the respect which was due to the sovereign, or in the other case endeavoured to excite those whom she denominated her subjects to sedition and an absolute contempt of the laws and all constituted authorities. She was in both cases equally culpable. Those extraordinary specimens of the unbridled licentiousness and daring of the age were now numerous enough to fill two large volumes, and were in that shape again to be put into circulation for the worst purposes. However, in the outset of the affair, she might plead irritation of feeling at the unexpected turn which things had taken, it was now impossible, that any allowance could be extended to her for her reiterated appeals to the worst feelings of the populace, for her attempts to revile the conduct and sacred person of the sovereign, and for her pertinacious attempts of late to set the people in hostile array against both the Houses of Parliament, If her majesty's name had never been erased, but continued at this moment in the Liturgy, these publications alone would, in his mind, be a sufficient cause to induce his majesty's ministers to advise its erasure. He should therefore oppose the motion, because he was convinced it could not but be against the feeling of the House to carry up to the Throne an address, which, whilst it must be derogatory to the interests of the Crown, must inevitably prove injurious to the best interests of the country.

Mr. Wynn

began by observing, that it had been his intention to address the House at an earlier period of these discussions, but having failed to catch the attention of the chair, he had still the satisfaction to find that his view of the question had been completely taken and illustrated in the luminous and able speech of the right hon. member for the University of Oxford (Mr. Peel.) Little remained for him on this occasion but to express his concurrence with the sentiments of that right hon. gentleman; and notwithstanding that he saw much to lament in the course of proceeding which had been adopted with regard to the Queen, he could not, in contemplating it as a whole, admit that it called for any formal parliamentary notice. He agreed with the hon. and learned gentleman in regretting the original erasure of her majesty's name from the accustomed form of prayer. Had it been inserted, its insertion would have been considered as a matter of course, and the subsequent inquiry might have been prosecuted without any prejudice to it, arising from this cause. The refusal of a ship of war to convey the Queen to this country was also matter of regret, and he could not but lament as improper, that the death of his late majesty had not been notified to her, and, above all, that no notification had been made to her relative to the death of her own daughter. This was a cruel and gratuitous outrage upon the feelings of a mother, which would never have happened in a private family, whatever the conduct of the mother might have been. The effect of the present motion, however, would be, to cause the re-insertion of her majesty's name in the Liturgy: and, without going at large into the argument on that subject, he must say at once, that he could not understand-the force of that reasoning which gave to the Act of Uniformity an imperative character. It was urged, indeed, that the only ground or excuse for making a change in the Liturgy, was a proviso in which the words "from time to time" were introduced; but in looking at the copy annexed to the act itself, he found only a blank, which might have been filled up in any way. Three precedents only had been adduced in support of the Queen's legal title, those of Henry 8th, with respect to one of his wives, of James 1st, and of Charles 1st. Such precedents were, however, hardly sufficient to make out a common law right, or any right that was equivalent to it. In one instance the name of the elector palatine, and in another, that of the princess Sophia had been introduced; the latter second cousin to queen Anne indeed, but neither of them answering to the description of "royal progeny." It was remarkable, too, that both Houses of Parliament addressed queen Anne upon the latter case, and expressed their thanks; thus intimating that it was not a matter of right, but of grace and favour. Some doubts had, indeed, probably arisen, whether the Queen had not committed some excess of authority by this introduction of the princess Sophia's name. But he must here ask, whether there was not an open and regular mode by which a question of this kind might be decided. With regard to what had been said as to taking the opinions of the judges, he certainly felt happy that they had not been applied to on this occasion. He could not admit, that the ministers of the Crown were justified in obtaining their opinions on questions which they might have afterwards to decide in a more regular form, True it was, that they usually required the attendance of the attorney and solicitor-general, but no counsel was heard on the opposite side, and such a decision could not therefore be considered as judicial. Recurring, however, to the immediate question before them, he confessed that he could not consider it advisable to address the Crown with regard to the exercise of its prerogatives, except in some glaring and flagrant case. At the same time, when he adverted to the Queen's conduct, or rather to the conduct which she had been advised to pursue, it did not appear to him to be of that nature which ought to induce them to call upon his majesty to perform an especial act of grace and favour. He had been told, indeed, that the Queen was acquitted, and that she ought to be considered in the same light as any other individual in whose favour a verdict of "not Guilty" had been pronounced. He was himself willing to look at the case as if the bill had been thrown out. He would grant to her every clear legal right; but when grace and favour were applied for, he was free to exercise his own private opinion. The House could not have forgotten the recent instance of the duke of Cumberland, to whom the refusal of the same allowance granted to the other branches of the royal family was unjust, upon the principle contended for, because nothing had been proved at that time against him; but the disapprobation of her late majesty of his marriage, and other circumstances equally well known, had made an impression upon the House, and the allowance was refused. The pre- sent was an exactly similar case in that respect; and in forming his mind as to the expediency or propriety of now addressing the Crown, every hon. member was at liberty to act upon his own inferences and opinion. His own persuasion was, that whether or not sufficient, had been proved in another place to show that her majesty was unfit to fill her exalted station, or whether she was so proved in any other indirect manner, her avowed conduct subsequently, the reviling and opprobrium which she had been advised to cast upon all the institutions of the country had rendered her unfit to be pointed out as an object of grace and favour. The result of the fullest consideration which he had been able to give this subject was, that the original omission was unwise, although not illegal; and that after what had occurred, and under all the present circumstances, it would not be advisable to address his majesty for the purpose of supplying that omission.

Mr. Wilberforce

said, that every thing which had happened since the period when he first delivered his sentiments to the House on this important subject, had tended to confirm the opinions which he then entertained. Under the circumstances in which the House was placed, it now became necessary to express a deliberate opinion, and as he had had no opportunity of delivering his sentiments the other night, he must now declare, that they were, in the main, the same as those which had been just expressed by his hon. and learned friend below him. Whatever his opinions might be upon particular parts of the case, he could not but thing, that, looking to the whole of the conduct of his majesty's ministers, there was nothing which called for the condemnation of the House or the country. The ministers had been placed in a situation of extreme difficulty; they had only a choice of evils before them, and if they had erred in making that choice, their error should in fairness be regarded as an error of judgment, and ought not to be imputed to incapacity, and still less to want of integrity. He had now, however, something different in contemplation: he wished to take a practical view of the subject as the best mode by which they could now arrive at a satisfactory conclusion. Intending to treat the question in this manner, he must, in the first instance, examine the objections which had been raised on both sides, to the course of proceeding to which each was respectively opposed. If the only doubt existing on the subject was that which involved the legality of omitting her majesty's name, he should not deem it of very high importance, and, after all he had heard, should be disposed to leave the question where he found it, in what had been called "the glorious uncertainty of the law." Let it not, however, be imagined, that he had not heard with pleasure and admiration the speech of an hon. and learned gentleman (Mr. Wetherell) on a former night. For a time, the reasoning of that speech produced a great effect upon his mind; but when he came to reflect further upon it, his doubts returned; and whether the original omission was legal or illegal, the question was now to be regarded under another aspect. He felt deeply the force of those considerations which had been pressed on the attention of the House by his hon. and learned friend (Mr. H. Legge), and could not but think, that her majesty, in adopting sentiments so unlike the tone and language which she had used in replying to the address of that House, had shown none of the respect due to the constitution, and to the established laws of the country. Whatever excuse he might be ready to make, still it must be admitted, that the reiteration of such sentiments went to violate the constitution, and were as injurious to the public as they were dishonourable to herself. At the same time it ought not to be considered, that the fault was so much that of the Queen as her advisers; and he had felt some surprise, that these who had printed her Letter to the king, or perhaps some other documents, had not incurred the animadversion of the law. When he supported the motion, he supported it, therefore, for the sake of the country, and for no other reason. He looked to the effect which was to be produced on the bulk of the middle and lower classes, who were at present left open to the assaults and seductions of mischievous men, who lost no opportunity of creating public confusion. The question generally asked was, why should not things be restored to their former situation? That they were not so restored was attributed to some evil design; and this belief was carefully inculcated. He was aware that public men sometimes thought it necessary to make a stand upon particular questions, and rashly declared amongst themselves a determination to that effect; but he never had known a subject on which it was less their interest or their duty to enter into such an engagement. If concession were to lead to many subsequent measures, if it were germinant and was necessarily to produce many branches, if it was the beginning of a course that might lead to an uncertain issue, he should clearly understand the force of their objections. On the contrary, however, the act required was simple, and led to no further consequences: it promised also to put an end to discussions, in which he had found some of the best and ablest men at variance. He must here persist, although, it might appear singular, or again expose him to derision, in the opinion which he had formerly expressed as to her majesty being already prayed for under the general title of "all the royal family." As this might be regarded as a quibble by some persons, he should not further advert to it; and returning to the general impression, he thought it impossible that any hon. member could have failed to observe, that a very common remark amongst the people was, "if the Queen is bad, there is the more reason to pray for her." This might serve to illustrate what was undoubtedly true; that the goodness or badness of individual character ought not to influence the admission or exclusion of names from the Liturgy. If questions of this kind were always to be tried by that test, the inconvenience and uncertainty would soon become obvious. Should it be necessary to mark the sense entertained of any impropriety or misconduct, it might be done in some other way, as, for example, by a diminution of allowance. The people now found, that her majesty was restored to all the prerogatives of Queen, and could not feel satisfied that she ought at the same time to be excluded from their prayers. This exclusion was a most unhappy circumstance in another respect, fearing as he did that it had been the means of introducing a political feeling into the church. Every religious man had before been in the habit of consoling himself with the reflection, that there was at least one day in the week when he might forget all his low and vulgar cares, and when he might dismiss from his mind the animosities which disturbed the course of human life. It was a day when the elements of discord should be at rest, and when every recollection that might tend to create disunion, or excite jarring sentiments, should, if possible, be avoided. True, it might be said, that to restore her majesty's name to the Liturgy would now produce the same effect, because it would amount to the triumph of one party; but he must take leave to say, that those who would triumph on such an occasion, were not amongst the chief frequenters of our churches. The latter did not always regard every act of the Crown as the act of its advisers, although this was the constitutional principle, and although he himself felt satisfied that if his majesty did know the general sentiment, or the satisfaction which might be communicated to the great body of his subjects by the measure, he would wish for its immediate adoption. Of all the considerations, therefore, which influenced the opinion that he had formed, that of the effect produced by the exclusion of her majesty's name on the popular mind was the most operative. The omission was brought under public notice every Sunday, and the wound which might otherwise be healed was kept in a state of continued irritation. Such an effect could not but be prejudicial to our church establishment at a time when there were but too many causes at work for its overthrow—at a time when so many mischievous men were industriously employing every means for the destruction both of our religious and civil constitution. He had been informed that the Queen, whilst excluded from the prayers of the established church, was prayed for in most of the Methodist chapels. Nothing, in short, seemed so well calculated as the present state of things, for bringing into disrespect and contempt an ecclesiastical system, sealed with the blood of martyrs, and from which the dissenters themselves had derived all the advantages which they enjoyed. He would, therefore, guard and cherish, with redoubled earnestness, what was so sacred in itself, and was now threatened by so many dangers. Those dangers were rendered formidable, both by the pressure of the times and the unceasing efforts made by the malicious to estrange the present generation from the religion of their forefathers. True justice, true dignity, and true magnanimity, did not, in his opinion, consist in resolutely adhering to a measure, because it had been once adopted. If its abandonment was likely to confer a substantial benefit on the country, it became a magnanimous as well as an honest man to sacrifice his own opinion to the general interest. Let not the House conceive, let not any honourable member conceive, that to yield to the present motion was to declare a belief of the innocence of the Queen. With him (Mr. W.) the innocence or guilt of her majesty weighed not a feather. Independently of any feeling upon that point, he would vote for the motion, because he thought that its success would go to tranquillize the country: if it would not at once restore peace and harmony to the kingdom, it would at least remove one cause of discontent—one cause perhaps of many, but certainly a cause of very considerable weight. Perhaps the feeling upon which he had acted during so many years, a feeling the advantage of which he had never yet found cause to doubt; perhaps that feeling might impress his mind more powerfully than it would affect the minds of those whom he was addressing; but he would vote for the motion of his hon. relation, if it were only that the motion was framed in a pacific spirit, that it tended to heal the wounds under which the country was suffering. Never, perhaps, had the House been in more danger of opposing itself to public opinion than in the present case: never, perhaps, could the country with more advantage advert to the principle adopted by Mr. Pitt, when, finding the public feeling strong against his own, he gave up his own opinion to the opinions of the people of England. That principle which led Mr. Pitt to seek a peace with France at the moment when he himself was disposed to a continuance of the war, was a principle of conduct which proved him worthy to be the minister of a free country;—a principle which, by attaching the affections of the people to the government, prevented the well meaning from being misled, and from becoming the dupes of the ill-disposed. If, when the various temporary causes of discontent should have passed away, the wound which he now sought to heal were left to fester and inflame, ill consequences, he feared, would be the result of such neglect; and honourable members would perhaps regret that they had not retracted at an earlier period. He supported the motion, not because he wished to fix any mark of dignity upon the Queen, but because its success would pratify the wishes of a vast majority of the people.

Mr. Stuart Worthy

said, he was anxious to follow his hon. friend, having acted up to that period in concert with him, though now obliged to differ from him in the line he had taken. His hon. friend professed that he took that line out of deference to the views of the people, stating at the same time that he did not agree with any of those views. He was ready to accede to him that the general feelings of a great body of the people were for the restoration of the Queen to the Liturgy, but then, in his view of the duty a member of parliament owed his country, those feelings were not to be acted upon at the sacrifice of an honest conviction. The feelings of the people ought to have their due weight with their representatives—he would listen to their prayers, and to the arguments by which they were enforced, but in that House he was bound to act according to the judgment he had formed. Upon that principle it was that his vote on the present occasion would be founded; and he would explain to the House why he could not, after what had happened, advise the Crown to bestow any mark of grace or favour upon the Queen. True, the sense of a great body of the people had clearly declared itself in favour of the effect of the present motion; but he thought that the people had come to that opinion under an erroneous impression. The people thought that to exclude the name of the Queen from the Liturgy was to deprive her of a right; and if once he could be of that opinion, he would undoubtedly vote for the insertion of her name; but he voted against the present motion because not even all the eloquent speeches he had heard had convinced him that in the exclusion there was any thing illegal. He did not put the negative vote which he proposed to give upon the ground taken by the hon. member (Mr. Legge) who had spoken for the first time upon the present occasion: he deprecated the language put forth in her majesty's addresses, and in her Letter to the king; but parliament ought in another way to mark its disapprobation of that language; he would not on that account exclude her majesty's name from the Liturgy. But the Queen, most ill-advisedly, had rejected the mediation of the House; she had refused to take any steps by which the differences between the illustrious parties could be arranged; she had put herself upon her trial; and, in so putting herself, she took the risk of any impression which might be produced by circumstances coming out during that trial. Now, there were some facts of which it was impossible to divest the mind; and although he, sitting in the House of Lords, might probably have been bound to declare her majesty not guilty, still there had upon the trial appeared such facts as made it impossible for him to call upon the Crown to hold her majesty up to the public in the situation of a graced and favoured Queen. He should give his vote according to his opinion; he trusted it would be considered an honest opinion; and he did think that if the same opinion, should be given by the House, it would go far to quiet the country. In spite of what was asserted by gentlemen on the other side, he was convinced that the votes of the House had already gone a long way towards tranquillizing the country. Before he sat down he would trouble the House with a few words as to his general conduct in her majesty's case. It was well known to those who were in parliament in 1812, that he had at that time expressed himself most strongly upon the subject of the differences in the royal family; and he had then said, what he still thought, that, at that period, the Queen was most unjustifiably treated. The opinion which he had then expressed he still maintained; and he did believe that a great deal of the feeling now existing in favour of the Queen might be traced back to the indignation excited by the course of conduct in 1812 pursued against her. He wished, for his part, to bury all that had passed in oblivion; and he thought that it might be done, provided the House was not called on to vote upon motions like the present; but if he was driven to say whether he would call upon the Crown to hold up the Queen to the respect of the country, he must say that there had been such circumstances proved against her majesty as induced him, most decidedly, to negative the measure.

Mr. Martin

, of Galway, said, that the present motion had actually been made in the form of an amendment eight months ago, and negatived by the House; and could any man now expect the House, after the lapse of so short a period, to reverse the decision then come to by a majority of 301 to 124, in which majority he believed the hon. gentleman himself joined who had brought forward this mo- tion. He had thought something in the way of concession necessary, and as he had failed to obtain it from the party who was wrong, he turned round and demanded it from those who had all along been in the right. It reminded him of a case in which a friend of his was accused of acting unhandsomely. He (Mr. M.) was applied to on the occasion, and was accordingly waited upon by the friends of the other party, who demanded a most penitential apology. He replied, that his friend was adverse to this, and had authorized him to say—"You may make a riddle of his body, but he will make no apology." The gentleman however remarked, that an apology must be made; upon which he (Mr. M.) remarked. "Then your friend must make it." "You have just hit it," replied the other, "an apology must be made, and as your friend won't make one, mine shall." And accordingly an apology was drawn up for all the newspapers.—Such to him seemed the conduct of the hon. gentleman. An apology must be made, and as she, from whom it might be expected, would not offer one, the hon. gentleman in effect said, "You who are in the right must retrograde in the most unheard of manner." He had heard it remarked, that the peace of the country ought to be restored and this question set at rest. So said he. The Queen might give way without at all compromising her character for innocence, as that House had already declared, that by doing so her character, instead of suffering, would rise in their estimation. He had heard, that her majesty would not give up this point because she considered it to be essential to the establishment of her innocence. But it was not always so considered by her attorney general for he had taken charge of a proposition which did not go to restore the Queen's name to the Liturgy. This to be sure he had not presented to her majesty; but it was not to be supposed that he would have charged himself with it at all, if he had not thought that it ought to satisfy his royal client.

Mr. Lennard

said, he was very glad that it had been at last admitted by gentlemen opposite that the exclusion of her majesty's name from the Liturgy was a punishment. He had always considered it so; and he thought it unworthy of the noble lord opposite to contend, as he had done on former occasions, that it was not punishment. He had heard with great surprise the members for Montgomeryshire and Yorkshire, contend that the restoration of the Queen's name to the Liturgy was an act of grace and favour. He would not attempt, after the luminous argument on a former night of the learned member for Oxford, to argue the question on the strict construction of the act of parliament; but it seemed to him that no man who had honestly applied himself to this question, with the assistance of those arguments, could have a doubt that the rejection of her majesty's name from the Liturgy was an arbitary and illegal assumption, in the teeth of the true meaning of the act of parliament. No man, in his opinion, could read that statute without being convinced that it was never meant that there should be any discretion to alter or change beyond that alteration which might become necessary by death or other inevitable accident. But the truth was, there was no law to reach the Queen; and therefore new laws were to be made and old ones broken. She was to be punished and then heard, "castigatque auditque.' She was to be punished with more than Rhadamanthean injustice; for, after being punished and heard, and tried and acquitted—the prerogative of the Crown—that prerogative contended for by ministers, but denied by the people—not the prerogative of mercy, which was admitted, but the prerogative of vengeance, which was denied—was set up to supply what was deficient in the rigour of the law. It had been said, that as the Queen's name had been already excluded from the Liturgy, it would be inexpedient to put it in again. What was this argument, but an admission that accusation, coming from the quarter from whence it came, was to be taken as proof of guilt? He was not surprised at this from gentlemen who had approved of the exclusion of the Queen's name from the Liturgy before her trial. This act served to mark the spirit of the proceedings against her—those proceedings, anomalous in the annals of our history, of the worst times of our history; it served also to mark the credit which was due to any sentiments in favour of justice professed by his majesty's ministers. No one could have forgotten how, after the Manchester massacre, they deprecated any expression of opinion which might prejudice that question; yet they had not been unwill- ing to brand the Queen as guilty before her trial—her anomalous trial, when her judges were her accusers, and her accusers the paid servants of her husband the complainant, and the supposed injured party. But above all she had a greater misfortune than having her judges for her accusers: they were her former friends; and it was the commonest observation, that none so persecuted their former religion as those who had abandoned it. "Renegadoes never change by halves." All her former friends, to whom she should have looked for support, had deserted her in her utmost need, and, with one exception (and he doubted even the truth of that exception), had ranged themselves against her. It was true that the right hon. member for Liverpool was not there that night to urge the course of government against the Queen; it was true that he had called her "the life, the grace and ornament of society;" but was it not also true, that he had coincided in the early measures against her: at all events, he had thought her unworthy of his support, and left her to be defended as she might. But she had found in the people of England—in public spirit—in that inherent feeling of justice which is always to be found in the breasts of an enlightened and free people—that pity and support which had been denied to her by the members of her husband's family. He could see the reason why no conviction was to be infused into the minds of his majesty's ministers; "vestigia nulla retrorsum" was their motto. They could not afford to be sincere—to confess that their Milan commission had been deceived, or that it had deceived them. All that they had done was to be defended and supported; but he did not despair of seeing the day when justice, though delayed, would at length be done. A few nights ago the right hon. gentleman below him, in a speech as remarkable for its manly sincerity as for its convincing and overwhelming argument, had declared his conviction, that if he had gone out of the House with only ten other members, still that the Queen's name would be replaced in the Liturgy. He had been at first startled at the position, but on a consideration of the state of public feeling, he was sure that he had been right. He would not then go into the Milan commission: the members of it might be "all honourable men." He would not pretend to say that, like king John or king Richard, they had whispered their wishes to their agents; but he had no doubt that there had been perjury among witnesses, and it would not have existed without the hope of reward. How that hope had been nurtured, God knew! The late measures against the Queen were an additional reason for parliamentary reform. Would any one pretend that a minister would have dared lo contemplate bringing a bill of the nature of that against the Queen, to a House of Commons really speaking the sentiments of the people? He had not gone into the law of the question: he considered that point had been set at rest; but he had stated his opinion of the treatment of the Queen. He thought she had suffered the greatest injustice, and he felt himself bound to support the motion.

Mr. Wilmot

expressed his conviction, that the motion was introduced by the hon. mover in the true spirit of peace and conciliation. He did not give less credit to the motives which induced the hon. member for Bramber to support it; but he could not conceal his regret, that the hon. member in his support had recognised a principle, which he thought in the highest degree dangerous, and capable of being perverted to the worst of purposes.—The hon. member admitted, that her majesty had no claim upon any special act of grace or favour of which the insertion of her name in the Liturgy clearly partook; for if she was entitled to that insertion by law, the question was set at rest, all discretion was at end, and the question of grace and favour would be wholly irrelevant. But the hon. member was desirous that her name should be restored for the purpose of complying with what he thought was the general wish of the people.—This was the principle against which he protested; even admitting that it was the general sense, it must be considered as yet (into whatever final judgment it might resolve) an effervescence of public opinion. He was most unwilling to differ from the hon. gentleman, whose efforts in the cause of humanity and of his country were so distinguished; but he must beg leave to oppose to such doctrine the opinion of a man, who was equally the ornament of the period in which he lived, he meant Mr. Burke; not in his later life when he might be stigmatised as the timid alarmist of the French Revolution, but during the period of the American War. Mr. Burke then told his constituents, the electors of Bristol, that he was not bound to consider what their opinions might be at the moment, but what his own and their opinions must be five years hence. He says, "I was not to look at the flash of the day,—I knew that you chose me in my place along with others to be a pillar of the state and not a weathercock on the top of the edifice, exalted for my levity and versatility, and of no use but to indicate the shiftings of every fashionable gale."—On the present occasion he did not mean to deny that a strong feeling was abroad; but that feeling was encouraged by systematised misrepresentation, and by wrong opinions industriously circulated which would be corrected by better information; more mature reflection. He had no reason to suppose that his constituents would be dissatisfied with the vote which he intended to give; but even if they should be, he could not flinch from the conscientious discharge of his duty.—The House was now called upon to decide a compound question, embracing in fact one of legality and the other of expediency, and although the question of legality had already been so amply dicussed, he could not but recall the attention of the House to the plain and as it appeared to him, unequivocal I meaning of the statute, as derived from the common import of the words employed—"Provided always &c. &c. that in all those prayers &c. &c. the names be altered and changed from time to time, and fitted to the present occasion according to the direction of lawful authority."—Supposing that a Queen or a prince of the blood were actually arrayed in rebellion against the Crown, was it meant that the wording of this statute should over-ride common sense and that the king was compelled to enforce the prayers of the country for her or for those whose object it was to overturn the state? He believed that if his majesty was to say that he thought his government, or rather his ministers should be altered and changed and fitted to the present occasion, that the hon. gentlemen from such language would not limit their contemplation to a mere novel arrangement of situations among the same men, as they were disposed to do in their interpretation of the statute in question: and, in point of fact, with respect to precedent, whatever may be said with reference to the unfortunate wife of George 1st, no person acquainted with history will deny, that if that princess had survived until after the accession of her son who was so warmly attached to her, there would have been the highest probability that he would have inserted her name in the Liturgy as Queen dowager.—Her story is involved in much obscurity; but there is one anecdote recorded of her, which does not lessen the interest we are disposed to feel for her fate on account of her misfortune, or our hopes that she might have been innocent.—When George the 1st ascended the throne of England, it is said that he proposed to her terms of reconciliation which she indignantly rejected. She answered, "If I am guilty of the accusations which you have brought against me, I am unworthy of your bed; if they are false you are unworthy of mine. I reject all offer of compromise or reconciliation."—With respect to expediency, he thought that the real grounds of the question were, whether it was expedient to confer upon her majesty a gratuitous act of grace and favor, which must sanction her as a fit person to be placed at the head of female society in this country, if she were entitled to this insertion of her name by law then no discretion would be exercised, and I no special act of grace or favor would be involved.—When he heard it constantly I imputed to his majesty's government, I that they had offered a bribe to her majesty, he begged leave to ask the House, what in in their opinion the gentlemen opposite would have said, if the additional bribe, as it would have been called, of the insertion of her name in the Liturgy had been offered her? Had her majesty, he would ask, received no caution respecting her conduct? had not his late majesty enforced upon her the strictest injunctions in that respect? had she not protested against the covert proceedings of 1806, and expressed her preference of a fair and open trial? and above all, had she not herself acknowledged the responsibility of her position, and shrunk with indignation at the idea of her separation from her husband furnishing any apology for her conduct if impeachable?—He would quote the words of her own letter to show that her partisans could not fairly plead that she had been taken by surprise. In her memorable letter to the late king; she thus expresses herself. "I am ready to acknowledge, sir, from the consequences which might arise to the public from such misconduct, as has been falsely imputed to mc that my honor and virtue are of more importance to the state than those of other women, and that my conduct may be fully subjected when necessary to a severe scrutiny;" and then she adds, that if there were fair existing grounds of suspicion she should be the last person who would be disposed to dispute the wisdom of the advice which would lead to make her conduct the subject of the gravest and most anxious enquiry:—He would not trespass longer upon the House, where it was natural that an impatience upon this exhausted subject must exist. He trusted that gentlemen would do their duty and rather represent the sound and permanent, than the accidental feelings of the people of England; and whatever plans of reform might be entertained by the hon. gentleman opposite, he for one hoped that that House would never be assembled for the mere purpose of registering the edicts of the populace.

Mr. Marryat

was of opinion, that even if ministers had been in possession of irresistible proof of her majesty's guilt, the exclusion of her name from the Liturgy was not the proper way of marking their sense of her misconduct, or inflicting the requisite punishment. He could discover no precept of Scripture, and no dictate of reason, which forbad us to pray for those who had wandered from the path of duty. The mode in which her majesty had been prejudged and punished by the exclusion of her name from the Liturgy, assumed the character of a religious persecution, and a religious persecution was of all others the most unjustifiable and the most odious. Hence the general dissatisfaction of the country with the treatment which the Queen had experienced. He verily believed that to the omission of her majesty's name in the Liturgy, and the odium attached to it, was to be ascribed the greater portion of her popularity. The people often reasoned wrongly, but they always felt right; and when they saw her majesty punished without trial, they could not refuse her their sympathy and support, nor would she cease to be an object of popular regard until she ceased to be persecuted. If he were a partisan of her majesty and wished her to retain the hold which she possessed over the minds of the people, he would advise ministers to refuse the insertion of her name in the Liturgy and to continue their present system; but anxious to see the public tranquillity restored, and the chief cause of her majesty's popularity removed, he would support the motion before the House. It had been erroneously stated that this was a party question, and that its object was, to drive ministers from their places. He neither supported it with that intention, nor did he think that its adoption would have that effect. They had stood on former occasions when outvoted on questions of great importance; they had lost the property tax to which they were pledged, and they still retained their offices; nor did he see why that might not be the case now. The success of the present motion would restore the Queen to her place without driving ministers from theirs. For himself, he could not feel himself justified in allowing the apprehension of any remote contingency to withdraw him from the performance of his duty. He was sent there to consult the interest of the nation, and he felt that he should best discharge that duty by voting for the present motion.

Lord Milton

argued against the use which had been made of Mr. Burke's observations on the instructions which he had received from his Bristol constituents respecting the Irish commercial propositions and the Catholic question, which measures were, about the time of his making the observations, quoted by the hon. member for Newcastle, coming under discussion in that House. If the hon. member wished to know Mr. Burke's real opinions on a question similar to that before the House, let him read his "Thoughts on the present Discontents," and he would there find the opinion which Mr. Burke entertained of the probable consequences of differences between what he termed "an addressing House of Commons and a petitioning people." He thought the House would act wisely to add their petition for the restoration of the Queen's name to the Liturgy, to those of almost all the rest of the nation.

Sir Thomas Acland

said, that if the House could be prevailed upon to think that the petitions on the subject before them were general, that they came from those classes of the community whose opinions deserved the greatest respect, and were founded on their cool and deliberate judgment, they ought certainly to adopt the recommendation of the noble member for Yorkshire, and add their pe- titions to those of the people: but when he considered that they expressed only the opinions of a considerable portion of the people not likely to come to very sound or dispassionate conclusions, he did not think that he should discharge his duty by acting upon such conclusions. His opinion was, that these petitions arose from the remains of that unsettled and feverish state of mind which had existed during the last year, and for which he would be the last man to deny that great cause did exist, and that they did not arise from generous feelings; but he could not allow such petitions to decide his judgment either as to the actual opinion of the enlightened part of the people, or as to the question before the House, which he thought the most important that had been brought forward during the present session, he thought it involved principles which concerned not only the dignity of the Crown, but the best interests of the country, and that the House was that night called upon to take the lead, and set an example which, whatever it might be, would, he was satisfied, be followed by the country. The resolution proposed did not appear simply to adopt the determination of a single point, but it appeared to include, that the House of Commons were prepared to interpose their mediation, their authority, or their influence, to compel or to advise the Crown to insert a name which the Crown in the exercise of its prerogative, had thought fit to omit. This was called for when during the last year nothing had been done on the part of her majesty to challenge at their hands or from the Crown that homage usually paid to royal station. After all the disgraceful circumstances which had transpired in the course of those proceedings, were the advocates of the motion prepared to declare, that no blame could attach to her majesty which could reasonably prevent her from asking, and the House from granting a proof of the most perfect homage which could be paid to a Queen of the most un-impeached morality and virtue? There was a degree of respect supposed to be due to her royal station; but then it could only be exacted or yielded with propriety, when the demand came from a party of strict morals and unstained character. He allowed that there was in this case, a kind of previous question, which, were it to be mooted on its own grounds, without reference to what had passed since the erasure of her majesty's name from the Liturgy, might lead him to a different conclusion from that which he had formed upon the motion. On the legality of the omission, he was not prepared to enter, and it would be presumptuous in him to argue in support of his views of the case after the able speech of the learned member for Oxford, whose reasoning, although he did not undervalue it, left him still unconvinced. Indeed, he could scarcely believe that those who had argued for the illegality of the omission placed great reliance on their own arguments, because on no former occasion, and not even that night, did they place that question fairly in issue. How happened it, that the omission of her majesty's name in the Liturgy, which that learned gentleman alleged to be illegal, should have been so long overlooked by those who were peculiarly bound to maintain her majesty's legal rights? From the outset, indeed, of that omission, the legal question had never been fairly grappled with not even in the course of the present debate. If it was illegal, it was moreover so unjust and arbitrary, that he should have expected to see it embodied in the present or some specific motion. He now came to the question of expediency, and here he must express his deep feeling of pain at being under the necessity of differing from his hon. friend near him (Mr. Wilberforce), for whose opinion he always entertained the highest respect, as being that of a person who never gave himself up to party, who had acted always from conscientious and upright motives, and who determined every question by the rules of religion and moral duty. He should, notwithstanding the opinion of his hon. friend, be very loath to admit expediency to decide upon a measure which could not in his opinion he recommended without great impropriety. That measure was no other than to procure the consent of the Crown to confer honours upon her majesty, whatever criminality was proved against her; however that criminality was established according to the forms of substantial justice; and however notorious it was that the majority of her judges—those judges who on both sides gave the evidence so patient a hearing, and who, he believed, showed throughout an honest impartiality—decided against her, not hesitating to declare their conviction that she was guilty of the charges of which she was accused. He could not lay these things out of view when a motion like the present was brought forward, and when the Crown was to be called upon to place her majesty at the head of female society in England. It had been said, by his hon. friend, that the people could not see why, if it was wrong a year ago to omit her name in the Liturgy it was not right now to rectify the error. But could they forget all that had passed in the interval? Though ministers might at first have acted inexpediently in erasing her name they were justified by what had occurred in not reinserting it. The original omission was a prejudgment, and sufficient cause appeared for the continued exclusion.—The honourable baronet proceeded to justify his vote on lord Archibald Hamilton's motion, on the ground that, though in words it merely declared the exclusion of her majesty's name from the Liturgy unadvised and inexpedient, the avowed object of its author, and its real effect if carried, was a change of ministry. He did not vole against it, but was silent, and voted for the adjournment, which did not compromise his opinion. He would oppose the present motion because he did not think that, if carried, it would restore tranquillity to the country, which was its object, while its consequences might be dangerous. If the House yielded to the present claim, how could it resist future ones? What was there so sacred in our palaces that should exclude her majesty from one, if her name was placed in the Liturgy? There was nothing in the past conduct of her majesty which could lead them to believe that her majesty would be satisfied with less than her full claims, or that she would concede any thing for an amicable adjustment. Did she show any such disposition when the House voted the address, and when, as the hon. member for Hertford shire had said, she might have retired with at least as much credit as she has since acquired? Instead of being satisfied with the restoration of her name to the Liturgy, she might make that favour a ground for future demands. There was another topic which he wished to press upon the consideration of the House; and that was, that if they conceded to her majesty honour in the Liturgy and honour in a palace, they could not, in case of a coronation, refuse to concede her honour in that august ceremony; or, if they did refuse to concede her it, they would still further increase the inflammation which was now stated to be so very prevalent in the country. Supposing, however, that these points were conceded to her, he would ask how they could then refuse to grant to her all the honours of a court? Could they collectively as a body refuse to grant to her the funds necessary to support a court, or could they, separately as individuals, with any consistency of conduct fail to attend personally at it, and pay to her that homage which was usually given to the consort of the sovereign? It was said on the other side, that even if the House of Commons were to interfere on these points, the public would still form an opinion for itself on all other points connected with her majesty. Allowing that to be the case, still the House would be placed in a very awkward situation, for if public opinion should turn against her majesty, it would have done every thing within its power to obtain for her the esteem and approbation of the country. For these reasons he certainly could not give his support to the motion of the hon. gentleman; and in giving it his opposition, he knew that those who thought that the House ought not to notice what was unfortunately too notorious, or to refer to what had recently taken place in another quarter, would not coincide with him in opinion. He had, however, formed his opinion after a calm and deliberate investigation of the whole question; and he could not help recollecting, that if the House owed something to her majesty, they owed something also to the female virtue of the country—they owed something also to themselves, and that was, not to sanction by their votes the payment of that personal honour and homage to her majesty which he wished to God that he could say that she had deserved by her conduct.

Sir John Newport

said, he did not know how those who censured the erasure of her majesty's name from the Liturgy in the first instance as unwise and inexpedient could vote against the present motion for reinserting it. They said, it was true, that circumstances had changed since the time of the first erasure; but if they had changed, he maintained that they had changed in favour of her majesty; for upon every principle of British justice, the abandonment of the bill introduced into the other House of parliament against her, was equivalent to an acquit- tal. He could not see any inconsistency I in the conduct of the hon. member for Bramber, who voted to restore her majesty's name to the Liturgy, on the ground that it would restore the peace and tranquillity of the country, and not upon the ground of the Queen's guilt or innocence. He condemned, in common with the whole country, the entanglement of political prejudices with the forms of the established religion, and recommended the House to adopt the motion as a mean of securing the tranquillity of the country, which would never be established until the point in dispute should be conceded.

Mr. Davenport

thought the original omission of her majesty's name in the Liturgy a most ill-advised measure; but, from what had appeared in evidence elsewhere, and from her conduct, particularly in her letter to the King, and her answers to addresses since she returned to this country, he could not consistently vote for the motion.

Mr. Lamb

said, that considering the importance of this subject, and the political consequences likely to follow from the decision of the House, he thought it necessary to offer a few words. With respect to the legal question, he must say, that he was not convinced that the clause in the act of parliament referred to, did not give the power to the Crown to judge of the names to be inserted in the Liturgy. The learned gentleman in his argument upon that point, had recounted all the various privileges which belonged to a Queen Consort; but he thought the learned gentleman would agree with him, that they were given to the Queen in aid and assistance, not in opposition and contradiction to the Crown. That was the general rule of law on which all the privileges of a Queen Consort were to be construed. The clause in the Act of Uniformity, on which the learned gentleman had placed so much reliance, was put in ex abundanti and for explanation of a former clause; and even if it were not so, still every act of parliament was to be construed consistently with reason and itself: therefore, if there had been no proviso like the one now relied upon in the act, there must have been a power vested somewhere to make such alterations as were rendered necessary by the course of nature and the hand of God. A clause, therefore, which was loosely worded, which settled no remedy, and consequently gave no right, was insuffi- cient to control a lawful authority which was recognised in another part of the same act; and if such were the case generally, it was peculiarly inefficient to control it in the present case of the Queen, after all the circumstances of a legal conviction—after all the circumstances short of actual degradation which had transpired against her. Upon the principle, therefore, of law, he did not think that her majesty had any right to have her name inserted in the Liturgy, though he could not help at the same time observing, that it would not be wise for that House to decide upon the construction of a dubious legal authority. On a former occasion he had stated that her majesty, as her innocence appeared to many to have been satisfactorily established, might with safety and propriety have conceded the point of the Liturgy. He was then blamed for having argued that her majesty was right, and therefore ought to concede; and the argument was even treated as highly ridiculous and absurd. Now, he saw nothing absurd in it; on the contrary, it still appeared to him that the concession of the Liturgy would have been the most prudent and patriotic measure that her majesty could have adopted. Her majesty was represented as a person of most exalted character; she had been described by one of her legal advisers as of a sagacity inferior to none that he had ever known, and of a propriety of mind, notwithstanding all that had been imputed to her discredit, rarely excelled. In his opinion, that sagacity of mind for which she was distinguished ought to have rendered her anxious to allay the present animosities existing in the country; and that propriety of mind for which she was so much eulogised, should have taught her that the best method of doing so was the giving up the long-contested point of the Liturgy. The hon. member after stating, that it appeared to him that the Crown, the Queen, and the House, ought each to concede something to the other, concluded by saying, that he should give his vote in favour of the original motion, in deference to the opinion of a large majority of the people; which, although it ought not to be servilely acquiesced in on all occasions, still should always meet with some attention from a wise and prudent government.

Mr. Bright

supported the motion, and contended that in point of law, as well as on the ground of expediency, her Majesty's name ought to be inserted in the Liturgy.

Sir J. Marjoribanks

opposed the motion, amidst loud cries of "Question."

Mr. Alderman Bridges

could not support the motion, after the exposure that had been made of her majesty's conduct. The Prayer Book was held, and justly, only inferior to the Bible, and he could not consent to its disgrace by the introduction of her name into it.

The House divided:—Ayes, 178; Noes, 298. Majority against the motion, 120.

List of the Minority.
Abercromby, hon. J. Duncannon, vise.
Allen, J. H. Dundas, hon. T.
Althorp, visc. Dundas, C.
Anson, sir G. Ebrington, vise.
Ashurst, W. Ellice, E.
Astell, W. Ellis, hon. G. A.
Aubrey, sir J. Ellison, C.
Baillie, J. Evans, W.
Barham, J. F. jun. Farrand, R.
Baring, A. Fitzgerald, lord W.
Baring, H. Fitzgerald, rt. hon. M.
Barnard, visc. Fitzroy, lord C
Barrett, S. M. Folkestone, vise.
Beaumont, T. W. Fox, G. L.
Becher, W. W. Frankland, R.
Benett, J; Gaskell, B.
Bennet, hon. H. G. Glenorchy, vise.
Bentinck, lord W. Gordon, R.
Benyon, B. Graham, S.
Bernal, R. Grant, G. M.
Birch, J. Grant, J. P.
Blake, sir F. Grenfell, P.
Boughey, sir J. F. Guise, sir W.
Boughton, W. E. B. Haldimand, W.
Bright, H. Hamilton, lord A.
Brougham, H. Hamilton, sir H. D.
Browne, D. Harbord, hon. E.
Bury, visc. Heathcote, sir G.
Byng, G. Heathcote, G. J.
Calcraft, J. H. Heron, sir R.
Calcraft, J. Hill, lord A.
Calvert, C. Hobhouse, J. C.
Campbell, hon. J, Hornby, E.
Carew, R. S. Howard, hon. W.
Carter, J. Hughes, W. L.
Caulfield, hon. H. Hume, J.
Cavendish, lord G. Hurst, R.
Cavendish, H. Hutchinson, hon. C. H.
Cavendish, C. Hyde, J.
Chaloner, R. James, W.
Clifford, A. W. Jervoise, G. P.
Clifton, vise. Kennedy, T. F.
Concannon, L. Lamb, hon. W.
Crespigny, sir W; Langton, J. H.
Davies, T. H. Leake, W.
Denison, W. J. Lennard, T. B.
Denman, T. Lemon, sir W.
Doveton, G. Lester, B. L.
Lloyd, sir E. Rice, T. S.
Lloyd, J. M. Rickford, W.
Lockhart, J. J. Robarts, A.
Lushington, S. Robarts, G.
Maberly, W. L. Robinson, sir G.
Maberly, J. Rowley, sir W.
Macdonald, J. Rumbold, C.
Mackintosh, sir J. Russell, lord W.
Madocks, W. A. Russell, lord J.
Mahon, hon. S. Russell, R. G.
Marjoribanks, S. Scarlett, J.
Marryat, J. Scott, J.
Martin, J. Scudamore, R.
Maxwell, J. Smith, hon. R.
Milbank, M. Smith, S.
Mildmay, P. S. J. Smith, G.
Milton, vise. Smith, A.
Monck, J. B. Stanley, lord
Moore, A. Stuart, lord J.
Moore, P. Sykes, D.
Newman, W.R. Talbot, R. W.
Newport, rt. hon. sir J. Tavistock, marq.
Nugent, lord Taylor, M. A.
O'Callaghan, J. Tichfield, marq. of
Onslow, A. Tierney, rt. hon. G.
Ord, W. Townshend, lord C.
Ossulston, lord Wall, C. B.
Palmer, col. Warre, J. A.
Palmer, C. F. Webbe, E.
Pares, T. Western, C. C.
Pelham, hon. C. A. Wetherell, C.
Phillips, G. R. Wharton, J.
Phillips, G. Whitbread, S. C.
Pierce, H. Whitbread, W. H.
Power, R. Whitmore, W. W
Powlett, hon. W. Wilberforce, W.
Price, R. Wilkins, W.
Prittie, hon. F. A. Williams, W.
Pryse, P. Wood, ald.
Pym, F. Wyvill, M.
Ramsbottom, J. TELLERS.
Ramsden, J. C. Smith, J.
Ricardo, D. Tennyson, C.
Anson, hon. G. Noel, sir G.
Balfour, J. Ponsonby, hon. F. C.
Belgrave, vise. Smith, R.
Coffin, sir I. Smith, W.
Crompton, S. Taylor, C.
Graham, R. G. White, L.
Gurney, H. Winnington, sir E.
Mostyn, sir T.
Creevey, T, Sebright, sir J.
Fergusson, sir R. C. Sefton, earl of
Lambton, J. G. Wilson, sir R.