§ Lord Castlereagh having moved that the House do resolve into a committee on the Militia Volunteering Bill,
§ Mr. Whitshed Keenerose and said: — Though I feel a scruple in detaining the House from going into a committee on this important measure, yet I must request their indulgence to submit some of the considerations which press strongly on my mind on the subject. This is the third great measure of the same tendency, which it has been the noble lord's lot, in the discharge of his official duty, to submit to this House. The first, the establishment of the local militia; a measure of which this House and this country felt the necessity at the time it was introduced. That noble body of men, the volunteers of Great Britain, nearly the whole male population of our country, started into, arms on the appearance of imminent danger of invasion. A spectacle admired 111 by Europe, and a proof of what a free country, sensible of the blessings it enjoys, will do when contented under the administration of its government. The effect at the time was most important, as it put an end to any expectation of success from the attempts of the enemy, and to apprehensions at home. But, Sir, this vast body of men (not less than 400,000), when the danger no longer threatened, gradually fell off to an inconsiderable number. It could not be otherwise, as it was composed of men, principally, who being employed in different occupations, by which they served themselves and their country, could nor remain permanently in that attitude. It was at the same time obvious that Holland and Flanders, with their sea ports, being in the possession of the Ruler of France, and he having also the command of the population of many states of Germany, it was necessary for the safety of our country to have a much larger body of men trained to arms, and ready for the call of their country, than even that meritorious body of the regular militia joined to the troops of the line, which might remain in the country. Sir, it has been often said, that good comes sometimes from evil. It appears to me that the unfortunate state of Europe alone could have brought forward and reconciled this country to this great measure of the local militia, by which 400,000 men are engaged for a certain time, and great part of them trained to arms, and by which, in the course of a few years, the whole population of the country fit to bear arms will be equally trained. This is a measure which could be adopted in Great Britain alone. It is perhaps the only country in Europe where arms could be put almost indiscriminately into the hands of its inhabitants. At the same time that it does infinite honour to its people, it puts an end to the bugbear of an invasion which France has so often held out; and what is of more consequence, while it makes the attempt improbable, makes the success impossible. The value of this measure does not rest here; such a mode of strengthening our defence most materially increases our power of offence; as our country will now be safe in the hands of the local and regular militia, and the troops of the line may be employed out of it. It is well known, that often the most efficient defensive measures consist in active aggression. The constitution and interests of Great Britain avow and 112 authorize active aggression under no other circumstances. Peace is her element; she seeks not to disturb the tranquillity, or invade the possessions of other countries, and unsheathes her sword only to vindicate her insulted honour, or repel aggressions; her interests are best promoted by the tranquillity and prosperity of other states. That, however, when reduced to war, the most important effects may result from a judicious employment of British troops in active aggression under proper circumstances, is most satisfactorily demonstrated by what has passed and is now passing on the peninsula. We have seen a body of British troops (a handful compared to the armies in the north of Europe, or the French in the peninsula, not less than 200,000 men) under the genius of our illustrious soldier there, supported by the valour of the officers, and that small body of men drive the enemy out of Portugal; and by a series of brilliant achievements, wherein the whole science of war was called into action, drive that enemy, with the assistance of the troops of Spain and Portugal, whose patriotic valour his genius had conciliated and organized, out of five-sixths of the country at one time in their possession. Lord Wellington, instead of being cooped in his lines at Torres Vedras, is at this moment acting with a mighty united force within the territories of France. The next great measure carried through by the noble lord was, the interchange of militia with our sister kingdom. This, while it adds so importantly to their mutual safety by the power of increasing the force in either, as circumstances might require, goes much farther. Great as this advantage is, it is inconsiderable, compared to what may be naturally expected from this intermixture of the inhabitants of the two islands, and the union of habits the consequence of such friendly interests. There is no magic in the act of parliament which in ten years could ripen the countries into a real union of heads, hands, and hearts, so much as this measure will probably do in one quarter of that time. Nor does the advantage of it rest there; it must prove highly economical. It is obvious, that the amount of our peace establishment must be regulated by the state of the power of France at the time peace may be concluded. Whatever would have been the amount of that establishment, if these measures had not been adopted, may with 113 them, be reduced considerably. It remained still as a measure of peace, which is best preserved by the prompt force which it can send forth, to establish such a system as might with the least delay and expence afford powerful means to repel and avenge insults on her honour and interests. With this view the noble lord has brought forward this great measure. In the introduction of it he has with much eloquence and sound judgment anticipated and obviated objections, which from a mistaken view (as I think) of the constitution, might have been made to its being supported by this House. The provident mind of those illustrious patriots, who introduced the militia system, accompanied it with such provisions as were in the then state of Europe adequate to the purposes of this country. On the same principle, they would have extended in the present state of Europe, the provisions to the degree now proposed As the noble lord did not in the first stage of the measure enter into its results, may I be permitted to submit some of the most prominent which press themselves on my mind Melancholy experience has proved the disadvantages our country labours under at the commencement of all those wars into which we have for more than a century been compelled to enter, for the vindication of our honour or interests. During the present dreadful revolutionary war, may it not be fairly presumed, that, had the measure now proposed existed, that torrent of devastation might have been confined? Is there not good reason to believe that if 25,000 men could have been sent to Toulon during the five months it was in our possession, it might have been kept, and the subsequent extension of the Revolution materially chocked? While the war in the Vendee raged, could we have sent 25,000 men to occupy a post on that coast, a communication would have been preserved with those distinguished men who were sacrificing their lives and their homes in defence of their religion and laws; and the event must have, been according to human reasoning, very different. When that inadequate attempt was made at Quiberon, could it have been, supported by such a body of British troops, the catastrophe could not have ensued, and consequences most important might have taken place. Gentlemen may differ from the speculations I have presumed to offer on the mode in which those troops might have been employed, but they cannot differ as to the 114 vital importance of having such an additional force with promptitude when this country is forced into war. Hitherto, on the breaking out of war, the government, from the unarmed state of the country, has been obliged to give rank for raising men, to the great detriment of the army. This mode has been attended with enormous expence both to the public and to individuals, and produces only raw undisciplined men, who require much training before they are fit for service; they have been got together by all the scandalous arts of contending crimps, and are as deficient in quality as they are in the business and habits of soldiers. The mode now proposed by the noble lord will give the country such a body of trained men, equal in every respect to those of the line (except not having been employed on actual service), in a few weeks, as could not be got together and rendered equally efficient in as many half years. There are many other important advantages to be expected from it; but I will not further delay the House at present by entering, into them, and shall only add that I consider the noble lord's proposed measure, when completed, as a mighty engine of a hundred horse power, in the arsenal of our country, ready to be drawn into operation when its defence may require it, and will thereby preserve it from insults.
Mr. C. W. Wynneasked, if any delay was to take place after the Bill had gone through the committee, for the purpose of discussing the principle of the measure; as much would depend upon the detail.
Lord Castlereaghsaw no occasion for any delay The House would be best able to judge of the course it ought to adopt, after the Bill came out of the committee. He thought the matter so simple, that no difference of opinion could exist, so as to require a reconsideration of the measure in detail. If so, however, any minor parts would be open to consideration in a future stage; and the measure would be better appropriated, and equally open to remark, after the committee, than it was now.
Mr. C. W. Wynnesaid, he considered, as every gentleman, he presumed, must do, the present measure to be utterly subversive of the first principle of the militia force, intended as it was for the internal defence of the country. He did not, however, say, that this, was to be, weighed against the advantages which were likely to result to this country and to the world at large, from the adoption of this measure 115 at the present moment. If any man, no doubt, were to look to the object which the country had in view in the year 1756, from the formation of the militia force, and to compare it with the present measure, he must feel astonished at perceiving how essentially it was altered. At first, the militia force was similar to our volunteer force, and afterwards to our local militia. The persons who were liable to serve in it were not to be taken for any length of time from their usual occupations, unless on urgent occasions; and the only ground for callling out that force was, the country being in imminent danger of invasion; when, alone, it was to be embodied. The practice of requiring landed qualifications from officers was now almost entirely superseded; there being, in most instances, more officers who were unqualified than who were qualified. The local militia now was as the old militia was then. This objectional service was not in contemplation when the men entered into it; but at the same time he (Mr. Wynne) did not conceive it to be so objectionable as to counterbalance the advantages to be derived from it. The measure had his hearty support, and should have it, even if it went to entitle the country to avail itself of the services of the militia to the whole extent. He had some observations, however, to submit on the two parts of the plan; considering, as he did, that the two methods would compete the one against the other. There would be a hardship on the lieutenants in the regular army, in having so great a number of captains from the militia placed in the army with superior rank to them; but the advantage likely to result from this arrangement was so great, that, on the whole, he could not see why their feelings ought not to be sacrificed in this respect to the public advantage. The part to which he felt the strongest objection, was that which regarded the provisional battalions, where an interest and a feeling was given to the men in support of the one plan, and to the officers in support of the other plan; so that a canvassing, as it were, might be expected to take place between the one species of service and the other; and he should not be surprised, the advantage to the officer was so great in the one way more than in the other, that an additional bounty were offered by the officers to the men, to induce them to extend their services into the regular army. On the other hand, where the militia officers were anxious to form provisional battalions, he 116 was afraid the present measure furnished them with inducements to lay temptations in the way of the men to withhold the more extended line of service. He was also afraid, that officers serving in those provisional battalions might lose their influence in the counties to which they belonged: and, to field officers belonging to the militia, most of whom were men of large fortunes, the offer of half-pay would be a very inadequate bait; a better and more effectual inducement to such men, he thought, would be the holding out some honorary mark of distinction. These were his ideas on the subject. He was afraid of the two plans clashing with each other.
Lord Castlereaghagreed, that the hon. gentleman had stated the case fairly, though he presumed to think he had gone into it more in detail than was at present necessary. He begged, however, to say a few words in answer to what had fallen from the hon. gentleman, who seemed to think that it would have been better had he confined his measure to one of the two plans, instead of extending it to both. He (lord Castlereagh), however, considered the second part of the plan as auxiliary to the former part, rather than otherwise. He believed the hon. gentleman had over-estimated the influence of the officers over the men. Those who knew the militiamen in general, best knew that they were not above a certain measure influenced by the advice of their officers. He did not see how it could have been possible, preserving due regard for the feelings of the officers in the army, to have introduced among them officers from the militia, with higher rank than that of captain; and the bounty already given to enlist from the militia into the army was so nearly equal to that now proposed, that he was afraid the present measure would be ineffectual, without some supplemental or extraordinary inducements, such as those now held out. If he had not held out the different species of inducements proposed by the present measure, he could not assure himself that he should be able to raise the force he expected. — He felt disposed to keep the bounties low, particularly as it was necessary to preserve a distinction between the bounties for the army and militia; but on the other hand, there were advantages attached to the militia, of which if the men now in that force were to be deprived by extending their service, he could not expect that they would be 117 prevailed on to do so. This, in a peculiar manner, applied to the militia of Ireland and Scotland; many of whom were married men, and who would lose the provisions at present enjoyed by their wives and families were they to enter into the army. It had been much discussed, whether it might not be expedient to allow militiamen to volunteer into the line, still preserving for their wives and families the peculiar advantages which, as militiamen, they at present enjoyed; but, on due consideration, it was deemed that it would not be advantageous to introduce into the line a species of force different from the line itself with so marked a distinction in its favour. On this account it was deemed infinitely more advantageous to establish provisional battalions.
With regard to the anomaly of those battalions being officered by persons appointed in some cases by the crown, and in others by the lord lieutenants of counties, he admitted the statement to be correct, but at the same time contended that no ill effects resulted from such an arrangement. The practice, though anomalous, was not novel. It had existed in the Irish militia, who, when they were brigaded, served under field officers of the line, while all the militia commissions were appointed as usual: and certainly they contributed as efficient battalions as any in the service. He hoped, therefore, that the anomaly, though inherent in the measure, would not be found in its practical details. If only one of the alternatives were to be resorted to, and remembering which alternative would necessarily prevail, he felt satisfied that the measure would not produce all those beneficial results which the Bill was framed with a view and confident expectation of producing. It would certainly fail in obtaining such a number of men as was desired. The only thing, he apprehended, which they had to guard against was, the exciting competition in the militia, which might be injurious to the regular army; and with that view he intended, when the Bill was in the committee, to propose an alteration in the rate of bounty, from what he had suggested on a former night.
§ The House then resolved into the Committee.
§ Upon the clause being read, which empowered his Majesty to accept the services of three-fourths of any militia regiment,
Mr. C. Wynnerose to suggest an alteration. He thought, when it was considered 118 that different regiments might have different feelings upon, the subject of volunteering, that in some regiments more than three-fourths, while in others much less than that number, might offer their services, the consequence would probably be, that the aggregate number would not amount to three-fourths of the whole militia of the country. In that case, the force would be less than was wanted, and the measure would fail in producing its full effect. He therefore thought it would be better to enlarge the proportion that might be permitted to volunteer from each regiment.
Lord Castlereaghsaid, that any alteration, such as proposed by the hon. member, would tend to destroy the militia, itself; a probability which, if it existed, would alone have discouraged him (lord C.) from proposing or prosecuting his measure. His object certainly was, not to destroy, but to keep alive, the militia system; and in securing that object, there was no fear of impairing the effective strength of the army. It was to be remembered, that there were in every militia regiment a certain proportion of men who were not fit to go on foreign service; and he felt quite certain also, that there were some officers who, from obvious reasons, would not be inclined to volunteer. It was his wish, therefore, to consult at once the fair freedom of the service, and the preservation of the militia, which he believed to be interwoven with the fundamental securities of the country. As the clause originally stood, it left an alternative, between three-fourths of the militia of a county, or of a single regiment; but he had now struck out that alternative, and confined the proportion only to single regiments.
Mr. Wynnesuggested, that a proportion of four-fifths of each regiment would be more likely to render the clause as effective as possible.
The words "militia of any county, riding, &c." were then omitted, and the following substituted: "not exceeding in any case three-fourths of the number actually serving in any regiment, battalion, or corps."
The next material alteration in the Bill related to the rate of bounty. Lord Castlereagh proposed, that the clause should be altered so as to allow only eight guineas, instead of ten, to those who volunteered for European service, and retaining all their privileges as militiamen. The 119 proportion between the different descriptions of service, according to his original view of the bounties, he felt aware was not sufficient; this reduction would render that proportion more conformable to what it should be, though he doubted whether even eight guineas for the first description of service might not be found too high. He was quite satisfied, however, that more than eight ought not to be given; and in filling up the blank with that sum, it was not intended that it should be mandatory on the part of government to give so much; only to provide, that in no case should that sum be exceeded.
§ On the clause which related to the number of the militia that were to be permitted to volunteer,
Lord Castlereaghobserved, that many hon. members seemed to be of opinion, that the proposed measure was not sufficiently extensive. He was anxious to state the reasons by which he had been induced not to push it further at the present moment. On referring to the amount of men now owing from the militia to the line, it would appear that the number was 8,767. This deficiency chiefly existed in Ireland; in which country, in consequence of the number of married men that were in the militia, and of other circumstances, the impediments to carrying into effect the volunteering from the militia into the line were greater than in Great Britain. The ground on which he conceived it not expedient to push the present measure further than by filling up the blanks of the Bill with 30,000 men, 28,750 being the amount of the double quota, and arrears (besides the officers and non-commissioned officers), was, that it was not desirable to do so until there was reason to believe that a greater force could be advantageously used. Unless this were previously ascertained, it would be unnecessary to put the country to an expence larger than that which our view of military policy seemed to demand. Not foreseeing such a necessity, it did not appear to him advisable to recommend parliament to allow a greater scope to the impulse of the militia to volunteer for foreign service. The assistance which the number to which it was proposed to limit the Bill before the committee would afford, would be most powerful. On a recent occasion he had stated its probable amount; namely, after covering the waste of the ensuing year, about 15 or 20,000 men. He meant that, supposing the waste of the British army not 120 to exceed in the ensuing campaign that which it had been in the present, we should close at the end of the campaign with 15 or 20,000 men more than we now possessed. He was also the less induced to push the measure further at present, by the consideration that the Bill would not prevent the operation in the year 1814 of the existing transfer from the militia to the line. He would therefore move to fill up the blank in the Bill with the number "30,000."
§ After a few words from Mr. Wynne the motion was agreed to.
§ On the motion for agreeing to the preamble,
§ Mr. Whitbreadbegged to move as an amendment the introduction of a passage, to which, considering the observations made by the noble lord opposite on a recent occasion, he dared to say that there would be no objection. It was to state, that the object of the measure was, "to bring the contest in which we were engaged to a speedy and happy conclusion, and to obtain the blessings of peace."
Lord Castlereaghadmitted, that he had said that which was the conviction of his mind; namely, that peace was the only legitimate and justifiable object of all war. But he should certainly object to the introduction of the particular words moved for by the hon. gentleman, because that would imply that the other measures of parliament had not been adopted in the same spirit. It was to protect parliament from such an imputation, that he must decline acceding to the amendment of the hon. gentleman.
§ Mr. Whitbreadsaid, that he would not press his amendment at present; but that on the report he would move it, in order that, should if it were rejected by the House, it might be entered on the Journals. He had abstained from commenting on the measure itself (however objectionable on constitutional grounds), for reasons which he had before stated; but he did conceive it to be highly important, at a period like this, when in France addresses had been presented to the ruling power, praying that the war might be brought to a speedy conclusion; and when in England, on the contrary, in unofficial papers, means were resorted to to inflame the people; that parliament, on adopting a measure such as that before the committee, should distinctly declare, that they were influenced solely by a wish to bring the contest to a speedy and happy termination. So thinking, 121 he repeated, that on the motion for receiving the report he should again propose his amendment.
§ The House was then resumed, and the report was ordered to be received tomorrow.