HC Deb 02 February 1809 vol 12 cc313-23
Lord Custlereagh

rose to move the order of the day, for the second reading of the Militia Enlistment bill: but as this bill differed nothing in principle from the bill of last year, and as he had so recently given his opinion at length upon its various details, he should abstain from troubling the house in this stage by repeating those opinions, but reserve himself for any objections that might be offered to it.

Mr. Elliot

wished to know the rate of bounties proposed by his noble friend.

Lord Castlereagh

answered from six guineas to eleven.

Mr. Elliot

expressed his great reluctance in opposing any bill having for its object to place the public force of the country on that respectable footing on which it ought to stand, His objection, however was to the system on which the bill was founded. He should not detain the house by going minutely into all its details, but should confine himself to its general heads. It afforded a striking lesson to the house and to the country, of the evil consequences of adopting a bad precedent, Heretofore, previously to the introduction of a similar bill, there was much of detail and preparatory communication with colonels of regiments, But the former measure of his noble friend being adopted, he relied that in this too he should be successful, His majesty's speech, at the opening of the session, certainly recommended to parliament every attention to an increase of the disposable army of the country, without impairing the means of home defence; but he thought it was impossible to attempt the former by means of this bill, without materially injuring the latter. He did not condemn the colonels of regiments for their anxiety to adopt the readiest means for filling up the ranks of their corps; but he did most decidedly condemn the principles of a bill, the operation of which would inevitably tend to the dissolution of all discipline both in the regular army and militia, as well as to the injury of morality throughout the country; for such would be the effect of high boun- ties given to the recruits from the militia to the line, and to the substitutes who were to fill their places in the militia ranks: the necessary consequences of which, as experience had shewn, would be intoxication and riot: such effects could not fail to produce disgust in both army and militia, and to exclude from both, as it had already done, officers of that class and description, which should characterize the service, So long ago as the peace of Amiens, he was decidedly of opinion that the militia of the country ought to have been reduced to its original standard as a maximum; and it was now found that a departure from that principle, ever since the commencement of the present war, had involved the country in all the evils which had been suffered under the militia system, viz. the oppressive effects of ballots upon the people, the enormous increase of bounties to substitutes to so high a rate as 18l. 20l. and even 30 guineas; the severe effects of this upon the balloted men who could not leave their homes and families to serve; the profligacy produced amongst the men who became substitutes; the constant temptations held out to them to desert from one regiment, in order to obtain the bounty in another; the heavy punishments for desertion widely increased, and such impediments thrown in the way of the regular recruiting service as to render almost impracticable the raising of men for the regular service, even at triple the usual bounties. He recollected the former plan proposed by Mr. Pitt, of which that minister was so fond, that it was deemed by his friends an infallible specific to increase the army of the country, a kind of talisman. Which, if any man touched, the enchantment was to be dissolved. But no sooner had his noble friend come into power than he totally departed from that plan, and resorted to the supplementary militia, from which all the mischiefs of increased bounties took their rise, By the present bill, the militia officers were required to recruit at a bounty of ten guineas, for which it was obvious that under the increased system of bounties, men could not be had. But, then, his noble friend had an expedient to let out. a little ballot, in case the bounty should fail, to be inflicted on the county where the quota of men could not be induced to enlist within a given period; and. Then, as a remedy to the balloted man, who could not find a substitute at half price, the ten guineas were to be given in aid. But this ballot coming on the heels of that for the local militia, could not fail to create general discontent, inasmuch as it was not a regular tax, but must weigh oppressively upon individuals. He wished the house could have an opportunity of obtaining such a document as the expence entailed upon the people in consequence of militia ballots, and the allowance to militiamen's families. It might be said, that those allowances would cease when militiamen were transferred into the line; but would not the burthen be upon the parishes, by the new shape it must assume in poor rates for the maintenance of those families? Yet such was the effect of this cheap defence of nations"—The honourable member next compared the effects of this plan with those of the plan proposed by a right hon. friend of his, not now in his place (Mr. Windham), and which proposed to recruit men for limited service instead of for life: a plan, the principle of which was founded on the feelings of human nature. He was ready to admit, that for the first four or five months it was in operation, the preference for unlimited service preponderated, But in the remaining seventeen, out of the 19.072 raised. 14.301 enlisted for limited service, In the last, the number of men transferred from the militia to the line in England was 19,152, and of these between 16 and 17.000 were for limited service. In Ireland he would allow the effects were different, and the proportion for both was about half and half, Whether this was attributable to a more valorous spirit, or a less calculating mind, he could not determine; but it was a fact, that out of 27.000 men, raised in 1807 for general service, about 19 000 were for limited service; a clear proof that had that principle been adhered to, and not abandoned for the purpose of introducing that now proposed, the country would not only have avoided all the evils experienced both by the country and the army under the balloting system; but that the force of the line would have been increased to any extent necessary, with a saving of nearly one half of the expence.

Colonel Wood

contended, that the recruiting of the regiments of the line from the militia ranks, was the most prompt and efficacious mode of rendering the former what they ought to be, and of rendering the physical strength of the country formidable to the enemy. The recent victories in Portugal and at Corunna were achieved by the men recruited from the militia ranks, and it was by transferring those men to the line, that they could acquire that military perfection which was not attainable in the home service. The hon. member had spoken of the communication, heretofore deemed necessary, with the colonels of militia regiments, before a measure of this kind was adopted. But he could assure him that, whether the colonels of militia, who then objected to this principle, had from experience surmounted their prejudices, or become better soldiers, they had not now the same objections; for they saw that the men trained by their exertions were more serviceable to their country in the line than they could be in the militia, and therefore they thought nothing of the trouble imposed on them by this arrangement, and had long abandoned those local prejudices for retaining their men, which heretofore prevailed. The hon. member had said that by this practice that class and description of officers which should characterise the militia service, would be disgusted from entering it; but he would say it was impossible to obtain this desirable class of officers for the militia, unless an encouragement was held out to subalterns in the service, by offering them commissions for volunteering into the line. Under the present system they were debarred of those hopes of promotion, which was the best incentive to good conduct, military ardour, and the acquirement of military skill, But if they felt the advantage of being transferred, with their rank and their men, to that branch of the service where they might look forward to the chance of being one day generals, the advantages to the army would be incalculable; for many young men, the sons of clergymen, and other gentlemen of moderate fortunes, obtained commissions in the militia, but were unable to purchase into the line, and never could rise beyond a subaltern rank, But if such an encouragement were held out, and a preference given to militia subalterns, on recommendation to commissions in the line, the militia service would never want officers, With respect to the rates of bounty, he denied that they were now so high as the hon. gent, had represented, whatever they might have been when competition for substitutes ran so high. Men might now be had for 8 guineas; and up wards of 30 had recently joined the regiment he had the honour to command, at and under that rate. He lamented as much as any man the frequency of desertions, which, he was wiling to allow, arose- in a great degree, from high bounties, A description of scoundrels, who never meant to be soldiers, made a practice of following the ballots from county to county, and taking the bounties with no other view than plunder, by enlisting in one regiment, and then deserting to take the bounty in another. Such fellows were worse than highwaymen: beside, by rendering more frequent the severity of military punishments, they brought disgrace on their regiments; and he was convinced the most effectual way of preventing such of fences would be to render them punishable by the civil law.

Sir T. Turton

wished to know, before he could agree to augment the disposable force, what it was intended to do with it. The noble lord had stated last year, that after allowing for the home defence, there would be 00.000 men convertible to purposes of foreign service, He wished to know where these men were. Unless we meant to repeat such scenes as the Convention of Cintra, or the retreat in Spain. we stood in need of no additional force; for it was childish to talk of danger of invasion with our superior navy. Rome had been unable to conquer Sicily until she had subdued the Carthaginean fleet. He objected to the measure also on the ground of its changing the constitutional principle of the militia of the country.

Mr. Bastard

argued against the bill, The only consequence of the former measure for allowing the transfer of men from the militia to the line, had been mutiny, drunkenness, and insubordination. He must do his royal highness the Commander in Chief the justice to say, that in executing the former bill he had religiously adhered to the letter of it, and he would recommend the civil department of his majesty's government to imitate his royal highness's conduct in this respect.

The Secretary at War

asserted, that it was admitted, on all hands, that some measure for augmenting the regular army was both proper and necessary. No other means but the present could be found for answering that purpose except a military conscription. It might be necessary for this country, in the present circumstances of the world, to act a great part on the continent, and that was only to be done by increasing the amount of the regular army of the country Though the operation of the ballot might be a hardship, that hardship would be greatly relieved by the provisions of his noble friend's bill, If the ballot were to apply at once, the bounty might rise, but when the deficiency was to be gradually supplied, no such inconvenience would be felt.

Mr. D. Giddy

approved of the establishment of the Local Militia, as securing the country against exposure to the danger of invasion. He also considered the success of a similar measure, in a late instance as a good ground for the present.

Mr. Calcraft

agreed with the Secretary at War, that the military force of the country ought to he placed on the most respectable footing. It was but a few months since they had been told, that the army was then upon the highest establishment of which the circumstances of the country admitted. The noble lord ought therefore to state what the diminution was which had taken place in that army since that period. The papers presented last year shewed that the army then consisted of nearly 240.000 men, while the papers then on the table shewed its amount to be only 210.000. It was the duty of the noble lord. Therefore, to shew how this diminution had taken place.—The hon. gent. then entered into a defence of the military system of his right hon. friend (Mr. Windham.) which he contended had not had a fair trial. That system had produced, whilst in force, a supply of nearly 24.000 annually, a supply as great as the circumstances of the population of this country would admit of. He did not look to our acting any great military part on the Continent, and hoped that before we attempted any such operation, we should maturely weigh the circumstances, and the scene upon which we should have to act. This was the fourth instance in which the militia had been drafted to supply the army, and the effect of this practice had been to drive qualified officers out of that force. He did not think it possible to recruit the militia by the bounty proposed by the noble lord's measure, If men were wanted for the public service, they should be raised at the public expence.

Colonel Frankland

thought that it was as necessary to attend to the manner in which the military means of the country were employed, as to the numerical amount of our force. He allowed, however, that the great point was the consistency of the house. It was true, parliament was pledged to increase the military means of the country; but the question was, whether the regular army might not, by this measure, be increased at the expence of our own defence? It was necessary for the house to take care that it should not be committed to the discretion, or rather the indiscretion of any man. After the experience we had had, who could say that an unbalanced army was the best means of defence? The hon. gent. then placed in a strong point of view the injury to the militia service by this mode of proceeding. It had a tendency to produce disorganization and disgust in the home service, and to preserve all this when created. He adverted to the permanent, admirable, and deeply founded system of his right hon. friend (Mr. Windham), and observed, that it was impossible to discuss such measures as this, without taking that system into view. All circumstances that bore upon the question were to be considered, and upon the whole, he thought that this system of expedients was the most insufficient and burthensome that could be resorted to.

Mr. Lockhart

said, that the events which had taken place might convince us that we ought not to trust to a mere defensive force, of whatever description; whether armed peasantry, local militia, or even militia. All systems were liable to objection; but the question was, whether this was not the best that could be adopted at present? He never understood, that the plan of the right hon. gent. (Mr.Windham) had been abandoned: but, at the same time, it was not sufficient for procuring an immediate supply, which was what was now wanted.

Lord Castlereagh

said, that although the house was pledged to the throne on the principle of increasing the army, yet the best mode of carrying that principle into effect was certainly a very fair matter for discussion, He, for his part, must support the plan which he had presented, and which appeared to him likely to increase considerably the disposable force, without at the same time impairing the defensive strength of the country, An hon. gent. had stated, that he objected to the increase of the disposable force, until there was an administration more capable of wielding it with advantage to the country. This was certainly no objection to the measure itself; for if the hon. gent. would point out to the house who these men were who would manage the strength of the empire with greater ability, and more to the public advantage; if that hon. gent, and his friends, who were sitting around him, were to form that new administration, still they should be obliged to his majesty's present ministers for making such an increase of the disposable force as would give their successors in office a greater power to wield, without incurring the odium of creating it. His majesty's ministers would be liable to a serious charge against them, if, thinking as they did of the necessity of increasing the army, they were yet to abstain for months from a measure they conceived necessary to the state, and not to bring it forward until they had the verdict of that house upon the several parts of their administration which were to be the subject of future discussion. He allowed that it was the bounden duty of ministers, when they came down to the house, to propose any measure that would increase the pressure upon the country, to point out an adequate necessity. Ministers had always two objects in view, in the measures which they proposed for augmenting the army. The first was to increase the disposable force; and the second was, to take care that the defensive force should be so strong as that the country should not be exposed to peril and danger from the manly exertions which his majesty's government might feel it their duty to recommend for the assistance of other nations. Whatever was the present appearance of the probabability of success to the cause of Spain, yet as the principle was agreed to on all sides of the house, it followed, that whether any or what portion of our army was to be sent to the assistance of Spain, was pure military question, which was only to be determined by the executive power. If ministers should afterwards appear to have given improper advice, or to have mismanaged the military means of the country, they were subject to a heavy responsibility; but he could not think the gentlemen on the other side would really wish to tie up the hands of the executive, and deprive it of all means of acting as circumstances might render necessary, merely from the fear that it might be advised to act wrong, or to make an imprudent use of its strength. He could not believe that the gentlemen on the other side could suppose that they saw their way so clear in respect of the war in Spain, as to say that circumstances might not occur which would make it the bounden duty of this country to give the most powerful assistance to the Spanish Patriots. It was his firm opinion, that while the people of Spain were true to themselves and to their own cause, it was not only the interest of this country, but the pledged duty of parliament, to support them. He did not mean to say, that we were now to embark in wild military speculations that had no chance of succeeding; but it was still his opinion, that it the Spanish people continued to display that energy which they had shewn not many months ago, the struggle in that country was by no means at an end. But supposing that struggle to be now completely at an end, did not other views open to the mind of the hon. gent, and shew the necessity still of increasing our armies? Were we to suppose that no occasion could ever after occur in which they might be wanted on foreign service, or that the exertions of mankind were for ever to be tied down by the tyranny and usurpation of one individual? If no field of action presented itself in Europe, British interests might call them for the defence of another part of the world; while, at the same time we must keep an invincible army on our own shores to protect them from danger and from insult. He hoped that these considerations would be considered as sufficient arguments for the general principle of increasing the disposable force. He believed an hon. gent. on the other side had fallen into a great mistake in stating the diminution of the army in the present year, and he believed the mistake arose from the artillery being included in the return of the last year, who were not included in the return of the present. In considering how the army was at present organized, there were 126 battalions of infantry, whose numbers exceeded 6OO, and there were 56 that fell short in number. It was well known that battalions, not amounting to 600, were considered inefficient, and not fit for service, and that the efficiency of the army depended a great deal on the battalions being full and complete. It this measure obtained 27,000 men, it would complete all the battalions of our infantry up to 900 men. There never was, perhaps, a more efficient army for its number, than that which was lately acting upon the continent. In Portugal there were about 29.000 men in 32 regiments; if there was now a deficiency in the fulness of our battalions, from the losses of that campaign, it was absolutely necessary that it should be repaired. This was a measure which would not only increase the disposable force, but ameliorate the internal organization of our army, and prevent the country being burdened with inefficient second battalions.—He should next advert to a former topic. Namely, the comparative merit of the plan of a right hon. gent. (Mr. Windham), and the experiment which he had thought it proper to make, of allowing men (if they pleased) to enlist for unlimited service. Now, if the gentlemen on the other side contended, that experience had decided in favour of the theoretic principles of the right hon. gent. he thought he could account for the result. His experiment had, in fact, been only tried for the last six months. For the first eight months of the time the gentlemen began their calculation, it was contrary to law for men to enlist for unlimited service, and therefore all the recruits which were got were for the limited service. For several months after it was lawful, it did not appear to be generally understood in the army. It was not till the last six months that any had begun to enlist for unlimited service. The first month only 12 men enlisted for unlimited service; but as the thing became understood. the number progressively increased. In the month of December, no less than 970 preferred the unlimited service. Of the last 1,400 recruits which were raised, about 1,100 chose the unlimited service; so that, instead of his experiment having failed, he thought it was evident that men preferred generally the unlimited service to the limited, and the profession of a soldier to the seven years service, which looked more like a trade. He had been twitted with its being an Irish discovery, perhaps suited to the temper and spirit of the Irish nation, but not adapted to this country or its more sober neighbour, Scotland. The event, however, did not justify this charge, as he was always much more disposed to rest his arguments on experience and facts, than upon abstract principles of philosophy. He was perfectly convinced that there was no other rational ground for the system of the right hon. gent., than that it was likely to produce more men; for it never could be said that it was likely to improve the discipline of the army. He was so far from rejecting the system altogether, that he by no means wished to exclude men from entering for limited service, being convinced that there were many men who would prefer this mode of enlistment; but as he was equally convinced that there were many others who would prefer the enlisting for unlimited service, he thought it but fair that they should be allowed their option. He wished to carry along with the more perishable materials of an army, as much as he could get of permanent. The fact about the number of recruits was, that, whatever was the system, the country regularly produced about 1,200 men a month. How the number came to be so exact, he could not say. Recruiting Serjeants might often put grave legislators to the blush, and there was a certain recruiting law which that house did not understand, and which perhaps got the men better than acts of parliament. Even in the halcyon days of high bounty, and no ballot, it was not found that the number of recruits exceeded the regular number by 100 men, nor under any other system did they fall short to that amount.—It had been mentioned, that large armies were dangerous to civil liberty. Gracious God! could any rational man now suppose, that the liberties of this country were in any danger from any regular army that it was judged proper to raise, balanced as that army must be by an immense force of Militia, Local Militia, and other armed descriptions of force, and still more balanced by those constitutional feelings which animated no description of his majesty's subjects more strongly than it did our gallant armies, which had so often and so recently acquired immortal honour for themselves and their country. He trusted the house would not be discouraged by the present aspect of affairs, but that they would see the necessity of increasing rapidly our disposable force.

Earl Temple

said, that the noble lord had now shewn us the nature and spirit of the measure, for the transfer was not now made on an emergency, but in contemplation of an emergency. So that this was now to become a regular system from year to year. This, he said, was a very bal mode of increasing the regular army, and as a regular system, he had the strongest objection to it. His lordship also defended the plan of his rt. hon. friend (Mr. Windham), and stated, that when the noble lord laid his cold fingers upon it, it was producing at the rate of 24,000 a year, instead of the 13,000 produced by the noble lord; and out of the 27,000 that volunteered from the Militia, 20,000 were for limited service at a lower bounty.

The Bill was then read a Second time.