HC Deb 07 March 1811 vol 19 cc260-9
Mr. M. A. Taylor

rose to bring forward his motion respecting the cases of Suitors in the other House of Parliament, and in the Court of Chancery. The hon. gent, regretted that he should be compelled to resort to the painful necessity of calling the most serious attention of the House to the situation of appellants in the highest court of judicature in the kingdom, and to the cases of suitors in the high court of Chancery. He had thought that after the assurance which he received during the last session from the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that something would be done to redress the grievances of which suitors complained, that he should have been spared the trouble of intruding himself again on the notice of the House. As yet, however, notwithstanding the promise given, nothing had been done—at least no active measure had been taker. It was true that a motion had been made in the House of Lords, and a committee appointed to inquire into these cases. [Here the Speaker interrupted the hon. gent. by reminding him that he was not strictly in order in making references to the proceedings in the other House of Parliament.] Mr. M. A. Taylor proceeded, and admitted that he was not in order, observing, however, that in alluding to those proceedings, he spoke of the House of Lords as an appellant jurisdiction. In the House of Lords then a motion had been made— [The Speaker again, to order, requested the hon. gent. would abstain from making allusions to those proceedings, because this House had no distinct knowledge of them.] Mr. M. A. Taylor then declared, that though a committee for investigating the state of Appeals had, in another place, been appointed, yet he should not be deterred from offering to the House his opinions as to the line of duty which ought to be pursued. When it was made known to the House that great abuses did exist, not from the conduct of the judges, for that he was happy to say was far above suspicion, but from the delay of justice occasioned by the vast number of suitors which came before the court, it surely would not be denied, that in appealing to the justice of this House to render to the subjects of the realm what they had the right of claiming, he did no more than an act of duty. What he desired the House was, to appoint a committee to inquire into the state of Appeals, by searching the Lords' Journals; meaning to follow that motion up by another which might be attended with advantageous effects to the suitors. He trusted it would not be imputed to him that he came forward arrogantly with idle plans of innovation. All he desired for the subject was justice, as my lord Coke very constitutionally had said—" Let the suitors in court be heard fully without denial, and have justice speedily without delay." That was what he now asked. To shew that some alteration in the mode of administering justice in the courts of equity was now requisite, he need only state the information which he had received. This information, which might not be strictly correct, but which, however, would be gathered from the Register's Book in the court of Chancery, stated that suits had been so long before that court, that many persons interested therein had died before the termination of them: more than half of the property, the object of litigation, was consumed in carrying on the suit, and the survivors having no right to the property when the case was at length heard. When, therefore, such grievances were proved to exist, it became the duty of the legislature to apply the remedy, and he called upon the House now so to do. The public contributed enough for doing what actually was not done. The exorbitant sums paid for fees on trials, evidently shewed that at least the public were entitled to have justice. It might be said, that the second lord at the head of the court employed the whole of his time in giving his attention to the cases before him. Why, so he did, but was it possible for any man, however eminent his abilities or sedulous his attention—however anxious to dispose of the business of his court, when it had increased so much, could he do what a judge had done 50 years before, when the number of the cases was nothing in comparison with the present time In former times, in cases of bankruptcy only, namely, in 1731, just before lord Talbot was made lord chancellor, the commissions sued out in that year amounted to 160; they, notwithstanding the prosperity of the country (about which so much had been vaunted by gentlemen opposite), in 1809 amounted to 1,100; and in the present year, as he was informed, to upwards of 2,400! Besides this accumulation, there were those of wills, settlements, and a variety of other cases, which came under the cognizance of the court, to an amount four or five times greater than in lord Hardwicke's time. Was it possible, then, for one judge to get through such an immensity of business? With every respect for lord Eldon, whom he had known for many years, it was in his opinion impossible, however desirous he might be of doing his duty to the public, to get through it. In moving for the committee, he assured the House he meant nothing invidious to the noble lord. He asked merely for justice for the public. How were they to get redress? In former times, in strict conformity with the letter of the constitution, our ancestors had wisely provided for that redress by appointing what was termed "a committee of courts of justice." It was established in order that the subject might have recourse to it for redress. But even this committee was a thing unknown to the legislature now. The oldest officers of the House had not the least recollection of the sitting of such a committee, therefore that mode of obtaining redress was now entirely done away. In cases of appeal, in the highest court in the kingdom, tardy was the progress of justice there, for the reasons before stated. He was informed that at this time there were 300 appeals waiting for hearing in the order and course in which they were set down. The number of causes heard ill one year were not more than thirteen; of course, unless some provision was made by the legislature for the disposing of them, 20 years would not be sufficient time for hearing them. Did not this circumstance call for a remedy for the evil? It might be said, what hopes could he entertain of obtaining redress for the subject, when men of splendid talents and great abilities could not avert the evil complained of? To this he would reply, that his duty told him something must be done; and when he I recollected the promise made to him in May, since which a period of eight months had passed, and things remained in the same state, he could not but feel that it was necessary this House should at least appoint a committee of inquiry. The great fatigue which the Lord Chancellor had undergone, both in the House of Lords and the court of Chancery, was such, that only one cause had been heard, and that was not decided. With the assistance of the Master of the Rolls, the list of causes was so great, that more than one hundred were in arrear. Some of the cases which had been decided, from the very long time they were in court, involved much of hardship and distress to the parties concerned. He would instance one—the case of Miles, in which a widow claimed under a testamentary bequest of her husband, and the question which arose out of that bequest was, whether it did not bar her dowry. In the agitation of that question, a period of from 12 to H years had elapsed, in the course of which the widow was reduced to the utmost distress, and the decision was not yet known. Another case was that of children claiming under a will, and entitled to a marriage settlement. Another, was that of suitors claiming a beneficial interest in leases. It had happened that before the decision of the suit the leases had expired, consequently the party interested was deprived of his right. In other cases of tenantry for life, the tenant had died before the decision of the court. These were some of the cases of hardship. Would it, then, be too much to ask for redress? In addition to these grievances, he would state, from the list of cases in arrears (which he had gathered from two books, published by a Mr. Beck with and a Mr. Grant), two cases of appeal, the one, that of an English writ of error; the other, that of a Scotch writ of error. In the latter case, though the lords of session had made a decree in favour of the party, in 1805, yet he was served with a writ of error, and the business came before the House of Lords, and remained as yet undecided. The respondent, an ensign in the army, was in consequence, by by being kept out of his right, reduced to great distress, and but for the kindness of some friends, who knew his claim to be founded in justice, and procured for him an ensigncy, he must have been literally starving. The other case was that of two ladies of the names of Bacon and Wren, entitled to property, but of which a person named Clayton claimed three fourths. This case was heard in a court of law in 1801, and they got a verdict in their favour. Clayton, however, put in his writ of error, and brought the subject before the House of Lords. There it had continued ever since. The unfortunate ladies were at a very advanced period of life, and by this conduct of Clayton debarred the enjoyment of their right not only for the present, but perhaps eventually. The House, he was sure, would do something to remedy the evil, something to expedite the business, because if they did not, they would by their refusal be doing what my lord Coke reprobated, "denying of justice."—The hon. gent. did not mean to impute to any one person in the courts of equity any dereliction of duty; on the contrary, from the highest to the lowest they most conscientiously discharged their duty. The Lord Chancellor, with the most scrupulous attention to the interests of the public, selected the most respectable men to fill the offices. But though the head of that court were the most upright and conscientious judge that ever sat there, yet it was possible that solicitors might not be the most active. It was therefore the duty of the legislature to supply the deficiency, and appoint one or two more judges to dispose of the business. He trusted that it could not be said, that in moving for a committee he was running a race with the House of Lords. No such thing. All he wished was, that the House would, by the appointment of a committee, ascertain what number of appeals were really before the Lords, which they might learn by inspecting the Journals of that House—that being done, he would next desire that the committee should ascertain what number of causes had been disposed of in the court of Chancery in the last five years. This was the object which he had in view, and it was not an answer to him to say that it had been made in another place fourteen days ago. He did assure the House, that he never had a Chancery suit, nor would he have one. He would rather put up with the loss of 2 or 3,000l. than run the risk of a decision.—The hon. gent. then moved, "That a Committee be appointed to inspect the Journals of the House of Lords, to ascertain the number of Appeals now before that House, and to report the same to this House." The next motion which the hon. gent. had to make, he observed, was to ascertain the number of motions and questions decided and heard in the court of Chancery during the last five years, and the arrears of business in that court. On the question being put,

The Chancellor of the Exchequer

said, he was disposed to give the hon. gentleman the fullest credit for the principle on which he had acted, in bringing the subject under the consideration of the House; but he did not see that even if the motion were acceded to, the object which he had in view would be obtained, and therefore he did not conceive there was any ground for entertaining it. At the same time, while he admitted that the bon. gentleman had used great candour in his speech, he could not deny that great grievances did exist; that there was a deficiency in the power of administering justice in various points, and, consequently, that it became the duty of the legislature to see that deficiency supplied. But when he stated thus much, he must also observe, that this increase in the business of the courts arose principally from the opulence of the country. The House would keep in mind the particular points of jurisdiction to which the hon. gentleman had directed their attention in the first instance, namely, the number of appeals undecided in the other House. That being the first of the grievances complained of, the subject had been taken up by that House, and more correctly so than by this House. It would therefore, in his opinion, be advisable at least to wait and see what course that House would pursue on the subject. With respect to arrears of cases in the court of Chancery, when it was recollected, that in the House of Lords the noble lord who presided, also sat in the court of Chancery, the best course to pursue would be to ascertain, in the first instance, in what way the cases of appellants might be accelerated, so as to administer strict justice; and then to ascertain whether greater facilities might not be afforded, in order to expedite the business in the other court. When the hon. gentleman talked of providing some remedy for the grievances, he conceived that without abandoning that duty which most certainly belonged to this House in point of redressing the griev- ances of the subject, it would not be too much to say, that that justice would not be delayed in the quarter where at present it was under consideration. It was of no use, under these circumstances, for the House to adopt the motion of the hon. gent. and he was sure that no person would be more ready to admit than the hon. gent. that the subject was one which involved much of intricacy, and required great consideration. The public, feeling that the fact was so, would not be inclined to find fault with parliament for taking time, before they instituted any measure for the purpose of remedying the evil complained of. The measure to remedy the evil must be of a legislative nature, and originate of course in parliament. Whatever was done in this respect, whether as to the erection of new courts of judicature, or in any other shape, must have the sanction of the legislature. The hon. gentleman would not accuse him of great delay, when a Committee had already been appointed, who were about to make that inquiry which he wished. Delay of justice was a cause of complaint, but from the very nature of many of the cases, the necessity for that delay was apparent, and whatever number of judges might be appointed they could not remedy the grievance. There was great delay in cases of equity, in getting the parties before the court, on the merits or demerits of the case, and various other causes, before the judge could make up his mind to decide. The question was certainly of the greatest importance, but he was convinced it would be most advisable to wait to see what the Lords' Committee would do.

Mr. Adam

wished to state his opinion upon the question, an opinion which he had formed four years ago when the bill was before parliament respecting the Scotch Courts. He did not agree either with the right hon. gentleman, or his hon. friend. 'I he grievance of delay was very manifest; the delay in cases of appeal which came from Scotland, was more seriously felt than in this kingdom. With respect to the cases in the court of Chancery, he agreed with his hon. friend, that the noble lord evinced great anxiety to do justice to all parties, in administering the duties of that court; but it was certainly true that dilatoriness had arisen to a great height, and this without imputing blame to any one officer of the court. It was not so in the common courts of judicature; there more of dispatch took place in less time, and it was so from the very nature of the courts. In regard to cases of appeal, much remained yet to he done before even justice could be administered. Not agreeing, however, with the right hon. gentleman, and wishing that this House should not appear to abandon the duty cast upon it, and having a concurrent duty to perform with the other House, he should conceive that the best way to decide would be by adjourning the debate for three weeks, that in the event of the decision of the other Committee not being satisfactory, the business might be resumed in this House. The hon. and learned gent, moved, "That the debate be adjourned for three weeks."

Mr. Simeon

vindicated the Lord Chancellor from what he thought a stigma cast upon him by the hon. gentleman, by the observations he had made. The public would be deluded if they were allowed to think that blame was imputable to the Lord Chancellor. From the statement of the hon. gentleman, it would appear as if the noble lord did not devote much time to the suitors of his court, but rather attended to politics. There was a vast variety of judicial business which the public knew nothing of, such as demurrers, bills of exceptions, &c. which the noble lord was obliged to attend to. When the hon. gentleman talked of only one cause being heard, he was not correct; and he certainly had not done the noble lord justice in quoting from a publication in which the author had misstated and misrepresented the cases, and had charged the court of Chancery with making use of the money of suitors in building a register office, and some other buildings for the convenience of the officers of the court. With respect to the motion, he should vote against it, because the matter was taken up in another place.

Sir Samuel Romilly

declared, that if the question of adjournment should not be carried, he should vote for the motion of his hon. friend: and he was desirous of stating his reasons for giving the vote which he should give on this occasion. The motion would not convey, either directly or indirectly, any mark of censure upon the noble and learned lord, as the hon. and learned gentleman opposite had just supposed; and he did assure the House, that nothing could give him greater concern than to be thought to give his consent to any motion which could in any way be construed into a desire to reflect upon the conduct of that noble and learned lord. No man had experienced more uniform acts of kindness than himself from the noble and learned lord. Indeed, his general attention to the bar, his conciliatory demeanor, and his strict love of justice, had endeared him to all the gentlemen who practised in that court. A man more eminently qualified, in point of talents and learning, for all parts of his profession, he knew not; and he most firmly believed that he never had his equal, in point of anxiety, to do justice to the suitors of the court. If he had any defect, it was an over anxiety in that respect. That being his opinion, it could not be imputed to him, (sir Samuel) that he wished in any thing he might say, to reflect on the character or conduct of the noble and learned lord; but when it was notorious that great and crying grievances really existed, would it not be as his hon. friend had justly said, "a denial of justice," not to inquire into them? The fact was, that from the great pressure of business within the last two years, causes had stood for that time in the Lord Chancellor's paper for hearing, without having yet been heard. Was not this period of delay a sufficient ground for inquiry? In the House of Lords the delay was of a much greater length. In one cause, which was that of a copy right, which had been before the House some years from the court of session, at the time the decision was known, the interest had ceased, for the period of the right (fourteen years) had expired. Another man who was about to present a petition was pining in gaol. With respect to the question, the first thing to be done was to ascertain the cause of the evil complained of: that being done, then to provide a remedy either of a permanent or of a temporary nature. Whether that could be done but by making an addition to the judicial officers, or in whatever other manner, was the subject for after discussion. He much doubted whether the increase of causes since the time of my lord Hardwicke, was greater or not. The case of bankruptcies was certainly a great evil. The number of commissions sealed in the last year was as many as in the preceding year. A commission in that respect might assist the Chancellor, and by affording a temporary remedy, get rid of the press of business of that nature. The right hon. gent. had stated that inquiry was going on, but he had not stated whether any plan was ma- tured, or whether it was in the contemplation of any one to bring forward a plan. At the same time he admitted to the right hon. gent., that it was a question which involved great difficulties. If nothing was projected but a committee, nothing then had been done for upwards of ten months, though much had been promised. It was the duty of this House to make the inquiry and not to wait for any result of proceedings in another place. This House was the proper channel for investigating public grievances, and they must not be stopped because a committee in another place were thinking about them.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer

said, that he thought the most expedient course was, as the delay complained of consisted chiefly in the appellant jurisdiction of the House of Lords, that the remedy should originate with them.

The Attorney General

stated, with regard to the proceedings in the courts of law, that there was not the slightest occasion for any alteration there. The business of each term was concluded in the term, and that of every sitting was concluded before the commencement of the next term.

Mr. Taylor

agreed in the amendment of his hon. friend, but complained that the arguments of another hon. friend of his were rather directed against a book which he did not write, than against any thing he had said. He quoted some additional cases of delay, and disclaimed any intention to cast the slightest reflection upon his noble friend who was placed at the head of the court of Chancery.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer

said, it was his intention, if the motion of adjournment were negatived, to move the previous question.

The House then divided, when there appeared—

For the Motion 47
Against it 87
Majority against the Amendment— — 40

The previous question was then carried without a division.