§ Lord John Russell roseand said: Mr. Speaker; The House will readily believe, that it is with no common feelings of anxiety that I rise to address them on the present occasion. In private life there is no task more painful, or more inviduous, than to tell an individual of his faults; and those who have had occasion to address this House on any question connected with reform, have found it no less irksome a duty to point out defects, and require amendment, in a numerous assembly. This difficulty, I am aware, has been much increased since last year, when I gave notice of my intentions. It is impossible not to see, that there are two parties dividing the country, both greatly exasperated, and both going to extremes: the one making unlimited demands, and the other meeting them with total and peremptory denial: the one ready to encounter any hazard, for unknown benefits, and imaginary rights; the other ready to sacrifice for present security, those privileges which our ancestors thought cheaply purchased with their blood.
1092 Yet, if I were inclined to maintain, that this moment is peculiarly favourable for entertaining the question of reform, I might cite an authority much respected in this House; I mean that of Mr. Pitt. On bringing forward, in May, 1783, resolutions, two of which are not very different from those which I shall have the honour to propose to the House, he is said to have stated, "that the disastrous consequences of the American war, the immense expenditure of the public money, the consequent heavy burthen of taxes, and the pressure of all the collateral difficulties, produced by the foreign circumstances, gradually disgusted the people, and at last provoked them to 'turn their eyes inward on themselves,' in order to see if there was not something radically wrong at home, that was the cause of all the evils they felt from their misfortunes abroad. Searching for the internal sources of their foreign fatalities, they naturally turned their attention to the constitution under which they lived, and to the practice of it. Upon looking to that House, they found, that by length of time, by the origin and progress of undue influence, and from other causes, the spirit of liberty, and the powers of check and control upon the executive government were greatly lessened and debilitated. Hence clamours sprung up out of doors, and hence, as was perfectly natural in the moment of anxiety, to procure an adequate, and a fit remedy to a practical grievance, a spirit of speculation went forth, and a variety of schemes founded in visionary and impracticable ideas of reform, were suddenly produced."* This, however, did not deter Mr. Pitt from proposing a plan which he thought calculated to preserve the constitution from decay. Soon after he says, "An Englishman, who should compare the flourishing state of his country some twenty years ago, with the state of humiliation in which he now beholds her, must be convinced that the ruin, which he now deplores, having been brought on by slow degress and almost imperceptibly, proceeded from something radically wrong in the constitution. Of the existence of a radical error no one seemed to doubt." Now, if we compare that period with the present, though indeed we have no foreign calamities to deplore, might I not urge that our expenditure and our burthens are qua-
*See Parliamentary History, v 23. p. 830.1093 drupled? Might I not show that undue influence is enormously increased? Might I not maintain, that we, the successful belligerent, are suffering all the calamities which defeat and disaster could produce?But, Sir, however great may be the authority of Mr. Pitt, I cannot but feel that circumstances like those which he has described, have at present too much embittered our political parties, to allow me to think the present a favourable moment for a proposal of moderate reform. On that question, above all others, these extreme parties are in open hostility. The one would leave the fabric of the constitution, like the temples of Rome in her last days of empire, when they were found by the Goths covered with cobwebs, and falling to ruin from the neglect of their worshippers. The other party consists of those audacious men, who seek to raise their names from obscurity to fame, by setting a firebrand to this magnificent edifice, the glory of our Ephesus and of the world, which has been a sanctuary even to those who now wish for its destruction. Amidst these conflicting feelings, I know how hard it will be to obtain a hearing for those who wish to clear away the pollutions and impurities of an undue worship, but to preserve the fabric unimpaired. It may tend to reconcile these parties to my proposition, however, that those who have opposed any general plan of reform, should reflect that they have always said they were ready to correct a particular defect; and that those who are for the largest plan of reform, should recollect that sir Samuel Romilly, a warm reformer, said, a great object would be gained if only two or three government boroughs should be destroyed, and that the duke of Richmond, two years after he brought in his bill for universal suffrage, was the chief promoter of the bill for preventing corruption in the borough of Cricklade.
I will not now presume to enter on the abstract discussion whether uniform suffrage, or variety of suffrage, be the best principle of representative government. But thus much I think is clear, that a system founded upon variety of suffrage is the more liable of the two to corruption and decay. If the principle of uniform suffrage be adopted; if, for instance, all persons of 100l. a year have a vote, the system, whether good or bad, may continue always the same. But if the principle adopted be that of giving representatives to the largest cities, 1094 and richest towns, it is not possible but that cities must lose their importance, and trade transfer its seat. It is for this reason I conceive that the ancient practice of our constitution allowed the greatest facilities for changing the places entitled to send members to parliament. As towns rose into importance they received a writ from the Crown, requiring their services in the great council of the nation: others, which fell into poverty and insignificance, obtained an exemption from this charge; Maldon, in Essex, for example, received a charter allowing the borough no longer to send burgesses to this House, on condition of maintaining a bridge. But there was another mode by which large and important districts received the right of taking part in the deliberations of the state. No one, who has read the speech of Mr. Burke on conciliation with America, can forget his description, as true as it is eloquent, of the manner in which the privilege of having representatives has been conferred at various times by act of parliament. Wales, for two hundred years, was vexed by rapine and violence: fifteen penal statutes were passed against that unhappy country: the remedy was at last discovered; it was representation: Chester suffered the evils of exclusion from the sympathy and protection of her governors, and parliament gave representation; Durham a long time after was found to suffer from the same evils and representation was still the remedy. The case of Haverfordwest offers, perhaps, the roost direct precedent for what I shall hereafter move; for eight years after a representation was granted to Wales, a special clause in an act of the 34th and 35th Hen. 8th extended that privilege to Haverfordwest In the Chester act, the preamble is most remarkable, and although before quoted, I cannot refrain from reading it. "To the king our sovereign lord, in most humble wise shown unto your excellent majesty, the inhabitants of your grace's county palatine of Chester, That whereas the said county palatine is and hath been always hitherto exempt, excluded, and separated out and from your high court of parliament, to have any knights and burgesses within the said court; by reason whereof the said inhabitants have hitherto sustained manifold disherisons, losses, and damages, as well in their lands, goods, and bodies, as in the good, civil, and political maintenance of the commonwealth of their said 1095 country; and forasmuch as the said inhabitants have always, hitherto, been bound by the acts and statutes, made and ordained by your said highness and your most noble progenitors, by authority of the said court, as far forth as other counties, cities, and boroughs have been that have had their knights and burgesses within your said court of parliament, and yet have had neither knight ne burgess there for the said, county palatine; the said inhabitants, for lack thereof; have been; oftentimes touched: and grieved with acts and statutes made within the said court as well derogatory unto the most ancient jurisdictions, liberties, and privileges of your said county palatine, as prejudicial unto the common wealth, quietness, rest; and peace of your grace's most bounden subjects inhabiting within the same;" Now, if any member of this House should say, that to grant representatives to a part of the kingdom which has not hitherto enjoyed that right is a novelty in this country, I will refer him to this act, and show him the principle consecrated in a statute more than three hundred years ago. Or if any one should maintain that those who are not represented suffer no grievance, and require no redress; I will point to the preamble which I have just read, as an authentic and solemn record of the evils which flow from an exclusion from this House.
The wholesome practice of altering and enlarging the basis of representation continued till the end of the reign of Charles the 2nd. The Durham act was passed in the 25th year of that king; and Newark was for the first time summoned by writ during that reign. At the æra of the Revolution, this practice seems to have ceased. A day's proceedings in this House, which I need not detail, show that the great authors of the Revolution seem to have been unwilling to disturb the state of the representation: they probably thought that having cut off one of the three great branches of the government, it would be unsafe to attempt a change in one of the other two, and that any further alteration might shake the frame of the whole constitution. This disposition, which they brought into the practice of administration, seems, at the time of the union, to have been introduced into the substance of the law. From that period it has been generally considered that the king no longer enjoyed the right of sending writs to unrepresented places, as 1096 the proportion between the two countries of England and Scotland would by that means be changed. But by this departure, a necessary departure perhaps, from the old custom of England, two great evils have been introduced.
The first is, that small decayed boroughs, finding their suffrages eagerly sought for, have sold their seats to the highest bidder. The second is, that towns and districts have risen to great importance from their trade, population, and manufactures, and have not been admitted to parliament. A third evil, flowing from the two former, has also made itself very sensibly felt; namely, that the House, of Commons has been-found in various instances-not to represent the people
The first of these evils is too notorious to require that I should dwell upon it. In the instances of Shoreham, Gricklade, and Aylesbury, the abuse has been acknowledged by the House. In that of Aylesbury, as it appears from the evidence, a mark of infamy was affixed to the houses of those voters who were too honest to receive the usual bribe. Now, it is a mockery to say that, in such a case, the present system "works well." One of the least evils which can happen is, that the managers of the borough apply immediately to the secretary of the treasury, who recommends two friends of undoubted solvency and approved steadiness This is one of the most respectable modes of these boroughs being represented; yet even this secures the votes of the members to government, and the patronage of the treasury to the managers of the borough. But, it often happens, that speculators expend the surplus of their wealth, or sometimes their whole fortune, to obtain a return to parliament. Their object in wishing for the honour of a seat in this House, is often far from being the public good. They have either debts owing them by government, which they require to be paid, or suspicious accounts which they wish to be settled; they either hope to repair their poverty with office, or to crown their fortune with a coronet. These are the men whom every good administration must dislike; for the necessity of conciliating their favour withdraws the government from that which ought to be their wish,—the task of gaining the un-bought approbation of their country. We are often told that the publication of the debates is a corrective for any defect in the composition of this House. But 1097 to these men, such an argument can by no mean apply; the only part they take in the affairs of this House, is to vote in the majority; and it is well known that the names of the majority are scarcely ever published. Such members are unlimited kings, bound by no rule in the exercise of their power, fearing nothing from public censure in the pursuit of selfish objects, not even influenced by the love of praise and historical fame, which affects the roost despotic sovereigns; but making laws, voting money, imposing taxes, sanctioning wars, with all the plenitude of power, and all the protection of obscurity; having nothing to deter them but the reproach of conscience, and every thing to tempt the indulgence of avarice and ambition.
The second evil is easily ascertained by looking at the history of those towns, which, during the last century, have grown up into importance. Thus, Manchester, which hi 1778 had only 23,000 inhabitants, is now supposed to have 110,000; Leeds had, in 1775, 17,117; in 1811, 62,534. Birmingham had, in 1700, 15,032; in 1811, 85,753. Halifax had, in 1764, 41,000; in 1811, 73,000. Sheffield, in which the first brick-house was built in 1696, had, in 1811, 35,840 inhabitants, Now, Sir, it is very evident that these places suffer a serious inconvenience from the want of representatives. It is said, to be sure, that they are represented by the members for the counties in which they are situated. But those members, however well inclined they may be to do their duty to their constituents, are often of different station and habits of life. They have not the knowledge requisite for stating the grievances and the wants of manufacturers. And when we consider how many questions relating to trade, to the poor-laws, to the laws of combination, and of particular taxes, deeply affect the manufacturers, we cannot but allow the justice of their desire to be represented Even should their grievances not be redressed, it will be a satisfaction to them to have their direct representatives in this House, who can state their complaints in the face of the ministers and of the nation Sir, when this argument was pressed in 1782, it was victoriously answered, "Where is the petition from Manchester Where is the petition from Sheffield?" I am aware that the argument now used will be very different. It will be said that the people of these towns are too clamorous; 1098 that we must not give way from fear. In answer to such an argument I would apply to the people the observation made by a right hon. gentleman (Mr. Plunkett) on the depositaries of power; "we must not be too critical in examining their conduct. We must recollect that we are their representatives. But if we should say to them, "Formerly we would grant you nothing because you did not ask; and now we will grant you nothing because you ask too loudly:"—if such should be the language used, this House, instead of being what Mr. Burke says it ought to be —"the express image of the feelings of the people," will appear, to be hard-hearted and capricious governor.
It has been said by some persons that to give the elective franchise to the large towns, would be to introduce tumults and affrays. Such an argument one should have thought, was not produced in England, but came from Naples, or from Spain; and indeed it is such as I have often heard from the mouths of the Spanish clergy. But in England experiences has taught us that, so far from occasioning bloodshed, elections have tended to give a vent to the political animosities of the place, and after a violent canvass and tumultuous poll, the air has been cleared by the storm, and settled into serenity. Perhaps if there had been elections at Manchester, we should not have had to lament the unfortunate events which we all deplore. Sir, on this subject, I may quote the example of Westminster. It is not a year ago that my honourable friend near me (Mr. G. Lamb) excited the most outrageous disapprobation, being supposed to be the organ of an odious coalition. But he has no sooner shown him self attentive to the interests of this city and a warm friend to the rights of the subject, than his appearance excites every where good humour and applause.—We have been very lately told that education, which ought to be a blessing, has been injurious to the population of the manufacturing districts. Sir, the fault is not in education; it is in the time and the circumstances which have accompanied it. Had the people received instruction, when they were rich it would have taught them frugality; had they received political rights at the same time they would have learnt the value of legal liberty. But they have received education when they were sinking into poverty, and they have received it without being admitted to poli- 1099 tical power; they have eaten of the tree of knowledge, like our first parents, only to be conscious of their nakedness.
I come now to the most difficult part of the subject, namely, the separation which has on some occasions taken place between the opinions of the people, and the declared will of the House of Commons. I am aware of an objection urged by a right hon. gentleman opposite, that those who ask for moderate reform state the evil as broadly as those who ask for the most extensive reform. This fault I would endeavour to avoid. I do not wish to create illusion, and therefore I do not pretend to say that reform would make our government less inclined to war, which, it must be remembered, is the cause of our chief burthens. A fondness for war is not the fault of an oligarchical, but of a popular government. If we look to late events, we shall see that the French war was popular in its commencement; the American war was popular in its commencement. True, these wars would have been sooner discontinued if the voice of the people had been listened to; but then, on the other hand, the long administration of sir Robert Walpole would hardly have passed in peace with a more popular assembly. If we look farther back in our history, we may observe, that when we speak of our Edwards, and of our Henries, we dwell with the greatest delight upon those of our kings who had the greatest disposition for war, and the greatest opportunities of indulging it. If we look to other countries, we may see, that Venice and Genoa, two popular states, sent their fleets round Italy, for the purpose of meeting in destructive contests. If we look farther back, to the great republics of ancient times, we shall see that Athens ruined herself by failing in the subjugation of Sicily, and Rome by succeeding in the conquest of the world. We may, therefore, state that the wars, in which this country has been engaged, would still have been undertaken if the will of the people had been entirely consulted; and this view is confirmed by looking at the large proportion of county members who voted in the great majorities which have sanctioned our two last wars. Indeed, we might almost say, it is impossible that an assembly acting in the face of the people, vulgi stante coronâ, should continue, by immense majorities of every class of members, to sanction, year after year, a policy which created immediate and 1100 enormous burthens upon the people, entirely against the feelings of that people. Such a system could hardly continue even in the most despotic state; and it is only by carrying the feelings of the people with them, that a free government can lay on greater taxes than an arbitrary king. So firmly persuaded of this truth was Montesquieu, that he has devoted to it a whole book of his immortal work.
But, Sir, there are other questions materially affecting the interests of this country which are not equally decided by a deference for public opinion; amongst them are those questions which regard the expenditure, and are under the eye of this House in its important capacity of guardian of the public purse. In looking at the divisions on this subject, we shall find, that at the periods when those questions were most interesting, and excited the greatest attention, the majorities, instead of being as large as they have been on questions of war, have been singularly small; and on farther examining those majorities we shall find, that, instead of being formed of the fair proportions of county and borough members, they consisted almost entirely of the latter. On the famous motion of Mr. Dunning, in 1780, which was carried by a majority of 18, there appeared in the majority, consisting of 233, the large proportion of 69 county members; in the minority, consisting of 215, only 11 county members. This question, however, it may be said, was carried; but there was another division, of which I will read an account from a letter of sir George Savile, which I have seen quoted in another place: "The most uncourtly question we have had this year was, when after having voted the influence of the Crown increased, &c., we moved to address the king not to prorogue or dissolve us till we had effectually diminished it: we lost it in the proportion of six to five. In this question, the House being divided into classes, showed itself in the following proportions: county members, about three to one, the three being on the side of the minority; English borough members, about four to three, the four being on the side of the majority; the members of a certain long county, which sends a great many, eight or nine to one, at the least; Scotch members, nine or eight to one, at the least; Cinque Ports, about four to one.'' On referring to what took place two years ago, we shall see that questions of a si- 1101 milar nature were then proposed in this House. In the beginning of 1817, there was a great cry for economical reform; in order to meet this cry the ministers proposed a finance committee. I do not blame them for so doing; for I think that the finances of this country are now so complicated, that they cannot be well examined except in a committee. Upon the composition of this committee, it is evident, depended the question whether our expenditure should be rigorously examined, and honestly corrected, or whether the same system of waste and extravagance should be continued and confirmed. If it was to be composed of independent and impartial men, we might expect the most useful results; if of the followers of ministers we could only look to laboured but flimsy apologies of the existing system of profusion. Sir, the proposal of ministers was, that, besides a great majority of ministerial supporters, five official persons should be members of the committee, in order to see all right, A division took place on the question of substituting the name of a country gentleman for that of lord Binning; for ministers there appeared 178, of whom 15 were county members; on the other side were 136, of whom 27 were county members. The consequence was, as might have been expected, that the reports of the finance committee were totally disregarded by the people. On the 28th of February, the same year, a division took place on the reduction of two junior lords of the Admiralty; when, of 208 who voted with government, 16 were county members; of 152 who voted for the reduction, 35 were county members, being more than double. Now, I do not mention these things as proving that county members alone ought to form the House of Commons, but as an index how totally opposite the decisions of this House have been, on some occasions, to those of the people. In support of the same thing I may mention, on the authority of Mr. Fox, that, although the Opposition were the popular party in 1780, yet they gained very few members by the general election. Even the last general election, decided as the voice of the people was, did not take much from the strength of the ministry.
I come now to the resolutions which I shall have the honour to propose: the two first declare, that when a borough is convicted of gross and notorious bribery and corruption, it shall cease to send 1102 members to parliament, and that a great town or county shall enjoy the right it has forfeited. On these heads I have nothing to add. The third declares, "that it is the duty of the House to consider of further means to detect and prevent corruption in the election of members of parliament." The meaning of this resolution is, that some means ought to be devised to give greater facilities in proving corruption in the elections in the smaller boroughs. Perhaps any person, not a candidate or a voter, ought to be allowed to complain of bribery in an election. The farther meaning of the resolution is, that a body appointed by this House ought to be enabled to decide, that a borough has lost by corruption its right of sending members to parliament. Some persons think, that this body ought to be a committee appointed under the Grenville act; and some are of opinion, that a second committee ought to be appointed. It is in order to avoid pledging the House on this subject, that the resolution has been expressed so generally. On this part of the subject, I hope the House will receive the assistance of the member for the county of Montgomery (Mr. Wynn), who, besides his learning, has hereditary claims to authority on this question.
The last resolution declares the opinion of the House, that the borough of Grampound ought to be disfranchised. The corruption of that borough was clearly proved before a committee of the whole House in the last session of parliament, and resolutions appear on the Journals to that effect. The question that remains is, whether Gram pound ought to be thrown into the hundred. Now, supposing that all the principles I have endeavoured to establish are false, that all the wants of other districts are imaginary, I still think that there is enough in the peculiar situation of the hundred in question to prevent its receiving from parliament the return of the two members which Grampound is unfit to send. The hundred of Powdar in which Grampound it situated, is one of the most fertile of the whole kingdom in members of parliament. It contains Tregony, Truro, Lestwithiel, Fowey, and Grampound, besides three out of five voters of the borough of St. Michael. It will scarcely be contended by any one I imagine, that the hundred of Powdar is not sufficiently represented. Why, then, since Cornwall is in no want of representatives, and the hundred in 1103 which Grampound is situated is already overstocked,—why not, I say, transfer the right of sending two members to a populous town? I know but of one objection, namely, the common one, that the innocent will suffer with the guilty. And the only answer I shall give, will be in the words of Dr. Johnson, in an argument he furnished his friend Mr. Boswell on the subject of a Scotch borough: "The objection," he says, "in which is urged the injustice of making the innocent suffer with the guilty, is an objection not only against society but against the possibility of society. All societies, great and small, subsist upon this condition,—that as the individuals derive advantages from union, so they may likewise suffer inconveniences; that as those who do nothing, and sometimes those who do ill, will have the honours and emoluments of general virtue and general prosperity, so those likewise who do nothing, or perhaps do well, must be involved in the consequences of predominant corruption."
And here, Sir, I might close my case, were it not that a question has been asked by a gentleman, lately a candidate for the city of Exeter, which it is incumbent upon me to answer; and the more so, because I have no doubt that the same feeling has arisen in the breasts of some whom I most deeply love and respect. The question is, why not disfranchise also the unconvicted boroughs? To this I answer, that I do not by any means maintain that the resolutions I now propose comprise all the amendments that can be made in the frame of this House. Whenever a specific proposition is made, I shall be ready to give it all my attention, and if I can approve of it to adopt it. But I do not, at present, I confess, see any rule by which any unconvicted boroughs can be disfranchised without disfranchising the whole. We then arrive at what is called a 'reform upon a principle, or the reconstruction of the entire House of Commons. Now, Sir, I will not dwell upon the arguments which are generally used to repel such a proposition; arguments resting chiefly upon the advantage of admitting men of talent into this House, by means of the close boroughs; and on the danger that an assembly of popular delegates would overthrow the two other branches of the legislature. But I cannot forget that these arguments have been urged not, as some out of doors, endeavour to persuade the people, by bo- 1104 roughmongers anxious to defend their own vile interests, but by some of the greatest, the brightest, and the most virtuous men whom this country ever produced. I cannot say, however, that I give entire credit to these arguments, because I think, that in political speculation, the hazard of error is immense, and the result of the best formed scheme often different from that which has been anticipated. But for this very reason I cannot agree to the wholesale plans of reform that are laid before us. We have no experience to guide us in the alterations which are proposed, at least none that is encouraging. There is, indeed, the example of Spain. Spain was formerly in the enjoyment of a free constitution; but in the course of the fifteenth century many of the towns fell into the hands of the nobility, who, instead of influencing the elections of members to cortes (the practice so much reprobated in this House), prevented their sending members at all. The consequence was, that when a struggle took place between the king and cortes, the aristocracy, feeling no common interest with the representative body joined the crown, and destroyed for ever the liberties of their country. There is also the example of the present French constitution; but that is of too recent a date, not to say of too precarious a nature to make a rule for us to go by; we must come back then to our own laws. The constitution of this country is not written down like that of some of our neighbours. I know not where to look for it, except in the division into King, Lords, and Commons, and in the composition of this House, which has long been the supreme body in the state. The composition of this House by representatives of counties, cities, and boroughs, I take to be an intimate part of our constitution. The House was so formed when they passed the Habeas Corpus act, a law which, together with other wise laws, Mr. Cobbett himself desires to preserve, although with strange inconsistency, whilst he cherishes the fruit, he would cut down the tree. This House was constituted on the same principle of counties, cities, and boroughs, when Montesquieu pronounced it to be the most perfect in the world. Old Sarum existed when Somers and the great men of the Revolution established our government. Rutland sent as many members as Yorkshire when Hampden lost his life in defence of the constitution. Are we
†1105 then to conclude that Montesquieu praised a corrupt oligarchy? that Somers and the great men of that day expelled a king in order to set up a many-headed tyranny? that Hampden sacrificed his life for the interests of a boroughmongering faction? No! the principles of the construction of this House are pure and worthy. If we should endeavour to change them altogether, we should commit the folly of the servant in the story of Aladdin, who is deceived by the cry of "New lamps for old.'' Our lamp is covered with dirt and rubbish, but it has a magical power. It has raised up a smiling land, not bestrode with overgrown palaces, but covered with thickset dwellings, every one of which holds a freeman enjoying equal privileges and equal protection with the proudest subject in the land. It has called into life all the busy creations of commercial prosperity. Nor, when men were wanting to illustrate and defend their country, have such men been deficient. When the fate of the nation depended upon the line of policy she should adopt, there were orators of the highest degree placing in the strongest light the argument for peace and war. When we were engaged in war, we had warriors ready to gain us laurels in the field, or to wield our thunders on the sea. When, again, we returned to peace, the questions of internal policy, of education of the poor, and of criminal law, found men ready to devote the most splendid abilities to the welfare of the most indigent class of the community And, Sir, shall we change an instrument which has produced effects so wonderful, for a burnished and tinsel article of modern manufacture? No! small as the remaining treasure of the constitution is, I cannot consent to throw it into the wheel for the chance of obtaining a prize in the lottery of constitutions.—There is yet another person who resembles Nestor in nothing but his age, who tells us that the people have a right to universal suffrage which is derived directly from heaven. No one is more inclined to allow the most extensive rights to the people than I am. I allow that they have a right, if they will, to overthrow their government; that they have a right, if they will, to exercise the sovereignty collectively. But representation is the invention of society, and I cannot allow that the people have any natural right to meet in their parishes and choose members of parliament by putting white and black beans into a box.1106 Sir, I have but one word more. It is to entreat the government, whether they accept of these resolutions or not, to adopt some measure tending to conciliate the people. The history of all free states, and particularly of that one on which Machiavel has thrown the light of his genius, demonstrates that they have a progress to perfection, and a progress to decay. In the former of these, we may observe, that the basis of the government is gradually more and more enlarged, and a larger portion of the people are admitted to a share of the power. In the latter the people, or some class of the people, make requests which are refused, and two parties are created, both equally extravagant, and equally incensed. In this state, when the party which supports the government loses all love and respect for liberty, and the party which espouses liberty, loses all attachment and reverence for the government, the constitution is near its end. Without any common attraction to the established laws of their; country, each is ready to call in force to subdue the other; and it is in the power of an ambitious king, an ambitious general, or an ambitious demagogue, to extinguish the liberties of his country, as easily as these lights above our heads will be put out after the debate! I now beg leave to move the following resolutions:—
- 1. "That it is expedient that all boroughs, in which gross and notorious bribery and corruption shall be proved to prevail, should cease to return members to serve in parliament; provision being made to allow such of the electors as shall not have been proved guilty of the said offence, to give votes at any election to be held for the county in which such boroughs shall be respectively situated.
- 2. "That it is expedient that the right of returning members to serve in parliament, so taken from any borough which shall have been proved to have been guilty of bribery and corruption, should be given to some great towns, the population of which shall not be less than 15,000 souls; or to some of the largest counties.
- 3. "That it is the duty of this House to consider of further means to detect and prevent corruption in the election of members of parliament.
- 4. "That it is expedient that the borough of Grampound, in which gross
1107 and notorious corruption has been proved to prevail, do cease to send members to this House."
§ The first resolution being put,
Lord Normanbyrose to second the motion. He said, that the grounds on which he might have troubled the House had been much narrowed by the speech of his noble friend: he should not therefore, enter into the detail of precedents which his noble friend had so ably examined, but state at once the general grounds on which he supported the motion. On former motions for reform, it had been a favourite argument to contrast the advantages of the present system with the dangers of a change. This argument had great weight with him when a practical good was opposed to a theoretical one; but when his noble friend proposed to touch nothing but what was as essentially bad in practice as it was erroneous in theory, this reasoning would not apply. The only question which could be raised on the disfranchisement of places convicted of corruption, was the abstract question of the property of the voters in their franchises. In his opinion, the word property did not apply. The privilege of voting was not property but a public trust, conferred for the benefit of the community at large—that trust which the voter delegated to his representative, had been delegated to him by the community at large. The nation had an interest, not only in every election, but in every vote. If the voter twisted his trust to the purpose of corruption, he forfeited his franchise; and if the majority of voters were so corrupted as to influence the whole return, the franchise or trust of that larger portion was as clearly forfeited, and should be transferred to some other place, which, from its size, wealth, and populousness, comprised the largest portion of the national interests [Hear, hear!]. He admitted all the evils of those itinerant demagogues, who went about the country and sought only the overthrow of that constitution which they pretended to reform; but the present motion would, if agreed to, have the effect of destroying the influence of such men, by placing the reform of abuses in hands from which a safe and effectual remedy might be expected. What could be a greater right than that of selecting a member of the legislature? and if that right was bartered, was it not proper that it should be forfeited? The member 1108 who should come into parliament by the purchased suffrages of the people might, it was possible, be an independent man, but it was not unreasonable to suppose that he would barter what he bought, and at all events such a member was any thing but a representative of the people. If the House should reject the proposition of his noble friend, what would be the remedy for the evil of which he spoke? He might be told that the right which was abused might be extended to the neighbouring hundreds. That in itself, he admitted, would be good; but would it transfer the right from those who had abused it, to places which had a greater stake in the country? The extension of the suffrage to the hundreds might, it was true, lower the price of corruption, but it would at the same time increase the market, and certainly would be very little, if any punishment, to those places who had been guilty of a violation of so great a privilege. If the House refused this motion, what security had they for the future independence of those places which had heretofore abused their rights? What guarantee had they that those persons would not still deal in that Cornish article of manufacture—a member of parliament? Such a man so brought into the House might, as he had observed, be an independent man; he might be a Whig or a Tory, or belong to no party; but this was certain—that he could not be looked upon with confidence by the people. If the right of voting, in cases of its abuse, should only be extended to the neighbouring hundreds, would it not leave to the party the same power of abuse as before? But it should be recollected also, that the freeholder of the hundred would have a vote for the county, and by this extension of suffrage a man might have a vote in several places—might have almost a little parliament of his own selection. Would it not, he asked, be much more wise to give the suffrage to those who did not possess it before, than to double the votes of those who could so abuse that great right? He would ask, if the House refused the present motion, how could they refute the attacks of those seditious demagogues who went about poisoning the minds of the people against them? Would not the refusal give them a new subject for violent invective? In his mind, the extension of the suffrage to large towns, which would exercise it without corrup- 1109 tion, would have the effect of draining off that stagnant pool of discontent which at present existed in the country, and which, when stirred, was calculated to breed a pestilence. His opinion on this subject was grounded on the experience of the state of public feeling in different parts of the kingdom. In the overgrown village of Manchester, there was manifest a restless and discontented feeling, while in the represented towns of Leicester and Derby, the same degree of irritation was not known [Hear, hear!]. He conceived it his duty thus to express his sentiments in favour of the motion of his noble friend. When his noble friend had first given notice of these resolutions in the last session, he had pledged himself to support them. He had since seen nothing which did not tend to make him more secure in that opinion. The motion broached no theory; it denied none. It presented a clear and efficacious remedy for an acknowledged evil, and went no further. The noble lord expressed a hope that gentlemen would seriously consider the consequence of rejecting the proposition of his noble friend. For that consequence must be to excite an apprehension, if not a belief, in the country that, however plain and palpable the abuses in our representation might be or however rational, moderate or definite the remedy proposed, that House was not disposed to entertain any proposition upon the subject. He did not call upon the House to accede to his noble friend's motion with any view or expectation of conciliating those demagogues who spoke so much of chimerical plans of reform out of doors, but in order to satisfy the rational, temperate and sober part of the people. The House was called upon, for the maintenance of its own dignity, as well as in the performance of its duty to the country, to withstand the objects of the former, while it was peculiarly bound to consult the wishes, and to attend to the desires of the latter; and there could be little doubt of the fact, that all the reflecting, intelligent and unbiassed men in England were of opinion that a reform was necessary in the system of the representation of the people in parliament. To this opinion then it behoved that House to pay the most respectful attention; for the best security of the constitution was founded in public opinion. All the external ornaments, all the imposing forms of the constitution 1110 might remain but its solid foundation was shaken, if deprived of popular affection, for this affection was the great fundamental principle, upon which alone it could safely rest, and upon that affection no reasoning man could calculate, it abuses and errors were to go on accumulating, without reform or remedy. This reform or remedy, too, should at once be adopted; for if postponed, while abuses and errors went on undermining the constitution, late amendments might only serve to weaken the fabric, and accelerate its fall. On these grounds he wished the House promptly to direct it consideration to this important subject.—[The noble lord sat down amidst loud and general cheers].
Lord Castlereaghrose, he said, at this early stage of the debate, for the purpose of submitting a few observations, with a view to direct the attention of the House to the real question which it was called upon to consider by the nature of the noble lord's motion. It was his wish that gentlemen, in discussing this question, should not allow themselves to travel into the unfathomable abyss of debate, to which party spirit or abstract theories might lead. The example of the noble mover would, no doubt, have its due weight with other gentlemen. That noble lord had, indeed, debated the question with a temper that was highly creditable to his judgment, and which naturally disposed his mind to make every practicable concession to the noble lord's wishes. In keeping aloof from the language and temper of the wild theorists who had lately agitated the country, the noble lord had pursued the course that was best calculated to conciliate the House and to promote his own object. Still, he must say, that the noble lord had sometimes fallen into the error of making an approach to those principles which the theorists whom he disavowed were forward to maintain. The noble lord had, indeed, dealt more in general topics of reform than was strictly consistent with the end which he had in view, or with the motions which he had brought forward; but still the noble lord's speech was, on the whole, of a moderate and conciliatory character. There was, at present, a peculiarly morbid sensibility upon the subject of reform prevailing in the country, and it seemed not at all probable that the proposition, of the noble lord would give any degree of satisfaction to those who were affected by that sensi- 1111 bility; but he assured the noble lord that he did not mean to press this circumstance as any argument against the motion. However, he must say, that while a spirit was abroad, and actively at work to depreciate the constitution of that House, the House itself should be cautious of recognizing any general principle that might serve to aid the object of those agitators. England enjoyed a system of popular representation, infinitely better calculated to answer all the good purposes of such a system than any other country had the fortune to possess, and the character of that system should be defended against every, possible attack. Those who were in the habit of making those attacks were not, he repeated, at all likely to value much the object of the noble lord, while they might probably deem any step towards reform rather as a concession from the fears, than as a vote from the judgment of the House. But still he did not mean to urge this as a plea in bar to the noble lord's motion. When the noble lord gave notice last session of this motion, there was not the same ferment in the country upon the subject of reform; and having pledged himself on that occasion to bring the motion forward, he was called upon to redeem his pledge, and the noble lord had done so in a proper spirit. The noble lord had, however rested too much, in his (lord C.'s) apprehension, upon what he regarded the theoretical defects of the constitution, without duly considering the utility and advantage belonging to its practical operation. In the course of his speech, also, the noble lord had argued as if every instance of borough abuses occurred among those who sat upon a particular side of the House—as if, indeed, those only on the ministerial side had any interest in maintaining borough patronage. But if the noble lord inquired a little of the gentlemen around him, he would find this to be a very great mistake. It was a mistake also to assume that gentlemen on the ministerial side had not enjoyed any proofs of popular confidence, as there were some gentlemen on this side who had, he believed, quite as many constituents as the same number of gentlemen on the other. He would not, however, dwell upon those points of dissent or difference, but proceed to consider rather those points upon which he was disposed to concur with the noble lord; and it would appear, on consideration, that there was less difference 1112 between him and the noble lord than might be anticipated. When they came fairly to understand the practical course which might be adopted upon a general view of the representation of the country, he was sure they would come to a perfectly good result; and that the House would not be placed in a situation, when the present state of the country was considered, substantially to differ on the real principle involved in the noble lord's motion, or upon those practical steps which the wisdom of parliament might point out. The apparent sense of the noble lord's propositions was, that where places now sending members to parliament were proved, to a certain degree, to have been guilty of corruption, in equity affecting the rights of the majority of the electors, they should be dismembered of those rights as an example to others, and that the elective franchise so abused should be placed in the hands of more deserving bodies, and more in consonance with the interests of the community. To that principle he had not a single sentiment to oppose; on the contrary, it was a principle which had been recognized by parliament, not merely in theory, but in practice; and that the principle had not been carried farther was to be attributed to the judicial difficulties that stood in the way of the application in particular cases which had arisen. In the course of the last session, three, if not four cases had occurred, in which this principle had been admitted by both sides of the House; and the only question which arose was, as to the facts of those cases, and the mode in which the principle was to be applied to those facts. He believed that one bill had actually been sent to the other House of Parliament; but, in all events, the inquiry into the course which was to be adopted in cases of corruption had considerably advanced at the close of the last session; and he confessed that at no period should this subject receive the least resistance from him; on the contrary it should always be met with the most cordial co-operation [Hear, hear!]. The House had distinctly agreed, that if any borough abused its franchise in proceedings at elections, it should be disfranchised, and its privileges applied to the general representation of the country. To this proposition he acceded, and he of course supposed that, in the course of this session, the House would proceed upon the same principle. That the House had not proceeded in the cases which 1113 were before it during the last session, he presumed, was to be attributed to the impolicy of bringing parties up to town upon inquiries, the pursuit of which the business before parliament might greatly retard. But it would be recollected, that during the former session he had expressed no disposition to prevent the House from looking into those cases, or from adopting such conclusions as the facts established on the records might warrant. Now, when the case of Grampound was before the House, if the view which the noble lord was disposed to take of that borough were correct, he saw nothing which could prevent him from coming to a concurrent vote with the noble lord for its disfranchisement: but a question of great moment still remained; and that was, what would they do with the franchise of the borough? It was very likely, although he was not prepared; to pledge himself to that opinion, that when he came to look at the difficulties which might arise, in applying the species of reform to that borough suggested by the noble lord, he might think it impolitic, and therefore oppose it; or he might, on the other hand, perfectly agree in the expediency of throwing the franchise into the district connected with the borough. All this must necessarily depend upon the circumstances of the case. But he thought it stood confessed on the very face of the representation of Cornwall that the description of reform suggested by the noble lord would be extremely inapplicable to a part of the country so situated. It was manifest that such a reform would be best, if at all, applied to boroughs situated in counties having but few places of representation. It was therefore very obvious, that the reform broached by the noble lord was not applicable to every county, under every circumstance; but, on the contrary, might, under peculiar circumstances, be productive of positive mischief. It was in this view of the question that he thought the noble lord's plan would in some cases be attended with irreconcileable difficulties, and therefore he could not but deprecate its adoption by the House. He was not inclined, nor would he then take upon himself to say, that the franchise of a borough might not be extended to the circumjacent county; but he would say, that many cases might be offered to the consideration of parliament in which an abjection might present itself to such an 1114 arrangement. With these feelings he could not but conclude, that the system laid down by the noble lord in his resolutions was founded upon very imperfects data, and its application likely to meet with obstructions, in; many cases, which it would be impossible for all the wisdom of parliament to obviate. It was altogether an abstract theory, in the practice of which inevitable difficulties must arise. It was not probable, in fact, that some cases would not arise, in which the norma of the noble lord would operate as an embarrassment to the very objects which he had in view. In the event of a borough being disfranchised, taking it for granted that this punishment would only extend to those who had been proved guilty of corruption, what would become of those electors whose rights had not been extinguished? Upon the principle of fairness, the only mode of disposing of those householders or potwallopers, as they were called in Ireland, would be, to throw them upon the county, and to give to them the privilege of freeholder. Would not this, he would ask, be a complete anomaly and an infringement upon the rights of freeholders? If the noble lord, therefore, reviewed steadily the consequences which might fairly be expected to result from his system, he would see that there were difficulties which could not be overcome. To enter resolutions on the Journals of the House, too, founded on abstract principles, which were not applicable to all cases, and could only be applied under peculiar circumstances of a local character, must necessarily produce great inconvenience: he would therefore submit to the noble lord, and to the House, whether it would not be a more natural course to take up at once the case in which reform was contemplated, and apply to it those arguments which its peculiarities might justify [Hear, hear!]. He could assure the noble lord, that if he asked for leave to bring in a bill to disfranchise the borough of Grampound upon the grounds which he had stated, that he would not throw the least difficulty in his way [Hear, hear!] He was perfectly willing to recognize such a course; and, in the discussion of that bill, the House would have an opportunity of determining in what manner the representation of the borough should be disposed of. Although he was not prepared to say that he would exactly adopt the arrangement which 1115 might be proposed, yet he saw sufficient reason to bring the question fairly to issue. He saw no danger in applying different principles of reform to cases which were opposite in their local character. Such a proposition was perfectly consistent with what he considered a constitutional reform; but if the abstract principles laid down by the noble lord were acceded to, he thought there was fair ground to apprehend that they might be made use of to put down that part of the representation which was not in conformity with the norma of the noble lord, and which was the peculiar excellence of our constitutional representation. It was from this feeling that he thought the attention of parliament should be called to the special circumstances of each case. The House would then, while they were acting upon the maxims of the noble lord, take care that those maxims were not turned to the destruction of the constitution. He did hope that when the noble lord (and he had every confidence in his prudence) looked to this question, he would see the impolicy of unnecessarily exciting a feeling of discord; and the more especially when he assured him, that he was disposed to co-operate with him in the most cordial manner, for the purpose of obtaining, by a more practical remedy, the reform which he had in view [Hear, hear.]. He had, therefore, to entreat that he would take the particular instance to which he had alluded, and found a bill upon it. If the noble lord looked to all the peculiarities of Cornwall, he would see the impracticability of applying his system to that part of the country. From this he could not fail to observe the impolicy of adopting a fixed principle: the mischiefs which would arise were self-evident: whereas, if each case, accompanied by its peculiar circumstances, were brought before parliament, then the question might fairly be discussed as to the mode of disposing of the franchise—whether to extend it to the adjacent county, or to populous towns which were not previously represented. He did deprecate, however, in these days, their combating shadows, where there was so much of substance in danger. He could assure the noble lord of every cooperation and support in every proposition which he might make consistently with the general views of policy which the preservation of the true spirit of the constitution of parliament might justify; but he must 1116 object to the introduction of any measure which was calculated to furnish a ground for discontent out of doors, or to bring into discredit the representation of that House [Hear, hear!].
§ Mr. Tierneydeclared, that he never rose with more of the spirit of moderation, or with more of a disposition to harmony than he felt at that moment; and in the first place, he must thank his noble friend for the opportunity which he had afforded the House of unanimously and decidedly discountenancing the wild and visionary doctrines of reform which had lately agitated the country. But while he must say, that he could not see the force of the noble lord's objection to some parts of the speech of his noble friend, he was pleased with the points upon which the noble lord expressed his disposition to acquiesce. The noble lord, if he correctly understood him, and he was not disposed to misrepresent, had acceded to this proposition—that if the majority of the electors of any place or borough, should be found to have conducted themselves corruptly, the right of voting for such place or borough should be thrown upon the adjoining districts, or the right of return should be transferred to some other district. But then the noble lord had raised an objection to that of his noble friend's plan, which proposed to confer the right of voting for the same county upon such electors as had not acted improperly, but as might be involved in the disfranchisement of any borough. To this proposition, the noble lord had said, that its adoption would serve to create an anomaly, by giving potwallopers the right of voting for the return of a county member. But to such an anomaly he thought no very serious objection could be urged. If the right of voting for a comity were given to the present potwallopers, non constat, that that right should descend to their successors. He did not indeed think that any county member would be adverse to the votes of such persons, or to those of the householders of a borough, more particularly as the right of voting, in either case, could only be demanded for the persons living at the time of the disfranchisement of any borough. The only question, then, which remained between his noble friend and the noble lord, was as to the establishment of a system, as the noble lord termed it. He himself (Mr. T.) had a system upon the subject of reform, but he was willing to 1117 waive that system, and to take all he could get at any time towards amending the state of the representation; and to guard against any objections that might be made to him, in consequence of this sentiment he had only to refer to his known opinions respecting reform—these opinions he was indeed ever ready to avow. But to return to the motion—trusting to the moderation of his noble friend, he took the liberty of advising him to withdraw it, in consequence of the declaration of the noble lord. His noble friend had the promise of the noble lord's support of a bill which was calculated to do some good for the cause of reform. The noble lord's pledge was no fetter upon the discretion of his noble friend, and the redemption of that pledge would form a good omen for the country. At all events, it would recognize this principle, that election corruptions ware in future to be discountenanced and punished. When a borough was to be disfranchised for such corruption, the only question, according to the noble lord, that would then remain, would refer to the manner in which that franchise should be disposed of. That franchise should, in his opinion, be transferred to some populous place. It was notorious that times and circumstances had created a very material difference with regard to some of these places, which at present possessed the right of returning members to that House. Many places had indeed sunk into comparative insignificance upon which that right was formerly conferred in consideration of their wealth and population. Was it not then obviously fair, that when any such places forfeited their franchise by improper conduct, that franchise should be transferred to Leeds, Manchester, Halifax, or some such popular town [Hear, hear!]? Sure he was, that such a transfer would be hailed by the people as a good omen of the disposition of parliament. But the principle for which he was an advocate, was the same as that acted upon by the noble lord himself, and by Mr. Pitt, in the arrangement of the Union, as in that case the right of returning members to parliament was reserved for the counties and the larger or more populous towns, while it was granted to but a very few boroughs. This he deemed a sort of parliamentary reform, and therefore he supported it. Upon that precedent, then, he hoped the noble lord would act in this country, and that upon his noble friend's proposition 1118 to transfer the right of return from Grampound to Leeds, the proposition would be supported by the noble lord. At all events, he trusted his noble friend would act upon the spirit of conciliation which had been evinced this evening by one member of the government, and that without hesitation he would withdraw his motion. The right hon. gentleman concluded with expressing his pleasure, that, after so many angry discussions of late, the House had had one quiet debate, terminating in a result which, he was persuaded, would be satisfactory to the country.
Lord Castlereagh, in explanation, stated, that the only difficulty which would remain on the disfranchisement of Grampound would be, as to the manner in which the right of return should be disposed of. That the return should be transferred to another district, he should have no objection, in consideration of the peculiar circumstances of Cornwall and the character of its municipal government. But he could not accede to the establishment of any general principle upon such transfers, and he must reserve to himself the right of moving an amendment upon any proposition, as to the place of transfer, which might be brought forward by the noble mover.
Mr. Wynnexpressed himself satisfied with the view of the subject which had been taken by the noble secretary for foreign affairs. He preferred the proposition of the bill recommended by the noble lord to the general propositions brought forward by the noble mover, because it was much more satisfactory to reason from particulars to generals, than from generals to particulars.
§ Mr. Valentine Blakestated, that, with the permission of the House, he would shortly notice his reasons for opposing all the resolutions of the noble lord; at the same time he would not disturb the harmony which now so happily subsisted between the noble lord and the right hon. gentleman, by giving a negative to the particular point upon which they agreed. He lamented that this spirit did not commence some days sooner, as he was sure, if it had done so, the right hon. gentleman; would have saved the House and the country much time and anxiety. He received with every respect the proposition of the noble lord, because there was no proposition, especially on the present subject, which the House would not feel disposed to receive from any member the house of Russell and this feeling was 1119 increased in consequence of the temper, moderation, and talent with which the noble lord brought forward his motion. He principally objected to the introduction of any new law which would alter the frame work of the constitution, especially as the one proposed did not remedy the acknowledged abuses of the existing law; and this he thought the House was bound in the first instance to do; for these abuses were such as to disgrace the representation, and to bring the constitution into disrepute, and it was only by an application of the proper remedy, that it now could be restored to its original vigour and beauty; and the consideration of the question of parliamentary reform was much prejudiced by the advocates for universal suffrage, annual parliaments, and election by ballot; for as by reference to the most undoubted authority, it must appear that those ingredients were not to be found in the fundamental structure of the constitution since it assumed a settled form, so it must follow that if they be now engrafted upon it, the change will amount to nothing less than revolution; for what is revolution but a change or alteration from one system or principle of government to another? The only difference would be as to the mode of bringing it about, as it would not be effected by force. The noble lord on the other side had eloquently described the original structure of the British constitution, and he (Mr. Blake) would add, that that structure was to be venerated, not only for its excellence, but also because it is the approved and tried work of the experience and wisdom of accumulated years. He was hitherto adverse to the consideration of this question, because it was impossible to approach it without its being mixed up with the most absurd and pernicious principles; but now those principles being almost entirely abandoned, he thought the time most apposite, but he considered the particular mode recommended as unjust and inapplicable to the evil. He could certainly urge many objections to the disfranchisement of a virtuous minority; and he would be unwilling to depart from ancient practice while we professed to follow it; but he would defer to the much better judgment of the noble lord. He considered the evil now complained of, to consist in the minor grievance of bribery only. Bribery and corruption were used as distinct terms in all resolutions of the House, and they had
§1120 distinct meanings: bribery is a reward given to pervert the judgment of voters at a particular election, but yet the persons returned were the real choice of the people, having a right to choose: corruption is the vicious, debauched, and rotten system, by which a person or his nominee (neither having the constitutional influence arising from local property), is permanently returned as the representative of a particular place, when, in reality, to the inhabitants he is utterly unknown, having no interest that is not adverse to theirs, and consequently not returned by them. This is effected by the degrading and insulting voice of non-resident freemen, not freemen by birth, servitude, or marriage—no, he respected their rights, whether non-resident or not, but persons elected to the franchise, and unknown except by name, and all of the lowest order. Corruption of this nature is therefore infinitely more pernicious than bribery; because it is a permanent and degrading system of mock representation; and besides, bribery, from its nature, is only practised among the lower classes of freemen having titles by birth and such like; and he would not punish their offences, nor as the noble lord said, scrutinize their conduct too strictly, in times likes the present, when every allowance ought to be made for the distress of the tradesmen, which it will be the effect of the disfranchisement to increase; but to this he could never object ultimately, his present object being to begin with the rich and the affluent dealers. A great deal had been said about non-represented places, but he would beg to ask, whether Manchester or Birmingham would not much rather be without local representatives, than be insulted by having men returned as their representatives, when they had no share in the choice? The evil of this system has brought the character of the parliament into more disrepute than all the bribery that has ever been practised. The noble lord's motion is directed against bribery only, and therefore levelled against the lower orders, while the affluent nobleman is the object of particular protection—one class of voters much more numerous now than in former times; the freehold franchise is fourfold more extended; and in this point of view the constitution has gained much. Forty shilling freeholds were first created in the reign of Henry 5th or 6th, yet the number then must have been very small, because it was not 1121 till the time of Henry 7th, the barons were empowered to alienate their estates, and it was subsequently of course to that time, that their tenants became possessed of freehold property; indeed, until this time, he believed, or near it, the agricultural people were respected little more than the other movable property belonging to the estate. Such certainly was the case in earlier times, as the words of Magna Charta demonstrate. If the House would not prohibit non-residents elected as freemen, it ought at least to put an end to the abuses of this right. In former times it was unknown in all corporations; it crept into some, and the vigilance of the parliament in the reigns of the Henries before alluded to, put an end by statute to the continuance of it; but those salutary acts were subsequently disregarded, and finally they were repealed only in the present reign. In Ireland they are still on the Statute book unrepealed, except by the judgment of the courts of law. The hon. member begged pardon of the House for having trespassed at all, especially after the subject had been disposed of by the compromise which has taken place, but he could not consistently with his duty to his constituents give a silent vote.
§ Lord John Russellsaid, he rose with feelings of peculiar pleasure to thank the noble lord for the conciliatory disposition which he had evinced, and to congratulate the House on the result of that night's debate. He was, indeed, ready to acknowledge, that the noble lord had given him every assistance in his power, in conducting the inquiry last session into the state of the borough of Grampound; but, on the present occasion, he must confess that the noble lord had even gone beyond what he had reason to expect. He certainly did not see the force of the objection which the noble lord had urged against his proposition; but on that subject it was not his intention to offer any remarks. If he rightly understood what had been said, the noble lord had no objection to a bill for disfranchising the borough of Grampound, and extending the right of representation to some great town or other place; and that if he should have any objections to the plan proposed for transferring the right of representation, he would state them when the bill came to be discussed. He now therefore gave notice, that on Thursday next he should 1122 move for leave to bring in a bill to disfranchise the borough of Grampound, and to transfer the franchise to some great town. Though he believed that it would be a great advantage to increase the number of members for large counties, yet he was convinced that it would be more beneficial in such cases, to transfer the right of representation to some of those great and populous towns that at present returned no members. He was not at present prepared to say to what particular town the franchise of Grampound should be transferred, because there were many circumstances which ought to be taken into consideration by parliament before that point was determined. He concluded by begging leave to withdraw his motion.
§ Lord Miltonsaid, it might perhaps be considered irregular in him to address the House after his noble friend had proposed to withdraw his motion; but he could not refrain from congratulating the House on the result of the debate. Though, for his own part, he certainly did not object to the propositions of his noble friend, yet, perhaps, some of them propounded principles which it was better to keep out of view. His opinion on the subject he should state when the bill was brought in; but at present he might observe, that he thought it would be both possible and expedient to adopt some general rule for supplying the vacancies in the representation occasioned by the disfranchisement of corrupt boroughs, and he thought that the House, in establishing such a rule, should direct its consideration to those places which formerly sent members to parliament, but which at present were unrepresented.
Lord Castlereaghwished to avoid future misconception, by stating, that he did not pledge himself to any particular mode of proceeding, nor was he pledged to the exclusion of the local principle, in the consideration of the transfer in all cases. He did, however, think from the number of boroughs in Cornwall, that the local principle did not there apply. Every distinct case should be canvassed on its own intrinsic merits.
§ The resolutions were then withdrawn.