BANK CASH PAYMENTS BILL.

HC Deb 09 April 1821 vol 5 cc91-148

The order of the day was read for going into a committee on this bill. The question being put, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair,"

Mr. Baring

rose to offer an amendment. His original intention, he said, was to move, that it be an instruction to this committee to re-consider the former act of 1819, in order to see whether some provision could not be made to lessen the existing evils under which the public interests laboured. But that mode of moving by way of an instruction, he after I wards thought to be a very inefficient one in the first place; and secondly, such an instruction might seem to imply an opinion on the part of the House as to this j subject, before it was examined; therefore he had come to the conclusion, that the most proper mode of all would be, to move for the appointment of a select committee to reconsider the whole subject. The more he considered this question, the more he felt it to be one not only of the utmost importance, but as "the" one in which were involved all the distresses experienced by the country and their remedy. Not only was he anxious to record on the Journals of the House, his sense of the necessity of adopting a measure such as that he should propose; but, if he found any encouragement, he should certainly divide the House upon it. They all felt, no doubt, that the country did at present stand in a very extraordinary situation. After the termination of a costly and protracted war, and the intervention of some years of peace, it was indeed very strange that without any given adequate cause, derangement still existed, and so extensively, that no class of society scarcely had escaped it. This evil, whatever were its character, and more particularly as regarded the agriculturists, seemed to be one for which no sort of remedy could be found: because, on the one hand, there were those agriculturists demanding, as the only possible means of subsisting them, prices which they had no prospect of obtaining; and, on the other hand, the other classes of the community, who affirmed that if the agriculturists did obtain those prices, the interest of all the other classes could not survive. This was a condition of things which made it necessary for the House to see whether there was not something bad and diseased at the very root and centre of the existing system of finance—a system which thus produced evils, for which no remedy could be come at. His opinion was, that these evils, alarming as they were, were occasioned by the alteration in our currency. On a former occasion, he certainly had had the misfortune to differ from his hon. friend (Mr. Ricardo) as to the extent of the alteration which had been experienced in the value of money. His hon. friend seemed to estimate it, taking the average of commodities and the price of labour in general, at from 5l. to 6l. per cent, and not more. Now in his (Mr. Baring's) view, it was infinitely greater. He rated it at not less than from 251. to 33l. per cent. In some instances he should say that it had risen to a third and even 50l. per cent. To say what had been the difference in the value of money between the period of its greatest depreciation and the present time, was a difficulty that he could not hope immediately to come to a very satisfactory solution of. But very few persons would agree, he thought with his hon. friend that it had been only 5l. or 61. per cent; and for his own part, he thought that if it were not of double or treble the amount at the least, he should now be taking up the time of the House very uselessly, by talking about the matter at all. But being, unfortunately, too firmly convinced of the contrary position, what he wished to persuade the House to do in this case was to appoint a select committee. His motion would be, therefore, "That a select committee be ap- pointed to consider the provisions of the 59th of George 3rd, chap. 49, and to report their opinion to the House, whether it would be expedient to make any alteration in the said act, so as to alleviate the pressure which its operation is producing, and is likely to continue to produce, on the various branches of public industry." The more he had considered this subject, the more firmly was he convinced that the interests of the country would not work—that the circulation of the country would not move—unless they did maturely and carefully reconsider that important act. The circumstances that had shown themselves in this case, exhibiting the most decided symptoms of the evils which were known to exist in our system, had been in the first place, the total ruin of a great class of persons, who, trusting to the then value of money, and not being aware (as in truth hardly a hundred persons, perhaps, in all the country were aware) of the general depreciation which was afterwards to take place; and having on their side, moreover, the sanction of that House, the opinion of parliament, solemnly pledging itself, that there was and would be no such depreciation, acting on that opinion and that authority, this class of persons now found themselves totally ruined. There was then a sort of credit, and facilities of business existing all over the country; and the consequence was, that among that extensive class, contracts had been entered into on one side and on the other which were now become totally inexecutable. He thought it was totally impossible to relieve, though it might be the cause of adding to, the existing distresses of the people, if they did not carefully review the whole of this measure. It was quite unnecessary for him here to allude more particularly to those burthens, or to mention what the state of things in England, generally, at present was. Every gentleman who had been through any part of the country must know that the small farmers and yeomanry in the country (a class of persons most valuable and most respectable in a community, but at the same time the most likely to be duped on such questions as these; because, though very intelligent men in the management of their own affairs, they were not likely to know any thing about the currency); he would see hundreds of these small farmers and yeomanry brought to the ground by reason of having made purchases under a state of value, as regarded the currency, recognised as it was by parliament itself. Supposing a yeoman had expended his all, a sum perhaps of 4,000l., in buying land, the present depreciation of prices left him in penury and debt. If he (Mr. Baring) was to be told that there had been an over-trading in agriculture, as in almost every thing else, he should say, that the effects of such over-trading, in whatever commodity, the House could not relieve. But, if this mischief had been done, in some sort, by the House itself, it was most material that the House should relieve the sufferers. What he hoped was, that no gentleman would listen to any mere statement as to the amount of depreciation; but he put it to every hon. member, whether, from his own daily experience, he could doubt of the extremely altered value of money? and whether any authority could convince him that that arose from any other cause but the state of the currency? His hon. friend said "look at the value of the precious metals." He (Mr. Baring) rather said "look at the value of all the articles of life." If that value was affected in merely one or two articles, he was aware it might be objected to him, that there might be such a variation sometimes, totally unconnected with the state of the currency; but if he found that the value of all articles had moved in the same way, that was an unanswerable proof, and the best authority, of an actual alteration in the value of that standard according to which the purchases had been made. Let them look at the variation of prices, then, which was exemplified in all the articles of life; and they would find it was to the extent of one fourth, one third, and in many cases one-half. Take the price of corn, which was the great grievance of the farmer. Although, as against the pound sterling, it was undoubtedly at a very low price, yet he would say that the price of corn, compared with that of any other commodity, stood now pretty nearly where it did before this alteration in the value of money took place. With a quarter of corn, the same quantity of sugar, leather, salt, gold, or any other article, could be procured by a person as he could get for the same commodity some time ago. It was only dear as compared with that standard by which the price of all other commodities was regulated. The burthens of the farmer, again, had been created by the alteration in the nominal currency. There might be some gentlemen who would say that all this was, or might be, perfectly true; but that there was no remedy for those evils which resulted from a depreciation of the currency. It might, however, easily be proved, that we had brought our standard above what it was in the year 1797, and therefore that no person need be scrupulous to that degree as to fear any ill consequences from the adoption of his proposition. It might be said—"Don't let us aggravate the evil; but let us rather leave it where it is." To this, the fact which he had just alluded to would be a sufficient answer. It ought to be the object of the legislature, in applying a remedy for an alteration which had been so destructive, to enter, if possible, into those principles which pervaded the minds of the parties at the time that former contracts had been made. Though this could not be followed up in all instances, yet having once touched the standard, he did not know whether it might not be the best course to pursue, observing, as nearly as could be, what might justly be supposed the real proportion of value between the two standards. We had gone beyond that however; the present standard exceeding that of 1797. The House would remember that prior to that year, gold and silver jointly were a legal tender. The price of gold was then 31. 17s. 10½d., and of silver 5s. 2d. per ounce. Gold still remained at 31. 17s. 10½d., but silver within these few days had fallen as low as 4s. 10d. That silver was now at 4s. 10d. which might before the year 1797 (always excepting the operation of a certain order in council which was in its origin only a temporary measure, and not made permanent till 1797) be taken to the Mint and exchanged for coinage at 62s to the pound. This gave a difference in the value of about 7 per cent. The difficulty was increased, therefore, by making that metal only the standard of currency, which was the scarcer of the two. From a comparison of the rate of foreign exchanges at different periods, it would appear, that the pound sterling was now raised to a higher value than at any former period. His hon. friend contended, that this alteration in the value of the currency was not the difficulty under which we laboured, because the price of all commodities would follow the variation of the standard of value, and this effect he seemed to think must necessarily be produced, with all the regularity of a mechanical operation. But the fact was, that the prices, which were equivalent to the average price of bullion, for twenty years antecedent to the alteration in the value of the standard of currency, were still continued, though they could not long be supported. High prices did not vary precisely with the alteration in the standard of value, but they were kept up by the habits, and feelings, and prejudices of the community. Take the meanest labourers at the present day—a man, for instance, who sawed stone, and it would be found that he could earn between 30s. and 40s. a week. Such a man, having been long in the habit of indulging himself in beer and spirits, could not readily be induced to abandon those luxuries; but it was quite clear that those wages could not last. His wages must come down, when his master could find nobody to employ him; and whenever that time arrived, which could not be very far distant, the reduction of wages would no doubt be received with great discontent. Reduced, however, their wages must be; and it was better to turn the attention of the labouring classes to the true cause of such a reduction, than to endeavour to make them profound patriots, by declaiming upon parliamentary reform. The true question was, whether it would not be more expedient and more just to bring the standard of value to the existing state of things, instead of attempting to bring the existing state of things round to the standard of value. He begged to observe, that though he had himself expressed a strong opinion as to the expediency of having a fixed standard of value, yet he must confess, at the same time, that he had somewhat under-rated the inconveniences and difficulties with which the adoption of such a measure was likely to be attended. He begged the House to consider whether, in the present state of things, it was possible for the country to go on; and if they thought we were not in a fair road to prosperity, whether it was not expedient to move for a re-examination. If such an inquiry were to be resumed at all, it should be resumed immediately: for it would be extremely unjust to postpone it to another year, when new contracts would be formed, and a new state of mind arise as to the value of the pound sterling. He was not one of those, who were in the habit of indulging in gloomy views of the finances of the country. He wished to see justice done to all, and good faith kept to the utmost extent to which the principle could be carried. He was perfectly convinced, however, that if the right hon. gentleman opposite thought the finances could be kept up in the present state of the country, he was grossly mistaken. He repeated, that the great difficulty with respect to the state of the currency, arose from the increased means of consumption on the part of annuitants and persons of fixed income, and the consequent overpayment of labourers, who now indulged in beer, spirits, and other articles paying a heavy excise, which it was impossible they could continue to indulge in. The case of these annuitants and persons of fixed incomes furnished an instance of an experiment, which it was extremely difficult to try in any community, namely, to what extent you can push the number of idle consumers, as compared with the industrious classes of the community? The hon. member concluded by moving, by way of amendment, "That a Select Committee be appointed to consider the provisions of the act of the 59th of his late majesty, c. 49, and to report their opinion to the House, whether it would be expedient to make any alteration in the said act, so as to alleviate the pressure which its operation is producing, and is likely to continue to produce, on the various branches of public industry.

Mr. Attwood

said:^*—

Sir; the measure proposed to the House by the right hon. the chancellor of the exchequer, cannot but be considered to be of importance, in this—that it forms a part of that system of measures for the restoration of the ancient standard of value which has exerted so powerful an influence on the interests of the country. It carries that system one step further, which in every stage hitherto has been accompanied by great sufferings and considerable dangers, the operation of which has been so ably enlarged upon and elucidated by the hon. member for Taunton, whose amendment, for referring the whole of this system of measures to the reconsideration of a select committee, I have now the honour to second. It has been stated, that the present measure is calculated to relieve, in some degree, the ^* From the original edition, printed for Ridgway, Piccadilly. existing condition of distress—but by what means? It is perfectly incompetent to such purpose; and if any expectation of relief from this bill be excited in the mind of the public, I am persuaded that that expectation will be deceived. On the contrary, the present measure, incompetent as it is to any beneficial object, is calculated under the particular circumstances of the country, to aggravate, probably in a considerable degree, the difficulties under which the country at present labours. It is calculated in some degree to limit and derange the country bank circulation, and the means of providing for and securing its payment. Particularly it is calculated to affect the interests of the country in its present state, if there should exist on the part of the public a disposition to exchange for the new coin, now about to be sent into circulation, any considerable portion of the country bankers' notes. This disposition may be expected to arise from numerous forgeries on the notes of the country bankers, when the one pound notes of the bank of England are withdrawn, or from any shock given to public or to private credit: and its effect would probably be to require an amount of five or perhaps ten or fifteen millions of gold to be substituted for the country bank circulation withdrawn. In this manner the present bill is calculated, in the existing state of the country, to aggravate the distress which prevails. We possess at present, it may be assumed, a sufficient supply of gold to substitute for the one pound notes of the bank of England, and, no doubt, to reserve in the coffers of the bank, such further supply as that body may deem it necessary to retain; but any further considerable supply of gold which this bill may render necessary, I apprehend, the country does not possess, but would be compelled to procure it by a forced importation from abroad. And when we consider what that process has been, and with how much difficulty accompanied, by which we have obtained the amount of gold which we at present possess, we shall not look without some apprehension to the result of a measure which may even by probability require us to carry further that process in the present state of the country. I would beg the House to consider what the late operations on our gold circulation have been. It was during the distress of the years 1815 and 1816 that we witnessed, for the first time during a very long period, an importation of gold. From seven to ten millions of gold was at that time imported—the compensation for the difficulties of that period. In the prosperous state of the country in the year 1818, which followed, we shortly ceased to import gold; that which we had recently imported was next perceived to be leaving us; and by the end of 1818, or early in 1819, the seven or ten millions which we had so recently acquired, had wholly left the country. That period was followed by the distresses of the present time, and that distress has been faithfully accompanied by the re-appearance in the country of that same gold importation, and probably to about the same amount, of seven or ten millions, which, having visited the country in the distress of the year 1816, had left us in the prosperity of 1818—and now is seen to visit us again in this second season of calamity and distress.

Now, I am persuaded that we cannot consider these operations of our gold circulation,—the manner in which they have corresponded with the great changes in the condition of the country, without being convinced that this importation and exportation of gold is in some way intimately connected with those changes with which they are seen so precisely to correspond. And the manner of that connexion is this, that it is only during a low state of prices in this country that we are able to import gold or to retain it here when imported, at the rate we have fixed by law for gold. By the law which is now under the revision of the House, we have fixed the price of gold at 4:1. an ounce, and have imposed on the country the necessity of procuring a forced importation of gold from abroad at that price. Now 4l. an ounce is not the price at which this country had been able to purchase gold, in any market of the world, for a very long period previous to the operation of these measures. It is not the price of gold as estimated in the money of this country, or at which it could be purchased for the last twenty years; it is the price of the century which preceded that period. What then has been the condition on which the country has been able to execute the task thus imposed upon it, of purchasing gold at a rate which had become antiquated and obsolete, and at a price lower than its customary value? That condition has been this, that we have been compelled to give our commodities in exchange estimated at an old and an equally low price also. Not a single ounce of gold could the whole power of the country, if directed to that one object, have brought into this country at the price which we have fixed by law for gold, and have retained it also in circulation—whilst our commodities retained their modern prices. Here then arises the difficulty which we by this law impose upon the productive classes of the population; we compel them to dispose of their productions, enhanced in their cost by the burthens and taxes of the last twenty years, at a price which admits of no remuneration nor advancement whatever on account of those burthens and those taxes. This is the task which we have by this law imposed on the productive classes; and it is against this difficulty that we now perceive them to be carrying on a vain and ineffectual struggle, which overwhelms them in despair and distress. It is not the debt and taxes of the country, nor the burthen and expenses of the government, which of themselves oppress the people; it is those taxes and those burthens combined with the operation of the present bill, increased in their amount, aggravated in their pressure by this bill and by the system of measures which accompanies it. It has never been seen that the people have been unable to support the public burthens of the country, enormous as they are, except at those precise periods when this system of measures can be shewn to have been in active operation. The resources are great which this country derives from the industrious habits of the people, from their unrivalled skill, and from the powerful motives by which they are impelled to the most unceasing toil before they give way to an hopeless despair—but, great as these resources are, they are unequal to the task we have now imposed. The people can contend with difficulties, but impossibilities they cannot surmount: and whatever else the result of the present state of things and of the present struggle will be, it will never terminate in the permanence of the present bill united with the permanence of the debt and the taxes; it will not terminate in the people of this country being able to unite the burthens and taxes of the late war with the scale of prices of the century which preceded it.

The great importance of the present bill, that which renders it so particularly an object of importance to the House and the country, is this—that whilst we regulate by law the price of gold, we do in fact regulate the price of all the property and commodities of the country; this is effectually done when we fix by law the price of gold, and is the only manner in which it is in the power of government or of law to regulate prices. It is in vain for the country gentlemen to think that they can by a corn law raise the price of corn. They can determine by a corn law whether grain shall be imported or not, whence it shall come, and where go; but what price it shall bear, that is beyond the reach of a corn law to determine, or even materially to influence—that can only be determined by a money bill, by a bill like the present, which fixes the value of gold, and determines the amount of money in circulation. The hon. member for Portarlington has told the country gentlemen, that the proper remedy for their present difficulties, the result to which they must look, is a permanent approximation of the prices in this country to the scale of prices of the untaxed nations on the Continent. And this, however difficult it may seem as a remedy, however it may seem to them to be in fact the disease itself of which they complain—is perfectly consistent—and is the inevitable consequence of the present system. What was the principle which at all periods, previous to the bank restriction bill, determined the scale of prices in this country? The scale of prices upon the Continent—the value of the precious metals upon the Continent, and throughout the world, determined their value in this country, and consequently determined the value of property and commodities, as estimated in money. It is that principle, and that only, which must, under the operation of the present measures, determine also our scale of prices, and not any operation of the debt and taxes of the country. That was the advantage which we derived from the system of circulation which we have now abandoned—which it is so much the practice to reprobate and decry, and which is so little defended by those by whom it was introduced. It possessed advantages, and the principal of them was this—that it enabled the country to maintain an internal scale of prices, which had a reference to its internal situation, to its taxes and burthens, and did not depend on the scale of prices in other countries. Thus did it enable those taxes to be imposed, and that debt accumulated: it was by these means, and by these only, that we were able to make and continue the exertions necessary for the support of the late war—and if that war and those exertions were necessary to the safety of the country, then does this country owe its safety to that system of circulation which we have now abandoned with a blind and ill-advised haste, which has hurried us into dangers and evils infinitely greater than those from which we imagined that we were escaping. The evil of the present system of circulation, the return to which has been hailed with so much exultation, is this, that it has no connexion with the present state of the country, no reference to its existing condition; it is governed wholly by other principles; it may possess other advantages; but, that the present debt and taxes of the country should exist in conjunction with it—that is impossible—it is folly and rapacity alone which can think of attempting their union.

It is impossible that the full importance of the present measure can be estimated, without a reference to the general condition of the country, and the manner in which that has been affected by the whole system of measures, of which the present forms a part; and the main circumstance in the state of the country, as connected with this great question, is—that the distress in which we are at present involved, must be taken to be of recent origin. The distress which the country has experienced since the peace, has not been a uniform condition of distress, but has been interrupted by a period of prosperity as great as universal, and as extensive as is the present and as was our previous distress. In the years 1815 and 1816 this country was involved in calamities and sufferings as great and severe as it had ever experienced at any period of its history, or as, it is my firm conviction, have been ever endured by any civilized community. Our condition at the present period corresponds very nearly with it but we are not to forget that the period of 1818, which has intervened, and that which adjoined it, was one in which the country attained a degree of prosperity as great as it had experienced during the war, or at any former period whatever. Two years of prosperity—four years of adversity and distress—that is a short history of the distress of the country. It is to this fact, this recent change in the state of the country, to which I am desirous to direct the attention of the House; because I am convinced that we cannot recognize that important circumstance, which is most in-contestible, that this country had at that time recovered from its recent calamities; that the prosperity which it experienced so recently as in 1818 was neither local nor partial, but extended equally to every great branch of national interest; that the present distress of the country in its whole extent, is a mere breaking up and giving way of the prosperity then existing; this I am sure we cannot recognize, without perceiving, that this great and recent change must have been occasioned by some cause as extensive as the effect produced, and coming at that same time into operation. And we thus get rid of much of those theories, speculations, and conjectures, which have been delivered in this House on this important subject, and with so little attention to examine them by the evidence of facts and the test of experience. I beg therefore the attention of the House to some few of those numerous circumstances which show what that change has been, which has taken place in this country so recently as within the last two or three years. And first, with respect to its revenue. The state of our revenue and finances, which is now so precarious, was so flourishing in the year 1818, that the amount increased after the rate of 100,000l. weekly during a great part of that year. Through the whole of 1818 the rate of increase was but little inferior to this, and the produce of the taxes in that year exceeded the produce of the same taxes in the preceding year by no less a sum than 3,662,000l. This important fact rests on the authority of the finance committee of the year 1819, and exhibits an indisputable proof of the flourishing state of the revenue at that period. At that same period it was in the power and in the contemplation of the government to have made an annual saving of several millions, by a reduction of the interest of the unfunded and part of the funded debt. The mode of reduction of the interest of the debt contemplated at that period, and which would have been effected if that prosperous condition of the country had continued, was, that the government could then have borrowed at a very low rate of interest sufficient money to discharge the claims of those creditors to whom a high rate of interest was paid; a mode of reducing the interest of the debt very different from those which have been agitated in this House and justified by the present condition of the revenue and of the county. By this reduction, a saving would have been made which may be taken at from three to four millions; and when we add this to the actual increase of 3,660,000l. which at the same time took place in the production of the taxes, and consider this additional amount of annual resources thus placed at the disposal of the government, and the firm and secure and easy condition of the whole of the revenue which it indicates, not at that time wrung with difficulty from the poverty of the people, but flowing from the abundance of their wealth, the natural tribute of a great, a wealthy and a prosperous empire to a government which, though expensive, and to burthens which, though enormous, were not at that time unsuited to the resources of the country; when we compare this state of the revenue with the present, when three millions of new taxes imposed on the necessaries of life, chiefly of the labouring classes, have proved wholly unproductive; when the revenue of Ireland has suddenly failed to the extent of, I think, one-fifth; and when of that monstrous amount of sixty millions of annual taxes, an amount so little suited to the present poverty of the people, though it is the whole of it necessary to the establishments of the government and the support of the public credit; when of this monstrous annual taxation it is not too much to say that it has become a matter of doubt whether it can be longer by any possible and practicable means collected or not; I am persuaded that a contrast more complete between the secure and prosperous state of the revenue at one period, and its shattered, strained and precarious condition at the present, cannot well be conceived to exist. If we look to the condition of the different great classes of the community, we shall find them to have corresponded precisely with this alteration in the revenue. The agricultural interest was at that time prosperous in an eminent degreee: they had then high prices. The fall of prices which has since involved this class of the community in distress, has commenced since the middle of the year 1818. A similar fall of prices and equally ruinous in its effects has extended to all our manufactured productions, and to all commercial commodities^*, and in fact to so great and universal an extent has this change of prices gone, that it may be safely asserted that there is no species of property whatever in this country, in whatever form it exists, except the property of the annuitant, that has not undergone a depreciation in its monied value, to an extent that may be taken at perhaps one-third, within the recent period of the last two or three years, that is, since the year 1818. The House has recently heard an alarming and deplorable statement from the right hon. the vice president of the board of trade, of the present ruinous condition of that important branch of our national wealth the shipping interest. The ships of the country are two numerous for its commerce; a certain and great proportion of them are irretrievably condemned. This condition of the shipping interest is stated and is understood to have arisen from the establishment of peace, and the consequent throwing out of employment of a great number of transports. And it is this fallacy, which has become almost habitual, of referring the present existing state of the country to circumstances I arising out of the establishment of peace in the year 1815, to which I am particularly desirous of directing the attention of the House. The fact, as to the commencement of the distress of the shipping interest, perfectly corresponds with the alteration in the situation of all the other great interests of the country. By a reference to the examinations which have taken place before the foreign trade committee, it appears that in 1818† the ship- ^* The fall of prices on some of the principal articles of manufactures and commerce, since 1818, may be taken to have been:—Iron, from 13l. to 9l. 10s.; copper, from 140l. to 98l.; cotton, from 1s. 1d. to 10d.; sugar, from 90s. to 60s.:—hemp, flax, tallow, wines, oil, have fallen in similar proportions. † The following Statement, shewing what the fall in the price of ships has been since 1818, appears in a speech of Mr. Marryat's, reported in Vol. 1, p. 849 of the New Series of the Parliamentary Debates: "The Sesostris, launched in 1818, 480 tons, cost 12,175l.; was sold in 1820, after making one voyage, for 6,300l. The Hebe, of 417 tons, was valued in 1818, at 6,000l.; was sold in 1820, for 3,250l, The St. Patrick cost in 1818, in repairs and fitting, independent of the then value of the ship, 7,100l.; and was sold in 1820, for 3,000l." He gives other si- ping interest flourished and experienced as great a degree of prosperity as did the country at large. Our ships at that recent period, instead of being too numerous, were inadequate to the commerce of the country. Mr. Tooke, a foreign merchant, tells the committee, that in 1818 he could not procure ships to transport his goods; and on being asked for how long a period that lasted, be says, during the whole season of 1818, except perhaps at intervals; and that the reverse has been the case ever since. Mr. Tindal, a ship-builder, on being asked the precise question, whether the shipping interest was not now depressed in consequence of transports thrown out of employment at the peace? Answers distinctly, that the shipping interest had, entirely recovered that depression, and that the transports and all other ships were employed at good freights in 1818, and were inadequate to the demand for ships. And this is confirmed by the consistent and uncontradicted testimony of other evidence; and it is not unimportant to compare here this state of the shipping interest in 1818, with the state of the revenue at that time and then I would ask, how these conjoint effects are to be explained by any of those partial causes to which the state of the country has been ascribed? I will mention one other circumstance as corroborative of this great change then taking place; and that is, that in the establishment in the city of London, called the clearing-house, through which, as is well known, a certain and a large proportion of the commercial engagements of the metropolis are discharged, in that establishment there appears a reduction, since 1818, of those transactions to the extent of about one-fourth; and this will be received, I am convinced, as an incontrovertible proof of this great and important circumstance, that the whole of milar instances. The depreciation in the value of ships, he says, (1820) "is proceeding more rapidly than ever." It has been said, that the importation of grain in 1817 and 1818, gave employment to ships. It did so; but it must be taken into account likewise, that in those years we exported seven or eight millions of gold, supplied by the Bank, at 3l. 17s. 10½d. an ounce, or thirty or forty per cent below the average price of our commodities; and this operation prevented the export of goods to perhaps an equal and certainly to a great amount, which must have taken place if this gold had been retained by the Bank. the commercial operations of the kingdom have undergone a contraction to that extent, within the short period of the last two or three years. I apprehend, therefore, sir, that nothing can be more complete, than the reverse which has thus recently taken place in this country, from a high, flourishing, and prosperous condition, to that present condition of difficulty, which it is not my intention to expatiate upon, the alarming reports of which have reached us from the remotest corners of the country. What is the cause of this great and ruinous change? It is not the war, for that has long ceased. It is not the transition state to peace, for that has long passed away also; and the country has recovered from whatever evils it experienced from these events. Whence is it, that in the absence of all those causes destructive of the prosperity of nations; that in the midst of abundant harvests, of profound peace, when the whole of Europe is in alliance with us, when all its ports are open to our industry, whilst all outward circumstances indicate tranquillity; that we perceive, in whatever direction we turn our attention, one internal scene of difficulty, ruin, and distress? To ascribe a reverse, sudden and universal like this, to trifling or obscure operations; even to discuss such causes on such a question; is at once to abuse the attention of the House, and the sense and distress of the country. It is most clear, that it can alone be ascribed to some cause as extensive as its effects, and which can be shewn to have been then in operation. And most assuredly there has been no such cause in existence at this period, except that change in our monied system and standard of value, which we have ourselves effected precisely at this time, and which necessarily affects equally all the great interests of the country, and is calculated to affect them exactly in the manner we have witnessed. And here again, therefore, I have to request the attention of the House to the consideration of what these changes have been, when they have taken place, and particularly how they have corresponded with that great change in the state of the country, which has thus recently taken place. The currency of this country became depreciated during the war: that, I think, is now universally admitted and agreed on. The rate of that depreciation is by no party estimated at less than 25 per cent; by many it is estimated at more than 50 per cent. The' criterion, taken as infallible by the hon. member for Portarlington, would give a depreciation of 40 per cent; but I will assume a rate of depreciation of from 30 to 40 per cent. A depreciation of money is, in other words, a rise of prices to the extent of such depreciation. Here then is a rise of prices during the war to the extent of 30 or 40 per cent, occasioned by the depreciation of our paper money, and by no other cause. Whatever other or further rise of prices may be supposed to have taken place during the war from other causes, here is a rise of prices to the extent of 30 or 40 per cent, which must of necessity be ascribed to this cause, and to no other. We have at the present period restored the value of our currency again. It is the boast of those gentlemen who have taken a leading part in that measure, that is to say, we have occasioned by this restoration a fall of prices precisely commensurate with the previous depreciation. So that whatever other causes may be supposed to have operated to depress prices, we have here most incontestibly a fall of prices of 30 or 40 per cent, occasioned by this one cause, and by this only.^* It was altogether impossible for ^* The rise of prices which took place during the war, because it was seen to accompany the imposition of taxes, the accumulation of debt, and a great national expenditure, was I commonly ascribed to the operation of these I circumstances. The great and rapidly in-I creasing prosperity of the country was ascribed to the same causes. These errors are not yet effaced: it will be some time before; it is again believed in this country, that the natural companions of war and taxes are poverty and low prices, and not high prices and wealth. "War brings poverty, poverty peace," is a true proverb, though it has appeared to us to be contradicted or reversed by recent experience. It describes very accurately the progress and termination of every foreign war, except the last, in which the country has ever been engaged. There is nothing in the nature of war or taxes capable of occasioning that rise of prices and increased I wealth, so necessary to their support; if these! existed in this country during the late war, it was in spite of the war and the taxes, and not in consequence of them; they were occasioned, and occasioned solely, by the increased amount of money thrown into circulation, in consequence of the Bank Restriction I act, and the consequent depreciation of money: high prices and prosperity continued no longer! than that operation. There was no fall in such restoration to be effected, unaccompanied by such fall. Let us see then what the intermediate alterations on our currency have been. We restored its value also in the years 1815 and 1816, and we then also witnessed that same precise fall of prices which we now witness, and which must of necessity have accompanied a restoration of the value of our currency. In the year 1818 we depreciated the currency a second time; and having by this means raised prices and altered our standard of value to the war rate, we then found that the country was able to discharge without difficulty the engagements imposed on it by the war. We have since brought back the ancient standard of the country, as distinguished from the war standard, and the effects are what we witness. There exists a difference of opinion as to the rate of the second depreciation of money the price of corn at the conclusion of any one of the three great wars in which the country was engaged the course of the last century; on the contrary, there appears a uniform rise; and there would have been no fall in corn at the conclusion of the late war, if that conclusion had not been accompanied by the removal of the restriction act, and an attempt to return to cash payments. The manner in which seven millions of gold was issued by the Bank of England in 1818, in an attempt to re-establish cash payments, was equivalent to giving a bounty of 25 per cent, on the foreign corn imported at that time. The following table shews the manner in which the price of wheat was affected by the establishment of peace at the conclusion of each of the three great wars in the last century:—

	per Quarter.
1712 last year of war—the average price of Wheat £.	2	6	4
1713 Peace establishment in July—the average price of Wheat £.	2	11	10
1714 Peace establishment in July—the average price of Wheat £.	2	10	4
1762 last year of War the average price of Wheat £.	1	19	0
1763 Peace in February the average price of Wheat £.	2	0	9
1764 Peace in February the average price of Wheat £.	2	6	9
1782 last year of War the average price of Wheat £.	2	7	10
1783 last year of War the average price of Wheat £.	2	12	8
1784 Peace in February the average price of Wheat £.	2	8	10
1785 Peace in February the average price of Wheat £.	2	11	10

During the nine years of the American war, beginning with 1775 and ending with 1783, the average price of wheat for that nine years was 2l. 3s. 2d. a quarter. The average price of the seven years which followed was 2l. 16s. 6d. the quarter; and the average of the seven years which preceded the American war, was 2l 18s. the quarter. This fact is perfectly conclusive, that the state of prices during the late war was occasioned by some operation peculiar to that period, and which terminated with it, and by no operation of war expenditure, loans, or taxes—if in fact that opinion needs refutation. in the year 1818; and it is to a misunderstanding on this point which prevailed in 1819, that the present ruinous system of measures are in some considerable degree to be ascribed. That depreciation, if it existed at all, of which there is no one who doubts, must, I apprehend, be estimated as to its rate by either the general scale of prices at that time, or by the amount of money which can be shown to have been in circulation, or by both, and not by a reference to the temporary price of any particular article; and inasmuch as both the scale of prices generally, and the amount of money thrown into circulation, approached to a par, or very near it, with the prices, and the amount of money which circulated during the war, so, I apprehend, must the rate of depreciation in 1818 be taken to have been the rate of depreciation before the close of the war, or nearly corresponding with it.

Why then, sir, we see here the operation of a great cause necessarily affecting every one of the great interests of the country, and precisely in the manner in which we have seen them to be affected, and affected precisely at those periods when those measures came into operation. And particularly we see the operation of those measures at that period of the year 1818, when no other cause whatever has been in existence, capable of affecting the main interests of the country. What we have witnessed within this recent period has been this—we have seen the prosperity of a great empire in its whole extent, and throughout every branch of national wealth, suddenly subverted and destroyed; its revenue, its agriculture, its manufactures, its commerce, its ships, all alike reduced to one uniform condition of beggary and distress; and when we hear an event like this, unequalled, in the history of the country, or of scarcely any other country, ascribed, in this House to trifling and insignificant operations, to importations from Ireland—itself equally distressed—to an abundant harvest, to the importation of a few millions of foreign grain; when we hear it ascribed to causes of dubious or even mysterious operation, to what is called an excessive supply, to a diminished expenditure; causes which did never yet in any time, nor in any country, produce the effects here ascribed to them, and which, if they were capable of producing such effects, as, if there is any truth in any principle of political economy, they are not, can never be shewn, nor be supposed to have come into any particular operation at this time—in the midst of this condition of calamity and distress, and of this obscurity as to its cause, can there exist a more important duty than that which rests upon this House, to enter at once into the most diligent, the most extensive, the most indefatigable investigation of this great subject—to dispel the obscurity, the confusion, the absurdity, that prevail—to exhibit to the people what the true cause is of the difficulties which overwhelm them, what are the real obstacles that oppose themselves to their removal and what those dangers and evils are, which we imagine that we avoid by persevering in our present course? There is no party which does not ascribe some part of the distress of the country to the alterations in our currency. Is it not the duty of the House—is it not due to its own character and interests, and the interests of the people, to determine what that part is? I am perfectly convinced that no particular portion, but the whole of the difficulties of the country have been occasioned by that operation; that all the sufferings of the people, and the difficulties and dangers which, from them, surround the government; the destruction or depreciation of capital and property; that all this is the condition which this country has paid, which it has yet to discharge, for what is called the restoration of the ancient standard of value, but which has been in truth, and in fact, and in law, the substitution of another standard for the then existing legal standard of value, in which existing legal standard of value all the debts, and taxes, and salaries, and leases, and monied contracts of the country had been founded, all of which were violated by that substitution; and the effect of which violation on the great interests of the country were never inquired into by the committee of 1819, appointed to investigate this great question; nor were these evils enumerated to the House by that committee, when they recommended the perseverance in measures from whence they must of necessity arise.

I would, in confirmation of these opinions and arguments, ask the House what the main feature is of all the difficulties which the productive classes sustain? Is it not a low state of prices? On what do prices depend? Is it not on money? "We come at once to the true cause of these difficulties. Have we not been engaged in making perpetual alterations in our monied system and standard of value? Have we not debased our standard? then raised, and then a second time lowered and raised it again? Is there, in short, any change of which money is susceptible, any means by which it is capable of affecting the interests of a state, which we have not made or attempted to make? And are we surprised that disastrous events follow; that we witness at one period a sudden prosperity, followed by as sudden and greater calamities? When has it been that governments have understood the full importance of what they were doing, when they have tampered with their standard of value? The mistake of the present period is this—that we have given to the country the wrong standard; we have given them the standard of one period with the engagements of another. Thence the difficult, the uneasy position of the country—the impossibility which opposes the discharge of those engagements. With these causes and effects thus plainly before us, can we longer shut our eyes to the nature of these operations, as well as to the dangers with which we are surrounded, from any other motive than a secret conviction of the evils which we have ourselves occasioned, and the injustice we have worked? How much longer shall we, instead of boldly applying ourselves to the nature of these evils and their removal, endeavour to amuse ourselves and the people by a succession of contradictory and contemptible theories—irreconcileable with facts, with experience, or with sound principles, in the vain hope and expectation that time or accident, or the industry or resources of the people, will surmount at length the calamities we have occasioned, and save the legislature the mortification of acknowledging and repairing its errors. The main feature of the distress of all classes I have stated to be the low rate of existing monied prices. Into that it is all to be resolved. It is that which prevents the farmers from being able to discharge their rents. The manufacturers and the merchants cannot procure a price which will reimburse them the cost of production and importation of their various commodities; from this arises the destruction of capital, the ruin of those classes. It has-been contended, that the fall of prices recently occasioned by the alteration of the currency, has been only to the extent of four or six per cent. This is the proposition of the hon. member for Portarlington; but the fact will be found to be, that the amount of bank of England notes reduced in this recent operation has been six millions. The reduction has been about six millions since the operation of 1818, and about seven millions since the war. If then the reduction of Bank notes has been six millions, and their present amount be twenty-three millions, both of which the papers before the House will show, I would ask that hon. member to say, whether he believes that a reduction of Bank notes can by possibility take place to the extent of one-fourth, and occasion a fall of prices to the extent of only one-twentieth? This I am satisfied he will not maintain. Another opinion has been generally entertained, that it is the fall of prices which has reduced the amount of circulation, and not the reduction of the circulation which has occasioned the fall of prices. Now what is the fact, as it applies to this opinion? The reduction which has taken place in the notes of the bank of England, of I will say one-fourth, has not been occasioned by any alteration of its advances to the agricultural or the trading community; that reduction has been effected entirely by a calling in of its advances to the government, dictated by this House, and for the express purpose of enabling the Bank to reduce its amount of notes in circulation, that it might by that means cause a fall of prices, raise the value of money, operate on the foreign exchanges, and procure an importation of gold from abroad at the old price of gold, precisely by that mode to which I have already referred. If therefore the reduction of Bank notes was not occasioned by a fall of prices, so neither could it by possibility take place without occasioning that fall of prices. We have therefore here before us a reduction of bank of England notes regularly and systematically effected, dictated by this House, to the extent of six or seven millions; that reduction must of necessity be followed by a proportionate or a greater reduction of the country bankers' notes^*: there is now therefore a ^* Dr. Copplestone has told Mr. Peel, that a reduction of Bank of England notes would be followed by an increase of those of the country bankers to keep up the level, as thus—"The Bank of England, it seems, have lately reduction altogether of the whole amount of money in circulation in this country to the extent of twelve, or perhaps fifteen or twenty millions. Now it is absolutely impossible that this could take place without a fall of prices similar to this which we have witnessed. The scale of prices, which can be kept up in every country, depends on the amount of money which can in that country be kept in circulation, and the proportion it bears to its property and commodities. This proposition, self-evident as it is, I will beg the indulgence of the House to state it in the words of Mr. Locke, because the authority of that great reasoner has been much referred to on this subject, and his opinions altogether misunderstood. That money and prices depend on one another, is thus stated by Mr. Locke: "The uses of money not lessening with its quantity—so much as its quantity is lessened, so much must the share of every one that has a right to this money, be the less—whether he be landholder, for his goods; or labourer, for his hire; or merchant, for his brokerage." And then he says, "If one-third of the money were locked up, or gone out of England, must not the landholders necessarily receive one-third less for their goods, and. consequently rents fall?" Now, sir, is not this precisely what we have seen? We see the one-third, or it may be one-fourth, of our money locked up systematically and taken from circulation. We see the necessary consequence following—the landholder receiving less for his produce; the labourer for his wages; the merchant less profit—all necessarily and equally reduced. Mr. Locke goes on to describe what, in his opinion, would be the probable consequences of a nation suffering calamities from this cause. It appeared to him, that the different great classes of the community, the traders, the farmers, the labourers, would be little likely to understand what the common cause of their distress was. He says, he should expect that each of these great classes would be disposed to ascribe its difficulties to some cause peculiar to their own situation, and to aim at measures of relief calculated, as they would believe, to assist contracted their issues; but to answer the demands of the market in the present state of the currency, other banks will increase theirs: to keep up the present prices, as one draws in, the other will shoot out. Being secure themselves in particular and probably at the expense of the rest. But this contest, he says, between the monied man and the merchant, the labourer and the landed man, is but scrambling among ourselves, and helps none against the common distress,—the cause, he says, is mistaken, and the remedy too.

This again, sir, is an accurate description of what has taken place. We see the agricultural community engaged in an attempt to raise, by restrictive laws, the price of bread, whilst the merchants and manufacturers demand a free trade, and measures calculated to lower it. Can we forget that we have heard in this House, a plan proposed for relieving the difficulties of the country by a division of the land, and giving a portion of it over to the fundholder? And have we not witnessed a strong disposition at least evinced against the only true test of their soundness, and their profits depending on the amount of their issues, can it be imagined, that they will ever of their own accord contract those issues?" [Second Letter to Mr. Peel, p. 12.] It might have been expected from a writer who is so intemperate, and loud in his accusations of ignorance, towards those who differ from him on these subjects, that he would have himself shown some degree of knowledge of the principles, at least, if not of the practice of circulation. If Dr. Copplestone believes that the country bankers are restricted or protected from paying their notes by any act of Parliament, as the latter part of this sentence seems to imply, then he is right, and the country bankers, if so protected, would undoubtedly have shot out their circulation, and have filled up any existing void very much to their own profit. But the country bankers have always been liable to pay their notes in notes of the Bank of England; and their circulation has been consequently always reduced by a scarcity of Bank of England notes, and can only be extended in consequence of an extension of the Bank issues. If the country bankers had attempted to proceed according to this plan, it would have terminated in their ruin and they could not have succeeded in keeping one single note more in circulation. In what manner the country bank circulation has in fact, since this time, been increased, to keep up prices, may be judged of from the degree in which prices have kept up, as well as from the following statement of stamps on their notes:

Amount paid for Stamps on Country Hankers1 Notes.
For the half year ending 5th April 1819	£.58,400
For the half year ending 5th October 1819	27,400
For the half year ending 5th April 1820	26,900
For the half year ending 5th October 1820	27,400
The amount paid for the half year ending Oct. 1818, was	73,800

amongst the landed interest, to relieve themselves by invading the property of the fundholder? A right hon. gentleman, the chief commissioner of woods and forests, has told us, that the state of things now existing is advantageous to the labouring classes; that the labourer is benefitted by a state of things that is completely ruinous to his employer. If it were true, that the condition of the labourer is improved, he is rapidly consuming the capital of his employer; and I would beg the right hon. member to tell us, how long he considers that an improvement so originating, is likely to last. But what are the symptoms in the condition of the country which we perceive, and from which we should judge that the condition of the labourer is likely to be improved? Do we not hear, in all directions, of land thrown out of cultivation? of the better land being worse cultivated? Must not the inferior manufactures necessarily follow the same fate? Have we not heard from the most unequivocal authority, that the shipping of the country is too extensive for its commerce? that By the side of this prediction as to prices, and the amount of the country bank circulation, may be set one by Mr. Ricardo, which is found in a reported speech of his, made about the same time, that is in May 1819. He says, "This question (the bank cash payment question) is one of immense importance in principle; but in the manner of bringing it about, is trivial, and not deserving half an hour's consideration of the House. The difficulty is only that of raising the currency 3 per cent in value. A most fearful and destructive depreciation had at one time taken place, but from that we had recovered, and he was happy to reflect that we had so far retraced our steps. We had nearly got home, and he hoped his right hon. friend would lend him his assistance to enable them to reach it in safety. He would venture to state, that in a very few weeks all alarm would be forgotten, and at the end of the year we should all be surprised that any alarm had ever prevailed at a prospect of a variation of 3 per cent in the value of the circulating medium. The value of money since this period has risen 20 or 30 per cent, and not 3 per cent. The cause is to be seen in the reduction of the country bank circulation* There is less money in existence. In May 1819, the Bank of England had in a great degree effected its necessary reduction; but the reduction of country bank paper necessarily following the Bank of England reduction, was an operation that had only recently commenced, and was then going on with great rapidity. an attempt or expectation to employ or to maintain it is preposterous? How then, sir, in the midst of this diminution in the demand for labour, of this frightful destruction of the funds by which labour is supported, are we to expect to find the condition of the labourer improved? It is contrary to every principle of political economy that has ever been received, to all reason, and to all experience. It has never happened at any time, nor in any country, that the condition of the labourer has improved, except by an increased demand for labour, and an increase of the funds by which labour is supported—the productive capital of a country. It has never happened in any country,—nor it never will in this,—that a permanent reduction in the demand for labour can take place, without this further consequence following—that the supply of labour must become proportioned to the contracted demand. This is the process through which the productive classes of the country must pass if the present state of the country continues, and which has, as I am convinced, already commenced. And what the nature of that operation must necessarily be in this country, by which the numbers of the productive classes are lessened, and become proportionate to the lessened demand for labour which exists, that I leave to the right hon. member to describe, and to reconcile it, if he can, with the improvement he speaks of in the condition of the labourers. But this opinion, which is dangerous to be sent out from this House to the country, in its present condition, for its tendency is to instigate one part of the people against the other, when they have all but one common interest, and are involved in one common distress, has been attempted to be supported by a reference to facts. It is stated, that of those articles which form the necessaries or the luxuries of the labouring classes, there is found to exist an increased consumption, since the present ruinous state of prices has been established. The article which has been brought forward in support of this statement, is malt. It is said, there has been an increase in the consumption of malt. Now, sir, what is the fact on this subject, as it appears by the papers containing returns made to this House? The year 1818 was the last year in which a remunerating price was paid to the producer for malt. The number of bushels of malt consumed in that year, ap- pears to have been 25,405,000 bushels. That is the quantity of malt consumed, we will suppose, by the labourer when he paid a remunerating price to the producer. What shall we find then the quantity to be consumed in the year 1820, when it is sold at a low price, which is ruinous to the farmer? The quantity is 24,621,000 bushels. Here is a diminution, instead of an increase. So that in this very article of malt, brought forward to show an improved condition of the labourer, in consequence of the fall of prices, it appears that in this very article, the labourer, when he paid a high price which remunerated the producer, was enabled to purchase and consume more by 800,000 bushels, than he was able to procure when he paid a price entirely ruinous to the grower. And thus it is that an improvement in the condition of the labourer is proved. Another article of consumption, referred to in another place by a noble lord, of whom I wish to speak with respect, in support of a similar opinion, is the article of British spirits, the luxury, perhaps to some extent, of the labouring classes. In the article of British spirits, an increase was stated to have taken place in the last year, compared with the average of the three preceding years, to no less an extent than 1,500,000 gallons in 5,000,000 of gallons. Now, sir, what is the fact, as it appears by returns made to this House? Instead of that extraordinary and altogether improbable increase which appeared in the papers laid before the other House of Parliament, there appears a great diminution. The return to the other House was plainly a clerical error, arising, probably, from taking in the last year the gallons of wash, and in the preceding years the gallons of spirits; but I do not refer to it, for the mere purpose of correcting an error, but because an erroneous and an important argument was founded upon it. The real state of the case, as it now appears, is this, that in the year 1818, the number of gallons of British spirits consumed, was 5,778,006 gallons; and the number consumed in the last year, was 4,756,000 gallons; being a reduction of one-fourth or one-fifth in the whole amount of British spirits consumed, instead, of that great increase of consumption which had been stated to exist: and thus, sir, it is, that an opinion opposed to every sound principle of political economy, to all reason, and to all experience, is destroyed by the facts brought forward i in its support.^{* *} This opinion of Mr. Huskisson was first advanced by Dr. Copplestone, and forms the principal feature in his work. It has been explained by Mr. Hume, in what manner it is that a rise of prices, following from an increased abundance of money, and its consequent progress to depreciation, is favourable to the wealth of a country, to the increase of its real capital, and in what manner it encourages industry, and improves the condition of the productive classes, the merchants, the manufacturers, the farmers, and the labourers. He has explained also, in what manner a scarcity of money and a fall of prices reverses this state of things, and involves all the productive classes of the community alike in poverty, beggary, and sloth. His arguments on this subject have received a striking illustration from what has taken place in this country from 1797 downwards, to the conclusion of the war, and from the different changes in our monied system, and in the state of the country which have since taken place. Dr. Copplestone has maintained a different opinion, as far as relates to the condition of the labourers. It appears to him, that an increased abundance and consequent depreciation of money, whilst it is in an extraordinary degree favourable to the prosperity of the higher classes of society, including the traders, is injurious to the labourer, and deteriorates his condition. The condition of the labourer is improved, on the contrary, as he maintains, by a scarcity of money and a fall of prices, which impoverishes or ruins his employers. The work of this gentleman, written for a particular and a party purpose, to depreciate the character and measures of the present chancellor of the exchequer, has been praised by the party with whose views it coincided, and has been estimated greatly beyond its worth. Undoubtedly it is an important question, which is thus agitated. No measures of any government can rest on a surer or more honourable basis, than an improvement in the condition of the labouring classes, the great majority of every country, if they are capable of effecting that improvement. We must require, however, very different arguments, and a more accurate statement of facts, than have been brought forward by this writer, before we can give any weight to the extraordinary position, that the labouring classes can flourish and improve amidst the general impoverishment of the country, or that they can become poorer and more miserable and distressed, in the midst of a rapid and general increase of national prosperity and wealth. It is not a waste of time to examine for a little the facts on which this opinion is professed to be founded, and the boldness or carelessness with which this gentleman makes use of facts and figures, and renders If, sir, there be any foundation whatever for these opinions, as I am convinced them subservient to the purposes of his preposterous argument. He has taken a review of the stale of the country in the time of Elizabeth. That was a period in which an operation took place, similar to that which followed the Restriction bill. A great increase of money flowed into circulation in consequence of the discovery of America, and was accompanied with a striking and unexampled increase of national wealth and prosperity. This Dr. Copplestone admits; but he says that he finds it was accompanied with a great deterioration in the condition of the labouring classes. That is the point in question. To prove it, he gives us a table, in which he sets down the price of provisions, and the wages of labour, at different periods, commencing with the year 1459, and ending with 1601. The conclusion he professes to draw from this table is, that in the earlier part of that period, before the rise of prices took place, the wages of the labourer would purchase a greater quantity of provisions than in the latter part of it, after that rise of prices. The first circumstance which strikes us in this table is this, that the price of wheat first given in the year When it commences, viz. 1459, is set down at 3s. 4d. a quarter, in money of that time, and at 5s. ½d. a quarter in money of the present time. But when we refer to the tables of sir F. Eden, from whom these prices profess to be drawn, we find the price of wheat there set down in 1459, at 5s. a quarter, in money of that time, and at 9s. 7d. in money of the present time; and that price agrees with the tables of Adam Smith. So that this table sets Out with two statements, and both of them erroneous. First, the price of wheat is set down at about fifty per cent, below its price in money of that time; and next, the money of that time is estimated at about fifty per cent, lower than its real value; and altogether we arrive at a price of wheat of exactly one-half of what the tables she from whence it is drawn, those of sir; F. Eden. A comparison is then drawn between the condition of the labourer in the first twenty years of the sixteenth century, before any depreciation of money had taken place, and his situation during the last twenty years of that century, after such depreciation, drawn from the tables which are given. It is slated, "that from the slightest inspection of the tables, it will appear that during the first twenty years of that century, the wages of a country labourer were at least three times as great as during the last twenty years, if measured by the quantity of food they would purchase." And then we are shortly afterwards told, that, "in the first period, a quarter of wheat at 5s. 3d. was equal only to thirteen days labour at the lowest rate. Now, in the first place, sir F. Eden's tables do not give the average price of wheat for the their truth is incontestable; if the facts on which they are founded are incapable of contradiction; it becomes this House to consider well the whole of this subject, before they take that further step which is now proposed to its adoption. What I twenty years beginning with 1501 and ending with 1520, at 5s. 3d. in money of that time, but at 8s. 3d. The average of twenty-one years, beginning with 1501, is 9s. 3d. And when we come to the year 1523, the price of wheat is set down in Eden's tables at 8l. a quarter in money of that time this being before the depreciation of money, and the consequent improved cultivation with which it was accompanied, had commenced. But the absurdity of this statement is the most material part of it. Dr. Copplestone can believe, when it suited the purpose of his argument to make out a prosperous condition of the labourer, that the wages of the lowest description of labour, of "a woman labourer, or other labourer," for that is the description referred to in the table, were sufficient, at that period, to purchase a quarter of wheat for the wages of thirteen days; which is nearly four bushels or nearly four and a half bushels of wheat, as the bushel is estimated at eight gallons, or at nine gallons, for a week's wages. This would give more than two hundred bushels by the year, for the wages of women labourers, and other labourers of the lowest description. To make this statement complete, the writer ought to have given us also his opinion, as to what quantity of land he imagines to have been in this country at that period, or even at the present period; which, if its whole gross produce were given to the labourers, without any reserve for rent to the landlord or profit to the farmer, would yield a remuneration to this extent. The average produce of an acre of wheat at about the period referred to, there appears reason to believe was about twelve bushels, and that much cultivated land did not yield more than six bushels by the acre at that time. Having, in this manner, established a prosperous condition for the labourer at one period—and certainly nothing can be imagined more prosperous, for it gives to a woman agricultural labourer the gross produce of near twenty acres of corn, of an average crop and goodness, for a year's wages, and of near forty acres of the crop of corn, of inferior corn land, for a year's wages, and would be equivalent to about 40s. a week for a woman labourer, or the lowest description of agricultural labourer, when corn is at 10s. a bushel. Having thus established this state of things, at one period, before money had depreciated, he finds it perfectly' easy, as might be expected, to take up the condition of the labourer at another period; and to show, that after prices had risen, the labourer had greatly gone back from this prosperous state, although in the midst of a great advancement of national have maintained is this: I say that a great reverse has taken place in the internal situation of this country suddenly and recently, and since the year 1818. Can that fact be denied? I say, that in that change consists, and into it is resolvable, prosperity and wealth. The picture of a worsened condition of the labourer, at a period when it suited the author's purpose so to describe it, is completed by a similar use of facts and history. Harrison, in his description of England, reckons the annual executions at the end of the reign of Elizabeth, at 300 or 400; and this is at once made use of to shew that the depreciation of money during that reign had involved the people in misery, and driven them to the commission of multiplied disorders and crimes. [Second Letter to Mr. Peel, p. 51.] Now this same Harrison states, that in the reign of Henry the 8tb, which is before any fail of money and rise of prices had taken place, the number of executions were nearly 2,000 annually; and Mr. Hume, who quotes both passages, almost in the same line, says, that it is asserted in an act of parliament of Henry the 8th, that the number of prisoners in the kingdom, for debts and crimes, were above 60,000; but this part of Harrison's statement Dr. Copplestone leaves behind, because it would have destroyed his argument altogether, and takes just as much as he can make to suit his purpose. It would be idle to trace this miserable perversion of fact and reason further, except that the next statement refers to the effect on the condition of the labourer, of the rise of prices in our own times. A contrast is drawn between the rate of wages and the price of provisions now and at the commencement of the past century. "A comparison," it is stated, "of the price of provisions with the price of labour in the first twenty years of the eighteenth century, and the last twenty years before the termination of the war, would exhibit nearly the same melancholy reverse of fortune to the labourer as we found in comparing the reign of Henry the 7th with that of Elizabeth. The price of provisions advanced about fourfold, whilst that of labour was not even doubled. Generally speaking the first might. be said to have become as seven to two, the second hardly as three to two" [Second Letter to Mr. Peel, p. 83.] And then he asks, "can we wonder therefore at a scene of helpless parents, starving children, &c. &c. all of which is imaginary as applied to the period of the war and of high prices." There are in this statement two facts given, with an apparent attention to accuracy; and they are both of them false; the price of provisions did not advance fourfold nor as seven to two; and it is not true that the wages of labour advanced hardly as three to two. The average price of corn for the twenty years referred to, beginning with 1701, was 2l. 4s. a the whole of the difficulties which we now experience. I ask, what has been the cause of this great reverse? What event, what cause, what measure, affecting alike all the great interests of the country, can be shewn to have been then in existence or operation? I point out that measure; I refer to the alterations we have at this same time effected in our currency, and, I show that that is an operation necessarily affecting alike every one of the great interests of the country, and which could not have been by possibility effected, without producing that fall of prices, and thence that complete and general reverse and distress which we witness. I have maintained, sir, that with the present system of circulation, and whilst it continues, the prices of this country must be governed by, and must nearly approximate to, the scale of prices on the continent. That none other can by possibility exist. All this leads to this further conclusion, that the difficulties and distress of the country have been occasioned by the measures of the government and the legislature; that they are subject to our control, and are within our power to remove. Let the House consider, then, quarter, and its average price for the twenty years before the termination of the war was not either 7l. 14s. or 8. 16s. a quarter. What the advance in the wages of labour really was, it is difficult to estimate, but without any inquiry, it is perfectly clear that the advance in the money wages of labour, within the last 100 years, has been more than as three to two; and so much and greatly more as to take away all weight and authority whatever from a person who is so utterly uninformed on the subject as to be capable of asserting it. The annals of the poor are at all times short and obscure; what their real existing condition at any time and place is, is never generally and seldom accurately known. It is not easy to know what even the money wages of labour are at any particular time; and there is nothing more difficult, nor more unsatisfactory than to determine what the wages of labour, and the condition of the poor have been at remote and distant periods. We have only a few scattered facts to guide us, and these, unaccompanied with particular circumstances connected with them, are frequently more calculated to deceive than inform us. The wages of labour differ more than is apt to be considered at the same time in places a little distant. Adam Smith observes, that the wages of labour in 1775, were 1s. 6d. a day in London and its neighbourhood; 1s. 2d. to 1s. 3d. at a little distance from London; 10d. at Edinburgh; the responsibility under which it acts. A more important duty, a heavier responsibility, has never devolved on and government, than that which rests upon this House, whenever this great subject comes in any way under its consideration, than now rests upon it, when we are about to adopt a step which pledges us to a further perseverance in these measures; which renders their abandonment more difficult, and probably increases their pressure. If we believe that the present measures are dictated by necessity, that they are dictated by a regard for justice, it at least is necessary that we should inquire what the grounds and nature of that necessity is, which dictates a course destructive of the best interests of the country, and of that justice which demands so great sacrifices and so great sufferings. The cause of the difficulties of the country is, I repeat it again, within our own power to remove, and that by a measure, not dubious in its operation, of which we have had the benefit of recent experience, and which, whether just or unjust, has had the sanction of its adoption by the present government within the last few years. That measure is, to give back to the and 8d. through the greater part of Scotland. In those remote periods, when the land was ill-cultivated, there existed no regular employment for labourers; the harvest on a considerable farm was usually, in those periods, begun and ended in one or two days, with the aid of as many hundred labourers collected for that purpose, and who were left without employment when that task was ended. To compare wages for this labour in a state of things like this, with the wages of labour when a better and more extended system of cultivation afforded more regular employment, necessarily shows nothing, without a reference to the altered circumstances and cultivation of the country; and the leaving these out of consideration appears to have been the absurd course which, in part, has led Dr. Copplestone to his conclusions. There are however obvious circumstances connected with the condition of the labouring classes, universally observed and known, and which are sufficient to convince us that during the late war their condition was highly prosperous. We know that their numbers did never at any period so rapidly increase z we know also that the diet of the lower classes became better, more wholesome and nutritious. Bread made from the inferior species of grain, oats, barley and rye, became every year more disused, and was at length only to be seen in some few, and those very poor and remote districts. country that standard of value, and that amount of circulation, in which its debts, and taxes, and engagements, have been founded, and in which alone they can be discharged, or ought in justice to be discharged—that standard in which our taxes have been imposed, our debt accumulated, to which all the expenses of the government have been proportioned, to which all its pay and salaries in every department, all its pay and salaries in every department, civil, naval, and military, have been apportioned, on which the taxes, the mortgages, the private engagements of the whole community have been founded. It is a measure virtually and precisely the same as this, by which the government relieved the country from the distress of the years 1815 and 1816. The government at that time drew from the bank of England, and returned to the circulation of the country, eight or ten millions of Bank notes, which they had previously drained from the circulation and returned to the Bank; the country bankers re-issued their notes on that foundation, as they must necessarily 'do; the amount of circulation being increased, its value lessened, it became depreciated; all prices rose, and the country being once more in possession of that standard in which its burthens were imposed, and its engagements contracted, it was again seen, that those burthens could be discharged without difficulty; nor did that difficulty again occur, till the war standard was again departed from, and the present system of circulation adopted.

Is it possible to doubt, that a similar measure now adopted would be followed by precisely similar effects? It admits of no doubt or contradiction. It would be absolutely impossible to adopt a measure so simple in its nature as this, to re-borrow from the Bank that same eight or ten millions which it has, since 1818, under the dictation of this House, been employed in repaying to the Bank. It would be impossible for this operation to be effected without its being followed by this consequence, that every class of the community would find their difficulties removed. It would be followed by a high scale of prices, which would at once enable the agricultural community to discharge their rents—whilst the labourers, the manufacturers and the merchants, would at the same time receive employment, and high and remunerating prices, which would enable them to carry on their operations and interchange their productions with advantage and profit. It would be followed by a productive state of the revenue—which would remove at once all anxiety as to the state of public credit, and give us shortly a real and efficient sinking fund without additional burthens on the people, which would rapidly cut down the amount of our public debt. What are the evils to be set against these advantages? advantages not to be lightly estimated by the government of this country in its present situation; nor, particularly, by those gentlemen who have taken a conspicuous part in urging those measures, and on whom a great responsibility rests. The evil is shortly this—we should lose, not the metallic standard of value, but one of two metallic standards. We should lose the metallic standard of 4l. and gain a metallic standard of 5l. In that consists all the evil and all the danger. We should lose an obsolete, an antiquated standard, not connected with the present state of the country nor with its great interests, and should gain that precise standard of value which properly belongs to the present state of the country and is the standard of the present generation that now exists within it. We should gain the advantage of possessing a metallic standard of value on the permanence of which we could rely; an advantage which at present we do not possess; for there is no individual amongst those even who are the advocates of the present standard, and who esteem, amongst its advantages and as a compensation for its mischiefs, its invariability and its permanency, there is no individual amongst those advocates, who, observing the difficulty with which it is imposed on the country, would venture to say that he can rely on its permanence. No man in his senses can rely upon it for three months. An individual would be insane who should make a final distribution of his property by will or lease depending on the continuance of the present standard of value; and in fact the instances are numerous in every man's observation, of persons being deterred from executing wills and leases, on this very ground—that they cannot expect the present standard to last. But against this alteration of the standard to 51. a cry of injustice has been raised, and of a breach of national faith. A great injustice was perpetrated in this country in the year 1797. That injustice was consummated, was rendered complete in the year 1811. The effects of the former measures, undisguised, manifest in all their consequences, came then under the review and the deliberate consideration of the legislature, and received the deliberate sanction of this House. What had been before a mere depreciated paper, became, by the act of parliament of 1811, the existing and the only existing legal standard of the country, for every purpose to which a standard of value is essential to the interests of the people. Every individual was compelled to submit to have his debts, his rents, measured to him in that standard. A still greater injustice was again perpetrated in 1819—unless the raising of a standard of value be a less injustice than to lower it—that was, a measure which combined and concentrated the accumulated fraud of both the former measures and of twenty years, and possessed not one of the advantages of those measures. In fact, the monstrous amount of wrong attempted by the measure of 1819, will render it impracticable and ultimately ineffectual. Against all of these three measures I am perfectly satisfied to see the indignation and the opprobrious epithets directed, of those hon. gentlemen, whose indignation is excited when they speak of governments that have worked injustice by an alteration of the national standard. A great injustice was perpetrated in 1797; it can be justified by nothing but necessity, if such necessity existed; without that it can never be sufficiently reprobated,—but that injustice having been committed, having been completed and legalized by the act of 1811, I deny that it could in any manner be remedied by a still more monstrous mass of injustice and fraud committed in 1819 on a different body of men. The annuitant, the public creditor of 1797, was paid off, his debt was discharged, the fraud which he had suffered had been completed, he had become the leaseholder, the landholder of 1820; and having defrauded him in one capacity, in 1797, will you, under the pretence of doing him justice, defraud him again in another capacity in 1819? And is it to a system of justice like this,—perverted, crooked, sophisticated, degraded—justice in the abstract, robbery in the individual instance, national justice founded on individual wrong; a system which, under the name of justice, is a system of complicated and enormous wrong—that we are called on to sacrifice the best interests of the country? We had lost for a long period the metallic standard of value. It was altogether disused in this country—for the fourth part of a century nearly it did not exist. Into that period were crowded the events, the exertions, the debts, the taxes, which might have sufficed for ages. And when at the expiration of this period we come to restore to the country the metallic standard again; at the end of this period of wars, of loans, and taxes, shall we think that we can do so by a blind reference to any former rule, and without any regard to the circumstances which have intervened, or any consideration as to what is the present existing state of the country? Can we regulate any one of the great interests of the country, or the great establishments of the government, by a reference to the rule of 1793? Can we place our military establishment, our naval, ordnance, any of the civil departments of government—can they be regulated by a blind reference to their footing in 1793? If we cannot do that with any one of these great establishments, if there exists nothing else in the country which we can reduce to or place upon the footing of 1793, how is it that we think that our standard of value alone, that with which all these great establishments and great interests are so intimately connected, with which they have all been made to correspond, on which they all mainly depend, can be regulated by a blind reference to a former rule, and placed without any consideration as to consequences on its ancient footing?

I have now finished these remarks. We have before us the choice of either attempting to adhere longer to the present standard and present system of measures, and encountering the dangers and sufferings connected with it, or of abandoning that system altogether, and restoring at once the prosperity of the country along with a permanent metallic standard, which, when once established and connected with the returning prosperity of the, country, we may guard by whatever precautions we can suggest. The hon. gentleman, the member for Taunton, has suggested to the House a measure which, as I understand it, would, without abandoning the ancient standard, alleviate to some certain, though not a great extent, the severity of its pressure-It would go, as I understand it, to enable a scale of prices to be kept up six or eight per cent higher than can be sustained during the continuance of the old standard, unaccompanied by the measures he proposes; and this I have little doubt of, because I am convinced of this, that by our system of bullion payments now adopted, and by our rendering legal the exportation of coin, we have in fact raised our standard of value higher, by perhaps two per cent, than the standard that antiently existed, or that has ever existed in this country. So far, therefore, we can go without abandoning the present system. But beyond this without abandoning that system altogether, we can do nothing. Any other attempted measures of relief would only excite and deceive the expectations of the people, without relieving their distress. If we determine on persevering in our present system, we have no other alternative than to remain passive spectators of that great and severe, though silent and at present patient struggle, which is going on throughout the country, between its productive population, and the burthens by which it is oppressed. In this struggle we can render them no assistance. We are restricted by a law of our own imposition. We can only wait with patience to observe what the next process will be of that great experiment, as it has been called, which has overwhelmed the people of this country in greater calamities, severer sufferings and more extensive ruin, than, it is my firm conviction, have ever before been brought on any civilized community by the measures of any government. We must await its next process, whether it will show us, as is by many hoped, a gleam of returning prosperity, founded on the permanence of the present monied system, and the present scale of prices; and which prosperity, if it take place, must be founded also on the destruction of a great part of the present generation—on the consigning to the gaol and the poor-house a great proportion of the most meritorious classes of the community, of those most deserving the protection of the government, of the farmers, the smaller traders and manufacturers of the country; and thus, by affording an opening to another race to enter into their establishments, unfettered by their contracts and engagements, to give them an opportunity of engaging, with some better chance of ultimate success, in what must still prove a severe and doubtful contention against the unmitigated rigour, the inexorable pressure of the public burthens of the country. This is the favourable view of the prospect before us; but its probable termination—that I am convinced it is not. I am convinced, that the more probable termination of the existing state of things and the present struggle, is this—that it will terminate in a sudden and a violent catastrophe, too sudden and too violent for resistance or remedy, which will prove destructive to the public credit, and dangerous to the safety of the state.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer

said, that he had been often called upon in repeated discussions in that House to return to the old metallic standard, and frequently reproached as one that prevented that desirable return to the ancient currency from being realized: he was reproached on the ground of supporting an artificial system, destructive of the public credit and the public prosper, and entreated to support the ancient legitimate standard. He had never any other opinion than that it ought to be supported, and believed it would never have been departed from, but on account of the pressure of circumstances, which established a strict and overwhelming necessity, a necessity that was not to be controlled or resisted; but although that standard had been so departed from, it had never been lost sight of; and accordingly, when circumstances allowed its re-adoption, it was solemnly restored. He was now called upon to accommodate that standard to engagements contracted during the war. He would ask what was the standard of 1797? precisely that of the war which ended by the peace of Amiens, and which the act for the resumption of cash payments proposed to restore. After the peace of Amiens the price of silver rose, and an alienation took place between the paper and bullion value, but it was not very perceptible till after some time; afterwards the standard varied year by year, month by month, and sometimes post by post. Now he wished to be informed, which of those fluctuating standards was it that the hon. member would fix upon for the fulfilment of our war engagements? Were these engagements to be fulfilled only in part or altogether? If the whole were intended to be fulfilled, he would be glad to know, if an adherence to the standard of any precise period, in a time of continued fluctuation, could realize the object pro-posed? Those hon. gentlemen who advocated such a project, would be guilty of a glaring injustice, even on their own; showing, whatever period they might fix upon, since the time he had mentioned. A time came when he thought that the engagements formerly made were to be put in the way to be discharged. A return to cash payments was called for by all—none doubted the propriety of that return. The only doubt was as to the moment when it should begin to operate. The peace followed, and that very standard was restored, at which by another process, the country had again arrived. A second depreciation took place, which probably arose from the large loan which government had of the Bank, on account of the repeal of the property tax. It was never very considerable. If they were now to adopt the standard of 1818, when the price of gold was 4l. 1s. or 2s. which was five or six per cent above the antient standard, he would ask if five or six afford such a relief as worth while to sacrifice the public faith and public honour, as pledged by the act of 1819? They had now come into complete possession of the antient standard, and to recede would not be a prudent change of measures, but an instance of childish caprice. It would be a wanton injustice to every engagement made in the present expectation of a metallic currency, and would occasion debts contracted, when the price was 3l. 17s. 10d. to be paid as high as 4l. 4s., or 4l. 10s. It was better to avoid those anomalies and capricious alterations, and stand firmly to the resolution which they had so deliberately taken. If the act of 1819 had not passed, and they were asked to adopt such a measure as that now proposed, it would not be so bad; but when they were asked to recede, it was a very different thing. The faith of parliament was now pledged, and no case was made out to prove a necessity for violating it. It was true, the hon. member for Taunton had not pledged the House to any thing: he had, with great dexterity, proposed that it should be referred to a committee to reconsider the provisions of the act, which he had himself been instrumental in recommending. But the hon. gentleman who followed him had gone much further, and had stated his project to reduce the standard to what it had been during the war. The hon. member for Taunton had nevertheless some other suggestions to make, though he had abandoned the remedy he formerly proposed; and what remained was a suggestion for so lowering the standard as to mix a silver with a gold currency, by making silver legal tender to any extent, however unlimited. True it was, that in this proposal he was justified by the antient usage of the country; but from the date of sir Isaac Newton's report in 1721, when the price of the guinea was fixed at 21s., the silver currency had not in fact been a legal tender. It had been limited still further in 1763; and in 1774 it had been restricted to 25l. The circulation of silver was now plentiful; but by law its use was principally confined to the subdivision of paper and gold. The hon. member for Taunton had maintained that a silver as well as a gold standard would give relief to the extent of 7 per cent; but in the first place, he was mistaken in the price for which he could now procure silver: the lowest price was 4s. 11½d. per ounce: and, in the next place, it was undeniable that a standard in one metal was more perfect than in two. It was admitted by all writers on this subject, that any metallic standard was imperfect from the fluctuating nature of the material; but if two metallic standards were adopted, of course the imperfection would be doubled.—On the whole, he saw neither justice nor policy in the proposition. In ordinary transactions a creditor would seldom be able to avail himself of the advantage, while a new opportunity would be afforded to speculators of playing with the precious metals, and taking advantage of their price. It ought to be recollected, that whatever distress arose from the low price of commodities, was not confined to this country [bear!] it was felt elsewhere, especially in America, where the reduction on flour was greater than that we had experienced upon wheat. The same depression prevailed in the article of cotton. At least this condition, therefore, was not owing to the act of 1819, but was produced, nearly in all parts of the world, by much, more general causes. One of those causes, perhaps, was the two successive and productive harvests; and if they were continued, either the price of grain would be still further lowered, or the growth would be diminished. The question was, whether the existing degree of inconvenience, difficulty, and pressure, had not been foreseen by the committee of the House on this subject, and whether parliament ought now to retrace its steps, undo all that had been done, and again embark on the troubled waves of an uncertain and fluctuating currency. It could not be denied that any hesitation or doubt on the subject was productive of difficulty. During the sitting of the bullion committee all business was paralyzed: and was the same state of uncertainty now to be restored, instead of persevering in a course that had been sanctioned by the almost unanimous voice of parliament? He by no means shared the terrors of the hon. gentleman with regard to the revenue. The returns for the last quarter made up the other day showed that the sources had been, on the whole, more productive, allowing for the malt tax, than the corresponding quarter of the preceding year. It was known that the consumption of almost all exciseable articles had increased, and was likely to increase. He admitted the error in a former return, which stated the quantity of wash instead of the quantity of spirit; but that did not of course affect the accuracy of subsequent accounts. Upon the whole, there was much more reason to hope that the pressure of distress would be alleviated by persevering steadily in the course marked out by parliament, than by adopting and new and untried projects. Above all he pressed upon the House, that the danger and inconvenience of again agitating the question might be boundless and irremediable. If the system at present adopted were abandoned, no confidence could in future be reposed in the most considerate decisions of the legislature.

Mr. Grenfell

expressed his surprise at the contradiction between the principles advocated by his hon. friend the member for Taunton on a former occasion, and his practice on the present. His hon. friend had formerly supported the necessity of placing our currency on a basis which nothing could shake, and he now made a motion to refer the whole question to a committee, the effect of which would be to set all afloat again, to undo every thing that had been done, and to replunge the country into all those embarrassments and ail those fluctuations from which so great an effort bad been made to rescue it. Conceiving that this would be a great national evil, he should certainly oppose his hen. friend's amendment.

Mr. Monck

was of opinion, that the cause of all the distress which existed in the country might be summed up in these two principles—the pressure of excessive taxation, rendered still more heavy by the attempt to return from a false and fictitious, to a sound currency. But however much we might feel that for a time, it would be better than to return to that unsound state of our currency from which we were now emerging. The question now was, whether, owing the immense debt which had been contracted for the country, we should pay it in a debased or in a sound and metallic currency. On this subject, he thought the conduct of ministers had been most reprehensible. The chancellor of the exchequer had induced the House, ten years ago, to come to a resolution, which certainly he considered a disgraceful one. He had proposed, and the House had adopted the proposition, that a pound should not be taken for less, nor the guinea sold for more than its nominal value; and upon this, soon after, an act was passed, making it a misdemeanor to take more than 21s. for a guinea in gold, or less than 20s. for a pound note; and at the very same time it was well known that a guinea in gold continued to be bought in the market for 28s. Not only was this the fact, but the government itself was the principal purchaser of guineas at that price, for the purpose of sending them over to pay our troops then on the continent. He called for a contradiction of this if it were not the fact. It was impossible to disprove it: if it were necessary, he could bring proof of it to the bar; for, within the last three days, he was in conversation with a person who was employed on that occasion; so that the law-makers on that occasion turned out to be the first and the principal law-breakers. He held in his hand a calculation of the variation in the prices of corn and gold, taken at periods of four years at and since the first Bank Restriction act. In 1797 the price of corn was 62s. the quarter. In 1801 the price had risen to 71s., nearly an increase of 15 per cent, and yet the price of gold continued the same. In 1804, corn rose to 75s., but still there was no variation in the price of gold. In 1808corn was as high as 79s., and then gold rose for the first time to 4l. the ounce. But the next and greatest rise was in 1812. Corn in that year was 105s. the quarter, and the price of gold, (taking the average of the whole year, for one time he believed it was as high as 5l. 10s. per ounce) was 5l. 5s. 6d. the ounce. From this calculation, the House would perceive, that though corn between the years 1797 and 1812 rose from 62s. to 105s. or about 100 per cent, yet the price of gold never increased above 27 per cent. If this reasoning were true, nothing could be more fallacious than the argument of the hon. member for Portarlington, as to the difference between the paper and gold. real prices of paper and gold. That hon. member was correct in saying that there was only a difference of 4 or 5 per cent in the price of gold as compared with paper; but then he only viewed one side of the question, and left out of his consideration altogether the depreciation of paper as compared with commodities. The hon. member on a former occasion, had also left out of his view the issues of country banks. Now, it could not be denied that, if a great reduction took place in the price of the produce of the land and other commodities, it must have an effect in diminishing the circulation, because the same quantity could not be absorbed that was before required. This was proved from the reduction in the prices which had taken place in the last three years. It had produced a diminution of the issues from country banks. In 1818, the stamp duties on country bank-notes amounted to 165,000l. In 1819 they were only 64,000l., and in 1820 they had been reduced to 54,000l. There was then, a question, whether things would not go back to the prices at which they were when the restriction commenced, and the unsound currency as he would call it, began to be circulated. They would, if in the interim we had stood still in our expenditure; but had we stood still? Had we not gone on during that time in a most lavish system of expense? Had we not increased our debt from 300 to nearly 1,000 millions, and did we not still continue most enormous civil as well as military establishments? Had we not a vast increase of settled salaries and other claims upon the public income, amongst which he would particularly notice the immense and extravagant civil list we had voted. All these were reasons why things could not return to their former standard, with the return to cash payments. When that measure came to be in full operation, there would be a great demand for gold. The Bank of England he was aware was rich enough, and no doubt would be willing to pay gold; but would that be the case with the country banks? He said no; he would say for the country banks that they had not 1,000l. in gold, to pay the fifteen millions of their notes in circulation. He did not mean to say that they were not solvent;—far from it; for he had no doubt they had funds. But how were they to get the gold? They would endeavour to get it by the sale of exchequer bills, and other government securities; and the consequence of bringing such large quantities into the market (for it should be borne in mind that gold must be the price of all) would be, that the stocks would have a very considerable fall for the time, and foreigners would be sending over their gold to purchase at such prices as many here would be obliged to sell. This would have perhaps the effect of rendering England, instead of the dearest one of the cheapest countries in Europe. That would be a great blessing, if it were not for the enormous expenses and the many fixed salaries which the country had to pay. These would still continue it one of the highest taxed countries in Europe. There would, as he had already observed, be a great demand for gold when the present measure came into operation. Many individuals after so long a Lent, and not having been blessed with the sight of a guinea for so many years, would be anxious to receive it in payment in preference to paper. Some would be glad to call for it from curiosity and the novelty of the thing; and others would, from motives of speculation, endeavour to possess it; but there was, he feared, a large portion who would be inclined to demand gold rather than paper from motives of malevolence, of which he believed there existed a great deal in the country. It would not be regular for him to say, that the parliament were at war with the people; but there was, he believed, a large portion of the people at war with parliament, and they would take gold to annoy government. They were now convinced that the best way to do that would not be to attack the Horse Guards. They would by such means endeavour to attack the exchequer, as the more vulnerable point. He had pointed at those inconveniences which, in his opinion would result from the measure before the House; but he could not point out how they were to be remedied. At all events he felt satisfied that the motion of the hon. member for Taunton would not be a remedy. One good effect, and one alone, he was certain of—the difficulties of our present situation would be a salutary lesson to us never again to tamper or play tricks with so sacred a thing as our metallic currency.

Mr. Ricardo

said, he would not have troubled the House if he had not been so pointedly alluded to in the course of the debate. He was not answerable, he said, for the effect which the present measure might have upon particular classes; but he contended that if the advice which he had given long ago had been adopted—if the Bank, instead of buying, had sold gold, as he recommended—the effect would have been very different from what it was at present. It was impossible, on any system of metallic circulation, to guard against the alterations to which the metals themselves were liable; yet all the complaints they had heard that night referred to the changes in the value of the metals. When the measure of 1819 had been adopted, they had known that the alteration that it would make between gold and paper would be 4 per cent: yet with that knowledge, they had, in all the difficulties with which they were surrounded, recommended the measure. The hon. member for Taunton had entered into a speculation on the subject, as if a gold standard had been an innovation of 1819. But that standard had been adopted some time between 1796 and 1798. Up to that period, gold and silver had been the standard. The chancellor of the exchequer had laboured under a mistake when he had said that silver had been a legal tender only to the amount of 25l. It was true that that had been the utmost amount in the degraded currency of the country; but a man might have gone to the Mint with his silver, and 100,000l. might be paid in silver of standard value. This, however, had never been any man's interest. But gold had been carried to the Mint, and gold had, in fact become the standard. The change in the relative value of the metals had taken place in the period he had mentioned between 1796 and 1798; and large quantities of silver had been carried to the Mint, in order to profit by the state of the law, and the relative value of silver and gold. If government had not interfered, a guinea would not have been found in the country, and silver would have been the standard. The government, aware that there would be one silver currency of degraded value, and another of standard value, had by an act of parliament, he believed, shut the Mint against silver; and he asked whether gold had not then become the standard? If the Bank had not bought gold, contrary to his opinion and recommendation, gold would not have risen. But it was only an assumption that gold had risen. When the relative value was changed, what criterion' could they find, to show, whether the one rose, or the other fell r His hon. friend (Mr. Baring), who had been examined before the committee with the attention which his high authority demanded, had strenuously recommended a gold standard as less variable than a silver standard. Yet he now stated, from his experience in France, that silver varied very little. His hon. friend's theories thus changed very often; his own were unchanged, though he had been represented as moving with the vibrations of a pendulum, and entertaining views of placing the currency in a degree of perfection not suited to our situation. His hon. friend had himself the same views of the perfection of the currency; and he regretted that his hon. friend had not continued to entertain those opinions. His hon. friend had spoken of the danger of keeping men's minds in a state of uncertainty; yet he constantly came down to the House with new speculations. The evil of uncertainty and alarm could only be got rid of by parliament being determined to adhere to the measure they had adopted. Such speculations coming from so great an authority as his hon. friend, were calculated to do much mischief. It had been stated, that we could not get labourers to consent to a fall of wages, and that they ran away with the capital of their employers. By altering the value of money, it was very true that they altered the distribution of property. By increasing the value of the currency, the stockholder received greater value, and another paid more. With rents it was the same: the landlord received more value, and the farmer paid more. Thus the distribution of property was always altered by the alteration of the currency. It was quite possible that this alteration might occasion a glut of certain commodities in the market. For instance, a clothier might bring to market a certain quantity of superfine cloth when prices were at a certain rate; if the clothiers should come to receive more money than before, and their labourers to pay more, it was not likely that the labourers should require so much superfine cloth as those whose property was diminished by the change in the currency had required: the consequence would be a glut of cloth in the market. By altering the distribution of property thus, an alteration would be made in the demand for some commodities; there would be a deficiency of supply to the new taste which came to the market, with the increase of property: and there would be too much for the taste whose resources had fallen. The hon. member for Calling-ton (Mr. Attwood) had ascribed the variations of prices in all commodities to the currency. He begged the hon. member to look at the variations in the prices of corn during the last century, and connect them if he could with the currency. Corn had risen or fallen forty or fifty per cent when no alteration had taken place in the currency. The low price of corn was to be ascribed to the very large importation from Ireland, to the productive harvest, to the very great abundance of corn that was in the country. The demand was limited, because no man could eat more than a certain quantity of bread. If there was more than the usual and ordinary quantity in the market, the price must of necessity fall. We had no outlet for corn, because our prices were higher than in any other country. If the variations in prices were owing to the money standard, which he denied, all countries must have been affected by similar variations, and he wondered that his hon. friend had not told them his experience in that respect in France, America, Russia, Spain, and other countries. But if the variations were owing to what he (Mr. Ricardo) had stated, it was not fair to impute them to the act of 1819. The chancellor of the exchequer had said gold had not risen before the peace of Amiens. This was not quite correct. It had begun to rise in 1799; in 1800 it had been 4l. 5s.

Mr. Gurney

said, that several lion, gentlemen, in the course of these discussions, had professed themselves shaken in the opinions they had at first entertained. For himself, every thing had gone to confirm him in that which he had stated in his place in 1818, and to which he had uniformly adhered, he feared with somewhat of an ungraceful pertinacity. He had always expected, the measure of recurring to a standard which no outstanding contract had been calculated to meet, would produce the distress it has done; and his surprise was, that that distress had not been still greater. In 1818, he had thought the sovereign ought to pass for 21s.—and he thought so still. Gentlemen, from the first, seemed to forget, that all the tamperings with the coin, in former times, had been effected whilst the coin was in actual circulation—in which case the breach of faith was manifest;—but, in the present instance, the fact being obviously the reverse, there would be no breach of faith at all. The passing the sovereign for 21s. would be a great relief to the country—as acting in the nature of a property tax of 5 per cent on monied capital alone—assessing itself exactly in the proportion in which every man became possessed of money—and giving a spring to the nominal prices of all commodities which they much needed. The arguments of the hon. gentleman (Mr. Baring) went moreover to prove, that this measure was now imperiously called for, from the relative values of gold and silver in the market—which, if so, seemed to be definitive as to the propriety of making the arrangement, even thus late, previously to the issue of the gold coin. But whether such alleged alteration in the comparative value of the two precious metals existed, or not, Mr. Gurney maintained it would be a measure of justice, as well as of expediency. He felt with the right hon. the chancellor of the exchequer, the great evil of unsettling and agitating the public mind by the appointment of another committee; and he wished the hon. gentleman had rather thought fit to have made some direct proposition to the House—which his unquestioned knowledge of the subject would have enabled him to do:—but, in a choice of difficulties, in this last moment, he should find himself compelled to vote for the hon. gentleman's motion.

Mr. Ellice

said, he had offered himself to the House immediately after his hon. friend (Mr. Ricardo), not to controvert the principles he had stated, in most of which he concurred, but to deny the correctness of his statement, that the depreciation of property occasioned by the measures of 1819, did not exceed 4 to 6 per cent. On that subject he entirely agreed with his hon. friend who had made the motion, and the hon. gentleman who had seconded it, for whose speech, although he knew some of the doctrines contained in it were rather unfashionable in that House, he felt sincerely obliged to him. A great deal had been said about the standard in which we had bound ourselves to pay the debts we had contracted, and the chancellor of the exchequer had stated, it had been always understood we were to satisfy them in the old standard. He wished to know from the right lion, gentleman, which standard he referred to—his standard of the pound note in 1811?—without reference to its relative value in coin, or the standard which had been established in 1819? With respect to the present motion, he feared he must vote against it, although lie did not desire to recede from the opinion he had so often stated that 5l. 10s. would have been a much fairer standard to adopt than 3l. 17s. 10d. He now feared it was too late to look back—and what he was then obliged to submit to, he was now disposed rather to support than to reagitate the country with new schemes of alterations, when the effects of the former ones had been in a great degree borne by many important interests in the country. When he said this he begged to be understood as adopting none of those sanguine expectations which others entertained of the result. On the contrary, he looked at what we had hitherto suffered as only the symptom, and that we had yet to contend with the disease. The effects felt by other classes of the community had been severe, but still had been suffered; and those who had paid their quota of the burthen inflicted upon them by the restoration of the standard, could not be relieved by any alterations now proposed. The landed interest had yet to bear their share of the difficulty. After the present question was disposed of, the farmer must be relieved by abatement of rent and taxes—for he might then bid adieu to what were called in the jargon of the day, remunerating prices—a term which had been brought in with a paper currency, and without which he must look to a price not much exceeding that of the grain grown in other countries. The landlord must, like all classes of society, pay his share of the penalty for encouraging the system of the government for the last 20 years, and from the results of which, after the decision of the House in 1819, it would be in vain for him to hope to escape. After so much mischief, and he would add, injustice, had been inflicted, irretrievable by any alteration which could now take place, on that great proportion of the capitalists of the country, which property was invested in different branches of trade, it was too late to turn round as we had done in 1817—to relieve by a second sue of paper, which was in fact the only intelligible relief, and which had been effectual for a temporary alleviation of the distresses of 1815 and 1816. In 1817, the amount of the Bank of England notes was raised to 30 millions, and that of country bank paper proportionably increased, and the committee in 1819 had misled the country when they stated the depreciation was only the difference between the price at which gold then was, 4l. 2s. per oz. and 3l. 17s. 10d. to which it was proposed to return. This depreciation, or the effect produced on the price of all commodities for the second time after the return of peace, could not be calculated at less than 30 per cent, and we were now suffering, or had suffered, from a fall in the value of property to the same extent. He would state one instance of this which had been mentioned by an hon. friend of his, who had shown him the account of liquidation of a commercial establishment, which had in 1817, 18, and 19, invested 360,000l in actual cost of merchandise and shipping in their trading operations. This property had been reduced by depreciation and fall of prices, to 120,000l.—all that remained of the immense capital invested, and, which was more extraordinary, not a shilling had been lost by bad debts; and, as the transactions had all taken place since the restoration of peace, their could not have been effected by the transition of which they had heard so much. How many other instances of a similar kind must have occurred, the House might collect from reference to the fact, that the value of ships, and almost any staple commodity used in our trade or manufactures, had fallen from a third to a half. What might be the final result of all the distress and difficulty which the paper system had inflicted on the country he could not pretend to estimate; but we were now fairly embarked in a course to ascertain them, and he dreaded the possibility of a conflict of which they bad already seen some symptoms between the landed and funded proprietor, as to the share which each should bear in the general calamity. If such a conflict should unfortunately take place, it must lead to a revulsion in which equity, justice, good faith, and all those lofty feelings of which they had lately heard so much, would be sacrificed to the particular views of their own interest, entertained by the different parties. Sophistry would not be wanting to reconcile to each the conflicting opinions, which under other circumstances they would have shrunk from the promulgation of. And when once principle was departed from, the security of property, and the best interests of the country, must take their unequal chance in the general confusion. One of the most baneful consequences, first of the vast creation of monied capital by the paper system; and secondly, of the great comparative depreciation of all other property, was, the increased influence of the monied interests on the institutions and government of the country. In 1815, the last year of the property tax, and when prices were nearly at their highest stretch, the landed income was assessed at 37 millions, the funded and other fixed annuities, at a sum very much under their present amount. The 37 millions would be reduced before we arrived at the full extent of depreciation, to precisely half the amount; while the other, having been considerably increased, and remaining fixed, will be nearly doubled. He wished to draw the attention of the House to the effect of this silent revolution on the political relations of the empire. That would be seen most clearly by looking to what had taken place during the recent proceedings instituted against the Queen. Until those proceedings had produced discontent and irritation against the government among the great mass of the population, the feeling of their injustice and impolicy was universal even among the fundholders. But as soon as that discontent and irritation became clearly manifest, the fund-holders, who were before inclined to blame government for having instituted measures calculated to disturb the public security, on which their success and welldoing depended, turned round to meet a greater danger, which they fancied to be rising up against them in another quarter. He mentioned this fact, to show how the measure on which they were then deliberating had operated upon the political interests of England. This he was afraid would be the last occasion on which the House would have an opportunity of expressing its opinions upon the great and important question then before it. He thought that it might with safety have undergone some modifications; but rather than open it again for public discussion, he would submit entirely to the measure of 1819, conceiving it to be a less evil to do so than to inspire the public with a hope that parliament would deviate from the system to which it had then so solemnly and so deliberately assented.

Mr. Pearse

thought there was no necessity for going into a committee on this subject, after that House had given such ample deliberation to it. He was convinced that it was the political events of Europe, and not the report of the committee of 1819, which had brought about the state of things so much complained of. For some time there had been a very steady favourable exchange with foreign countries; and being satisfied that this would continue, he should vote against any further revision of the question.

Mr. Irving

corroborated the statement of the hon. member for Coventry, respecting the losses sustained by those whose speculations had commenced in the years 1817, 1818, and 1819. He had seen a statement of the concerns of a mercantile House, which had vested 360,000l. in ships, ventures at sea, &c. which were in a short time afterwards valued at 292,000l., but did not, in fact, realize more than 142,000l.; so that the difference between the estimated value and the produce was 50 per cent, and the total loss to the owners 60 per cent. He gave this as a proof of the effects of this measure upon commerce; and he would be a bold legislator who, knowing these results, would have ventured to propose such a measure. The House ought to be much indebted to the hon. member for Callington, for the very able speech which he had made—the effect of which would be, not only to make the House, but the country at large, turn their attention to this most important subject. He did not think it expedient for the House to review this subject, with any view to depreciation of currency; because it was not from a view of depreciation of currency that any advantage could be derived, but from augmentation of circulation, which he now thought too little. Some hon. members might say that he I had changed his opinions, but he did not think that he had ever given an opinion except in favour of a return to a metallic currency. He neither agreed with the measure nor the mode proposed for carrying it into effect; his chief objection was, to the apprehensions likely to be created in the public mind. In 1819, when this country had arrived at the highest pitch of prosperity by trade, the apprehensions excited by this measure, even before the object of it were known, had the effect of depreciating every commodity at least 20 per cent. He should agree to the appointment of a committee, were it not for the alarm which such and appointment would create. With respect to the proposition of having two standards, he had considerable objections to it. He thought we had mistaken the metal for, our standard, because silver was the metal of those countries with which this country traded; and he did not know how we could measure our metals by a comparison with countries whose standards were different. He should therefore wish silver to be the standard, as gold was not, as silver was the money of the world. He agreed, that an abundance or scarcity of silver regulated at all times the exchange. He agreed also with the Bank directors, that the quantity of metals in circulation was too small, and he did not see that they could do better than to take care that the public should be furnished with a larger quantity of circulation, which he was sure would, in a great degree, remedy the evil; and he would wish the maximum in the variation between gold and silver to be one per cent.

Mr. Cripps

said, it was admitted on all hands that some shock would be felt by the country. To make that shock as slight as possible was the business and the duty of parliament. He agreed, that to return to cash payments by degrees was the best plan that could be adopted; but, at the time that it was. resolved to adopt that plan, he was not given to understand that the one pound notes were to be altogether withdrawn from circulation—he thought that it would be left at the option of the public either to get at the Bank a one pound note or a sovereign; but he was now informed that the Bank intended to withdraw one pound notes altogether—a step of which the country had just reason to complain. If it was intended as a means to prevent forgery, it would prove worse than abortive; for those who now employ themselves in forging one pound notes would, in that case, set about forging five-pound notes.

Lord A. Hamilton

said, he would vote for the amendment, because he was convinced the subject was one which would ultimately force itself upon the attention, of the House. Inquiry must come, and he looked upon the present as the most convenient time for instituting that inquiry. The House would recollect how often he and his hon. friends had, as it were, persecuted that House with motions to compel the Bank to return to a sound currency. The right hon. gentleman opposite, and those who acted with him, uniformly resisted those motions. The right hon. gentleman boldly asserted, that there was no depreciation to guard against; and there was a resolution framed by him, and supported by a majority of that House, which broadly declared that no depreciation existed. Now, however, the right hon. gentleman, with great simplicity, and certainly with great candour, talked of the great depreciation, and was willing to found legislative measures upon it. His noble friend (lord Folkestone) had been charged with abetting rapine and spoliation, because he wished the whole subject revised; while, so far from being exposed to such imputations, he was on the contrary the best asserter of public faith. It was said that it would be time enough to reconsider the claims of the public creditor when the agriculturist had paid his all. If the statements of agricultural distress were not exaggerated, that all had been in many instances paid, and the agriculturists were in many parts of the country pining in prison and poverty. He conjured the House not to lose a moment in considering the whole question.

Mr. John Smith

could not agree, that the depreciation of the currency was the real cause of the agricultural distress. As a proof that that could not be correct, he had only to advert to the fact, that within the last nine months corn fell 80 or 90 per cent, whilst the currency had not depreciated at all in the same proportion. He never knew capital so easily obtained as within the last two or three years. The Bank refused no accommodation to persons who offered a fair security. In his opinion, the effect of issuing two or three millions by the bank of England to-morrow, would merely be a reduction of the interest to three and a half per cent.

Mr. Wilson

said, he should support the amendment. If good resulted from the inquiry, so much the better; at any rate, it would be some satisfaction to know that so important a question had not been disposed of with every possible consideration being paid to it.

Mr. Wodehouse

thought the subject required immediate consideration. He should therefore also support the amendment.

Mr. Hart Davis

thought the question ought to be fully inquired into.

Mr. Alderman Heygate

said, that the real point on which the public distress hinged was the change of the currency. The bill now insisted on might drive Bank notes out of circulation to the amount of six millions, which, together with the six millions of gold locked up in the coffers of the Bank, would diminish the currency by 12 millions. How was such a diminution to be supplied? It was the policy of the Bank to return to cash payments; because it was their interest to pay off a number of small notes which had been repeatedly forged. The prosecutions occasioned by forgeries had led to great expense, which it was desirable to prevent. The proposed measure might tend to reduce forgeries, but burglaries and highway robberies would increase as forgery decreased. He implored the House maturely to weigh the question, which was ten thousand times more important than the malt tax.

The question being put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the question," the House divided: Ayes 141. Noes 27. Majority against Mr. Baring's amendment 114.

List of the Minority.
Attwood, M.	Gurney, H.
Baring, A.	Heygate, Ald.
Bennet, hon. H. G.	Irving, John
Benett, John	Lethbridge, sir T.
Bridges, Ald.	Nolan, M.
Brogden, J.	Onslow, A.
Calthorpe, hon. F. G.	Shelley, sir J.
Clifton, lord	Thompson, W.
Corbet, P.	Walker, J.
Crawley, S.	Western, C.C.
Davis, H.	Whitmore, W. W.
Eliot, hon. W.	Wilson, T.
Gascoyne, Gen.	Wodehouse, E.
Gordon, R.

The House then went into the committee.

Mr. Baring

maintained, that prior 1797, gold and silver formed a legal tender; and that if they did not choose now to return to the double standard, they would be perfectly justified in raising the value of the sovereign to 21s.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer

expressed his belief that if the present measure did not restore them to a permanent metallic currency, it was in vain to hope success from any other.

Mr. Baring

observed, that they would now have a gold standard distinct from all the nations in the world.

Mr. W. Pole

entered into a short statement of the amelioration that took place in the state of the coin in 1776, and argued, that gold was then considered as the legal standard of the country.