MR. BROUGHAM'S MOTION RELATING TO THE ORDERS IN COUNCIL AND THE LICENCE TRADE.

HC Deb 03 March 1812 vol 21 cc1092-163

Mr. Brougham

rose and said: Sir, I now rise to bring under the consideration of the House the state of the commerce and manufactures of the country, and in contemplating the extent and diversified nature of this vast and complicated subject with the great variety of detail to which it naturally leads, I am tempted to believe that if I had anticipated an inquiry so various and extensive, I should have paused before I undertook so laborious a task. But as I shall have ample occasion for all the indulgence of the House in the course of the exposition which I am about to submit to them, I shall preface it no farther than to say, that the object of my motion is to induce it to go into an inquiry on the state of the trade and commerce of the country under the operation of the Orders in Council. I know, Sir, that I have to address myself to various descriptions of persons, all agreeing as to the fact of the distress which pervades the country, and all acknowledging that the voice of the country is raised in consequence of that distress—all coinciding in opinion, therefore, I hope, that it is not an idle question or useless investigation, to attempt to discover whether the sentiments uttered by this voice, have or have not a just foundation. Some there are, however, who now hear me, who differ with respect to the origin and extent of the calamity, and as conscientious men will always differ upon important questions, are anxious to see those opinions, which they still entertain, defended and established. Many, who looked much to the system begun in 1806, are desirous to understand how far that system has been supported, or its operations forwarded by the Orders in Council of January, 1807. Some there are, too, who, not entirely disapproving of the new system at the period of its commencement, but induced by subsequent experience, and surprised at unexpected results, wish to perceive clearly and distinctly whether there are sufficient grounds to come to an alteration of their opinions. Others, still adhering to the wisdom of the policy, may entertain no little doubt as to the expediency of the mode in which it has been pursued; and, advocates still for the principle, may see much to condemn in the manner by which it has been endeavoured to carry it into effect. They may think, that however necessary it may have been to sanction certain relaxations from the strictness of a general rule, the present system of relaxation is the most objectionable that could be adopted. Another class of persons there is, who originally supported the Orders in Council, because, feeling that the edicts of the enemy were of an unprecedented nature, they concluded that some new and grand experiment was called for to counteract them, but who are now anxious to ascertain the success of that experiment. There is also another class, (among whom, in point of confidence in the justice of their opinions I rank myself foremost, but in influence and authority most humble), who, having opposed and reprobated the new system, from its earliest commencement, and having predicted from it the most ruinous consequences, are now prepared to shew that unfortunately for the country every prediction has been verified, and every anticipated evil accomplished, even beyond the most desponding apprehension—and as they think that no time is too late to turn aside from a course of blindness and ruin, they wish earnestly for an opportunity of exposing the blindness and of pointing out the ruin. Lastly, I have to enumerate a class of persons distinct from all these, a class of persons who undervalue all commerce and all manufactures, and consider the land and agricultural labour of a community as the only sources of real wealth, and the only constituents of national prosperity. These persons must, upon their own principle, be no less desirous of entering into the proposed inquiry, and of ascertaining what is the danger that in its progress must so nearly affect what they regard as the only true resources of the country, and which, if it does not menace, according to their theory, the safety of the country, at least tends to aggrandize the power of the enemy. To all these different classes of individuals, I now address myself, and agreeing, as they all do, in the points which I have stated, call upon them not to refuse to listen to the distressed voice of the people, but to vote in support of the motion for going into a committee.

The object of this committee will be, to enquire into the effects of the Orders in Council, to enquire whether they have counteracted or assisted the policy of the enemy, what is the nature, the cause, and the extent of the distress felt throughout the country, and what is the most advisable remedy to be applied—whether it may be most expedient to retrace our steps, or prosecute the same course with additional vigour and effect. If we are to tell the people that the evils of which they complain are great, but irremediable, that they are not merely to be deplored, but endured, this language will not be the worse received for being prefaced by an impartial and accurate investigation into their causes. I have thought, Sir, that thus much might tend to clear up the preliminary view of the question, by stating exactly the case as it stands among persons entertaining a diversity of opinion on the subject. The fundamental principle on which this new system of commercial policy is founded, has always professed itself to be a retaliatory principle. It is of indispensible importance, therefore, to un- derstand what that system was on which it was pretended to retaliate. The end of our Orders in Council, says the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer, is to retort upon the enemy the evils of his own injustice. Their object, says the noble President of the Board of Trade, (lord Bathurst), is to counteract the designs of Buonaparté; their principle, as sir William Scott pronounced, is to produce a reflex-operation upon the trade and manufactures of France. Without knowing, then, fully and precisely what this system is, of which the obstruction and turning back form the basis of our own policy, it is utterly impossible that we can arrive at any safe or sound conclusion, or that the discussion can serve any useful purpose. Now, this system of policy maybe distinctly traced to one of the first principles of the French government, the principle of destroying the commerce of its enemies, although its own trade should be the necessary sacrifice. That this is the principle which lies at the bottom of its whole policy, there is abundant evidence to convince us. It is a sacrifice on the part of France of all the advantages in point of revenue, wealth and prosperity, arising out of trade, to what is called the continental system—a system purely anti-commercial. A long train of measures have, for a long period, been directed to this exclusive object. Undoubtedly, Buonaparté has expressed a wish for ships, colonies, and commerce, but he was no sooner awakened from the vision by some new victory of our navy, than he found that the only means left him of accomplishing his ulterior designs, and of gratifying the first passion of his mind—unceasing hatred towards this country—was to sacrifice all his own commercial views and interests to the destruction of ours, and he returned with avidity to his former and favourite system. I am borne out fully by his acts, and justified by the whole tenour of his government, in asserting that the French ruler looks upon commerce in general as necessarily hostile to his interests. The Conscription alone might serve to convince us of his determination to sacrifice his commercial to his military system. What was his conduct when you first determinined to hamper the importation of colonial produce into his dominions? 'With all my heart,' said France, 'your colonial produce shall not enter my 'ports at all.' We had long employed ourselves in devising schemes for preventing the introduction of cotton into the enemy's ports. In August, 1810, after the revocation of the French Decrees had filled the ports of France with American merchantmen, laden with this commodity, a duty of sixty sous per lb was imposed by Buonaparté on the import, amounting to nearly a total prohibition. The inhabitants of Bourdeaux represented their distresses to the government, but their representations were answered by the declaration that it was too late to talk of trade; France was a country of arms. The merchants of Hamburgh poured in their complaints, in reply to which they were told that the French emperor wished to see among his subjects none but soldiers and peasants. In order to gloss over this system with the tinsel of theories, we find the French ministers declaiming on the advantages of agriculture. A book has been published by Talleyrand, in which be labours to shew that the exclusive encouragement of agriculture is the true and natural policy of the French government, since the stormy period of the Revolution. Commerce he represents as leading men into large societies and rendering them restless, inquisitive, and turbulent, while agriculture disperses them, tranquillizes them, and fits them for submission. Thus it appears that the enemy's policy is war no less on commerce than on liberty, on the parent and the child, as indissolubly connected and nourishing and supporting each other by a natural and reciprocal operation. Thus it appears, that in the view of his stern and merciless policy, commerce is as hostile to all he aims at, the subjugation of the world, as it is friendly to all he hates—the freedom and the happiness of mankind. As for his power to accomplish his purpose, I do not mean to place an implicit confidence in the declarations of Buonaparté's ministers, or the promises of his new made duke. But admitting him to be all deceit and treachery, a compound of trick and violence, restrained by no other feeling and no other obligation than a sense of his master's interest, I will yet believe him whenever he undertakes to do what it is for his advantage should be done. If no commerce exists within the territory of France, and her system is as repugnant to it as I conceive it to be, it does not necessarily follow, that it should be extended to all her allies, because she well knows that, by indulging their trade she is preparing seamen for her own future navies. What, then, in the situation of things which I have described, ought to have been the counteracting policy of a state so situated as ours? Ought it not to have had for its object to support and encourage our own commerce, and to foster neutrality wherever found, not to hazard both in the weak attempt to inflict upon the enemy injuries which he does not feel, and retort upon him his own injustice rather than consult our own interests? If we had adopted the principle of encouraging neutrality, what description of neutrals would it have behoved us chiefly to favour, the dependants and allies of Buonaparté, those whose seamen are his seamen, and whose territory he may, in a moment of caprice, render an integral part of his own dominions? Or ought we not rather to have looked to a people separated from that enemy by an ocean to him impassable, a people having a common origin, and speaking a common language with ourselves; the only nation on earth except Britain, free from the domination of Buonaparté? Let it be recollected, too, that this was a people who could not rival us in the most insignificant manufacture, a people every way so closely connected with us, that nothing short of the extremest madness and folly can ever produce a rupture between the two countries, a people that could not send out scarcely a single ship of war to oppose us until they shall be driven into hostilities, and whose political state is such as to indispose them to war, unless compelled to a premature exertion of their strength. Instead of a policy leading to such results, I humbly apprehend we should have acted more wisely in holding up the neutral character to respect, in avoiding all that had a tendency to injure or destroy it, because next to the calamity of a war with America, the greatest that can happen to British commerce, is a war between France and America. Such a war must co-operate with the designs of the enemy in destroying and excluding our commerce from every part of the continent. Such a war must immediately deprive this country of all those advantages which she enjoyed while America remained uncontrouled, and which rendered the French decrees almost as nugatory as the blockade of the British isles.—It is lamentable to look back at the reverse of all this, to find that instead of conciliating and neutralizing other states, our policy has breathed nothing but hostility to neutrals; and the whole series of our measures speak but one language—that they must take part either with the one belligerent or the other. I wish not to enter upon the subject of the negociation that is still pending. I rejoice that it is yet pending; but I grieve that what lately fell from the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer has diminished the probability of a prosperous result. But if I could suppose that America was as willing to acquiesce in our system, as we are strenuous in acting upon it, I should still contend that it would be wise in us to abandon it, and that by no other system is France so likely to succeed in her ultimate designs. So much was said on this subject four years ago, at a period when I had the honour of raising my voice at your bar against this policy, that I shall compress into one sentence the sum and substance of that argument. It was then said that under the new decrees of France, the test imposed upon American vessels in French ports would be solely, "Had they touched at the British isles?" This was a question which the Americans could at any time evade. The fact of having entered a British port was one which the enemy could not possibly ascertain. Under these circumstances our Orders in Council were issued, and every American vessel compelled to enter and pay tribute in a British port, previous to her entrance into any of the ports of France.

Let us for a moment attend to the effects of these edicts, as evinced in the first year after their proclamation. In the returns for the year 1809 it appeared that the amount of exports and imports fell short of the amount of the preceding year 15 millions; 10 millions to the continent and 5 millions to America! In April 1809, therefore, these Orders were in a great degree modified, or rather rescinded. The only Order now in force was then issued, and to this the attention of the House should be particularly directed, as in place of the former sweeping principle, it substituted a blockade of limited extent, including Holland, the coast of Germany as far north as the Ems, and that portion of Italy which lies between Pesaro and Orbitello. Thus the original principle was completely surrendered; for what was the object of that principle, but to make Buonaparté feel and repent of the operation of his own policy—what was it but an avowed struggle between him and us of who could play at this game the longer? Were we not told by the right hon. gentleman opposite, that Buonaparté could never hold out against the effect of our new schemes, and that the result must be that he would be compelled to revoke his own decrees? What, then, was done by the Order of April 1809? "You roust not," said this Order, "export your coffee, your cotton, or your sugar on this side the river Ems; but go to the north of it, stretch your course a few leagues farther, and you may trade at your discretion." While the north of Italy and the south of France were labouring for a vent to their manufactures, the language of this Order was, "You shall import nothing from Toulon, no, nor from Genoa; but beyond Orbitello, a few miles to the southward, all restriction ceases." When we shew, therefore, what the effect was of the first Order on our exports and imports, we are desired to look at the vast encrease which has followed the second, for which credit is taken as though it were so much actual encrease.

In one respect, at least, the last Order was more absurd than its predecessor, inasmuch as it could have no pretence whatever for being considered as a retaliatory measure, intended to injure Buonaparté. We are told, however, that the consequence was a great addition to our exports; let us examine, therefore, the nature of this assertion. In the year 1810, a sum of between nine and ten millions, of the property of British merchants, was confiscated and transferred to the French treasury. Here was the secret of Buonaparté's relaxations. A sum exceeding by 2 or 3 millions the whole amount of the Droits of Admiralty, accumulated in a period of eighteen years by the plunder taken from Spaniards, from French, from Danes, from our Dutch allies, from Toulon (in trust for the royal family of France) &c. was, as it were, in a moment added to the funds of our enemy, not taken from his subjects or his allies, or even from neutrals, but from the subjects of that state with which he was openly at war! In the following year his system of relaxation was carried still further, for we then find him burning and prohibiting with new fervour. In 1807 you press him hard; in 1809 you begin to soften; and in 1810 the sum total is, that he adopts a measure infinitely more destructive than ever, both to his own commerce and to yours. Had he varied one iota in his policy, or deviated for a single instant from his great and presiding principles, this part of the ease would be altered. It does appear to me most extraordinary that, seeing all these things, any man of sense, who has been in the habit of representing Buonaparté as the despiser of all rules and all ordinary maxims, can expect to move him by commercial distresses. It does appear most extraordinary that they who are in the constant practice of characterizing him as abandoned to the most profligate principles, as the blood-thirsty destroyer of his kind, the foul murderer of his companions in arms—charges which I hope, not for his sake, but for the honour of our nature, are unfounded—that these men could have ever made up their minds to propose to parliament a measure that, by depriving the French soldiers of bark, was to alarm and prey upon Buonaparté's tender feelings. If these considerations had any weight when urged against the original adoption of this policy, they must be still more forcible after the fact, and after every desponding view that was then taken, has been more than realized. I can explain the adherence of the right hon. gentlemen to their former opinions, only by attributing it to that reluctance which men feel to abandon a theory in which they have been once fully entangled.

And now, Sir, I shall enter a little more minutely into a few of the facts which prove the destructive influence of the Orders in Council on the trade and prosperity of the country. One proof, and certainly one would think a very strong one, may be seen in the enormous increase of bankruptcies, and another may be seen in the distressed state of our commercial and manufacturing towns. We know that the poor of Liverpool, in the space of four weeks, increased to more than four times their former amount; and that in that once opulent and flourishing town, they are now relieving from sixteen to seventeen thousand poor in a week, over and above the ordinary paupers in the different parishes. Of these sixteen or seventeen thousand poor, it is to be considered that not more than three or four weeks ago, there were not above two or three thousand, and that not more than a year ago there existed literally none. These facts should, I think, bear me out, and induce the House to go into the proposed committee, even in the teeth of all the Customhouse returns, if those returns are at variance with them; for if I find nothing bat misery and distress in all the manufacturing and commercial parts of England; if I cannot shut my eyes to the effects of that misery and distress every where but too apparent; if I see that in the course of last year there were nearly 2,000 commercial failures; if I know that petitions are every where in preparation (and on this subject the knowledge of the right hon. gentleman is probably much more extensive than mine) embodying thousands and thousands of complaints against the distress occasioned by the Orders in Council, in Warwickshire, in Lancashire, in Nottinghamshire, in Yorkshire, in Derbyshire, and other parts of England, and several parts of Scotland; of what avail is all the eloquence of the right hon. the Vice President of the Board of Trade, or the piece of paper which he chooses to produce to me from Mr. Irving's office? It is true he will tell me, the amount of bankruptcies is one thing; but the amount of exports and imports is another. Of what avail are all the distresses in Nottingham—of what avail is the amount of bankruptcies—of what avail the accounts of starving manufacturers—look to the accounts in the office of Mr. Irving, the saviour of the country, who, under Mr. Vansittart's act every March or April, or every first of April, makes returns to the House, clearly proving that in spite of appearances we are an exporting, a flourishing, and a gay nation. The right hon. gentleman will tell me, no doubt, that the people whose names swell the list of bankrupts, are mistaken, that the Gazette is mistaken, and that all this is feeble paper-proof when compared with this ægis of brass from the columns of the Custom-house books. I care not, therefore, what the right hon. gentleman may produce from this quarter, nor is it necessary for me to go more minutely into this part of the subject, to induce the House to enter into the proposed inquiry. What better evidence could the wit of man devise to shew which party is right, and which party is wrong? We have only to turn our eyes towards our gaols filled with debtors, our poor houses crowded with objects of mendicity, and our midland counties, where so great is the distress, that the people are driven even to insurrection.

But let us inquire how the case of the right hon. gentleman is made out? By a Custom-house bit of paper.—Let us see, then, how the case really stands on the shewing of these documents of the right hon. gentleman. I have already mentioned what the state of things in this country was in 1808, and the unfortunate falling off of our exports in that year. Come we down to the last year, 1811. I am here dealing with the hon. gentlemen opposite on their own documents, the Custom-house returns made out under Mr. Vansittart's act. We have now before us a Return for the three quarters of every one of the four years, ending the 10th of October 1811. It appears that we exported, of British manufactures, in the three quarters ending the 10th of October 1810, 27,019,516l.; and in the corresponding three quarters of 1811, we exported only to the amount of 16,397,311l.; so that here is a falling off of nearly 11 millions in the amount of British manufactures exported in three quarters of one year only; and if a proportionate allowance be made for the other quarter, the falling off will then be between 14 and 15 millions of official value in the amount of British manufactures alone in a single year, which sum of between 14 and 15 millions of official value corresponds to somewhat between 20 and 21 millions of real value. It appears, then, that there is not such a discrepancy between the Gazette and the Custom-house books as from the cheering of the hon. gentlemen opposite one would be led to suppose. But the right hon. gentleman will say, "It is true there is a falling off in the amount of last year compared with 1810, but 1810 happens to be the greatest year of exports ever known, and there is no falling off when we compare last year with 1809." But here again the right hon. gentleman will find himself in some difficulty, for it appears that there is a falling off of two millions last year, when compared with 1809; for 1809 was within nine millions of 1810. Thus it appears that we must go back to the year 1808 for a comparison; and it is to be considered, that if there is a falling off in the last year compared with. 1808, it is a falling off compared with the very worst year ever known in this country, for in the year 1808 there was a decrease in the exportation of British manufactures of about 15 millions as compared with 1807; and therefore if there is a falling off in 1811 compared with 1808, we have a right to conclude that there is a falling off compared with the very worst year that could be selected. How then does the fact stand? In the 3 quarters ending the 10th of October 1808, the British manufactures exported amounted to 18,013,043l.; and in the corresponding quarters of 1811 they amounted to 16,397,311l., being a decrease of nearly two millions. We have not yet got the accounts of imports for the last year, and I believe that they cannot be presented for more than two months. We know, however, enough to allow me to state with confidence, that in the imports there has also been a falling off; and that the imports in the year 1811 fell off nearly as much as the exports. Upon the whole, then, it appears, that there has been a falling off in the year 1811, compared with the very worst year, namely, 1808.

But on this subject I think I shall be able to say something to shew why the Custom-house Returns are at best but of doubtful authority, and are not to be trusted when they appear to speak a different language from that of all descriptions of people in the country. It is to be observed, from the Accounts presented to the House, that in 1809 the exportation to North and South America, and the British Settlements, amounted to 8 millions more than that of 1807; and the exportation to the countries of Europe to 12 millions more than in 1807. Such was the statement on the face of the documents. This would at first sight induce any one to draw the most favourable conclusions respecting the state of the country; but when we know bow different the state of the country really is, we must look for the cause of this apparent contradiction. There are a sort of prying people in this country, who are not quite disposed to pin their faith implicitly to Mr. Irving's books, and are unwilling to believe this increase of 1809 real: these sceptics on the contrary, have the boldness to say, that this excess of exportation went to a market which was not disposed to receive it. They will tell you that the goods which were sent to South America were not sold; that the goods which were sent to the various countries of Europe were not sold. If such were the fact it was naturally to be expected that their conjectures would be borne out by the return of goods from the same quarters in the next year, and accordingly next year there was an almost proportionate excess of importation of the same kinds of goods in which there had been an excess in the export the year before. In 1810 there came from America to the amount of five millions more than in 1807; and there was imported from countries in Europe, including West India produce, more than twenty millions, and not including it sixteen millions. So that it was evident a great part of the goods sent out from this country in 1809 found found no sale, but having glutted the markets of Buenos Ayres, Guernsey, Jersey, and other places, were returned to this country, to swell the amount of imports in the succeeding year. It appears that in 1810 the exports were 62,702,409l.; and the imports 74,538,061l.; and as it has been confessed that the Bank could not have supplied 12 millions in gold to balance this account, the circumstance is inexplicable but on the grounds which I have already stated. As the Custom-house accounts then abound with difficulties and inconsistencies, I shall at once dismiss them as unintelligible, without some parole information, without we may have an opportunity of examining Mr. Irving himself, and the officers of the Custom-house, and contrasting and comparing the information to be derived from them, with that which appears in their books. Unless such an examination take place, these documents, instead of being the oracles of truth, can be considered only as the depositories of error. There is another reason why I am disposed to place little faith in the accounts of exports. It is well known that several articles pay no duty on exportation, such as cotton and wool, for instance; and it is no uncommon thing for a man to enter goods exported to the amount of a hundred thousand pounds, for the purpose of giving an idea of his commercial consequence on' Change, who has not, in fact, exported to the value of ten thousand pounds; a fact I can prove, if the House will agree to my motion for a committee. Thus far having gone out of my way, for the purpose of meeting something like a challenge, which appeared to be made on the other side, I will leave the House to judge how far I have succeeded in my object, of endeavouring to reconcile those papers with the distresses and petitions of our manufacturers, and I shall proceed to resume the argument at that part at which I deviated from it, namely, the relaxation of the system of the Orders in Council in 1809.

If this relaxation proved the greatest want of confidence in their system on the parts of ministers themselves, if in fact it wholly abandoned the ground on which it was originally pretended that those Orders were founded; if it demonstrated that all prospect of making Buonaparté relax in his system by bearing hard upon French commerce was vain—I am now prepared to show that every thing that has since' happened has evinced the total futility, with regard to its professed object, of retaining all that remained of our measures, and that every thing that has since happened ought to induce us to retrace our Steps, and return to that more wholesome policy from which in an evil hour we departed. And here I wish to call the attention of the House to a subject of great importance, namely, the licencing system. In 1807, the number of licences granted amounted only to 1,600; and in 1810, it appears that they amounted to no less than above ten times that number, to upwards of 18,000. Having shewn the amount of this traffic in licences, it is easy to see how much of the whole commerce of the country is carried on under this system. Let us next inquire what are the effects produced by this licensing system on the enemy, on neutrals, and on ourselves. What are its effects on the enemy? Why, it at once gives up to him all that remains of the principles of the Orders in Council; because if the principle is to Be relaxed ad libitum, if those who apply for licences, if every man who wishes to trade with France and Holland, has only to go over to the right hon. gentleman to attain his object, what, I will ask, is to become of the blockade of 1809? The relaxation, therefore, I contend, eats up and destroys the very system itself; and we are now carrying on a trade which is open to the enemy, but shut to all neutrals, except those who choose to be partakers of the licensing system. I ask, therefore, if it is consistent with the policy of this country, which has always aimed at engrossing the carrying trade of the world, endeavouring by every means to increase our own marine, and taking all methods to prevent the increase of that of France; is it consistent, I ask, with this policy, that we should hold out every encouragement for the increase of the shipping of those neutrals who are under the dominion of France, or under the influence of her power? It is by their interference alone that the trade of the enemy can be carried on. The flags of Kniphausen, Pappenburg, Empden, and several little ports which it is difficult to know where to look for in the map of Europe, (though these places are in fact altogether French) and those of the Danes, the Swedes, and the Norwegians, equally carry on by means of our licences, the trade between France and their own countries, and the trade between this country and France. It is absurd to think that they conform to our regulations; on the contrary it is well known, that furnished with, and protected by our licences they trade directly as our enemy desires. Suppose for instance a vessel clears out from Pappenburgh (wherever that may be,) whose ultimate destination is Rotterdam (a port somewhat better known) with a licence, bearing that she is to touch at the Downs; is it not obvious that she may make directly for Rotterdam, if she can escape our cruisers? Those who are acquainted with the proceedings in our Admiralty courts, know well how often the licence is used in this manner, and that the vessel describes the string instead of the bow, if I may use the expression. There is no possible way of preventing this, but by covering the whole of the enemy's coast with your ships, and thus establishing a real, and not a paper blockade. And it is to be borne in mind, that there is not one of those cargoes allowed to be imported into France, which is not attended with as much gain to the enemy as to us. I ask, what is the effect of all this? The effect is, that the number of seamen and amount of tonnage of this country, compared with that of the foreigners engaged in our trade, which in 1806 and 1807 were nearly equal, in 1809 assumed a very different proportion; and in 1810 there was an increase in the foreign shipping of upwards of 1,100,000 tons, and an increase of foreign seamen of more than double the number which the enemy had in the Scheldt and elsewhere, only four short years before—namely of from 29,000 to 60,000! If this fact does not dispose us to inquire into the consequences of these measures, I know not what will. What a nursery of seamen for the fleets of the enemy had this system prepared! No wonder that the ship-owners of Hull and Shields will complain of the measures. If such be the ground of their complaint's to parliament, and if these complaints are even borne out by the Custom-house papers of the right hon. gentleman opposite, I think I ought to expect even the support of that right hon. gentlemen himself to my motion. It appears that even the ship building is falling off considerably in this country; and that comparing 1809 with 1806, there is a decrease of one-half. The tonnage of 1811 is not yet presented. Such are the grounds on which I call on the House for inquiry. All this increase of foreign tonnage is at the expence of the tonnage and seamen of the Americans, a nation altogether harm- less, and naturally friendly to us; a power with whom we have no rivalship—from whose prosperity and greatness we have nothing to apprehend; and we have thrown this increase into the hands of powers naturally hostile to us, and either subject to or at the disposition of our enemy.

Now, Sir, let us inquire what has been the effect of this Licencing system on our own country. Sure I am it is altogether novel in England,—not that trade should be interfered with, for that has formerly been frequently done, generally by laws, and particularly by Orders in Council, (though seldom much to its advantage)—but that this interference should be systematical, and that every day in the year trade should be controlled by the executive government. The trade of the country, at this day is not carried on by merchants residing at Liverpool, or London, or Hull, or any other of the great commercial cities, but by the President or Vice-President of the Board of Trade.—That body, for whom, as individuals, I have the highest respect, is not now employed as formerly, in devising means of hostility towards the enemy, or of protection to our own trade; but the whole of their mornings are occupied with the assortment of cargoes, with inquiries after what goods are best calculated for this or that market, and with settling the proportions of the various sorts of goods that ought to be carried out in vessels of a given burden; an employment to which, with whatever respect I may entertain for them, I cannot but think, that of all human beings they are the most incompetent. I am speaking of the right hon. the Vice-President of the Board of Controul (Mr. Rose) not in his political capacity, not in his natural capacity, but merely in his mercantile capacity. (Laugh.) I may entertain a very different opinion of him in the one and in the other; as in the same manner I may entertain a very different opinion of an hon. Secretary of the Treasury (Mr. Wharton) in his official and his poetical capacity—I allude to an hon. gentleman opposite who came out lately to the world as an epic poet.—It certainly wears rather a strange appearance to see the President and Vice-President of the Board of Trade—to see these noble and right hon. politicians spending whole mornings in laying their heads together, and determining with the utmost attention and gravity whether one cargo should consist of cotton, or of wool—whether scissars should be added—whether nails should be added to the scissars—whether the scissars or the nails should be left out—or whether the commerce of the country might or might not be ruined by throwing in a little hemp along with the nails and the scissars! (Laughing.) These are now the lucubrations of the right hon. gentleman and his colleagues. Now with all the respect possible for the right hon. gentleman in his political capacity, I really feel so little respect for him in his capacity of tradesman, that I tremble for the consequences of leaving our commerce to such management.

But this system of controul and interference is not all; there are abuses connected with the granting of licences which speak powerfully in favour of the present inquiry. I do not mean by abuses, to say that I think any undue preference is shewn in the granting of these licences, or that any unjustifiable motive at any time is the cause of their refusal; but with every allowance for purity of motive in the right hon. gentleman and his colleagues, I contend that there are abuses to which, from the nature of things, this sys-tem is inevitably exposed. It came out lately, that by the mistake of a clerk in one word a paper was delivered from the Licence office, for which my hon. friend near me, one of the greatest merchants in the world (Mr. Baring,) said he would willingly have given 15,000l. This is a circumstance which surely ought to make us pause. Is it not dreadful that our trade should be carried on in such a manner that an effect like this may result from so trifling a mistake? It is nothing to the purpose to tell us that that fabricated paper was the consequence of a clerical error. All this may be very true; but who knows whether this was the only mistake, and whether this beneficial error may not at a future period give a pretty significant hint for repeating the error designedly? Besides, are there no other modes of preference? Is the system liable to no other abuse? Can no other favour be shewn but this? What is the House to think of the opportunities which some gentlemen must have of obtaining information compared with others? Some hon. gentlemen are more nearly connected with the right hon. gentleman than others, and have more opportunities of hearing his sentiments. He, like other traders, has his particular customers, with whom he must naturally be more disposed to converse than with others; for I presume the right hon. gent, does not act without furnishing himself, by communication with some commercial men, with the knowledge necessary for his business. Now these favourite customers may in all probability be much more cunning than the right hon. gentleman is aware of, and, with all due confidence in his sagacity, it is not unlikely that while he is consulting different individuals with respect to what assortment of goods may best fit at one time, or what at another, he may allow them to leave him persuaded of the importance of the information he has derived from them, while they are as perfectly satisfied with the intelligence which they have contrived to ferret out of him.

I am sure that the right hon. gent, opposite (Mr. Canning) who not long ago held the seals of the Foreign Office, is very sensible of the number of persons who are always prowling about in order to learn something that may be turned to advantage. They strive in the first place to get at the principal, and to enter into conversation with him, always on the watch to catch something for their purpose. If they cannot see the principal they resort to the secretary; if the secretary is not to be had they try the clerks, and when they find these inaccessible they fasten upon the very door-keepers, and in short, employ every effort that cunning and a keen sense of interest can suggest to pick up little odds and ends of information. But if this system is resorted to at the Foreign-office, and if such information is somehow or other frequently obtained from persons of the utmost purity of motives, how much more must the Board of Trade be open to abuses of this sort? In the Board of Trade it is necessary to consult and converse with interested persons; and when questions are put to practical men, if they have the usual acuteness of British merchants, they will soon know from the right hon. gentleman what he is about to do. It is giving to such men as great an advantage as it would be for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to tell a stock-broker what was to be the amount of the next loan, when he proposed to fund a large amount of Exchequer Bills, or at what precise period peace or war would take place in the country. Indeed the information to be had at the Board of Trade under the present circumstances, is far more lucrative; and probably as brisk a trade is carried on in this way between Lombard-street and Westminster, as that carried on by licence under the Pappenburgh flag. But who were the persons who would be found thus waiting on the right hon. gentleman? There indeed will not be found the hon. member near me, nor the hon. member for Worcester, nor any of the members for the city of London, clearing inwards and outwards (a laugh) No such respectable individuals will you find there; but you will find, besieging the doors of that office, ample exports and imports from Lombard-street and Duke's place—neutrals under the controul of the enemy, and their jobbers, Jews, persons of the description of Jews, and brokers of merchants resident in the north of Germany, who have their agents here for the purpose of managing their commercial transactions. These are the persons with whom the vice-president of the Board of Trade consults. In this manner you furnish the enemy with the means of knowing the course and current of trade at every instant. The Orders in Council and the Navigation Laws are general measures; but here you have another system by which the enemy has the means of knowing at all times what articles you wish to have exported, and what you wish to have imported from the continent; and by this means it is his own fault if he does not put that commerce completely within his controul.

But the last and most deplorable consequence of this licensing system, is the effect which it is producing on the morals of the trading part of the community of this country. Here I implore the attention of the House, and the attention of the hon. gentlemen opposite (would to God I could appeal to them in a more effectual manner), and intreat them to consider the consequences of giving continuance to a traffic which has so often been described as "a system of simulation and dissimulation from beginning to end." These are the words of the respectable Judge who presides in our Courts of Admiralty, who as he owes in that capacity allegiance to no particular sovereign, is bound to mete out justice equally to the subjects of all nations who come before him. This is the language of the right hon. and learned gentleman alluded to, but in my opinion, it would be still more accurate to say that it is a system which begins with forgery, is continued by perjury, and ends in enormous frauds. I will read a clause from the first licence that comes to my hand—for it is in them all—in 18,000 licences a year—and it is a clause which demands the most serious attention of the House. What are we to say when we find that the government of the country lends the sanction of its authority to such expressions as the following, in the licences from port to port: "The vessel shall be allowed to proceed, notwithstanding all the documents which accompany the ship and cargo may represent the same to be destined to any neutral or hostile port, or to whomsoever such property may appear to belong." Notwithstanding, says his Majesty in Council—at least his Majesty is made to use such language—notwithstanding, says this paper, which is countersigned by his Majesty's Secretary of State 18,000 times in a year, this trade is carried on by fraud and perjury, we will sanction that foulness, and we will give orders that these ships shall be enabled to pass through the British fleets. Perhaps the full import of this clause is not known to the House. It is proper they should be informed that papers are put on board stating the actual place from which the ship cleared out, signed in the proper and usual manner, with letters from the ship-owner to the proper persons; and that these real documents form what is called the ship's papers. By this licence the captain is enabled to take on board another set of papers, which are a forgery from beginning to end, and in case his vessel happens to be overhauled by our cruizers, he escapes detention. If the ship happen to clear from London, it is perhaps said to clear from Rotterdam, and the proper description is made out, as nearly as possible, in the hand-writing of the Custom-house officer at Rotterdam, and if it be necessary that the paper should be signed by a minister of state, as is the case in Holland, his hand writing must be forged, frequently that of the duke of Cadore, or perhaps, as I happened to see the other day, that of Napoleon himself. Not only are the names forged, but the seal is also forged, and the wax imitated. But this is not enough. A regular set of letters is also forged, containing a good deal of fictitious private anecdote, and a good deal of such news from Rotterdam as might be supposed to be interesting to mercantile people, and a letter from a merchant in Rotterdam to the ship owner. Thus provided, the vessel sails, and the object of the clause in the licence which I have just read, is to prevent her from being seized by any of our cruizers who may intercept her. This is what is meant by the general expression of—"Notwithstanding all the documents which accompany the ship and cargo may represent the same, &c. &c." So much for the system of forgery on which this licence trade rests; but all this is not enough. All this must be done with the privity of the merchant here, and of his clerks. That most respectable branch of society, and these young men, whom they are initiating into trade, are no longer at liberty to follow the system, by which our Childs and our Barings have risen to such respectability and eminence; but from their very outset in fife, are now to be initiated in the humiliating mysteries of this fraudulent commerce. All these forgeries, too, are confirmed by the solemn oaths of the captain and crew when they arrive at their destined port. They are obliged to swear in words, as awful as it is possible to conceive, that all these documents and letters are genuine. Every sort of interrogatory is put to the captain and the whole crew, which is calculated to discover what is the real port from which the vessel sailed, and to the truth of the answers to all these interrogatories the captain and the whole crew are obliged to swear. They are obliged to declare from what quarter the wind blew when they left Rotterdam (although they were never near the place,) when they took a pilot on board, and a number of other particulars, which they are obliged to asseverate on the most solemn oath, which it is possible to conceive; knowing at the same time that they sailed from London and not from Rotterdam, that they took no pilot on board, and that their other statements are utterly false. So that, under this system, the whole crew and captain are under the necessity of perjuring themselves, if they wish to act up to their instructions. In confirmation of these statements, I will read to the House a letter of a most curious description which has been put into my hands, written to an American merchant, of the highest respectability, the contents of which would be extremely ludicrous, if the contemplation of them were not accompanied by a feeling of disgust at the moral depravity it displays. It is written by a professional man, not that he is either a lawyer, a physician, or a divine, for he would be a disgrace to any of these honourable occupations; but he is a man who has made the forgery of ship's papers a regular and organized profession. I shall omit the names of any of the parties, because I should be sorry to injure individuals, whose only connection with the writer has been, that he has dared to send them this most atrocious circular. It is as follows:—

"Liverpool,——.

"GENTLEMEN—We take the liberty herewith to inform you, that we have established ourselves in this town, for the sole purpose of making simulated papers [Hear, hear!] which we are enabled to do in a way which will give ample satisfaction to our employers, not only being in possession of the original documents of the ships' papers, and clearances to various ports, a list of which we annex, but our Mr. G——B——having worked with his brother, Mr. J——B——, in the same line, for the last two years, and understanding all the necessary languages.

"Of any changes that may occur in the different places on the continent, in the various custom house, and other offices, which may render a change of signatures necessary, we are careful to have the earliest information, not only from our own connections, but from Mr. J——B——, who has proffered his assistance in every way, and who has for some time past made simulated papers for Messrs. B——and P——, of this town, to whom we beg leave to refer you for further information. We remain," &c.

Then follows a long list of about twenty places from and to which they can forge papers (having all the clearances ready by them, from the different public agents) the moment they receive intelligence that any merchant may need their assistance in this scheme of fabrication. And, is it come to this? [Hear! hear! hear!] Is this the sort of trade carried on by British merchants? Is this the way in which we are to defeat the designs of Buonaparté? Is this the mode by which we are to make him bite the dust? Which of the two contending powers is subdued by the respective systems adopted against each other, that which has openly sacrificed its commerce, which says, "We will have soldiers and peasants but no traders;" or that which, to the abandonment of all national honour, maintains such a foul, such a filthy commerce as that on which gentlemen on the other side contend the existence of our commerce depends? If this be the triumph of England and of Englishmen over the continental system—if this be all for which our soldiers cheerfully bleed on the fields of victory, I shall soon be ashamed of the title which I hope still to boast, a representative of free, independent, honest, British traders, and I will not be one of those who will go in processions of triumph, which, instead of glorious trophies and banners, presents to my mind nothing but an assemblage of gibbets and halters. These are transactions which ought to be as much a source of grief to ourselves, as they are a source of reproach against us by foreign nations.

I know that the right hon. gentleman will tell me, that if these crimes were not committed by us, they would be perpetrated by others. That if our merchants in Liverpool refused to fabricate papers, those of Boston would not be so scrupulous. In answer to this assertion, I shall merely say, that the argument is not new. It has been hacknied over and over again (in the absence of a better) on other subjects. I remember it; and in the recollection of the hon. member for Yorkshire it must still be fresh. It is the old and favourite argument used on the long de-bated question of the Slave Trade, by which the ministers of the day were scandalized, and by advancing which, if by nothing else, the memory of lord Sid-mouth will be perpetuated as long as a sense of shame is retained in this or in any other country.—"Oh!" said they, "if we abandon the Slave Trade it will be carried on by others, and perhaps humanity will suffer in the exchange." It may he so, but I repeat, as applied to this subject, what my hon. friend (Mr. Wilberforce) then so forcibly and truly urged on that occasion, "In God's name let it be carried on by others, we will no longer let our hands stained with human blood be the accusers of our hearts."—I say, let this nefarious practice be adopted by any other country, by America, if it be not too honest, by Pappenburg, or some of the dirty ports of Denmark: but let it not receive the sanction of the British government. Let it be no longer said that England, whose merchants in former and happier times were held in universal estimation for probity and honour, have forfeited a character by the preservation of which alone they can claim a just right to the privileges of humanity. Weighing, therefore, all these circumstances, which I am too much exhausted, and the House too much fatigued to recapitulate, I ask any honest and impartial man, whether sufficient ground has not been laid for inquiry, in order to ascertain whether there be or be not any remedy to the grievous evils, some few of which I have enumerated? If I am asked what remedy I would apply, I say, let us first go into the inquiry. How is it possible to prescribe till the full extent of the malady be known? Different views may be taken by different persons; but do not let us turn an inattentive ear to complaints "that would cure deafness:" let us go into a committee to learn the cause and effects of the enormities I have stated.

If, as an humble individual, I might venture an opinion, I should say, without a moment's hesitation, conciliate the Americans; let us do all that lies in our power to protect, maintain, and support their neutrality; but do not let us drive them to the extreme of making an election injurious to them but fatal to us.—Do not let us force them to chuse between a French alliance and an English alliance; but at all events let us avoid occasioning the greater of the two calamities, an alliance between America and France, which would inevitably lead to a war between America and England. We need not be afraid of going too far towards conciliation. I should be the last man in the nation to insinuate, that because the people of England are distressed we should assume a lower and more humble tone. I would not recommend it, because I should be speaking a language at which my heart would revolt against my tongue; but let us not be falsely proud and refuse this inquiry from the weakest of all weak fears, the fear of acknowledging that we have formerly committed an error. There can be no rivalry between the two countries—they are disposed to friendship, and since the population of both is chiefly composed of merchants and farmers, their interests are too much united to allow them to proceed to hostilities without the most imperious necessity. Let us employ our army and navy, to whose victories we are indebted for our independence, to protect those who require our support; let the tree of liberty expand its sheltering branches over other countries than our own; but let us not insult those who are anxious to continue in amity with us. I know that the motion I have to submit will receive the approbation of the people—I trust it will obtain the sanction of the House—If it do not, I shall have the satisfaction of feeling that, however others may forget their duty, I have discharged mine.—I will conclude, Sir, by moving, "That a Select Committee be appointed for the purpose of taking into its consideration the present state of the commerce and manufactures of the country, particularly with reference to the effects of the Orders in Council and the Licence Trade."

Mr. Rose

expressed the sincere pleasure he felt that this important subject was about to undergo a full and impartial discussion, because he was persuaded that the more it was examined the more apparent would be the benefits resulting from the system which now received the sanction of government. However deficient he might be in eloquence, the facts he should adduce would be amply sufficient to subvert the fabric which it had cost the hon. and learned gentleman so much pains to raise. He was not disposed to deny that the condition of the manufacturers in various parts of the country was much to be commiserated, but their discontent did not arise so much from a want of work as from a diminution of wages. In Birmingham, particularly, a greater degree of calamity was felt than in any other town in the empire; because the trade of that place depended, almost more than any other, on the connection with America. But, when the hon. and learned gentleman proceeded to contend that these distresses were general, and being general, were produced by the Orders in Council, he wished to enquire, whence the hon. and learned gentleman had derived the information on which he founded his statement? In fact, the papers on the table, so far from supporting, directly contradicted the assertions of the hon. and learned gentleman. And here he felt it proper to observe, that the hon. and learned gentleman appeared very much disposed to object to the accuracy of Mr. Irving's figures, when they were unfavourable to his argument; but he was quite ready to deduce inferences from them, when he considered them as at all leaning to his side. He (Mr. Rose) was persuaded, that there never had been a fair question of doubt raised on the correctness of the Customhouse accounts, which were by no means justly liable to the observations made on them by the hon. and learned gent.

He would now proceed to an examination of the facts connected with the statement made by the hon. and learned gentleman. The Orders in Council were issued in the year 1807, and it would be proper to consider, by comparison, what effect they had had on the export trade of the country. In the year he had just mentioned, the exports amounted to 34,566,572l.; in 1808, they were 34,554,267; in 1809 they had increased to no less than 50,286,900l.; and, in 1810, they were 45,869,860l.;—a great and evident increase from the year 1807. The hon. and learned gentleman had spoken of 9,000,000l. of British exports having been seized by Buonaparté, in the year 1810; and that, for the express purpose of getting possession of this property, he had, for a short time, suspended his own decrees.—That the act alluded to was one of great and unjustifiable violence, no person could doubt; but how did the fact stand? The decrees were relaxed from the end of 1807 to 1810, and for two years previous to the seizure complained of, the trade to the Baltic had been conducted with the utmost advantage, and it only arose from accidental causes of wind and weather, that Buonaparté was enabled to apply the cargoes of several hundred ships to his own use; but the truth was, that this trade had nothing to do with the Orders in Council, and the destruction of the trade so vehemently enforced was, in truth, an augmentation from twenty-five to thirty millions. A few years since it had been as boldly said, as it had been tonight repeated, that our trade with America would be annihilated; and he then took occasion modestly to express his opinion, that if a Non-Intercourse law were passed in the United States, the commerce with the Spanish and Portuguese colonies might be carried on directly from Great Britain. Experience had fully confirmed this opinion. In 1807, our exports to America and the West Indies amounted to 14,800,000l.; in 1808, notwithstanding the partial prohibition in the United States, to 15,800,000l.; in 1809, to 19,200,000l.; in which last year, be it remembered, the American Non-Intercourse act was carried into effect; yet, notwithstanding that, in the year 1810, the exports to all America and the West Indies, amounted to no less a sum than 20,418,000l. And from this it appeared, that, between the years 1807 and 1810, an increase to the amount of six millions sterling had taken place in the export trade of this country to all America Did he mean from thence to argue that England ought to be indifferent to her connection with the United States of America? By no means: he had always contended, and he always should, that the interests of Great Britain and of America were closely united. But it was too much to expect, that this country should allow America to treat her differently from other states.

Reverting to the seizures which the hon. and learned gentleman said had been made by Buonaparte, he begged leave to observe, that, instead of nine millions being thus borne away, not more than six or seven had fallen a sacrifice to his arts. The ships seized by him, were, at the time, trading under the system of neutralization; and the loss was sustained by an unfortunate coincidence of circumstances; by a non-adherence to the place of rendezvous which was appointed, and suspicion as to the danger which threatened the property being asleep.

The hon. and learned gentleman had talked a great deal of the information which people, of a variety of descriptions, had derived from him (Mr. Rose.) He did not know whence the hon. and learned gentleman had derived his intelligence; but this he could assure him, that he was completely and entirely mistaken with respect to the kind and class of company which he was in the habit of entertaining. What connection the individuals, whom the hon. and learned gentleman had so humorously described, might have with the door keepers and messengers of his office, he could not say; but undoubtedly they had no access to him. He himself, and the noble lord at the head of the Board of Trade, had been accused by the hon. and learned gentleman of spending their mornings with Jews and Brokers, for the purpose of selecting and assorting cargoes for exportation. Here the hon. and learned gentleman was again mistaken. This was not the object of their consideration; nor were the persons they, met of that description. The object which engaged them, and the respectable gentlemen whom they consulted, was, to determine on what articles it was safe, fit, and proper, to allow to be imported into Great Britain.

In answer to the hon. and learned gentleman's assertions, as to the supposed injury which the shipping interest of Great Britain had sustained, in consequence of the licencing system, he would beg leave simply to state the fact. By accurate calculations he would shew, that, since licences had been resorted to, the tonnage was greatly increased. In 1807, the British shipping employed was 1,436,000 tons; in 1808, 1,311,000; in 1809, 1,539,000; and, in 1810, 1,609,000 tons were engaged. So that now there were 200,000 tons of British shipping employed in addition to the quantity, which, prior to the Orders in Council, had been engaged. When the Orders in Council were first resorted to, 88,900 seamen were employed in British mercantile transactions; at present, not less than 102,000 seamen were so engaged—making an increase of 14,000 seamen. He was willing to admit that foreign shipping had increased in a greater proportion; but if such shipping had not been employed, what would have become of British commerce? How could the trade of Great Britain have been carried on with those various ports of Europe, which were shut against British vessels? He would ask the House, would government have been justified in permitting the manufactures of the country to rot and perish in warehouses, rather than employ foreign vessels in the distribution of them through the world? From the general habits of his life, no one, he was convinced, could suspect him of being insensible to the distresses of the ship-owners. But, he put it to the House, he put it to the hon. and learned gentleman opposite, whether it was possible to stand by, in cold blood, and see the manufacturers of the country starving, rather than permit the produce of the country to be exported in foreign ships? Besides, the rate of the transport service would shew that no material injury had been sustained by the British shipping interest. This he thought could be made very evident from a comparison of the rates at different periods. In the year 1807, when the Orders in Council were originally issued, the rate was 19s. per ton; but, at present, it was no less than 25s. per ton—a clear proof, in his mind, that the great body of the shipping of the country was constantly employed. Even with respect to Hull, a place more likely to suffer than any other, by the pressure of the times, he had good reason for stating from private information which he had obtained from thence, that there was not a ship belonging to that port, which was not at present either absolutely engaged, or on the point of being employed.

The hon. and learned gentleman bad asked, why were not American vessels made use of? The answer was, they experienced exactly the same treatment with other neutrals—no distinction had been made. It was therefore most unfounded to say, that any partiality had been evinced in favour of one state or of another by government, but a preference was given by the merchants to other foreign ships, as being safer, and less liable to suspicion in the continental ports. The trade with the Spanish and Portuguese settlements of America was at least equally advantageous with that which had been recently carried on with the United States. In proof of this, it must be observed, that for the last ten years the American trade had been carried on from a seventh to a twenty-third part in British shipping. When the commercial treaty of 1797 was concluded with America, it was founded on the principle of reciprocal advantage. There was a stipulation mutually to relax the duties on the importation of goods from the two countries ten per cent, on the gross amount of the customary duties. But no sooner had this treaty been concluded, than America doubled her imposts, while those of Great Britain remained stationary. Such a measure, every gentleman must see, amounted almost to a prohibition of the commodities of this country. Again, looking to the benefits which England would obtain from trading with the Spanish and Portuguese settlements, it was not to be forgotten that this country would not only derive the mercantile profits, but also those which were connected with the navigation. In his opinion, nothing could be more palpable than the disadvantageous situation in which Great Britain would have been placed, but for the intervention of the Orders in Council: if it had not been for them, France would have possessed the great benefit of trading with all the ports of Europe, which were shut against England, and she would have been enabled to furnish herself, from America, with every article which she wanted, particularly with the raw materials for her manufactures—and, above all, with cotton, respecting which manufacture she had latterly shewn great anxiety.

What had been the origin of the Orders in Council? France said that there should be no trade to England. Our answer was—an answer which we had the power to enforce—that nothing should go to France that did not come to her through England. We had a right to say to neutral powers, that if they tolerated a regulation of one of the belligerents inimical to our commercial interests, they must tolerate a regulation on our part in defence of those interests. Nothing hostile was intended to wards America. On the contrary, every degree of attention and kindness was shown to her by Great Britain. The conduct of France towards America was directly the reverse. Had Buonaparté seized none of her shipping, and had he not, going be yond what the laws of nations allowed, decreed, that every ship coming from England should be confiscated? An immense confiscation of American property was the consequence; but the United States passed over the insult unnoticed. Encouraged by this supineness, Buonaparté went further, and on advice of his Court of Admiralty, determined that any French cruizer that fell in with an American vessel, which she supposed was on a voyage to England, might burn and destroy her. Then followed the Milan Decree, and on a remonstrance being made by general Armstrong, the duke of Cadore, the French minister, replied, "that the conduct of France was consistent with the eternal principles of justice." The Decree of Rambouillet was the close of that scene of iniquity, which America had tamely allowed to be acted before her eyes. The Orders in Council, on the contrary, were not promulgated until it was perfectly well known in the republic, that such would be the conduct of Great Britain. It had been said, that the French decrees had been revoked; but on no foundation. In a recent prize cause, on a vessel called the Catherina Augusta, it was allowed that the Berlin and Milan decrees had not been rescinded. An original letter was produced during the proceedings, dated in September last, in which the merchants at Rotterdam state, that "it is true that the Decrees of Berlin and Milan have not yet been publicly repealed." An American vessel in ballast, with an American master and American seamen, from London to Charlestown, had also been carried into Calais; and no longer ago than November last, the captain and owner presented a petition to Congress, praying their interposition, and alleging that the vessel so captured was taken on the sole ground of a supposed infraction of the Berlin and Milan Decrees, by the vessel having sailed from an English port. But the House was told, that there had been no condemnations in France tinder those Decrees, subsequently to the 2nd Nov. 1810. Of this he could not speak; but no one would deny that there had been sequestrations to a considerable amount; and in these times in France, the distinction between sequestration and condemnation was merely nominal; while on the contrary the conduct of the British High Court of Admiralty had been marked with liberality, almost amounting to injustice towards ourselves; and which had rendered the eminent individual at the head of that court as popular in America as he was in England. Much had been stated, with most imposing eloquence, on the evil consequences—the immoralities—arising from the system of licencing. The fact was that every syllable which the hon. and learned gentleman had uttered on the subject of simulated papers was applicable to the period before the Orders in Council and the Trade Licences were issued; and he would state, without fear of contradiction, that the latter had very much checked the perjury and fraud complained of. Before the Orders in Council and the Licences were issued, it was necessary for every captain of a ship to take an oath at the Custom-house, relative to the size of his ship and the number of his men. This was discontinued, and he knew of no oath substituted. To all those shocking perjuries which were formerly frequent in Doctors' Commons, there was now no temptation. That perjury prevailed as a system before 1807 was notorious; and a house was established at Empden, which, for frauds of that kind, received a regular commission of two per cent. He had enquired particularly into the subject, and he was assured, by masters of neutral vessels, that they were not called upon to make any affidavits on the other side of the water. Under these circumstances, was it fair for the hon. gent to tome down and brand the national character with the imputation of systematic perjury? Were the Orders in Council and the Licences abolished, then indeed the country would return to that system of neutralization under which perjuries were formerly so frequent.

Reverting to the distresses of the manufacturers, he allowed that distress existed to a considerable degree, but expressed his persuasion that great arts had been used to make the suffering individuals believe that their evils originated in the Orders in Council. Those persons had certainly borne their distresses with a patience and a fortitude which entitled, their present complaints to the most indulgent attention; but it was impossible to convince him that the greater part of the individuals who put their names to a petition against the Orders in Council, were at all competent to ascertain the mode in which those Orders operated; and of this he was assured, that their sufferings would be materially encreased were those Orders rescinded. He then took a view of the exports of the current year, which, though depressed, yet exceeded in a considerable degree what they had amounted to in 1808 and 1804. From this, he thought he was warranted in asserting, that the desponding statements which had been made with regard to the existing state of the country, were either exaggerated or wholly without foundation. The country was in no danger of ruin, while so flattering a comparison could be made. Would the hon. and learned gentleman contend that England was not a great and flourishing country in the year 1804. He believed that it had never been denied that she was; and, therefore, he could see no ground at present for asserting that she was in so bad a state from the depression of her trade—as, notwithstanding that depression, her exports were still considerably above what they had been in the years he had before mentioned. The hon. and learned gentleman had contended, that the goods exported in the year 1809 had not been able to find a market. In that assertion, however, he was obliged to contradict him, and could, inform him that they had found a market—and still further, that our goods had continued to find a market until the month of March 1810. He presumed that he need not inform the hon. and learned gentleman, that the produce of our colonies and fisheries was included under the head of imports. This being the case, however, it would appear that our exports, compared with our imports, did not determine the balance of trade.

As to what had been advanced with regard to the excessive issues of Bank paper in England, he had to observe, that our Bank-notes had risen, within the last two months, according to the rate of exchange at Hamburgh, 10 to 15 per cent, and he did not entertain a doubt, that if the present favourable aspect of affairs continued, a more extended improvement would take place in the exchange. He had to state, besides, that the price of gold bullion was falling. These were facts that completely refuted what had been advanced so confidently on the other side during the debates on the Bullion question.

He proceeded to contend, that the conduct of this country towards America had been uniformly conciliatory. In turning to the subject of the repeal of the Orders in Council, he wished to offer some observations to the House, and especially as to the grounds upon which it was maintained that that repeal should take place. We were told that the French had repealed their decrees, and that therefore we ought to repeal our Orders: but the duke de Cadore said, that they should be repealed when England gave up her right of blockade: and upon this the question rested. America also said, it was not our Orders in Council that she wished to have repealed, but she distinctly required of us to repeal so much of the prior regulations of 1807 as would give greater liberty to her traffic. What, however, would be the infallible consequences of repealing the Orders in Council, and of giving up the Licence trade? To open to France and America the trade of the whole world. America would then carry the manufactures of France, and all the colonial produce, to the different ports of Europe; while England would be excluded from ail participation in a commerce which she would thus provide for her enemy. We should then too behold, instead of a correction of frauds and perjuries, all those neutralizing gentlemen in our Admiralty courts again, who had realized such large fortunes on former occasions, and under the operation of a different system. The plan of the Orders in Council had not been adopted from any hasty suggestions, or any sudden start of policy; a body of the most respectable merchants had attended the Board of Trade for the purposes of consultation; and most of the cabinet ministers had been present. The trade of this country had continued to prosper under their operation until last year, when it suffered in consequence of the adoption of measures on the part of the enemy, which, he believed, had never been made use of by one nation towards another. The consequence of this unprecedented line of conduct was now recoiling on themselves. In cases of an ordinary description, it did not afford much consolation to one country, under circumstances of distress, to be satisfied that another country was placed in a similar situation; but in this instance there was a satisfaction in knowing that those measures which the enemy had recourse to, for the purpose of inflicting an injury on us, were acting with increased force against himself. He could make it appear, from a reference to official documents, that the revenue of France had suffered considerably by those very measures. In 1807, the amount of the French customs was 2,400,000l. sterling; in 1808, after the issuing of the Orders in Council, it had decreased 740,000l.; and, in 1809, 460,000l. more, notwithstanding a great increase which had been made in several of the duties. In 1810, it had again risen to 2,000,000l.; but this augmentation arose from the proceeds of the vessels seized in the Baltic; it had resulted from the robberies committed on individuals. The discounts of the French bank, in the year 1810, were 30,000,000l; in 1811, they had fallen to 16,000,000l.; the profits in the former year were 10,000l.; in the latter, they were only 4,500l. It was thus apparent, that the profits of the French bank were reduced to so small a sum, that there was scarcely a bank in England, conducted by private individuals, which did not divide as much. These statements were derived from authentic documents, and from the same documents it appeared also, that the French manufactures exported in 1810 amounted to fifty-four millions sterling, with a population of thirty millions; while we, with a population of only twelve millions, exported, in the same year, to the amount of fifty-six millions sterling. Had it not been for these Orders in Council, however, now so much decried, we should have been counteracted every where—they had been and still-were our only protection. He would ask, in reply to the hon. and learned gentleman who had so strongly condemned the licence trade, as employing foreign seamen and vessels, and which he described as proceeding from the Orders in Council, in what manner our trade was to be carried on? It would be, in his opinion, a deplorable trial for oar manufacturers were we to suspend all trade, all commerce, while we were endeavouring and contending for the admission of British ships into the ports of the continent. Considering, therefore, as be did, the Orders in Council to be a measure of sound policy, and manifest utility to the country, he should conclude with expressing his anxious hope that the House would not go into a com- mittee to enquire into a question which laid wholly upon the surface, and amounted simply to this, whether we should open the trade of the world to France or not?

Mr. A. Baring

regarded the subject as one of so much importance, that he could not think he discharged his duty in that House, if he permitted it to pass without offering a few observations. The question seemed to be, not whether the Orders in Council should be repealed, but whether, from the general and evident distress in every part of the country, there must not be something radically wrong in our commercial system, which called for inquiry. This appeared to him more particularly the case, when we were told, as we had been by the right hon. gentleman, that our shipping, our trade, and every thing connected with them, were in a prosperous state. What that inquiry, however, would be, to what it would specifically lead, whether to establish the fact that the Orders in Council had completely failed in their original purpose, whether they were radically bad, or whether the licence system had arisen from them, was for the future consideration of the committee moved for by his honourable and learned friend. For himself, be had no hesitation in stating it as his opinion, that our first deviation from the strict line of sound policy, was when we issued those Orders, when we listened to the bravadoes of France, and fettered and interrupted neutral commerce by our retaliatory system. We had struck at American commerce, and we had substituted for it a French commerce, which the gentlemen on the ether side must well know. He decidedly condemned the sort of neutral trade, if it might be so called, which was now carried on; and if it were possible to substitute an American carrier for those sham neutral carriers, he thought it would be highly for the benefit of the country, an opinion which, he believed, none would be prepared to deny. In examining whether our Orders in Council had failed or not, it would be necessary to consider what was the professed object of their institution. We were, at that time, carrying on a good trade; but a neutral was also carrying on a good trade, and we hoped that our Orders in Council would suppress that neutral's trade, and transfer it all to ourselves. Had such been the case, however? We had, indeed, put an end to the trade of the neutral, but had we got it all for ourselves? We had not. That sort of grasping policy had been defeated, as it always was, and as it always ought to be. The right hon. gentleman admitted that our trade with North America had fallen off, but then, as a sort of counterbalance, he maintained that our trade to the whole of that quarter of the globe had increased. There was a fallacy in this argument which he would point out. It should be remembered, that when the United States re-exported the manufactures of Great Britain to the Spanish colonies we were at war with Spain, and therefore they did us a benefit, as a neutral state, in carrying on a kind of smuggling trade for us with those places. When we came to peace with Spain, there was no fear that America could rival us in those markets. The general increase with regard to the other parts of America, arose from what went to the Brazils, and which formerly went through Lisbon, but which was now conveyed direct from England. He had looked also into the amount of exports to Spanish America from the United States in 1807, and he found that they did not quite amount to one million sterling.

Much had been said by the right hon. gentleman about the effect which the repeal of the Orders in Council would have on the manufactures and commerce of France. He was, however, thoroughly convinced in his own mind, of the soundness and accuracy of his hon. and learned friend's assertion, that there was a decided hostility in the present ruler of France, to all commerce, and to the progress of all manufactures. He would be able to receive cotton from America, said the right hon. gentleman, if those Orders in Council were repealed. But why did he not now receive cotton? There was nothing in the present state of those Orders, as modified by the Order of April 1809, which prevented America from going to Liege, to Flanders, &c. with her produce. If it were a question of manufacturing competition, however, the manufacturing interests of England had more to fear, for there was more real danger to them in the manufactures of Massachussets, than in all the manufactures of the French empire.—They were not speculative but real; they were rising daily into eminence, and if the present system was not put a stop to, they would soon attain to a height which no change of measures could reduce. It would surprise many persons to learn to what extent manufac- tures had increased in New England. They had the advantage of possessing the raw materials, and they had begun, already, to export the first article of manufacture, cotton twist. This he knew with certainty; he knew that a cargo of it had been sent to the Baltic. There was every reason to apprehend too, that with the facilities which America possessed, with a population which, with the exception of great towns, was as thick as in this country, she would soon be able to supply the southern part of that continent with her manufactures, if the present system was persevered in, especially considering the easiness of communication, the total absence of commercial restraints, and the want of a Board of Trade to direct her commercial operations. He was particularly anxious to impress upon the attention of the House, an opinion which he strongly maintained, that as competitors, the subjects of America were more dangerous to the manufactures of England, than those of France: and if the right hon. gentleman was sincerely anxious for the prosperity of our manufactures, and wished to secure them from successful competition, it was to that quarter he should direct his most serious thoughts.

In adverting to what had been stated by the right hon. gentleman as a proof that our Orders in Council had materially affected the interests of France, he thought that the customs of that country formed but a very insignificant part of its revenue. But, before even the diminution of those customs was received as a criterion, it would be well if the right hon. gentleman could make any thing like a calculation of what might be the value of the confiscations. If these were enumerated, and they ought to be so, the difference he apprehended would be great compared with that which now appeared; and he could not dismiss this consideration of the operation of the Orders in Council, without confessing that they had completely failed in every point of view. The only remedy was a repeal of them; and the existence of a real neutral would do away those tricks and frauds so justly complained of, and also the necessity of a pretended neutral who, in fact, was a real enemy.

The right hon. gentleman, in the course of his speech, had gone into a consideration of the question between America and this country, for the purpose of vindicating the British government. He did net pro- pose to follow him minutely, or even to enter generally into the subject, as it was not immediately before the House, but one part of it required some observation. There were many gentlemen in that House who concurred in admitting that it would be well to conciliate America, by repealing the obnoxious Orders, but who shrunk from the concession because an opinion prevailed, and which was fostered by the government, that America had conducted herself so haughtily and so arrogantly, that it would be quite derogatory to our national honour to conciliate her by those means which she required. This required some explanation. The question now at issue between this country and America had no reference to the origin of these decrees; but whether we, having promised to repeal our Orders whenever the French decrees were repealed, such a repeal of those decrees had actually taken place as might call upon us for the fulfilment of our pledge—and whether America had urged her claims upon this subject in such an offensive manner as required from us a vigilance over our national honour, which might prevent us from sacrificing it to her arrogance. With regard to the first topic, he had read the correspondence between the American and English government, and it appeared from that correspondence that America considered France as having actually repealed her decrees. Our objection was, first, that the repeal was only conditional, namely, that France consented to repeal her decrees, provided that we repealed our Orders in Council; and secondly, that it was not in toto, as she continued to practise her continental system. He saw, however, no objection to the mode of this repeal. France agreed to rescind her decrees, provided always, that we did away our system of blockade; and in the correspondence between Mr. Foster and Mr. Monroe, it seemed to be perfectly understood that the blockade should cease. Suppose we had begun first; we might have justly said to America, we will repeal our Orders in Council, but remember that we consent to do so upon the distinct condition that France shall also repeal her decrees. Then as to the second objection, that the repeal was not perfect which seemed to be the subject of dispute—the part we objected to was, to use their jargon, the denationalizing system; but, in proof of the complete repeal, the Americans affirmed that there had been no instance of confiscation since on that ground. Captures there had been, but no confiscations; and this was not contradicted by Mr. Foster, although he stated the duty of neutrals to be to force France to bring trade back to its former state. What, however, be chiefly wished to impress upon the attention of the House was, not so much whether these decrees bad been repealed or not, as that, if the House should be disposed to institute an inquiry into our commercial situation, nothing had been done on the part of the American government, so arrogantly or so haughtily, that we might not enter dispassionately upon the discussions pending between the two nations. With regard, indeed, to the belief of the repeal professed by America, it was no more than the exercise of common courtesy between one nation and another. Suppose we had begun, for instance, in repealing; what should we have thought, if, when we bad notified our repeal of the Orders in Council, America had distrusted our declaration, and had said she would wait for evidence, wait till we gave proof that we had really repealed them? She had, in fact, only confided in the French government, as one independent nation ought to confide in another.

The right hon. gentleman had talked of our maritime rights being insulted, and that was a cry which, whenever raised, would always rouse feelings of indignation in the country. He should be sorry to witness any improper insensibility on this important subject, but before raising the cry, it was important to consider the justice of it. Our maritime rights were great words for a toast at a public dinner at all times; but when used as they had recently been, he should expect at least to hear the meaning of such a flourish. The three points referring to this topic were, 1st, the impressment of seamen; 2dly, the rule of war of 1756; and 3dly, the blockade. America said, that the rule of 1756 was not consonant to the law of nations; but yet she had submitted to its operation, which had not caused any very serious discussions. As to the case of the seamen, she said that it was a very great hardship to have her ships stopped on the seas, and the men taken out, yet she had submitted to it, making only complaints, but not retaliations. It was unquestionably a great hardship, but it was a claim, he admitted, that under all the circumstances of our situation we could not safely give up. As to the blockades, the correspon- dence of Messrs. Foster and Monroe shewed that there was an agreement on that point by their defining a blockade to be such as must be made with an adequate force. There was, therefore, in those points, no dispute of a nature to bring from America language which she had not held at all times, and under all circumstances. The claims of America on Florida he thought as unjustifiable, as the conduct of Buonaparté to other nations, or of any governor of the East Indies to the nabobs in that quarter. Here we were certainly justified in our opposition. The present system of our trade was, to render our whole commerce with Europe a system of licences, which encouraged frauds to a shameful degree. Formerly the intention of a licence was to prevent injury to the government; but now it went to direct and controul merchants in their own business. The right hon. gentleman said, that the frauds were not increased by the licences; but it was very difficult to believe that, when licences had increased from 1,600 to 18,000 a year, the increase of frauds did not keep pace with them. The scene had, indeed, now shifted. Formerly neutrals were persons living at Emden and other places; now they were persons setting out hence under the immediate sanction of the government, on a sort of Quixotic expedition to all parts of Europe with fabricated papers and forged passports. But setting aside the morality of the question, the business itself was most ill conducted. Why could not trade in general be rendered subject to some general regulation, instead of to this partial System of licences? He could not perceive any great objection to such a measure, if well considered. If the House would still persist in their support of the whole system of Orders in Council and licences, he yet thought that it would be most proper to go into a Committee, were it only to see how they could be generalized for the advantage of trade. He considered it almost impossible to select any number of competent persons out of the House who would not be of opinion, that the system ought to be materially changed; and concluded by expressing his decided concurrence in the Motion.

Mr. Stephen

regretted that any discussion should have arisen on the subject of our present situation with America, a rupture with which power he Was most anxious should be avoided, and he was sorry the last hon. member had not, on this subject, followed the example held out by the opener of the debate, but had on the contrary gone out of his way after topics connected with an apprehended war. He should himself endeavour to avoid any deviation of this kind as much as possible, and should touch only on such points as might be necessary for placing the present question in a fair point of view. What was the proposition now before the House? Instead of being a motion for repealing the Orders in Council, it was a proposition for amalgamating into one, all the contradictory opinions on the subject. It embraced the usual parliamentary expedient on all such occasions, being a motion for a committee to inquire into the trade and manufactures of this country, especially in as far as respected the Orders in Council, and the Licence trade. This was very indefinite indeed: First, as to the Orders in Council. What Orders in Council? Was it on the whole Orders in Council? Was it intended that the committee should take into their consideration the whole volume now lying before him? As well might his hon. and learned friend move for a committee to consider the Statute book. He would not quarrel with the phraseology of the motion if it were explicitly understood, but did his hon. and learned friend, passing over the Orders in Council, January and November 1807, which were modified and so far superceded by the Order in Council of April 1809, mean to confine his inquiry to that Order in Council; or did he mean to extend it to the Order in Council of November 1810, which went to interdict the coasting trade Of the continent? He was at a loss to know which he meant; because the hon. member who spoke last expressly said, that he would never consent to repeal this Order in Council—that he would never consent that France, even through the means of America, should have the carrying trade of Europe, or rather of the world. The hon. and learned mover, too, if he understood him, seemed himself to agree that the only Order in Council in question was that of April 1809, Before the House came to a vote on this subject then, was it not necessary to see to what the question was directed? Was it meant to transfer to a Select Committee of that House the whole of the functions which properly belonged to, and could alone be exercised by the cabinet? Was it meant that it should be delegated to them to determine, not if our manufacturers were in distress; but, if a neutral power, (the only one probably now left) because situated in another part of the world, was to be permitted to carry on all the trade of the world? Was this committee to decide on all questions in which this country was interested, commercial as well as political? If all this was in the contemplation of the hon. and learned mover, he was satisfied there could be no person who must not be startled by it. For a committee so constituted what were the grounds? He had heard the hon. and learned mover, and also the last speaker, state the great distress of the manufacturers of the country, and the general opinion that there was something wrong, as reasons for the appointment of this committee. No attempt, however, had been made, that he had heard, to deduce this from the Orders in Council. Had they attempted to shew that the Orders in Council had had the effect of producing this evil, or that their repeal would cure it? He had heard a glowing and eloquent detail of the distresses of the manufacturers of this country, but nothing to shew that they arose from the Orders in Council. Documents had been called for to prove the distressed state of our commerce and manufactures; and those very documents we were now called on to reject, because it appeared from them, that down to the last year, not only was our commerce prosperous, but that it was in an unparalleled state of prosperity. When those documents were in favour of his hon. and learned friend he relied on their evidence, when it was against his argument; he discredited it—In considering the general effect of those Orders in Council, it must be recollected, that before the Order of 1807, our trade had been prostrated, and totally failed. In August, September, and October of the year 1807, no less than 70 or 80 vessels, that had taken out cargoes for the continent, were obliged to apply to the Custom-house for leave to reland them, on account of the total stagnation of trade. This shewed that the export trade of the country had failed before those Orders in Council could have any operation. In the two years 1807 and 1808, taken together, the amount of our exports was but 29 millions and an half, and that of our imports 26 millions and somewhat less than an half, and yet in the two following years of 1809 and 1810, the trade had increased so much, that the exports were 51 millions and an half, and the imports 47,900,000l. It there- fore clearly appeared from those returns, that under the operation of those Orders in Council, our trade had very much increased instead of declined. Those who first supported the Orders in Council never had predicted that they would entirely and completely counteract the system of the enemy; whereas those who opposed them had predicted, that they would occasion the total ruin of our trade, both with the continent of Europe and with America. By these returns, however, it appeared, that even the trade to the United States of America was not injured by them, inasmuch as the exports of the years 1809 and 1810 to the United States exceeded the exports of the two former years to the value of about a million, and the exports of the years 1809 and 1810 to the whole of America, exceeded the exports of the two former years by nine millions. If a committee were to be appointed, he did not know what better authority they could go upon than this printed report of the inspector-general of the customs. Against such a document as this, he thought the private information of a few individual merchants, however respectable, would not be sufficient to carry the committee over to their opinions. If such a committee were appointed, they would have before them gentlemen of different sides: some deeply connected with the American trade, and entertaining naturally certain prejudices in consequence of this connection; while other gentlemen, connected with the trade to the continent of Europe, would have prejudices of an opposite nature. He must own, that he could not anticipate any thing from their discordant opinions and conflicting prejudices, which would in any degree remove the distress from the country, op give relieve to the manufacturers of Yorkshire. After the question had been considered in its commercial bearings, it must afterwards be considered as affecting the belligerent powers; for well, indeed, might America and other nations charge us with directing our policy on principles of sordid avarice, if we were to calculate a question of this importance to the trade of the world, solely on the ground of profit or loss to ourselves. If the gentlemen merely relied on the fact of distress, existing in the country, he would ask them, had they forgotten that there was great distress in 1807, and that there were riots at Manchester and other places, in consequence of this distress, before the Orders in Council had been passed? So far, then, from his conceiving, that the Orders ought to be repealed, because there were riots and disturbances at Nottingham, and other places, he should draw an inference directly opposite. If the manufacturers did not know the prosperity of their trade—for he believed, that it was the great prosperity of our trade in 1809 and 1810 which occasioned much of the present distress,—that would not be to his mind a sufficient reason for repealing those Orders. If he were called upon to assign a reason for the distress now felt, he should attribute a great part of it to the prosperity of the year 1810, to which there naturally followed a year of less prosperity, in which the manufacturers who bad not the same full employment as in the preceding year felt distress. Whenever there was an extraordinary demand for our manufactures, extraordinary exertions were made to meet it, and the price of wages was raised. If the demand did not continue to increase, or if it slackened, it was obvious that some distress must be felt. It was well known also, that great losses had been sustained last year, owing to adverse winds and consequent captures of our convoys in the Baltic, where no Orders in Council prevailed. Was the House, then, to resolve upon a committee, merely to raise in the minds of the starving manufacturers, or rather to confirm in their minds an opinion which had been artfully raised from wicked motives, that all their distresses were owing to the misconduct of their own government, and not to the barbarous policy of Buonaparté, who violated all the laws of civilized nations, for the purpose of injuring them? The hon. and learned mover had dwelt much, and with great force, on the frauds and perjuries connected with the system of Licences. It must be observed, however, that the system of Licences was a subject quite different from the question of the Orders in Council themselves; but it would not be contended that those frauds or perjuries which had been spoken of, had any thing to do with the distresses of our manufacturers. He was sorry to hear such a subject introduced, and he was sure that no man held in greater abhorrence than he did the practice so eloquently reprobated by his hon. and learned friend; but it would not be said, that our export trade was diminishing in consequence of those frauds, for it was well known that it was only by masking the property that British manufactures or "produce could find their way upon the continent. Whatever consequences, however, might follow from the necessity of carrying on our trade by licences, these consequences were quite unconnected with the question of the Orders in Council. There was no maxim in the law of nations more constant, fixed, and inflexible, than that no trade could be carried on with an enemy but by a licence. This principle was so perfectly established, and so necessary to prevent treasonable and improper intercourse, that it was never departed from, and he himself had heard it determined in the court of Appeal, that under no circumstances could the trade with an enemy be allowed, except by virtue of a special licence. Our enemy had now possessed himself of almost the whole of the continent of Europe; and he would ask gentlemen sincerely, were they prepared to abandon all trade to the continent of Europe on account of those objections in point of morality which had been stated by the hon. mover? He felt himself perfectly ready to meet any statesman upon this ground; and he really believed that he would find few who had weakness enough to think, or hypocrisy enough to assert, that the whole trade with Europe ought to be abandoned on account of the immorality or the frauds necessarily practised in carrying it on. If the hon. gentlemen on the other side did not wish to give up the trade to the continent of Europe, (and he was sure they did not,) he thought that they were bound to state by what means they would propose it to be conducted without those frauds and immoralities of which they complained. Although he had been often taunted by an hon. gentleman opposite (Mr. Whitbread) with being the parent of the Orders in Council, and feeling a partiality for them on that account: yet, as to the system of licences, he was not the author of that, and had no prepossessions to indulge in its favour. If the gentlemen on the other side could point out any way in which the trade could be conducted without licences, he was read to listen with the utmost attention to their plan, but he was not prepared to say, that it might be right to reject altogether those palliatives, and adhere to the strict inexorable rule of the Orders in Council. The fact was, that the government was much importuned for licences by the merchants. The object of the licences was to protect their vessels from British seizures and condemnations; for it was by other means that they calculated on evading the continental system, and introducing their merchandize. As the decrees of Buonaparté were directly against this trade, it was necessary to deceive our enemy in his own ports; and this deception could be practised only by masking the property in such a manner, that it should appear to be neutral, and not coming within the scope of those decrees. Without licences, our merchants calculated on evading Buonaparté's continental system; but licences were necessary to protect them from the effect of our own maritime system. As to the forging of papers and French Consul's certificates of origin, he was convinced that neither this, nor shewing false colours to the enemy, would be supposed so serious an immorality as to make us consent to abandon all our trade. At this kind of trade, government certainly connived, when licences were granted; and he believed that the immorality of deceiving our enemy, and evading his unjust and barbarous decrees, notwithstanding all that had been urged by his hon. and learned friend, would not induce the House or the country to say that the export trade to the continent of Europe ought to be abandoned. If it were to be carried on, he believed it must be by modes somewhat similar to those in which it had hitherto been carried on; and if it were abandoned on the alleged consideration, the ruined and starving manufacturers of this country would hardly know how to appreciate such a refinement in morality. If the Orders of Council were, however, to be entirely done away, and the Americans were allowed, without molestation, to carry the sugars of Cuba into France, and the manufactures of Germany into South America, while the British trade was subject to the French decrees, still there must be (as had been said with respect to the existing system) forgery in the origin, and perjury and fraud in the conclusion of the transactions. The American captains must swear that the goods were of American manufacture, and the correspondence must be forged also. He by no means meant to resort to the miserable plea, that if we did not carry on this traffic others would. Such were not his principles. What he contended was, that the imposture must still be practised by British subjects, that the British government must still connive at it, and that Great Britain must act her full part in the mas- querade. But the hon. and learned gentleman had said, that Buonaparté was a decided enemy to commerce. He ought to have added a word to that sentence, and said, that he was a decided enemy to British commerce. As to his own commerce, he appeared to have it very much at heart. When he had extended his line of sea-coast from France to the shores of the Baltic, did he then appear indifferent about the commerce of his empire? When he allowed, as it was said, 60,000 seamen to be employed in navigating the merchant-vessels of the northern parts of his empire, instead of putting them on board his fleet at the Scheldt, did that appear as if he was indifferent about commerce? As to America, it must be particularly recollected, that it was not only the Orders in Council which she required of us to abandon, but also that which Buonaparté called our new principles of blockade. As America had required both, it was not fair to argue now, that the repeal of the Orders in Council would be sufficient to conciliate America. As to the right of blockade, the hon. gentleman himself did not wish to abandon it nor yet to throw the whole trade of Europe into the hands of America, while we were excluded from it. With respect to what had been said about arrogance of tone in the correspondence between the two countries, he did not wish at present to make an observation on the subject, and he hoped that that consideration might long be postponed. He did not wish to make any observations upon the stile of the correspondence, or on any minor points. In order to preserve peace and friendship with America, he would consent to any sacrifice that was consistent with the commercial existence of the country, or with our means of opposing the great and almost overwhelming power of the common enemy. Nothing appeared to him more to be deprecated than that a nation allied to us in language, in common origin, in habits and manners, and above all in liberty, should favour the enemies of all liberty, and lift up a parricidal hand against the freedom of the world—against that freedom for which she had so obstinately fought, and which was now her boast. He allowed that this country now stood on too high grounds, from the victories which she had obtained by land as well as by sea, to have it supposed that in the concessions which she might make to America, she was actuated by any but the noblest motives. She stood higher still from the generosity of her conduct, and her opposing herself as the bulwark and safeguard of all nations which the ambition of the enemy sought to conquer or destroy. If it were possible to conciliate America without the destruction of our commerce, or without depriving ourselves of the means of carrying on the war with France, be thought that there could be hardly any sacrifice too great for such an object; but if the means of prosecuting the war must be thrown away to satisfy America, he never could consent to it. The country might as well ask a peace of Buonaparté at once. With these views of the subject, it was his firm opinion, that the distress which was spoken of did not at all proceed from the Orders in Council; and he could not consent to appoint a committee, which he thought could not possibly do any good.

Mr. Brougham

rose to explain. An insinuation had dropped from his hon. and learned friend in the course of his speech, as if he was a person who felt impatient at any reflections being thrown on the French emperor. He was not a little surprized at such an imputation, which was totally unfounded on any thing he had ever been in the habit of saying, or bad uttered that night. His hon. and learned friend must have completely misconceived, and therefore misrepresented him.

Mr. Stephen

denied having any intention of throwing such an imputation on his hon. and learned friend. But he certainly understood him to have expressed disapprobation of the warmth with which the conduct of the French emperor had at times been spoken.

Mr. Brougham

again observed, that he had been misunderstood by his hon. and learned friend.

Mr. Canning

said, that having forborne to press himself on the attention of the House in competition with the hon. and learned gentleman, [Mr. Canning and Mr. Stephen had risen at the same moment, but Mr. Canning gave way] whose speech the House had recently heard, he felt the disadvantage under which he rose after the speech of that hon. and learned gentleman, in which he had introduced so much and such variety of matter not connected with the subject of discussion, if he should endeavour to bring back the attention of the House to the dry question upon which they were assembled to decide. He had listened to that hon. and learned gentleman with all that attention and de- ference which he was ever ready to pay to what fell from him, but more particularly upon a subject with which he had the reputation of being peculiarly conversant. He had listened to him even with still more deference, because, he was free to confess, that all the knowledge which he himself possessed upon such subjects was derived from his hon. and learned friend, if he might be permitted so to call him. But, if he recollected aright the principles which he had derived from that hon. and learned gentleman, he must say, that in his speech on that night the hon. and learned gentleman appeared to have forgotten all that he had formerly so strenuously maintained. His hon. and learned friend had omitted much, but in much of what he had stated he seemed to have forgotten that the Orders in Council were first resorted to as a mode of retaliation, and not as a measure of commercial rivalry. On an occasion, such as that afforded by the motion under consideration, he had expected that his hon. and learned friend would have distinctly and demonstratively laid down all the principles on which the conduct of the British government could be justified in having adopted and maintained the Orders in Council. This course was the rather to have been expected on the part of his hon. and learned friend, because the principles upon which he had always considered the Orders in Council to rest and to be justifiable, had that night, for the first time since their adoption, been shaken by the speech of the right hon. the Vice President of the Board of Trade, which seemed calculated to show how these Orders had succeeded as a measure of commercial rivalry, rather than as the dignified retaliation of one belligerent upon another. If the question had been what his hon. and learned friend had expected it would be—what throughout the greater part of his speech he had argued it—and what in the remainder he never ceased to lament it was not,—he should perhaps not have felt much difficulty in concurring with him in the greater part of what had fallen from him on the occasion; but if he understood the motion submitted to their consideration by the hon. and learned gentleman opposite, they were not called upon to decide whether the Orders in Council ought or ought not to be repealed, but merely to go into a committee to inquire into the state of the manufactures and trade of the country with reference to those Orders. His opi- nion of the Orders was, upon this ground, better than that of his hon. and learned friend. He should vote for the committee, because he thought enquiry could not injure those Orders according to their true original spirit and import. For his own part, he should freely own, that as far as he could foresee any effect of this inquiry upon his mind, he was persuaded that he should come out of the committee with precisely the same opinion respecting the Orders in Council, as that with which he would go into it. But it had been asked by his hon. and learned friend, as it had been before asked with something like infantile simplicity in another place, what Orders in Council were meant to be inquired into? He knew not how far that amiable ignorance had been assumed, or how far it was really unaffected, but surely his hon. and learned friend could have little difficulty in determining what was meant by the Orders in Council referred to in the present motion. In January of the year 1807, the government preceding that of which he became a member, issued an Order in Council, professedly retaliatory on the blockading decree on the part of France, of the November of the preceding year. In November 1807, the government of which he became a part, issued another decree upon the same principle, only somewhat more enlarged in its application and extent. And in April 1809, Orders in Council were substituted in the place of the former two; and these were the edicts which, professing to be retaliatory, the right hon. the Vice President of the Board of Trade had affirmed not to be retaliatory edicts.—For these Orders in Council, so far as he had been connected with their adoption, he was ready to take his full share of responsibility. What Orders truly were meant? Why, they were the Orders in Council, which, until he had heard the speech of the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Rose) that night, he had always looked upon as retaliatory upon the enemy, which had been so understood in every instance, until the Vice President of the Board of Trade, in contradiction to every statement which had hitherto been given to the public on the subject—in contradiction to every document in office respecting these Orders—in contradiction to every communication which he (Mr. Canning) had made, and every dispatch Written in his official character, explanatory of their nature and spirit—in contradiction to every speech which had been made in parliament in defence of them, had thought proper to represent them, not as measures retaliatory upon the enemy, but as measures of self defence. Self defence but not retaliatory! In this sentence he should like to hear explained the adversative force of the particle "but;" as it stood, he could not understand it. Retaliatory but not self defensive, did leave an opposition that admitted of explanation; but as it otherwise stood, he did not understand it. He denied, however, that they were in their original adoption meant to be other than retaliatory. Retaliatory and not self defensive! If it were otherwise, then were those Orders to be tried on other grounds; and then would he call upon one civilian to defend them on the mere principle of their being a great commercial regulation. If they were to be in no larger a sense retaliatory than as self defensive—if they were not to retaliate directly against the enemy, but to be defensive against a rival in trade—if they were not to be belligerent measures, but purely defensive, then all the arguments by which they had hitherto been supported would fail to apply. He should no longer defend what he had looked upon as retaliatory upon a belligerent, if they were to lose that character, and be considered as measures of commercial rivalry. He bad understood these Orders to rest upon the principle of retaliation alone, and he should beg leave to introduce the few observations he had to address to the House on the subject, by recalling their attention to the Order in which these measures were resorted to. When the French government had thought proper to declare the British Islands in a state of blockade, it was deemed right by the British government to denounce to the world the injustice of the proceeding, and to proclaim its own right to retaliate, at the same time announcing that if it did not carry its retaliation to the full extent to which it was entitled, it was influenced by expediency only. The words of the Orders in Council made on the 7th of January 1807, were, "Whereas" (reciting the Berlin decree, &c.) "such measures would give a right of full retaliation to restrain the injuries of the French government, and to retort the evils of its own injustice, &c." The very terms of this Order proved that it was merely retaliatory. The Order of November, 1807, referred to this Order of January, and expressly declared that they were intended to "retort upon the enemy the violence of his own aggression." Such had been the ground, the origin, and the principle of the Orders of 1807. His Majesty had undoubtedly thought it right to qualify the principle of retaliation by the adoption of a restriction in its application which amounted only to a mitigation in favour of neutrals. This mitigation of the extended principle showed the desire of his Majesty's government to confine the evil to the enemy, and if any part of it should fall upon neutrals, it was the enemy alone that was responsible for it. Where the operation was confined to retaliation, the evil to the neutral was only incidental though not to be avoided: it was a consequence to be regretted, but the measures from which it resulted were forced upon the British government. If at any time it should appear that these Orders did not retort his aggression upon the enemy, but operated solely to the injury of the neutrals; if even the British government should appear to have interfered to relieve their pressure upon the enemy, they would stand upon far different principles from those upon which he had supported them, and would, in his opinion, be very proper objects for examination and revision. It was obvious, that, when a considerable change had been produced in the situation of Europe, by the transactions in the peninsula, as well as by other events on the continent, the Orders of 1807 were found to be no longer applicable. This change led to the adoption of the Orders of April 1809, which converted the larger blockade under the previous Orders into a more limited blockade, rendering that which was retained more rigorous, as to the ports of France and Italy, and exempting the ports of the north. This explanation of the Orders of 1807 and 1809, was his answer to the question of his hon. and learned friend: these were the Orders which, as he understood the question, the hon. and learned mover wished to have referred to a Select Committee, for the purpose of ascertaining, as the change of circumstances between 1807 and 1809 had rendered an alteration of the Orders of the former year necessary, whether any change had taken place since 1809, which would call for any further alteration at the present moment. The changes which he had understood the hon. and learned gentleman to allude to, were not external but internal. He was perfectly aware that a reference to a committee on such subjects as the distresses of manufactures and trade would not be any remedy. God knew it could not. For his own part, he did not think that these distresses were attributable to the Orders in Council, nay, he might perhaps be of opinion that these Orders were calculated to prevent them: but still it was impossible for that House to shut their eyes to the impression which prevailed throughout the country on the subject. They were aware of the representations that had been and would be made to them. They must feel a full conviction of the existence of discontents throughout the country, and this very obviously suggested the expediency of a parliamentary inquiry, which might satisfy the public mind as to the real grounds of the distress which was felt, and show that no part of it was a consequence of the Orders in Council. Nothing was more common than when distresses were felt, to assign them to some ostensible cause: this was the fallacy inseparable from human nature. Evils, the source of which were not visible, were generally ascribed to measures, the operation of which was not fully known, and no maxim was more false in itself, though more generally applied than this—"Post hoc ergo propter hoc." The hon. and learned gentleman who brought forward this motion, 'had, in his speech, which was not more remarkable for ability than (in comparison with the answer that had been given to it) for moderation, had connected with this subject another, which, in his mind, had no connection whatever with it. That hon. and learned gentleman had argued the question of the Orders in Council as connected with the system of licences. Against any such connection he must forcibly protest. The Orders in Council might be established without any system of licences, and the system of licences might be carried to the full extent to which it had been carried without the Orders in Council having been previously in existence, or both might be co-existent without any necessary connection; and, indeed, the best possible, because the most indisputable practical evidence, that they had no necessary connection, was the fact, that where the Orders in Council did not operate, there the Licence trade existed, and where the system of licences was in activity, there the Orders in Council did not apply. Whatever might be the mischief, there fore, of the licenses, the Orders in Council, he would maintain, were guiltless of it. When he considered the impression which prevailed in the country, he was not prepared to oppose the motion for an inquiry, whatever might be his feelings, if the hon. and learned member in the first instance were to propose to repeal the Orders in Council. If the House were to refer the subject at all, he was inclined to think that the whole should be referred. The Orders in Council he believed had been beneficial; but of the advantages of the system of licences he bad his doubts: but he would not presume to prejudge the question. Some gentlemen seemed to look at the appointment of a committee as unprecedented and alarming; but he could discover no ground of apprehension in such a measure. It was usual in that House to appoint committees, whether general or select (he preferred a select committee), to inquire into the state of trade, into the distresses of the manufactures, and into the circumstances of the commerce of the country. It was not unusual either to bring such questions again before the House. Even the Orders in Council had in the first instance undergone a fuller discussion than any measure of trade had previously had in parliament. If eighteen months after they had been originally adopted they required revision and alteration, the period that had since elapsed might have produced changes which would render a further modification necessary. With respect to the discontents which were known to exist, he would ask, would it be nothing to pronounce by a vote of a committee rather than by speeches in that House, that they were not attributable to the Orders in Council, which would continue to be beneficial if acted up to according to their first principles? Would it be nothing, if licences had not led to the distresses felt, to have that point supported by the report of a committee, and sanctioned by the concurrent opinion of that House? Would it be nothing to submit all these points to the test of opinion, and to have the whole matter ascertained by examination and confirmed by experience? The consideration, however, which had principally called him up was, the statement of the right hon. gentleman, the Vice-President of the Board of Trade, that the Orders in Council were not retaliatory upon the enemy, but measures of commercial rivalry with America—(Cry of No, no!). So he had understood the right hon. gentleman, and, if that were the case, it would be necessary to bring back the Orders in Council to the original principles upon which they had been originally established. The differences were these, we contended that Buonaparté's nominal, ineffectual, and inefficient blockade gave us the right to blockade all his dominions, we accordingly put France in a state of constructive blockade; but when we did so, we did not contend, that when we substituted constructive for actual blockade, there should belong any privilege to the constructive blockade which was not fairly comprehended within the ordinary privileges of actual blockade. If, for instance, we had a port of war, in an actual state of blockade, we should have a right to stop all neutrals from conveying their goods into that port; and why? Because peace being generally the interest of all nations, belligerents had a right to make the pressure Tall as heavily as they could upon the enemy, for the purpose of forcing him into terms; and thus, the neutral's temporary inconvenience was made a party in working his permanent benefit by expediting a general peace. Here then, under the actual blockade, you take nothing from the enemy, and you do not suffer the neutral to convey him any thing. Apply this to the constructive blockade. The Berlin decree gave us a right of blockade. France and all her vassal ports were under constructive blockade; but while the belligerent under that constructive blockade kept out all neutrals, surely he could have no right to trade with the enemy himself. (Hear, hear!) Vattell had laid it down, that in such case the belligerent could not so relieve himself and the enemy, at the expence of the neutral. The Orders, of April, 1809, were so far from impeding the right of the neutral to the profit of the enemy, that they mitigated the restraints upon the neutral to the injury of the enemy; that was, they restricted the extent of the blockade, while they aggravated its strictness. He contended, therefore, that, under this Order, the neutral had a right to complain, if under such Order she had been debarred from that trade which the belligerent so prohibiting her had herself indulged in.—There was an instance in history proverbially notorious in the wars of Louis 14, when in alliance with the Dutch. He was besieging some town in the Netherlands, which he intended as a present for the Dutch. The town was hard pressed and on the point of yielding, when suddenly the besieged seemed to have got new succours and, a brisk fire was re-opened upon the assailants. It was soon discovered that the Dutch had sold them ammunition; and how was this different from the absurdities of that mode of blockade that would establish a trade to supply the enemy with weapons against ourselves? If France be ready to burst with a plethora, were we to say, "come, well bleed you"? Or if she was about to faint for a supply,—"We are the proper persons to relieve you"? Was this, he asked, the mode of conducting a blockade? So far from this, he was for giving the Orders in Council a full, unlimited, unmitigated vigour of operation, restoring them to their first spirit, and working them upon their first principles. Were he called upon to state definitively his opinion of what he conceived the Orders in Council should be, he could not do it more fully than by saying that they were most perfect as they approached towards a belligerent measure, and receded from a commercial one (Hear, hear!) Let them have for their object the pressure and distress of the enemy, for the purpose of compelling him to listen to terms of accommodation; and not for the narrow policy of wringing temporary concessions from him, with which they might go to his own market.

With regard to the Licence trade, that was a subject upon which he had but little information or knowledge, and he should therefore be very concise in his observations upon it. The fault he imputed to this system was, first, its tendency to produce convulsions in the course of trade, which were injurious to commercial interests generally; next, as these licences were occasionally granted or withheld, there was no uniform principle upon which men could square their speculations. That they were the source of considerable losses, he admitted was not to be attributed to government, but when so many thousands were granted, and so many refused, such losses must be the ultimate consequence. An instance had been lately communicated to him, where an application was made for one of those licences, and refused. A second application was made on a subsequent day, through the medium of a friend, and again refused; a third application was then made with the same result, but upon the fourth day, the party seeking the licence got another friend to apply, and was ultimately successful. Now, he did not blame the Board of Trade for all or any of those decisions; they might have had good reasons for objecting in the first three instances, and acceding in the fourth. But all he would ask was, under such a system how could the regular merchant act? (Hear, hear!) Upon what one less veering casualty was he to calculate?—That these were evils no man could deny; but were they unavoidable? (Hear, hear! from both sides.) If they were, then they must submit to them; but if they were not, might not some substitute be found equally efficient and incomparably less objectionable? (Hear, hear!) It had been said we could not do without licences; but did it follow, that because a few licences might be from time to time necessary, that we should therefore have a licence trade. One licence had been granted lately at an inordinate saleable value. This might perhaps arise from a clerical error, which might not occur in 10,000 licences, but if he were in the situation of administering that part of the government, he should be most anxious to avoid such errors in future.

He had heard of another instance respecting a vessel that had sailed to this country from a neutral port with a cargo consisting of articles importable into this country—and also an article not importable here; in the course of her voyage she contrived to get rid of the contraband article, and landed the remaining part of her cargo while in the river; the vessel was searched on suspicion of having gold—no gold was found, but the paper containing a list of the articles comprising the cargo, in which the contraband was specified. Here then the merchant could go into a court of justice and prove that no such article was assigned to him. If he proved this, he hung the correspondent abroad, and if he did not, he must abide by his penalty—now which was be to do? (Hear, hear!)—These and a variety of other instances might be produced to shew the expediency of at least going into the committee. As to the general principle of the Orders in Council, he had endeavoured to make himself understood. He would not compromise or qualify them, but act upon them on the strictest reciprocity with respect to neutrals, and unmitigated blockade as to France. When the enemy was beginning to feel most sensibly their rigour, that was not the time to abate it. Had they been originally enforced against Russia (and on this subject he took much blame to himself) he believed we should now have a greater chance of bringing her to terms. As to America, he should carefully abstain from saying more than this, that as he was the last man who would lay the honour of this country at the feet of America, so would he be among the first to go far in the work of honourable conciliation; and he thought it was too much to object to a motion, not upon its own grounds, but merely because it might have incidentally the effect of conciliating America. This would be with him but an additional argument—but without it he was prepared to say, that the appointment of the Select Committee now moved for was due to the circumstances of the times and the complaints of the country.

Mr. Marryat

considered it as a commercial question. That the hon. and learned gent, saw no difference between the Orders in Council and Licences, he was surprized at, for they were both of his own offspring. By means of licences the British officer was prevented from making captures. There was a great difference in the species of licences; those that were direct to France were very different from others, for they were reciprocal to both countries. The Licence trade abounded with frauds. There was not a consul in the world whose signature was not forged; and there were men in London, who, if they received a letter to-day, would be able in a few days to produce two or three letters so completely similar in hand-writing, water-mark, &c. that he who had wrote the original, could not distinguish it from the copies. The Americans suffered great hardships by the Orders in Council; they were obliged to send their ships into British ports, and pay a certain centage, and which, if they did, they were certain of confiscation in the enemy's ports. He defended the Orders in Council, as originally established, as perfectly justifiable; and had they been strictly adhered to, he bad no doubt they would ultimately have effected the purposes for which they were promulgated; but he regretted that any alteration in those Orders had taken place, as it had the effect of benefiting the colonies of our allies, while it reduced our own; as an elucidation of this, be instanced the case of the island of Cuba, from whence alone, during the last year no less than 220,000 hogsheads of sugar had been exported, whereas at the beginning of the war the export of that commodity amounted only to 70,000 hogsheads. He hoped, therefore, that his Majesty's ministers would revert to and adhere to the system of retaliation as originally adopted, and any motion which had this for its object he would most cordially agree to, but seeing no beneficial consequences likely to result from the present proposition, he should oppose it.

Mr. Johnstone

took a directly opposite view of the question, considering the licence system as necessary, but the policy of the Orders in Council as erroneous. He felt himself called upon to support the motion, although he was by no means disposed to wish ill to the administration of his right hon. friend.

Sir Charles Price

denied that there existed any grounds for the alleged immoralities of the licence system. If trade was to be carried on at all under the present circumstances, such a system was not only proper but indispensible.

Mr. Wilberforce

was of opinion, that whether the question was considered in a political or in a commercial view, they ought to go into the committee. The motion was such, that all who had doubts as to the results of the Orders or of the Licence trade, ought to vote for it. He was originally convinced by the arguments of his learned relative (Mr. Stephen) of the justice and policy of the Orders: but now that there existed great discontent, which was attributed to the injurious effects of those Orders, no conduct could be wiser for parliament, than to meet the discontent" by inquiry, and shew to the people, that whether their complaints were founded or not, they should at least be attended to, and that they should see that they underwent a solemn investigation. If it was true that the Orders had been advantageous to the country, then their advocates could not fear inquiry, for it would only display their justice and expediency. The people of England had good sense enough to be satisfied with the result of investigation, if it could be fairly proved that the Orders in Council were beneficial to their trade. They would then ascribe their distresses to the evils inseparable from all human systems in time of war. He insisted on the immoralities of the Licence trade, and said he was astonished to hear an hon. baronet denying their existence. He then argued on the contracted nature of the Orders and the Licence trade. Their inconsistency alone was ground for enquiry. One system tended to restrain, the other to relax;—one to starve, the other to feed;—one denied, the other gave away, although both were the measures of the same government, and were adopted against the same enemy. Another reason for the committee, and one which should stand high in the consideration of all who wished well to the country, was the state of our relations with America. It was said, there were but slender hopes of remaining at peace with that power. Were not those Orders in Council one of the causes of contention between the Americans and us? Did it not, therefore, become us seriously to inquire, whether the foundation of this system complained of by America was a proper one, in such a delicate situation, to be continued? He would vote for inquiry. An opinion against the Orders was not necessary to vote as he did. It was quite enough that doubts were entertained as to their beneficial efficacy to warrant any one in voting for the motion.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer

said, that he did not rise to object to this motion from any apprehension that he entertained of enquiry, confident as he was that the distresses of the merchants and manufacturers, which had been so strongly alluded to on the other side, did not all arise from the Orders in Council; but he objected to the inquiry because it was not calculated to produce any possible benefit. He could not agree with his hon. friend, who had just sat down, that it would be expedient to go into this inquiry, if it were for no other purpose but to shew that no inquiry at all-were necessary. He was not surprized, however, at his hon. friend supporting it, because it was that species of motion which generally met with his approbation; indeed the motion was framed with a view to catch his hon. friend, and that description of gentlemen who might be called floating votes. He was surprised, however, at what had fallen from his right hon. friend (Mr. Canning) upon this occasion. If his right hon. friend was of opinion, and he was sure he was, that the Orders in Council were not only justifiable, but absolutely necessary, if his right hon. friend thought, and he was sure he did, that the distresses of the manufacturers, which had been brought forward as the grounds of the present motion, did not arise from the Orders in Council, he should have thought that his right hon. friend, entertaining such sentiments, would have been one of the last men in the House to have given his support to a motion for inquiry. There was one circumstance which had occurred in the present debate, which had never occurred before, and upon which he could not avoid congratulating himself. Although gentlemen had represented the Orders in Council as impolitic, and as productive of great injury to this country, not one of them had this night contended that the principle upon which they were founded was unjust. He wished to press this upon the House, because, upon former occasions, the injustice of the Orders in Council had been strongly urged, and it was highly gratifying to him to find that that line of argument was now abandoned. The Orders in Council were therefore now to be argued merely as a question of policy, not as a question of justice. He could not help expressing a wish that gentlemen had always pursued that course—if they had, they would not have led America to believe that we were not only acting hostilely towards our enemy, but that we were conducting ourselves upon unjust principles towards the United States. He never could see much force in their arguments, but there could be no doubt but that they had produced a considerable effect in America. His right hon. friend (Mr. Canning) had said that it was absurd in his hon. and learned friend (Mr. Stephen) to ask which of the Orders in Council it was they were finding fault with, bat he contended that the question was a most material one. The hon. and learned gentleman who had opened this discussion, and who had declaimed so strongly against the Orders in Council, had yet defended the Order of 1807. It was therefore most material to know against which of the Orders in Council the accusation was specifically directed. With respect to the principle upon which these Orders in Council were founded, he begged to state, that be had always considered them as strictly retaliatory, and as far as he understood the subject, they were most completely justified upon the principle of retaliation.—It never could, be was sure, be contended, in any assembly of rational men, that retaliation should be excluded from the law of nations. There was, in fact, no other means of enforcing obedience to the; law of nations, but by-means of retaliation. If a great and powerful nation, like France, would set all laws at defiance, would break down every system that had hitherto been regarded as sacred, and would carry on the war uncontrouled by any principle of the law of nations, how was she to be resisted but by a recurrence to measures of retaliation? The law of nations would otherwise prove a trap and a snare to those who were disposed to obey them, and a sword and a shield to those who were determined to violate them. It was, therefore, most absurd to contend that we bad no right to have recourse to retaliation; and yet it was upon that principle that it was argued that we had acted unjustly to America. But then it was said, that if we did retaliate, we must do it in mode and form, as the enemy had injured us. A more extravagant proposition it was difficult to conceive. What! if the enemy chose to violate the law of nations on a point where she had nothing to lose, and we had every thing, could it seriously be argued that we were bound to retaliate, not where we could make her feel, but where we could do her no possible injury? When a country violated the law of nations, not in trifles, but boldly and systematically violated the law of nations, she lost the protection, because she had thrown off the obligation of that law. This was the principle upon which the whole of our proceedings had been founded. He was, he confessed, a little surprised at what had fallen from his right hon. friend respecting the mode in which he conceived the blockade was to be enforced. What was the occasion that led to the Orders in Council? France bad declared that Great Britain should not have any trade with any nation upon earth; the British government, in return, said, "You (France) shall have no trade but with us." The object of government was to protect and to force the trade of this country, which had been assailed in such an unprecedented manner by the French Decrees. If the Orders in Council had not been issued, France would have a free colonial trade by means of neutrals, and we should have been shut out of the continent. If we had attempted to destroy all trade, both our own and that of France, France would have been the gainer, be-cause she had less to lose, and she depended less upon her commercial exertions than we did. The object of the Orders in Council was not to destroy the trade of the continent, but to force the continent to trade with us. The article of bark, about which so much had been said formerly, would prove that he was in earnest in his understanding of the principle upon which the Orders in Council were founded. The British government had never said that France should not have bark, it had only said, "if you want bark you shall not have it, unless you will import other articles with it." It was obvious, therefore, that our object was to compel France, and the nations that were subject to her Decrees, to trade with us. In 1809, there was an alteration of the Orders in Council; it was thought that the alteration proposed would be more acceptable to America, and it was so; but it was not only America that we had in view, but our allies. But it was needless for him to go at length into these points, on which he had been so ably anticipated by his right hon. friend, and by his hon. and learned friend (Mr. Rose and Mr. Stephen); indeed they had left him very little to say. With regard to the assertion that our trade had been injured by the Orders in Council, there were documents before the House which distinctly disproved the assertion. It was obvious from those documents that after the Orders in Council, the trade of the country rose progressively. If we had so far effectually rescued ourselves from the ruin with which we were threatened, as to place ourselves in the same situation in which we stood in 1803 (a period of which he had heard no complaint), by means of those Orders, he did not see upon what ground we could impute out present difficulties to their existence. After two such years as 1809 and 1810, in which the exports of the country were doubled, it was natural to expect a temporary stagnation. Certainly in 1810, several seizures had been made, as was stated, and great loss sustained by the country; but did not that, and the consequent reluctance of embarking in speculation, account for the depression of trade, and the multiplication of bankruptcies, rather than any thing connected with the Orders in Council? His hon. friend (Mr. Wilberforce) had admitted not only that the Orders in Council were strictly justifiable, but that they had produced a beneficial effect. The commercial embarrassments which were now experienced induced him to think there was something wrong in the system, which required alteration; and therefore he supported this motion for inquiry. It did not appear to him to be a very correct mode of reasoning to attribute the recent diminution of trade to those Orders in Council, when it was an incontestible fact that for two or three years they had produced a directly opposite effect; and when the decrease which had taken place had been so clearly traced to other causes. But it had been argued, that even if the Orders in Council had not produced effects detrimental to our trade, they had tended to encourage foreign seamen. The first and obvious observation that occurred on this objection was, that it was wholly irreconcilable with those which had been urged from the same quarter. It would hardly be contended that the Orders in Council could produce two effects diametrically opposite to each other; they could not at the same time destroy our trade, and yet give such great encouragement to foreign seamen in carrying it on. That foreign shipping and foreign seamen had, from the peculiar and unprecedented circumstances of the times, been employed to a greater extent than could be wished, was not denied; but that effect was not produced by the Orders in Council which had been issued by the present government. The system of which it was the result was in force when they came into power; and those gentlemen who expressed such alarm at the consequences of employing foreign seamen, ought surely to have proclaimed their apprehensions when that system was first introduced in the administration of lord Grenville. He was far from contending that, if any measure which he had adopted was impolitic, he ought to be excused, because it was introduced by another administration; he had merely mentioned the circumstance, to shew gentlemen who were so ready to throw every species of blame upon the present ministers, bow necessary it was to ascertain facts before they preferred charges. The assertion, however, that the effect of the Orders in Council had diminished the quantity of British shipping (against whatever administration it was directed) was not founded in fact. Between the years 1806 and 1810, the number of British ships and of British seamen employed in our trade had increased: it was true that the number of foreign ships and of foreign seamen had increased in a greater proportion; but that was owing to other causes wholly unconnected with the Orders in Council. The extraordinary state of the continent had rendered it impossible to carry on so large a portion of our trade in British bottoms as we had been accustomed to do; when therefore our commerce increased we had only the alternative of giving it up or carrying it on by means of foreign ships. This was the plain state of the case, and it placed the consistency of the gentlemen on the other side in a very striking point of view. They described in strong colours the distresses of our manufacturers arising from the reduction of our trade, and they proposed to remedy the evil by reducing it still lower. The trade of this country could not, it was obvious in the present state of things, be carried on with the greater part of the continent by British ships and seamen; we were therefore compelled, if we meant to carry it on at all, to employ foreign vessels. The language of the gentlemen opposite to him' to the manufacturers, if they spoke fairly, must be to this effect: "we feel deeply for your distresses, which we know arise from a diminution of trade; we are extremely anxious to relieve you; and in. order to accomplish that object, we have proposed an inquiry, in order to see if we cannot destroy the greater part of the trade that you carry on with the continent of Europe." Whether the manufacturers would be grateful to the honourable gentlemen for their interference, or would approve of their remedy, he would leave the House to determine. He now came to another part of this subject on which the gentlemen on the other side had employed much of their eloquence—he meant the licences. Here again he begged to observe, that the system of licences, whether wise or unwise, originated with the administration of which those honourable gentlemen were such enthusiastic admirers. Nay, the very clause in the licences which the hon. and learned gentleman who brought forward this motion had reprobated with peculiar severity, and had represented as being at once mischievous and absurd, was drawn up by that very administration, and was found by the present ministers ready cut and dry in the office. This identical clause, upon which the hon. and learned gentleman had bestowed such opprobrious epithets, was drawn up at a meeting of the Board of Trade, by lord Grenville, lord Auckland, lord Henry Petty, and lord Temple. He was ready to admit, that if the measure was a bad one, it was no excuse for him that it had the sanction of such names; but he mentioned the circumstance in the hopes of inducing gentlemen on the other side not to be so lavish of their censures before they were quite sure to whom they applied. With regard to the perjury which was said to take place, he had every reason to believe that it was much less under the present system than it was before, and for a most obvious reason, that the number of oaths to be taken were greatly reduced. He should not now stop to argue whether carrying on trade by means of licences was not liable to some objections, for the real question to be determined was this—If you cannot carry on your trade with certain countries, except by means of licences, are the objections to that mode of proceeding so formidable that you would give up your trade rather than have recourse to it? If gentlemen really thought that it would be better to give up trade altogether, than to carry it on by means of licences, they would, he presumed, act in the committee upon that system, and diminish our commerce in order to increase our manufactures. Having stated the effect which the Orders in Council had had upon our trade, he begged leave shortly to state how they had operated upon the enemy. The duty arising from customs in France, amounted, in 1803, to 33,000,000 livres; in 1804, 41,400,000; in 1805, 52,700,000; in 1806,51,700,000; in 1807, at the latter end of which year our Orders in Council were adopted, the duty amounted to 60,483,000 livres, and the very next year they fell as low as 18,500,000 livres. In 1809, they fell still lower, they only amounted to 11,500,000 livres. The House would bear in its recollection, that while the amount of the French customs was thus reduced immediately after the adoption of the Orders in Council, our revenue bad experienced an astonishing increase. He was aware that the customs did not form so important a branch of the revenue in France as they did in this country; but it was impossible that they could have experienced such an extraordinary decrease, without producing a very considerable effect upon the rest of the revenue. He knew that some gentlemen on the other side were fond of supposing that Buonaparté entertained an opinion, half philosophical and half mad, that trade was productive of liberty, and therefore he hated it. The fact was, he hated British trade, and would willingly sacrifice his own to destroy ours; but if he could carry on a commerce without benefiting us, he would most willingly do it. This was most obvious from the pains he took to construct canals and roads for carrying on internal trade, and from the uniform language of those annual expositions which were published respecting the state of France. He was bound, however, in fairness to state, that the duty of customs in France rose, in 1810, to 49,000,000 livres, but that was not owing to any increase of trade, but in a great degree to the confiscation of British property in Prussia and other places; the incorporation of Leghorn, Genoa, and other ports of Italy into France must of course have had some effect in increasing the revenue. Besides, the duties had been in many instances augmented five-and-twenty fold, and even more; therefore, if the trade had remained the same as it was before the Orders in Council were issued, the revenue ought to have amounted to 725,000,000. But although gentlemen in that House denied that the French were affected by the Orders in Council, the French themselves confessed the fact. In the Address of the Senate to Buonaparté they acknowledged that they no longer had any trade, except what was carried on by means of canals, and admitted without hesitation the difficulties under which they laboured. He begged to ask those gentlemen, who were so hostile to the Orders in Council, what would be the effect of repealing them? The effect would be, that America would be able to supply France with all colonial produce, and the Americans would in return take away her manufactures; in fact, France would be in a more favourable situation than she would be in a time of peace, and the trade of Great Britain to the continent would be annihilated. He would not trust himself with the discussion of that part of the question which related to America, but when the hon. and learned gentleman opposite to him said that the Berlin and Milan decrees had been repealed, and that a proclamation had been issued to that effect, his memory must surely have failed. The government of this country had repeatedly called for that proclamation, America had called for it, but it had never appeared.—There was, indeed, the famous letter of the French minister for foreign affairs, in which he said that the French decrees should be repealed on condition either that our Orders in Council were re- scinded, or that America would no longer suffer her ships to be denationalized; that was, no longer to suffer her ships to be searched. But even if the decrees were repealed with regard to America, they would be in force with regard to Great Britain. It was therefore not a partial but a total repeal of these decrees that Great Britain had a right to demand before she gave up her Orders in Council. The French decrees were not, as gentlemen had stated, internal municipal measures, they were adopted in time of war as measures of hostility, and even if a neutral chose to submit to them, it by no means followed that a belligerent was also bound to acquiesce. But it was not only to France that these decrees extended, but to all her vassal states, to every country over which she could extend her power. He wished to know whether there was any quarrel between Hamburgh and France when Hamburgh and the other Hanse towns were seized by the French. Holland, Tuscany, and Rome were seized upon no other ground than because it was convenient to Buonaparté to seize them, and the Berlin and Milan decrees immediately applied to them. Could it be concluded, that upon any principle of the Jaw of nations, we were bound to suffer France to give laws to all these neutral nations without our making an effort to induce them to assert their neutral rights? He would not trespass any longer upon the time of the House; it had been incontestibly shewn that the distresses of our manufacturers did not arise from the Orders in Council, and therefore he should oppose going into a committee, from which no possible beneficial consequences could result.

Mr. Whitbread

maintained that there never was a speech more calculated to mislead the House than that of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The right hon. gentleman had told them that the questions they were called on to decide were, whether the Orders in Council were to be maintained? Whether the licensing system was to be continued? Whether this country had acted justly or unjustly towards America? And whether the Milan and Berlin Decrees were or were not repealed? And he had finished a grand climax by slating, that the French government was no longer possessed of revenues to carry on the war.—But he would tell the House, and the right hon. gentleman, that they were not called on to decide any of those questions. The great point for consideration was, whether they would, when the people of England were suffering, as they stated themselves to be—when their manufacturers were unemployed—when petitions were forming in every part of the country—and, particularly, when petitions, which ought to be presented to the Regent, were withheld for some reason to him incomprehensible; whether they would, in such a state of things, refuse a Select Committee to inquire into the state of the trade and commerce of the country? The right hon. gentleman and his colleagues had made a fine statement of figures. This put him in mind of the correspondence which had taken place between a noble lord (Castlereagh) and general Moore, as to the force commanded by the latter. The General observed, "I had only such a number of men:" "O," said the noble lord, "you had a great many more;—here I can prove it on paper." So, to the starving manufacturer, who exclaimed, "I am unable to exist," the House of Commons might exultingly say,—"Look to these accounts—behold the flourishing state of our exports and imports."—But when they spoke of such prosperity—a prosperity derived from the Orders in Council—be (Mr. Whitbread) would draw their attention to the bankruptcies of the last year, which amounted to between 1,300 and 2,000l In the argument which the right hon. gentleman had used on the present occasion, he appeared to have shut his eyes against the principle on which he had acted last session, when a Committee was appointed to inquire into the state of the manufacturing interest, prior to a vote of money being appropriated to its service—a measure which, however, had totally failed. The right hon. gentleman, supposing all men's minds confined to the same small particular branch of finance with which he had been occupied, told them of the diminution of the French customs; and forgot, that during this era of distress, France had subdued Russia, over-run Spain, conquered Austria, and made herself mistress of Europe. According to the argument of the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequers France had been compelled by the severe operations of our Orders in Council to this aggrandizement of her empire; while we, O powerful policy! had nothing to shew in return, but our Orders, and the pure morality of our licence system. The right hon. gentleman had enumerated all the powers that were subject to France, and united against Great Britain; he had talked with indifference of America, who might be forced into the arms of the enemy, and with his universal panacea of Orders in Council and licenced trade, he felt himself equal to contend with all the world in arms against him, although, in truth, the enemy knowing their ruinous consequences to us, had done more than England for their preservation and enforcement. What, he begged to be informed, had become of all the petitions that had been transmitted to the Secretary of State, from the country? Why were they not yet laid before the Prince? Why was not his Royal Highness allowed to form an opinion on a subject that affected even the stability of his throne! The speech of the right hon. gentleman abounded in fallacies, and among them none was greater than his statement respecting the large exports of 1808 and 1809, when Spain and Portugal were open to our trade, and when an immense quantity of British goods had been wantonly thrown into the hands of Buonaparté. The most serious attention of parliament was also demanded by the dependence of the British armies in Spain and Portugal upon America for grain and flour, since it appeared that no less than 1,500,000 barrels had been imported into Cadiz and Lisbon, during the last year, from the United States.

The right hon. gentleman objected to the committee, because it would involve a discussion respecting America: he, for one, however, had he the honour to sit in that committee, would entirely disclaim all such discussion—for the proper object of such a committee would be to inquire into our private policy, not our foreign. If the committee should report that the Orders in Council were injurious and impolitic, it would then be for the House to decide whether they should be repealed—and it would also be a question to consider whether they could be repealed, consistently with our national dignity. On this question he should offer no opinion now, In considering the operation of those Orders in Council, he thought they had entirely failed in their object; but they had one effect, and that was to provide sailors for Napoleon, who was, according to the confession of the First Lord of the Admiralty on a preceding evening, creating a navy in spite of war, though one reason assigned for not making peace with him was, lest he should create a navy. He however was building ships, and we were supplying him with mariners. He had no hesitation in saying that he thought the conduct of government grossly unjust to" wards America, and highly dangerous to this country.

The Hon. Mr. Herbert

stated that the licence system had given rise to repeated instances of perjury, as the clearances from foreign ports were all made on oath.

Lord Granville Levison Gower,

adverting to one part of the speech of his hon. friend who had just sat down, informed the House, that he had in his custody a Petition, signed by many thousands of the manufacturing population of Staffordshire, addressed to the Prince Regent, complaining of deep distress, and praying for relief. That he had informed the Secretary of State for the Home Department of this circumstance, and that that right hon. gentleman had offered to take the Petition from the noble lord, and present it himself to the Regent. This the noble lord said he had refused to do. He had consulted the petitioners thereupon, and received their directions to present the Petition in person, which he intended to do at the first levee, but that levee had not yet taken place, although three weeks had elapsed from the time at which he received the petition.

Lord Milton

rose merely to state, that he was exactly in the same predicament as the noble lord.

Mr. Brougham,

in reply, animadverted on the various arguments that had been adduced against his motion. It seemed that we were not now to press upon the enemy with a fair military view of overcoming him; in prosecuting which object we might unluckily be compelled to bear hard upon neutral rights. We were no longer following such a gallant, soldier-like instinct; but attempting with the sordid, trading, pedlar-like desires of retail-dealers, to undersell, and force America to help us in underselling a rival shopkeeper. It became parliament to stand forward between the country and the ruinous effects of such a mean and profligate policy as this, and to save it from the last of disasters, into which the Prince Regent's ministers were hurrying it—a war with America. But was there nothing else, to make the House still more anxious to inquire than they might have been a short time ago? Had no other circumstance transpired in the latter part of the debate? Did they bear in mind the statements of his noble friend, the member for Yorkshire, and the noble lord, the member for Staffordshire? It now appeared—what never yet had been known since England was England, and therefore never could have been suspected on the present occasion—that while the country laboured under distresses quite unparalleled, the people were denied access to the Prince Regent, at the foot of whose throne they desired to lay their complaints! There was nothing to be seen in the manufacturing counties but misery—nothing to be heard but the cries of distress—we met it in every shape, bankruptcies, petitions, tumults, combinations, mendicity, and the thousand miseries which could not be recorded in Gazettes, but which were not the less touching for being less obtrusive; the horrors of supplies daily and hourly straitened; the anxieties of tottering credit—this was a short but unexaggerated picture of the state of the people; groaning under such a pressure, they sought the throne of the Prince Regent with their grievances, but they found the avenues to his person barred! Then it became more than ever the duty of parliament to throw its doors open to their oppressed and insulted constituents, and to show them that there was a redress, and at any rate a hearing, to be had in the House of Commons, if the Prince should be advised to turn away his ears from their just complaints. This was necessary because it was the duty of representatives, but it was still more imperative, because it might preserve the tranquillity of the country, at a moment when the executive government was madly driving the people to despair, and seeking to convert their complaints into insurrection.—If any man then was desirous of preserving peace with America, he would vote for the inquiry; and every one who gave such a vote might go to his home, and lie down with the consciousness that he had done his utmost to avert the greatest evil with which the people of England could be menaced.

The House then divided;
For Mr. Brougham's motion	144
Against it	216
Majority against the Motion	—72

List of the Minority:
Abercromby, hon. J.	Baring, sir T.
Adair, R.	Baring, A.
Agar, E. F.	Bernard, S.
Anson, gen.	Bennet, R. H. A.
Antonie, W. L.	Bennet, hon. H. G.
Aubrey, sir J.	Biddulph, R. M.
Baker, Jobs	Binning, lord

Blachford, B. P.	Longman, G.
Brougham, H.	Lyttleton, hon. W.
Burdett, sir F.	Macdonald, J.
Byng, G.	Madocks, W.
Busk, W.	Martin, H.
Babington, T.	Mathew, hon. M.
Campbell, gen.	Milton, vise.
Canning, right hon. G.	Montgomery, sir H.
Canning, G.	Moore, P.
Cocks, J.	Morpeth, vise.
Coke, T. W.	Morris, E.
Colborne, N. W. R.	Mostyn, sir Tho.
Cotes, J.	Myers, T.
Combe, H. C.	Newport, sir J.
Cuthbert, J. R.	North, D.
Daly, rt. hon. D. B.	O'Hara, C.
Dundas, hon. L.	Orde, W.
Dundas, hon. R. L.	Ossulston, lord
Dickinson, W.	Parnell, H.
Dillon, hon. H. A.	Peirse, H.
Duncannon, visc.	Pelham, hon. C.
Eden, hon. G.	Pelham, hon. G.
Elliot, rt. hon. W.	Piggott, sir A.
Ellis, C. R.	Prendergast, M.
Ferguson, gen.	Pollington, vise.
Fitzgerald, lord H.	Pousonby, rt. hon. G.
Fitzpatrick, rt. hon. R.	Ponsonby, hon. G.
Fitzroy, lord W.	Ponsonby, hon. F.
Folkes, sir M. B.	Power, R.
Folkestone, vise.	Prittie, hon. F. A.
Fremantle, W. H.	Pym, F.
Gascoyne, T.	Ridley, sir M. W.
Giles, D. (Teller)	Romilly, sir S.
Grosvenor, gen.	St. Aubyn, sir J.
Gower, lord G. L.	Scudamore, R. P.
Grattan, rt. hon. H.	Sharp, R.
Greenhill, R.	Simpson, hon. J.
Greenough, G. B.	Smith, S.
Grenfell, P.	Smith, A.
Grenville, lord G.	Smith, G.
Guise, sir W.	Smith, J.
Halsey, J.	Smith, W.
Herbert, hon. W.	Speirs, A.
Hibbert, G.	Stanley, lord
Hippisley, sir J. C.	Tarleton, gen.
Horner, F.	Tavistock, marquis
Howard, Henry	Taylor, M. A.
Howard, hon. W.	Taylor, W.
Howarth, H.	Temple, earl
Hurst, R.	Templetown, vise.
Hussey, T.	Thornton, H.
Huskisson, W.	Tierney, rt. hon. G.
Hutchinson, hon. C. H.	Tighe, W.
Jackson, John	Vernon, G. G. V.
Jolliffe, H.	Walpole, hon. G.
Johnstone, G.	Ward, hon. J.
Kemp, T. R.	Warrender, sir G.
Knight, Robt.	Western, C. C.
Knox, hon. T.	Whitbread, S.
Lamb, hon. W.	Wilberforce, W.
Latouche, R.	Wilkins, W.
Leach, J.	Williams, O.
Lemon, sir W.	Winnington, sir T.
Lemon, J.	Wrottesley, H.
Lemon, C.	Wynn, C. W. W.
Lester, B. L.	Wynn, sir W.
Lloyd, J.