HC Deb 11 April 1809 vol 14 cc5-7

With respect to a retreat upon Portugal, I wish to confine myself to a simple political opinion, which, supposing other considerations not to be decidedly adverse, might, I think, determine for a retreat upon Gallicia or the strong country in the neighbourhood of Astorga in preference to Portugal, supposing of course a retreat to be already determined upon as absolutely necessary. If, however, you do me the honour to consult me respecting the general state of the country, and the means of resistance to be expected from it, I should say, that the provinces which you have hitherto seen, are, of all Spain, the least distinguished for a military spirit.—In the course of the late events they have been wholly passive, and have seen their country occupied successively by the stronger party; and indeed it is difficult to blame them; living in open towns in vast plains, without either arms or horses, they have neither the means of defence or escape. But even here we see that the towns have been abandoned at the approach of the French; that no magistrate has ever been brought over to take an oath of allegiance, nor have the French been able to enlist a single soldier. The whole of this country however has in all ages belonged to the party which was superior in cavalry. In the extremities of the kingdom, weaker powers have been enabled to preserve their independence for ages.—From every thing that I can learn of the disposition of the other provinces, they seem to be possessed by the most ardent and determined spirit, which, even in the event of the defeat of the levies which they are raising for the general defence of the kingdom, would lead them individually to continue a desperate resistance under the direction of their separate Juntas, with such assistance as England could afford them.—But it must, I appre- hend, be the wish and intention of government on every account to prevent things from being, brought to this. extremity. There seem to be tow modes of acting with this view, one which you state justly to be of greater hazard, inasmuch as we place ourselves effectively in the power of the Spaniards. But, as yon observe at the same time with great truth, this may be worthy of risk, if the people of Spain and their government have sufficient energy to recover from their late defeats. Of the people I have no doubt; the government are new, but they are resolute, and I believe every man of them determined to perish with the country; they will not, at least, set the example of weakness and timidity, which the ruling powers and higher orders in other states in Europe have exhibited.—The military system is certainly defective; but I am persuaded that your representation, in this as well as all other points, would be listened to with, the greatest deference.—If you should determine to march into Spain, exclusive of the importance of covering the capital, there are, I think, these advantages which would result from hastening the measure We have now in Castile an army, of 20,000 men, upon which Castanos is, falling back; the reinforcements are daily passing through the provinces, and the addition of the British would give a force very much, I should think, superior to any thing which the French would be able to assemble by that time, especially having a strong country in arms against them on their left, the whole way from the Pyrenees. There is besides at present a great delay in the arrival of the reinforcements which were promised them, and which, if they had been sent, would by this time have composed an enormous force. There are reports, that the resistance to the conscription has been much, more obstinate than usual, and the pastoral letter of the bishop of Carassone seems to imply as much.—Every great effort on the part of France has been preceded by an interval of weakness or internal disturbance; an advantage therefore which should be obtained at this moment would be of double importance, inasmuch as it would render a conscription for a third attempt upon Spain, infinitely difficult. If on the other hand, the French with their present forces are allowed to maintain their present advantages, and to wait the completion of their conscription, they would pour into Spain with a num- ber of troops, which would give them the immediate possession of the capital and the central provinces; the war would then be reduced to an absolute competition between the two countries in standing out against the waste of population, enormous as it would be on both sides. I cannot but think, therefore, that considerations both of policy and generosity call upon us for an immediate effort.—If, however, this view of the subject should not appear sufficiently clear or conclusive, to induce you to take a step which would, I am convinced (since you do me the honour to refer to me on that subject), meet with the approbation of his majesty's government, I would venture to recommend retaining the position of Astorga. The retreat from that place to Corunna would, as far as an unmilitary man may be allowed to judge, be a matter of less difficulty than through Portugal to Lisbon; and we might in that position wait for the reinforcements of cavalry from England, which would enable the army to act in the flat country, which opens immediately from that point, and extends through the whole of Leon and Old Castile.—I have already troubled you with my political reason on this head. I mention this however, in my humble opinion, only as the least objectionable of two modes of retreat. The object, I should conceive, would be to unite a force capable of repulsing the French, before they receive reinforcements. The covering and protecting Madrid is surely a matter of great moment for effect in Spain, and much more in France and in the rest of Europe; it would be a point of the utmost importance for Buonaparté to be able to publish a decree or to date a letter from Madrid. The people of the town are full of resolution, and determined to defend it in spite of its situation, which is judged to be an unfavourable one. This determination ought to be encouraged by a show of support. The siege of Madrid be a pretender to the throne, would be a circumstance decisive against his claim, even if in other respects it had been a just one.