§ Mr. Whitbreadrose for the purpose of submitting to the house the proposition of which he had given notice, and to which he could not anticipate the slightest rational objection. It was his intention to have pressed this proposition on a former night, if he had not been induced to withdraw it on that occasion, in consequence of the suggestions of several members, that they were not prepared to discuss the question then, as it had come upon them by surprise. The right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer had declared himself ready to meet the question in that instance, and to give a direct negative to a Resolution, that it was desirable still further to limit the number of persons, holding places, or pensions, or sinecures, having seats in that house. That right hon. gent. could not have forgotten the foundation of the reference to the Committee of Finance on this subject, which reference had grown out of a proposition of a noble lord (lord Cochrane) now member for Westminster, submitted to that house on the 7th of July 1807. The ground upon which the noble lord had brought forward that proposition, was the impression upon his own mind, that the influence of the crown in that house was considerable, and a conviction, that, according to the opinion of the public, the influence, of the crown in parliament was too great; that the corruptions which were known to exist, were the necessary consequence of that influence; and that a solemn investigation was necessary in order to ascertain by what constitutional means means it could be reduced. With a view to this investigation, the noble lord h id moved for a return of all the places, pensions, sinecures, offices, or emoluments under government, enjoyed by persons having seats in that house, or by their immediate connections. The right hon. gent. however, generalized the proposition of the noble lord, in the reference he made to the Committee, directing it to report upon all sinecures, pension, &c. distinguishing those held by members of parliament. It was said at the time, that the object of the right hon. gent. was to slur over the matter, and to mix it with other considerations, in such a manner, that it would be impossible to come to any distinct decision upon the real 935 question. He did not mean to say, that the right hon. gent. had any such intention; but certainly the effect of his interference on the occasion was, that the whole question became so confused, that the simple and distinct proposition of the noble lord was absolutely lost in the extraneous complicated matter blended with it. When the house had been lately in a Committee on the Bill of his hon. friend, and a reference was made to the original intention in forming the Committee of Finance, it was proposed to leave out the word "influence," as if the reference to that Committee extended only to economy and not to influence. The noble lord who had originated the proposition for the appointment of the Committee, was at the time in the house; and he had expected that the noble lord would have taken the occasion to recal the attention of the house to the real state of the original reference to the Committee. As the noble lord had left the house without saying any thing upon the subject, he then felt himself bound to move the Amendment he had submitted to the Committee, which the right hon. gent. had declared himself ready to meet, but which, on the suggestions of others, he had then been induced to withdraw. On putting the question at that time, he intimated his intention to bring it forward in a distinct shape, in the course of the present session. But owing to some mistake respecting the notice, and considering the advanced period of the season, as well as the very thin attendance which was likely to continue during the remainder of the session, of which the state of the house at that moment was a proof, he had changed his intention, and now proposed to move solely a Resolution, that at an early period of next session, that house would appoint a Committee to consider of the propriety of providing further limitations of the numbers of persons holding places, pensions, or sinecures, and seats in that house. To that Resolution he did not think that any opposition could be made, because, whatever might be the opinion of the right hon. gent. upon the ulterior question, as the influence of the crown in that house was now avowed, and said to be necessary, a doctrine which had never before been tolerated in that house—he thought that the right hon. gent., from deference to public opinion, would net object to this Resolution. It was strongly impressed upon the public mind, that the influence to which he alluded was the 936 cause of all the corruptions in the state, and consequently led to the increase of the public burdens so grievously felt by all classes of the community. In deference, therefore, to the opinion of the public, the right hon. gent. would not, he trusted, make any objection to his proposition, especially as, in the next session, when the subject should be brought fully before the house, he would have an opportunity of shewing, if he could, that the influence of the crown was not so great as was supposed, or so prominent as to require any reduction.—But here he was bound to state, that in his view of the subject, the influence of the crown had increased, and ought to be diminished by those constitutional means which parliament had been in the habit, frome time to time, of resorting to for its reduction. Unless those means which by constitutional right and habitual exercise, belonged to that and the other house of parliament, should be employed to diminish the increasing influence of the crown, it would in the end overthrow the two other legislative branches of the state. A right hon. gent. opposite (Mr. Rose) who had studied this subject with diligence, had on a former night entered into statements, and produced tables to the house to shew, that the influence of the crown had been diminished, rather than increased, because there were fewer placemen in parliament at present than in former periods. He did not mean to stop here to inquire into the accuracy of these tables, or the justice of the right hon. gentleman's deductions from them. Though it might be true that there were fewer placemen in that house now than formerly, that would not shew that the influence of the crown had undergone any diminution. That unobserved influence of the crown out of doors, growing out of the appointment to the various and numberless offices under the patronage of government, was alarmingly progressive, and might render it necessary to diminish the number of public officers and placemen eligible to seats in that house.—Every man who contemplated the vast accumulation of the national debt, the enormous extension of the army and navy, the correspondent augmentation of all the other public establishments, and the mass of patronage in the gross and in the detail that must necessarily arise out of such a state of things, must be convinced that the influence of the crown has increased and is increasing. The next question was, whe- 937 ther that being the case, it ought not to be diminished? It was his decided and conscientious opinion that it ought, and that it must be reduced, if parliament were disposed to do its duty. As an instance of the alarming increase of the influence of the crown, he might refer to an act which passed within the last two years, the act for the establishment of the Local Militia. He begged gentlemen to consider what a mass of influence was creased by the establishment of that large force, extending too throughout every part of the kingdom; he wished them only to contemplate the means which this single establish merit afforded for attaching persons of every description to the government, as would be obvious from the number of commissions signed and published in every gazette.—[Signed by the lieutenants, whispered across the table.]—Yes, signed by the lords lieutenants; but the persons were to be approved of by the government, and, consequently, indebted to the government for their commissions. Besides, the number of applications to the Secretary of State's office, and the sums of money indispensably issued for the support of this force, necessarily and unquestionably increased the influence of the crown over members of that house, through their constituents.—There were numerous other instances which he could state, but as there was another important subject to come on, he should not think it justifiable in him to occupy too much of the attention of the house, in as much as the principal question would not be discussed till next session. The right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer had, on a former night, taunted him with being a theorist, a disciple of speculation, whilst he claimed for himself to have the practice all on his side. So far however, from being supported only by theory, he would contend, that he had the uniform practice of parliament and the sound principles of the constitution on his side. During the whole of the last century, measures had been adopted from time to time, for the gradual improvement of the constitution of that house, by the removal from its body of persons dependent upon the crown. Of this description were the various Acts for the exclusion of disqualified persons from seats in that house, and for the disfranchisement of voters who might have rendered themselves unworthy of the elective franchise by the corrupt abuse of that valuable privilege. Every such measure was more calculated to pu- 938 rify parliament than to curtail the influence of the crown. He did not rest therefore upon theory; his Resolution was founded upon the original practice of that house, and was but an extension of the principle which had been uniformly acted upon since the Revolution. Having proved his Resolution to be conformable to the uniform practice of parliament, he should then contend that the present was a proper time for acting upon it, by diminishing the number of Placemen and Pensioners, and others influenced by the government, having seats in that house. He was bound, however, to add, that that part or the Act of Settlement which was to exclude all public officers and placemen from seats in that house after a certain time, was a mere theory that never had been acted upon, for it ceased to be a theory, even before it could have became a law. The principles laid down in that part of the Act of Settlement would, if acted upon, prove most mischievous in practice, and highly detrimental to the public service. But there was an opposite mischief, which it was equally the duty of that house to guard against; they might have too many such persons in parliament; a mischief which existed at present, and which it was the bounden duty of that house to correct. A right hon. gent. opposite (Mr. Rose) had said on a former night, that, besides the great officers of state, it was necessary that others connected with the public departments should have seats in parliament, as the duties of their situations were intimately connected with the business of that house, and could not be effectually discharged if they were excluded from seats in it. Granted: this he did not pretend to deny. It was never his wish to exclude a reasonable proportion of the gentlemen connected with the public departments from that house; but he thought that some limits should be set to the number, and was convinced that there were at present more than were necessary among the members of that house. He begged to be understood in this observation as leaving the persons so circumstanced altogether out of his consideration, and looking only to the practice. Many of the hon. members who were in that situation were highly respectable, and would, no doubt, give their votes independently on the same side as at present, even if they had no connection with government or the public departments. Any observa- 939 tions, therefore, which he should have to make, would not apply to the particular persons now in office: others had before them been in the same situation, as others might after them; the practice alone he condemned, and to that he should be a most decided enemy, whoever might be involved in it. In looking to the list upon the table he was prepared to assert, that it did not appear to him necessary that all the commissioners of the Admiralty should have seals in that house. Whenever the First Lord, as it often happened, was not a member of that house, two Commissioners and the Secretary of the Admiralty would obviously be enough to have seats in that house, and fully adequate to do all the parliamentary business of that department. The same observation he should make respecting the Commissioners of the Treasury, of whom he was of opinion, that only a certain proportion, together with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, should be allowed to sit in parliament. In the Ordnance department, as the Master general was scarcely ever a member of that house, he was of opinion that the Secretary might be allowed to become a member of that house; bat he could see no reason why the Storekeeper, the Treasurer, and the Clerk of the Delivery, should be eligible to seats in parliament? With regard to the Paymasters of the Army, it would be desirable that the Principal Paymaster should sit in that house; but there could be no necessity whatever for admitting either the joint or the deputy paymaster to the same privilege. As to the Board of Controul, as the business of that office had very little connection with the details of parliament, he could see no reason why any more than the President of that Board should have permission to sit in parliament. Having said that he would not object to the efficient officers of the State being members of that house, and even having admitted that some of the subordinate officers connected with the public departments might be allowed to sit in parliament, in order that they might have an opportunity to become acquainted with the business of that house, and fit themselves for higher offices, he should confine his concessions to them, because he did not think it at all necessary, that any other placemen should have seats in that house. He should now leave that part of the question, and go to his majesty's Household, the individuals connected with which having seats in that 940 house, were so many advocates for prerogative, and added considerably to the influence of the crown in parliament. This might be extremely proper; but it did not appear so clearly in that light to him. Gentlemen might think that it was necessary and right that the ministers should have a controul over a certain number of the members of that house; they might think, and maintain too, that it was proper that the crown should have, as in other times it had, a party in that house to controul both sides of the house. But to this point he should only allude, because, however relaxed their practice had been of late, and however difficult the Speaker might find it to resume those reins which his predecessors had found effectual to check all irregularity and disorder, but which had been wrenched from him, certainly without any the most distant imputation against himself, by the gross and disorderly assertions to which he had been reduced to the necessity of listening; still relaxed as their practice had been, there were limits which it would not be justifiable on any ground to overstep, and consequently he should only allude to a circumstance which he could not without violating order venture to mention. He could not discover any reason why the Groom of his majesty's Bedchamber, the first Equerry to his majesty, or the Vice Chamberlains to his majesty and the queen, should be members of that house, the duties of their office respectively not having the slightest connection with parliamentary business. It was his opinion, that the presence of such officers in parliament had no other effect than to increase the influence of the crown.—The cases he had mentioned, out of the many that could be brought under the consideration of the house, would be sufficient, he trusted, to prove to the house the necessity that existed for providing some further limitation of the number of Placemen and Pensioners having seats in that house.—Without supposing the existence of any corrupt or dishonourable motive in such persons, there were even virtues in their nature that might give them an improper bias; gratitude and friendship might blind them to their public duty, and the respect they owed the constitution. It had been provided by an act of queen Anne, that no persons having pensions during pleasure, should be eligible to sit in parliament. The principle of the act was sound, but it was soon evaded, for Pensions were 941 afterwards granted for terms of years. By the act of George the First it was provided, that persons holding pensions for terms of years should not be capable of sitting in Parliament. This was an extension of the principle of the former act, but the measure stopped short of the limit it should have been carried to, and left it to a third act to exclude life-pensioners from that house. There could be no doubt, that the persons to whom pensions were granted, must feel attached to the government to which they were indebted for the grants; but it might be said that the holders of pensions for life were more independent than those who held during pleasure, or for a term of years. Undoubtedly it would appear that such must be the case; but when it was considered that pensions might be granted for a term of years, greater than the probable or possible duration of any life, it must appear extraordinary, why the Act of George I. had not been extended to pensioners for life as well as pensioners for a term of years. The holders of sinecure places ought also to be excluded from scats in that house, because it was maintained by some persons that such places ought still to be continued, in order that they might be made the reward of merit and public services;—they created influence, and should therefore disqualify for parliament, it might perhaps be right that a sinecure place held for life should not render the holder incapable of sitting in parliament. But sinecures were not always bestowed as the reward of merit: they were often granted without any reference to services, and in such cases were the instruments of the most pernicious and reprehensible species of influence. He had thus stated the views upon which he was induced to bring forward the Resolution he had to propose. He hoped, that no person would take alarm at the production of such a proposition at this particular moment, as if it was the first step to a Parliamentary Reform. Whatever might be the difference prevailing in the house upon the subject of Parliamentary Reform, he was persuaded, that this was a proposition which should unite both the advocates and the opponents of Reform in its support. Those who were adverse to Parliamentary Reform, according to the usual sense in which it was understood, would do well to vote for his Resolution. The adoption of such a proposition would shew the people, that the house of commons had the means and the 942 disposition to reform itself, and deprive the advocates of change of one of the strongest of their arguments against the constitution of that house. The friends of Parliamentary Reform, on the other hand, had an interest in supporting his proposition, because in whatever way the question of Reform may be disposed of, however the members of that house may be elected, they must agree with him, that it was not desirable that the influence of the crown should be increased in that house.—He did not recollect any thing further that was necessary for him to say on this subject in order to induce the house to agree to his Resolution. He had stated on a former night his opinion upon what was called granting remunerations, but what he considered anticipations of services. He was still of the same opinion, and looked upon such grants as a most prodigal waste of the public money.—Much he had heard said of purchasing the lives of professional men, that is, of giving them a compensation for abandoning their professions. This practice he was sure could not be right upon principle, and appeared to him to be a gross and glaring abuse, the growth of modern times. He was glad, however, to take that opportunity of adverting to what had fallen from a noble friend in answer to some observations he had made on a former night, relative to the appointment of a learned gentleman, Mr. M'Donald, to be an American commissioner. He felt pleasure in stating, that he believed his noble friend's representation on that occasion, to have been correct, and that Mr. M'Donald not only had been distinguished in his profession, and ably executed the duties of a commissioner, to which he had been appointed, but had made no stipulation whatever respecting the amount of compensation to which he was entitled for having quitted his profession: the grant and the amount of that compensation having been the gratuitous retribution of the government. Though he considered the case of this gentleman as a distinguished exception, he was no less an enemy to the principle, and entirely condemned the practice. The hon. member then moved his Resolution to the following effect, "Resolved that this house will early in the next session of parliament, take into its most serious consideration how far it may be expedient to provide some further limitation to the number of Persons holding seats in this House, to- 943 gether with Pensions, Sinecures, and Places of emolument under the crown."
Mr. Rose, as one of the persons alluded to by the hon. gent., and whom he wished to disqualify from holding seats in that house, begged to say a few words.—The hon. gent. had proposed no practical amendment to the great influence of which he complained. That house consisted of 658 members, and the measure suggested by the hon. gent. would not go farther than to disqualify 25 of them, which was a number so small that it could not make any sensible alteration in the constitution or the decisions of that house. He had occasion to state a few days ago, that the number of placemen now in parliament was less by 18 or 19, than it was in the year 1781. He had since found that in fact there were about 25 or 26 less than at the former period. When the hon. gent. spoke of the unobserved influence of the crown, he certainly had forgotten, or perhaps not attended to the statement he had then made. The diminution of the influence of the crown over the members of that house was still greater in respect of this, which was called the unobserved influence, than in the ostensible places granted by the government. Formerly, valuable bonuses in loans, lotteries, and contracts, used to be given to the members of that house; and nothing was more common than members having the profits of offices held in other names, and of which none but the ministers, or those immediately about them, knew any thing. There were probably, in former times, above 50 or 60 members who thus enjoyed concealed favours from the crown. As to the king's immediate household, or grooms of the bedchamber, he had never heard of their influencing the decisions of that house. He believed that at present there was but one amongst them who was a member of the house of commons. As to the provisions so often spoken of in the Act of Settlement, they were immediately found to be impracticable, and that serious inconveniences would result from them; and therefore this part of the Act of Settlement was very soon repealed. It appeared to him, upon the whole, that if the increasing influence of the crown was what the hon. gent. complained of, he had not pointed out a sufficient remedy.
The Chancellor of the Exchequersaid, that, as the hon. gent. had begun his speech by saying, that he could not conceive any possible objection to his motion, 944 he therefore thought it necessary for him to give his reasons for opposing it. He considered that if the house were to agree to the motion, it would be expressing its opinion that it was desirable to take the subject into serious consideration, with a view of diminishing the number of placemen in parliament. He, therefore, conceived, that it would be prejudgcing the question to agree to such a motion, whereas the question would not be prejudged by their not agreeing to it. It would be open to the hon. gent. to bring it forward as early as he pleased in the course of the next session. The hon. gent. had stated, that at no former time was it ever argued in that house, that the crown ought to have an influence over the members of that house. Now, he would venture to say, that whenever the question of reform was agitated there it was resisted on that very ground, that practically it was of advantage to the country that the crown should have some influence in that house. Even the celebrated Resolution of Mr. Dunning, "That the influence of the crown had increased, was increasing, and ought to be diminished," did not go so far as to take away all influence from the crown. In this motion, which the hon. gent. seemed to have in view in bringing forward his present resolution, such influence was to a certain degree recognised, else the motion would have been, not that it should be diminished, but that it should be abolished and removed out of those walls. As to what he had heard of a great discontent prevailing in the public mind, on account of abuses in the constitution, he did not believe the fact. It was a topic used by those demagogues who argued at public meetings; but he did not believe it was the sense of the country. He could not conceive any good that could possibly result from this motion, and therefore he could not support it. If the influence of the crown had increased, the influence of the popular part of the constitution had increased also. The increase of wealth and independence was a sort of countervailing influence which balanced the increasing influence of the crown. He was astonished that the hon. gent. should consider the establishment of the Local Militia as an increase of influence, when he must know that he himself was not in the slightest degree influenced by holding a high commission, that of colonel, in the Local Militia. The fact was, that the ap- 945 pointments were given, not by the crown, but upon the recommendation of the lord lieutenants of counties, to which recommendation the crown had certainly a negative. Conceiving that the motion could have no other effect but to prejudge the question, he should not support it.
§ Mr. Tierneysaid, that as the Resolution was now worded it would prejudge the question, but he thought with a slight alteration that objection could be got rid of. If his hon. friend would limit his motion to a resolution, that the house should in the next session of parliament enter into the consideration of the subject alluded to in his notice, he should agree to the motion. Although he was not for yielding to popular clamour, yet if the public opinion evidently sat in one direction, he thought it ought not to controul absolutely the decisions of that house, but that it should induce them to consider that subject with peculiar attention. This matter, however, did not originate from popular clamour, or from any thing which took place out of doors; it was from an act of the house itself; from a Report of a Committee which they had appointed to investigate this particular business. Upon that ground, he thought the house might very properly pledge itself to take into consideration early in the next session, a report of one of their own committees. They would be only pledged to consider the subject, but not pledged as to the manner they were to determine OH it. He thought that some of the placemen mentioned ought not to sit in parliament; but he disagreed with many people, in thinking there could be any sound objection to sinecure placemen and pensioners, who had their appointments for life. They were just as independent as any other men: and the late administration were constantly opposed by many persons of that description, and the present administration by some.
Lord Folkestonerose, in consequence of the last observation which had fallen from the right hon. member, who appeared to him to have fallen into a great mistake. The confusion of the right hon. gent. seemed to consist in this. Many of those who held sinecures and pensions for life, when they voted against a particular administration, conceived they shewed a great deal of independence, and that therefore they were very fit and proper men to sit in that house. This was not, however, the sort of independence which he thought should 946 be required from those who called themselves the representatives of he people. The sort of feeling that became a representative of the people was a common interest with the people at large. Those who held these sinecures and pensions had a different interest. They had other people to look to, to whom they were bound, if not by expectancy, at least by gratitude, and therefore they were not altogether as independent as other men, or as fit for representatives of the people. If they did not expect any thing from ministers, therefore, they had their debt of gratitude to pay to them, and did not continue with the people, as true and honest representatives ought to do. On this ground he objected to them as much as to persons having pensions during pleasure.
§ Lord H. Pettydid not conceive that the reduction of placemen in that house would produce much effect. The increase of the influence of the crown was principally from the increased patronage in the revenue, the army, and navy, but did not appear directly upon the members of that house. Though the influence of the crown, upon the whole, had greatly increased, it had rather diminished in that house. The immense military force, and the expenditure of the country, were the causes of this increased influence, which, though it did not operate so much in that house, had a great effect on the country at large. His hon. friend would agree with him, that the inflence of the crown, instead of increasing, had diminished in that house, when he stated that in 1738 the number of persons having places and pensions under the crown amounted to 234, having among them an income from the public purse of 212,000l. per annum. The observation of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, however, as to the motion of Mr. Dunning, did not apply. He did not allude in that motion to the influence of the crown in that house, but to the influence of the crown generally. That great man would have been the last person in the country to admit, that the influence of the crown in that house ought to prevail, or that such an idea ever had been, or ever ought to be, entertained in parliament.—One reason why he agreed with the motion, was, because he thought the Welsh Judges ought to be excluded from seats in that house, as should also the Masters in Chancery. He once more begged to recommend to the right hon. gent. the review of the establishment as to the Welsh 947 Judges, and particularly that fiction of law, that there was one sovereign of this country and another of Wales. He thought the Welsh Judges should be removed entirely, that Wales should be treated as a part of England, and three more added to the number of the Judges of this country.
Mr. Ponsonbysaid, he felt not the least difficulty in agreeing with the motion proposed. It seemed to him, that after the Report of the Committee of Finance upon this subject, and the consideration given to that Report in the course of last week, if they were to negative this motion it would be almost saying to the country, that they were to disregard totally that part of the Report; a proceeding which would be most impolitic, injurious, and improvident. He was not prepared to say what offices or sinecures ought to be abolished; at the same time he could venture to say, that his views of the subject did not coincide entirely with those who had spoken, though he was convinced that something should be done. To say that it was only necessary to exclude the members holding official situations, from that house, shewed an ignorance of the constitution, and the manner in which the government was carried on. Before the Revolution the government was conducted out of parliament; but since the Revolution the practice of the constitution was, that it should be conducted in parliament, and principally in that house. It was essential, therefore, that the servants of government should be there in person. What use, however, could there be of persons who had places holding seats in parliament if they had no business to do there? Of this description were the officers referred to by his noble friend.—As to sinecures or pensions for life, he thought it not fair to extend the principle of exclusion to all who might hold such appointments. In this country rewards for services were conferred in various ways, and to some persons it might be more gratifying, that the reward should descend to their families than be enjoyed by themselves. Would it not be hard, that in a case of this kind, the person enjoying such reward should be excluded from parliament, though altogether independent of the crown. He himself held a place for life, in lieu of his seat on the Chancery Bench in Ireland. He was not, however, under any obligation, to the crown for it; he held it under an act of parliament. He could not, therefore, agree, that all persons holding situations for life should be ex- 948 cluded from parliament, so long as they were situations that rendered them independent. The noble lord (Folkestone) said, that persons holding pensions had no common interest with the people of this country. Did the noble lord mean that he had no interest in the Habeas Corpus, or in the constitution? He should be glad to know why he had no interest in all the laws existing for the preservation of the liberty of the country and civil prosperity of the kingdom, because he held an office for life? It had been recognised that since the Revolution ministers should sit in parliament, but never that they should be suffered to influence or controul the decision of parliament. If it were so, what would it amount to, but that two branches of the government were to be corrupted by the third? This house, however, never did give to the crown any power so to influence it. The influence of the crown in our naval, military, and other branches, had greatly increased. Without entrenching on the constitutional influence of the crown, he thought something might be done by agreeing to the motion of his hon. friend, which would prove useful to the country, creditable to the house, and satisfactory to the public. If the house rejected the motion, it would appear, as if they intended to do nothing at ail in the business now suggested.
Lord Folkestoneexplained, that he did not mean that pensioners had no common interest with the people, but that they had an interest separate and distinct from die interest of the people.
Mr. Secretary Canningsaid, that he could by no means agree with the hon. mover in the premises he had laid down, and of course it could not be expected that he should agree in his conclusion. He could neither agree with him, that the influence of the crown over that house had increased in a great and unparalleled degree, nor could he agree with him in supposing that it would be advantageous to reduce the number of placemen in that house. There was one pare of the original argument which was now abandoned. It was no longer insisted that the number of placemen in that house had increased of late years; and it had been correctly stated by a noble lord (H. Petty) that far less than a century ago, the number of placemen in that house was in a proportion of at least five to one greater than at present. It would no longer be contended that the number of placemen in parliament had in- 949 creased, and he felt it necessary for him to state the reasons why he thought it would be improper to drive those out of parliament who were now in it. As it was evident that the house of commons must always want information on various public subjects from the members of the administration, it was much better that ministers, and persons in ostensible situations, should be spoken to in their places, as members of that house, than be brought up to the bar like culprits. The present practice experience had shewn to be a wholesome one, and if it did not at present exist, it would be beneficial now to introduce it. If no placemen were suffered to sit in parliament but the ministers themselves, it would follow that when the present generation of ministers were over, they must be succeeded by raw and inexperienced persons. This was a necessary consequence; for it those who were acquiring knowledge of the business of government in inferior departments, were to be absolutely excluded from sitting in parliament, in what office were they to learn that necessary and constitutional part of a minister's duty, to explain to that house the motives of their conduct, and to defend the propriety and policy of their measures? If men were to be trained up for ministers in any other school besides that of parliament, if the crown were to look for its ministers any where but in parliament, then, indeed there might be a well founded jealousy of the power of the crown. He knew no greater security to the people for the faithful discharge of the duties of government, than that those who held high situations should have seats in that house, and be there obliged to explain the motives of their measures and conduct to the house and to the country. If we were now to set about contriving a plan to enable the crown to chuse its ministers any where out of parliament, such a plan would be most, injurious to the liberty of the country. This was now by long habit, though not by established law, the practice of the constitution, and he was convinced that it could not be changed without great public detriment. This motion would go to remove from their seats in that house many distinguished persons who held sinecure places or pensions for life, as the reward of public services performed either by themselves or their fathers. This exclusion of persons who were receiving rewards for their past services, he conceived, would be equally erroneous and unjust as 950 that of the public officers themselves. He believed it would be admitted that both in the other house of parliament and in this, there were at least as many persons holding Pensions and Sinecures who voted against ministers as for them. They, on all occasions, voted as if they had no advantages from the crown. The right hon. gent. (Mr. Ponsonby) had marked so strongly his own pension as coming from parliament instead of his majesty, that he could not forbear from saying, that if any desire of making that house the source from whence such rewards should flow, lurked behind, he should esteem it a most lavish, and preposterous idea of remuneration, and he thus early intimated his dissent from any such proposition. The right hon. and learned gent. (Mr. Ponsonby) had himself a pension for life, and yet the present ministers had always the advantage of his vigilance and correction. There were other hon. gentlemen on the some side of the house, who, though long holding sinecures or pensions, were constantly arrayed against his majesty's present government. A noble lord (Folkestone) had talked of pensioners being bound by gratitude. The gratitude, however, of those gentlemen for the remuneration they received for their services, did not certainly appear to be any gratitude to the crown. The right hon. and learned gent. (Mr. Ponsonby) had spoken of his pension being conferred by an act of parliament, and not by the crown. The right hon. gent. might, therefore, well conceive that it was to the parliament, and not to the crown that his gratitude was due. If there lurked in the mind of any gentleman the idea of parliamentary pensions being granted as the reward of public services, he, for his part, would much rather forego all claim to remuneration. He did not know any course that would lead to a more lavish and preposterous expenditure. He felt satisfied that the influence of the crown over that house was gradually, but constantly diminishing. He wondered that the hon. gent. (Mr. Whitbread) who himself held a conspicuous situation in the Local Militia, should consider appointments of that sort likely to influence the votes of members. He was surprized to hear that gentleman, in the language and tone of manly independence, complain that such appointments as he himself held, made men dependent on the crown. There was an old philosopher, who said he would not argue with a man who had 50 legions, and 951 for the same reason it did not become him to argue about the influence of an appointment in the Militia with a Militia Colonel (A laugh). But if this establishment of Local Militia were so very bad, and if it introduced 300 sycophants and dependants on the crown, he would ask, was that great evil to be redressed by driving two Lords of the Admiralty out of that house? (A laugh). The number which the hon. gent. proposed to turn from the house was so very small, that it could not sensibly affect the votes of the house; but the absence of those members might deprive them of a great deal of useful information. He therefore could not by any means concur in a proposition which would appear like an acknowledgment on the part of the house, that there were too many placemen among them. If the hon. gent. chose to argue that point next session, he might do so without being at all prejudiced by the decision of the present night.
Sir Francis Burdettexpressed the particular disadvantage under which he rose to reply to the commander of so many legions, as he presumed the right hon. gent. who last addressed them was. For his own pan, he admitted, that his knowledge of the constitution was principally derived from the Statute Book. He was of opinion that the commons house of parliament ought to be a full and fair representation of the people; and so thinking, he could not but consider that argument as most extraordinary, which defended the defects in the representation of the people, upon the ground that there were at present in that house many persons who, under a reformed system, would not be returned. What was this, but to assert that there were representatives of the people as the house was now constituted, who had not only a separate, but a contrary interest to that of the people? Amongst the many evils which the defective state of the national representation engendered, there were none more grievous than the obligation under which the house frequently was placed to resort to palliatives for the purpose of staying the evil; an evil which admitted of no palliative. It had been stated by a right hon. and learned gent. (Mr. Ponsonby,) in illustration of a principle, that he, though holding a pension in right of his late office (that of Lord Chancellor for Ireland) still held that pension totally independent of the crown. Now, he must own, that in his view, both the principle and the practice of conferring 952 such pensions, were a very great and objectionable public grievance. It was hard that the people should be saddled with such burdens. Within a very short period the country was called upon to pay pensions to four different Chancellors of 5,000l. a year each. Why were persons holding such offices removed on the change of every successive administration, thereby impeding the course of public justice; at the same time that it aggravated the public pressing? In supporting the present Resolution he still felt that it was only palliative, capable of producing good as far as it went. He, however, would feel much regret, if it tended to mislead the public judgment, or diverted it from the only redress adequate to the evil, namely, a Reform in the Representation of the People. For that there could be no substitute; as upon a free and pure election, where the choice of the people selected those entrusted with the disposal of their properties and persons, the very spirit of the constitution depended. If, however, it was to be all influence (in other words, corruption) in one branch, and all submission in the other, then he could not consider the whole but as a mere farce. Would any man pretend to say, that such a pure and free election existed, when it was asserted and proved in petitions before the house, that 157 Borough-mongers returned a majority of its members to that house? He laid no stress upon any augmented influence of the crown, but he reprobated a system which alternately in the name of the crown oppressed the people, and in the name of the people diminished the just prerogative of the executive branch of the constitution. He knew that the crown was entitled to the constitutional exercise of its prerogative by the law of the land, and that it was necessary to entrust to the executive government strong powers for the able and effectual administration of public concerns. But it was also a part of the constitution, and the very living principle of popular representation, that the people should not be taxed without their own consent, and that their persons should be safe under the protection of the laws. Secure them in those two points, and on their part there will be no attempt to encroach upon the rights or just prerogatives of the crown. Where can the security be found? Only in a fair and adequate representation of the people in the commons house. This, he would ever contend, was the plain and simple principle, certain of producing the 953 desired effect, and rendering unnecessary substitutes and palliatives of any sort.
Lord Porchesterreprobated the proposition of excluding official characters from that house, as replete with evils of serious magnitude. The noble lord had determined to vote however for the Resolution, under the impression, that there might possibly be a description of persons holding places and enjoying pensions, whom it would be proper to remove from that house.
Mr. Ponsonbyin explanation stated, that the hon. baronet must know that in the nature of things it was impossible, that a Chancellor could remain in office who differed wholly in his political views from the other members of the king's government.
§ Mr. Ellisonprotested against the libels which he too often heard uttered against the laws and constitution of the country—a constitution under which the people enjoyed a greater participation of civil blessings than any other empire in the world. The hon. baronet, he was sorry to say, saw nothing but deformities, and was wholly led away by a predilection for dry abstract propositions. He could not vote for the proposed Resolution, brought forward at a time when the general purity of public management was so universally admitted (a laugh).
Mr. Hawkins Browneexpressed himself of the same opinion. He was far from thinking the influence of the crown had increased in that house; on the contrary, he thought it less now than at any former period. Unless the house saw some great and effectual remedy would be the consequence, to pledge themselves to a measure of this kind, would be a delusion of the people, especially of those who wished to see placemen excluded. There were many cases, in which only a choice of evils was left. It was different here. For his own part, he knew the good effects of the present system. The country had long flourished under it, and he for one would not easily consent to change it. The present measure he viewed as a mere palliative, which could produce nothing but delusion. He should, therefore, give it his negative.
§ Mr. Pole Carewthought the hon. gent. who brought forward the motion, had laid no grounds for his proposition that should induce the house to entertain it at present. It was open to him to give notice for the next session, but at present they had not 954 had a fair opportunity given them to deliberate on it in such a manner as the importance of it required. He should, therefore, oppose it.
§ Mr. Whitbreadsaid, he would beg leave to trouble the house with a very few observations, in answer to what had fallen from some of those hon. members who had opposed his motion. Notwithstanding all that had been said with respect to the impropriety of agreeing with his Resolution, on the ground that it would, in effect, go to prejudge the main question, he contended, that the course he had pursued was the ordinary course of proceeding when a measure was considered by any member necessary, and the existing session was too far spent for its discussion then. The house had a precedent in the Bill brought forward to regulate the office of Treasurer of the Navy. Two hon. members had adverted to the characteristic purity of those times, and in the fervour of their ejaculations almost appeared to feel that it was heaven itself; yet, notwithstanding all their encomiums upon the purity of public men, he (Mr. Whitbread) must say, that he was anxious to apply a little correction to them, not to the hon. members personally (a laugh), but as constituting a part of the house of commons.—He next reviewed the objections of the right hon. Secretary (Mr. Canning,) and contended, that such was the purity, as it was called, of those times, that even the Chair was obliged to endure from the right hon. gent. and his colleagues, admissions and justifications which in other times, in the days of Mr. Dunning, would not be tolerated. The right hon. gent. he supposed could not have been present at the whole of his (Mr. Whitbread's) speech, or he would never have spoken as he had lately done. So far from having an idea of excluding the members of the administration from the house of commons, he had expressly said it was his wish that a liberal portion should be allowed to sit there. Yet there were offices the holders of which ought to be excluded from parliament; and there were persons in that house who were only there for the mere purpose of giving direct influence to government. His right hon. colleague who preceded him (Mr. Perceval) had said, that no such expressions had been used in former times as were on the present occasion. This he (Mr. Whitbread) denied. Could it be supposed that when Mr. Dunning introduced his bill against the influence of the crown, expres- 955 sions equally strong and plain were not used? Did not that bill expressly say, that "the influence of the crown had increased, was increasing, and ought to be diminished." That right hon. gent., however, introduced a language into that house, as to the sale of seats in parliament, which no former Speaker would have endured. He was sorry to say the present right hon. gent., who so honourably filled that high station, was obliged to listen to it; for the fact had been incontestibly proved; and the right hon. gent. had openly avowed and vindicated it; and when, from the zeal and sincerity of the house, they were about to have a Bill that would go a great way to put an end to such disgraceful proceedings, that right hon. gent. came forward, and was willing the bill should preclude the landed and monied interest from purchasing seats in that house, but was very ready and anxious to give the whole monopoly to government in the way of offices, and by that means make the mischief more grievous and more extensive than ever it was before. The learned Chancellor of the Exchequer considered it the duty of the house not to indulge any hopes of reform, which might be entertained out of doors. Let him not be alarmed, lest any false hopes should be entertained by the people respecting him. For what hopes could be indulged, when they saw a noble Secretary (lord Castlereagh) convicted, on his own confession, of an attempt upon the dignity of parliament, still retained in the service of the crown; when they knew that the right hon. gent. himself had been accused of a participation in another unconstitutional attack upon the independence of that house, and had shrunk from the inquiry? When they recollected that he, one of the greatest reversionists of the kingdom, had opposed the passing of a measure which had twice received the sanction of that house, for the purpose of correcting such an abusive exercise of the prerogative. That right hon. gent. had taken care the people should have nothing to hope for from him. He had positively denied that all which the house had heard, either from petitions or regular county meetings, was the opinion of the people; it was only the clamour of a set of demagogues, who wished to carry their own favourite points. That house, forsooth, the learned gentleman contended, should not now mistake the voice of a few designing demagogues assembled at a tavern, for the legitimate opinion of 956 the country. Oh yes! when every county in the empire resounded with a cry for the correction of gross abuses, the answer is, these are clamours of Jacobins and Demagogues; and the learned gentleman totally forgot what he himself had seen and heard, the cry of some infuriated ruffians armed with bludgeons, insulting and abusing some of the best men in the country, as enemies to Church and State (Hear! hear!). Turbulence and insanity or' this kind, in the estimation of the learned gentleman, bespoke the sense of the people; but the converse was applied to the legitimate expression of their sentiments, when the people were convened constitutionally, and their decision unsupported by any factious arts (Cries of hear, hear! and laughter, from the ministerial benches), "unsupported, I say," (added Mr. W.) "by any of those factious arts which raised that murderous cry, to which (he right hon. and learned gent. owes his office, and to which those who now cry 'hear him!' are indebted for their places." That right hon. gent. also hated meetings at taverns, and yet he did not hesitate to defend his right hon. colleague for having attended a tavern meeting, and there most indecently and unconstitutionally declaring the sentiments of ministers on questions of a public nature put to him by the chairman.—Mr. Whitbread then said, there were some who held at present official situations, who, he should think, might severally be dispensed with from a seat in that house. One was the right hon. gent. opposite to him (Mr. Rose), whom he was afraid, he must agree to part with; not because he was Treasurer of the Navy, but as clerk of the house of lords. The right hon. gent. was liable to be called away by the lords, and therefore, rather than he should be taken from them at a time when they might not wish to part with him, he thought it would be best to provide that the clerk of the parliament should not sit in the house. He thought the Masters in Chancery should also be excluded, and he was not clear whether it was proper for the Master of the Rolls to have a seat in parliament. He adverted to the statute of queen Anne, by which all officers in the administration were to be put out of the house, and to the statute of George I, by which pensioners for years were disqualified, and said, that by Mr. Burke's Bill, the third Secretary of State was excluded from a seat. It might be practically be- 957 neficial to diminish the seats of officers of government in that house, not in order to diminish the talents in the house, but to take away a dead weight from it. He viewed this measure in a different light from the hon. baronet. It was true, indeed, it was but a palliative, in comparison of a reformation in the house of commons; but if that was not to be obtained such a palliative was better than nothing. The hon. member then expressed himself a decided friend to a temperate and constitutional Reform of the house of commons, carried into effect by the house itself. To lead to that successful result, the whole country must, in a temperate and firm manner, express its wishes. The experience that recent circumstances afforded, of almost the highest power in the country yielding to its unanimous feeling, must, in a similar case, ensure the success of the cause of Reform. The great danger to be apprehended was from any precipitancy in pressing the question, and thus by the people's own conduct throwing themselves into the power of their opponents. He strongly recommended the people not to fall into such a snare, as the royalists did, who, when seeing Oliver Cromwell on an opposite hill, prematurely rushed forward to promote his object, crying out, that the Lord had delivered him into their hand.
Strangers were, ordered to withdraw. The house then divided, and the numbers were—
For the Motion 54 Against it 113 Majority against it 59