HC Deb 11 May 1808 vol 11 cc143-5
Sir Francis Burdett

had waited till he saw the house in a sufficient state of attendance, before he stated how he was circumstanced with respect to a transaction which in his view of it involved a breach of the privileges of that house. It would be necessary for him in order to explain the situation in which he stood, to state to the house a transaction which had taken place in one of the courts below. It was well known, that at the last election for the city of Westminster, the electors had nominated him as one of the candidates without his knowing any thing of the fact; and it was only towards the close of the election, that he was made acquainted with it. The electors claimed to be exempt from paying any part of the expence of that election, and the High Bailiff of Westminster had brought an action against him as one of the candidates, to recover a proportion of the expense of taking the election. Though there was no law to authorise such a demand, nor any custom to sanction the practise, though it was well known that he had not taken any share or portion in the conduct or direction of that election, yet, without any proof of the existence of law or custom to sanction the demand, the learned judge in the court below had thought proper to direct the jury to find a verdict against him, merely because he had taken his seat. This was the reason delivered by that learned judge to the jury, why he had incurred the expenses for which the action was brought. Now as to his taking his scat, that was not voluntary on his part, as he had done it in compliance with the writ, and any individual who may be elected, was compellable to attend and do his duty in that house. Yet the learned judge had held that the circumstance of his having taken his seat had rendered him liable to expences incurred in taking the election. He was yet to learn what benefit it was to an individual to sit in that house, if he came there to discharge his duty with integrity; and he was therefore surprised to hear any learned judge say, according to the law, as it is at present, that a seat in that house was any other than a burthen upon the individual elected to that situation. He was not, however, surprised to find that learned judge consider a seat in that house a benefit, as it was a stepping stone to the bench. But he had not expected that a judge upon the bench would lay it down, that an individual for yielding obedience to the writ, had incurred a penalty for doing what, if he had not done, would have made him liable to the censure of that house. A person who had a duty imposed on him ought to be suffered to do it without impediment: but this was an involuntary act upon his part, and ought not, according to any constitutional law, and he hoped that all such law was not altogether forgotten, to subject him to any such penalty. It was said in lord Raymond's reports, that judges did not understand the laws of parliament. The matter was of small moment to him, it was even an object of perfect indifference, but it was of material importance to the electors of Westminster, and to the privileges of that house. He did not make it a subject of complaint. What he mentioned the transaction for was, to know whether he was to comply with the demand that would be made upon him, in consequence of the decision of the court below. He applied but for the advice of the house, in order, that," by his silently submitting to that decision, the privilege of that house should not suffer any breach in his person.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer

did not know how to address the house on this occasion; indeed, he felt he should apologize for offering himself, as there was he motion before them. He trusted, however, that the house would allow him to state what occurred to him in the view he at present had of the case; and from, every attention that he could give to the statement of the hon. baronet, it did not appear to him to be a case in which the house could interfere. If the hon. baronet was right in his conception of the law, respecting the misdirection of the learned judge, he had been very ill advised by his counsel, not to apply for a review of the whole case, by a motion for a new trial, or by a bill of exceptions. As he apprehended the case, the action had been brought against the hon. baronet for the use which he or his agents had made of certain erections for hustings, and the facts went to be decided upon to a jury. The direction of a judge might be right or might be wrong, but in either case that house was not the proper tribunal in which to have the proceedings of the court below-reviewed. The course of practise in the administration of law, was in such cases either to proceed by motion to the court out of which the record issued for a new trial, or by a bill of exceptions; and if either of these had been resorted to by the hon. baronet and not been successful, there would be no relief for him. It was not for him to say whether or not the direction of the learned judge was correct; but the jury had no doubt decided upon the evidence produced to them of the use made of the erections by the agents of the hon. baronet. That was his view of the subject, but it would remain for the hon. baronet to decide what course he should pursue to attain any object he may have in contemplation.

Mr. Curwen

vindicated the learned judge from the imputation of having obtained his present exalted station by any party services, and contended that his elevation was altogether owing to his transcendant talents; as an abler or more upright judge had never sat upon, the bench.

The Speaker

did not know that he was not bound, upon an application of this description to the house, to state what occurred to him upon the subject. Undoubtedly, as he understood the matter, the hon. member had offered himself to the house with perfect regularity, on a transaction which appeared to him to amount to a breach of their privileges. The hon. baronet in taking this course had done his duty, and it was a grave question he had submitted to their consideration, so far as it regarded a breach of the privileges of that house, and affected the character of an eminent person in a high judicial office. If he (the Speaker) had had any notice of such an application; if he had but the slightest intimation of the intention of the hon. baronet, he would have endeavoured to be better prepared to satisfy his inquiry. At present he had to apologise to the house, if he should not be able to give that satisfaction which on such a question was to be desired. The house could not be prepared in this instance to give advice to the hon. baronet. What he would recommend was, that he should wait, till some practical consequence should result from the decision of the court below, and if he should conceive that consequence to be a breach of the privilege of the house, he could not too soon bring it under the view of the house, nor could the house too soon proceed to take it into consideration.—After a few words from sir F. Burdett, disclaiming the having brought the question forward as a complaint, his object having been to obtain advice from the house, the matter was allowed to rest there.

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