§ Mr. Hornerwished to address a few words to the noble lord opposite before he proceeded to his motion upon this subject. He had received an intimation that it was not the intention of ministers to oppose the production of the greater and most important part of the papers that would be required. If such were the fact, he submitted that it would be much more consistent with the practice and constitution of Parliament for the documents to be furnished by a message from the throne. It seemed to be at least the most respectful mode of proceeding, on the commencement of a new war with a Power with whom we had before been on terms of amity. But at any rate, if it was the intention of the noble lord to produce all the papers which he (Mr. Horner) thought were necessary, it would be better that the House should be saved the trouble of an unnecessary discussion on the motion for granting them. What he understood the noble lord would grant were, all the communications which had passed between his Majesty's government and the present government of Naples. More than that he could not himself call on the noble lord to produce. If, therefore, the noble lord was prepared to grant all which he was prepared to ask, it would be unnecessary for him to preface his motion with such a detailed statement as would otherwise have been necessary.
Lord Castlereaghcould not avoid feeling the utmost surprise at what had fallen from the hon. and learned gentleman. He had conceived that those who sat on the other side of the House had long since considered themselves to be in possession of information sufficient to warrant them in charging his Majesty's Government with an unqualified breach of faith. An hon. gentleman who sat opposite had very recently declared in terms the most decided, that he had at length conclusive grounds for ascribing to ministers a breach of faith, and a gross violation of their duty. It was impossible for him to imagine that those who had so long since criminated the proceedings of Government and of our Allies, in the general arrangements adopted for the settlement of Europe, should not now be prepared to support their accusations. He trusted, therefore, that as he had come down to the House in the discharge of his duty to meet the discussion of charges preferred in his absence, the hon. and learned gentleman, with the usual candour and manliness of 26 his character, would not now shrink from pursuing his notice.
§ Mr. Hornerbelieved that, in his own parliamentary experience, such a reception had never been given to any suggestion coming from any quarter of the House, as that which the noble lord had given to the observation he had thought it his duty to submit. The noble lord might enjoy his short lived triumph; he was no more inclined than that noble lord to shrink from the task of redeeming any pledge which he had once given to the House, although, if the noble lord had done justice to his proposal, he would have admitted the propriety of deferring an inquiry till the papers which he had intended to move for, as preliminary to that purpose, were before the House. The noble lord must have known that he had it in his power to embarrass ministers in that House by referring to papers which had been already laid before the other House of Parliament. (Cries of Order, order!) He wished, however, to take no such advantage; but be did not think the noble lord had treated the House very respectfully in leaving them to discover, by an ambiguous allusion of his own, that we were now engaged in a war, instead of making that communication in the ordinary form by a message from the Crown. He desired, also, to repel, with the indignation that was due to such an insinuation, the idea that he was disposed to shrink from the prosecution of any inquiry he had proposed to institute. He trusted he was as incapable of such conduct on the one hand, as on the other of abstaining from a full confession of his error, if there was any error into which he had been betrayed. The noble lord had been misinformed by his right honourable friends, however, if he understood that any substantive charges had been brought against him in his absence. He, for one, had certainly preferred no such accusation. Questions had certainly been asked, whether the facts were as they were stated to be, and whether published documents, purporting to be the genuine engagements of different powers, were fabricated or authentic instruments? Upon all these points the noble lord's right hon. colleagues and partners in responsibility had left them in the deepest ignorance,—whether from a disposition to withhold information, or because the noble lord had left them in ignorance not less profound, it was not for him to determine. The whole of their 27 conduct, both then and since, was such as impressed him with the irresistible conviction, that the stories so current in Europe had too much foundation, and the questions with regard to Saxony and Genoa gave them an additional colour of probability. If he understood correctly the substance of what had fallen from the noble lord the day before, it was that this country was now committed to hostilities with marshal Murat, and that the present, therefore, was a proper time for entertaining the question which he had given notice of bringing under the consideration of the House. He had previously put two specific questions to the noble lord, each of which, in his opinion, admitted of a direct answer; first, whether any regular or formal, treaty had been concluded with the person now ruling the kingdom of Naples, and secondly, if there had been no formal treaty, whether any thing amounting to an honorary engagement had been entered into. The reply of the noble lord was, that he was not prepared to answer either of these questions; and the unavoidable inference was, that his case required explanation. The motion which he should bring forward must undoubtedly be founded on imperfect information; but the object of it was to place the House in a situation in which it might judge with more advantage, by being put in possession of information that should not be imperfect, but as ample and complete as the nature of the case might require. The subject appeared to him, then, to divide itself into three periods: the first consisting of that portion of the last year which Was employed in active military operations; the second during the proceedings of Congress; and the third, which included whatever further communications had taken place under the views entertained when marshal Murat first acceded to the common cause, viz. since the commencement of the present spring. If he should fatigue the House by the minuteness to which he must now descend, he begged them to reflect that it was the noble lord who had imposed this necessity upon him. It appeared, then, that on the 11th of Jan. 1814, a treaty was signed between the Crowns of Austria and Naples, but that this was by no means the commencement of intercourse between the two Courts, which had probably subsisted from the period of the battle of Leipsic. This Treaty was signed by two persons on 28 the part of the Court of Vienna, and though there was no accession on our park to it, yet a communication was said to have been made to the Government of Naples, through the Court of Vienna, the substance of which was that Great Britain would be prepared to accede to the Treaty on the same condition under which that Treaty was concluded, viz. the military co-operation of marshal Murat in the common cause. Such, he believed, was the true state of the case. But at any rate, a letter was dispatched to lord William Bentinck from the noble lord, dated Basle, the 22nd of January, 1814, instructing him to proceed to Naples as soon as he should be informed that the Treaty with Austria was concluded, and there arrange, a suspension of arms. On the 3d of Feb. an armistice was concluded at Naples, the terms of which were. 1. A suspension of arms. 2. A free commerce during the armistice. 3. That three months notice should be given on either side, if it was intended to break the armistice; and, 4. That a military convention should, be concluded between Austria, England, and Naples, to arrange a plan of operations, according to which the respective troops, united in the same cause, were to act in Italy. He had certainly heard this engagement treated by the first minister of the Crown, in a place which it would be irregular for him to name, as a mere act for a temporary suspension of arms. Was it usual, then, in a mere armistice to stipulate for commercial relations, and arrange plans of military co-operation? The engagement entered into by lord William Bentinck appeared to him, whatever construction might be put upon it by others, to be in substance, although not in form, a treaty of peace, and not only a treaty of peace, but a treaty of offensive alliance. It was now very material to see what had been the conduct and proceedings of the Neapolitan Government subsequent to these transactions, in what light they were viewed by marshal Murat, and how far he had acted in adherence and conformity to the stipulations they contained. His own information was, that he immediately advanced his forces, and took up positions that produced a very favourable change in the affairs of the Allies in the north of Italy. In the beginning of January, Eugene Beauharnois, viceroy of Italy, who had an army of 45,000 men, was posted between the Mincio and the Adige, and engaged in offensive operations against 29 general Bellegarde; but, in consequence of the movements of marshal Murat in favour of the Allies, he gave up his offensive movements, and retired on the first week of February, to a new position behind the Mincio. All this took place in pursuance of the Treaty with Austria, and the convention with lord Willian Bentinck. In this state of affairs it was, indeed, very important for the British Government to consider the necessity of reconciling their new engagements with their former treaties with the King of the two Sicilies. In his own opinion they were not incompatible. On looking at the Treaties with Sicily, he was convinced we were perfectly at liberty to enter into those engagements with marshal Murat. The Treaties were three in number: the first was concluded by sir William Drummond, which was modified by two others, concluded by lord Amherst and lord William Bentinck. In the first Treaty which had been concluded with the King of Sicily, we guaranteed to him his two kingdoms of Naples and Sicily; but in the Treaty concluded by lord William Bentinck in 1812, which superseded the first, there was a most material difference: in the 13th Article of that Treaty, concluded at Palermo, the 12th of September, 1812, it would be seen, that we guaranteed to Ferdinand his kingdom of Sicily alone. We should, therefore, have been justified in entering into those engagements with Murat which had been brought near to a conclusion. Soon after the period to which he had alluded, marshal Murat, from particular circumstances, began to entertain doubts of the faith of the Allies. He had ratified the Treaty on the 5th of February, but he received no ratification from Austria. He complained of this neglect, and inquired whether or no it was the intention of the Austrian Government to fulfil their part of the engagement, as he had done? At last, after long delays, the Austrian Government stated, that it was its intention to fulfil its engagement; but that the English minister, whose assent it was wished at the same time to procure, could not, from certain motives (perhaps from delicacy to King Ferdinand), give his accession immediately; but that in the mean time the Ruler of Naples should receive a letter under the Emperor of Austria's own hand, containing an assurance that the Treaty should be ratified to its utmost extent.—This letter, as well as the ratification, was delayed, till on the 15th of 30 February, information was sent to marshal Bellegarde by Murat, that he would not advance until he received either the letter or the ratification. On the 4th of March the letter was sent without the ratification, but promising the ultimate ratification, with an account of the causes of the delay. In consequence of this assurance marshal Murat immediately put his troops in motion; on the 6th of March he took Reggio, a town of the utmost importance in the wars in that part of Italy. The attack he commanded in person, and on that occasion one of his most experienced generals was severely wounded. It was needless to detail the succession of victories which followed: marshal Murat occupied Parma, Guastalla, Modena, and arrived at the walls of Placentia. Such having been the exertions of the Ruler of Naples in support of the Allies, he was grossly misinformed, if up to this period the faith of Austria, at any rate, was not pledged, and if England was not closely connected with the engagements of Austria. A most important paper had been published, purporting to be a communication from the minister of Murat to the noble lord opposite (lord Castlereagh), in which there was a statement that a verbal assurance had been given by that noble lord to the minister of the Ruler of Naples, that the British Government would accede to the Treaty of Austria with Naples, and that the reason why he could not immediately accede to that Treaty was, that being under engagements to the King of Sicily, from motives of delicacy it was thought proper that the negociations for indemnity to the King of Sicily should proceed hand in hand with our accession to the Treaty with Murat. This was given as the statement of the minister in question; but if the noble lord opposite would wholly deny the existence of any such document, he (Mr. Horner) was bound to believe him; but if the statement was true, he would put it to the House whether we were not as much bound to Naples as if the noble lord had affixed his seal to the Treaty. Another circumstance, respecting which he expected to hear many details from the noble lord, was the landing of lord William Bentinck at Leghorn, a circumstance which would naturally tend to create distrust in the mind of marshal Murat, as that measure was taken without concert or communication with him, notwithstanding the Convention which had been concluded pursuant to the armistice, and 31 notwithstanding that Murat was in possession of great part of Tuscany. Lord William Bentinck also having a division of Sicilian troops in his army, a proclamation was published from the Prince Regent of Sicily on the 14th of March, inviting the Italians to join the independent standard, and asserting the right of King Ferdinand to Naples. Much discussion, and much angry discussion, arose in consequence between the Sovereign of Naples and lord William Bentinck, as to the party which should retain the possession of Tuscany. He knew not whether lord William Bentinck had received instructions which had not been communicated to the noble lord (Castlereagh); but much difference seemed to exist between them, for that noble lord had sent instructions to lord William Bentinck, in consequence of which a communication was made to the Ruler of of Naples at Bologna on the 1st of April, confirming an assurance which had been given verbally to the Neapolitan minister by the noble lord, that on the condition of active and immediate co-operation with the Allies, England would confirm the Treaty, and mentioning motives of delicacy to an ancient Ally as the ground for withholding consent for the present. The sentiments of the noble lord opposite, were conveyed in a dispatch dated Dijon, March 30, stating the impolicy of supporting a distinct and separate interest in the Italian war, and the necessity of unanimity, and of confidence and cordiality towards marshal Murat. In consequence of this dispatch, lord William Bentinck withdrew his opposition to marshal Murat on the subject of Tuscany. The Proclamation of the Prince Regent of Sicily was well calculated to excite distrust in Murat; and this was admitted by the noble lord, in a dispatch dated Dijon, 3d of April, 1814; in which he expressed to lord William Bentinck his surprise and indignation at such a Proclamation, and the impossibility of supporting the rights of the King of Sicily, in contradiction, or to the prejudice of the views of the Allies; and that though England had entered into no absolute engagement with the King of Naples, it had declared its intention so to do, by the conclusion of the armistice, and by the verbal declaration of its minister; and that, if the Court of Palermo persisted in its opposition, his Majesty's ministers would be obliged to conclude an immediate treaty with the Sovereign of Naples. The dispatch was, in fact, a distinct decla- 32 ration, that his Majesty's Government intended to recognize marshal Muat as King of Naples, and to take common measures with him accordingly. It was notorious that in consequence of these engagements Murat co-operated with Bellegarde, and that the object of that co-operation was to purchase the recognition of his title to the sovereignty of Naples. So faithful indeed was Murat to his engagement of co-operation with Austria, that he rejected a proposition which he (Mr. Horner) understood was made to that ruler by Beauharnois to conclude an armistice, stating that an armistice had also been concluded between France and the Allies. Whether this statement was correct or not, was immaterial to the present purpose; for it was known that Murat referred the proposition to Bellegarde, thus proving his fidelity and the justice of his claim upon those who promised to recognize his title. The evidence of this promise rested upon a variety of facts, all of which were calculated to encourage the reliance of Murat, that the Allies intended to observe a good faith towards him. That the ministers of Austria and England professed so to intend at a particular time, was obvious from several public documents. In the letter of prince Metternich to the noble lord (Castlereagh), dated Troves, Feb. 15, 1814, that minister dwelt upon the propriety of making a liberal compensation to Ferdinand, king of Sicily, thus admitting the security of Murat's dominion. But a number of circumstances which had transpired with respect to the negociations at Chatillon, left no doubt of the disposition of the Allies towards Murat at that period; for when a proposition was made by Buonaparté's minister to discuss the affairs of Italy, the answer distinctly was, that the title of Murat to Naples could not be questioned, and that to that point no such discussion could apply. But the noble lord was so tenacious with regard to the proceedings at Chatillon, that he probably would decline to favour the House with any explanation upon that subject. However, as the noble lord was not so unwilling to communicate information respecting the negociations at Chaumont, he would not, perhaps, hesitate to admit that to the Treaty-concluded on that occasion Murat was invited to accede. Was not this invitation, then, an admission of the title of Murat, or at least an indication on the part of the Allies to recognise that title? But to this 33 recognition the faith of this country was distinctly pledged by the noble lord opposite, and also by lord William Bentinck, in consequence of the proclamation of the Prince Regent of Sicily. It was also material, upon the consideration of this subject, to look to the value and importance of Murat's co-operation in the common cause of the Allies. For at the time that co-operation commenced, it was known that the viceroy, Eugene Beauharnois, had no less than 84,000 men under his command, combining those in garrison with those in field, and that he had in position from the Adige to the Mincio an effective force of 45,000 men; while Bellegarde had only 31,000 effective men in the field, the remainder of the Austrian army being from sickness unable to act. For although the Austrians mustered between 60 and 70,000 men in January, scarcely half that number were fit for action in February, and no less than 10,000 men fell victims to the diseases that prevailed among them. It was therefore evident, that if it were not for the co-operation of Murat the Austrians must have retreated, and that that co-operation was obtained upon a promise to recognize Murat's title to the throne of Naples. These circumstances, then, must be admitted to furnish a primâ facie case that called for inquiry. This, he presumed, the noble lord opposite would hardly venture to deny; and he should suppose that the noble lord upon such a case ought, instead of waiting for a motion from that side of the House, to feel it due to the House itself, and to his own character, to have a message brought down from the Crown upon the subject, accompanied by an explanation of all the circumstances connected with such an extraordinary transaction. It was known, not only that the military co-operation of Murat had been obtained under the engagements on our part, which he had already described, but that a proposition was entertained for establishing a commercial intercourse between Naples and this country. He had heard that a proposition was made to Murat to grant him an indemnity for Naples; but nothing of this nature had ever appeared in any paper of which the public had had a glimpse. On the whole, he felt it extremely difficult to imagine what defence the noble lord could make out for the conduct of the British Government towards Murat. It was said that the noble lord proposed to deal in recrimination upon 34 that ruler, by charging him with such a violation of good faith as released our Government from the obligations contracted with him. For the honour of the country, and even for the honour of the noble lord, although he had no acquaintance with him, he declared that he should rejoice to see such a charge substantiated. It would, indeed, be somewhat satisfactory to his mind to find that the conduct of Murat had been such as to justify a suspicion of his purposes, or to absolve us from our engagements; but it would answer no end to show any ambiguity in the demeanour of Murat, which might naturally result from his just suspicion of the designs of the Allies towards him. Nor could any general statement give satisfaction to those who really wished to see our Government vindicated, for not fulfilling its promises to Murat. No; the noble lord, with a view to a satisfactory vindication, must state something specific—he must refer to dates and circumstances, as he (Mr. Horner) had done. The noble lord must also, in order to sustain any recrimination, refer, not to what occurred previous to April 1814, but to something which had taken place since Murat became pledged to the cause of the Allies. The hon. and learned gentleman said, he had heard, that pending the angry discussion between lord William Bentinck and Murat, that Ruler made a proposition to Eugene Beauharnois, which was certainly not in favour of France, although it did not imply co-operation with, the allies, namely, that he and the Viceroy should form a junction, and declare for the establishment of the independence of Italy. He had also understood that lord William Bentinck, who did not then appear to enter into the views of the noble lord opposite, had proposed to marshal Bellegarde to unite their forces in order to destroy Murat. All these circumstances called upon the noble lord for explanation; but he hoped that in such explanation the noble lord would, if he entered into the case, favour the House with a statement of time and place, and refer to events posterior and not anterior to the month of April, 1814. It would be for the noble lord to show whether the faith of this country, which he had solemnly pledged, had been kept—whether the promises he had made were redeemed. Let Austria, which had, unfortunately for herself, no parliament to inquire into the proceedings of her Government, answer for 35 her own conduct; but it was incumbent upon the noble lord to justify the part which the British Government had taken in this transaction, chiefly through his agency. It was for the noble lord to show whether in this instance the British Government had acted upon the just and liberal principles professed in the celebrated Declaration of Frankfort—upon those principles which the Allies in their proceedings at Congress, in their views of personal aggrandizement, had so shamefully abandoned. These proceedings, however, would remain for discussion. He did not call upon the noble lord to enter into them at present, or to make any disclosure upon the subject which he might deem inexpedient: but he required from the noble lord an explanation of what notoriously took place with respect to Naples. If the title of Murat were brought into question at Congress, one should suppose that the noble lord was bound, from his special engagements, to resist any proposition upon the subject. He (Mr. Horner) could readily imagine that there were persons at the Congress very willing to question the title of Murat, and to promote his removal; Talleyrand, for instance, with any other representative of the Bourbon family, might naturally be supposed to possess that wish; but then as France was not, he fancied, the predominant power in that assembly, he should have thought that the noble lord and prince Metternich, who were tied hand and foot in their obligations to Murat, would have been forward to withstand the wish of the French minister. A document, however, had made its way to the public, which furnished something directly contradictory to this natural supposition. That document, which purported to be a letter addressed by Talleyrand to the noble lord, was really of such a nature, that he could assure the noble lord he could not persuade himself to believe it genuine, from the base fraud it proposed, until the noble lord's own conduct, when questioned in that House upon the subject, removed all doubt from his mind. From this letter it would seem, that the noble lord himself had originated a proposition for removing Murat from the throne of Naples. Such, indeed, was the clear inference from the outset and conclusion of that letter, which distinctly referred to the invitation of the noble lord to the writer to consider of the expediency and practicability of disposing of Murat. Of the general character of 36 Talleyrand, who for twenty years had had such ample opportunities of studying all the diplomacy of despotism and duplicity, he (Mr. Horner) did not wish to state his opinion, lest he should hurt the feelings of the noble lord by any censure upon his lordship's new ally; but he had no hesitation to say that this letter, in the expedients it suggested for attacking Naples, and evading the pledge by which Austria guaranteed the throne of that kingdom to Murat, together with the preservation of the peace of Italy, betrayed a character pregnant with such perfidy and baseness as the vilest wretch in society could scarcely parallel—[cries of Hear, hear!]. He (Mr. Horner) anxiously hoped that the noble lord would be able to repel the idea of having in any degree sanctioned such expedients, or been a party to the origination of the proposal which gave rise to this extraordinary letter. He also hoped the noble lord would be able to give some satisfactory explanation why the execution of the engagements entered into with Murat on the part of this country had been so long delayed? why the promises solemnly made to that ruler above twelve months ago had never been fulfilled? Murat had frequently pressed for the fulfilment of those promises, as appeared from the publication of some documents addressed to the noble lord by the agents of that ruler. Possibly it was intended that the execution of the engagements to Murat should go on, pari passu, with the settlement of an indemnity for the King of Sicily, but the House would hear what the noble lord had to say upon the subject, especially as to the proposition of Murat not long since to co-operate with the Allies, and to conclude a treaty for that purpose on the recognition of his title to the throne of Naples. He understood that this proposition of a treaty was made to his Majesty's ministers some time before the noble lord's return from Congress, and that the consideration of it was waved until the noble lord's return. The hon. and learned gentleman begged it to be understood, that be was not disposed to panegyrize Murat, or to place any reliance upon his promises, unless where he had a clear and indisputable interest in observing them; but that it was Murat's interest to adhere to a treaty with this country; if' his title to the throne of Naples were recognised, there could be no doubt whatever. Such a treaty, then, Murat 37 offered to conclude. Nay, farther, he proposed a commercial treaty upon the most favourable terms, offering to place our shipping which might trade with Naples on the fooling of the most favoured nations, and to admit the principal articles of our manufacture, namely woollens and cottons, into all Neapolitan ports, upon the payment of a trifling duty. Was it not, he would ask, the obvious policy of this country to accede to such a proposition? But what was the conduct of ministers?—why, they referred the proposition to Congress, refusing to give the Neapolitan minister any answer upon the subject. He really could not divine the motives which suggested such a proceeding. That the discussion of a specific treaty between this country and another state upon a commercial question, should be referred to Congress,—that such a question should be left to the adjustment of foreign powers,—appeared to him a measure without precedent or policy. The proposition, however, of the Neapolitan minister was rejected by his Majesty's ministers without any consideration. But those ministers themselves seemed to feel the impolicy of their conduct, and therefore they proposed to negociate with the Neapolitan minister upon the subject of his proposition. When, however, was this feeling manifested? Why, on the very day that intelligence was received of the advance of Murat's army to Bologna! Then, truly, ministers expressed a disposition to avail themselves of the opportunity offered to them, and which they roost imprudently threw away, of securing the co-operation of Murat in the cause of the Allies, and of obtaining important commercial benefits for their country. It would not be fair to attack his Majesty's Government on the ground of the immense advantages they had lost at present, as it was impossible for them to foresee the new posture of affairs; but from the state of things in the beginning of the present year, it was most impolitic in them to reject an alliance with the reigning Government of Naples. The truest policy would have been to unite the whole of Italy under one great military power; this would have been the best possible arrangement, both against the projects of France and all other nations. Under existing circumstances, while the north of Italy was subject to the control of Austria, and the south was under a great military power, the true policy of this country was 38 to secure the friendship of that Power: this country would then have possessed more influence over Italy than by any other measures that he could mention. The policy of this country, he repeated, would have been to maintain the independence of Genoa, and to secure the alliance of Murat; but it was the policy of Talleyrand to alienate England from Naples. Wishing, however, to relieve the House from any farther observations, he would state distinctly the grounds on which he intended to move for inquiry: first, that it was necessary to be shown, that the good faith of the country had not been sacrificed; secondly, that it was proper to see that the policy of securing an alliance with the reigning Government of Naples had not been neglected; and thirdly, that ministers should inform the House what were the true grounds and cause of war between this country and Naples. The only ground of war that he could conceive, was one that had not yet taken place, namely, under the Treaty of the 25th of March. He asked the noble lord to explain, independent of the question of an armistice, how, until that Treaty had been ratified, we could be considered as parties with Austria in the war? Until that period, it could only be a war on the part of Austria. Such were the grounds of his inquiry; and he should conclude with moving,
"That an humble Address be presented to his royal highness the Prince Regent, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions, that there be laid before this House, an account of the negociations between his Majesty's Government and the government of Naples, with a view to the conclusion of an armistice and a military co-operation in the war against France in the course of the last year, and also of such communications as have since taken place relative to the acknowledgment of the present ruler of Naples prior to the commencement of hostilities between that government and Austria."
Lord Castlereaghbegan by stating, that the House would naturally suppose that he must feel anxious to enter into explanations upon the question then before them; and hence he had pressed upon the hon. member to fulfil the notice which he had given, and to open the matter according to the view of it which prevailed in his mind. The hon. member had accepted his challenge, and had certainly argued the question with that fairness, ability, and 39 manliness, which always characterised him. He had put it upon its fair and proper footing, and the House would therefore be enabled to exercise a sound and effective judgment on all the circumstances connected with it; and it would certainly be necessary for them, as the hon. gentleman had observed, to examine with patient minuteness the dates of the facts stated, because upon those dates the reasons deduced were founded. He should not now enter into the discussion of some of the collateral topics brought forward by the hon. gentleman, but would enter at once upon that branch of the question which involved its immediate interest and importance. He was sure the House would do him the justice to recollect, that whenever the question was incidentally agitated, he had uniformly avowed that he should not rest his defence upon the mere technical distinction as to whether the engagements entered into with Murat were to be found in the words of an official dispatch, or whether they existed in the stipulations of a ratified treaty. In the very outset he again begged leave to affirm, that his explanations would not rest upon any such distinctions. He agreed also, with the hon. member, that the question naturally divided itself into two considerations—first, as to what might be the obligations of good faith from this country to the Government of Naples; and, secondly, supposing all claims of good faith and honour to be dissolved, as in fact they were, whether it was expedient to adopt that course towards Murat which it might be supposed had precipitated him into hostilities. The hon. member had stated, and truly stated, that the basis of the transactions between Murat and the British Government was laid in an instruction of his (lord Castlereagh) to lord William Bentinck, dated Basle, January the 22d, 1814. That instruction was issued inconsequence of the Treaty of Peace and Alliance concluded between Austria and Murat, and directed that upon the faith of that Treaty hostilities should be suspended between this country and Naples. Before, however, the order reached lord William Bentinck, a person authorized by him, had concluded an armistice with the Neapolitan Government on the 3d of February, 1814, being that instrument on which the hon. gentleman had argued in the course of his speech. He should now proceed to the next step in those transactions, and read to the House an extract of a letter, which he appre- 40 hended would enable him to place the question on that ground on which he should most successfully argue it. The letter was dated Chatillon, Feb. 21, 1814, and addressed to lord William Bentinck. The substance of this extract was "that the British Government had never liked the measure of a peace between Austria and Naples; but the engagement being concluded, Great Britain had entered into it upon two conditions—first, that Murat should honourably and effectively exert himself in co-operation with the Allies against the common enemy; and, secondly, that an indemnity (for it could not be called an equivalent) should be provided for the King of Sicily." It would be recollected that when the Peace of Paris was under the consideration of that House, an hon. member had adverted in strong terms, and very naturally, in his (lord Castlereagh's) opinion, to the apparent abandonment of the interests of the King of Sicily by this Government: but in point of fact, our engagements with Sicily extended no farther than to the protection of Sicily, and nothing in the shape of a sine quâ non entered into them, that Naples should be recovered for her. In short, from the situation of the continent at the time when those engagements were contracted, nothing could appear more improbable than that Naples could be restored to the King of Sicily; and there was no obligation of good faith, no obligation of honour on the part of this country, which could induce the Government to put such an object in competition with what the general security of Europe required. In the month of August last, the Government of Austria, naturally anxious to strengthen her interests in Italy, and secure her possessions there free from danger, entered into negociations with Murat; and at that time his Majesty's Government concurred in those negociations upon the basis, not that Murat was to retain Naples, but that he was to receive an equivalent elsewhere. Towards the month of October, however, it appeared that any such arrangement was entirely out of the question, for that Murat would listen to nothing of the kind: and it was then agreed upon, that he should retain Naples, and the Sicilian family receive indemnities. The grounds upon which that was done was because it appeared inexpedient to place at hazard the general interests of Europe, in order to pursue the attainment of remote and uncertain objects.—With regard to the con- 41 duct of his Majesty's Government on this occasion, he had no hesitation in stating, that it most reluctantly became a party to those transactions; but, at the same time, as Austria found it necessary to conclude an alliance with Murat, it assented to the general principle, with the two same conditions which had before been insisted on by this country. Those conditions being thus carefully stipulated for, it remained to be seen whether the co-operation of Murat with the Confederated Powers was of that description which entitled him to the execution of those assurances which had been made. The hon. member, in the course of his speech, alluded to what he called a misunderstanding between lord William Bentinck and Murat; but he should have the satisfaction of reading to the House a short extract, which would show that it was not a misunderstanding merely, but a deliberate judgment on the part of lord William Bentinck respecting the conduct of Murat, because that conduct was not consistent with those conditions which recognised him as Sovereign of Naples. At the same time, he would take upon himself to say there was nothing in the conduct towards Murat, with one exception, which could throw the slightest cloud over his confidence in that Government. The Treaty, indeed, was not formally ratified and exchanged, because, the Emperor of Austria being then in the field, it was not practicable to do so; but it was accompanied with an autographical letter from the Emperor to Murat, stating his approbation of the terms of the Treaty, his intention to maintain them, and his hope that Murat would consider that personal recognition of his Imperial Majesty equally as conclusive as if the Treaty were regularly ratified. Murat, as might be expected, signified his perfect reliance upon the assurances of his Imperial Majesty, thus flatteringly communicated to him. Now, the only exception to the general scope and intent of the Treaty, was one which had for its object to defeat a purpose which was then suspected, and had since proved to be at the bottom of his heart, namely, by limiting and fixing his possessions within the marches of Ancona, so as to prevent him from extending them to the boundary of the Po. Lord William Bentinck communicated to marshal Bellegarde what his opinion was how Murat had executed his part of the engagement. He evidently meant to qualify the conduct of the British Government, and 42 said, that they did not know the conduct of Murat, when that authority was transmitted. On the 25th of March, long after the Treaty had been ratified, and when Murat might have destroyed those unfavourable opinions which lord William Bentinck had formed, that noble lord made use of the following language: "It is now necessary to consider the conduct of Murat. Has he fulfilled his engagements with Austria? Has he not acted rather as a friend to Buonaparté? Was it not the policy of a deserter to throw his whole force into the scale? He could expect no favour from Buonaparté: but is it not the language of all his officers, that Italy should be united, and that he should be the head? Finally, is there any man in Italy, or in the Austrian army south of the Po, who has any confidence in him? He is only waiting to place himself on the strongest side."
Such, continued the noble lord, was the opinion entertained by lord William Bentinck, of the conduct and intentions of Murat, and it must be allowed that he had opportunities of closely observing him. At the same time, when that communication of the 25th of March reached him, he certainly did endeavour to argue down all the suspicions it contained, not because he considered them as wholly unfounded, but because he thought it probable lord William Bentick might entertain some honourable prejudices in favour of the Court of Sicily, which would, perhaps, lead him to scrutinize with anxious severity the proceedings of Murat; and because he thought, that if relations of peace were to be maintained with Murat, and his co-operation secured, they could only be effected, with such a man, by testifying an excess of confidence; in short, by showing much more confidence than was felt. The strong impression upon his mind, however, and upon the minds of others with whom he communicated, certainly was, that the conduct of Murat was not such as the Allies were entitled to expect; but, on the other hand, it was at that time no more than mere matter of opinion; and if the question as to the engagements between this country and Naples had rested simply on that opinion, however strong or probable, he, for one, should not have considered it as a justifiable motive for suspending the fulfilment of the conditions. He had an opportunity, however, while at Paris, of communicating with a person, whom he 43 could not with propriety name, from whom he received information which produced on his mind a complete moral conviction, that Murat had not honourably performed his engagements towards the Allies. The communication was derived from a quarter which could leave no doubt as to its authenticity; and he then distinctly avowed, on the part of his Majesty's Government, that if it satisfactorily appeared that those engagements were not fulfilled by Murat, he should consider the engagements between this country and Naples as dissolved. In pursuance of this declaration, he took the earliest opportunity after his arrival in this country, to make a similar communication to the Neapolitan minister accredited here, and he stated the same to the duke of Campochiaro at Vienna, observing, in consequence of the moral certainty which existed as to the non-fulfilment of the stipulated conditions by Murat, that the question with respect to Naples still remained free and open, to be discussed upon its own individual merits in Congress. The noble lord here read an extract of a letter which he sent home from Vienna, dated January 25th, 1815, in which he stated that "he transmitted, for the consideration of Government, a note delivered to him by the duke of Campochiaro, and observed, that he had, upon two different occasions, most explicitly declared, that, in the opinion of the British Government, Murat had not fulfilled the conditions of the Treaty, and that therefore Congress was free to act upon the question of Naples according to what the general policy and interests of Europe might seem to require." He was not prepared to say what line of policy would have been adopted by Congress, or what it would be most expedient to adopt, for it appeared to all the plenipotentiaries assembled at Vienna as a most difficult and intricate question; and the only point upon which they did agree was, that it ought to be the last, instead of the first subject, on which the Congress should be called upon to pronounce. In fact, down to the period at which hostilities commenced between Austria and Naples, no act of Congress had been concluded upon that question. The views of the British Government in respect to Naples, and its conviction that it was free as to its future proceedings, in consequence of the conduct of Murat, were not made any secret of: they had been frankly avowed to the 44 ministers of Murat, and of course were tot withheld from the ministers of the other Powers of Europe. Prince Talleyrand in particular pressed him to declare what were the ultimate intentions of his Majesty's Government; but he could not possibly anticipate any future decision upon a question that was suspended for a emote consideration, though at the same time he requested prince Talleyrand to communicate the propositions which he intended to submit, that he (lord Castlereagh) might have time to transmit it for he consideration of his Majesty's Government, and receive their answer before Congress was called upon to pronounce upon the question itself. That was the course of negociation which led to the production of prince Talleyrand's letter. When he (lord Castlereagh) stated to the Juke of Campochiaro, that the British Government considered its engagements with Murat dissolved, in consequence of him conduct, the duke submitted to him [lord Castlereagh) an extended review of what had been the whole course of his master's proceedings, politically and morally, from the time of the battle of Leipzic, down to the period at which that instrument was delivered. The House would be put in possession of that document among others. It certainly did not shake his conviction of the insincerity of Murat; but at the same time he thought it wise and prudent, in a matter of so much delicacy and importance, not to rest merely upon his own opinion, but to fortify and confirm it, if possible, by that of individuals who were well qualified to pronounce upon the accuracy of the historical narrative in question. He, therefore, submitted it to the examination of general Nugent, an officer of the highest credit, of the most unblemished honour, and possessing that sort of mind which enabled him to state, not only a general but a reasonable opinion. The House were aware that general Nugent had acted with Murat in the campaign of Italy, after the Treaty between Naples and Austria. He did accordingly make a detailed report upon the document, paragraph by paragraph (which would also be communicated to the House), in which he not only denied the facts as stated by the duke of Campochiaro, but also controverted all his conclusions. He affirmed that Murat not merely maintained a degree of military inactivity, but by a skilful management of his troops, con- 45 trived to defeat the very objects for which his co-operation was required in order to secure their success. In addition to that information, he had also sent the narrative to lord William Bentinck, who likewise returned a very detailed report upon it (which would be among the papers communicated to the House), in which he contended that Murat had totally neglected to fulfil his engagements to the Allies, and had, instead, played falsely with all parties, endeavouring to keep the balance suspended in his own hands till he could determine on which side he could most safely incline it. The House would have, in those documents, the judgment of two distinguished and experienced officers, not upon insulated topics, but upon the whole scope and the general operations of the campaign in which they so largely participated. Prince Talleyrand also told him that he had the clearest proofs that long after Murat had been negociating with the Allies, he was also in direct negociation with Buonaparté for the possession of Italy south of the Po. It was true that Buonaparté, not then thinking so humbly of his fortune, treated his proposal with the utmost contempt, and talked of Murat as a madman and a fool. It appeared that even in the month of February last year, the queen of Naples was in direct communication with Buonaparté, and made proposals to him on the part of her husband. As to the merit that was claimed for his not joining the Viceroy, the fact was, that he could not join him, as their pretensions were incompatible. He in fact claimed about half of his vice-royalty. The House would now see the cruel situation in which ministers had been placed. They had been reviled in every corner of the country for supposed breaches of faith, which the gentlemen on the other side so confidently charged them with. He trusted that he had been able to collect sufficient documents to prove to the House and the country, that there had been no breach of faith on the part of the British Government. He admitted that the hon. gentleman had fairly and properly, this night, said that the case was a primâ facie one, and called for some answer or inquiry. He thought, however, that any man who had the least value for the honour and character of his country, or the government under which he lived, should, even if there was a primâ facie case of breach of faith, suppose that the Government 46 would be able to give it an answer, and justify their conduct. Ministers, however, had been most violently attacked by other gentlemen in that House, upon some loose documents that had got into their hands, and before the time had arrived when they could go into their justification. As he had wished to get possession of what documents he could find respecting the conduct of Murat, he intreated prince Talleyrand to have a search made in the public bureaus of Paris. A diligent search had been made, and very important documents had been found. He should now read to the House extracts of the correspondence which had been found, that passed at that time between the princess Borghese, Buonaparté, and the King and Queen of Naples. He should also read extracts to prove the opinion of the French constituted authorities on his conduct. From the first letter, which was from the princess Borghese to Buonaparté, dated Lucca, February, 14th, 1814, he read the following extract; "The King of Naples is in a state of great agitation. He is astonished that the Viceroy should have retired from the Adige, and that I have quitted Tuscany, upon the notion that he could be the enemy of your Majesty and of France. He loudly expresses his devotion and his gratitude for your person, and he even said to the Tuscan deputies, that he would prefer receiving the first blow, to drawing his sword against a Frenchman. I know not how to reconcile this language, of which I do not suspect the sincerity, with all the arbitrary measures which have endangered my authority, and those which oblige me even now to provide for the safety of the French troops assembled at Pisa. Your Majesty will appreciate these contradictions, which seem to me to proceed from a resolution, deemed by the King, conformable to his interests, but into which he has been dragged contrary to his own affections. I am assured that the language and conduct of the King are similar in his communications with the Viceroy. It is nevertheless, certain, that a Proclamation of general Bellegarde's, which recalls the nations of Italy to their former state, has been reprinted at Bologna under the eyes of the King. This Proclamation, drawn up with much art, has produced the greatest effect in Tuscany, where it is extensively circulated." The second letter which he should read, was from Buonaparté to the Queen of Naples, 47 and was dated Nangis, the 17th of February. At the time this letter was written, Buonaparté did not despair of his fortune, and treated Murat in the style of a master. This letter contained the following expressions: "Your husband is a very brave man in the field of battle, but he is more cowardly than a woman or a monk when not in the presence of the enemy. He has no moral courage. He has been frightened, and he has not hazarded losing for a moment that which he cannot hold but by me and with me. Make him fully sensible of his absurdity. When he quitted the army without my order, I foresaw all the evil counsels which would be given him. I am, however, better satisfied with the message he has sent me through you. If he be sincerely sorry, let him watch the moment for proving to me that he has not been so ungrateful as he is pusillanimous. I may yet pardon him the injury be has done me." He should next read an extract from a letter from Fouché to Buonaparté, dated Lucca, February 18. This letter recounted the difficulties he had experienced in attempting to correspond with Murat. He says, "I set out for Bologna, where the King of Naples was. I experienced no difficulty as far as Florence; but upon my arrival in that town, the new authorities signified to me that I could neither continue my route, nor remain at Florence, and that I must go back as far as Prato, there to await the answer of the King. I dispatched a courier to that prince, and am returned to Lucca, where I am in greater safety than at Prato, which is in a state of insurrection. I know not what the King will be allowed to answer. The Austrian and English ministers reproach him with being French, and particularly with being too much attached to your Majesty. The revolutionists who govern Florence just now assert loudly that the King of Naples has an understanding with the French, and that he deceives the Italians. They attribute to my counsels the inaction of the Neapolitan troops which the Allies wished should march against the Viceroy at the moment when he was about being attacked by general Bellegarde. The King is sick with grief. He now thoroughly feels in what a situation he is placed. It is difficult for me to make my advice reach him. If there were as much firmness in his character as good qualities in his heart, he would be stronger in Italy than the coalition." The noble lord then read an ex- 48 tract of a letter from Eugene Beauharnois to Buonaparté, dated the 20th of February: "The King of Naples," he writes, "who appeared inclined to march against us, and to yield to the solicitations of the Austrians, paused as soon as he became acquainted with your Majesty's late victories of the 10th, 11th, and 12th. He had not yet received the ratification of his Treaty the evening before last. I therefore hope that he will not add to the wrongs of which he has been guilty towards your Majesty, by firing upon your troops." He next read the following, letter from the French consul at Ancona, which was without date, but was certainly written about the same time; most probably from Lucca: "The consul had occasion to see the King of Naples on account of his passports. The following is the substance of the conversation he had with him:—Necessity alone, said the King, has obliged me to unite with the Allies; the great extent of the coasts of my kingdom exposed them to the invasion, of the English. Their maritime strength, and their force in Italy, are well known. Who would have defended my kingdom, had I carried my army beyond the Po? besides, it would have been impossible for me to make it leave the kingdom. On the other hand, my people were discontented in consequence of the stagnation of commerce, which prevented them from realising the productions of the soil; it would have been easy for the enemy to have reduced them, to the sole detriment of myself and of France. On the other hand, my nation would have been dissatisfied had I not acceded to the proposals which the Allies made me, of indemnifying myself for Sicily by the countries on this side the Po, which his majesty the Emperor of the French was obliged to renounce by the force of circumstances. He added, that his intentions were so much the purer on this head, as it was agreed that his army was never to fight against the French: he would recollect constantly that he was himself a Frenchman, and that he would not forget all he owed to his illustrious brother-in-law. He desired the consul to remain at Ancona, and to continue his functions, assuring him that his correspondence should be free, since he was not at war with France. The consul did not think that it was for him to make any objection. On their arrival at Ancona, the Neapolitan authorities had all the Italian arms taken down. The 49 arms of France, placed at the consul's house, were respected." The next letter which he had to read was a very curious document; it was a letter from Buonaparté to Murat, giving him an account of his successes over the Austrians on the 10th, 11th, and 12th, of February, and threatening him with the effects of his displeasure if he did not change his conduct. He, however, addressed him with some degree of courtesy, in still giving him the title of a king. This curious instrument began in this manner—"Sire, my brother; I say nothing to you of my displeasure at your conduct, which has been diametrically opposite to your duty. That, however, belongs to the weakness of your nature. You are a good soldier on the field of battle, but, excepting there, you have no vigour, and no character. Take advantage of an act of treachery which I only attribute to fear, in order to serve me by good intelligence. I rely upon you, upon your contrition, upon your promises. If it were otherwise, recollect that you would have to repent it. I suppose that you are not one of those who imagine that the Lion is dead, and that he may be—(The rest of the sentence, lord Castlereagh said, he would read in the original)—et qu'on peut lui pisser dessus. If such are your calculations, they are false. I defeated the Austrians yesterday, and I am in pursuit of the remnants of their columns. Another such victory, and you will see that my affairs are not so desperate as you have been led to believe. You have done me all the harm you could since your departure from Wilna, but we shall say no more about it. The title of king has turned your brain. If you wish to preserve it, behave well, and keep your word." Another letter from Buonaparté, dated March 5, addressed to Murat, runs thus: "I have already communicated to you my opinion of your conduct. Your situation had set you beside yourself; my reverses have completely turned your brain. You have called around you men who hate France, and who desire to ruin you. I formerly gave you useful warnings. What you write to me is at variance with your actions. I shall however see by your manner of acting at Ancona, if your heart is still French, and if it is to necessity alone that you yield. I write to my war minister, in order to set him at ease with regard to your conduct. Recollect that your kingdom, which has cost so much 50 blood and trouble to France, is yours only for the benefit of those who gave it you. It is needless to send me an answer unless you have something important to communicate. Remember that I made you a king solely for the interest of my system. Do not deceive yourself. If you should cease to be a Frenchman, you would be nothing to me. Continue to correspond with the Viceroy, taking care that your letters be not intercepted." Such was the sort of ally which the Coalition had gained in Murat! The noble lord proceeded to enlarge on his perfidy, and stated that in one instance when a French corps was shut up in Reggio, and surrounded by the Allies, Murat so disposed of his force as to give them an opportunity of making their escape. His conduct had in every respect been perfectly consistent with the base policy on which it was proved he had acted. The noble lord said, he began now to apprehend that the old charge against ministers would be likely to be renewed, and that they would be accused of having been too negligent of the interests of the King of Sicily. Sicily had the same claims on us that she always had. We were bound to do all the good we could for her, compatible with the general interests of Europe. Had Murat been faithful to his engagements, like a man of spirit and honour, he would have been supported by the Allies. His perfidy threw Sicily into the same situation in which she had formerly stood. Had Murat's conduct been different, the question respecting Naples would never have been pressed as it had been by the French Government; that question had been pressed—honourably pressed—to the utmost, and that Government, in the actual state of things, would never have been a party to any arrangement which went to establish Murat on the throne of Naples. Buonaparté left Elba on the 22d of February; intelligence of this reached Naples on the 4th or 5th of March. On this Murat called his cabinet together, and declared his resolution of adhering to the Allies. A communication to this effect was received in this country on the 18th; and, notwithstanding the former conduct of the man, the English government had not decided in what way this should be treated, but had immediately transmitted it to Vienna. Of this proceeding, the person representing him in this country had been distinctly informed. Two days after the time at which Buonaparté left 51 Elba, the ministers of Murat presented a note to the Congress at Vienna, complaining of the hostile views entertained by France against Naples, and demanding categorically to be permitted to march an army of 80,000 men through the Austrian possessions, in order to call France to an account for her conduct. In this there was a singular coincidence, as Murat for a considerable time had been raising an armament by very severe measures, much exceeding the resources of his states, and at this remarkable period wished to employ them where it was impossible he could suppose there was any danger. It was certain that he had some illegitimate object in view; and in consequence of this note the Austrian Government informed him, that no power would be suffered to march an army through their dominions; and it was added, that a note to this effect would be given to France, should a similar demand be made on her part. Before the reply to the communication made to this country of the determination of Murat to be faithful to the Allies Could be received in Naples from, this country or from Vienna, Murat proceeded to the head-quarters of his army, on receiving intelligence that Buonaparté had been joined by the army and by Ney. Here he resumed the title of Napoleon, which before had been added to his name, but which he had laid down on joining the Allies. Was this to assure England and her Allies of his friendship? The proclamations of Buonaparté he published in French and in Italian: he advanced in a hostile manner through Florence and the Papal States; he drove the Austrian outposts before him, and issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of the several states through which he passed, calling upon them to rise against their legitimate governments. Was this done to show his friendship for England, who he knew would not be separated from her Allies? No;—the language held by him respecting this country, like the civilities which he had shown to the English in Naples, were only intended to induce a belief in Italy that his present proceedings had the countenance of England. It was said, that the armistice concluded with him was not to be broken without three months notice; but this arrangement, made in the contemplation of a state of peace and alliance, was not to tie up the hands of this country when an act of aggression took place on the part of Murat. If this 52 construction were to be put upon it, such an armistice would be better for him than a definitive treaty of peace. It was impossible that any thing so absurd and so contemptible could be imagined. Could it be thought that be would either deceive himself or the world by representing this country as likely to be held by such, a cobweb?
The noble lord said, he had now repelled those charges which had been so unadvisedly, and he would say, so unfairly brought forward at a time when they could not be answered. To repel them was a duty which he owed, not so much to himself, as to the honour of the country. For the time to come, he thought it was not too much to hope that the gentlemen opposite would have sufficient charity not to assume that the good faith of the country had been sported with till the period arrived at which explanation could be offered without injury to the public service. He trusted what had passed this night would give the opponents of Government a salutary lesson, and that they would not in future be so ready to bring forward complaints on partial statements like those contained in the documents recently published, which he knew, for the most part, not to have been derived directly or circuitously from an official source. They must have been furnished by the agents of other countries, who were desirous of putting forth statements in this way which they feared to avow in the face of Europe. He conceived these to furnish very bad grounds for any parliamentary proceeding; and if gentlemen kept their ears open to such representations, and on these did that which must lessen the country in the estimation of the world, they would do the greatest possible injury to the public service. It was not too much to hope, that they would give credit to the Government for not having sacrificed their duty till they could with propriety explain their conduct. Where a question arose, while a doubt remained, the presumption ought not to be in favour of the enemy, but in favour of their own country. Feeling this as he did, he trusted the feeling would not be confined to himself, and that the hon. gentleman opposite would for the future be more cautious how he committed himself to an opinion favourable to the enemies of his country.
§ Mr. Whitbreadsaid, he did not mean to eater into the case at length that night, 53 as a more fit opportunity would be afforded after the production of the papers; but in his view it did not seem clear, from the statement of the noble lord, that he alone was the government of the nation, that he alone was the whole empire, and consequently, that he alone was to determine the future fate of the country; nor was it more satisfactorily proved that all those who argued that the noble lord had grossly misconducted the affairs of the nation, were not Englishmen and the real friends of their country. It was not at all proved, in the opinion of Mr. Whitbread, that the noble lord was blameless in those transactions; he must have been blind indeed, if he did not perceive the system upon which the King of Naples was acting from the beginning. Buonaparté and the Allies were agreed on this point, that he was a most excellent general in the field, but treacherous and pusillanimous in the council; the whole statement of the noble lord displayed a scene of diplomatic treachery, that he hoped would ever remain without a parallel; and the noble lord must indeed have been a puny politician, if he ever conceived that Murat was guided by any other views than those of self-interest, and self-preservation. Why had he vacillated from Buonaparté to the Allies, and from the Allies to Buonaparté—but from his anxiety to ascertain which was likely to be successful? Most of the documents on which the noble lord had rested his defence, were probably written during this period of hesitation; and when the King of Naples found that Buonaparté could not support him, he threw himself into the arms of the Allies. It was, however, a serious question for the noble lord to consider, whether he had not injured the cause of the country by refusing to ratify the verbal understanding that prevailed between the Allies and Murat. That ratification might have bound him firmly to our cause, instead of having him leagued against us. The defence hung upon the first intelligence the noble lord received at Paris from prince Talleyrand regarding the treachery of Murat: it was only a matter of suspicion. And why did not the noble lord refer to marshal Bellegarde, who could have given positive and decisive information? Why had not this question been put to him—Whether, without the co-operation of the King of Naples, he could have been successful in Italy? After adverting to what had passed last 54 year, regarding our engagements with the King of the Two Sicilies, Mr. Whitbread remarked upon the state of suspense in which Murat had been kept, by having no treaty on which he could depend, and upon the necessity there was on his part to take some step for his own security. He lamented that the noble lord had thought fit to quit Congrees, before he had given his powerful aid in solving this most complex problem. At present, it did not appear to him that the justification of the noble lord was at all complete.
Mr. Ponsonbysaid, he would not discuss the documents until they were regularly laid upon the table; but he could not help observing upon the most vain hope expressed by the noble lord, that the proceeding of this night would afford any lesson to the side of the House usually opposed to ministers. Nothing that had fallen, or was likely to fall, from the noble lord, could afford any instruction, or give any useful advice to his political antagonists. His principal object in rising was to vindicate himself and his friends from an aspersion cast upon them by the noble lord, who asserted that they had circuitously and clandestinely received information from the agents of foreign governments, of which they had availed themselves, to make accusations against ministers. This was a most serious charge. The noble lord must know that it was so:—but it was utterly false; neither be nor any one of his friends, he was convinced, would have any communication with the agents of any foreign power to the prejudice of this country, and it was a base insinuation on the part of the noble lord to intimate that they would. The noble lord had been extremely un-candid towards his hon. and learned friend who made the present motion, in assuming that the scope of his argument was in favour of the independence of Italy. He had treated the idea as romantic; as that which, if possible, might be wished for, but as that which no man could hope or expect to see accomplished. If Murat had broken his faith with this country, he admitted we were released from the observance of our engagements with him, but the failure on his part had not yet been established.
Lord Castlereaghexplained as to the misrepresentations with which he had been charged. As to the remarks he had felt it his duty to make upon the incom- 55 plete information produced by gentlemen on the other side, his lordship wished to know whether the right hon. gentleman meant to persist in applying to them the epithets 'false and base?'
Mr. Ponsonby.The noble lord has asserted, that we received information directly or circuitously from the agents of foreign Powers, which we unworthily applied in this House. If the noble lord persists in that charge, I must deny that we have received any such intelligence. I must assert that there is no truth in the assertion; that the insinuation, as I before said, was base: and that on this side of the House we are incapable of such conduct. I must repel the charge in those words; but if I have mistaken the noble lord, I should be sorry undeservedly to employ such terms.
Lord Castlereagh.Does the right hon. gentleman mean to say that the information was not derived from the agents of Murat? I have no difficulty in stating undisguisedly, that I did understand that a direct communication had taken place from Genoa to an hon. member on the other side of the House, and that in consequence of the information procured, steps had been taken in this House by that hon. member.
§ Mr. Whitbreadsaid, that he was happy to assure the House that such a charge was perfectly ridiculous. Certain documents had appeared in the public prints, and some animadversions were made upon them in Parliament. Two or three days afterwards he had received a letter purporting to come from Genoa, which he had never answered otherwise than by acknowledging the receipt of it to the individual, who said he had been charged to deliver it four or five weeks earlier, but had not met with him (Mr. Whitbread) at home. That was the only communication he had received, and he felt himself perfectly at liberty to make use of it, as he had not resorted to any improper source of information. The fact of the letter being sent, he had stated to the noble lord (Castlereagh) in the lobby, who then certainly seemed to possess more urbanity than at present, for he had warned him not to lend his ear to such stories, and the reply was, "What if they come in letters from abroad, how can I avoid it?" He scarcely felt it necessary to assure the House, that he had never sought for or knowingly obtained any information from improper sources.
Mr. Ponsonby.I can only say, upon 56 my word of honour, that I never did receive myself, or ever heard that any of my friends had received any communications from the agents of foreign Governments during the course of my life. I hope the noble lord will not now assert that we have clandestinely received information from foreign agents.
Lord Castlereagh.I wish to understand in what way the right hon. gentleman meant to apply the terms 'false and base'
§ Mr. Tierneyobserved, that this disagreeable discussion might in a moment be terminated, if the noble lord would admit that he did not mean to insinuate that improper practices had existed on the subject.
Lord Castlereagh.I am not prepared, I confess, to make such an admission. I think the information was not obtained constitutionally, or properly.
§ Mr. Tierneywas quite willing to be examined as to any suspicious correspondence he was concerned in. No body had fewer correspondents. It was impossible for the noble lord to mean that any improper or treasonable intercourse had been carried on with the enemy. Such a charge would be ridiculous.
§ Mr. Whitbreaddid not understand what the noble lord meant by the terms, 'constitutionally and properly.' He was satisfied that the noble lord was too manly to advance any thing against his opponents which he was not prepared to justify, and therefore asked if he had any serious charge to bring against them, of their having acted in a manner inconsistent with their duties as citizens and members of parliament. If he meant to make no such charge, his right hon. friend would be satisfied that there was no foundation for what had fallen from him; that the noble lord could hot have meant what he had understood him to say.
§ The Speaker.I am quite persuaded that the House cannot suffer the debate to terminate with such words unexplained. Whatever might be the heat of debate, or the strength of the impression they made, they are words that, I am sure, the right hon. gentleman will disclaim having used in a personal and offensive sense. They are certainly words not to be employed without an explanation, that they were not intended to give personal offence. The right hon. gentleman owes it to the House to give some explanation.
Mr. Ponsonby.I am sure, Mr. Speaker, 57 that this is not the place for a man to be too pertinacious regarding any expressions he may have used, since he must know what would be the consequence of the intervention of the chair, But I submit to you, Sir, that I was not the first person whose language was exceptionable. I made no charge against any individual of holding clandestine correspondence with an enemy. Let the noble lord place himself in our situation and suppose the accusation brought against himself, would he not feel it very acutely?
Lord Castlereagh.I objected on the general principle to the employment of information that must directly or indirectly have come from such sources as those to which I alluded. The right hon. gentleman ought to be the last person to complain of unparliamentary language.
§ Mr. Hornerbegged to be allowed to say a few words, as the individual to whom the remark of the noble lord was intended to apply. He did not feel called upon to state what were his sources of information, and the House would not suppose that any guilt was connected with them until it were satisfactorily proved. On such a charge, however, it was not unnatural that his right hon. friend should have felt warmly, knowing that the noble lord had no foundation for the imputation. The noble lord ought to make allowances for the heat of debate, and ought to take this opportunity of disclaiming any thing of a personal nature.
Lord Castlereagh.I have no difficulty in admitting that I intended no personal charge. I did feel that a motion made upon intelligence procured through indirect channels was not such as Parliament could wisely adopt.
§ Mr. Tierneywas fully persuaded that his right hon. friend would be satisfied when the accusation was put in that way. He was sure that the natural good-humour, of which the noble lord possessed so large a share, would prevail to restore amity. The noble lord had at first undoubtedly used a very strong expression.
Lord Castlereagh.I am not aware that I employed any strong language that could reasonably be made the subject of complaint. I apprehend that a motion made on information of such a description would not deserve the attention of Parliament.
Mr. Ponsonby.I confess that I did feel for my hon. friend, when the charge was made, very strongly. I felt for myself, 58 and for all those by whom I am usually surrounded; and I am happy to find that nothing was intended. I did assert that the accusation was of a most serious nature to every man who values his character, and with that impression I employed the words in the warmth of debate: after the explanation of the noble lord, I may say that I am sorry I used them.
§ Mr. Wellesley Polecongratulated the House on the good humour into which it had subsided. He thought that the gentlemen opposite had profited by the lesson which they had received. Their tone was greatly changed, and they could no longer sing out their usual charge against his Majesty's ministers, that through their fault a valuable ally had been lost. He praised the fairness with which the question had been brought forward, and thought it had been proved that it was impossible to follow any other line of conduct than that which ministers had adopted.
§ Mr. Protheroehaving remarked that the hon. member for Bedford had cast his eye rather in a sneering manner towards him, on hearing some gentlemen on his part of the House cheer the noble lord, said he should take that opportunity of expressing aloud the satisfactory impression which that noble lord's defence had made upon him.
§ Mr. Horner, in reply, contended, that he had a right to seek to obtain information in a constitutional manner. The noble lord's speech had not altered the impression on his mind; though he approved of his having reduced the question to one of good faith. The noble lord had directed the attention of the House to the reports of military commanders who had described Murat's conduct; but unless they made out that it had been such in the campaign as could not be fairly attributed to the imperfection of all human efforts, they had not proved what was necessary to support their case. The noble lord had chiefly relied on a collection of letters, which were certainly curious, as they unfolded the private character and dispositions of men of whom one had heard so much; but they did not touch the question. They were all prior to the 4th of March, when the ratification of the Treaty had been signed on the part of Austria, and a month before we had acceded to that Treaty. Murat's conduct before he had entered into any final engagement with the Allies, could be no 59 ground of complaint, and the letters only applied to that period. It was only subsequently to the engagement that he could be declared guilty of a breach of faith. He also thought that the manner in which some of the letters had been procured, should be explained. There was a letter from Buonaparté to Murat, written at Nangis, and, strange to say, afterwards found at Paris by prince Talleyrand. On this, however, he should not expatiate. If his Majesty's Government could prove a breach of faith on Murat's part, then it was clear that they were freed from all engagements with him, but this he contended had not been done.
§ The question was then put and carried.