GALWAY ELECTION PETITION. (Hansard, 16 February 1819)

§ Sir J. Mackintosh
observed, that by the indulgence of the House he was now enabled to make a short statement of the grounds on which the petitioners prayed for the enlargement in question; in doing which the House would perceive that their equity and liberality were strongly appealed to by the circumstances of the case. The time prescribed for entering into recognizances was 14 days. He conceived, that the effect of the determination of the House to adhere rigorously to the rule in the case of petitions from remote parts of Ireland, would be to shut the door of the House against such petitions. By the provisions of the act, recognizances could not be entered into without giving eight days notice, which eight days were included in the 14 days; and it would be impossible in the remaining time to comply with the rule, in the case of petitions from the extreme parts of Ireland, such as the county of Galway. The question for the House, therefore, was, whether they would pass the utmost verge of possibility, and fix a time for the entering into recognizances in petitions from the extreme parts of Ireland, in which communication 443 by letter could not take place. He had looked into the Journals of the House, and found-two cases bearing an analogy to the present; namely, the cases of Saltash and Dungarvon, in which an extension of time was granted by the House. In the case of Saltash, the time had just elapsed, as in the present case, and an application was made for an extension, on the ground that letters had been mislaid which were sent by post. It was to be recollected, that Saltash was not a fourth part of the distance of Galway; and certainly greater negligence had been shown than in this case. In the other case, that of Dungarvon, the ground of application was, that the petitioner was residing at the time at some distance from the place where he usually resided; and this was deemed by the House a sufficient reason for enlarging the period. Now, he conceived that a petition from a remote part of Ireland was entitled to a treatment at least as favourable as that which the petitioner in this last case experienced. He was satisfied that if the prayer of the petition was acceded to, the petition would not be found frivolous or vexatious. The petitioners were resolutely determined to prosecute their petition, if the House would only keep the doors of justice open to them a little longer.

Mr. Bathurst
said, that in the view which he himself took of the case, he thought that the House were not called on to consider the alleged hardship. The time fixed by law had been allowed, but the law had not been complied with, nor bad: any thing particular been stated with regard to this case which prevented compliance. The hon. and learned gentleman did not complain of the want of liberality on the part of the House, but he complained of the hardship of the law in general. The hon. and learned gentleman, however, would see, that where the law was distinctly laid down, the House was not in the habit of deviating from it. In each of the two cases which had been cited, there was some reason assigned—some ground for claiming an extension of time; but here there was none. It did not appear that the hon. and learned gentleman, by the examination of the agent for the petitioners, had come to the House to-night better informed as to the circumstances of the case, than he had been last night: his researches on the subject seemed to have been confined to inquiries into 444 the usage of parliament in similar cases. The right hon. gentleman then examined the precedents which had been quoted and contended that, neither of them was in point. Whether the House would feel themselves called on by a principle of liberality to grant the prayer of the petition, he could not know; but if they were to construe the act according to its obvious meaning, they could not extend the time. He certainly was of opinion, that there was no liberality in contradicting the act.

Mr. Wynn
said, that in all such cases, he conceived that applications of this kind should be discouraged, unless when they arose out of circumstances of imperious necessity. It was much to be desired, that on all occasions they should adhere as strictly as possible to precedents. Where circumstances, over which a petitioner had no control, prevented a compliance with the law, the House would grant an indulgence, but not in other cases; indeed, the instances in which it had been granted were not many. In two cases it had been extended on the petitioners applying before the time had expired, because that circumstance showed that they had been desirous to comply with the law. With regard to the two' cases cited by his hon. and learned friend, he thought, that had the circumstances of those cases been considered properly, it would not have appeared right to grant the indulgence. The hon. gentleman then cited many instances of time being extended to petitioners, but in all of them it appeared that the petitioners had done all in their power to comply with the act. He concluded by saying, that he was of; opinion, that if indulgence were granted in such cases as the present, a door would be opened to negligence on the part of petitioners.