HC Deb 14 June 1815 vol 31 cc799-822

These were as follow:

1,900,000 Interest on Exchequer Bills 2,000,000
290,000 Sinking Fund on ditto 270,000
121,000 Debentures & Loyalty Loan 90,000
6,000,000 Vote of Credit Bills 1814, and Reduction of Exchequer Bills 6,000,000
£. 89,728,326
8,107,094 Deduct Irish Proportion of Joint Charge 9,572,814
Deduct Civil List and Consolidated Fund 188,000 9,760,814
And there remained to be borne by England £. 79,968,112

The vote of credit intended to be proposed this year was to the extent of 6,000,000l., and would be made good in the usual way, by an issue of exchequerbills to the same amount. Anxious, however, that there should not be too great a pressure on these securities, he should propose a reduction of three million from those voted last year, besides the re-payment of 5,000,000l. issued on the last vote of credit; by these means the sum paid off would be equal to that which it might be necessary to issue in the course of the present year. When it was foreseen that an expenditure to the immense amount which had now become necessary, must be provided for in the course of the pre- sent session, an important consideration arose, whether it would be better that an. extraordinary exertion should be made to raise an unusually large proportion of the supplies within the year, or whether it would be preferable to call on the public only for what they had been accustomed to pay in former years, and raise what remained wanting by means of a loan. Much might be said in favour of either course. For his own part, he had no hesitation in declaring that if he had considered it probable that a similar expenditure would be necessary in future years, he would at once, whatever the hazard might be, have made an appeal to the spirit and magnanimity of the country; and from such an appeal he was sure the country would not have shrunk. From, the feeling which had been manifested in consequence of the recent events, he was satisfied that those measures, which the wisdom of Parliament might think necessary to the honour and security of the country, would be cheerfully submitted to. But thinking as he did, that an expenditure to the amount of that of the present year, was not likely again to recur, even if the war should continue on the present scale, which was what he could not anticipate, he had thought it wiser to have recourse to no other means than those which it had been usual for Parliament to adopt on former occasions. However large the demand which had in consequence been made on the credit of the country, he saw no reason to regret this resolution. The right hon. gentleman now proceeded to state the ways and means which would be, in the opinion of his Majesty's ministers, the fittest to meet the supplies which had been voted. He took the Annual Duties at 3,000,000l.; the surplus of the Consolidated Fund he also took at 3,000,000l. It would be satisfactory to the House to learn the grounds on which he estimated the surplus of the Consolidated Fund, at that amount; and they would view with pleasure the increased resources of the country. It might also be proper that he should show the grounds on which he intended to propose on a future day a grant of 22,000,000l. out of the growing produce of the War Taxes. He should not call upon them to come to this vote that night, as it was more consistent with the forms of Parliament, that some portion of the ways and means of the year should be reserved for a time to meet any future grants which might yet be made in the course of the session. He, however, considered himself justified in taking the War-taxes at 22,000,000l.; the Lottery he took at 250,000l.; Old Naval Stores at 508,000l.; the Vote of Credit he had stated at 6,000,000l.; the Exchequer-bills Funded, and the Loan in the 5 per Cent. would give 18,185,000l. The second Loan 27,000,000l. These were the ways and means by which he proposed to meet the charge of the year, immense as it was. The total amount of them was 79,893,500l. This sum fell a little short of the supplies; but upon the whole he expected the ways and means which he had enumerated would prove sufficient. It was his peculiar duty this day to state the terms on which the Loan had been contracted for the service of the public. It had been the object of the Treasury to diffuse the loans called for, over different species of stock, in order to divide the burthen, to remove all inconveniencies to the public creditor, and to provide for the exigency on the easiest terms. This would be seen by adverting to their former proceedings in the course of the session. It had been proposed to fund 18,000,000l. of Exchequer-bills. This, in the first instance, they had not been able to effect; but subsequently on a loan in the 5 per cents. subscribers had gone beyond the 18,000,000l. by a sum of 135,000l. The sum, therefore, of 18,135,000l. was thus placed in the ways and means. The committee were aware, that by the loan that day, no less a sum than 27,000,000l. for England was to be raised; and as the 5 per cents. were sufficiently burthened, it became necessary that this should principally fall on the 3 and the 4 per cent. stocks. It was originally proposed that a larger sum should be taken in the 4 per cents.; but on the subscribers objecting to this, 10l. percent. only had been given out of that stock; 130l. had been taken from the 3 per cent. reduced, and the remaining part of the 100l. was to be by a bidding in the 3 per cent. consols. It had happened singularly enough, as it had once on a former occasion, about eighteen months ago, "that the sum offered by the subscribers, was exactly the minimum of what the Treasury had resolved to accept. This was a circumstance so far satisfactory, as it went to show that, both parties met on fair and honourable terms, and arrived at the same point from reasoning in different ways. What further proved the correctness of the view which had been taken of the case, was that four different calculations had been made by four different persons, and all had concurred in naming 44l. in the 3 per cent. consols, as that which ought to be the bidding. The bonus which the subscribers had was to be estimated in this manner:—

The 130l. given in the 3 per cent. Reduced, at 54⅛, were worth £71 0 3
The 10l. in the 4 per cent. at 69⅞ 6 19 9
The 44l. in the 3 per cent. Consols, at 54 23 15 2½
Total £101 15 2½
The consols, being shut, there was no money price to them, and the times price was something more than the money price of that stock. The times price was 55½; but from this one and a half per cent. was to be deducted, on account of the dividend to arise from the half-year which was about to expire; as no dividend would be paid to the subscribers to the loan on that stock till January next. This, therefore, reduced the value of the 3 per cent. consols, to 54l. which made the total sum given to the subscribers what he had before stated—101l. 15s. 2½d.; to which, adding the sum which would be allowed them in case of prompt payment, made an addition of 2l. 13s. 7´d. and the total 104l. 8s. 10¼d., including the whole of the discount allowed to any who might pay the entire amount of their subscriptions at once. But it was obvious, the loan being on so large a scale, it would not be fair to expect that so many could do this as had so come forward on former occasions, and that when the monthly instalments were so considerable, there was less probability of payments in advance than when a smaller loan was called for. On this account he thought that not more than half the discount, at the utmost, could be estimated as a bonus to the contractors, which, would reduce their advantage to no more than 3l. 2s. per cent. The bargain therefore was not unreasonably favourable to them, and there was reason to rejoice that such a loan could be obtained at a period like the present on such terms. He would now proceed to explain the grounds on which he took the surplus of the Consolidated Fund at three millions. The actual surplus of that fund in the year ending 5th of April 1815, after deducting all charges, had been 3,647,000l., and would therefore have justified an estimate to the same extent for the current year, sup- posing the revenue to remain equally productive, and the additional charges to be covered by the provision made by Parliament for meeting them. As however there remained the sum of 284,000l. granted for the service of the former year still due on the 5th of April, the sum which would remain for the service of the current year would be no more than 3,363,000l. In another mode of estimate the result would be still more favourable. The amount of taxes applicable to the Consolidated Fund of Great Britain in the year ending 5th of April, 1815, was £38,702,000
Adding the War Taxes appropriated to the Consolidated Fund 2,706,000
There would be a total income of 41,408,000
From which, deducting the permanent charges of Great Britain existing on 5th April 1815, amounting to 37,588,000
There would remain 3,820,000
From which again deducting the sum due on the former grant of 284,000
There would remain applicable to the service of the year 3,536,000
He should therefore have thought himself justified in proposing a grant on account of this surplus to the extent of 3,500,000l. But as no inconvenience would arise from its being estimated too low, and some had been experienced from an error of an opposite nature, he thought the safer course was to take it at 3,000,000l. With respect, to the War-taxes, he should at a future day propose a vote highly satisfactory, from the view which it gave of the increasing means of the country. The amount of the War-taxes, taking them at what they were last year, and adding the arrears of the Property-tax remaining to be collected, would furnish 32,925,454l.
From this deducting the sum remaining to complete the Grant of War Taxes for 1814 £8,005,887
And the War Taxes pledged for Interest of Debt 2,706,000
£10,711,887
There would remain to be granted for the service of the year £22,213,567
On the credit of this he should consider himself fully justified in moving on a future day a grant of 22,000,000l. It was worth while to look back to the increase which had taken place in the produce of the permanent war taxes since the last considerable addition was made to them. The committee were aware that no new taxes had been proposed since the year 1813. In the year ending April 5,1813, their total produce was somewhat less than 60,000,000l. In the year ending April 5,1815, they amounted to 65,804,000l. thus giving an increase of five millions and a half. Undoubtedly it must be admitted, that the year ending April 5,1813, had been less productive than some which had preceded it; but making every reasonable allowance for this circumstance, the increase had been great beyond all former example. He now came to state the amount of the charge on the country, by the loans for the present year, and the way in which it was proposed to meet them. The total amount of the capital created by the Exchequer-bills funded, and the loan in the 5 per cents. amounted to 21,208,000l. 5 per cent. stock; the interest of this to 1,060,000l.; the Sinking Fund to 331,000l., with the usual charge, for management. The loan obtained that day created a capital of 49,680,000l. the interest of which would be 1,517,000l.; the Sinking Fund would amount to 758,700l., to which would be added the charge for management. The total amount of the capital created in the present year by funding, was 70,888,000l. The interest on this was 2,577,000l.; the Sinking Fund 1,090,000l.; the total annual charge to the country 3,689,000l. The rate per cent. at which, the whole of the sum raised, in the present year had been obtained was, to the subscribers (including the Sinking Fund), 5l. 14s. 2½d. The total charge to the country was, every thing included, 8l. 3s. 5¾d. He wished to show what had been the impression made on the stocks by the financial operations of the present year, and to compare them with that which had formerly been produced by those measures tendered necessary to prosecute the late war. In 1795, a loan was obtained at 4l. 14s. per cent. In that and the following year 137 millions were added to the national debt, and the effect of this on the stocks was such, that for a loan borrowed at the beginning of 1797, the public were compelled to pay 6l. 7s. per cent. being an increase of interest, and consequently a depression of public credit of 33s. per cent. on the amount of the loan, and of 35 per cent. on the interest paid in the former year. Now, since the year 1813 the public debt had been increased one hundred and eighty-seven millions, and the effect was this:—in that year we paid 3l. 8s. to the subscribers: we this year paid 5l. 14s. 2d. on the whole amount borrowed. So that with this immense addition to our debt, no greater depression on public credit was observable than 6s. 2d. per cent. on the loan, and about 5½ per cent. on the former interest. This might be considered to result from an Astonishing increase of public credit since the period to which he had referred, or to the improved situation of the country. And which ever way it was viewed, the effect was equally gratifying. To provide for the annual charge of 3,689,000l., the House had already supplied by taxes of Customs and Excise on tobacco, and on Excise licences, about 600,000., and there were now under the consideration of the House additions to the Stamps and Postage to the amount of about 1,200,000l. more, making in the whole a provision by new taxes of about 1,800,000l. Thus it would be seen about half the necessary supplies were provided by taxes now agreed to, or in progress through the House. For the remainder, he proposed to take a sum of from 1,800,000l. to 1,900,000l. out of the sums in the hands of the commissioners for liquidating the national debt, as he was authorized to do by the Act of 1813. The sum in their hands was at present about 70,000,000l., and he proposed to cancel so much of that as would suffice to meet the remainder of the charge created by the loan. He wished it to be borne in mind, as a consideration of no small importance, that a large proportion of the immense sum called for must have been supported by the country as arrears of the late war, had not the recent events again placed us in a state of hostility to France. On the most moderate calculation, no less than 21,000,000l. would have been sufficient. Of this 12,000,000l. were for the arrears of the Army Extraordinaries: for the payment of the Naval Debt, 2,000,000l. more; for Bills of Credit and arrears of Subsidies, 3,000,000l. for the Commissariat department in Portugal, not less than 2,500,000l. These sums together made 19,5001,000l. The 2,000,000l. for the Army Extraordinaries, which he had mentioned, were for the former year, though included in the grant for the present. The payment of the sum which continued due on account of the Commissariat in Portugal beyond what had been already discharged, had been suspended during the war. The parties interested had acquiesced cheerfully in the arrangement made, and consented to receive the interest, without complaining that the principal would not be paid. This was satisfactory, as it showed that the monied men of the country (for the greater number of the creditors were British merchants) had the interest of the nation more at heart than their own private profit. They had made a considerable sacrifice, as the state of the exchange would have given them a great advantage, which must be wholly lost to them by this arrangement; which however would prove beneficial to the public service, and from its effect upon the exchange greatly promote economy in those departments in which our service had hitherto been conducted abroad at an immense expense; and thus our operations would be carried on with new vigour. The Committee must see with pleasure, that even under the pressure of present circumstances, the precious metals had been reduced in price since last April. Gold, which had then been 5l. 7s. the ounce, had been reduced to 5l. 5s., and the price of dollars had sunk within the same period to 6s. 3d. per ounce. Ha stated this to show that we had been enabled, not only to meet, but in part to surmount the difficulties of our situation. Returning from this digression, he observed, that he had brought up his statement of the charges which the country must have borne, if a new war had not broken out, to 19,500,000l. One million more was to be added as the balance due to the achievements, of our brave army; for the capture of stores. Five-hundred thousand pound of the sum called for in the present session would also have been necessary in aid of the Civil List. Thus this made up the 21,000,000l. he had mentioned, which were to be provided for in the present year, which did not arise from the renewal of war, and must have been borne had no such event taken place. He was aware it would be asked, if the war should continue, how would such expenses be met in a future year? He would not say that there would be no difficulties to contend with, but it was not probable that those difficulties would be of equal magnitude with those surmounted in the present year. He could hardly think it possible that this country would be engaged in an extensive naval war, while making such exertions as she was now displaying on the Continent. Either the attention of France would be so much directed to the confederated armies, that she would not be able to make any great effort with her navy: or, supposing any arrangements to be made by her with the Continental Powers, that expense now incurred for our armies would cease, and the supplies at present demanded for them could be applied to the service of our navy: so that he conceived no prospect of the war being continued at the present great expense. Up to the year 1814, a provision had been made for 140,000 seamen. These were reduced in the last year to 70,000: but this, instead of a diminution, had caused a great additional expense, as the numbers of persons returning from long voyages and claiming the arrears due to them, had made larger disbursements necessary than were called for at any period of the war. This burthen could not continue; and he thought he was not too sanguine, when he looked for a diminution in the naval estimates for the next year, to the amount of four or five millions, including the transport service. The reduction upon the whole, even if the war should continue, might therefore, in another year, be not less than four or five and twenty millions. He believed that in every stage of the late war, this question had constantly been asked, "How shall we go on next year?" The general answer to this had been, that the spirit and resources of the nation would still furnish the means for prosecuting the contest, if it should be necessary. This answer, he thought, might suffice on the present occasion; but it was happily in his power to give one more distinct and specific. The House were not to suppose the Act of 1813 would not yet furnish fresh resources from the fund in the hands of the Commissioners for redeeming the National Debt. Though when all the grants of the present session were passed, but 9 or 10 millions would remain in their hands; in the next year there would, by the progress of redemption, be found in their care from 20 to 30 millions of stock. We had raised by loans in the present year, no less a sum than 45,500,000l. The House would consider the prospect before us less gloomy than it might otherwise appear when he stated that it was probable, for the reasons which he had assigned, that in the next year the loan required would not exceed 20 millions, and from 20 to 30 millions of stock would be applicable in the hands of the commissioners. But what had induced ministers to prefer having recourse to a public loan, rather than to a more onerous, though a more provident and certain mode of meeting the exigencies of the case, was this—they had reason to hope the contest might be short. In whatever light the subject was viewed whether we supposed the government of Buonaparté was only established over France by the domineering power of a mutinous army, or whether it was assumed that he was invested with, the sovereign authority by the suffrages of the nation at large in the present instance, it could not affect the measures which it had become necessary for England to adopt. Placed in that situation which we occupied, and deeply pledged in respect both of honour and of interest to support at any hazard the system upon which the peace of Europe had been restored, we could not but join with the Confederated Powers to give France encouragement to declare herself, and to enable the Royal party to struggle for the liberty of their country before its present Chief should be in possession of its whole resources. How far the enterprise might succeed, he could not say. But hearing as he did, in many parts of France, murmurs half suppressed, and seeing in others open hostilities against the ruling Power, he could not but cherish a belief that the real supporters of Buonaparté were very few indeed, beyond the limits of the Army, which had been accustomed to live under his banners. But supposing, for the misery of mankind, and most of all for that of France, that, carried away by her lust for military triumphs, she should prefer a warlike chief to lead her armies to the conquest of Europe, and that for such a character, she had deliberately rejected a mild and moderate government, terrible as it might be to combat the whole strength of France embodied under such a leader, such a consideration would make little difference with respect to the measures that ought to be pursued. Greater means ought, in fact, to be put forth, and more intense energy exerted to crush a Government, in its nature inimical to all other governments. He was unwilling to believe that France had acted such a part; that she had rejected the sway of a moderate and legal Prince, for one who ruled without law, and who even now trampled on the constitution he so recently pretended to establish. Such a power must be combated. It must find its end in internal discord or by external force, or it would never rest satisfied till its military domination extended over the whole of Europe. He would not however suffer himself to be led into the discussion of topics, however interesting and important, which were not immediately under the consideration of the Committee, and was not aware that he had omitted to state any thing necessarily connected with the business of this evening; but he should hold himself ready to offer any further explanation which might be required by the Committee. He then moved his first resolution, which was, "That, towards raising the Supply granted to his Majesty, the sum of 36 millions be raised by Annuities, whereof the charges of 27 millions are to be defrayed on the part of Great Britain, and 9 millions on the part of Ireland."

Mr. Turney

declared, that the proposition with which the right hon. gentleman had concluded his speech was one of the most alarming that he had ever heard. At the same time, he must do justice to the right hon. gentleman for the clearness and fairness of his statements with respect to the existing ways and means, on which, upon the whole—although it was probable that there would be some deficiency in the property-tax—he agreed with him. As to the supplies, the right hon. gentleman had endeavoured to convince the committee that they ought not to contemplate a similar account next year, for that at least 21 millions could not recur. The committee should, however, bear in mind, that they were ignorant of the nature of that arrear of 21 millions. To him there seemed no reason to doubt that similar arrears would again accumulate. In the article of Army Extraordinaries, liberal as the annual grants had been, they had never covered the actual expenditure; and it was not to be supposed that they would do so in future. The estimate of the Commissariat appeared to him to be under-rated by the right hon. gentleman. Last year the expenses of that department were three millions, and the year before two millions and a hall; but this year they were estimated by the right hon. gentleman at only 1,100,000l. In future years they would be much more. The Barrack estimate this year, in consequence of the sale of old barracks, was only 99,000l.; but that cause of diminution was temporary, and next year that item of expenditure must necessarily be increased.—Before he said any thing on the general subject of foreign troops, he observed that we gave to Austria 400,000l. and to Russia 200,000l. in addition to the former sum of 500,000l., for taking care of her own ships. The amount of the sum appropriated to foreign Powers was three millions, of which 1,600,000l. had been already voted by Parliament, and the remaining 1,400,000l., though altogether a new proposition, was now very quietly and without remark proposed as a vote to the committee by the right hon. gentleman. In the first place, no information had been given to the committee of the nature of the sums composing this vote. He had apprehended that all our subsidies had been made good. If not, why had not that been stated? It seemed as if the right hon. gentleman was not in the secret on the subject, but merely said the demands came upon the Treasury in the shape of bills, for which it was neceseary that he should provide. As to the Army Prize-money, it might be very proper to pay at once a million of arrears on that subject; which, however, nobody looked for. But should the war continue, we should, in all probability, have brave men distinguishing themselves, for which his Majesty's faithful Commons would of course be called upon to provide. Of what value, therefore, was the right hon. gentleman's supposition, that such arrears would not recur? In fact, they would go on at a rate more rapid than ever. The total amount of the supplies of the year was 89,728,926l.; from which, if the 21 millions of arrears were deducted, how much still remained! But the right hon. gentleman seemed to think that we were a very happy people, if we had only 60 millions to provide. Let the committee look at the progress of our expenditure, creeping up as it had been for the last six or seven years. In 1808, it had been 45 millions; in 1809, 50 millions; in 1810, 48 millions; in 1811, 52 millions; in 1812, 55 millions; in 1813, 57 millions; in 1814, 63 millions; and now, in 1815, 72 millions. Willing as he was to admit that the right hon. gentleman fulfilled the duties of his high office with exemplary attention, he must contend, that he was mistaken when he conceived it possible to carry on the war without an increasing instead of a diminishing expenditure. It was quite astonishing, therefore, to hear the right hon. gentleman attempting to form an estimate of the loan for next year. It was in the nature of such an expenditure to be rapidly increasing. Circumstances were perpetually starting up to produce this effect. This was a frightful prospect for the country. If the system on which Mr. Pitt proceeded with regard to the national finances—a system which did him infinite credit—was entirely deranged, the causes of that derangement required investigation. That system was to raise so much of the supplies within the year, as should materially reduce the amount of the loan, and by the operation of the Sinking Fund to afford to the public means of obtaining the loan on terms better than they could otherwise have enjoyed. Let the committee compare the amount of the Loan and the amount of the Taxation during the last eight years. In 1806 the Loan was 18 millions, the Taxes were 24 millions, being an excess in the latter of 6 millions; in 1807 the Loan was 12 millions, the Taxes were 27 millions, being an excess in the latter of 15 millions; in 1811 (for he would, not trouble the committee with the intermediate years) the Taxes exceeded the Loan seven millions and a half. There the old system ended. In 1812 the Loan amounted to 27 millions, and the Taxes only to 24. In 1813 the Loan exceeded the Taxes by 17 millions; and in the present year by 17 millions and a half. This was a gloomy contemplation, and it behoved the committee to pause and deliberate on so dreadful an alteration in public affairs. Instead of keeping down the Loan by Taxation, we maintained the Taxation, and yet were compelled to have recourse to Loans of the most enormous magnitude. In adverting to the subject of the Sinking Fund, he would, in the first place, call the attention of the committee to the gradual growth of that Fund. In 1806 the Sinking Fund bore the proportion of a 68th of the National Debt; in 1807 of a 64th; in 1808 of a 57th; in 1809 of a 64th; in 1810 of a 51st; in 1811 of a 48th; in 1812 of a 46th; in 1813 of a 44th. Now, however, the system of Mr. Pitt was destroyed; and if it had been satisfactory to the country, the violation of it could not but be regarded with extreme uneasiness. The whole of Mr. Pitt's system with respect to the Sinking Fund had been set aside, possibly without fault, by his friends and admirers. In 1806 the Loan exceeded the amount of the Sinking Fund seven millions and a half; in 1807, three millions; in 1808, 2,700,000l.; in 1810, 5,800,000l.; in 1811, eight millions; in 1812, 15 millions; in 1813, 24 millions; in 1814, nearly 29 millions; in 1815, 33 millions. The noble lord seemed to think lightly of this statement: to him (Mr. Tierney) it appeared to be very serious, at a moment when we were about, to engage in a war the end of which no man could foresee. He had proved to the House that the two vital principles of Mr. Pitt's financial system had been overturned; he implored them to turn their attention to the subject, and not allow themselves to be deceived by the plausible speech of the right hon. gentleman. With respect to the new Loan, he most readily concurred in the opinion of the right hon. gentleman, that it was a fair bargain on all sides. Knowing as he did the soundness and strength of the contractors, he had no doubt that they entered into the contract on good grounds; and he heartily congratulated the country on the liberal spirit in which it had been concluded. But although, under the circumstances of the case, the terms of the Loan were, in his opinion, good, it was impossible to agree with the right hon. gentleman, that there was no depreciation of public credit.

He intreated the House to observe the effect which the measures of the right, hon. gentleman would have on the Sinking Fund. In the present year they were taking actually from the Sinking Fund 900,000l. He wished the House not to shut their eyes to the fact, that they were going backwards instead of forwards in all their prospects respecting the National Debt—while new incumbrances were added, the Sinking Fund was, from day to day, becoming less. If they took 900,000l. from 11,400,000l. the previous amount of the Sinking Fund, it would be reduced to 10,500,000l. If instead of having ten and a half millions, we had between sixteen and seventeen millions to go into the market with, what a difference would that make in favour of the credit of the country! So that what the country gained on the one hand by the measure of the right hon. gentleman, they lost on the other. However unpleasant it might be to bring forward new taxes, yet there was no other possible way of meeting the evil. The subject was desening of the most serious attention of the House; and it was the more important at a time when we were starting on a new war. He hoped they would not shut their eyes to the consequences, if we continued to go on in this career of expenditure; and we must bear in mind, that if the war was persevered in, we could not look for any reduction of expenditure. He meant no disrespect to the right hon. gentleman, or his calculations, when he said he put no faith whatever in them—he would not, if Mr. Pitt, or any other financier were to rise from the dead and give these statements, place the least reliance in them. We were starting on a new career of expenditure—we did not know what would he the amount of our expenditure when war was once determined on, and to be pushed at every expense. Let us only see how things stood now, compared with what they did three months ago: Buonaparté then had made his appearance in France, and a mad Declaration was signed by the. representatives of the different Sovereigns at Vienna; and by one man, who, he believed, would be the last person in the world to give his cool approbation to the doctrines which that Declaration contained. But his associates naturally felt a good deal mortified at the event which had taken place—it had knocked all their labours on the head. That Declaration was, however, confirmed by the Treaty of the 25th of March, in which the Allied Powers agreed never to lay down their arms till Buonaparté was driven from the throne of France. Would not one have supposed, that, after such declaration, something would have been done to control the man whom they had thus proscribed? But they had not done any thing. The noble lord had told them, the night before last, that the Treaty which gave validity to the contracts with Russia, which he then produced, were only signed on the 19th of May; and he had also told them, how very improvident it would have been to sign that Treaty till the 19th of May, when they understood what the Allies were about. Why, then, it seemed, that up to that period we did not understand in what manner we were to act. But what had been actually done from the 19th of May up to this day? Nothing had, in fact, been done—nothing but making preparations, and marching troops from a great distance. All this was certainly in favour of Buonaparté, as it allowed him time to make preparations against the attack with which he was menaced. It had been said, that he had not derived the least advantage from this delay. Was it nothing to have consolidated the government of France? Was it nothing to have obtained the assembly of the Champ de Mai, and the sanction of the nation to the Additional Act? Was France in the same situation now, that she was in when a King had just been pushed from the throne, and there was no Legislative Assembly or any other body through which the voice of the nation might be pronounced? Having now been recognized by the nation as Emperor, his cause became united with that of the nation. The right hon. gentleman had told them that in some parts of France there were suppressed murmurs against his authority. However much he might admire the budget of the right hon. gentleman, he had no doubt that even it would be received with suppressed murmurs in many parts of England—[A laugh]. The fact was, that a rapid progress had been made in consolidating the government in France. He was convinced that an honest and sincere wish was entertained by a majority of the people of France to have a good constitution. He saw nothing in the proceedings of the Chamber of Representatives to induce him to draw the inferences which some people had drawn from them. It had been said, that their proceedings were irregular—that propositions were received with murmurs; but if any foreigner were to judge merely from the appearance which this House often exhibited, he would say that they were all going to loggerheads, and that the constitution could not last a month. But what were the propositions which were received with murmurs? They were always propositions in favour of Buonaparté; these were the propositions which were always put down. It had been said, that we went to war to get rid of Buonaparté, to prevent another military despotism from being established. Now, it was his opinion, that there would be no military despotism in France, unless we contributed to enable Buonaparté to establish it. Vast preparations of defence had been made in France. There might be a difference, in the accounts, more or less; but no man could doubt that at present there were 500,000 men in France, properly equipped. The noble lord had indeed told them, that the Allies were to bring one million and eleven thousand men into the field against France. But even were there to be one million and eleven thousand men led against France, if that country was united, he did not believe that they could make any impression on it. He was supposing France to be united. It would be ridiculous to suppose, that in a country which had just experienced a revolution, all parties saw things in the same point of view; but from every thing which had taken place in that country, from all the different accounts which had been received, he thought he had a right to lay it down that France wished for a free constitution, with the exclusion of the Bourbons from the throne; and though they might not all be attached to Buonaparté, yet they considered it necessary to have a military character at their head, capable of wielding the resources of the nation in an able manner, in the present critical emergency. He warned them to stop before the blow was struck. They ought to reflect on what might be the consequences if Buonaparté should be successful, and see if peace could not yet be made. If France were to be attacked without having committed any acts of aggression against this country or the rest of Europe, those who so attacked her would be guilty of as deliberate a crime as ever was committed. But he believed we might have reasonable security against danger from France, if we went the right way about it—we might yet make a peace, if we went about it properly. But this was not the object of his Majesty's ministers; their object was to put down Buonaparté, for the sake of the restoration of the Bourbons to the throne. They must know how inimical this was to the wishes of the people of France. They might yet have reasonable security, if they would be satisfied with it; but he was not convinced that they would always have it in their power to get it. After they had Spent these 36 millions, he was not satisfied that they would be able to have it. It was probable that the war on which we were entering would be a protracted war, as it was engendered in a degree of animosity, which had not been witnessed since 1793. Did the right hon. gentleman think that there was any probability that this war would be a short one? It might all be very well if there was to be but one great effort, and that a short one; but he saw no probability of any thing of the kind; the war could be determined by nothing but the overthrow of the people of France. The great object for which the country was to submit to all these privations, was the overthrow of the present Government of France, in order to bring the people of France to their senses. Now, he believed, that this was a thing which it was impossible for all the people in the world to do. They would find the people of France more disposed to sub- mit to privations in defence of their country, than those would be disposed to submit to who attacked it. The great Vote of Credit of six millions, meant nothing more than that it secured ministers against a meeting of Parliament for some time. The circumstances under which they were to meet again, might well alarm the right hon. gentleman and his colleagues. If the war should not be terminated soon, there would be a general gloom from one end of the country to the other. He had made diligent inquiries into the situation of the country, and he knew that a very general distress was at present felt by the middle ranks, which was working up to the higher ranks of course. If the country remained at peace, he saw no reason why we should despair of our situation; but a fresh war might be attended with the most ruinous consequences to the country.—Again he would implore them to pause before striking a blow—they would have no other moment to deliberate. This was the first time that the country had had a budget to the amount of nearly 90 millions. The way in which the interest of the Loan was provided for, had sapped and undermined the vitals of the country, by the deterioration of the Sinking Fund, and the consequent deterioration of all funded property. It would be impossible lo borrow money in any part of the country, when people were tempted by the high rate of interest which would be obtained from holding Government securities. The plan of Mr. Pitt was now abandoned. If ministers should not succeed in their project, France would be justified in waging eternal war with this country. The insolent manner in which we conducted ourselves in every question, made us very generally hated throughout Europe, and was greatly injurious to the interests of the country.—[Hear, hear! from the Ministerial benches.] It would be said by the noble lord opposite, perhaps, that this was a proof they feared us. He would repeat the word insolence, which was cheered by the noble lord. What could be a greater instance of it, than those medals which had lately been struck? Forty or fifty medals in gold had lately been struck, and presented to all the foreign Powers with whom we were on good terms. On one side there was a very fine likeness of the Prince Regent, which did great credit to the artist—greater credit than to the person who ordered it—with the Latin inscription, "Seipsum constantiæ exemplum Europæ præbuit." On the other side was a figure of Britannia supporting Europe. One of the Potentates to whom a medal was sent, if he was not misinformed, had said, that this was one of the most singular examples of modesty he ever knew.—He conceived that it must be attended with intolerable misery to Europe to place France in a state of war. Did ministers suppose that they could draw a line round France, and confine the consequences of the war to that country? It was impossible that France could suffer without giving rise to great agitation in all the neighbouring countries. This was his sincere opinion. Gentlemen might make a clamour, but they could not oppose any satisfactory arguments to what he had advanced. What he said, went home to the feelings of men; at least it would six months hence. He would defy the Chancellor of the Exchequer to meet the expenditure of the war for two years on the present scale.

Mr. Arbuthnot

would only say, that in every part of the world, except France, the name of the Prince Regent, and the unblemished honour of this country, were most highly respected and extolled.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer

entered into an elaborate reply to the comments of Mr. Tierney. He began by expressing his satisfaction at the approbation given by the right hon. gentleman, in general, to the statements he had made, and the measures he had proposed. The candour shown by the right hon. gentleman made him the more desirous of entering into such explanations as his (Mr. T's.) observations appeared to require; and he trusted that he should be able to give such an answer to so many of the right hon. gentleman's observations as were of a financial nature, as he would admit to be satisfactory, though he could not flatter himself they should so readily agree upon the political topics which the right hon. gentleman had introduced.

There were two principal points relating to finance, to which the right hon. gentleman had directed his observations, viz. the amount of our foreign expenditure, and the alteration which had taken place in the management of the Sinking Fund, and which the right hon. gentleman represented as a dereliction of those principles of finance upon which Mr. Pitt had acted. With respect to our foreign expenditure, the right hon. gentleman had asked what security we had, that the extraordinaries of this year would not as much exceed the provisions made for them as those of the last year had done. On such a subject it was obvious that no positive security could be obtained. But there was every reason which the nature of the case allowed of, to hope that such an excess would not take place. In the first place, the provision made in the present year for extraordinary expenses was greater than it had been in the former; and as almost one half of the year was already elapsed, we were able to reason with a considerable degree of certainty as to a large proportion of the expense. In the next place, it should be observed, that the contest now unhappily renewed, differed materially in its nature from the war which had so long been carried on in the Peninsula, and did not seem likely to lead to an expense either so great or so uncertain. In so unproductive a country as Spain, the supplies of the army were necessarily brought from great distances, at an expense of carriage many times exceeding the cost of the articles themselves. The difficulties increased with every movement the army made in advance, and rendered it necessary to scatter the commissariat establishment over the country in such a manner that upwards of 800 officers were employed at once. From this resulted such a multiplication and intricacy of accounts as was incompatible with any system of economy. The circumstances under which the present war was to be carried on were in many respects the very reverse of these. It was conducted in one of the most fertile and productive countries in Europe, where every kind of necessary was to be obtained in abundance, where every commercial arrangement was perfectly understood, and where the facility of water-carriage, so essential to the abundant supply of a large army, was afforded to the greatest extent. In addition to these advantages every effort had been made by the Government to improve to the utmost the system of account and the control of expenditure. An additional Comptroller of Army Accounts had been appointed with an immediate view to this object, and under his examination monthly estimates of the expense of every department of the service were directed to be prepared and transmitted to the Treasury. A special Accountant-general had also been appointed to prepare and render the accounts of the commissariat to the Comptroller on the spot, and was directed for that purpose to call upon each individual accountant for a weekly statement of his receipts and issues, and a weekly schedule of his balances either of cash or stores. Under such a system he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) would not undertake to say that an excess of expenditure was impossible; but he saw great reason to hope it would not take place, and that at any rate it could not happen, as it had on other occasions, unforeseen and unexpected.

With regard to the Barrack estimate, he thought the narrow limits within which it was reduced this year, rather a subject of congratulation than of suspicion. After some other observations on this head and other branches of public expenditure, he proceeded to observe, that it appeared to him unnecessary to enter into any defence of the different heads of foreign subsidy, en which the right hon. gentleman had descanted, as they all arose out of engagements recognized and approved by Parliament.

Having touched upon the several matters of detail on which the right hon. gentleman had observed, he proceeded to subjects of a more general nature, involving principles of the highest importance. He should be sorry indeed to think that be had deviated from those principles of finance by which his predecessors, and especially the great founder of the Sinking Fund, had acquired high and deserved reputation, though not much of the right hon. gentleman's approbation and support. But he denied that he could be justly charged with any such deviation. He denied that any of his predecessors, and especially that Mr. Pitt had ever attempted to cover the charge of a great and extraordinary exertion, not apparently likely to be of long continuance, by supplies raised within the year. The principle on which Mr. Pitt, no less than other ministers, had acted, was that of endeavouring to provide for permanent expenditure by permanent income, and to have recourse to means of credit for raising extraordinary supplies. There were three periods in which great attempts had been made to provide for a large proportion of the public expenses within the year, and they had been eminently useful and successful. The first was by Mr. Pitt in 1797 and 1798; the second, and much the most considerable, by lord Sidmouth in 1803; and the third by lord Grenville, and lord Henry Petty, in 1806. The first arose out of an extreme depression of public credit, occasioned partly by a variety of, political calamities, but principally by a succession, of loans larger than the money market was then prepared for, or able to bear. The second and third were distinctly explained by the ministers who proposed them, as intended, with the assistance of a small annual loan, to meet the permanent, and ordinary war expenses. So carefully, indeed, was any misapprehension on this point guarded against, that in the printed; explanation of lord Grenville's plan in? 1807, it was stated, that any expenses arising from expeditions abroad, or from foreign subsidies, were to be provided for by other means—that is, undoubtedly, by borrowing. So completely successful had been the efforts made by the country for meeting the ordinary expenses of the war, that in 1808, when the resources proposed by lord H. Petty came into full operation, there was a small diminution of the capital of the funded debt, instead of any increase. It was true, that from the same year commenced that arduous struggle on the continent of Europe which had entailed upon us so large an addition of public debt, but which, with so much expense and difficulty, but also with so much glory, had at length brought the war to a successful termination. For these immense expenses it had been the duty of Mr. Perceval and himself to provide; but he denied that it could be expected of them, or would have been practicable, to raise such sums within the year. They were only bound to propose such measures as were consistent with sound principles of finance, and adapted to the occasion; and it had been his happiness to provide for the most arduous and pressing period of ibis great contest, without imposing any additional burthens on the country. But he was ready to admit that the system on which he was then, and now acting, was one suited to a temporary emergency;—and it was only under the conviction that the struggle was likely to be short, and that the ordinary resources of the country were sufficiently great to bear the more permanent expenses, that he could forbear from recommending to the House some additional and extraordinary measures of taxation even in the present session.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer then referred to the measures of Mr. Pitt at different periods, and particularly in 1805, to show that he did not in great and ex- traordinary emergencies, attempt to raise the whole of the expenses by taxation, but by an increase on the amount of the loans; and to justify his own present proceeding by the authority of that great man's precedent. He likewise entered into a variety of calculations showing the effect of the system introduced in 1813, respecting the Sinking Fund, and proving that the progress of the redemption of the national debt would be perfectly satisfactory, notwithstanding the relief afforded to the public burthens.

He next adverted to the right hon. gentleman's observations on the doubtful success of the war. He did not mean to deny that the forces of France were formidable, and conducted by a leader of great military talent, or that the events of war were always uncertain; but as greater exertions were making on the part of the Allies than on any other occasion recorded in history, it was only reasonable to hope for corresponding success. The roads of Europe from the Oder and the Vistula to the Rhine were literally covered with the successive columns of their forces; and though the right hon. gentleman thought it not possible for them to make any impression on France, he was disposed to augur more favourably of the event, and to congratulate the House on the probable result of such an unexampled union of exertions. It was evident, even by the right hon. gentleman's statement, that France would have to encounter fearful odds. But were the prospect less favourable, he should not be less of opinion that the effort ought to be made with the utmost resources of the country—for on this effort hung the subjection or independence of mankind. It appeared to him a weak and childish delusion to think that the French had expelled their King for the purpose of obtaining peace and a free constitution. They already enjoyed peace and a free constitution under that mild and benevolent monarch; and the very last thing that the people of France could have thought of, if they had really wished to have a free constitution, was to put Buonaparté at their head. His conduct had always been the very reverse of that of the amiable monarch whose government they had overthrown. The King had imposed no arbitrary laws upon them; he had made no infringement on their personal liberty, nor torn away their children by odious conscriptions.

The right hon. gentleman was himself so sensible of the ambitious and domineering spirit of the present French Government, that he talked of requiring securities for the preservation of peace. What securities he could ask, or the French Government would be disposed to give, he had not explained, nor could he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) conceive any that would afford any solid ground of confidence; but it would at any rate be time enough for the House to consider them, when the right hon. gentleman should be authorized by the French Government to communicate them.

The Resolutions proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer were then put, and agreed to.