HC Deb 31 January 1809 vol 12 cc210-40

The Papers relative to the late Overtures from Erfurth being entered as read:

Mr. Secretary Canning

then rose, and said, that in proposing to the house to address to his majesty the expression of their thanks for the communication which his majesty had been graciously pleased to make of the Papers upon the table; their acknowledgment of the principles upon which his majesty had acted throughout his communications with the courts of France and Russia; and their resolution to support his majesty during the continuance of the war, which he had been unable to bring to an end consistent with honour or security, he could not anticipate opposition, nor did he believe there could exist any diversity of opinion. He apprehended, that any question which would that day arise, must apply to the conduct of his majesty's government as to the manner in which it had followed up its principles, and not to the principles themselves upon which they had acted. Whatever of doubt or of hesitation there should be would only be felt as arising out of the particular steps of the negotiation, and not as to the principle upon which it turned, or the result in which it terminated. No man, he believed, in the house would say, that if the business had been otherwise conducted, it would have led to a negotiation, or ended in peace. What he, therefore, had to say in proposing the Address, would lose much of its interest, because the result under any circumstances would not have been different, as the intentions of the enemy were obvious on the face of their overtures. No man would contend that the overtures had ever been sincerely meant to lead to a negotiation, or afforded the slightest chance of peace. On the face of the overtures their delusive character was manifest, and he saw before hand what must have been the necessary result. If it could be shewn that any principle had been introduced into the discussion inconsistent with the sincerity of pacific intentions, or any opportunity lost of bringing to a point the intentions of the enemy; if it could be shewn that any occasion had been taken to put an end to the intercourse, before it was obvious that it could not be continued with any prospect of success, or without dishonour; he would admit, that in either of these cases, though the final result might be the same, yet that blame would justly attach to his majesty's ministers. In what he had to say, therefore, he meant to confine him self to their conduct, rather than by argument to enforce principles upon which every man must be agreed. There was this singularity in his present situation, in moving the Address upon this subject, that if ministers had been called to account for their conduct in the transaction, either at the moment in which it took place, or immediately after its termination, he should have had far different topics to touch upon from those to which he was now obliged to advert. Any man who recollected the sensation excited by the receipt of the overture in this country, any man who could remember the state of the public mind at that period, and upon this subject, must be aware, that if any fault was attributed to his majesty's government, it was that of having entertained delusive overtures of a dangerous tendency, rather than that of putting a precipitate stop to the prospect of a negotiation. The general apprehension at that period was, lest ministers should suffer themselves to be entrapped into an idle and delusive negotiation, which could lead to no pacific result, and would only tend to forward the insidious views of the enemy. Even those, who at all times had been the advocates of peace, and recommended the necessity of negotiation, even all those were universally of opinion, that in making the overture, the enemy had no intention but to delude, no object in the proceeding but to profit by that delusion. At that time he and his colleagues had the misfortune, if misfortune it could be called, to differ from the public impression. They felt it their duty, however delusive the overture might appear to be, to endeavour to ascertain, beyond the possibility of doubt, the real intentions of the enemy. If they had suffered any unnecessary time to elapse before they had accomplished that object, he would allow it to have been a practical evil to the country; but it was an evil counterbalanced by the advantage resulting from shewing, that whilst we were sincere in the desire of peace, the real intention of the enemy was to delude by a hypocritical ostentation of a desire for peace. For one he had thought it his duty, before the overture was rejected, to try to ascertain whether the enemy were really desirous of peace. Many persons at that period were of opinion, from the unexampled atrocity of Bonaparte's conduct towards Spain, that we would have been justified not only upon every ground of high spirit, but upon every dictate of sound principles, in rejecting every overture from him towards negotiation. Most people thought the withdrawing the French troops from Spain, and a restoration of the legitimate, government in that country, ought to have been made the conditions of entering into any negotiation, or of accepting any overtures. Upon the moral principle, he could not diner from those who entertained that sentiment. But, thinking that political considerations were not always to be controuled by the principles of morality, and that governments had other complicated duties to perform beside what a rigid regard to the abstract rules of morality enjoined; however atrocious, however violent, or however iniquitous the conduct of Bonaparte might have been, he did not think that this government had any political right to demand atonement as a preliminary to negotiation. There was not in this world an authority that could confer such a right, and consequently, he did not make the demand. He was ready, to allow, however, that if the demand had been made, it would have placed this country upon a high and commanding ground, though he did not deem it wise to to reach that elevation at the expence of any essential interests. However atrocious, therefore, the conduct of Bonaparte, however iniquitously it might have surpassed the atrocity of all his own former examples, his majesty's ministers did not think it right to demand any conditions from him, but such as by the refusal of them he must place himself at the bar of the European world as the enemy of its repose. They had not made any sacrifice of the hopes of peace by insisting upon conditions, which they had no right to demand, or yielding to popular feeling rather than their sense of public duty. Their impression was to shew, that if there was any chance of peace they were ready to avail themselves of it; but if, as they foresaw, no such result should follow from the overture, they were determined that the fault should not lie with them, They felt that to demand, as the price of entering into a negotiation, the evacuation of Spain by the Trench, would have been to do that, which it was the business of Spain to do; it would be to negotiate for her; to assume the tone and character of her protector; to exercise a right which had never, either in fact or in substance, been conveyed to us. Such a demand would also have given cause of complaint to other allies, whose territories had been also invaded, and successfully invaded. So that we stipulated for our new allies no more than we did for our ancient allies, to whom we had been bound by solemn and long existing treaties. The demand of the restoration of the lawful sovereign of Spain would also have been a question which more particularly belonged to Spain, to insist upon: it would likewise be to abandon that bold and liberal policy, in which the house and the public were last year agreed; namely, to leave Spain to herself, and not to interfere in her internal concerns. The demand, that had been made in reply to the first overtures, was the lowest, but at the same time the most efficacious that could have been made; that Spain might be admitted to the negociation, that she might have the opportunity of stating her own demands; that the negociation should not be conducted for her by us, but that she should be afforded an opportunity of pleading her own cause in the persons of her own plenipotentiaries before the assembled representatives of the powers of Europe. It had been staled in other places, that he proposal of this condition amounted to a demand of a preliminary concession from France. But so far from that being the fact, so far from concession having been demanded with respect to the legitimate sovereign of Spain, it was only required that the existing government, the government de facto in Spain, should be admitted to negociate, that the government that was in possession of the executive authority should be so admitted, described, too, as it described itself, as a party to the proposed negociation. This was the least that could have been done, and this we were bound to do, without any dictation towards Spain, which had ever been most studiously avoided by his majesty's government. Could any one be so little read in history, so little versed in the transactions of modern times, as not to know, ibr it was notorious, that in almost every instance, governments so situated had been admitted to participate in negociations, without any notion being entertained that such admission amounted to the smallest concession on either side? Who did not know, that in the last war, of which Spain was the theatre, the war of the Succession, in which Great Britain supported the archduke Charles, and France the duke of Anjou, that in that war there was no exclusion of the existing government from negociation, nor was the demand to admit that government to the negociation considered as amounting to any application for preliminary concession. If we looked farther back, to the war which separated the Low Countries from Spain, we should not find that during the whole of its continuance, the admission of the existing government as a party to negociation was ever considered concession, nor was any attempt ever made to exclude it from any negociation. It was in the year 1576, that the Low Countries first rose to resist the authority of the king of Spain, and the independence of the United Provinces had not been recognized formally till the peace of Munster in 1648. During the whole of that period, the existing government of the United Provinces had been admitted to negociate, without such admission having been considered a concession. In demanding, therefore, that the government de-facto of Spain should be admitted a party to the negociation, we demanded the lowest possible, condition of the enemy; at a later period this country might possibly contend for more; but, without meaning to under-rate the interests of Spain, he felt that no more could have been demanded in the first instance; and the moderation of the condition was sufficient to quiet all suspicion in the minds of mankind respecting the sincerity of our wish for peace. What concession, then, had been demanded of Buonaparté? Absolutely none. The admission to negociate alone was demanded for the Spanish government; but the admission to negociate would not decide the right, nor interfere with any disputed point, but simply open the way to immediate negociation and eventual decision. It had been said, that this demand would more properly have been introduced if the negociation, which might have been entered into upon the basis of the uti possidetis. But by whose right could Spain have been let into the negociation upon such a basis, if not allowed to be an original party to the ne- gociation? Who possessed Spain, so as to let in the consideration of negociating upon such a basis? We had no right to treat for Spain upon such terms, because we had not the possession of Spain. Upon this principle he had felt it his duty to protest against such a principle of negociating for an independent nation, as if we had the possession of it in such an extent, as to authorise us to treat for it upon the basis of actual possession. He protested against the principle in the case of the king of Sicily in a former negociation, and he abjured it in every instance. If we had accepted the proffered basis without stipulating the admission of the Spanish government, it might have given to France a claim to the fortresses of Spain; which they had gained possession of by; treachery, upon the same principle; and, I perhaps, that was the object which the enemy had in view in the proposal of their delusive overtures. By demanding the admission of the Spanish government to the negociation, we had given France an opportunity of doing away all suspicion upon this head, if her views were not; sinister. There were others who were of Opinion that the acceptance of the first overtures was but a mere waste of time, and that, consequently, they ought to have been rejected at once. In this preliminary opinion he was not disposed to concur. He and his colleagues, though not sanguine that the result would end in peace, yet thought the trial worth making; and the circumstance of the emperor of Russia being joined in the application gave strength to any expectation that might be conceived of the possible restoration of the blessings of peace. They had hoped, that the emperor of Russia, from a consideration of the perfidy with which the French ruler had gained possession of the principal fortresses of Spain, and of the villainy with which he enticed the legitimate sovereign of that country, first beyond his frontier, and afterwards led him, with all the members of his house, into captivity; would have opened his eyes to his situation; would have anticipated the degree of forbearance he had to expect, when such atrocities had been committed against the best and most serviceable and most faithful ally and friend of France, the compliant, submissive and un-reproaching power, which ever exhausted its own means, to promote the ambition and the interest of an ally. He had expected, that the emperor of Russia, from the comparatively little that he could do for France, contrasted with what had been done by Spain and the possessors of Spanish South America, could not look to any very exemplary forbearance, and that the time had at length arrived when he would endeavour to retrace the course, which he had pursued since his alliance with France. He was not quite sure, that, if the Erfurth meeting were again to take place, he would not again entertain the same sentiments, because he could not conceive, on an occasion like this, that sovereigns would cringingly submit to dig the pits for their own fail. His expectation was an homage to the spirit of a man, to the first, causes of human action—the principle of self-preservation. They had, upon the presumption that the emperor of Russia felt as a man, thought that he would have been influenced by the feelings of human nature, and consequently, that he would not have become a party to the designs of Buonaparté. If they had acted otherwise, it would have been said of them, that they had aspersed his character, and thrown away all chance of peace. He confessed himself to be one of those who entertained a hope that peace might possibly be the result of an overture, to which Russia had been a party, especially as Russia had, on all accasions, particularly interested herself for the honour and security of Spain. If it was a question for making peace, she uniformly intreated that Spain might be made a party; if a question for making war, the request was, that Spain might be exempted from the calamities of the war. The recollection of these facts, and the conviction how much it must be the interest of Russia herself, to discountenance the ruinous projects of France, rendered it not surprising, that he should have entertained a strong impression of the sincerity of any overture for peace coming from such a quarter. Whatever was done at Erfurth, there could be no doubt but the situation of Spain, which at that time occupied the attention of all Europe, formed a very considerable part of the discussions. What, then, was the surprise of his majesty's government at seeing that subject studiously omitted in the overtures? They could not help supposing that Spain had been sacrificed by the emperor of Russia, and they considered it as their paramount duty to bring the matter immediately to a point, and to shew, that if any reliance was placed on the aid of Russia; in the Spanish cause, it was a reliance on a broken reed. It was therefore necessary in their answer, as studiously to introduce the name of Spain, as it had been avoided in the overtures, and to adept one of two ways, either to demand all for Spain, or only that it should be admitted, at the opening of negociations, to treat in its own behalf. They preferred the latter. What, then, was the answer returned by France, and her faithful follower Russia? It had been stated, that France and Russia had no alternative: but, from the nature of the answer from the British government they could only return a direct negative to the demand there made; but this was not true. France might have said, that as G. Britain and Spain were not in alliance, the government of Spain might be permitted to treat, reserving always the question of right to the sovereign of that country. By this means Buonaparté would preserve his dignity. Or he might have said, we will admit the de facto government of Spain to treat, provided you will at the same time admit of plenipotentiaries from my brother the de jure king. It was not now necessary to discuss what would have been the answer of government to this proposition; he merely mentioned it as the return which might have been made by Buonaparté instead of a direct negative. What then, as he had already said, was the answer returned by Buonaparté? Was it either of the two he had just specified? No! it was distinctly this; "In no shape shall the Spanish people be admitted to treat, because they are in a state of rebellion against me and the sovereign it is my will to impose upon them". Thus, then, it was Buonaparté, and not the British government, that had required recognition. The requisition was not contained in their demand, as a prelude to negociation; but in his answer. But the case did not rest here. If he had simply said, I will not admit the Spanish people through their existing government to treat, it would not have been so much, but the reason he immediately after assigned, put an end to the question. He affirms that Joseph Buonaparté is king, and in complying with his preliminary, we should not only have abandoned the interest, but destroyed the name of Spain; we must have admitted the description of the Spanish people as rebels, and sanctioned their punishment as traitors! To whom?—Joseph Buonaparté: thereby, while he scouted the proposal of the admission of the de facto govern- ment, tacitly commanding our recognition of his atrocious usurpation. Yet, if any further illustration of his principles were necessary it was to be found in the next paragraph; respecting the Roman Catholics of Ireland. He only mentioned this circumstance to reprobate it, and noticed the argument adduced by our enemy to show its falsity in deduction, though he was far from allowing it to be even founded in truth. He begged to be understood as not acknowledging that the Catholics in Ire-land were rebels; but if there were rebels in that country, they were rebels to a king in complete possession of the country and perfect in all his rights of sovereignty. Yet they were compared to the universal Spanish nation in arms against the usurpation of Joseph Buonaparté, who neither had right to their throne nor possession of their monarchy. But to return to the argument of insisting on a preliminary demand, he had to repeat, that the British government had demanded nothing, they had merely resisted a demand. They had said, we will not, with a stroke of a pen dismiss a whole people to slavery, and acknowledge a tyrannous and usurping dynasty. It had also been said that the question in Spain was merely as to the rights of different kings, and that the matter between Charles IV. and Ferdinand VII. did not require our interference. He readily agreed to this, as we had no business with the question between these legal and legitimate sovereigns. It was the person whom the country unanimously preferred as their king, that we were bound to acknowledge. The only question was, which should have greater force, the edict of Buonaparté, or the almost unanimous declaration of Spain. The universal enthusiasm of the Spanish nation in favour of Ferdinand VII. had determined this country in its decision. It had, indeed, been said, and asserted by our enemies, that this universal enthusiasm was the result of arts practised by Great Britain. To say nothing of the absurdity of this assertion, which could only be supported by confounding all dates and times, it was scarcely requisite to point out the impossibility of stirring up numerous provinces at a distance from each other, and resembling so many distinct kingdoms, to rise at once and unanimously lift up their hands for liberty and independence. Fifty proclamations had almost simultaneously been issued from different points of the Spanish dominions. All the provinces of the monarchy, with the exception of only two or three, accorded in declaring Ferdinand VII. to be the object of their choice, love, loyalty and admiration. Would it be contended that it was our duty to point out to them a new person for a sovereign, calculated to renovate their kingdom, by implanting into it all the virtues of a new dynasty? He hoped the British nation would never adopt these principles of the Napoleon school, or those of the French revolution, which for 16 years had been the source of all the misery that had desolated the world. His majesty's government did not conceive it to be a duty imposed on them to point out to the people of Spain even such errors as the eye of philosophy might discover in the best formed constitutions. Great and glorious as was our own, they would consider themselves better employed in rectifying any errors that might have crept into its pure system than in pretending to judge for others. They were content to take Spain as they found it, and never wished to take an advantage of its misfortunes to modulate its government into experiment. They considered it in the view the Spanish people themselves took of it—they offered no counsel—they suggested no change—to ask for the admission of the de facto government was not therefore to force any thing on Spain, or to interfere at all in the continuance or termination of the war. If after the answer returned by France, ministers had receded from the cause of Spain, then, indeed, they would have deserved all those taunts, all those suspicions, and all those doubts which during the interchange of couriers between the countries were preparing for them. But to set the designs of Buonaparté in a still stronger point of view, he must recal to the recollection of gentlemen, that it was not in consequence of the Answer returned to the Erfurth overtures, that he formed his determination to subvert Spain. That determination was declared before the answer was received. The overtures reached this country on the evening of the 22 d of October, and Buonaparté on the morning of the 25th of the same month, in his Speech or Message to his Legislative body, pledged himself to place the crown of Spain, by force, upon the head of his brother. If there were those who ever thought an opportunity for successful negociation had been missed, they might see from this whether of not any other line of conduct would not have been equally useless.—Another charge had been brought against government: it was said, that whenever Buonaparté had resolved on any measure, and declared that he would accomplish it, such a declaration should be received, as the fiat of a superior being, against which it was folly to oppose any kind of resistance! He never pledged himself to any thing but what he could carrry into execution! His resolves were insurmountable! His career not to be stopped I We were therefore to submit to dependence if he declared such to be his will and pleasure, and so far from daring to stand gloriously forth the champions of the continent, we were not even to think of defending ourselves against this irresistible leader! Such might be the opinion of some; but such was not his opinion, nor the opinion of the British people. Even were the ship in which we were embarked sinking, it was our duty to struggle against the boisterous elements. But he never could acknowledge that such was our state; we were riding proudly and nobly buoyant upon the waves. Of those who entertained such desponding, such unmanly sentiments, he was sure the number was very small.—In another, and certainly the least brilliant light in which we could consider the nature of our connection with Spain, namely, as far as our own interest was concerned, could any one of the few who looked at the subject in this selfish view, say that we ought to have abandoned the cause of Spain? There might be many opinions as to the mode in which assistance ought to have been rendered, but there was only one opinion on this point, that we ought not, in any case, to seem to apply it to our own particular interest. It had; been spread by our enemies on the continent, that England stimulated the wars which had so long disturbed the repose of the world in pursuit of her own advantage, and to augment her maritime superiority, and that if she failed in the preservation of her allies, she was ever ready to share in their plunder. Care, then, was to be taken not to suffer the imputation of a blot of that kind in the war for Spain; and against such a suspicion ministers had most cautiously guarded the honour of their country. It certainly had been possible for us at the commencement of the Spanish war, to have remained neutral, and said to ourselves, we are glad to see discord springing up between France and her allies; but the voice and feeling of the British nation declared loudly and vehemently against such a course. When we had, then, gone into the more high and elevated line, we were bound to adhere to it with the more vigour and perseverance. If we had agreed to the terms proposed by Buonaparté, Spain would have been in a worse condition than when she first rose against his usurpation: deserted in the moment of her utmost need, and given up to the vengeance of an enraged and tyrannous conqueror, and to all the terrors of military execution. In these enlightened days the imposition of a foreign dynasty was not regarded with so much abhorrence, as it was considered what useful internal regulations the usurpers might introduce. Glad was he to think that so detestable a mode of reasoning was confined to only a. few political speculators; the general sense and feeling of mankind revolted at the idea. There was an irresistible impulse which bound men to their native soil; which made them cherish their independence; which united them to their legitimate princes; and which fired them with enthusiastic indignation against the imposition of a foreign yoke. No benefit to be received from a conqueror could, in their mind, atone for the loss of national independence. Let us, then, do homage to the Spanish nation for their attachment to their native soil, an attachment which in its origin is divine; and do not let us taunt them with being a century behind us in civilization or in knowledge, or attached to prejudices in religion, in politics, or in arts, which we have happily surmounted.—In conclusion, he begged the house, in judging of the conduct pursued by his majesty's ministers, to lay aside every thing in their favour which might excite an interest in the heart, and to judge them in the matter of the negotiation by the strictest rules, as if they had been treating with an unworthy ally and an undisguised enemy.—The right hon. secretary then moved an Address, thanking his majesty for the communication on this subject made to the house; pledging themselves to support him in the maintenance of the war; and approving of the line of conduct pursued by Ministers on the late occasion of the Overtures made by Russia and France from Erfurth, &c.

Mr. Whitbread

said, he rose fully confident that he could reconcile the opinion which felt it his duty on that night to state with the sentiments which on a similar occasion he had formerly delivered. He had listened with no less satisfaction than at- tention, to the speech of the right hon. secretary; a speech truly eloquent; but, what much more astonished him, replete with those axioms of political truth which, if they had been acted upon by that side of the house sixteen years ago, would have prevented the destruction of the balance of power, preserved the Bourbon family, and have sustained the greatness and prosperity of this country, now, from the operation of contrary principles, reduced, he feared, in some respects to a sinking state. He was ready to admit that, after the answer of the French government, negotiation was out of the question; but the fault he had to find with the right hon. secretary was, that he had provoked that answer by his ill-placed taunts, and by a wanton and unjustifiable arrogance, in replying to a fair overture. It was an error too prevalent, and frequently fatal, with individuals in office, to assume, in their communications with a hostile power, every virtue to themselves, and to charge their opponents with every vice. But to hear such observations from the right hon. gent, opposite, he who, last year, scouted in that house those principles of morality and justice which it was once the pride and character of civilized nations to revere and perpetuate; to hear him who committed an act which exceeded the most atrocious occurrences in our history (the attack on Copenhagen), complain against France, that its usurpation of Spain was unparalleled, was, to say the least of it, not very consistent. Who could suppose last year, that he would have so speedily abjured his new morality, and have that night expressed his indignation at the unprincipled invasion of an independent neutral state, and the imprisonment of a friendly sovereign? The aggressions of human governments were not, unfortunately, either new or infrequent. Great Britain was not to suppose that Providence, in its wise dispensations, had confined justice within geographical limits. It was somewhat extraordinary, therefore, that the right hon. gent, should have presumed to call the conduct of Buonaparté towards Spain an "usurpation, which had no parallel in the history of the world." It really carried an air of ridicule along with it, to Buonaparté, not less, however, than did another assertion carry of insult to the Emperor of Russia. What must he have thought when the denunciations were perused by him against the violator of the Spanish throne; lie, who must have re- membered well how Catherine, called the Great, and Frederick, called the Great, and the Emperor of Austria, dismembered Poland, and dethroned the king? Why should we talk of atrocity? Why should we blasphemously call on our God; we, the ravagers of India, we, who in the very last session, voted the solemn thanks of the house to the despoilers of that unhappy, persecuted country. Oh! "When we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us". Why did he dwell upon these points? He did so to impress upon the country and the house moderation and justice; to guard them against the infatuation of conceiving themselves superior to the accidents of adversity, and released from the influence of reciprocal duties. He begged of those infatuated with ideas of our own importance, to look how much we had gunk in the scale of nations from the rank we once held; not that he advised truckling to the enemy, but that we should pursue the same system of honour in the North and in the East we recommended to others, and not brand Buonapartéwith unparalleled atrocities, as if we had forgot all history, and even that which had passed in our own days; as if we had forgot the atrocities which had been perpetrated by Spain in former times in the western world, and by ourselves so very lately, on Spain and on Denmark. He contended that there existed a contradiction between the king's speech and the reasoning employed by the right hon. secretary, when called upon to give up Spain. It was not true that Buonaparté required of us, in his first communication, the abandonment of Spain as a preliminary. For it was stated by him after he had received the communication from our government. The first communication which came from the enemy was, in his opinion, perfectly unexceptionable in. its manner and style. He could not conceive any thing more respectful than the note of count Romanzoff The right hon. gent, had before refused the offer of the mediation of Russia, on two grounds; first, he had required that a specified basis should be stated upon which the negociation was to be founded; and secondly, be positively refused to send another plenipotentiary to Paris. In the late overture, both those objections were removed; for count Romanzoff did propose as a specific basis, the status quo, or any other basis that ministers should prefer, and as to the place of negotiation, it was left entirely to his majesty to send his plenipotentiaries to any town he should chuse on the continent of Europe, where the emperors of France and Russia also engaged to send their plenipotentiaries. The right hon. gent, had no right, then, to treat the emperor of Russia with that severity which he had done in his answer. If the emperor of Russia was in a degraded situation, the right hon. gent, should have considered what were the causes which had brought him to that state of degradation. It was to be traced to that fatal and disastrous coalition of 1805, which, by its ill concerted projects, prostrated the strength and resources of the continental powers. Did he forget the negociations at Tilsit, and the memorable transactions which followed in the north of Europe? Such events, in his opinion, accounted for the hostile feeling of Russia to Great Britain, and for its dependence on France. The right hon. gent, should have remembered that act of the present government against Denmark, which had given the most just and serious grounds of offence to Russia. The form of the communication which was now under consideration, was certainly not usual till very lately; but, surely, there was nothing disrespectful in the letter signed, "Alexander—Napoleon", nothing that called for the very pointed insult with which it had been met. There had been two instances before, when unfortunately, direct proposals of peace made by Buonaparté to the king, had been made in vain. Every body remembered, and almost every body now deeply regretted, the manner in which the first overture of that nature had been rejected. However highly he respected the noble lord (Grenville) who was then the secretary for foreign affairs, his opinion of that transaction remained the same now as it was at that time. Experience, and the evidence of facts, were then the burden of the song. Heavy, indeed, was the song, and he feared it was a knell which sounded the doom of the country. He could see nothing at all disrespectful in the letter of the two emperors. There was, indeed a sentence somewhat perplexed, one which the right hon. gent, appeared to have entirely misunderstood, respecting maritime commerce. This sentence, however, afforded no pretence to justify a studied insult to either of the emperors. The right hon. gent, was not bound to have gone out of his way to let the emperor Alexander know, that there would have been an answer to his letter, if his name had not been joined with that of Buonapartéwho had not been acknowledged as Emperor by this country. This country had, however, at the Treaty of Amiens, recognized him as Chief of the French nation, and First Consul; and the change of his title could not make any essential difference or objection to treating with him. Whenever we thought proper to negotiate with a man, who, from his great successes, as well as his power, had some right to be delicate about the point of honour, we ought not to begin by any thing like insult. He thought, indeed, that the right hon. gent, should be more careful in the composition of his State Papers, and that he should abstain altogether from indulging that sarcastic vein which so much amused his friends in that house, and which he conceived to be so successful in opposing his political antagonists. In his official note sent in answer to the letter of the two Emperors, the right hon. secretary, in his opinion, might, when speaking of the basis of the Uti Possidetis, have abstained from that parenthesis of its having been so much the subject of discussion formerly. In the note of the right hon. secretary, it was stated, that "the king had uniformly declared his readiness and desire to enter into negotiations for a general peace". It was certainly true, that this sentiment was often expressed in the language ministers thought proper to put into the mouth of his majesty; but he could have wished to have seen conduct corresponding to those professions; and in that case, he believed that the country would have had a secure peace a long time ago. He remembered, that, upon the failure of two attempts to negotiate with republican France, it had been formerly stated in that house by a minister (lord Melville), that "the country had had a lucky escape from a peace". He firmly believed that there hardly ever was a time when the gentlemen on the other side of the house had any sincere wish for peace. He did not pretend to say that the overture of Erfurth could have been received in any manner that could immediately have led to peace; but still the negotiation might have been so managed as not to increase the hostility or rancour between the two governments.—As to the second paragraph in the note of the right hon. gent, that his majesty could "not be expected to see with unqualified regret, that the system devised for the destruction of the commerce of his subjects had recoiled upon its authors or its instruments", this was a sentiment which appeared to him altogether improper to put into the mouth of a benevolent king, nor was it a language fit for a Christian country to hold to the Christian world. It appeared to him to be indecorous and improper in every point of view. Why should the right hon. gent, say he rejoiced at commercial evils being retorted upon our enemies and their instruments, unless it could appear that our enemies were thereby humbled or weakened? If it was meant as a retort, the retort was unsupported. France was not humbled. Buonapartéwas progressively advancing in his career to the subjugation of Europe; his power was by no means diminished; and so far from the insurrections which were predicted in the South of France, there did not appear to be either insurrection or murmur throughout the whole of his universal empire.—The next paragraph of this note, he contended was false from the beginning to the end: it stated, that "the war in which his majesty is engaged, was entered into by his majesty for the immediate object of national safety. It has been prolonged, only because no secure and honourable means of terminating it have hitherto been afforded by his enemies". This, Mr. Whitbread contended, was altogether false. The war had not been entered into for the immediate object of national safety. (Hear! hear! from ministers). He repealed it; that was not the cause of the war. He should now ask some of the right hon. gentlemen opposite, who had been parties to the making the Treaty of Amiens, and afterwards to the breaking that Treaty, whether the present war did not begin with a falsehood, which was put into the mouth of his majesty, in the celebrated royal Message of the 8th of March, 1803, which called upon this country to arm in consequence of great armaments in the ports of France and Holland. He should ask those gentlemen, was not that statement a falsehood? [No, no, from some members.] He thought it had been universally admitted now that that statement was untrue. Was it not well known that it was for Malta we went to war? [No, ho, from some members.] At least, it was generally allowed, that if France had given up the point about Malta, there would have been no' war. He disapproved, above all things, of false statements being inserted in state-papers; and he felt firmly convinced that if the overtures made to us in 1800, 1805, 1806, and 1808, had been met by a sincere desire for peace in this country, a secure peace might have been made and maintained. It appeared to him strange, that Spain should have been mentioned by us so pointedly to the enemy, and that Portugal and Sicily should not have been mentioned at all, and yet before the English landed in Portugal, the Portuguese had rescued a considerable part of their country from the enemy; and before the Prince Regent left Portugal the expressly renewed all the treaties with England, and appointed a Regency. It would appear, that the Regency of Portugal acting in his name was as necessary a party to this negotiation as Spain herself. He would allow, indeed, that it would be wasting too much time, to delay a negotiation until we could consult our Ally the King of Sweden. That Ally lived at too great a distance; and his alliance, for which we paid him 100,000l. per month, was of so little service to our cause, that many wished he would make his peace with his enemies—As to Spain, he had already declared his opinion, that the engagements which his majesty had entered into with the people of that country, were such that their interests could not have been abandoned, nor was then; a single Spaniard who would at that time have consented to any peace which had not secured the independence and integrity of Spain, and restored them their beloved king Ferdinand. The Spaniards were then animated by the glorious principle of resistance to any invader or usurper, be he who he might. They were not, however, insensible of the amelioration that was necessary in their country, or of the mischiefs which had been done by their former bad government. This was a subject which had been taken notice of in all the proclamations of the different Juntas. In his opinion, the mode in which the negotiation ought to have been managed on the part of this country was, that the independence of Spain should have been made the first condition of a peace, but that it should not have been insisted on as a preliminary. Buonapartédid not propose the abandonment of Spain as a preliminary; it was the right hon. gent, who made the admission of the Spanish nation as parties, a preliminary to all negociation. It was not till after his first communication had been answered in an insulting tone, that the French emperor used insulting expressions. He thought it was always wrong to use insulting language towards Buona- partéfor, after all, if ever we wished for peace, it was probably with this man that we must make it, and the price of peace would be at least for us to use something like decorous language to a power, which was perhaps the greatest that ever did exist on the face of the world. As to pledging ourselves to any point as a sine qua non he could not avoid remembering how many of those sine qua nons the British government had been obliged to abandon since the first commencement of the war. He could not conceive that peace was so dangerous as some gentlemen supposed. Buonaparté had got almost the whole of Europe by war, and he did not see how he could have done more, or so much, in peace. The right hon. gent, in the Declaration of his majesty, stated the situation of the different powers in Europe, but appeared to forget how very small a part of Europe this country had any influence over. The right hon. gent, had done him the honour to allude more than once to those sentiments of his which he had thought proper to send forth to the public on this subject. What he then said, he still thought—he still was of opinion that that period was favourable to a negociation; that at a period when Buonapartéhopes in Spain were so low; when Austria was vacillating, he did think that it was more probable that at that moment Buonapartémight, by such pressing contingencies, be tempted to admit a negociation, the preliminary of which was, the integrity of the Spanish dominions, than that he would listen to such a proposal now. He thought also, that another good opportunity occurred at the time of the flight of Buonaparté brother from Spain. But even in the late overture, he contended, that as Buonaparté did not require of us to abandon Spain, we ought not to have called upon him, by way of preliminary, to abandon his designs upon it. It was indiscreet, too, to taunt him in the letter to Romanzoff with those designs, and it was wrong and unjust to throw upon him personally, for at least the last ten years, the odium of continuing the war; nor was it less unjust to conclude that letter with desiring him to do what we had already refused to do. Much had been said upon the declaration made by Buonaparté on the 25th of October to the French senate, when he professed his intention of setting out to crown his brother at Madrid. But we know not how certain circumstances relative to the reception of that proposition, made by him, might have, been conveyed to him, and how such a communication might have influenced him. As to the supposition made by the right hon. secretary, of Joseph, a King neither de jure nor de facto sending his Envoys to plead, together with those of Ferdinand, their respective claims to the Crown of Spain, lie thought it so ridiculous, (notwithstanding the high unknown authority who might have suggested it), that it scarcely needed a serious observation. He thought that the Note of the Emperor of Russia did not at all go to pledge him to secure Spain to France, lie merely says, that he has acknowledged Joseph King of Spain; and in an after part it is said, that this difference need not preclude negotiation. With respect to the last Note of the French Emperor, it was certainly unjustifiable; but however unjustifiable it was, it could not, he was sorry to say, be said to be unprovoked; language, arrogant and unconciliating, had brought down an answer in a correspondent tone. In alluding to this answer the right hon. gent, did not impute rebellion to the Catholics of Ireland. He was glad to hear him do that injured body justice. Let however that right hon. gent, and his colleagues learn, if they are yet to learn it, that Buonapartéknows where lies the weakness of the empire. The speeches of that right hon. gent, in that house would argue, that he was well inclined, if he could persuade his colleagues to go along with him, in giving security to the empire, by giving relief to the Catholics of Ireland. But it was a bad encouragement to that body to hear of the promotion to the Privy Council, of a man who had said that a Catholic and a Rebel were synonimous terms. Were these gentlemen to say to Ireland, Go, fight the cause of Spain and of Europe; and after advancing the glory of their country, by their gallantry and conduct— after having thanked them for their intrepidity and valour, displayed at Vimiera and at Corunna, were we to tell them that they deserved every thing at our hands, and that we would give them every thing—but toleration? He besought the house that they would think it worth while to pay more consideration to this most serious subject; and he earnestly hoped that no time would be lost in giving that numerous and deserving body that relief they were entitled to, upon every ground of justice and desert. He hoped that before the present session terminated, one vote of that house would at length do Ireland justice, and deprive the common enemy for ever of every pretence for misrepresentation, with which her privations might have furnished him.—The Address of the right hon. gent, went to applaud ministers for their mode of bringing the late Overtures to a conclusion, He could not approve of that conduct. He thought it reprehensible. He knew he was in a small minority, both in that house and the country: it was for that reason, more especially, his duty to state the grounds upon which he felt himself justified in differing from so many. He, therefore, again lamented that the offer for negotiation was so abruptly put an end to. For what could be the use of commencing a negociation in terms of sarcastic recrimination, unless it was with a view to put a stop to it as soon as possible; and even in breaking with France, it was better to break with her in a spirit of as little acrimony as possible; for, let gentlemen say What they would, we must ultimately treat with France—"To this complexion we must come at last". He repeated it, we must finally treat with France. The conduct of this country in rejecting so often, on good terms, what it must finally take on inferior terms, brought to his mind the memorable incident recorded in antient history, when, in the earliest age of Rome, the Sybil came with her nine books, and proffered them for a price which was refused. She afterwards tendered six of the nine for the same price, which, being refused also, it was at last thought advisable to purchase the three remaining volumes at the price for which the first nine had been originally tendered. He hoped this story would be no illustration of our future destinies. France had accused us of selfishness: he feared with too much justice. We had entered into the war originally for Holland; had forsaken her, and benefited ourselves in the sharing of her spoil. It would not be easy to say, when we might calculate upon even as good terms as in the late overture we had been offered. We knew not what the next news from Portugal might bring us; perhaps, before this, Portugal was re-conquered. The bubble with respect to the re-capture of Madrid by the Spaniards had already burst. Buonapartéwas hastening to fulfil all his prophecies; if he had not already crowned his brother at Madrid; he yet had the power of crowning him: he had certainly — however gloriously for the British arms—he had yet, in effect, obliged us to evacuate Spain, and, perhaps, was now on his way to plant his eagles on the towers of Lisbon. With respect to Spain, he confessed the hopes he once had were nearly gone, and that the various reports from different quarters, from some, of the want of wisdom on the part of the government, from others, of the want of energy on the part of the people of that country, that such reports were not calculated to revive them. Whether it was want of enthusiasm in the original, as some said, or, as others more plausibly said, that that enthusiasm had subsided, he had not very sanguine hopes of the success of Spain.—The hon. gent, then concluded with moving the following Amendment:

"That an humble Address be presented to his majesty, to acquaint his majesty that this house has taken into its most serious consideration the Papers which have by his majesty's most gracious commands been laid on the table of this house, relative to the overture made to his majesty for entering into Negociation by the powers of Russia and France.—To assure his majesty we would have witnessed with the deepest regret any inclination on the part of his majesty, to consent to the abandonment of the cause of Spain. At the same time to acquaint his majesty, that upon a review of the letter addressed to his majesty, the communications originally made to his majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs by the accredited ministers of the governments of Russia and France, it does not appear to this house that any such disgraceful concession on the part of his majesty was so required by the other belligerent powers as a preliminary to Negociation.—To stale to his majesty, that the stipulation insisted upon in the Official Note, transmitted to Paris by his majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, as an indispensible preliminary to any Negociation, viz. That the government of Spain acting in the name of Ferdinand VII. should be admitted as a party, was unwise and impolitic, unnecessary to the maintenance of the great cause of Spanish independence, and obviously calculated to prevent all further intercourse on the subject of Peace— Humbly to represent to his majesty, that it appears to this house, that an overture made in terms respectful to his majesty ought to have been answered in language more moderate and conciliatory, and that im- mediate and decisive steps ought to have been taken for entering into Negociation on the basis proposed in that Overture; whereby alone it could have been discovered, whether there did or did not exist a possibility of effecting, through the means of Negociation (combined with the unremitted and powerful assistance which his majesty was enabled to give to the Spanish nation,) the rescue of Spain and Portugal from the usurpation of France, and whether Peace was indeed utterly unattainable.—Humbly to request his majesty, that he will be graciously pleased to avail himself of any opportunity which may offer of acceding to, or commencing, a Negociation for the restoration of the blessings of Peace, on such terms as the circumstances of the war in which we are engaged may render compatible with the true interests of the empire, and the honour of his majesty's crown".

Mr. Ponsonby,

in a few words, opposed the amendment of his hon. friend: the unfeigned respect he bore his hon. friend, called upon him to state his reasons for differing from him, as he did almost wholly upon the present question. The question, in his opinion, could be reduced to a much narrower compass than his hon. friend seemed to think— it did not go into the wide detail of foreign relations; the question for the house was, whether on the papers now before them, it appeared that his majesty's ministers acted right or wrong, when the overture for peace was first made by the government of France? Was it, or was it not, a proper course for ministers to demand a quick explanation with respect to the admission of Spain as a party to the Treaty? He thought it was. He again differed from his hon. friend, as to the stress laid by him on the probable consequence of the high tone in which the overtures had been answered. He did not believe any tone, however moderate, would have had the least effect on this negotiation; not that he approved of the tone used by the right hon. gentleman, far from it, he thought the language and stile adopted by the right hon. gent., more like what one political adversary would use to another in that house, than what became the gravity of diplomatic correspondence for a negotiation that was to restore peace to the world. He was inclined to think that in point of time, the crisis was most unfavourable to negotiation, for Buonaparté on the 25th of October, had declared that it was not for the interests of France that any of the Bourbon interest should reign in Spain, and that it was safer for France that the same dynasty should reign in both countries. His senate, in their answer, said, that his views were wise, and that the war with Spain was politic, just, and necessary. After this pledge of the Emperor's, after the answer of the senate, and after the vote of 160,000 men, with which that answer was followed up, it could not be supposed that any moderate tone of negotiation could have induced the Emperor of France to abandon his views on Spain, the cause of which country, it has since been evident, could have been decided by the sword alone. Besides, he did think that by not demanding that Spain in the first instance should be admitted as a party, we should have abandoned her in the face of the world. With respect to Spain, there was no man in that house less committed than he was. A noble lord had charged him with throwing cold water upon the enthusiasm of the Spanish cause; if, however, that noble lord (Castlereagh) had been less enthusiastic upon that subject (though certainly enthusiasm was not his constitutional vice), perhaps our affairs would not be so circumstanced as they then were.

Mr. Croker

said, he was astonished to hear the expressions which had been used by the hon. gent, opposite. If he had found out irregularities in any proceedings of this country, which was not impossible, he believed the hon. gent, would find it difficult in the annals of the British legislature to find a parallel to his own speech. As to the allusions made by that hon. gent, to the case of the Sybilline books, he contended, that the hon. gent's, own conduct would have been more aptly illustrated by that allusion. Thrice had the hon. gent, brought this proposition before the house, and in each succeeding time found himself in a smaller minority. The hon. gent, had even owned that on the present occasion he expected to find himself in a minority. As to the allusion made by the French minister to the Catholics of Ireland, he considered it a foul and impotent calumny, and said that it obviously meant nothing further than merely to exasperate one party against another. The Catholics of Ireland had, he understood, lately been in the habit of denying what their friends in that house advanced in their behalf. (A cry of No, no!) He had heard so; but if it were otherwise, he hoped they would consider the hon. gent, as their advocate. He was sure, at all events, that it was a foul and scandalous calumny of Buonaparté and he hoped no gentleman in the house would take it up, for the sake of building an argument upon it in favour of Catholic Emancipation.

General Mathew

esteemed the right hon. gent. (Mr. Canning,) the only man of any political integrity amongst the present ministers. The hon. general said, he was not afraid of the cry of Jacobinism, however much it might be the system of certain gentlemen on the other side, to hold it out as an object of terror. The noble lord opposite, whom he had the honour to call his countryman, and also the hon. gent, who had spoken last, knew practically in the year 1708 and 1709, in what Jacobinism consisted. He defied any man to say that the Catholics of Ireland were rebels. The person who should presume to say so did not deserve to live, but to die by the hands of the common executioner. He asserted that it was false, and that no communication, good, bad, or indifferent, had taken place between them and the French since the year 1796, when Arthur O'Connor met with Hoche on the borders of Switzerland. The right hon. gent, talked of atrocities: never had more atrocities been committed by the most desperate despot than by the British government. Of all despots the British government had been the worst. How they dealt with kings whom they wished to dethrone, his honourable friend (sir A. Wellesley) could inform them. In the East they did not imprison kings— they murdered them. He saw a gentleman in the house who was Secretary of ' State in Ireland in the year l798. He could tell the house what was then the situation of Ireland.

Here the Speaker

called the honourable member to order. This was not the line of conduct to be pursued in a question of the kind now before the house.

General Mathew

said, other members had introduced Ireland, and the Catholics of Ireland were alluded to in the Papers before the house. He would tell earl Camden, if there ever was tyranny in any country, it was in Ireland under the administration of that noble, lord.

The Speaker

again called the hon. member to order.

General Mathew

said, then he must give up the year 1798, the scalping, and all the rest.—Being again called to order, he observed, that the best thing he could do was to sit down.

Sir F. Burdett

said, that having a different view of the present question from any of the gentlemen who had this night delivered their opinions, and not having previously attended any of the debates connected with the cause of the Spanish people, nor expressed what were his notions on that subject, he could not allow the question to go to a vole without shortly delivering his sentiments on the occasion. On addresses proposed to be voted to his majesty, he understood it to be as a matter of right in any member to enter into a discussion of the general interests of the country. It might be disagreeable to the ears of Englishmen to hear the perilous situation of their country described, to have enumerated a train of occurrences more calamitous and improvident, probably, than had ever disgraced any nation on the face of the globe; but still, had he not been instructed by the superior judgment of the Speaker, he should have been of opinion that the honourable member who spoke last, had he not waved the right, was entitled to have proceeded, and might fairly have introduced any parallel instances of atrocity, when told, on the other side, that the act of the emperor of the French, by which this country was precluded from listening to his overtures for peace, was an instance of the most unparalleled atrocity which had ever disgraced any country. He felt no pleasure in recalling to the recollection of the house the calamities and burdens under which the people of this country groaned. He did not wish them to look back to what was past, but with the recollection of past occurrences in their minds to look forward to what yet remained; and to consider well that a continuance in similar courses might ultimately prove fatal to this land. Whatever were the merits of Buonaparté which unquestionably would not be fairly discussed in that house, it would, at least, be allowed, that he knew the best means of accomplishing the objects he had in view. Having, then, received from him a taunt as to an unprotected part of our dominions, let us take the hint, and by an act of our own render a repetition of the taunt unnecessary. It had been said, that beat a fool-in a mortar with a pestle, he would never quit his folly; we had been beat in a mortar for many years, but what had we got but disgrace? If we were to assist the Spaniards, it was the duty of ministers to see that there was a rational hope of attaining our end. In his opinion there was not any such rational expectation.—The absurdity of acting on the divine right of kings had been the misfortune of this reign. In support of it we had made an unavailing waste of blood and. treasure, but we had never yet embarked in any legitimate object. We were now smarting under the effects of war with America, and the burdens with which we were loaded by the corrupt ministers of those days. It suited the right hon. gent. [Mr. Canning) to-night to say, that the internal government of a country should not be interfered with. How did this doctrine accord with the idea of the contest in which, for the last 15 years, we had been engaged with the French, simply because they chose to alter their internal form of government? Instead of a monument to the memory of the minister who involved us in such a war, he deserved to have lost his head on the scaffold. In addition to the other losses our armies in Spain had sustained, he thought the life of the gallant officer who commanded the expedition to have been too dearly sold for Ferdinand VII. If he was rightly informed, there were bulletins in town, in which, notwithstanding the acrimony of the French ruler, he does ample justice to the bravery of our army and its gallant commander. He could not believe that men who, like our present ministers, could see no merit in an enemy, were fit to rule over a generous people. He begged, however, to disclaim the idea of being the advocate of Buonaparté.— As to the general state of the war in Spain, unless ministers proceeded on the fact of the known enthusiasm of the country; if they presumed to take that information on light grounds, they had been guilty of a crime of the deepest magnitude, being a course calculated above all others to produce the greatest calamities. In addition to accurate information on this subject, they should have been able to see that there would be 300,000 men in arms; that all the passes were secured; and that they would be able to fight with every advantage, not subject to the want of food, and that they would only have to fall, if they did fall, in the field of glory. If these things could not be ensured, then their duty was not to hare landed a single man, but to have supplied the Spaniards with arms and other necessaries, which might have produced a prolongation of the war. These were the only two rational plans of proceeding; instead of which ministers had contented themselves with sending only such a body of men as was sufficient to prevent disgrace to our arms, which the valour of our army could itself effect, but not enough to save the nation from an aching heart. They presumed, too, to trust the British character and honour on the rotten plank of the Spanish government, not excepting even the Inquisition. They had no right to do so; there was no necessity for doing it. With respect to sending money to the Spaniards, it would have well become ministers, before they called for a supply from the exhausted pockets of the people, to have restored the millions of which Spain had been some years ago unjustly pillaged by the government of this country, and which had gone to his majesty under the name of Droits of the Admiralty. This would only have been a restitution of their own property, and while it aided the Spaniards, would have cleared the character of this country, and confirmed our former assertion, that we had seized on their money principally to prevent its going into the hands of BuonapartéHe confessed he should prefer to the amendment now proposed, an address to his majesty, requesting that he would order an inquiry into the grievances of which the public had to complain, and that, as an earnest of the reformation of abuses, ho would dismiss his present ministers from, his presence and councils. The house was called on for an Address of Thanks. He, for one, had no thanks to bestow; kings were too much exposed to have adulation poured into their ear. It was the cause of the overthrow of too many of the thrones of Europe. We had not heard that any of the kings who had of late years (alien under the dominion of Buonaparté were in want of courtiers. It was fit that the king of England should occasionally hear the truth from his commons, and no better opportunity than the present could possibly present itself. The secretary of state had objected to the idea of this being a sinking country lie (.Mr. Canning) might be rising, bat the country was sinking. He (sir Francis Burdett) was of that opinion, and there was too much ground to believe it would sink still lower, if a Reform did not speedily take place.

Mr. Beresford

denied that his majesty had drawn the sword to support the tyranny of the Inquisition, or any other ty- ranny; but on the contrary declared, that it had been drawn for the purpose of defeating the most atrocious of all possible tyrannies. He did net believe that there was a man in the house who would vote with the hon. gent, on the grounds stated by the hon. baronet who had just spoken. With respect to the negociation, had not government acted as they did, they would have been considered as abandoning the cause of Spain. For his part, he was satisfied that the only danger to which England could be expose would be peace with France.

Lord Porchester,

while he agreed with his hon. friend (Mr. Whitbread) in many observations, deprecated the idea of this being a sinking country, or that there was any necessity of shewing an anxiety to enter into negociation for peace.

Lord H. Petty

was satisfied that no peace was to have been expected from the Overtures at Erfurth, but on the abandonment of Spain and that it was by arms, and not by negociation, that the fate of Spain was to be decided. Our character with Spain was still to be gained, and if we wished to inspire her with a belief that we meant to make an exertion in her favour, our conduct should have been in unison with our declaration, and not calculated to raise any doubt in the minds of the Spanish people as to our sincerity, or that we meant to bring the cause of Spain into our market.—With regard to the observations so eloquently urged by the hon. baronet (sir F. Burdett), as to the propriety of taking part in the cause of Spain, whether that was right or wrong, we had already made our election; our part was chosen, and an abandonment of it would have been alike detrimental to our honour and our interest. His lordship deprecated the tone of insult in which the answer of the right hon. secretary was conceived; but at the same time he did not see any mode by which the intentions of the French emperor could have been altered. If the last words of the Address were meant to convey that we hoped the contest was to be persevered in, though in a manner very different from that in which it had been hitherto conducted, he agreed in it. If the object, on the other hand, was to imply an approbation of what was already done, he must protest against any such meaning being put upon it. He did not think this a sinking country, but he was satisfied that nothing had been omitted by ministers to render it so.

Mr. Secretary Canning

animadverted upon the inconsistent grounds upon which the gentlemen who opposed his motion justified their opposition, and upon the equally inconsistent grounds of sense of those who agreed with him. But with regard to the noble lord who had just sat down, he could not help expressing his astonishment and regret to hear the unqualified manner in which that noble lord had thought proper to approve of the opinions delivered by the hon. baronet behind him (sir F. Burdett.) To the talents of that hon. bart. and to his sincerity also, no man was more willing to do justice than he was; but, without meaning any thing personally disrespectful to that hon. baronet, he must observe, that he was grieved to hear the noble lord, who was naturally to be ranked among the great men of this country— who was to be looked to as one of its probablé governors— declare such an entire concurrence in those sentiments of the hon. bart. which appeared so dangerous in their nature and character. If the evils which the hon. baronet deplored were so grievous, why did he not bring them forward in some distinct and tangible form, and not fasten a general declamation upon a question of this nature? Why not propose some practical remedy for the grievances he complained of—such a remedy as any minister could applv—and not continue to repeat his doctrine, that the whole frame of the government was not worth preserving (a loud cry of 'No, no!—Misrepresentation !' from the Opposition Benches.) The right hon. gentleman vindicated the Replies given to the Notes of both the Russian and French ministers, and contended that there was no just ground for the desponding language which was used with regard to Spain. On the contrary, the hope he entertained and acted upon at the outset, he still continued to cherish— that if Spain were true to itself it could not fail to triumph.

Lord H. Petty

thought it a very singular proof of unqualified approbation, with regard to the sentiments of the hon. baronet behind him, that he was about to vote against him. At the same time he could not hesitate to repeat, that in the principal part of the sentiments which the house had this night heard from the hon. baronet, and which were delivered with an eloquence such as could not be soon forgotten, he cordially concurred; and he would add, that there was no man in whose sentiments he would be more happy to feel it consistent with his opinion to concur, than those of the hon. baronet.

Sir F. Burdett

deprecated the promulgation of an opinion under the sanction of the right hon. secretary's authority, that, he had uttered any sentiments injurious to the interests of the country. He appealed to the house whether such an imputation was applicable? Whether the course he pursued this night, as he had uniformly done, in reprobating the abuses that prevailed in the administration of government, could be fairly deemed inconsistent with the profound veneration which he felt for the genuine constitution of this country

Mr. Sec. Canning

said, that his allusion to the hon. baronet's speech referred to the phrase of "absurdly contending for loyalty".

Sir F. Burdett

explained his meaning, that the argument respecting loyalty in Spain was pushed to an extremity inconsistent with the freedom of any nation, and particularly with the constitution of this land.

The question was then put upon the Address moved by Mr. Secretary Canning, and carried without a division.