ADDRESS RESPECTING THE CONGRESS AT VIENNA.

HC Deb 20 March 1815 vol 30 cc265-305

Mr. Whitbread

rose, in pursuance of his notice, and said:—The noble lord in the blue ribbon (lord Castlereagh), who is more particularly the object of universal attention, has, during the fifteen months which have last passed, run a great and brilliant career. He was selected by his Majesty's government as the person most fit to conduct the affairs of this country abroad—to contend, if to contend was necessary, for its interests; and being thus selected by his political friends, no one of his political opponents was found to cavil at that choice. But there was no one of his high situations which I should have so much envied him, as that, when as a commoner, he returned from his last great mission, to the Commons of the United Kingdom, to lay before us the proceedings of the Congress at which he assisted, to explain doubts, to disperse those calumnies which he complains have been cast upon himself as the representative of Great Britain, and the continental Powers our allies; and thus deserve and receive again the undivided approbation with which he was once before hailed in this House. But it must occur to every one, that after the noble lord had accepted a second time the great task of settling the relations of this country with foreign powers, he ought not to have returned leaving that task unperformed: if it was necessary that the noble lord should go to the Congress at Vienna, he should not have returned without having finished the great work, without being able to explain it to the satisfaction of the country and the world. However, there was no lack of British ministers at Vienna. The noble lord was placed there, as it were, in the bosom of his family, surrounded by those persons in whom he could confide, not only from their talents, but from their being nearly connected with him. The noble lord, however, had cast a slur on those persons, inasmuch as he called in the duke of Wellington from Paris to conclude those negociations which he had left unfinished. If it was necessary that the duke of Wellington should have been sent to Paris from the extraordinary situation of affairs in France, he should not have been removed from his post there under any consideration: and though, if we consider the events which have so entirely changed the face of affairs between the time when I gave my notice and the moment in which I am now speaking, we may rejoice that the duke of Wellington was removed from Paris; yet confining ourselves to the subject before us, it was most extraordinary that he alone should have been thought fit to unravel that part of the negociations which the noble lord opposite had not concluded. Instead of such an important part of the arrangements being left by him, (as we must conclude from this circumstance, they were left unsettled), we had expected that the noble lord would display to this House all the great acts of the European Congress; that he would be able triumphantly to announce that all the great principles which the allies, when advancing upon Paris, announced to Europe, had been carried into complete execution; that their promises had been fully accomplished; and that they were, in deed, as well as in word, the liberators of the Continent. For my own part, I had firmly hoped that he would, on his return from Vienna, as he did on his return from Paris, enter this House with the treaty in his hand, signed by all the Powers of Europe. But being frustrated in this hope, it remains for me, as an individual member of parliament, at the request of the noble lord, to call for that explanation which, without some questions, he would not be able to give, and to inform him of the charges which have been made on the government of this country in his absence.

The hon. gentleman proceeded to say that these charges could not be said to be personal to the noble lord, because that noble lord had always been regarded merely as the representative of our Government, and he should repeat them to show that they were not brought merely to take advantage of his absence. It had been said, that pending no negociation had so many questions been put as during the progress of the Congress of Vienna. In answer to this he should observe, that during the negociations at Chatillon and those at Paris, no inquiry had been made on that side of the House: he and others had remained satisfied till the noble lord had returned—they would have remained satisfied also during the Congress at Vienna, if nothing had transpired of the negociations there, or if only vague rumours, discredited by the manner in which they were stated, had found their way into the public prints. But when official documents, at variance with good faith and against plighted treaties, had been published with the appearance of authority, it was impossible that they should shut their eyes; and when they saw that, without waiting for the termination of the Congress, armies took possession of independent states, and proceeded to make partitions, it was impossible that they should shut their ears to the general cry of bitter lamentation, disappointment, and despair throughout Europe; and it became their duty to call on the ministers present at the time, to know whether the reports spread, as to the conduct of the allied powers, were well founded. The noble lord had probably heard how his right hon. colleagues had been harassed during his absence; and they might have complained of the utter ignorance in which they were left by him, which disabled them from cutting a better figure: but he did not know whether they had informed the noble lord of the threats they had thrown out, that when the noble lord returned, all the political opponents of the Administration should have reason to remember and regret the attacks they had made. One very active member of the Administration (Mr. Wellesley Pole) had also promised, that if they would wait till the noble lord returned, they should have, singulatim et literatim, every thing which had passed respecting Saxony, Genoa, and Poland; but soon after, he had begged that all that he had said might go for nothing. It was not his wish that the noble lord should be bound by the declaration of his colleague, or that the right hon. gentleman should resign his seat in the Cabinet, because his pledge was not answered; but to shew that the questions which he (Mr. W.) and his political friends had put, during the absence of the noble lord, were not for the purpose of attacking a defenceless administration, but in the hope that those papers would be contradicted, which, if true, proved that a system of spoliation and rapine was carried on, which would leave the seeds of war in every state; that the great Powers had grossly neglected their duty, and put themselves on a level with the man whom they had wisely and magnanimously combined to overthrow; or if the papers in question were admitted to raise their voices in that House, and unite their protests against the concurrence of this country in the measures to which these publications referred.

The noble lord had said, that there had been propagated gross calumnies against this country and the allied Powers. He would now have an opportunity of shewing that the honour of the allies had not been implicated, that there had been no breach of faith, in those acts which now appeared injurious both to their honour and their good faith. He hoped if he stumbled, in the course of his statement, on any paper having no foundation in truth, the noble lord would give some indication of that circumstance, that he might not unnecessarily take up the time of the House. The noble lord would not deny, in the first place, the declarations of the allies in their advance upon France, in which they professed themselves the saviours of Europe, and the defenders of independent states; and promised that a general pacification should shew that they had not forgot in prosperity the lesson which they had learned in adversity, especially the Declaration at Frankfort in December 1813, the Manifesto on the rupture of the negociation at Chatillon, and the proclamations of the various generals. Never did any men occupy a position so grand as the allied Sovereigns at Montmartre before Paris! they shewed a moderation in victory which obtained the praise of all men; and had They there died, they would have died at the very pinnacle of human glory. What had their subsequent conduct proved, but that they had forgotten all the lessons which should have made so deep an impression on them, and that they wished to tread in the steps of the conqueror whom they had destroyed, and, unless the papers which he should allude to could be disproved, that they had been pursuing the same paltry, pilfering, bartering system which had led heretofore to the destruction of so many states. The Treaty of Paris, however, was concluded after the bloodless entry of Paris, and with the exception of one bloody blot—the renewal of the Slave Trade—that Treaty had met with universal approbation. As the noble lord had wished him to concentrate his questions into one motion, he should first ask, whether the Treaty laid on the table of the House contained the whole of the articles there agreed upon, or whether there were any secret articles in that Treaty? If there were any secret articles which had not been laid before the House on that occasion, he should say that the noble lord had obtained the approbation of the House surreptitiously on that Treaty, and if on that occasion one enormity was decided on—the fate of Genoa—it was a subject of serious charge against the noble lord, that information of that article was not laid before the House; then they might have delivered their judgment on it (and what that judgment would have been there could be no doubt), so that that enormity might have been prevented. The hon. member here observed, that as a friend to mankind secret articles seemed to him to be productive of no good whatever. They knew the secret articles to the Treaty of Tilsit, and to what fraud, bribery, and corruption—worse, perhaps, than the loss of human life—they had given rise; and under the pretence of those articles the Copenhagen expedition had taken place. When treaties were made public, secret articles being reserved, such conduct was an imposition on nations, by affirming falsely that such and such were the grounds on which they might be drawn into war, and no other; but it was more important that the House of Commons, at whose bar the affairs of the world were tried, should have the truth, and the whole truth before them. Before the noble lord left England, some Genoese and Poles—men of high birth and great respectability—had feared that the independence of their states might be overlooked among the concerns of the greater Powers, and the noble lord had been reminded that Genoa was an independent state, and that the partition of Poland had sown the seeds of all the evils which had befallen Europe. He (Mr. W.) had read the proclamation of lord W. Bentinck in that House in the presence of that noble lord—who, in reply, had seemed to dwell with such particularity on one point as to attract notice, though he was too manly and had too high a sense of his own honour and that of his country, to attempt to equivocate. The noble lord's colleagues also in his absence had given full assurances, though little information; and the Chancellor of the Exchequer had assured the in, that to the partition of Poland and the transfer of Saxony, the noble lord could not lend his name.

The next question he should ask was, whether prince Talleyrand had not addressed a note to prince Metternich on the 19th of December last, which had been published in many of the journals of Europe, complaining of the conduct of ail the Powers at the Congress except France? Here the hon. gentleman read some extracts from the note alluded to; which note appeared to him to present a full justification of what had been said in the noble lord's absence, by himself and others, as to the views of Congress, and he now called upon the noble lord to vindicate his conduct, with that of the allies, against the bitter comment which that note contained—against the charge of a departure from those principles which were so loudly professed previous to the abdication of Buonaparté. Was this note of prince Talleyrand a genuine paper, or was it not? For if it were, he apprehended that the attacks made upon that Congress, of which f the noble lord was a party, could not be deemed unjustifiable. The noble lord had stated, that be had returned from the Congress without having concluded any Treaty, but that all the great points were adjusted, and that all the great Powers; were agreed. He would, however, ask the noble lord, whether the minister of France had signed any of the protocols of Congress, or whether that minister had not protested against the proceedings of Congress towards other Powers, as well as towards France itself; and surely France was to be considered as one of the "great powers" assembled at Vienna?

So much as to the general principles which actuated the conduct of Congress, and that of the noble lord; and here he would take occasion to assure the noble lord, that if he omitted to state any thing in his presence, which he had been urged by a sense of duty to bring forward in the noble lord's absence, such omission must be merely the result of forgetfulness; for he had no disposition to advance a charge against any man in his absence, which he was not ready to repeat and justify in his presence. The steps which the noble lord had been pursuing at Vienna, were not such as in his judgment became the character of the country he represented, and therefore he animadverted upon the information which he had received upon the subject. With whom, too, was the noble lord pursuing this inconsistent course, in forcing people to abandon their ancient governments, and to submit to foreign powers, after those people had struggled with us to shake off the tyranny of Buonaparté, upon the promise of liberty and improved condition? Why, in concert with Sovereigns who had not long before been leagued with that gigantic power to extend and consolidate his dominion—in concert with one Sovereign in particular, who, so late as the 12th of March, 1812, concluded a treaty with Buonaparté which treaty was signed by that very prince (Schwartzenberg) who afterwards led a triumphant army into Paris? But yet in that treaty Austria agreed to every thing required by Buonaparté that could be deemed hostile to this country, pledging itself also to assist in that invasion of Russia which led to the overthrow of the giant, upon the condition that Austria was to have certain indemnities, which, strange as it might appear, were the very same as those the noble lord, with the other members of the Congress, were now conceding to that power. During the prevalence of that enthusiasm which pervaded Europe upon the defeat of Buonaparté—which was particularly manifested in this country in the presence of Alexander and Frederick, when the ears of these sovereigns must have been stunned with the repetition of their praises—when every Englishman would fain forget that the objects of his praise had ever coalesced with the emperor of France against this country—when the most splendid civic feast was prepared to testify the national opinion of the great merit of those sovereigns—who could have dreamed that such a reverse should have taken place—that the world should have so soon to witness such an extraordinary dereliction of all those great principles which gave rise to such panegyric? But the profession of these principles turned out to be a mere fallacy; and if any thing could serve again to set up the giant, it would be the adoption by Congress of the same practices which originally created his greatness. That Congress had adopted such practices he felt himself justified in asserting; and therefore he had to arraign the conduct of the noble lord and the Allies for having disregarded the lesson which the fate of Buonaparté presented— Discite justitiam moniti, etnon temnere divos. But example seemed to have no influence whatever upon this unholy Congress, while promises and professions were totally abandoned. The hope of the re-establishment of Poland as an independent kingdom—of the restoration of Finland to Sweden—and of Norway to Denmark, which hope many were encouraged to indulge, from the benevolence and liberality at one time professed, had proved quite delusive. Upon the liberality of the emperor Alexander most men, indeed, were induced to calculate, as that sovereign was represented as peculiarly anxious for the re-establishment of Poland. In the gratification of this anxiety it was said that this sovereign experienced some embarrassment from other members of the Congress, including the noble lord. But the order of the day, issued by the Grand Duke Constantine at Warsaw, betrayed the existence of that embarrassment, while it marked the emperor's resolution to withstand every opposition to his will. For in that order the duke distinctly adverted to the probability that the Polish troops would have to fight for the independence of their country; and it was also stated as a further proof of the emperor Alexander's intention to cut the gordian knot, if he could not contrive to untie it, that, that sovereign had told one of the principal ministers at Congress (perhaps the noble lord) that he had 500,000 men ready to maintain his views in Poland. What had been, or what was likely to be the result of this monarch's determination, that House and the world was yet to learn.

The hon. member next adverted to the proclamation of Prince Repnin at Dresden. Having described the proclamation alluded to, in which the occupation of Saxony was transferred to a Prussian army, he observed that the noble lord was stated to have put his name to a paper sanctioning the object of that proclamation. The answer of ministers to the questions put to them upon this point, was in the recollection of the House. It was asserted that the occupation of Saxony by the Prussians must have been only provisional—that the actual transfer of that territory to Prussia was a thing quite impossible, and the more so, as Congress was not opened at the time the proclamation of Prince Repnin was issued. Bat it now remained for the noble lord to explain upon that point. It was for him to say, whether he had not acquiesced in the transfer of Saxony to Prussia, and also whether in a few days after he had subscribed to that transfer the noble lord did not, in consequence of instructions from home, present a note protesting on the part of England, against that transfer; namely, whether the noble lord did not first consent and afterwards retract upon this transaction, in which he conceived the allies to have most grossly violated their own declaration of the principles which they professed to have in view? But if those allies had made no declaration whatever, he would maintain that they had no moral right to act as they had proposed with regard to Saxony; that the purpose which they had betrayed in this proceeding was truly scandalous. It was indeed extremely shocking to see this Congress measuring the claims of potentates by the number of human souls which each commanded, without any reference to justice or right. But if monarchs would not attend to the march of the human mind, as the emperor Alexander said at Paris—if these monarchs would not keep pace with the improved judgment of their subjects—a day of severe retribution was but too likely to come. Upon what ground he would ask could those monarchs attempt to justify the harsh conduct which they adopted towards Saxony? Was Saxony, of which they themselves had been so long the comrades, alone to suffer for co-operating with Buonaparté? Was the sovereign to be dragged from his subjects, and the subjects dragged from their sovereign, in consequence of that co-operation which neither he nor they had the power to avoid? After complimenting the manly protest of the king of Saxony against the transfer of his dominions, the hon. member forcibly animadverted upon the tyrannical measures taken to prevent the Saxon people from expressing that attachment to their sovereign, and consequent abhorrence of subjugation to Prussia, which they notoriously felt. As an instance of these measures, he referred to the case of two general officers of the Saxon army who had eminently distinguished themselves against the common enemy; yet who, when they ventured to send a remonstrance to Vienna against the deposition of their sovereign, were met with an arbitrary order,—"Let these two officers be committed to a dungeon" He earnestly hoped this statement was untrue; for such a punishment for the expression of loyal feelings, especially upon general Le Cocq and his colleague, who were entitled to the most liberal reward for gallant services, every honest man must contemplate with horror.

The hon. member took notice of the change which had taken place in the conduct of the noble lord within a few days in that House. When he (Mr. W.), and those who acted with him, took occasion, with all the humility of unofficial men, to put some questions as to the Treaty of Chaumont, they were told that if they moved for a copy of that Treaty it would not be granted; but yet in a short time afterwards, not only that Treaty, but several other treaties, for which they never asked, were presented by the noble lord. Among others, indeed, the treaty with Ferdinand the seventh was laid before the, House, which, when asked for some time ago, was refused by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with that smile which always so gracefully became that right hon. gentleman. As to the Treaty of Chaumont, that was concluded in the contemplation of peace with Buonaparté, at a time when the Allies were sick and saints, but now being well, no longer saints were they. With respect to Italy, the hon. member observed, that by the Treaty of Paris, Austria was to be restored her ancient possessions in that country, while the other parts were to return to the governments they possessed previous to the dominion of Buonaparté. But what was the fact? why, that Venice was taken possession of on the part of Austria permanently—and surely this was not in conformity with that treaty. For Venice was not an ancient possession of Austria. It had only come under its dominion by the transfer of Buonaparté at that treaty of Luneville, which Mr. Fox, in his admirable speech upon the subject in 1800, had so justly characterized. In that speech, to which might well be applied the compliment of the poet to the celebrated orator of antiquity, "divina philippics famæ" Mr. Fox deprecated the idea of allowing the spoliation of France to constitute the right of Austria. How, then, could the latter be now entitled to claim Venice as an ancient possession under the Treaty of Paris? But the conduct of Austria throughout Italy was marked by a degree of usurpation and cruelty, which flung the system of Buonaparté into the shade. The tribunal it had established at Milan was of the most horrible character, although that territory was only surrendered provisionally to the Austrians according to Treaty between general Bellegarde and the Viceroy of Italy, whose motto and whose practice was "fidelity and honour." The character of this Viceroy was, indeed, universally respectable; yet the articles concluded with him were most grossly violated. Then, as to another part of Italy, it was known that Murat had the throne of Naples guaranteed to him by a treaty with Austria, to which the noble lord had signified his assent, and the emperor Alexander had also sent a letter to Murat, expressing his acquiescence in that Treaty. Yet it was understood, that it had been directly intimated to Murat that he must descend from his throne. Was this intimation wise, or was the attempt to depose such a captain with a large army practicable? The effect of the intimation might, under existing circumstances, be peculiarly perilous. But upon this point the next accounts from Italy would probably enable the House to judge. Then as to Genoa, if the proclamations which he had before recited in that House were genuine, the Genoese were deceived, and the conduct of Congress was most disgraceful. But the Government of this country was particularly implicated in this transaction; and the noble lord must find it extremely difficult to vindicate his conduct, unless he meant to disclaim the authority of lord William Bentinck. He apprehended the noble lord would not dispute the publication of lord William's proclamation at Genoa, which, if he was rightly informed, was known to that noble lord five days after the date of its issue, and no notice whatever was taken of the way in which he had proclaimed himself to the Genoese. As to the scope and intent of the proclamation itself, there could be no doubt; it professed for its object to restore the ancient government of the Genoese, under which that republic had flourished, and found happiness for a series of years. But their hopes were delusive; their confidence in the faith of this country was betrayed. A very few days before that 1st of January to which they looked forward as the period when they were again to enjoy an independent existence, a mandate from the Congress reached general Dalrymple, signifying to him, that Genoa was to be delivered into the hands of the king of Sardinia. If those facts were true—and their truth or falsehood was alone the object of his present inquiry—where would be justification of the noble lord? No disclaiming of lord William. Bentinck would do. The name, and honour, and good faith of the country were too deeply implicated to be at once relieved by such a proceeding, should it be adopted. An hon. and learned friend of his (sir James Mackintosh) in an eloquent speech on a former occasion, which he (Mr. W.) regretted the noble lord had not heard, had reminded the House of some important particulars connected with the annexation of Genoa to France. When Buonaparté so annexed Genoa, he did it with some sort of grace, compared with, the manner in which the noble lord and the ministers at Congress had acted. The Ligurian Republic was represented as wishing to place themselves under the imperial protection of Napoleon; the Doge and Senators of Genoa went to Paris to solicit that protection; and so scrupulous was Buonaparté to maintain at least the semblance of acting in conformity to the wishes of the Genoese, that he sent the Doge back again to Genoa to ascertain the exact sentiments of the whole body of the people. But how did the allied Sovereigns and their ministers conduct themselves? General Dalrymple, in his proclamation, told the Genoese that there, was no fault to be found with them, that they had conducted themselves in the most exemplary manner, that they in fact deserved to enjoy their liberty and independence; but, notwithstanding, they were to be delivered over to the king of Sardinia. He would now read a dispatch dated December 20th, 1814, from the noble lord, and which, if he (lord Castlereagh) would say was a forgery, he should immediately throw it aside. He remembered a letter which was once read in that House, of which the noble lord said it contained one sentence the most canting of any he had ever heard; but if ever there was a letter that deserved the name of a canting letter, it surely was the one he was about to read to the House. He did not know, indeed, whether it was written in French or English; if in French, perhaps it might contain some tournures de langage, which were wholly lost in the translation, for among the other wonderful things of the present times, he had been informed that the noble lord had delivered a speech in French, of three hours long, at the Congress. It began by stating that "the warm interest which his royal highness the Prince Regent had taken and continued to take in the future prosperity of Genoa, had imposed upon him (lord Castlereagh) the pleasing duty of watching over her affairs, from the first moment when the British arms delivered her from the oppression of the enemy." Would not any one, continued Mr. Whitbread, suppose that the next sentence contained a declaration that Genoa was to be restored to her ancient independence, and to the possession of that constitution so dear to her? But no such pleasing annunciation was reserved for that unhappy state: the letter proceeded thus—"He (lord C.) regretted much, as well as all the ministers of the Allied Sovereigns, that he was not able to preserve to the Genoese their free constitution, because there was every reason to believe that such was their wish." What a violation of every feeling which is sacred or honourable in man! In the same breath the Genoese were told that they wished for freedom and independence, and that they had lost them! They were reminded of their strong desire for liberty, and yet they were informed, that in defiance of the faith of Great Britain, solemnly pledged to them, their liberty was bartered away by that act of enormity which transferred them to the Crown of Sardinia. It was known that they did not like the king of Sardinia; that, in fact, they detested his power; and yet they were delivered over to it. The continuation of the letter proceeded in the following terms, after slating as above, that the liberty and constitution of Genoa could not be preserved "without the risk of weakening that system which had been adopted for Italy; but he was quite certain that the general interests of the Genoese were more effectually consulted by the proposed plan, and he did not doubt that, under those circumstances, all classes of people would receive it as a kindness, and submit with pleasure to a regulation that secured their Own interests, as well as those of all Europe." Now, if that letter was an authentic one, he would venture to affirm, that a more canting production, or one more insulting to the feelings of a brave people, had never been penned by any minister of any country. Under what circumstances did the king of Sardinia take possession of Genoa? In consequence of the Treaty of Paris, he was put in possession of his own dominions. But, as it was found necessary, in the general arrangement, to take away a certain portion of his territory, so it was deemed adviseable to indemnify him elsewhere. In what part of Italy did he land, after his restoration? At Genoa, where the people received him with acclamations. They were happy to see an end of that tyranny by which they had been so long oppressed. They were rejoiced that he was restored to his throne. With the feelings of a free people, they hailed, with delight, the destruction of that oppressive government by which he and they had been bowed to the earth. They little thought, at the time, that the king of Sardinia was intended for their monarch. It was, however, so settled. The members of the Congress at Vienna said, "We have been obliged to take a part of your property in the North, and you shall have something in the South in lieu of it." In this one transaction was brought together all the perfidy, baseness, and rapacious violence, that could disgrace a country.

On the question of the Slave Trade, (continued Mr. Whitbread), I wish to ask the noble lord what has been done towards carrying into effect the strongly expressed wishes of this House? I wish to know, whether he has made any progress in procuring the abolition of that abominable traffick? I wish to know whether he has received any substantial assurance, from those powers immediately connected with the infernal trade in slaves, of their intention to abolish it? I ask him, whether, he can protect himself, not from the charge of an absolute dereliction of duty, but from the accusation of having shewn a lukewarmness on the subject, when at Paris—at a time when it was confidently stated, that the measure of complete abolition might have been carried? Many rumours have gone forth on this point. It has been said, that the exertions of Russia were promised to the noble lord, in support of the annihilation of this trade, to an extent beyond what he would receive; and it has been asserted, that it was owing to him, and to no other cause, that the Slave Trade was not abandoned by France—[Lord Castlereagh here, by motion, intimated that the charge was not true.]—I am glad the noble lord receives the charge as he has done. I am glad that he will shortly have an opportunity of denying it in distinct terms. I observe, that the noble lord has obtained from Spain and Portugal a limitation, by which those powers bind themselves not to carry on the trade in slaves further than 10 degrees north of the equator. There is, Sir, an article of a very remarkable nature, on the subject of the Slave Trade, in the Treaty with Ferdinand 7; and I am sure, my hon. friend (Mr. Wilberforce) will hear with regret what has been done. If Ferdinand 7 does not display more sincerity on this occasion than he has done on others, all the attempts made to do away the traffick in slaves have been utterly useless. This is a separate article, signed by sir Henry Wellesley, and entered into with that Government, which has annihilated the Cortes, and is now endeavouring to reduce beneath its arbitrary sway, the inhabitants of those countries, which once formed its foreign possessions—but which, I hope, will never again be attached to it. The article in question says—"His Catholic Majesty, concurring in the fullest manner in the sentiments of his Britannic Majesty with respect to the injustice and inhumanity of the traffick in slaves, will take into consideration, with the deliberation which the state of his possessions in America demands, the means of acting in conformity with those sentiments."—[Mr. Whitbread stopped here—but a loud cry of "Read on, read on!"—following, he proceeded]—" His Catholic Majesty promises, moreover, to prohibit his subjects from engaging in the Slave Trade, for the purpose of supplying any islands or possessions excepting those appertaining to Spain, and to prevent likewise, by effectual measures and regulations, the protection of the Spanish flag being given to foreigners who may engage in this traffick, whether subjects of his Britannic Majesty or of any other state or power."—[Hear, hear! from lord Castlereagh.]—If the noble lord has gained any thing, I rejoice at it; but I deny the sincerity with which this article is penned. The next article, Sir, proves that what was stated in this House, as to the entire neutrality of Great Britain in the contest between Spain and her colonies, was not exactly consistent with the fact. The article sets forth, that "his Britannic Majesty, being anxious that the troubles and disturbances which unfortunately prevail in the dominions of his Catholic Majesty in America should entirely cease, and the subjects of those provinces should return to their obedience to their lawful sovereign, engages to take the most effectual measures for preventing his subjects from furnishing arms, ammu- nition, or any other warlike article to the revolted in America." This Government is bound not to afford any assistance to the revolted in America; but there is no stipulation that assistance should not be given to the Spanish Government to subdue the colonies; and, contrary I am sure to the feelings of the people of this country, assistance has been afforded to them. Now, Sir, what have these revoked subjects, as they are termed, done? They had, in every instance, expressed their hostility to the Slave Trade; they had utterly cast it off, along with many other blots that indelibly remain on the character of the Spanish monarch. I hope they may effectually throw off the yoke of dependence—since, in the very infancy of their freedom they have done that which the selfish and illiberal policy of the mother country would never consent to.

It does appear to me, Sir, that many of the acts which have disgraced latter days, have arisen from the feeling, that such, was the tyranny of that man, who was lately an exile at Elba—so much was his conduct detested—so utterly were his principles reprobated—that those by whom he was overthrown might, without exciting particular attention, play what pranks they pleased. It was thought that their actions would not be scrutinized, in consequence of the iniquities which had preceded them. It was precisely a feeling of this kind that had produced for Europe those direful events, to stop the progress of which the allied Sovereigns united their strength. Of the rise and fall of Buonaparté's power, I never had but one idea. He was aggrandized by his enemies—he dethroned himself. And should he be again seated on the throne of France—a matter which now hangs in doubt—he will be placed there in consequence of those proceedings which have occurred subsequent to his overthrow.

Now, Sir, I should be glad to know, whether the proclamation signed 'Napoleon,' and dated from Bourgogne, is considered by his Majesty's Government as a genuine paper? I am told by persons who saw it at Paris, that it is considered a true publication. On the 11th of April a treaty with Napoleon was signed at Fontainbleau: by this the Imperial title was permitted to be assumed by him and his wife, during their lives. To him the sovereignty of the Isle of Elba was secured; and Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, were settled on his wife, and were to descend to her son. The government of France also stipulated to pay to Napoleon, annually, a certain sum of money. The name of the noble lord appears to that treaty; but we are all aware of the little part which this Government took in its formation. The signatures of the accredited persons, on the part of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, also appear to the treaty; and it was signed by marshal Ney, prince of Moskwa, on the part of Napoleon—in opposition to whom he is now said to have taken the field. If any case, more than another, called for the strict observance of good faith, it was this. In the first place, to shew their good conduct opposed to his perfidy; next, that he might have no reason for stirring at any future period; and, lastly, because all treaties, whatsoever their contents, should be deemed binding on the contracting parties. Now, Sir, it is alleged by Buonaparté, that he never received his pension: he further states, that the proposed provision for his wife and son had not been made; and, lastly, he avers, that it was intended to take him forcibly from the island of Elba, and place him in some other quarter. The noble lord can contradict these assertions, if they are not founded. But, if they be true, what a case can Buonaparté make out against those who have thus broken faith with him! What a case can he lay before the prince of the Moskwa, now acting against him, and who, on his part, negociated the treaty? For Louis 18, individually, I feel the greatest respect. All his conduct since he has been placed on the throne has evinced much moderation, good sense, discrimination, and a gentlemanly feeling highly creditable to him. To the acts of his government, indeed, objections may be made; but whatever has been done amiss, originated, I really believe, with his ministers, and not with himself; while the good that has been effected, was owing to his firmness and discrimination; and, if it please God to withdraw him from the throne, I am convinced that that event will not be produced by any thing that he has done.—Mr. Whitbread then expressed his hope, if a civil war were kindled in France, that this country would not take any part in it; but that every means would be taken for preserving Great Britain in a state of amity with foreign Powers. Should the throne of the Bourbons remain firm, he hoped their friends, from this second escape, would see the necessity of acting with justice and liberality; if, on the other hand, the dethronement of Louis took place, he trusted, if it were possible for adversity to make any impression on the human breast, that the reverses of Buonaparté would teach him moderation; and that this country would be blessed with such a peace as she had a right to expect at the termination of the late contest. Not a peace marked by bartering and truckling for little objects—not a peace recognising the infernal traffick in slaves, whether white or black—but a peace, securing the rights and liberties of the people, in their most extensive operation. The hon. gentleman concluded by moving, "That an humble Address be presented to his royal highness the Prince Regent, that he will be graciously pleased to direct a communication to be made to this House, of the progress made at the Congress now sitting at Vienna, towards the final adjustment and permanent pacification of Europe, of such transfer and annexations of territory as may have actually taken place, together with other information touching matters still under consideration, as may be given without prejudice to the public service."

Lord Castlereagh

assured the House, that he regretted extremely the necessity imposed upon him of addressing them at great length on this subject, feeling, as he did, the importance as far as he was able, and premature as the hon. gentleman's wish for information was, to rescue the honour and interests of this country, bound up, as they were, in the honour and interests of Europe, from the evil of that misrepresentation to which they had been subject. He was persuaded that the House would agree with him, that not only the interests of Europe were intimately concerned in this question; but that if any vestige of character remained to the councils of this country, or of those Sovereigns to whom the safely of the world had been entrusted at a period heretofore perilous indeed, and still more so if that part of the alternative of the drama, with the description of which the hon. gentleman had closed his speech, should unfortunately be realized—a realization that he trusted, under the existing circumstances, would never occur—to that character it was due, that as full an explanation should be afforded as was consistent with the observance of a sound discretion. The question whether the councils of those Sovereigns of Europe on whom our hopes of general and permanent peace depended, and whether the councils of this country had conducted themselves with integrity and wisdom in the course of the late discussions, imposed upon him the necessity not to avoid, from a sense of his own inadequacy to such a task, to refute the insinuations which had been cast upon them. He did not pretend to complain of the conduct of the hon. member in bringing forward this motion. The mind of that hon. gentleman was too manly, and too candid, to utter any attack in his absence which he would not avow to his face; and he thought, that widely different as were the views of himself, and of that hon. gentleman, yet they agreed in this, that one was as direct in his repelling an attack as the other was in making it. But though he felt a sympathy with the hon. gentleman as to this point of character, he must distinctly protest against that species of attack which had been made upon him in his absence: he must for the sake of the public service, and for the sake of the public character, protest against his attempt to deprive his Majesty's Government, of the advantage of which no government in this country ought to be deprived during a negociation abroad; he felt it his bounden duty to make this protest on his return to Parliament; he protested against this novel system in our history of making complaints of the conduct of his Majesty's Government under such circumstances, without any ground on which the value of those complaints could be estimated, of ascribing, in the absence of full and accurate information, and actuated only by a morbid jealousy, disgraceful and profligate conduct to that Government, and of attempting to put them on their defence by garbled statements and misrepresentations. He protested against the practice on the part of any member of that House, upon mere insinuations by the agents of foreign powers pending a negociation, (which insinuations those agents would not venture to avow in the face of Europe,) to put his Majesty's Government in this dilemma—either to defend their conduct on imperfect data, or to deliver themselves from the charge adduced against them by disclosures injurious to the public service. But, above all, he contended, that no government was fit to meet other governments in solemn discussion, that was so humbly circumstanced in its own country as not to enjoy the confidence of that country until the whole of the negociations in which it was concerned were brought to a close; but which, on the appearance of every single and unconnected public document, was called upon to allow or to disallow it, and whose conduct on insulated charges was thus reviewed prematurely and unjustly. On this part of the subject, however, he begged to decline covering his conduct with the shield offered to him by the hon. gentleman, who had said that he could only be considered as an individual minister, associated with the other confidential servants of the Crown. He should be ashamed of himself, if on this occasion he did not assume a pre-eminence of responsibility—not certainly arising from any improper or proud feeling; and he felt therefore that he could not, without personal degradation, accept the understanding held out by the hon. gentleman, of being deemed only a single servant of the Crown on this subject. If there was any motive which sent him as a representative of the Government of this country to the assembled representatives of the Governments of the Continent, it was simply because with his knowledge of the sentiments of his Government, and of the Prince his sovereign, it was supposed that he might be able to act in the arduous situation in which he was to be placed, and under the various changes of circumstances which might occur, without the necessity of a perpetual reference to instructions from home. He felt, that had he ever suffered the machine of Europe to stand still—had he ever, with a view to cover his own responsibility, by obtaining the sanction of his Government, permitted any delay in its action, or refrained from giving that impulse to it which Great Britain was called upon to give, he should have basely betrayed the trust which had been reposed in him. Without, therefore, assuming any pre-eminence, which he knew did not belong to him, in the councils of his Sovereign, he assumed, injustice and in truth, pre-eminent responsibility, if the honour of the Crown, the good faith of the country, and the general policy of Great Britain and the confederated Powers of Europe had been violated and disgraced in the eyes of Europe. Protesting, therefore, against the injustice to the country of the attacks made by the hon. gentleman in his absence, he declared himself perfectly prepared to meet those attacks when made in his presence, and to acknowledge that he was eminently culpable if he had committed those crimes with which the hon. gentleman had charged him.

Before he entered into the more general and ample field of European policy, he wished to discharge a debt of duty which he conceived due to the House (and he would do this shortly, as future opportunities would occur for more minute detail), in order to shew them how far the great object of Parliament, as declared towards the close of the last session, had been accomplished, and how far their injunctions on that occasion had been attended to. He alluded to the measures which had been adopted for the abolition of the Slave-trade. On this subject an hon. gentleman (Mr. Wilberforce) had recently made some inquiries, and to those inquiries he was now, as far as he was able, about to answer. He did not know what value might attach, in that hon. gentleman's mind, to the exertions made by his Majesty's Government on this subject, and he could readily make allowance for that laudable impatience of moral feeling which manifested itself with respect to it; but he trusted that that impatience would not lead to an undervaluing of what had been obtained. On this question he should have no difficulty in submitting to Parliament the details, extensive as they were, of what had passed in the Congress. He flattered himself that when those details came before them, it would appear that no rational effort which it was possible for this country to make had been unattempted, and that the British Government had exhibited as much zeal as the warmest advocates of the wished-for measure could desire. Indeed, he could not help expecting that a counter-objection would be made to the proceedings of his Majesty's Government, and that they would be accused of having evinced a disposition to make sacrifices too great for the object. He confessed, however, that he entertained less serious apprehensions with respect to this than to the opposite charge; for, in his opinion, it was eminently important to the character of this country, taking, as it did, on the subject of the Slave-trade, a tone extremely painful to foreign Powers, and extremely prejudicial to our foreign relations in other respects, by every means in our power to demonstrate that we were not influenced by colonial policy, or any base and interested principle; but that if we called on foreign Powers to make great sacrifices on this subject, we were prepared to mitigate the severity of those sacrifices by making as important sacrifices on our own part as could reasonably be demanded. When the nature of the sacrifices which we had made to France, to Spain, and to Portugal, should be considered, he trusted that it would not be thought that the British Government had gone too far in return for the sacrifices which those Powers had made with respect to the Slave-trade. But if the House should find that, notwithstanding those mutual sacrifices, there existed a feeling in other nations which compelled their Governments to abstain from farther concessions, the House would, from that circumstance, collect this fact, that however we were actuated by a wish to accelerate the general abolition of the trade, the obstacles to that abolition in other countries must be great indeed, which such sacrifices had not been able wholly to overcome; and they would, therefore, in justice, refrain from reviling the Governments of those countries from arriving quickly at the termination of a traffick which we, with our nicer moral feeling upon it, had not accomplished until the lapse of many years. Due allowances ought to be made on this subject; and those Powers which shewed themselves disposed eventually to contribute to the common object, ought not to be disgusted or alienated by a refusal of justice to the motives which withheld them from immediate action. When last he had the honour of addressing the House on this subject, he had informed them, that the utmost he had been able to obtain from France on the subject, was a pledge to abolish the trade in five years—that Portugal had made a general declaration in favour of the abolition, without stating any particular time; and that the third Power, actively occupied in the trade, Spain, had made no engagement, general or particular. He had now the satisfaction to say, that although he was unable to announce the immediate and actual abolition of the trade, all the Powers of Europe had agreed that it should not be extended beyond the period at which by possibility it could be terminated. They had concurred in a solemn address to the world, on the necessity of sweeping a trade, so intolerable in a moral point of view, from the face of the earth, and had pledged themselves to take no further time for that purpose than was necessary for the internal regulation of their own dominions. When the docu ments should be laid on the table, this pledge, and the qualifications by which it was accompanied, would, he was persuaded, prove very satisfactory to the House. It was no small gratification to him to have brought the different Powers of Europe, not only to an agreement to the principle of the abolition, but to an early and absolute accomplishment of it. He heartily wished that he could announce that this curse of humanity had ceased to exist, but final sentence had been passed upon it. It had been thought a favourable circumstance when Denmark had declared that she would put an end to the trade in ten years. When he said that two of the greatest Powers engaged in the trade had agreed to abolish it in eight years, he must add, that he did not despair of ultimately reducing that period. As to France, though he had not hitherto been able to persuade the French Government to do so, he did not despair of ultimately inducing them to reduce the period of five years; for in all his intercourse with the ministers of his Most Christian Majesty, he found them animated with what he believed was a most sincere desire to terminate the trade at a period as early as could be reconciled to the general feelings of the country. He had also attempted to obtain an abolition of the trade north of the line. The discussion on this subject, not having been closed at the Congress, had been adjourned to commissioners, who were to meet at London and Paris; and as a proof of the sincerity of the Congress, the Powers assembled there had declared, that while they were prepared to make allowances for particular countries, they should reserve to themselves the right of judging as to the periods assigned by them for the abolition in their respective instances, and of abstaining from receiving the colonial produce of such countries as might seem inclined to extend the trade-beyond a reasonable period, endeavouring at the same time to obtain it from countries which had shewn themselves more favourable to the cause of humanity.—He would say a few words on the efforts he had made to obtain certain local abolitions of the trade. Spain had engaged to abolish the trade altogether beyond ten degrees north of the Line, and to abandon all the trade not carried on in Spanish vessels; and Portugal (respecting which country the hon. gentleman had been greatly misinformed) had agreed to abolish the trade altogether north of the Line, If France and Spain could be prevailed on to adopt the equator as the limit of the trade, half the coast of Africa would be relieved from its horrible inflictions. He trusted, therefore, that as much had been done in this interesting and important subject as, under all the circumstances of the times, could reasonably he expected. He had the command of the Prince Regent to submit to the House all the details on this subject, and they would then form their judgment upon it.

He had now to call the attention of the House to the general scope of the hon. gentleman's argument, as applicable to the proceedings of Congress, touching the continental arrangements. And here he must intreat the House not to do such injustice to the Government of this country and to the other confederated Powers, as to conclude that should his observations, from any defect in himself, or from any impossibility of recollecting all that was necessary to say on a subject so extensive, be deemed an insufficient reply to the hon. gentleman, that the conduct of those Powers was therefore insusceptible of explanation and defence. The House were aware that the object of the Congress was to carry into effect the Treaty of Paris. The fair question, therefore, was, taking that Treaty as the foundation of their proceedings, whether the allied Governments had fairly and honourably executed the task which they had prescribed to themselves. He was prepared to meet the hon. gentleman on this ground—he was prepared to sustain the character of the transactions which had taken place, against the foul calumnies with which the hon. gentleman, doubtless, in misapprehension, had impugned the Government of this country, and the other Governments of Europe, in a manner that was calculated to be highly prejudicial to the general interest. In considering the recent transactions, the House would not expect to find that in such an assembly of sovereigns and ministers, no clashing of interests had occurred, no differences of opinion had existed. Such an entire unanimity would have been contrary to the feelings of human nature, and of that independence which the destruction of the tyrant mind had happily permitted in the different states of Europe. The question which the House would have to decide was, whether a system had been created under which all countries might live in that peace which it was the great object of the confederacy to establish. A difference of sentiment on some points of the arrangements could be no impeachment of the wisdom of the whole. Perfection belonged to no work of human beings, even when many years were devoted to it; much less when its completion was accelerated by the necessity of circumstances. On this general principle he applauded and was prepared to maintain the proceedings of the Congress at Vienna. On this general principle he protested against the observations made by the hon. gentleman on the conduct of the allied sovereigns. If they had issued a declaration that all the governments of Europe, which had been swept away during the late convulsions, should be revived, without considering the tendency of that revival to recreate the dangers from which Europe had so happily escaped, and without providing any safeguards against their recurrence; if that was the way in which their declaration was to be understood, he should be ashamed that Great Britain belonged to a confederacy founded on a system of such imbecility. But parliament had to inquire (and the hon. gentleman was too much of a statesman, and his mind was too manly, to deny it), first, whether or not the principle on which Congress had proceeded was unsound, and if not so, then whether by departing from that principle in execution they had betrayed the trust which the confidence of Europe had reposed in them. On these grounds he was ready to refute the hon. gentleman. The excellence of the principles on which they had set out—the principles comprehended in the Treaty of Paris, the hon. gentleman had already acknowledged, and it would be found that from those principles no departure had been made. It was perfectly understood, during the whole of the negotiations for the general peace, that the great object of the sovereigns of Europe was the re-establishment and the re-organization of those two great monarchies, which, to all practical purposes, had been destroyed during the war—Austria and Prussia. To do this it became necessary to establish a security for the flanks of those monarchies: a power between the north of Germany and France, and a power acting as a barrier between Italy and France, to prevent them from coming into contact. It was necessary also to maintain the independence of Switzerland, and to re- store the constitution of the German states. The question was, whether the arrangements which had been made were calculated to effect these great objects—whether the assembled powers had endeavoured unduly to aggrandize themselves, or faithfully to execute their trust. The hon. gentleman had alluded to the letter of the minister of France, protesting against throwing the whole population of Europe into a general fund, and then drawing it out again in different portions, for the advantage of particular sovereigns. If that letter were written against the annexation of Saxony to Prussia, and if that annexation were not called for by all the circumstances of the case, and justified by every consideration of the law of nations and of a wise policy, the argument would be cogent. But while he admitted the truth of the general principle, which it involved, he denied its application in the present case. The object was to give Prussia additional force, and increased population was that force.

But he would first endeavour to call the attention of the House to the allegations made by the hon. gentleman, of the breach of faith on the part of this country with respect to Genoa. If such a breach of faith should be proved, he hoped the whole wrath of the country might fall upon himself. The good faith of England was the greatest power she possessed on the continent, and accusations against it ought not to be slightly hazarded. The hon. gentleman assumed that a solemn pledge had been given to Genoa that she should be preserved as an independent state, coupling this accusation with a reference to a prior proclamation to Italy, promising the establishment of an Italian kingdom. He wished first to disentangle the question of Genoa from that of Italy. From the misinformation of the hon. gentlemen on this subject, he gave a character to the real facts, by the drapery in which he clothed them, that rendered it difficult to know them. It was true that at a remote period, before he had the honour of holding the seals of the foreign office, an intimation had been made to the British Government of a disposition on the part of the Italians to throw off the French yoke, and a disposition had been expressed by the British Government, in return, to aid the attempt by military means. But the circumstance never assumed the consistency alluded to by the hon. gentleman. Details as to the shape or sovereign of this projected Italian kingdom had never been entered into; and the expectations which had been held out had never been in the slightest degree realized. Down to the moment at which the French were driven out of Italy, never were a people so passive, and so inclined to submit to their oppressors, as the Italians had shewn themselves to be. At the moment that half the French troops were engaged in a disastrous contest in Spain, and the infatuation of the man at the head of the French nation was sacrificing the other half in Russia—when no French troops were in Italy—not an Italian rose; and Buonaparté was in as complete possession of Unit country as we were in possession of Yorkshire, or any other loyal county. With the exception of a small rising among the mountains of Tuscany, the success of the allies in Italy was entirely owing to their own arms. But, was this the single circumstance that justified the conduct of the Congress with respect to Italy? Did the House recollect the auspicious moment, when every thing depended on awakening Austria to a determination to join the common cause of Europe? The House had on its table the Treaty by which the great confederacy was bound together.—The basis of that Treaty was, that all the Powers should act in unison, for the purpose of giving independence to Europe generally. But it was evident, that this was incompatible with the re-construction of that ancient government in Italy to which the hon. gentleman argued that the country was pledged; and that Austria could not be restored to the rank which, for the security of all, she ought to hold in Europe, unless at least the northern parts of Italy were under a sovereign not an Italian. As to the Proclamation of lord William Bentinck issued on the 12th of March, he had read it while in Paris with peculiar attention, on the representation of marshal Murat, who had also complained that lord W. Bentinck's corps had appeared with the colours of Italian independence. Having read this Proclamation, he had told the Neapolitan ambassador that he could not concur with him in thinking that the Proclamation declared in favour of Italian independence. He then wrote to lord W. Bentinck, apprising him of the misapprehension which existed with respect to his objects, and guarding him against any appearance of cherishing an interest separate from that of the other powers. That lord W. Bentinck issued his Proclamation without any such purpose as that ascribed to him, was evident, for on the receipt of his (lord C.'s) letter, he would otherwise of course have recalled it. No officer could indeed be authorized to do that which lord W. Bentinck was said to have done. Not only was he not authorized, but he had been prohibited from doing it by positive instruction.

He maintained, that on the subject of Genoa the Congress had decided wisely and right—wisely with respect to Europe—right with respect to Genoa. The union of Genoa to Piedmont was a principle to which the confederated Powers looked before they left Paris. If there was any thing in the Treaty of Paris which the different Powers could not avow at the proper moment, he would be ready to consign those Powers to the execration to which the hon. gentleman, without information, was so ready to devote them. But certainly there were parts of that Treaty not then promulgated, proceeding, however, on a principle of serving, and not of imposing on the credulity of Europe. For instance, the hon. gentleman had asked if there was any thing in that treaty about Holland? There was. He should have thought he exhibited a criminal confidence, if he had not brought France to a sense of the essential interests of this country on that subject before he parted with the essential securities in his hand for the attainment of those interests. And here he must say, that on that question, on the Slave Trade, and on the general principles of European policy, France had conducted herself in such a manner as, he trusted, would produce in the mind of the hon. gentleman a practical feeling of the value of preserving that government which had given peace to the world, and by its conduct seemed capable of maintaining it. He claimed praise for having obtained from France a distinct understanding, that although the precise frontiers of Holland should be left open for discussion, she should be assured of such a mass of territory as should enable her to maintain her independence. In the former national assembly of France there had been a person styling himself the ambassador of the human race. The hon. gentleman appeared to emulate that individual, and to set himself in active opposition to all the sovereigns of continental Europe, to whom he did not even observe the decorum that he was bound to maintain, and did maintain, with respect to the sovereign of our own country. Another of the distinct understandings by the Treaty of Paris was, that Austria was to be bounded by the Po and the Tessine.

Reverting to the subject of Genoa, he contended that no one could suppose that a general officer commanding a corps could be entrusted with the power of creating and destroying states. He could do no more than provide provisionally, not permanently. No one doubted that lord W. Bentinck knew perfectly well what it was his duly to do; but, besides this, he had received a special prohibition on the particular subject in question. The noble lord here read an extract of a letter which he had written to lord William Bentinck from Dijon, on the 30th of March, 1814, instructing him to give every aid to the restoration of the King of Sardinia, but cautioning him studiously to abstain from such measures as might commit Great Britain or her Allies, with respect to the ultimate destination of the north of Italy—a subject which must be discussed in the negociations that would follow the conclusion of peace. He then proceeded to examine lord W. Bentinck's Proclamation, to shew that the change in the Government was provisional, not permanent, and that it was established by him, not on the authority of the Allies, but because he thought it conformable to the general sentiment. With respect to the statement of the hon. gentleman, as to the conduct of the Genoese, he distinctly denied that they had in any way aided the British: not a Genoese had raised his hand on the part of the British army on their approach, however disinclined they felt toward the domination of France. Certainly they had a claim on our good will, but they had none on our good faith, for their surrender was as complete a conquest on every principle of the law of nations, as had ever occurred in the history of any country. The noble lord then read a letter from lord W. Bentinck, dated 27th April, and his answer dated May 6th, both tending to confirm his argument with respect to the expectations held out, and the measures which had been adopted towards the Genoese. That the Genoese themselves did not consider this country as pledged to any establishment of their ancient form of Government, he could shew from a letter put into his hands, when he was at Paris, by a person who acted in some measure as a Plenipotentiary for that people. In this letter, which was expressive of their wishes, nothing more was claimed from this country than the interposition of our good offices with the Allies, for the restoration of the ancient Government. He should have thought that he would have been failing in candour, had he not then been explicit in the expression of his understanding on that subject. He was then, in fact, as explicit to that person as he had been to the hon. member this night. He told him that lord W. Bentinck not only had received no instructions to restore the ancient Government, but that he had received positive instructions to establish merely a provisional government. He stated farther, that if any doubt remained on the minds of the people of Genoa on this subject, that doubt ought forthwith to be cleared up by undeceiving them. It was not his duty to undeceive the Genoese, by issuing a Proclamation, derogatory to the reputation of any public officer: he had left it to lord W. Bentinck, and to their own minister, to undeceive them. But the Genoese had never been deceived on this subject, from the very first moment of our appearing before the place, up to the present; they had always understood what was established to be merely a provisional government. They might have considered the Proclamation in the light of a sort of claim on the good offices of this country, to endeavour to assist them in the object of having their ancient Government restored; but they never were deceived with respect to the ultimate possibility of their annexation to the possessions of the king of Sardinia. The House would find that this did not rest merely on his assertion; for in a note left with him on the 18th of May by the same person, and which was a sort of written reply to some of the arguments he (lord Castlereagh) had used to him in their preceding conversation, they would find the annexation of Genoa to Piedmont with a view to the military security of Italy, and some other points, discussed in such a manner as to leave no doubt of what the understanding of the Genoese on this subject actually was. While however, it was considered necessary for the security of Europe that Genoa should be annexed to the states of the king of Sardinia, it would be unjust to the Allies if he did not also state that all those conditional securities were taken for the interests of the people of Genoa. He begged leave to repel the charge made against the Allies of having departed from their declarations, and having been actuated by the same love of conquest and aggrandisement which they themselves had so loudly condemned. The odious sense of conquest, on the principle of which the Allies were said to have acted in this and other cases, they positively disclaimed. In no part of their conduct had they departed from the principles professed by them; but they would have been most unfit, indeed, for the situations which they assumed, by entering into the general obligation to restore the peace of Europe, had they so stultified themselves in the eyes of the world and of Europe as to disqualify themselves from changing the face of Europe, the ancient governments of which had been broken down and destroyed, in such a manner as might thereafter be found best calculated for the preservation of its future peace and tranquillity. The light in which their conduct on this occasion had been viewed by the hon. gentleman, carried such absurdity on the face of it, that it could never have been taken up by any man possessed of any thing like the information of that hon. gentleman, without his having a taste for running down the different sovereigns of Europe, which in the times that we lived in, to say the least of it, was indecent as well as dangerous. The Allies had made war, not for the sake of subjugating any power, but for the sake of preserving the whole of Europe from subjugation; they had succeeded in their object; and they had endeavoured to give to the different powers of the European commonwealth a protection from that danger by which they had already been destroyed. When he stated the principle upon which the allies had acted, he had no hesitation in saying at the same time, that he was sorry that even the prejudices of the Genoese people could not on this occasion be attended to; for the prejudices of a people were entitled to attention when greater objects did not stand in the way; and by doing violence to their feelings, even when the general safety rendered such violence necessary, he was aware that they might give rise to these attacks of the hon. gentleman against the sovereigns of Europe. There were grave and solid reasons why they could not grant to Genoa what was demanded of them in behalf of that people, arising out of the very situation of Genoa, consistently with the security of Europe, and the objects to which they were pledged, arising out of the treaty of Paris. That very state of Genoa had in a great degree contributed to the former weakness and overthrow of Europe; for it had first contributed to the overthrow of Sardinia, and thus been the means of enabling the French to achieve their conquests. An insurrection in Genoa had led to a difference between the Genoese and the people of Piedmont; and this gave the French a pretence to interfere, in their usual way, in the affairs of these two states. The allies were bound to act in the manner they conceived best for the general interests, and to see if they could, not find some mode of re-uniting Piedmont and Genoa, which would secure the common interest and strengthen that part of Italy against attack. Genoa, it was proper to remark, was the most important military position in the north of Italy and the general security essentially depended upon having the possession of that port. The question was, whether the measure adopted, or that of allowing it to be held by a commercial republic, was the most likely to provide for the general security? Whether the allied princes decided right or wrong on this point, this much he would say, that there never was a decision which could be less open to the imputation of having been given from improper motives than the one in question. As far as the separate interests of this country were concerned, had our view been to seek a national benefit without any reference to the general objects for which the different powers were confederated, there could be little doubt but that these interests would have been best promoted by the establishment of an insulated republic there. The Genoese were willing to enter into any terms of alliance with us, and to give us every facility for availing ourselves of that important position in our different operations: but then, had we followed this policy, it would have been said on the continent, that we had broken loose from the general object, with the view of prosecuting our own separate interests. There never was a question in which it was less possible to impute had motives to the continental powers than in this. The king of Sardinia had not the power, if they had not been so inclined, to impose on them, as the value of his services to them, any conditions derogatory either to their honour or their interests. He had been expelled from his states on the continent, and was incapable of giving any assistance; and if the allies had not conceived that this annexation of Genoa to Piedmont, was rendering a service to the cause, they were not under the necessity of adopting such a measure. No power could possibly have any other motive but the general good on this occasion. France might, indeed, have had an interest the other way, and to keep up the difference between Piedmont and Genoa; but the French government did not attempt to act in any such spirit, and they were a willing party to this act. It was from a sincere conviction that it was necessary to make the barrier effectual on the Italian side, as well as the other, that they thought it advisable to intrust the entrance by the Alps and by the Genoese sea to the same hands; and on this principle alone was Genoa annexed to Piedmont. The decision was exempt from had faith in the most unequivocal sense of the word. He trusted that the House would see that this measure was grounded on a large view of military expediency; and with the avowed and understood object of strengthening that flank against France. This measure was neither adopted for the sake of any of the allied powers, nor from any feeling for the king of Sardinia himself, but from a conviction that in so strengthening the king of Sardinia, they would best consult the interests of the general policy of Europe. The noble lord said, he should be failing in his duty to the allies, if he did not state that this measure was followed up in such a way as was best calculated to promote the interests of the Genoese people. Every possible step had been taken to secure to them their different interests; and he believed that their present government would be a more popular one than that under the ancient republic, which was an oligarchy of the purest description.

Having dismissed the question of Genoa, the noble lord proceeded to inculcate the necessity of supporting government, by abstaining from the discussion of measures which were not before the House. Those premature and inflammatory descriptions of the conduct of the different governments were more likely to produce public disturbances, and to impede the progress of the negociation, than to produce any other object. The cause of this country had been very much injured by that sort of inability which seemed to belong to some members of withholding their judgments till any subject could come with propriety before them. [Hear, hear, hear!] Parliament was not formerly so much in the habit of anticipating discussions, and he trusted that such an indiscreet practice would not be countenanced by the House. The House would not expect that he should now enter upon the discussion of any branches of interests not yet brought to a decision—as the understood arrangement of the powers of Europe. With the exception however of one branch, on which he could not at present give any information, namely, the arrangement of Italy south of the Po, he could state that all the other arrangements were concluded in nearly the same form in which they would stand in the ultimate treaty, and were considered as binding on the different powers as if they were the subject of a treaty. He had no objection to state in answer to the hon. gentleman that France had been an honest power at the Congress, and had done her best for Europe and herself; and that she had consented to these arrangements. The noble lord went into a justification of the conduct of the different governments at the Congress; and he contended that these governments could not be said to have acted from sordid views. Till the reconstruction of the great powers of Austria and Prussia, there was a great blank in Europe, and there could not be said to be any bulwark against future aggression. Till those powers were restored, Europe was not herself. There was nothing in the conduct of either of those states from which their moderation could be called in question. They wished to be replaced in the state of their possessions in 1805. In taking this state Austria at least had not chosen a period the most markedly advantageous. Had she taken the year 1792, when she had the Low Countries, though not Venice, she would have taken a period when her population was at least two millions higher. Prussia took the period before being dismembered by France, and she had not received 40,000 inhabitants more than she possessed at that period. Nothing, therefore, could be less open to accusation than the great features of the arrangement. With respect to Saxony, it was, no doubt, true, that at one time it was in contemplation to incorporate the whole of that country with Prussia. He was one of the persons who had opposed this incorporation; and it was ultimately by the sacrifice of the interests of Holland and Hanover that the other sacrifice was made in favour of the king of Saxony. But while he stated this he would broadly contend that the right of conquest, under certain circumstances, would warrant the incorporation of the whole of one country with another. He did not wish to say any thing painful to the feelings of the sovereign of Saxony, whom he wished to continue long to reign over his Saxon subjects: he had fallen on unfortunate times; but if ever the principle of conquest had a legitimate application it was in the case of the king of Saxony. He had returned to his connection with France, after he was placed in circumstances which might have withdrawn him from it, if he had not thought the other course more for his interest. With respect to the principles of conquest, there was no writer who would deny that the country and people of a conquered enemy, with arms in their hands, did not fall a sacrifice to the conqueror. Happily this principle had been modified in modern warfare by two principles, the one the receiving a reasonable indemnification, and the other the reasonable security to be given to prevent the recurrence of future attack. It was no argument that other powers had also been in alliance with Buonaparté for they had afterwards contributed to the salvation of Europe; and the compensation fell properly in an aggravated proportion, on the power which came last in. But the principle on which he conceived the measure of incorporation unadvisable was, that it would have been a mischief to Prussia rather than an advantage; for the general feeling in Germany at the sacrifice of an ancient family, would have revolted against Prussia. Then came the proclamation of prince Repnin on delivering up the government to the Prussian authorities, which he really believed originated in one of those misconceptions to which the best officers were liable. When the proclamation first came into his hands, he (lord C.) lost no time in shewing it to the Prussian minister, who said that it was the first time he had seen it. Count Nesselrode, the Russian minister, made a similar declaration; and in return to an official note which he (lord C.) addressed to prince Hardenberg, that minister returned an official declaration that the proclamation was wholly unauthorized on the part of Prussia. Such were the unequivocal declarations of both these courts. It was true that the Prussian government, the nation, and army, felt a strong interest in the possession of Saxony, in consideration of the efforts and sacrifices which they had made in the common cause, and the importance of the line of defence which it would have afforded. Nothing, perhaps, but a wish to conciliate the nations of Europe, and their receiving the line of the Elbe, could have induced them voluntarily to have relinquished their views.

With regard to Poland, his lordship had interested himself as much as possible, to procure a determination that would be equally satisfactory to ail parties; and whatever might be the particular arrangements that the separate powers might adopt, they would all be dictated by the same spirit of liberality and justice that had governed the great states in all arrangements. The main object of conciliating the people would not be lost sight of, and they would be relieved from those local difficulties and personal disqualifications under which they formerly laboured. Whatever system of policy might formerly exist, the Poles would now be governed as Poles; and with regard to territorial arrangement, and to the particular form of government that each possessor would establish, he wished the House to suspend any opinion until more detailed information was supplied. In erecting them into a separate kingdom, hon. gentlemen would not forget the many difficulties that must be encountered, not merely in procuring the assent of the monarchs who were interested, but in severing immense tracts of territory bound to its neighbour during a long course of years, until at length they had grown, as it were, into each other, and were sometimes incapable of separate existence.

In calling the attention of Parliament to those parts of the arrangements that more peculiarly regarded this country, he should have had less satisfaction, if, during the course of his mission, he had employed himself in obtaining concessions, the objects of which were merely the separate aggrandizement and interest of Great Britain; but in the case of Holland, in whose establishment under the present system, we were individually deeply interested, the allied powers had felt, as they must feel, that they were all gaining an equivalent advantage. If it were impolitic for this country, as no one would deny, that France should in future possess the large naval resources supplied by a long line of coast from the Pyrennees to the Texel, it was not less the interest of the other states of Europe to prevent the application of such means; and at the same time, by erecting Holland into a powerful and independent kingdom, under the House of Orange, by the annexation of territory formerly belonging to Austria, an essential service was rendered to all the continental powers. It was but a tribute due to the sovereign now reigning, to say, that none of the high individuals had been more successful in gaining the confidence of his subjects, by persevering endeavours for their benefit, by liberality in the exercise of his authority, and by a happy talent of drawing resources equally from all parts of the dominions so recently placed in his hands. What he had said of Holland would apply equally to Hanover: the Sovereign of Great Britain had not consulted merely his own private interests, and his allies were sensible of the enlarged views upon which he had acted. On this point there had always been some degree of jealousy in this country; but he was rather inclined to think that Hanover had, generally speaking, suffered more than she had gained from the connexion. Its people had recently proved themselves faithful supporters of Great Britain; and he would say that there had not been a more efficient, more faithful, and honest body of men in our service than the Hanoverian Legion; they amounted to not less than 12,000 men, to which number they had always been kept up by voluntary enrolment, and it was not too much to say that the absence of such a corps might have had a most injurious effect on our military exertions. The preservation of the importance of Hanover, as a constituent slate of Germany, should therefore be dear to us, as well in this point of view, as from its connexion with our reigning family. The increase of territory she had received tended to consolidate her connexion with this country, by the extent of sea coast which it gave her: while liable to be intercepted from this country, her efficiency was less considerable. From the moment also she was in close contact with Holland for an extent of 150 miles; this naturally contributed to strengthen and protect her. Neither was this a connexion of which our continental allies were at all disposed to feel jealous. They were thoroughly convinced that no interest was felt so strongly in this country as the con- servation of the general liberties of Europe. In noticing the treaty with Spain, upon which the hon. gentleman had commented, the noble lord expressed his conviction, that on procuring from that country in its present situation, an acknowledgment like that which had been referred to, much had been procured; and he thought that some reliance was to be placed upon the assurances given both by that country and by Portugal. He vindicated government from the imputation that they had not procured that proper neutrality between the king of Spain and his South American subjects; and he severely censured the hon. member who had brought forward this subject, for recommending that the British nation should erect itself into an arbiter between a sovereign and his revolted subjects. His lordship never could prevail upon himself to pay any respect to opinions given to encourage rebellious subjects, and he thought that the individual who delivered them travelled far beyond the duty he owed to his own sovereign. He admitted that the scenes transacting in South America were disgusting and painful; he allowed also that Spain, with respect to commerce, had not conducted herself with the liberality we had deserved, but that clouds of prejudice prevented her from seeing how nearly her own interests were connected with those of this country.

The noble lord said, he concurred in several parts of what the hon. member had said regarding the events that had recently occurred in France. What course of policy England would pursue in regard to the convulsion by which France was at present agitated, he could not venture to state, but upon the issue of that contest much of the happiness and repose of the world in future depended. If Buonaparté succeeded in re-establishing his authority in France, peace must be despaired of; at least such a peace as we had recently the hope of enjoying. The question now was, whether Europe must once more return to that dreadful system which it had so long pursued; whether Europe was again to become a series of armed nations, and whether Great Britain among them was to abandon that wholesome state into which she was now settling, to resume her station as a military people, and again to struggle for the independence of the world? These were questions of no small magnitude, depending upon events now in issue, depending upon a new and an unexpected contest, in which the liberties of mankind were once more assaulted and endangered. It was not merely a question whether the Bourbon family, which had already given so many benefits to France, and among them, that best of all benefits, peace, should continue to reign in France, but whether tyranny and despotism should again reign over the independent nations of the continent? Whether as applied to this country, we should enjoy the happy state that we had bought with our blood after a long struggle, or whether we should once more revert to that artificial system which, during that struggle, we were compelled to maintain? Upon these points there could exist only one feeling, and his lordship trusted that Providence would ordain only one result. After referring again to the efforts made by the King of France to give a free constitution to that country, and the success with which the experiment had been attended during the sitting of the legislature for five or six months, his lordship concluded by justifying himself for not having, as much as might be wished by some, endeavoured abroad to introduce the free principles of the British constitution; he had not, like a missionary, gone about to preach to the world its excellency and its fitness, because he by, no means felt convinced, that in countries yet in a state of comparative ignorance, and brought up under a system so diametrically opposite, it could be advantageously introduced. A great deal had been done to promote the happiness of nations, and if Buonaparté was not permitted to intercept the prospects which were arising, never could Europe look forward to brighter days than those which it might now anticipate. The noble lord sat down amidst loud and repeated cheers.

An hon. member under the gallery, whose name we could not learn, remarked upon the mode in which the noble lord had cast imputations upon lord William Bentinck, for the purpose of justifying his own conduct.

Lord Castlereagh

, in explanation, observed, that he had not argued that lord W. Bentinck in any respect had acted inconsistently with his duty; on the contrary, the foundation of what he had said with regard to Genoa was, that the British minister having no such power, had not re-established permanently, but only provisionally, the ancient government of the capital of the Ligurian Republic.

Mr. Ponsonby

argued, that the noble lord could only escape from the charge by removing the weight to lord W. Bentinck, as he had done, in fact, though not perhaps in argument, in the course of his speech. He hoped that the original instructions to the British minister in Italy would be produced upon some future occasion. He did not understand the very unsatisfactory explanation made by the noble lord with regard to Poland. What was meant by the assertion 'that the Poles would be governed as Poles?' Had they not been so governed heretofore? and it so, what new advantage had they acquired? With respect to Saxony, the noble lord's statement was by no means convincing, and he hoped that all the documents would be laid upon the table, and that the noble lord would be ready to give the necessary explanations. It appeared to him, that a very extraordinary and unparliamentary course had been pursued upon the present occasion, for the noble lord, contrary to all practice, had first made his speech, and then was to produce the papers. After the Easter recess he would probably make some motion upon the subject, but in the mean time, until all the information was afforded, he protested against being supposed to give any opinion upon the subject.

Mr. Whitbread

, in reply, remarked, that considering the charge of the noble lord, that he had brought forward his accusations upon illicit information, it was singular that the noble lord had not only not ventured to give one of them a contradiction, but that they had all turned out to be true and authentic evidences. The noble lord had said that he had not deemed it a part of his duty to go about the continent like a missionary, preaching the English constitution. He was glad that the noble lord had not undertaken the task, for assuredly it would have been most inadequately executed, if his speeches there would have been like those in parliament, which, like that just delivered, was a libel upon the excellency of our constitution: one of those libels was the had effect of discussions like the present in parliament; but Mr. W. said, he was disposed to apply a very different epithet to them, and to assert, that even with regard to the Congress the effect had been most beneficial. To what a state of degradation would the noble lord reduce the House of Commons, a part of our excellent constitution, when he would make it dependent upon an envoy at Vienna, whether it should or should not be submissively silent. In his View the noble lord's explanation was complete and satisfactory in no one point. Regarding that large tract of territory upon the left bank of the Rhine, the noble lord had given no information; and as to Belgium, Saxony, and Genoa, the information given was altogether delusive. What did the noble lord mean to say regarding the Poles? Did he mean to be understood? What was meant by the Poles being governed like Poles? unless indeed, as had been long the case with that unhappy people, they were to be continued in a state of bondage to the will of their temporary masters. As to Saxony, the noble lord had said, that the proclamation of prince Repoin was unauthorized; but who could tell whether, on the remonstrance being made, it had not been diplomatically disavowed by Prussia, while the agent was abandoned? He would again repeat the question, Why did the noble lord, go to Vienna, and why did he come back? Because he was ordered, was the answer. Who ordered him? Why, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and the Master of the Mint; and yet the noble lord had talked so soundingly of his responsibility, and his confidence in himself, which enabled him to decide upon points without instructions which would have delayed the mighty machine, of Congress. He hoped, as Buonaparté had said, that the Congress was now dissolved, and that it would not turn our that what in his hands they had called robbery and plunder, in their holy keeping was vested right and legal property.

Mr. Wilberforce

expressed his satisfaction at what had been done respecting the Slave Trade.

The Address was then agreed to.