VOTE OF THANKS TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS—NEPAUL WAR. (Hansard, 6 February 1817)

Mr. Canning

said, that in rising pursuant to his notice to call the attention of the House to the gallant conduct of our army in India, he was aware how comparatively deficient in importance it would appear when contrasted with the brilliant achievements and splendid victories of our armies in Europe. He was aware that distance operated to diminish and to obscure. He was aware, too, of the degree of interest which attached to those transactions nearer home, on which depended, not the preservation of any distinct branch of our empire, but our national safety and independence. But under all the disadvantage of such comparisons, he felt that both justice and policy made it incumbent on the House, not to pass over without notice those transactions which had lately taken place in India. Justice was not local or comparative. With whatever feelings the soldier went forward to his task, whether in a distant country or nearer home, he exerted all his energies and incurred equal dangers. And in India, where our army was opposed to a force of a very peculiar nature, and fought in a strange country under many disadvantages, their achievements were not less severe or less difficult, and the House would feel that it ought rather to seek than to shun an opportunity of showing these gallant men that their services were duly estimated. But he thought that there was good policy in noticing any achievements in our Indian empire, because it would show that the House had a watchful eye over the most distant part of his majesty's dominions, as much to give praise where it was due, as to control where there was blame. The country of Nepaul, which was the scene of the actions to which he wished to call the attention of the House, was some years ago probably almost unknown to most members of the House. It had grown § 239 up into importance within the last few years. Its situation was that adjoining the British empire in India, along the borders of which it extended for 600 or 700 miles, with the exception of a comparatively small interval. It was ruled by what was in practice and theory a conquering government. The incitement of ambition and the experience of success had made it singly an object of danger; besides which, it was a rallying point for those powers which might be disposed to attack the British possessions in India. It was the only power which had never bowed its neck to a Mahommedan conqueror; and those who knew how much Mahommedan conquest paved the way for British dominion, would understand how much the more formidable the Nepaul power was by its having successfully resisted it. The power which was now called Nepaul, had not existed above half a century. It was in the year 1767 that we first became acquainted with it. In more early times the whole tract of country which it lately embraced was laid down as occupied by a series of independent states. At the period which he had mentioned, the attention of the government of Bengal was first called to Nepaul by an attack made by it against one of our Indian allies, in consequence of which an expedition was fitted out and sent against it, but it was quite unsuccessful. The impression made by this defeat was, of course, very unfavourable to the British interests; and its results tended to increase the Nepaul power, by enabling it to extend its territories. From the union of Nepaul with Goorkha, and some other smaller states, arose that power which bad been extending and enlarging itself by successive occupations, from the year 1798 to 1808, when it made the aggregate power, and comprehended the extent of territory which he had described. They were a very warlike people, and made many incursions on the neighbouring powers. In 1791, they fitted out an expedition, and committed some acts, which drew down upon them the wrath of no less vindictive a sovereign than the emperor of China, with whom they were then compelled to make a tributary league. After that they turned their forces towards the west, and endeavoured to conquer the territory of Cashmire, an enterprise in which they did not succeed. But from 1804 there was no year during which they had not some quarrel with the East India Company, or some of its allies. 240 Border quarrels certainly might sometimes be passed over. But those who knew that country must know well the importance of not tolerating any aggression, or passing over any insult, which might tend to shake the British influence in India. Such was the impression made upon the government in this country by the representations of the Bengal government, respecting the aggressions of Nepaul, that orders were framed for the purpose of directing that very course of conduct which had then already been adopted by lord Hastings. Before recourse was had to hostilities, every mode of remonstrance and negotiation had been exhausted, and, apparently, with such success, that the Bengal government, more than once, thought that all disputes and differences were at an end. But it was found that during these negociations they had taken forcible possession of a neighbouring and friendly state. Then it was seen that forbearance had extended too far, and recourse was had to arms. It would be unnecessary for him to take up the time of the House by attempting to give the details of a military campaign, where there were so few of the common data to proceed upon, which was carried on in a country with the geography of which we were for the most part unacquainted. The chief purpose of the war was to detach from the Ghoorkha power its more recent conquests. But no addition to the, territories of the British empire was contemplated, except where there were no means of restoring the former governments. The campaign ended by leaving no less than one-third of the Ghoorkha dominions in the power of the British, and by the rest being restored to its former condition. In the conduct of the expedition the names of sir David Ochterlony, of general Gillespie, and of colonel Nicholls, were particularly distinguished. The second of these brave officers he might be permitted to name more particularly, as he fell while gallantly leading on one of the first attacks made in the campaign, which was on the fort of Kalunga. It had been said of this attack, that he had made it rashly; but if rashly, the error had been atoned by his fall. The failure in the first attacks upon the fort had been nobly retrieved by the wonderful success of sir David Ochterlony, the result of whose operations was, that at the end of the campaign he was left in possession of the whole territories of the enemy, to the western point of Ghoorka. 241 This success led to negociations, the result of which was such as he had stated. The war was then thought to be concluded, and so certainly was this opinion entertained, that it was announced in the Speech from the throne at the end of last session. But a new and perfidious aggression on the part of the Nepaul government made it necessary again to have recourse to arms; and general Ochterlony was on his march to reduce the enemy to submission, when he was stopped in his progress by the news that the treaty was ratified without any alteration in its terms. The governor-general felt that enough had been done against this state; that its power was sufficiently crippled, and its resources exhausted, without pursuing to extermination a war which might be ended with security and honour. Thus ended a power which held out the appearance of growing into a formidable and dangerous rival, and threatened the safety of our Indian territories; but with which we were now happily not only on terms of amity, but of friendly intercourse. It was now so reduced and humbled, that it could no longer be looked upon by any of the native powers in India as a rallying point for the enemies of the British government. The firmness and moderation of the governor-general led to this result. On this short statement he hoped he might venture to found a motion for the thanks of the House, to him, and to the officers and the army by whose exertions the war had been brought to a successful issue. He had abstained from details on which he was not competent to enter, and which were not required. He hoped he had refrained from any exaggerations. The result of this war he believed to be a source of safety—certainly of honour and glory to this country; but in its future consequences of an importance not easy to trace. He concluded by moving, "That the thanks of this House be given to general the marquess of Hastings, knight of the most noble order of the garter, governor-general of the British possessions in the East Indies, and commander in chief of the forces there, for his judicious arrangements in the plan and direction of the military operations against Nepaul, by which the war was brought to a successful issue, and peace established upon just and honourable terms."

§ Mr. Brougham

did not intend to oppose by any means the vote of thanks to the noble marquis, although he had heard that a diversity of opinion existed with respect to some of the measures pursued by the noble marquis. Under these circumstances, he should have thought it not inconsistent with the respect due to parliament, that ministers should have given the House some information, by presenting papers upon the subject for its perusal. The difference of opinion, as to the policy and conduct of the war, to which he alluded, existed in a quarter well known to that House and the India board. Mr. Edmonstone and Mr. Dowdeswell's names were familiar to all persons conversant with Indian affairs; one had been at the head of the military, the other at the head of the civil department, during a splendid career of successes, and an able administration of our affairs in that part of the world, not to be equalled in the history of India, or of any of our colonies. He alluded to the distinguished period of the marquess Wellesley's administration. He, however, could not but feel it a duty particularly gratifying to the House, to return thanks to the gallant and meritorious officers and soldiers concerned in the operations of that campaign. Yet even here he could not but regret that, a set of arrangements had been made by the institution of the new order of the bath, by which all officers in the East India service who had not attained the rank of major, were excluded by positive regulations from becoming members of that order, as well as all officers engaged in affairs previous to the present war. There was an exception to the first rule in favour of such captains as had been appointed captains in the field, from the circumstance of their superior having fallen in action. By these arrangements it would be seen, that most of the officers engaged in that war, which, in 1799, had, under the conduct of the marquess Wellesley, completely overthrown the power of the most inveterate and dangerous enemy of the views of this country, Tippoo Saib—were, notwithstanding such gallant exploits, precluded from the only order of merit now known to our military establishment. Hence it arose, that the time 243 of service necessarily required to become a major in other branches of our army might be taken at about six years, while an officer in the eastern service would not be eligible who had served almost twenty long years, in an unhealthy climate, at an immense distance from his native country, and under many inconveniences and privations, not known to other services. Something ought, therefore, to be done immediately, to render the distribution of; honours more equitable. Formerly medals had been given to reward the services of individuals. This practice had, since the late great extension of the order of the bath, been discontinued. Without expressing himself invidiously, he must say, that most assuredly this was not an arrangement which would have been sanctioned by the concurrence, had they been consulted, of either the marquess Wellesley, or the gallant duke his brother: the former would have too well appreciated the merits of his faithful and deserving servants, during the period of his distinguished career; the latter would never have consented to disqualify his gallant companions in arms from receiving the reward of all their severe toil and laudable exertions.