§ I had the honour to receive on the 2nd instant your letter of the 30th ult. [No. II. of these Papers.] in answer to that which I addressed to you on the 27th November. Had this army been united and ready to act at the time of general Castanos's defeat, much as I think it would have been risking it, yet it was my intention to have marched on Madrid, and to have shared the fortunes of the Spanish nation. If I could not have sustained myself there, I thought that by placing myself behind the 9 Tagus I might give the broken armies and people of Spain, if they had patriotism left, an opportunity to assemble round me, and to march forward to the relief of the capital. That this was my intention, is known to the officers with me, who are in my confidence; it is known also to lord Castlereagh, to whom I had imparted it in one of my late letters. I wished to have my opinion confirmed by yours, which was my reason for addressing you on the 27th; but had you seen the affairs of Spain in a different light, and had you been adverse to the army being committed in the heart of Spain, your opinion upon such a subject would, I may say certainly, have decided me to have altered my intention.—With respect to the determination which I made on the evening of the 28th, upon receiving from Mr. Stuart the account of Castanos's defeat, I should, had you been with me, have communicated it to you, but should never have thought of asking your advice or opinion, as that determination was founded on circumstances with which you could not be acquainted, and was besides a question merely military, of which I should have thought myself the best judge.—At that time the army was divided in three different corps, and could not possibly have been united before the 13th or 14th of this month, before which period there was every reason to believe that it would be attacked by all the force of the enemy; and after Castanos's defeat, I knew of no Spanish army from which it could receive the smallest assistance. The army I commanded was weak from separation, and, when collected, amounts only to 26,000 men fit for duty. I had been left without any communication with any of the Spanish armies; I expected no assistance from any; and it behaved me to consider the safety of the British troops. I therefore directed sir David Baird, whose corps would not have been collected at Astorga until the 4th of this month, to full back on Corunna. I directed general Hope, by forced marches, to join me here, where I intended, if I was permitted, to wait his arrival; and I took measures for retiring with him into Portugal, with a view either to defend that frontier, and ultimately to retire on Lisbon, or to return to Spain, should any change of affairs there render it eligible.—The resistance made by the people of Madrid has occupied the French, and has prevented any corps from being detached against me. This example of enthusiastic patriotism in the capital, if it 10 holds, may be followed by the most happy effects, if the flame communicates, and the example is followed by the provinces.— There has been no example of any such resistance in any ether part of Spain, and, though I hope this will produce it, I hare neither seen nor heard of such enthusiasm or patriotism elsewhere, though I trust it will prove otherwise. I cannot but consider it as doubtful, whether the people of Madrid will continue firm when they come to be pressed. If they yield, the whole is gone.—I received yesterday, a letter from the Junta at Madrid. I have ordered sir David Baird to march back to Astorga, and I have stopped my preparations for retreat on Portugal. I have put myself in communication with the marquis of Romana at Leon, and, without being able exactly to say in what manner, every thing shall be done for the assistance of Madrid and of the Spanish cause, that can be expected from an army such as I command. I cannot make a direct movement on Madrid, because the passages of the Guadarrama and Somosierra are in the hands of the French: besides, until joined by sir David Baird, lam much too weak.—I have thought it my duty thus calmly to explain to you the reasons which have and do actuate my conduct, and I wish anxiously, as the king's minister, to continue upon the most confidential footing with you; and I hope, as we have but one interest, the public welfare, though we may occasionally see it in different aspects, that this will not disturb the harmony that should subsist between us. Fully imprest as I am with these sentiments, I shall abstain from any remark upon the two letters from you, delivered to me (No. III. and IV. of these Papers.] last night and this morning by [] or on the message which accompanied them.