HC Deb 08 December 1819 vol 41 cc863-78

Lord Castlereagh moved the order of the day for the House resuming the committee on this bill. The House having resolved into the committee accordingly, the chairman proceeded to read the eighth clause of the bill, which enacts, "That if notice shall purport, that any thing by law establish may be altered, except by authority of King, Lords, and Commons, &c, the meeting shall be deemed an unlawful assembly."

Mr. Denman

said, he considered this clause, as totally unnecessary, inasmuch as before the meeting could be assembled the magistrates must be satisfied that the objects for which it was called were not of an improper nature. According to this clause, after the meeting had been assembled with the sanction of the magistrates, they would have the power of exercising their caprice and dispersing it.

The Attorney-General

said, that this act did not give a magistrate the power of dispersing a meeting without previous notice.

The ninth clause, which enacts that if any person or persons shall attend a meeting contrary to the provisions of this act, and shall not depart within a quarter of an hour after proclamation to that effect has been made, the meet- * ing shall become illegal, and every such person remaining shall be guilty of a felony —having been put by the chairman,

Lord Althorp

said, he thought that some amendment to this clause should be proposed, to prevent a magistrate from dispersing a meeting while there was any one person of a different parish present.

Lord Castlereagh

apprehended it would be dangerous to oblige a magistrate to draw a line of distinction respecting the number of strangers that should render a meeting illegal.

Mr. J. P. Grant

said, that the first proclamation directed to be made by the magistrate, declared the meeting to be unlawful, and the second made the persons so remaining liable to the penalties of a felony. Now he begged to know, what was the right construction of that clause? because, from the ambiguous manner in which it was worded, 20,000 or 30,000 people might be made guilty of felony by the obstinacy of one person.

Mr. Denman

said, that once or twice a-year a greater number of persons than was allowed by this clause attended at Lloyd's and if one stranger was to intrude himself among them, and refuse to. withdraw, they would all become subject to the penalties of a felony. He should wish to be told how it was to be known that a person was a freeholder. Was he to take his title-deeds in his pocket; or was the magistrate to take the word of the party himself? He needed not, surely, remind the supporters of the bill, that no language admitted a greater latitude of construction than that which applied to residence. This clause rested the case of persons attending a meeting who had no right to be present, and it gave the magistrate the power of dispersing the assembly if those strangers did not withdraw. Now, supposing that, in the execution of the order for dispersion, death should ensue, would the magistrate be guilty of murder, if it was shown to the jury on the trial, that the person on whose account the meeting had been dispersed was really an inhabitant of the parish? These, he conceived, were topics that deserved the consideration of the noble lord, and of the learned gentle-men opposite.

Lord Castlereagh

said, that when a magistrate had read the Riot act in ordinary cases, individuals who did not depart, subjected themselves to the penalties of the act, with a full knowledge of the consequences; and the same would be the case after the reading of the proclamation according to the provision of this clause. The learned gentleman had not stated any circumstance that would not justify a magistrate to act in other cases where the law had been violated.

Mr. Denman

said, that here were facts on which a magistrate was to judge, while not one of the facts was within his knowledge; and yet the noble lord had said, that this case was the same as any other riot. The distinction was evident and important.

Lord Castlereagh

observed, that the moment a magistrate had read the Riot act, persons remaining culpably on the ground subjected themselves to the penalties of the law. This provision was merely a transcript of the Riot act, with this difference only, that the parties offending were guilty of a felony, instead of a misdemeanor. In all cases, the magistrate ought to decide on the law, and it did not become the subject to sit in judgment on the magistrate.

Lord Folkestone

remarked, that the noble lord did not seem to understand the objection of his learned friend. The magistrate, not knowing the fact himself, but acting on the information of others, might be liable to commit a mistake; and the case put by his learned friend was, that if death ensued in consequence of this mistake, the magistrate might be guilty of murder. The right of the magistrate to judge of the law was not questioned; it was only alleged, that by acting on the information of others, when he had himself no means of knowledge, he might be led to the commission of murder.

Mr. Leslie Foster

said, the objection of the learned gentleman was, that by the attendance of one stranger, or rather of a person erroneously supposed to be a stranger, a magistrate might be brought into the situation supposed. The objection, however, did not apply, because the object of this clause was, to prevent individuals who were known certainly to be strangers from interfering in the business of a meeting.

Lord Milton

considered the clause to be one of a most savage description. The noble lord had endeavoured to draw a parallel between actual riots and constructive riots, and had contended, that the penalties annexed to the latter, after the reading of the proclamation by a magistrate, were analogous to those which were annexed to the former after the reading of the Riot act. There was, however, a most important distinction between the two cases; for, supposing even that the penalties were the same, which was not the case, the Riot act allowed a whole hour for the dispersion of the meeting, after notice of its illegality had been given, while this clause allowed only a quarter of an hour. Thus the present clause subjected persons guilty of a constructive riot to the penalties of a felony, after a quarter of an hour's notice; while, by the provisions of the Riot-act, those guilty of a real riot were exposed to the penalties of a misdemeanor only, and that not till an hour after notice had been given.

Sir J. Marjoribanks

suggested the introduction of a clause, purporting that a meeting should not be dispersed as illegal, unless the order of a magistrate for the arrest of any unqualified person present should be resisted by such meeting.

Mr. J. P. Grant

said, that as the clause stood at present, the meeting became unlawful when the magistrate declared it to be so. His object was, that after a declaration to that effect by the magistrate, time should be allowed to the people to disperse before they became subject to the penalties of the bill; and he wished the attorney-general would frame an amendment to that effect.

Mr. Denman

observed, that a man pointed out by the magistrate as a stranger, might, in reality, be a freeholder, while another person, not pointed out, might be a stranger. As the clause was at present worded, that person's presence would make the meeting illegal; though surely that never could be intended by the framers of the bill. The magistrate, therefore, should be required to point out the individuals whose presence rendered the meeting illegal.

The Attorney-General

agreed to alter that part of the clause, so as to have the following effect:—that when any person who was a stranger had been ordered to withdraw and had refused to comply with that order, the party so refusing should, upon conviction, be adjudged guilty of felony.

Mr. Denman

proposed that the provision in this clause: which empowered a single magistrate to disperse a meeting, should not extend to meetings called by the lord-lieutenant of a county or riding, by a sheriff, by five justices, &c. or to any other than parish meetings.

A conversation ensued, in which lord Castlereagh, lord A. Hamilton, sir J. Sebright, lord Milton, Mr. Ellison, the Solicitor-general, Mr. Denman, the Attorney-general and Mr. Primrose, took part, when the amendment was negatived, and the original clause carried without a division.

The clause indemnifying magistrates in case of killing or maiming in dispersing meetings, being read,

Mr. Denman

objected to it, as introducing a new and dangerous principle in law. By the riot-act, the remaining together, or not dispersing on proclamation made, rendered the parties guilty of felony, without benefit of clergy; but even there the magistrate was not indemnified for ordering those who disobeyed the proclamation to be killed.

The Solicitor-General

contended, that the magistrates, by the statute of Henry 7th, and by other statutes founded on the commission, had the right to disperse an unlawful assembly by force.

Mr. Denman

most positively denied this principle, and would appeal to the whole body of lawyers in support of his opinion. Hawkins, who was in opposition to the principle of the learned Solicitor-general, had put the case of an assembly for the purpose of hearing Mass, which was then unlawful, but could not be dispersed by force. Force could not be used but when there was a breach of the peace. Unless, therefore, every thing cruel and despotic were to be raked into this measure—unless a contradiction was to be given in it to every principle of law and justice—unless a complete power was to be placed in the hands of magistrates over life, limb, and liberty, without responsibility, this clause he was confident could not pass.

Mr. J. P. Grant

said, that the proposition of the Solicitor-general was the most alarming that he had ever heard, and the most opposite to the principles of law or the opinions of any lawyer. Let the hon. and learned gentleman consult Mr. Justice Hale, who said that it required an act of parliament to indemnify a magistrate who had caused death in dispersing an unlawful meeting, from the charge of having committed murder. Was the Riot-act to be brought up here? That act applied to a riotous assembly; while the assembly here contemplated was merely an unlawful one; and yet a magistrate was to be justified for sending troops of horse to trample down and destroy them! He never heard a more monstrous proposition than this—that by implication any assembly might be made unlawful, by implication any unlawful one might be dispersed by force; and if lives were lost, the magistrates would be indemnified against a charge of murder! If this was the meaning of the clause, why was it not openly declared, that his majesty's subjects might be put on their guard?

The Solicitor-General

said, that if he looked at the statute of Henry 7th, and other acts founded on the commission of the peace, he found that the magistrates had the right of dispersing unlawful assemblies, even before the Riot-act. Suppose 50,000 people had assembled to the breach of the peace, they might have been dispersed without the provisions of that act. If a magistrate was called to any riotous meeting, or to any unlawful meeting, in breach of the peace, he was justified in using force to put it down, and was indemnified against the consequences. The force, however, was only to be a proper force; he was not allowed to exert more force, or to apply greater violence, than the dispersion of the assembly required. He acted under a heavy responsibility in this respect, but his power by the law could not be denied.

The clause was agreed to

The Attorney General

, before he alluded to the clauses relative to unlicensed places for debating and discussion, would only call the attention of the House to one or two of the many questions of the sort which had been debated and discussed, as it was called, within the last six weeks, ill different parts of the metropolis. Perhaps it would be sufficient to observe that what he held in his hand purported to have been a question propounded at a place called Hopkins's Chapel, near Berwick-street, Soho, on the 24th of November last. The notice of the meeting ran in these terms: —"This evening the following question will be debated; Which of the three professions has the greatest tendency to harden the human heart—the hangman, the grave-digger, or the parson?" He need not say in what manner that question was decided. Another question was, "Whe- ther lord chief justice Abbott's refusal to allow Mr. Carlile to read the Bible, in the course of his defence, arose out of a real respect for the sacred writings, or from the fear that their supposed absurdity and folly might be thereby exposed?" With the leave of the House he would just read them a passage from a publication called the Black Dwarf. The hon. and learned gentleman here read a short extract, which was to the effect "that the radical reformers wanted concentration; that reformers should deal only with reformers; that they should carefully endeavour to keep their body in force by their holding together; lastly, that they should subscribe, so that in every considerable town there might be public dinners, or other meals provided, of which reformers might partake at a cheap rate; and from which all exciseable articles, as much as possible, should be banished; that delegates should be paid to repair to them, in order to exhort and instruct them in the cause; and that in every town where they possessed a reading room, they should keep books which might be lent out upon the cheapest terms possible." Now it was with a view to the mischief likely to be caused by such practices, that the provisions relative to debating societies, both in 1817 and 1796, where blasphemous or seditious opinions were read or maintained, had been enacted. This clause, relative to unlicensed places for holding debates, was founded upon the 36th of the king, and upon the act of 1817. He should therefore propose by way of amendment, that the operation of the act should not only extend, as at present, to "places used for the purpose of delivering lectures and holding debates, at which discourses have been held of an irreligious, immoral, and seditious nature,'' but also to all places whatever, where persons not licensed should publicly read or debate.

Sir R. Heron

wished to ask the hon. and learned gentleman whether any prosecution had been instituted against the authors of the two first papers which he had read?

The Attorney General

said, that no prosecution had been commenced; but a bill had been found against one of the persons who attended at the meeting, for the seditious and blasphemous opinions he had there maintained.

Mr. Alderman Wood

desired to know, whether the clause was meant to apply to meetings for the discussion of philosophical or scientific subjects.

The Attorney General

said, the clause only applied to places where money was received.

The amendment was carried without a division. The next clause was, that all houses, &c. where meetings should beheld, and money taken either for admission or refreshment, such places not being previously licensed for that purpose, should be deemed disorderly houses.

Mr. Denman

objected to one part of this clause. He did not know what disorderly houses meant, except in one sense, which he did not care to name. He should move that those words be omitted.

The amendment was negatived without a division.

Mr. Denman

objected to the clause relative to the revocation of licences. As the bill now stood, a man might be ruined, and never know the cause of his misfortunes. He should therefore move, that after the words "complaint made," the words, "upon full evidence and information on oath," be inserted.

This was also negatived without a division.

Lord Folkestone

, adverting to the clause relative to the limitation of actions, said, that if he read it rightly, actions against individuals charged with the offences contemplated by this bill, might be proceeded in, within a term of six months; but if any of those individuals should happen to have been committed under an erroneous impression, they must prosecute the magistrates, upon whose warrants they had been so falsely committed, within three months. This surely required explanation. The clause went on to say, that if the plaintiff in the latter case should become nonsuited, or the jury should find a verdict for the defendant, or if, upon demurrer, judgment should be given, as against the plaintiff, the defendant should have double costs. This, too, was to be noticed; because it was evident how very cautious it would have the effect of making persons in adopting proceedings against any magistrate.

Mr. G. Lamb moved, that the words, "three months" be omitted, and "six months" substituted in their stead. After some observations from Mr. Barham, and Mr. J. P. Grant, this amendment was put and carried. In answer to a question from an hon. member, why in the case of Scotland the costs should be trebled? the lord advocate observed, that it was the usual custom. Mr. J. P. Grant thought, that the sooner the custom ceased to exist, the better it would be for his unfortunate countrymen, who were thus liable to pay more than their southern neighbours, who could afford it so much better. He should move that the word "double" be inserted in the place of "treble." Mr. Martin (of Galway) thought, that some security ought to be given to magistrates who might be proceeded against for the payment of their costs in case of nonsuit. The amendment was carried without a division. The other clauses of the bill were then agreed to, after which

Lord Castlereagh

rose, for the purpose of proposing some new clauses. His first clause was, that in those cases where strangers, or persons who had no right to attend at a particular meeting, were present, and after being ordered to withdraw. refused to go, it should be lawful for any person or persons (having a right to attend at such meeting) to take the person so refusing into custody, and bring him before the next magistrate, to be dealt with according to the act. This clause was read a first time. On its second reading,

Mr. Brougham

objected to it, and contended that it would be manifestly absurd if carried into effect. It went to give any man who had a right to attend at such a meeting a power of a special constable, and also to take away all those who had not the right to attend. Now suppose, as he understood was the case at Manchester, there were 20,000 out of the 30,000 who might have attended, who had no right at all to attend under this bill, what would be the consequence? Or suppose, to take small numbers, there was a meeting assembled of 1,500 persons, of whom only 500 had a right to be present, did the noble lord mean to say that every man who had a right to attend should arrest one who had no right; or, to speak in short terms, that each lawful man should arrest his radical and take him off? Now, in such a case, all the 500 men who would have a legal right to attend, would be engaged in taking away 500 of those who had no such right; or, as he might say, in "pairing off" with them, (laughter), and thereby leave 500 of those present who had no right so to be. Would not this, he would ask, be a manifest absurdity, if the object was, to put down the seditious meetings mentioned in the bill?

Lord Castlereagh

was surprised at the extravagant construction which the hon. and learned gentleman had put upon the clause. He should recollect that it could not have the effect alluded to, as it was not compulsory on any man who had a right to attend, to take any other not having the same right from it. Every such man was not bound, as the hon. and learned gentleman had supposed, to take his radical and walk away.

The clause was then agreed to.

Lord Althorp, on rising to propose a clause for limiting the operation of the bill to the disturbed districts, observed that he had many disadvantages to surmount. These disadvantages did not consist merely in the lateness of the hour, or in the disposition of the noble lord to repel every important alteration. He felt, also, that any suggestion coming from himself must come with this disadvantage—that as he was known to object to the whole principle of the bill, he might be suspected of an intention to interfere with that principle in recommending a clause for their adoption. The clause, however, which he felt it his duty to propose, did not interfere in any degree with the useful operation of the measure, though it was calculated to prevent its unnecessary and vexatious application. The papers before the House did not make out a case of alarm beyond some of the great counties of England and Scotland. His majesty's ministers had described the measure as an improvement of the law; but that was not the opinion of the House, or they would have made it permanent. But it was not enough, according to his view of it, that it should be temporary; justice seemed to require that it should be local also, and that those parts should be exempted from its severity, where no case of disturbance could be made out to justify its introduction. The Bill which authorized search for arms was limited to the disturbed districts; why should not this be limited in the same way? It was more easy to remove a magazine of pikes from one county to another, than to remove such meetings as this bill was intended to prevent. The clause, which he should propose might appear, on the first view, to impose restrictions upon certain counties; but it only affected some counties, while the bill, as it stood, affected all, and therefore was rather to be considered in the light of an exemption. It might be argued, that it was an odious task for magistrates to apply for an extension of the bill to their respective counties when the state of things required it. But, disagreeable as the task might be, he was sure that no magistrate would refuse to do his duty. Another argument which might possibly be urged against it was, that it gave too great a discretion to magistrates; but their discretion was not increased beyond the powers of the present act, and was, after all, a discretion to exempt where it might be expedient. The noble lord concluded by moving a clause to limit the operation of the measure to certain counties therein mentioned, but empowering the lords lieutenant or magistrates of counties, now quiet, to introduce it by proclamation whenever disturbances might render it expedient. The counties named in the clause were the west riding of Yorkshire, Lancashire, Cheshire, Durham, Cumberland, Northumberland, Nottingham, Staffordshire, Warwickshire, Renfrew, Lanark, and Derby.

Mr. Cartwright

opposed the clause, and denied that it was more easy to transport arras than assemblies from one county to another. The tranquil part of the country, he was satisfied, would feel themselves aggrieved if the bill was not extended for their protection.

Mr. Honywood

thought it strange that any of the quiet counties should feel aggrieved at not being placed under the ban of this act; and he was sure he might say for his own constituents, that they would feel much aggrieved, if, without any act of disloyalty upon their parts, they were exposed to all the hardships and severities of such a measure.

Mr. W Lamb

said, that with the opinion he entertained as to the danger of the country, he could not refuse his support to the bill; but, on considering its provisions, the amendment proposed by his noble friend appeared to deserve the adoption of the House. He was sure the noble secretary of state would feel the necessity of carrying along with him in those measures as much of public opinion as possible; and when he considered the measures of 1817, he would find, that nothing had tended so much to render the Habeas Corpus act odious in the eyes of the community as the indiscrimate universality of its operation. There were many who admitted the existence of danger, and yet thought it hard, unjust, and iniquitous, that those who had committed no fault should be exposed to its severity. He could assure the noble lord, that the same feeling would operate with regard to the present measure, if it was applied with the same indiscreet latitude. The bill, if properly limited, was not essentially an abridgment of the rights of the subject; for right, when properly used, was under a better limitation than that of law; But, when rights were abused, as that of petition had been, the law was a necessary corrective. An hon. gentleman had observed that the disturbers of the public peace might carry their effects into other counties, but his belief was, that in no other part of the country could their projects be brought to act. As to any abuses that might arise out of the plan proposed by his noble friend, they might easily be met by other provisions, and therefore he did not hesitate to press seriously on the attention of ministers, the feeling which they run the risk of exciting by extending the measure in the first in-stance to the whole country.

Mr. Grant

admitted the necessity of carrying along with these measures as much of public opinion as was possible; but the first object was, to carry their purpose into effect. No fact could be more plainly proved than the necessity upon which they were legislating. He would not now discuss the extent of the danger, as he might assume that it was admitted by the House. This danger did not arise merely from distress, a system had been pursued which was not the creature of distress, though it had availed itself of the advantages supplied from that source. The question therefore was, whether, with the conviction that such a spirit was in existence, with a knowledge of its increasing activity in making converts, and of the distress which constituted its chief aliment, they should anticipate the danger, or leave the country, not to the chance of a small evil, but to the chance of an evil growing to that extent which might soon require, not measures of prevention, but of suppression and dispersion. Two engines were employed for the propagation of a system, the object of which was national and not local—those engines were public meetings and the press. Could any one imagine that local bills would succeed in putting it down— or was it not more probable that they would have to follow the disaffected with unequal steps into other counties? It was necessary to destroy their hopes, and show them that parliament was determined to crush their designs. An hon. gentleman had said, that the system could not be carried into other parts of the country, but he was not willing to see the experiment tried, how much poison the frame of the country could bear before it was destroyed. It was in behalf of that population with which he was officially connected, and to whose interests he was bound, that he was anxious the bill should stand in its present shape. It was said to be a bill of coercion; on the contrary, it was one of protection. It was coercive, not against the people, but against the enemies of the people, whose name, was so often usurped by revolutionary demagogues. He must say, that if this measure was made local, it would be an encroachment on the high privileges and liberties of the undisturbed counties; as it would deprive them of that protection to which they were entitled. To use the words of lord chief justice Holt, it would be "an assault upon the, people of England." It was not the nobility, nor the commons, that were to be protected by this measure; it was the honest the un-contaminated, the industrious peasantry of the country whom they were to protect against those who wished to deprive them of the privileges of the constitution, and the consolations of religion; thus rendering them miserable in this world, and hopeless as to the next.

Sir M. W. Ridley

did not mean to say that something of this kind was not necessary; but he thought that it should be strictly confined to the necessity of the case. If the bill was limited, as proposed by the amendment, it would be adequate to all its objects, for magistrates could correspond with ministers sufficiently early to prevent inconvenient or dangerous meetings.

Lord Ebrington

felt that he should be wanting in the duty which he owed to the populous and loyal county which he had the honour of representing, if he did not oppose the extension of these measures to it. He entered his protest against including the loyal and peaceable inhabitants of Devon in this measure. It was urged, that the seditious leaders would, if the measure was made local, extend themselves to the peaceable counties. Even if they did, it would be impossible for them to produce any effect in the county where he resided. He therefore felt it his duty to support the amendment.

Mr. W. Courlenay

agreed with his noble friend, that infinitely the largest portion of that part of the country with which they were connected was free from any disposition which might require restraint; but, at the same time, they all looked for something of this kind; and if they were left exposed to the attacks which might be made by itinerant agitators, they would consider themselves unfairly treated.

Mr. Macdonald

said, that whatever difference might exist as to the necessity which called for coercive measures, he thought they all agreed in feeling reluctance in passing them. There was but one way of demonstrating that general feeling, and that was by limiting those measures to the strict necessity which called for them. This measure was to be limited in a two-fold way—in point of time and in point of extent. The time had been already fixed, and for a period which he regretted as he thought a much shorter time would be sufficient. The extent in point of district was still to be limited. He would ask, whether his noble friend had not provided for any emergency in counties proposed to be exempted from this bill? He should like to hear something like an answer to this from the other side of the House. What could be required more, than that the magistrates should have the power of proclaiming their county, in whole or in part, subject to the operation of this bill? At least the onus was upon the other side.

Lord Milton

fully concurred in the reasons urged for limiting the bill, and felt disposed to support the amendment for other reasons. The hon. member for Exeter had stated, that the part of the country with which he was connected was well disposed. His noble friend, the member for Northamptonshire, had said the same of that county. He could make the same statement respecting the county in which he lived—he meant Huntingdonshire. It was a French saying, that where nothing exists, the king loses his rights; so he would say of this bill. Whatever ground there might exist for passing it in the manufacturing districts, no necessity for its extension to agricultural districts could exist, but in the imaginations of men who saw nothing but radical meetings all over the country, threatening fire and destruction to all within their reach.

Mr. Mansfield

opposed the amendment. If the measure was made local, the evil would spread itself, and parliament would in a short time again be convened, in order to enact additional measures of restriction.

Mr. Barham

said, that if he was convinced of the efficacy of the clause he would vote for it. It was the wish of all that some efficacious measures should be adopted. It was urged that the great bulk of the people were loyal. Why, then were the great bulk of the people to be subjected to the same restrictions as the disaffected? There were several counties in England where the term radical reform would not be understood. The most certain mode of spreading the evil would be by passing this law, as it would excite the curiosity of the people to discover what it was enacted to prevent. The best way of convincing the people of the benefit of entertaining loyal principles, would be to let those who did not abuse their liberties, continue in the enjoyment of them; while those who abused were punished by being deprived of them. The bill would have a dangerous tendency, by showing that the loyal and the disaffected were treated with equal rigour.

Mr. Cooper

considered the present bill as intended for the defence of our rights and liberties. What was liberty? Was it not the right of doing what a wise and good man would wish to do? They were legislating, not for mischievous agitators, but for the liberties of the people.

Mr. W. Parnell

strongly objected to the clause. He also objected to the measure altogether as it regarded Ireland, where according to the statement of the noble lord himself, the greatest tranquillity and prosperity existed. Even in this country he did not think it would effect the end proposed. The conduct of ministers reminded him of a little French tale which he read some time since. There was a very ugly knight, but a man of great wisdom, who fell in love with a beautiful young lady, who, notwithstanding was very indiscreet. The knight thought the folly of the young lady could make no obstacle to their union, "for," said he, "our children will possess all the beauty of their mother, with all the wisdom of their father." Unfortunately the knight was mistaken. The children possessed all the ugliness of the father, with all the folly of their mother. Now, so it was With the question before them. This boasted beauty, the privilege of the people, was as a corrective to its indiscretion to be coupled to the ugly but wise knight; the measure proposed by ministers. He feared, however, that the produce of the union would be similar in both instances —namely, that it would possess the ugliness of the father, and the folly of the mother without retaining any trace of the boasted wisdom or beauty of either.

Mr. Hutchinson

said, he was anxious to impress upon the House, that, in the event of the amendment being negatived, he was determined to bring it forward, as far as Ireland was concerned, on the bringing up of the report. In doing this, he trusted that he should receive the support and co-operation of every independent member of that House. Though he had not any immediate connexion with the right hon. the secretary for Ireland, he could not but express his regret at the speech which he had made that night. When he recollected the brilliancy with which that right hon. gentleman had conducted himself, both before and since he commenced his public career, when he considered the efforts he had made in another quarter, he could not help feeling a sincere anxiety, for the consistency of his political character. He did not express this regret from a feeling that his country could be benefitted by the exertions of any right hon. gentleman, but from a respect for the right hon. gentleman's former exertions.

Sir W. Guise

said, his constituents deprecated the extension of this measure to them, and had told him that there was no-occasion for it in Gloucestershire. He would therefore support the amendment.

Mr. R. Martin

pledged himself to oppose any attempt to prevent this measure being extended to Ireland. It was calculated to produce peace and happiness in that country.

Sir R. Fergusson

protested in the name of his country against the measure. It was said that it would be a blessing to the sister kingdom. It may be so, but from such blessings good Lord deliver us.

The committee then divided: For the Amendment, 51; Against it, 191: Majority against it, 140. The original clause was then put and carried; after which the House resumed.

List of the Minority.
Barham, Jos. Calvert, G.
Barnet, J. Cavendish, lord G.
Bennet, hon. H. G. Churchill, lord C.
Brougham, H. Clifton, lord
Calcraf, J. Crompton, S.
Dundas, Thos. Nugent, lord
Denman, T. O'Callaghan, Jas.
Ebrington, lord Palmer, C. F.
Fergusson, sir R. Parnell, Wm.
Folkestone, lord Philips, G.
Graham, J. R. G. Price, Robt.
Grant, J. P. Primrose, hon. W. F.
Guise, sir W. Ramsden, J. C.
Hill, lord A. Ricardo, D.
Honeywood, W. P. Ridley, sir M. W.
Howarth, H. Robarts, A. W.
Hume, Pat. Rumbold, C. E.
Hutchinson, hon. C. H. Russell, R. G.
Heron, sir R. Smith, hon. R.
Kennedy, T. F. Smith, Wm.
Lamb, hon. W. Tavistock, marq.
Lamb, hon. G. Walpole, hon. G.
Lambton, J. G. Webb, Edw.
Macdonald, J. Wood, Matt.
Martin, J. TELLER.
Milton, lord Althorp, lord.
Monck, sir C.