HC Deb 20 May 1808 vol 11 cc475-88
Mr. Taylor

rose to move his promised Resolutions respecting the Expedition to the Dardanelles, but from the manner in which his speech was delivered, it was impossible, with the utmost attention, to catch more of it than suffices for a mere summary, he began by observing, that from the public notice which this Expedition, with all the circumstances connected with it, had excited, it was necessary that some inquiry should be instituted concerning it, a thing equally due to those who had planned it, and those to whom the execution had been entrusted. He stated, that before he had seen these Papers, he was rather inclined to think favourably at least of the object of the expedition; but he was now of opinion that it was founded neither in justice nor policy. In order to prove the injustice of the Expedition, he entered upon the consideration of the nature of the connection between this country and the Porte, and said, that the only ground we had for interference, was, the treaties of 1798, between Russia, England, and the Porte, the obligation of which treaties had become void by the peace of Amiens, after which any right we or the Russians had to sail in the Turkish seas, ceased. The Russians had only acquired a right to pass from the Black Sea in single ships, for the purpose of throwing supplies into the Ionian republic, which right was to be at an end when that republic should be settled, and it did end when the whole fell into the power of Buonaparte; and he contended, that our negociations to reconcile the Porte and Russia, ought to have been carried on at Petersburg, rather than at Constantinople, the Russians having been the aggressors. The hon. gent, then proceeded to consider the policy of the Expedition, and maintained that it was extremely unwise, for any trifling object, to alienate from us the minds of the Turks, who had been extremely well disposed to us. In order to prove that this was the case, he read a variety of documents, proving the favourable disposition of the Turks, Main alukes, and Arabs, in Egypt, and throughout the Ottoman empire; observing at the same time, that the persons at the head of the Turkish government were no less favourably disposed towards us than the people. He also found fault with the way in which the orders for the execution of this enterprize had been arranged. By passing the Dardanelles, which we had no right to do, we had commenced hostilities before negotiation. The ambassador had been unwisely trusted with too much discretionary power. The attack on the Turkish ships was an useless object; the number of ships was not equal to the enterprize; and lord Collingwood ought to have been allowed to choose any officer he pleased, to conduct the Expedition. With respect to the expedition to Alexandria, he had not been able to see its object and policy, and it had been so mismanaged as to bring dishonour upon the British arms. The hon. gent, read a variety of documents in support of his argument, and concluded by moving four Resolutions, the first of which was as follows, viz. "That his majesty's fleet, under the command of sir J. Duckworth, appeared in the vicinity of Constantinople, on the 20th of Feb. 1807, and after having remained there for ten days, retired without effecting any important object." The other Resolutions went to express a sense which the house, entertained of the disgrace that the disastrous result of the Expedition reflected on the honour and character of his majesty's arms.—On the first Resolution being put,

Mr. T. Grenville

expressed the satisfaction which he felt, after such repeated delays, in at length finding the motion substantially before the house, and in such a shape as to render it tangible. Far was he from complaining of the institution of inquiries of this nature. On the contrary, he deemed it most desirable, that those men who had exercised public functions should be called upon, in the face of the house and the country, to account for their conduct. More particularly were he and his colleagues gratified by the institution of the present enquiry, which would enable them to remove any unfavourable impression with respect to their conduct in this affair, if such impression existed, although if it did, he was at a loss how to conceive in what it could have originated. As well sis he could understand his majesty's present ministers, they had expressly disclaimed any participation in the institution of this enquiry, still, however, thinking it their duty to consent to it, and to allow of the production of the papers on which it was to be founded. All this was right and judicious enough. If he had any complaint against them, it was, that although they had never themselves asked for or appeared to warrant an enquiry, they had repeatedly, by insinuations and collateral arguments, endeavoured to produce a feeling against his majesty's late government, which it was impossible that at the time they could combat. He alluded particularly to the observations of the right hon. secretary of state for the foreign department, who, in a moment, certainly not of deliberation, but of violence and impetuosity, had accused the late administration of conduct, of which the official documents in his possession must have convinced him that they were innocent. That right hon. gent, had complained that his majesty's late government, at the requisition of the court of Petersburgh, made a diversion in the south of Europe, with ships without troops, when that requisition was for both ships and troops. No argument was necessary on this occasion. Let the house look at the papers on the table, and they would perceive, that so far from the Expedition to Constantinople arising out of any such regulation from the court of Petersburgh as that alluded to, it originated in the negociation that was carried on by Mr. Arbuthnot at Constantinople itself. He did not mean to follow the hon. mover of the present question at any great length, because without meaning any disrespect to him, he did not think that there was a man in the house who would adopt the line of argument pursued by the hon. gent. The right of interference between Russia and Turkey, which G. Britain possessed, was indisputable. Both the treaty of 1799, and that which followed the peace of Jassy, had for their object to connect in one bond of union the three countries. By the Convention entered into between Russia and Turkey, on the 21st of March, 1800, the passage of the Bosphorus, with troops, military stores, &c. was reciprocally secured to each power. When, therefore, this Convention was violated on the part of the Ottoman Porte, was it necessary to point out the policy which induced the British government to maintain the rights and interests of Russia unjustly attacked? In doing so, the late administration had only followed tip the line of conduct pursued for a long course of years by their predecessors, who had thought, that it was the interest of G. Britain to support and extend her connection with Russia. That the government immediately preceding the last were unequivocally of this opinion, was evident from the three documents to that effect upon the table. Thirty documents instead of three might have been laid on the table to prove this, but, doubtless, it was conceived by his majesty's present ministers that those produced were amply sufficient.—Passing over the deposition of the Hospodars, the representations made by Mr. Arbuthnot of the growing influence of France in Turkey, &c. he would call the particular attention of the house to the Note from Sebastiani, the French minister, which the hon. gent, had said appeared to him to contain much solid reasoning and nothing objectionable. That it contained nothing objectionable to a French ear, he did not doubt, but that a member of the British parliament should express himself; in such a manner with respect to it, was a circumstance that he confessed he could not have believed had he not witnessed it. This note was full of the violence and insolence which abounded in the numerous compositions of French diplomacy. The writer declared, "that if in the difficult circumstances of the times, the Ottoman Porte did not form the decision which her interests required, he should have ere long to lament her fate." He stated that "he had received positive orders from the emperor, that the Bosphorus should be shut against all Russian ships of war and all Russian vessels carrying military stores, &.c." and this at a time when Sebastiani must have well known that Russia had a right by treaty to send what ships she pleased through the Bosphorus. In a succeeding paragraph of the note it was observed, "that that passage could not be opened to the Russians by the Turks without committing an act of hostility against France, and giving to Napoleon the Great the right of marching troops over the territory of Turkey, that he might combat the Russians on the banks of the Dniester." Was all this unobjectionable? Then followed an intimation that a declaration of war by France would be the consequence should the Ottoman Porte turn a deaf ear to the representations of the French minister. "His majesty the emperor," said he, "has a large army in Dalmatia, assembled there for the defence of Turkey; but unless all ambiguity is removed, and the conduct of the Ottoman Porte proves that she is not inclined to favour the cause of Russia and England, that army will be used for the directly opposite purpose;" an immediate and categorical answer was required to this demand.—Having said so much on this Note, he would now advert to the excellent commentary upon it, contained in lord Howick's dispatches to Mr. Arbuthnot, of the 14th and 20th of Nov.; by which dispatches it must be evident to the house, that the accusation preferred by the hon. gent, against the late government, as entertaining a hostile feeling towards Turkey, was groundless. In the first of these dispatches, dated the 14th of Nov. lord Howick directed that every practicable mode of amicable remonstrance should be used for the purpose of endeavouring to recall the Ottoman Porte to a better line of policy. Mr. Arbuthnot was instructed in that dispatch from lord Howick, to acquaint the Turkish government, that if they would let the Russian ships pass, all appearance of hostility should cease on the part of G. Britain.—The right hon. gent, then proceeded to shew, that Mr. Arbuthnot had written to lord Collingwood and lord Howick, stating how desirable it was to send a force to the Dardanelles to support his negociation with the Porte. Sir T. Louis had in consequence been dispatched with three sail of the line by lord Collingwood, and the intelligence of that proceeding had been received in this country at the time when his majesty's late ministers were considering the propriety of sending a naval force to that quarter. They instantly approved of what had been done by that gallant admiral, and measures were taken for dispatching a larger force on that service. Some comments had been made on the nature of that force, but the house would judge of its sufficiency from the statement of Mr. Arbuthnot on the 29th Sept. that it was impossible for the Porte to withdraw its fleet to a place of safety. It was the opinion of all naval men with whom he had conversed upon the subject, that there would be no difficulty in passing the Dardanelles. He asked, therefore, as this was a new expedition, what could the government do but collect all the authentic information they could from professional persons and others, upon which to act? It was expected, too, that assistance would have been afforded by the Russian fleet; and that such expectation was not ill founded was evident from the circumstance of eight sail of the line of that fleet having joined Admiral Duckworth four days after he had repassed the Dardadelles, for the avowed purpose of co-operating against the Turks.—As to the delay that had been charged upon the late government in sending out a force, that was not imputable to the councils of his majesty's ministers. On the 9th of Nov. they received the information which led them to send out that naval force, and on the 22d of that month six sail of the line were completely equipped for the reinforcement of lord Collingwood's fleet, though, unfortunately, from the state of the weather, they could not sail for six weeks. As to the employment of troops, the question was, whether any could have been sent out in time to accomplish the objact in view, namely to attack the castles at the Dardanelles, before they should be able to place themselves in a state of defence. Mr. Arbuthnot represented the works as in a state of progressive and daily improvement on the whole line of the Bosphorus; and as the application for troops should come through lord Collingwood off Cadiz to this country, it would have been the middle of April before the troops could have arrived at their destination, when the works would have been completely secured against attack. No naval man with whom he had consulted, either before, or pending, or since the expedition, was of opiuion that any troops were necessary for passing the Dardanelles. It was a desperate service to attack a battery, but the bravery of British seamen made them despise the danger of passing batteries. But when gentlemen talked of troops, did they mean that an army of 60,000 men, or only a detachment of 4 or 5000, should have been employed on the occasion? The former could not be spared, and it would have been imprudent and unavailing to risk the latter in an operation within fifty miles of Constantinople, where 200,000, not men, but soldiers, were collected to march against the Russians.—He came, then, to the Resolution respecting the expedition to Alexandria, and if he had not heard the manner in which the hon. gent, had brought that forward as a matter of charge against the late government, he should have supposed that his object was to found upon it a censure of the present ministers. There were upon the table the instructions sent out by lord Howick to general Fox, directing that he should not give orders for the embarkation of the troops till the actual commencement of hostilities with the Porte; and sir John Duckworth was instructed to dispatch immediately upon that event taking place, a fast sailing vessel with the intelligence to general Fox, in order that he should, upon receiving it, make the necessary arrangements for the embarkation of the troops. The object of this Expedition was the capture of Alexandria, and not the conquest of Egypt. It was intended to secure Alexandria, and consequently Egypt from falling again, into the hands of the French, and to afford protection and encouragement to any party there might be in the country, favourably disposed to the British interests. The capture of Alexandria was, therefore, an act of effectual warfare. But, was it meant to be said or implied, that because the Expedition against Rosetta had been unfortunate, that was to be charged upon the planners of the Expedition which had been successful? He did not mean to go more minutely into this case than was absolutely necessary, and he should regulate what he had to say upon it with all the delicacy that was due to the officers of the army. He must however say, that the keeping of Alexandria, or the final evacuation of that city, was not affected by the difficulty of procuring provisions, without the possession of Rosetta. He had no official documents upon this question, but he had the authority of the most respectable naval and military men who had served there, to say, that so far from Alexandria having been in want of provisions, rice and corn were allowed to be exported to the Greek Islands in the months of June, July and August, up to the period of the evacuation. And this exportation was allowed, after reserving one year's rice, and six months wheat for the inhabitants, as well as six months provisions for the army. Besides, with the great naval force we had along the coast of Egypt, we might have supplied Alexandria from the Greek Islands, even though all supply from the interior was cut off. If any blame was imputable, it was to the present ministers who had given up Alexandria, at a time when they were endeavouring to open a negociation with the Porte, in which the evacuation of that city might have been looked upon as a concession to influence the Porte in our favour, and withdraw that power from the influence of France. It might be said, perhaps, that the city had been evacuated, in order to set free that portion of our military force which formed its garrison, and if they had been employed in any profitable operation since, that might be a justification. But they arrived at Syracuse from Alexandria; on the 25th of Nov. at Gibraltar; and on the 28th of Dec. in England, where they found that eight days before 10,000 troops had left England to look at Ceuta; he wished it had been to look into it. The right hon. gent, then briefly recapitulated the points which he had endeavoured to establish, and concluded by asserting, that, upon a review of all the measures to which the papers on the table referred, there was not one act which he would not again resort to under the same circumstances.

Mr. Secretary Canning

had listened with great attention to the statement which the right hon. gent, had made in defence of himself and his colleagues, and could not help being surprised at the manner in which he had kept to the declaration which he had made at the outset, that he would discard from his mind every idea of justification by recrimination. The right hon. gent, had very properly, in his division of the question, considered it in a political and military view, the former of which he had defended by the example of the predecessors of the late ministers, and the latter he had vindicated by a comparison with the measures of their successors. He did not, however, mean to impute any blame to the right hon. gent, for having departed from the declaration with which he had set out. The right hon. gent, was, undoubtedly, warranted in his wish to hear the opinion of some of his majesty's ministers upon this subject. The right hon. gent, had justified his own and his colleagues' conduct towards the Porte upon subsisting treaties, and particularly that of the triple alliance, and upon these he grounded the right of interference by an armed mediation. If any gentleman would but look into the treaty itself, he would perceive that the argument of the right hon. gent, could not be sustained. The triple alliance treaty had been concluded in 1793, and had reference to the situation and existing circumstances of the contracting parties, all equally at war with France at that period. The treaty had in it a stipulation, limiting its operation to eight years, after which it was to undergo a revision, and such alteration as the respective circumstances of the different countries might then render necessary; and that the treaty had been understood, even in this country, to have reference to the existing situation of the contracting parties, he believed that proofs were not wanting. The preamble of the treaty expressly stated these circumstances to which it applied; and could the right hon. gent, mean to assert, that a treaty negotiated with a view to existing hostilities in which all the parties were engaged, and followed, not by a joint peace, but by separate pacifications of each of these parties, must necessarily survive? Or, did he mean to say, that had it terminated with the war, it was necessarily to be revived on the renewal of another war, into which any of the parties might afterwards enter? If that were his view, it was contradicted by the facts; because that had not been the understanding of any of the parties, nor had the treaty ever been so acted upon. Great Britain renewed the war with France in 1803, but did Russia or did Turkey then go to war? The right hon. gent, said, that the treaty continued during the peace; but had G. Britain called upon either Russia or the Porte to join her in the war? Did the right hon. gent, therefore, mean to say, that this treaty, so concluded with reference to existing circumstances, sunk under the peace, and rose again, not at once but at three different times, and in three different parts? If they looked into the body of the treaty, they would find no better support for the argument of the right hon. gent. The treaty contained a stipulation guaranteeing the integrity of the Turkish dominions, as they were previous to the invasion of Egypt by the French. On this treaty the late ministers justified their measures for the conservation of Egypt by the capture of Alexandria. He would not deny that there might be cases in which it would be justifiable to make war upon a power that was in alliance before. He would not pretend to deny that we might have had a right to call upon Turkey to fulfil the defensive alliance with us: but then, after the lapses and laches which had taken place, we had no right to call upon this power for the fulfilment of that treaty. The right hon. gent, had asserted, that the refusal of the passage of the Dardanelles to the Russians had given to this country a right to assume an armed mediation; but as the passage was given by a subsequent convention, to which this country was not a party, we had no right, in virtue of an anterior treaty, to insist upon the fulfilment of that convention to which we were not a party; at least no writer upon the law of nations that he had ever read, had laid down such a doctrine. He admitted that the late ministers had shewn a disposition to conciliate Russia. But, however desirable it might be to make Russia believe we did not suspect her design upon the Porte, we should not precipitate ourselves into hostilities with Turkey, so commenced and so conducted as the war had been begun and conducted by the late ministers. When we did interfere, it ought to have been done in a manner that would not have given the Porte reason to suspect the sincerity of our views, nor Russia a right to charge us with not having interfered as we ought; and she must have expected we should not commence an interference by an expedition for our own advantage. He had not been in the house when the right hon. gent, began his speech, but he understood the right hon. gent. to have said, that no demand had been made by Russia for troops; but he could assure the right hon. gent, that a demand had been transmitted from St. Petersburg for a considerable body of troops; so that this was not so novel a part of the question as the right hon. gent, represented. The right hon. gent, had commented upon a note of M. Sebastiani, and the dispatches of lord Howick. He could not be suspected of being partial to the productions of the enemy, but certainly no one could read lord Howick's dispatches, without perceiving that he went great lengths to direct an armed interference to defeat the ascendancy of French counsels at the Porte. Notwithstanding the declaration of the right hon. gent, that he would abstain from recrimination, he had done upon this, as had been invariably done upon every other occasion when this matter was mentioned in that house—made it the ground of condemnation against the present government. The interference at Copenhagen was not more decisive in principle than this was. Here a force was sent to bombard the capital, not of a neutral, but of an ally; to burn the capital of a power whom we had taken an oath to protect. If you wish for war, enter into a definitive alliance; if you want to strip a power of part of its territories, enter into a stipulation to guarantee the integrity of its possessions! Here was the affair at Copenhagen justified; in this had the present ministers an acquittal from all the charges that had been made upon them with respect to that Expedition. If they could only be able to lay upon the table a copy of a treaty of defensive alliance with Denmark, the cases would be parallel, except that the Danish expedition was crowned with success, whilst the other was attended with defeat and disgrace; the calculation of the proportion between the means and the end being such as only to secure discomfiture.—The right hon. secretary then proceeded to quote several passages from lord Howick's dispatches, to shew that the doctrines they contained exactly corresponded with the principles upon which the Danish Expedition had been so justly undertaken, and so successfully executed. It was impossible that the Turkish fleet, passing the Dardanelles and the streights of Gibraltar, should attack any of the British possessions. On the contrary, the Danish fleet might, if once launched with a hostile view, be on our shores without a moment's notice. An intervention to procure, by pacific means, the arrangement desired by Russia, he did not condemn; but to interfere first by menace, and afterwards by violence, violence inadequate and unsuccessful, was what he did condemn. It was known that the passage of the Dardanelles would be regarded as an act of hostility; at least it was quite as natural to suppose that the approach to Copenhagen, the landing of troops, and the investment of that capital, would be received without resistance, or without a feeling of hostility, as that tile passage of the Dardanelles, and the appearance before Constantinople in a hostile attitude, would be viewed by the Turks with calmness and indifference. The estimate of the strength of the castles, and the appointment of the British force, shewed clearly that there was an idea that the object of the expedition was likely to be regarded as hostile, and to be met with resistance. But, it was said the expedition appeared before Constantinople purely for Russian objects. The restoration of the Hospodars was a Russian object; but how was it demanded by the British commander? With the alternative of giving up the Turkish fleet! If the fleet had been given up, could the restoration of the Hospodars be still insisted upon? And if it was not insisted upon, and the British force came off with the Turkish fleet in pocket, what would become of our attention to the interests of Russia?—Thus much as to the justice of the expedition. Now, as to the policy, he would contend that the Russians ought to have been induced by all means to concentrate their whole force against the most powerful and dangerous enemy, Buonaparte, and not to have weakened it by unprofitable schemes upon Turkey. That ought to have been our policy also. There, as to the force, the inadequacy of it was such, that if sir T. Louis had not come away as expeditiously as he had done, his passage would have been totally cut off. The necessity of having a body of troops was also laid down by the naval commanders. It was asked, what the troops could have done? They could have taken and held Lestos castle, which was tenable and important. They might have taken the castle of Abydos, and destroyed it. These towers did great damage to the British ships in their return; and the admiral said, that if another week had been allowed to prepare the defence, the squadron could not possibly have returned. It was asked, what could 5 or 6000 British troops have done, when Constantinople had 200,000 men of military age among its inhabitants? They might have destroyed the castle of Abydos by a coup de main, and they might have held the castle of Lestos, where the 200,000 men from Constantinople could not have got at them. But the troops were sent to Alexandria to commit a double breach of alliance, and to incur a double failure. He did not think 5000 men could achieve miracles: he could hardly conceive that 5000 men could open a communication from Chili to Buenos Ayres, over the highest and most impracticable mountains in the world; but he did think they might have destroyed one small castle by a coup de main, and taken and held another in which no attack could have been made on them.—He again insisted on the insufficiency of the grounds of the Expedition in point of justice and policy, the inadequacy Of the force employed, and the madness of sending a military force to secure a retreat. The return of the troops sent to Alexandria set free a part of the force in Sicily, which was brought to Gibraltar with a view to co-operate in securing the retreat of the royal family of Portugal from Lisbon, but that object was happily effected without the necessity of employing them. He defended himself and his colleagues from taking a forward part in this discussion. He did not see what practical benefit could result from a censure on persons who were no longer in his majesty's councils; and he thought it would be injurious to have on the Journals, a resolution reflecting on the honour of the country. If a vote of censure was proposed against ministers in office, supposed to have misconducted themselves, the passing of the resolution might lead to the removal of those ministers. No practical object being likely to be answered by the present motion, and the injurious and unpleasant consequences he had adverted to being likely to arise from the recording of such Resolutions on the Journals, he thought he should best discharge his duty by moving the order of the day.

Mr. Windham

observed, that, gentlemen semed to consider a treaty as binding, notwithstanding any change of circumstances that might arise. Now, he considered that a treaty was only binding as to what was within the purview of that treaty; a friend might, for instance, become our very worst enemy by change of circumstances. Was it to be supposed, then, that under every circumstance, or whatever might be the conduct of the power to which we were allied, we were still to adhere to it as firmly as if it not only fulfilled the letter and the spirit of the treaty, but as if it had gone further, as if it had proceeded to the utmost stretch of honour; were we still to look upon them with an eye of friendship, when we were convinced, not only of their awe of the power, but of their attachment to the cause, of the enemy? The letters of admiral Louis and sir J. Duckworth informed, the government that force was necessary, and that every thing depended upon promptitude. He would, therefore, leave it to any officer, whether it would have been politic to have advanced and left the troops behind. The question was to be decided upon the principles of general policy, and not upon an argumentum ad hominem; and he maintained, that there was nothing, either in the principle of action, or the arrangement of the plan, which had been attempted to be controverted; it was not therefore, to be judged of, from what followed, instead of from what preceded, the transaction.

Colonel Wood

endeavoured strenuously to impress the house with an idea of the impolicy of the measure.

The question was then loudly called for, and, after a short reply from Mr. Taylor, the question, that the other orders be now read, was put and carried without a division.