HC Deb 10 January 1812 vol 21 cc131-46
The Chancellor of the Exchequer

, in rising to move the Thanks of the House to the different persons for whom he should propose them, thought it necessary to state, that though, undoubtedly, the recent great and glorious exertions which had led to the conquest of Java, would most particularly call for notice, yet it would not be just to the persons concerned, if the House were to take so narrow a view of the subject, as to confine its attention to that achievement alone. To the conduct of the governor-general of India he should particularly call their attention. To the wise and well arranged plan which he had formed, was, in a great degree owing that ultimate success with which our arms bad been crowned. At the commencement of the present war, an intimation had been given to the East India Company, to guard them against expending large sums in expeditions against the French East India islands. Intelligence, however, was received by the governor-general of India, in the year 1808, that the islands of Bourbon and of the Mauritius were in such a situation that it might be expected a well-timed blockade would compel them to surrender to the British. From subsequent information as to the state of defence in which the island of Bourbon then was, he conceived himself justified in sending out a small expedition against that island" and at the same time he had it in contemplation to prepare a more important force to proceed against the Mauritius. The same intelligence that led lord Minto to form this design, reached this country about the middle of the year 1810, in consequence of which, instructions were sent by government to the governor-general of India, to attempt the conquest of the Mauritius. By this fortunate coincidence, it happened that when instructions to that effect reached India, the armament, which, upon his own responsibility, lord Minto had previously prepared, was ready to sail immediately. That expedition proceeded without loss of time to its destination, and succeeded in effecting its object in the December of the same year. Every thing that occurred in the prosecution of that enterprise was highly creditable to all parties concerned in it. General Abercromby, who commanded, had proved himself possessed of all the necessary qualifications to enable him to discharge his duty in a satisfactory manner, and was in every respect fully equal to the task which had been imposed on him. It was however thought, that though the conduct of that gallant general in itself could not be too highly commended, yet that conquest singly was not of sufficient importance to call for the thanks of parliament.—This at least was the view taken of the subject, and till it was followed up by those ulterior successes which had followed, it was not thought expedient to bring the subject forward. There was one circumstance connected with this expedition which he thought it his duty to mention, as it was so creditable to captain Rowley, that it could not with justice be passed over. Before the capture of the Mauritius, it would be recollected that a force had been fitted out for the purpose of destroying the French frigates which were in its neighbourhood, This attempt, though successful in the first instance, was subsequently, through various accidents, so unfortunate that our naval superiority in those seas was lost, and for a short period, our force was inferior to the French force on that sta- tion. Things were in this situation, when, by the, distinguished exertions of captain Rowley, by a vigorous display of all that could prove him worthy the confidence of his country, that superiority was wrenched from France by his valour, and transferred to Britain. The turn thus given to things in that quarter, contributed not a little to the success of the expedition, as if, on its arrival there, it had found the naval superiority on the side of France, that circumstance might have considerably embarrassed its operations. At that time, the governor-general of India repeated the observations he had previously made to his government on the importance of Java to France. He was aware that reinforcements were expected from Europe, and before these could arrive, he was anxious that it should be taken military possession of by an English army. He thought it necessary for the security of our commerce and possessions, that the enemy should be dispossessed of it, and proposed, as soon as the troops should return from the Mauritius, to employ them in this service. For this new enter prize he was then preparing, and he trusted that instructions to attempt it would arrive before the expedition was ready to sail. Instructions were received from this country, in April. It was afterwards apprehended that the season was too far advanced for it to be made at that time. Considerable naval difficulties had seemed to oppose themselves to the undertaking, and here peculiar credit was due to lord Minto. He had made such examinations with respect to the course of navigation to be pursued, as greatly forwarded the object in view. From the ordinary course of navigation in those seas, considerable obstructions were to be feared. These were so very great, that the officer to whom the naval part of the expedition was to be trusted, expressed considerable apprehensions on that head. These, however, were completely dissipated when the plan which lord Minto had formed was explained. Admiral Drury died in March, and the command in consequence devolved upon commodore Broughton. The whole force sailed on the 31st July, under the directions of rear-admiral Stopford. The governor general in person accompanied this expedition, in order to make such inquiries and form such arrangements as were likely to be conducive to the ends for which the conquest was undertaken The landing was effected at a plans called Chillchilling, situate about 12 miles east of the city, on the 4th of August. Some difficulties, it was apprehended, would be thrown in the way of the army's progress, by the city of Batavia. This, however, was not done, as the French evacuated it at the approach of the English army, and it was taken possession of by the invader" on the 9th of August. The enemy had retired to a strong position, which they had previously prepared, about two miles in advance of their works, at Fort Cornelis. Their position was defended by an abattis, occupied by 3,000 of their best troops, and four guns of horse-artillery. There they were attacked by colonel Gillespie, who had so greatly distinguished himself throughout the operations, with the greatest gallantry, and compelled to retire, leaving behind them 500 dead. It was here stated by the gallant general who commanded, that though thus far successful beyond expectation, the difficulties of the enterprize were not yet surmounted: the enemy, greatly superior in numbers, was strongly entrenched in a position between the great river Jacatra, and the Sloken, an artificial water-course, neither of which were fordable. This position was shut up by a deep trench, strongly pallisaded. Seven redoubts, and many batteries, mounted with heavy cannon, occupied the most commanding grounds within the lines. The fort of Cornelis was in the centre, and the whole of the works was defended by a numerous and well organised artillery. The season was too far advanced, the heat too violent, and our numbers insufficient, to admit of regular approaches. To carry the works by assault was the alternative, and on that he decided, The situation in which the enemy presented himself was such, that to different officers, and to different men, it would have furnished an obstacle sufficiently formidable to prevent any farther advance. The general knew the officers and the men he had to command, and determined on an assault. On this occasion colonel Gillespie led the attack with such spirit, that the enemy flew before him as if they had no means of resistance. The whole of the business was conducted in the ablest manner, and while the loss of the enemy was very severe, ours was remarkably slight, as the greatest loss experienced was caused by the explosion of a battery, which our victorious troops had taken possession of. A variety of different attacks were necessarily made; each was crowned with success, and it was difficult to say which had been conducted the best. The very able exertions of colonel Gillespie could not be praised too much. It was due to that gallant officer to state, that at the time he thus distinguished himself he was not in good health. He was very unwell, yet, unremitting in his exertions, he forgot his weakness in his zeal, and was only solicitous to discharge his duty. One instance of this he wished particularly to notice. When the enemy fled, and he saw the horse pursuing him, colonel Gillespie was heard to lament that he had no horse to join in the pursuit. A horse was then brought to him, which he was just about to mount, when exhausted by indisposition and the overstrained exertions he had made, he fainted on the spot. Colonel M'Leod also, who unfortunately lost his life in this operation, ought not to be forgotten. Than him, a braver officer had never drawn his sword in the service of his country. He fell, while nobly taking his part in the exertions of this glorious day. The destruction of the enemy had been immense, as an army of 10,000 men had been killed, made prisoners, or dispersed, with the exception of a small body, which had retired with the French general up the country. The conduct of lieutenant general sir S. Auchmuty, who commanded on this occasion, was entitled to the highest praise. In speaking of him, he had only to use the words of lord Minto. The right hon. gent. here quoted that part of the noble lord's letter, where he observes, that his sovereign will not forget the share sir Samuel Auchmuty had in the operations, nor his countrymen fail to appreciate the man who had so eminently distinguished himself.—It was almost unnecessary to state, that wherever the navy could take a part in the operations, all that could be done was effected by their zeal and valour. The manner in which the subordination of the army had been spoken of was a subject of much congratulation. There never was an instance of an army being in a country which afforded such temptations to plunder, deporting itself in a manner more regular and correct.—On the importance of Java, as an acquisition of territory, he would not speak at present, as he wished to avoid touching on any subject on which a difference of opinion might exist to disturb that unanimity which he hoped would accompany the vote. He would, however, say that the conquest of Java was of infinite importance. If it was not important as a colony gained to England, it was of great importance that it had been snatched from France. That the enemy had been dispossessed of it was' of great importance to our East India possessions, as in the hands of France there was every reason to fear from the activity of the enemy, that it would be made the means of great annoyance to us. This had been perceived by the governor-general, and to him in particular were the thanks of the House due for the manner in which he had taken upon himself to prepare an expedition, and for the wisdom and skill with which all his arrangements had been made. He would therefore move, "That the Thanks of this House be given to the right hon. Gilbert lord Minto, governor-general of the British possessions in the East Indies, for the wisdom and ability with which the military resources of the British empire in India have been applied in the reduction of the power of the enemy in the Eastern seas, by the conquest of the islands of Bourbon and Mauritius, and by the recent successful operations in the island of Java; and that this House doth attribute the brilliant and important successes which have crowned our arms in that quarter of the globe to the vigorous system of well-concerted measures so wisely adopted and steadily pursued by Gilbert lord Minto."

Mr. Sheridan

said, that he had not a moment's hesitation in concurring with the right hon. gent., that no thanks the House could bestow would be an adequate reward for the gallantry and discipline displayed by the British army; but however ungracious the task might be, he could not prevail upon himself to say, that the same claim existed on behalf of lord Minto, to justify the pompous phraseology employed in the motion just read. In the first place, it ought to be made oat, that it was not only extremely essential to the success of the undertaking, but that it was absolutely necessary that the governor-general should forsake his station at Bengal, to enter on a voyage for six weeks or two months, to be present at the conquest of Batavia. Nothing but absolute necessity could justify the forsaking of the trust reposed in him elsewhere, Much merit had been attributed to lord Minto from the circumstance, that, at the time the dispatches from this country, authorising him to undertake the expedition against the Mauritius, every thing had been pre- pared for that purpose, and yet on the first check received, the whole object of the armament must have been disappointed, had it not been for the admirable conduct of captain Rowley (whose merits could not be over-stated) who maintained, with an inferior force, the honour and superiority of our flag. Whatever applause, therefore, was due to captain Rowley for this circumstance, must of necessity be withdrawn from lord Minto.—The next merit attributed to the governor-general was, that the time of year the expedition against Batavia was undertaken, rendered the success extremely doubtful, and admiral Drury, who had been long in those seas, from the lateness of the season despaired of accomplishing the object; but that the governor general had made himself, in Bengal, so much more master of the subject than the British naval commander, that it was determined to proceed. The right hon. gent. congratulated the House that lord Minto was so distinguished an admiral, and he hoped that he would likewise prove himself, without the aid of ministers, a great general: it was, however, no great compliment to our naval commanders, who had devoted their attention solely to matters of navigation. For was it to be believed, that so experienced an officer as admiral Drury, was to be instructed by the governor-general? and in this instance too, if any merit were due to lord Minto, it must be detracted in the same proportion from admiral Drury.—The right hon. gent. said he could by no means concur in the opinion expressed, that the importance of the acquisition to the nation was not to be contemplated in a question of this kind.—"You must not." said the Chancellor of the Exchequer, "enter upon that, for it will be sure to produce a difference of opinion." Unquestionably sir Samuel Auchmuty, colonel Gillespie, and the other brave soldiers engaged, had done their duty in obeying the orders of their superiors, and they deserved a reward for their valour; but when it was demanded of the House to pass a vote of thanks to the planner of the expedition, because it had succeeded, surely it would not be denied that now was the most proper time to consider what was the value of the acquisition. "No," said the Chancellor of the Exchequer again, "you must not inquire whether it is worth the many precious lives it has cost? Whether we can quit it without leaving the natives to certain destruction? or whether certain destruction will not attend our troops if they remain?" These inquiries Were to be passed over; inquiries which he would like to have answered by some of the East-India Directors, who, by some unlucky accident, on a question in which they were peculiarly concerned, were all absent from the House: Why, if the conquest was worth the blood it had cost, were they backward in giving their share of applause?—There were no terms of approbation too strong as applied to sir Samuel Auchmuty, for his skill and intrepidity, because he had been compelled to engaged in a project, than which it was confessed none was more hazardous; and at one time he had no choice between adventurous fortitude and a disgraceful retreat: either Fort Cornelis must be taken by storm, or the expedition relinquished; for a regular siege would have destroyed our army. The right hon. gent. over the way would not deny, that before the storming of Fort Cornelis was determined upon, it had been in agitation whether the British troops should not abandon a project, the success of which was almost visionary, and the reward, if the object were attained, but a name. Why was it necessary that lord Minto should accompany the armament? He had a rooted dislike to any civil controul being exercised over an army or navy. It savoured too much of the French revolution, where a deputy from the Convention always accompanied the troops—not to share the danger, but to participate in the glory.—He wished to speak with every respect of lord Minto—for personal respect he felt—but he could not but recollect something of his conduct in Corsica. towards the much lamented sir John Moore; which, if it had succeeded in influencing that highly valuable officer, would have rendered him a proscribed man over the face of the earth. The right hon. gent. concluded by saying, that he must be informed of the essential necessity of lord Minto's leaving the seat of government to superintend the operations of the expedition; and till he had official proof of the great merit and value of his personal attendance he could not, though it might appear invidious, concur in the pompous and elaborate panegyric which had been framed on the wisdom and vigour of that noble lord's system of operations.

Mr. Yorke

observed, that he had taken a far different view of the subject from the right hon. gentleman, and hoped to convince the House, notwithstanding the plausibility of what had been just slated, that lord Minto fully deserved the compliment proposed to be paid to him. After professing that, in a question of this kind, he dismissed all party feelings, he admitted that it was extremely fit to inquire, whether the object that was to be attained, namely, the dislodgment of the enemy front a post where he might greatly annoy our trade, was or was not worthy the means employed and the expence incurred; but he denied that those inquiries should extend to the question, whether it was wise or impolitic to retain possession of the island thus acquired? No man, he believed, would doubt that it was extremely desirable that the French should be driven from a situation where they possessed such extensive means of annoyance to our trade in the Indian seas, especially when it was recollected that of late years particularly, the employment of this station against Great Britain had been made so important an object with the French government. With regard to the peculiar merits of lord Minto, it was unnecessary to confirm what had been already so ably urged as to his lordship's merits in planning and arranging the subjugation of these islands. He admitted that the talents and judgment of commodore Rowley could not be too much praised, and he was glad that under Divine Providence, we had innumerable examples of a similar kind; yet it was not to be supposed that this circumstance only had effected the conquest of the Mauritius. No; to the talents of lord Minto Great-Britain was mainly indebted. Surely it was no small praise to say of the governor-general that he had forestalled, as it were, the wishes of his government. Was it no merit to a man to say that, at the very instant instructions arrived to make preparations for an important attempt, all the arrangements had been made, and, that the expedition was ready to sail? At least, it was but justice to say, that he had done more than even the most sanguine could expect.—The right hon. gent. who spoke last, had alluded to some transactions in Corsica. What they, were, he was perfectly ignorant; but this he knew, that they had no bearing upon the present question: the (rue point to be considered was, whether there was any danger at all in lord Minto's leaving' the seat of government? What was to prevent him? Were there commotions in Bengal? No, Was his presence required at that particular period? No. Was his presence required at Java? Undoubtedly it was most important, not only to the success of the expedition, but to the future settlement of the conquered island. Sir Samuel Auchmuty must have been comparatively ignorant of the intentions of the governor: whether it was intended merely to take military possession, or whether it was to be retained as a colony to be, attached to the mother country: whether military or civil magistrates should be appointed; and a vast variety of other points, to decide upon which any person but the governor-general was incompetent. Under these circumstances he hoped the House would feel, that had his lordship remained in Bengal, he would have been deficient in a necessary and important part of his duty.—Much had been said on what, to his mind, was a most conspicuous instance of high desert in lord Minto, namely, that he procured the expedition to sail, although admiral Drury had at first expressed his opinion to the contrary. It was true that sir S. Auchmuty was of the same sentiment, and yet that lord Minto, by explaining to those gallant officers a new course of navigation to the west of Borneo, had convinced them that the expedition could sail, and reach its destination before the setting in of the S. W. winds; for it ought to be known, that while the expedition was only in con; templation, lord Minto had employed a captain Gregg, of great experience, to try the soundings of the new course by the Caramalla, and by shewing his report to admiral Drury and sir S. Auchmuty, they were convinced that the project was practicable. What then became of this ground of objection against the noble lord? A passage, through which before only small vessels had proceeded, was discovered, through which 100 sail might proceed with security. Under these circumstances, he trusted that the House would differ from the right hon. gentleman, and bestow the tribute of gratitude which distinguished, services so justly merited. Before he sat down, he begged to refer to what had been stated, that at one time after the city of Batavia had been captured, the enter prize was found to be so hazardous, that lord Minto had it in contemplation to resign the attempt, On what authority such a statement was made, his majesty's ministers new not, but certain it was that such information had come to their know- ledge. On the whole, he did not despair that even the right hon. gentleman over the way would be convinced by what he had said, and that the vote of thanks to lord Minto would be carried without a dissentient voice.

Sir Henry Montgomery

objected to the vote of thanks to lord Minto, because he conceived that noble lord to have done little, if indeed he had done any thing, which could entitle him to so high an honour. Perhaps he rather deserved censure for some of the acts which had marked his visit to Java, one especially of which was to give freedom to all the slaves the moment lie arrived; a proceeding which he could not but condemn, as they were the most blood-thirsty fellows imaginable. The hon. baronet then read some extracts from a private letter, which he had received from India, the purport of which extracts was to cast a portion of blame upon some of the actions of lord Minto, and he concluded by submitting to the House, whether they could, with any propriety, pass a vote of thanks to his lordship; though at the same time, he was entirely of opinion that every praise should be bestowed upon the gallant achievements of general Auchmuty and the army serving under him.

General Tarleton

ridiculed the idea of a man of sir S. Auchmuty's abilities being sent out on an expedition with a nurse to superintend him. The House need not refer to the Deputies of the French Convention alone, to convince them of the impolicy of setting civil masters over military commanders, for if they looked to the wars of prince Eugene and the duke of Marlborough, the same fact was rendered most evident. Neither, in later days, could he think the sailing of far-famed sir William Curtis from the Downs, had any good effect en the Walcheren expedition. He bestowed a high panegyric on sir S. Auchmuty, to whose decision and temerity in, attacking Fort Cornelis, together with the valour of the army, he attributed the salvation of the whole force. On this ground he would give his negative to the vote of thanks to lord Minto, as decidedly as He would with satisfaction give his affirmative to the other votes.

Mr. Grant

, after the discussion that had already taken place, would not occupy much of the time of the House, and the more so as there had been expressed no difference of opinion with regard to the melitary merit of the expeditions in question. But since the subject had been started, he felt himself bound to state his reasons for considering lord Minto as justly entitled to their thanks. He then entered into a defence of lord Minto's conduct on those points wherein he had been attacked. He justified his leaving his government, by the greatness of the occasion, and the example of many former governors, who, according to the system pursued in that quarter, were frequently in the habit of going out of their jurisdiction for far less important purposes. As for his lordship's voyage being connected with a controlling superintendance over the military, no candid man could entertain the idea; and as no injury or inconvenience had arisen from his absence, he ought, so far from being blamed, to be highly commended for his anxiety to be on the spot for the purpose of making the most beneficial arrangements for his country and the East India Company. For his part, he had not heard any thing of what the hon. baronet had asserted with regard to the manumission of the slaves; and would only observe, that first reports of that sort were generally very inaccurate and imperfect, and the repetition of them ought not to be lightly hazarded.

Mr. P. Moore

thought the House ought not to come to this resolution till they had further documents on the subject, as, at present, they saw nothing to justify lord Minto for going out of his government. The hon. ex-director who spoke last on this occasion seemed willing to set aside a very good rule observed in another place, namely, never to vote thanks or a pension for services in India, till the party returned, and his whole conduct had gone under review and consideration: In his opinion, lord Minto had enough to do at the seat of government, and his absenting himself was extremely censurable. Neither could any thing be more improper than for a civil officer to go as a check with a military force; as an example of which, he had heard that if it had depended on lord Minto's opinion, the expedition would have been abandoned altogether on the eve of its accomplishment. He would therefore give his vote against the motion.

Mr. Rose

professed his decided conviction that lord Minto had justly earned the thanks of the House, by the skilful and judicious plans which he had directed to be put in execution. In quitting his government, it was impossible that he could have been actuated by any other motives than what were connected with the public good and with his public duty, namely, as governor general.

Mr. Fremantle

agreed with the right hon. gentleman who spoke last, as to the motives by which it was evident lord Minto must have been influenced in his temporary departure from the seat of government. He thought, also, that the right hon. gentleman who opposed the motion, should have proved that during lord Minto's absence, any risk to the civil government was incurred, or that any injury was actually sustained. This, however, he believed could not be done. He regretted also, that it should have occurred to the right hon. gentleman to compare his superintendance of the military expedition to Java, to the controul exercised by a deputy of the French directory. With regard to that responsibility which every commander ought occasionally to assume to himself, in defiance of the strict line marked out for him by the government at home, he thought it the prime feature of a British commander, and it was such a responsibility that lord Nelson took upon himself when he quitted his station in the Mediterranean, and proceeded to the West Indies in quest of the French fleet. Under all the circumstances, therefore, he could not reconcile to himself to give a silent vote in favour of a man who had deserved so well of his country; of a man who had incurred every risk of responsibility which success might justify, but which, had he failed, would only have subjected him, perhaps, to ignominy and censure—As to the statements of the hon. baronet, he himself had seen private communications of a very different tendency. While, however, he was in favour of the motion, he could not refrain from saying a few words as to the policy of the capture; and here, he was afraid, it might be justly said, that if we were to send; British troops to keep it, we had gained a loss. We had not the means of sending out troops to garrison the country; and ought rather to communicate freedom and commence to the natives, for the purpose of rendering them independent of every European power.

Mr. Whitbread

said, that he had paid every attention to the subject under discussion which it seemed to him to require, and was sorry, therefore, that a vote of thanks should have been proposed to lord Minto, for, howeven unwillingly he might do it, he felt himself conscientiously bound to oppose the measure. He thought the question was not, whether lord Minto had done certain services to the country, nor whether he had acted with a certain degree of judgment and vigilance creditable to himself and beneficial to the British possessions in India; but whether he had performed such services, whether he had displayed such judgment and vigilance as might justly entitle him to so high an honour as receiving a vote of thanks from that House. Much had been already said, within those walls, of the prostitution of votes of thanks, and if the resolution then under discussion should be passed, it would, in his opinion, be another proof of that prostitution. Lord Minto might have great merit; Batavia might be a possession of great value to this country; but what had been done by lord Minto that could not have been done without him,? What schemes of policy had he devised, what measures of utility had he effected, what achievements had he performed that could justify his absence? Was it a customary procedure of that House to pass votes of thanks to those who had planned successful and important expeditions? Certainly not. The First Lord of the Admiralty might have planned many which had been gloriously achieved; but did it ever occur to that House to vote him their thanks? He thought it was establishing a new and unnecessary precedent, and he regretted that the measure had been proposed, as it only tended to bring lord, Minto's name and actions under a discussion from which they could not retire untouched, even though the resolution should be ultimately carried. The marquis Wellesley, indeed, had been thanked by that House for a noble and extensive plan for expelling the French from the Indian peninsula; but he conceived there was a vast difference between the two projects, While, however, he dissented from the motion which would convey the thanks of that House to lord Minto, he should most willingly concur in every praise that it might be judged proper to bestow upon sir S. Auchmuty, and upon the officers and men serving under him.

Mr. Secretary Ryder

began by disclaiming any motives which might arise out of political or private acquaintance with the noble lord who was the object of the motion, in advocating the present vote of thanks. He would not go into any detail of the circumstances of the achieve- ment so ably narrated by his right hon. friend, but would confine himself to the simple question; which was, whether the result of this most important campaign did not deserve the thanks of that House. The conquest of the Mauritius and the island of Java was by far the most important colonial conquest made in our East Indian history; not, perhaps, so much on account of the territorial acquisition thereby gained, but for the protection which our commerce in the Eastern seas would receive from this station. It was also important, because it struck the last blow at the power of France in the Indies, and because it deprived her of an island which was the depôt of all her annoyances to us there, and the rendezvous of all her privateers. It was not, in his mind,—what-ever the right hon. gent. on the other side might imagine,—the least important feature in the merits of lord Minto, that be went out of his way to collect information for the purposes of this conquest, and that be superintended the arrangements immediately preparatory to it. Neither did he think that the praise of having laid such an admirable plan for so successful a conquest, could be done away by any extract of a private letter which an hon. baronet had thought proper to produce. To say that the information of that private letter was false, was an awkward expression; but what guarantee had he for its accuracy? He thought lord Minto eminently entitled to the distinguished honour of the thanks of that House.

Mr. Elliot

said, he could not give a silent vote on this occasion, when he heard a right hon. gent. near him compare the conduct of his noble friend, lord Minto, in accompanying the expedition to Java, to the exercise of civil control which the deputies of the French Convention exercised over the generals in the early period of the Revolution. He thought his noble friend most eminently merited the vote of thanks proposed, as it was evident that his ably-conceived and well-digested plan had wrested from France her last and best possession in India. With respect to what had been said of his noble friend's conduct in Corsica, he would only say, that it would bear the strictest investigation. He should be sorry to revive the controversy on this subject, and particularly as his noble friend was ever ready to bear his warmest testimony to the military merits and high character of the gallant person alluded to.

The question being put and carried.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer

then moved, "That the thanks of this House be given to lieut. general the hon. John Abercromby, for his able and gallant conduct and meritorious exertions in effecting, with rapidity, the entire conquest of the important island of Mauritius:—To lieut. gen. sir Samuel Auchmuty, for the decision, skill, and energy manifested by him, in the command of the forces of his Majesty and of the East India company in the late operations in the island of Java, by which the honour of the British nation has been gloriously sustained, and additional lustre has been reflected on the reputation of the British arms:—To vice-admiral Albemarle Bertie, and to rear-admiral the hon. Robert Stopford, for their cordial co-operation, and the essential service rendered by them in the late operations in the Eastern seas:—To major-generals Henry Warde and Frederick Augustus Wetherall, and to the several officers of the army, both European and native, for their gallant conduct and meritorious exertions in the late successful military operations in the Eastern seas:—To commodores William Robert Broughton and Josias Rowley, and to the several captains and officers of his Majesty's naval forces employed in the late operations in the Eastern seas, for their skilful, gallant, and meritorious exertions in the reduction of the enemy's settlements in that quarter of the globe:—That this House doth highly approve and acknowledge the zeal, discipline, and bravery, uniformly displayed by the non-commissioned officers and private soldiers, both European and native, employed against the enemy in the several operations in the Eastern seas; and that the same be signified to them by the commanders of the several corps, who are desired to thank them for their gallant behaviour:—That this House doth highly approve and acknowledge the services of the seamen and royal marines serving on board his Majesty's ships employed in the late operations in the Eastern sead; and that the same be signified to them by the captains of the several ships, who are desired to thank them for their gallant behaviour."

All which were agreed to nem. con.