HC Deb 09 May 1808 vol 11 cc132-9
Mr. Calcraft,

in rising to Tiring forward the motion of which he had given notice, began with professing, that nothing was more distant from his intention than to throw out the slightest reflection upon the conduct of sir Rd. Strachan, for whose character, both as a naval officer and a man, he entertained the highest veneration: and nothing which had fallen from the hon. baronet (sir C. Pole) went to impute to him any such intention. All that that hon. baronet had said, was, that the testimony of sir Rd. Strachan would be very material in guiding the decision of the house upon the question, which he was now bringing before it, and in this he perfectly agreed with him. For example, there was one paper that had been moved for, for the purpose of shewing the reasons which made it necessary for sir Rd. Strachan to quit his station before the port of Rochfort, prior to the sailing of the French squadron from that port in Jan. last. He understood that no such communication had been received at the admiralty, and therefore there remained a chasm in the evidence, which it would have been most desirable to supply by the evidence of the gallant admiral himself, could he have been called to give such evidence at the bar of the house. He had also good reason to believe, that sir Rd. Strachan had found it necessary to take water and provisions from the Ferrol squadron; but there was no evidence to this effect in the papers which were on the table of the house; and as the admiral was not present to be examined as to the truth of the fact, he should leave this circumstance out of the charge that he meant to bring forward. The charge, limited as it was, he did not bring forward upon trivial or light grounds. It was important that its merits should be fairly and fully investigated, both for the interests of the public service and for the honour of the admiralty. When the gentlemen belonging to this department of government talked of a squadron being victualled for two or three months, if they meant any thing at all, they must mean that the squadron was in a state capable of serving all the purposes to which it might be, called. When a squadron was employed in a blockading service, it was necessary, not only that it should be in a condition to keep its station, but as its utmost vigilance did not at all times suffice to prevent the enemy's fleet from putting to sea, it ought also to be in a condition to follow the enemy wherever he went. The circumstance of lord Gardner, whose zeal and attention to the service merited every praise, having, so early as the 30th of Oct. detached the Conqueror from the Brest fleet, to relieve one of sir R. Strachan's squadron, was a confirmation of the principle he had now laid down. Had the Conqueror gained the Rochfort squadron, it would have relieved the Impetueux, which had been 4 months at sea; but the Conqueror never reached the blockading squadron, and lord Gardner's intention was so far frustrated. Notwithstanding this information, however, which the admiralty had received from lord Gardner, of the necessity, or at least of the propriety, of sending some relief to this squadron, so early as the 30th of Oct. (though it appeared that on the 11th of Nov. the squadron had 3 months provisions on board, and on the 11th of Dec. that it had two months provisions on board, a circumstance which did not at all weigh with lord Gardner against relieving it,) no respect whatever was paid to his intimation, and nothing was done by the admiralty till the 3d of Dec. when the Mediator was ordered out with provisions, which, however, did not reach sir R. Strachan's squadron till the 12th of Jan. On the 30th of Dec. the Superb and the Spencer were ordered to join sir R. Strachan; but the order, as far as regarded the latter, which had the measles on board, was countermanded, and the former did not reach the blockading squadron till the 12th of Jan. In the mean tune, however, sir Richard was become so extremely impatient, that he deviated from the usual rule of the service; and instead of addressing his letters, as he had been in the habit of doing, to lord Gardner, wrote directly to the admiralty, to make his distress known to that board—a state of distress to which he could not have been reduced without the grossest negligence in that department of government. He was aware that it might be pleaded, that on account of the number of squadrons then at sea, it had been impossible for the admiralty to pay all that attention to the wants of each which it would have been desirable to do. But was not this a circumstance which ought to have entered into their calculation, before dispersing them in so many quarters, and on so many different services? Was it of no consequence, that the toils and fatigues which the Rochfort squadron had undergone in the course of a whole winter should be rendered of no use? Was it of no consequence that a French squadron should be permitted to escape under the most enterprising of their naval commanders? On the 4th of Jan. however, sir R. Strachan was reduced to the situation of having only 3 weeks provisions on board; and it was not till the 12th that supplies arrived, at a time when he had only 13 days provisions on board. Now, he would put it to the house, whether it was fitting, that any squadron should be allowed to be so much reduced in indispensable necessaries? If the Rochfort squadron had put to sea at that time, sir R. Strachan could not have gone in pursuit of them to any distance, even though he had been aware of the direction in which they had sailed. Prom the 12th to the 19th of Jan. the weather was so bad that the Mediator could not be cleared till the 19th; and the Rochfort squadron had been already seen at sea by the Phoenix on the 17th, sir R. Strachan being entirely ignorant of it for some days afterwards. It appeared from the papers, that sir Richard was in distress for provisions, particularly for water, so early as the 1st of Dec. and that he was even then complaining of a want of cables, sails, and anchors. From this the hon. gent. inferred, that his leaving Basque roads, the situation of all others the most favourable for keeping up the blockade of the port of Rochfort, was to be ascribed to the reduced state of the necessaries on board the squadron, and that he had stood out from Rochebonnes to see if he might chance to fall in with any of the victuallers that were sent out to him. As a further proof that this was his motive in leaving his station, immediately after clearing the Mediator, sir Richard writes, that he was using his utmost endeavours to regain his station.—Mr. Calcraft next stated the course which he meant to adopt. His intention was to move a number of Resolutions containing a recital of facts, which he meant to follow up with a Resolution of censure upon the conduct of the board of admiralty; reserving to himself however the power of withdrawing this last Resolution, should he find it to be the sense of the house, that the case was not clearly made out which he meant to prove. It was possible that the papers now on the table of the house, left the case in some measure defective; but he pledged himself to be able to make it out completely to the satisfaction of every candid and impartial man, if he were permitted to ex- amine at the bar of the house some of the officers belonging to the squadron. The Resolutions which he meant to propose, he had communicated a week ago to the hon. secretary to the admiralty, as their tendency certainly was to bring a serious accusation against that department, and he always wished to do to others as he would wish to be done by. The hon. gent, concluded with moving the following Resolutions; which he said, if assented to by the house, he should then follow up by a motion of censure upon the board of admiralty. 1. "That it appears to this house, that on the 30th of Oct. 1807, admiral lord Gardner called the attention of the board of admiralty to the squadron off Rochfort, under the command of rear-admiral sir R. Strachan, by informing their lordships he had ordered the Conqueror, after refitting and replenishing at Cawsand bay, to relieve one of the ships on that station. 2. That on the 1st of Dec. 1807, the squadron off Rochfort, under the command of sir R. Strachan, consisted of the following ships: Cæsar, 80 guns, sailed from Plymouth 13th Oct.; Spartiate, 80 guns, sailed from Portsmouth 14th Sept.; Impetueux, 74 guns, sailed from Portsmouth 4th June; Donegal, 74 guns, sailed from Plymouth 6th Aug.; Edgar, 74 guns, sailed from Plymouth 5th July; Warrior, 74 guns, sailed from Plymouth 18th July; Renown, 74 guns, sailed from Plymouth 28th Sept. all victualled for 5 months; Indefatigable, 44 guns, sailed from Plymouth 18th Oct.; Emerald, 36 guns, sailed from Plymouth 7th Aug.; Phœnix, 36 guns, sailed from Plymouth 10th Sept.; Tribune, 36 guns, sailed from Plymouth 18th Oct. all victualled for 4 months; Foxhound, 18 guns, sailed from Plymouth 2d Sept. victualled for 3 months; Martial, 10 guns, sailed from Plymouth 18th Sept., victualled for two months; Rapid, 10 guns, sailed from Plymouth 25th Sept., victualled for two months. 3. That it appears to this house the Conqueror did not join the squadron cruizing off Rochfort, nor were any ships ordered to join lord Gardner, for the purpose of enabling his lordship to send relief to that squadron, before the 21st Dec. 1807. 4. That on the 11th Nov. 1807, the squadron off Rochfort had not more than 12 weeks provisions. That on the 23d Dec. it was further reduced, the bread averaging for the whole squadron only 36, and the wine and spirits 30 days; and that on the 4th of Jan., 1808, the squadron had only three weeks provisions, although the bread appears to have been reduced to two-thirds allowance from Dec. 21st 1807; and further, that it was not until the 12th of Jan., when the squadron was reduced to 13 days provisions, that any part of it was relieved by fresh ships, or supplied with any provisions, notwithstanding the earnest entreaties and repeated representations from admiral lord Gardner, rear-admiral sir R. Strachan, and admiral Young. 5. That on the 12th of Jan. 1808, the Superb and Mediator joined the squadron ten leagues south-west of the Rochebonnes, that the Lavinia joined on the 14th, and the Colossus on the 15th, and that it was the 19th of Jan. before the Mediator was cleared of her stores; and that the squadron was unable to regain its station, owing to the delay occasioned in the clearing the Mediator, the adverse winds, and rough weather; and that on the 17th of Jan., Sunday, the French squadron, from Rochfort, was seen at sea by the Phœnix, having, as it appears, escaped out of Rochfort during the time rear-admiral sir R. Strachan had been obliged to quit that station for the purpose of receiving provisions."—Upon the first Resolution being put from the chair,

Mr. Wellesley Pole

rose and said, that as the hon. gent, had thought proper to move a series of Resolutions without at present following them up with any thing expressive of the object avowed, he should feel it his duty to move the previous question upon the first Resolution. He was, he confessed, not a little surprised to hear that object still avowed by the hon. gent., after his having perused the papers that had been laid upon the table of the house, because he thought that those papers must impress the mind of every candid man with a conviction of the zeal, vigilance, and activity, of the present board of admiralty. The hon. gent, had brought two most serious charges against the board; one was, that the board paid no attention whatever to the repeated and earnest requisitions of the several commanders of the blockading squadrons, complaining of want of provisions, and requiring relief and supply. The other was, that sir R. Strachan had been compelled to abandon his station off Rochfort, in consequence of want of provisions. Here he would observe, that the rendezvous appointed by the admiralty for sir R. Strachan's squadron in case of their being dispersed by bad weather, was off the Chasseron light-house. He was from the station but from the 16th to the 19th Dec. That might surprise the hon. gent.; but he had too much patriotism not to be glad, in case he was satisfied that the admiralty had done their duty. The hon. gent. had asked, why sir Richard was not able to pursue the enemy? It would appear from a letter he should read to the house, that the weather, and not the want of victuals, was the true and only cause that prevented the pursuit. The house would judge from the letter which he should now read to them, that so far from—

Mr. Tierney

spoke to order. He observed that all the papers moved for by his hon. friend, and all the papers moved for in justification of their conduct by the gentlemen opposite, were on the table. He conceived it would be productive of great inconvenience were the practice to be continued of allowing a member to draw from his pocket a paper, not regularly before the house, and to read from it such portions as he might think conducive to his object.

The Speaker

said, that certainly much had lately passed upon this subject in the house. He did not however feel authorized to state that any precise or positive rule of order existed, with regard to it. It appeared to him to rest wholly with the discretion of the house, who would of course pronounce their judgment according to the circumstances of the case.

Mr. Ponsonby

thought that if the house had never adopted a rule to prevent this practice, they ought to do so. Nothing could be more injurious to debate, or more replete with absurdity, for what would be the consequence if—

The Chancellor of the Exchequer

spoke to order, observing, that it was one thing to state what the order of the house at present was, and another to consider what it would be expedient to make it.

Mr. Ponsonby

said, that if the hon. gent. persisted in reading a document not formally before the house, he should move an adjournment of the debate.

Mr. Wellesley Pole

then said, that he should be sorry to persist in any thing unpleasant to the house, and should not press doing what might be offensive to the gentlemen opposite. He would therefore not read the letter, but content himself with stating the substance of that letter, and let the house give it whatever credit it thought due to his character. He would then take upon himself to assert, that sir R. Strachan, after leaving the bay, passed the Ferrol and Lisbon squadrons, without, applying for provisions of any kind, or doing more than exchanging the usual signals by telegraph; and that he passed in the same way Gibraltar. This much he would state, and he pledged his character to the truth of the statement. On the 30th of Oct. lord Gardner wrote to the admiralty acquainting them that the Conqueror had joined him off Ushant, and that he had ordered her to proceed to Cawsand bay to relit, and then proceed and relieve one of the ships off Rochfort; and he wished it to be remembered that this ship was then ordered to convey as much provision and as many live bullocks as she conveniently could; this ship arrived, agreeably to lord Gardner's orders, on the 1st of Nov.; and the 15th of the same month it was ordered to repair to the ships employed in the service of conveying the royal family from Lisbon to the Brazils; and to the squadron under sir Sidney Smith, four sail of the line were then detached. Here he observed that some of the ships had been five months at sea before they had reached the squadrons they were destined to relieve. He referred first to an order from the admiralty to the victualling board, requiring them to send out provisions of potatoes, onions, and live bullocks, for the several squadrons off L'Orient, Rochfort, and Ferrol; the potatoes, three pounds per man a week for two months, the onions, half a pound a man per week, and as many live bullocks as she could conveniently stow: also to a letter from Mr. Barrow to lord Gardner, acquainting his lordship with those directions, and both dated 3d Dec. 1807. He next referred to other papers to shew the actual state of sir R. Strachan's squadron on the 1st of Dec. On the 3d Dec. the order was issued for forwarding the supplies by the Mediator, but no requisition was received at the admiralty till the 18th of Dec.; and yet provisionary orders had been issued on the 3d of the same month. That letter was written on the 11th by lord Gardner, and did certainly state that there were not more than eight weeks provisions on board; on the 21st, another letter came from lord Gardner, covering another from sir R. Strachan, of the 1st Dec; and two days after, the 23d, the Mediator went into Portsmouth, and though then ready to sail, was not able to do so till the 6th of January, merely because the present board had not ingenuity enough to controul the winds and the weather! On the 21st, an order was issued for the sailing of the Superb and Spencer. But it had been objected, why were not those ships sent direct to sir Richard, without being first sent to lord Gardner? The objection he was surprised at, because it betrayed such ignorance of the general routine, which was, that all blockading squadrons are subject to the controul of the commander of the Channel fleet. He next referred to a letter dated the 20th Dec, and received at the admiralty the 22d, from admiral Young, beginning, "As a very considerable supply of provisions has been sent to the ships off Ferrol, and the Audacious will sail on Tuesday for that squadron with six months provisions, I submit to their lordships whether it may not be advisable to allow the provisions carried out by the Mediator to be divided between the squadrons off L'Orient and Rochfort," &c. He next adverted to lord Gardner's letter, transmitting the state of sir Richard Strachan's squadron, the bread being at two-thirds allowance on the 21st Dec. and then reminded the house of adm. Young's letter of the following day, recommending a division of the provisions. The relief was ready to sail eight or nine days before, but prevented by bad weather; and as soon as the weather permitted, the Spencer, Superb, and Cumberland, were sent directly to sir R. Strachan. He here took occasion to pay a high tribute to the professional merits of admiral Young, as the best port admiral in the navy. On the 31st Dec. the Colossus was ordered to join; and there would be found the letter of admiral Young, requiring the two transports sent into Catwater, to be forthwith laden with two months provisions for 4,500 men, for the immediate relief of the Rochfort squadron.—He then entered upon the second division of the subject: the other serious charge was, that sir Richard had been compelled to abandon his station in consequence of want of provisions. He shewed what had been the state of the weather from the 21st of Dec. till the 6th of Jan.; that it was so tempestuous as to prevent the relief going out, and that this and this only was what compelled sir R. Strachan to abandon his station. He was anxious, in proof of this, to call the attention of the house to sir Richard's letter, dated the 21st Dec. and not received till the 30th. "We have been driven off and have only just got hold of the land. Nothing material has occurred. We have had very tempestuous weather." He then cited sir Richard's next letter of the 25th Dec. mentioning the reduced state of the provisions, and stating, that "the weather has been such, we have not been able to apportion the remains of provisions to each ship." He next cited an extract from sir Richard's letter to lord Gardner, dated the 28th Dec. off Rochebonnes, in which he says, "I inclose the state of the squadron on the 23d, since which, the weather has prevented much communication." On the 4th of January, sir Richard, when stationed ten leagues off Belleisle, wrote that since the Emerald and Eurydice had parted in chace, they had had constant gales; and on the 22d of Jan., the admiralty received a letter from sir Richard, dated the 16th, then lying ten leagues south-west of the Rochebonnes, in which he states, that the Superb and Mediator joined on the 12th, the Lavinia on the 14th, and the Colossus yesterday; and adds, "but it was not till this morning that the weather would permit us to communicate by boats." This then was sir R. Strachan versus the hon. gent, and let the house decide between the two authorities. The hon. gent. then proceeded to shew, by a variety of documents which he cited, that sir Richard was compelled to abandon his position by the weather, and not by want of provisions; and concluded, by admitting that the facts contained in the hon. gent.'s Resolutions were, generally speaking, correct; but he denied the inference from them. The last resolution, which that hon. gent. had candidly submitted to his inspection, and which he had declared his intention of moving, should those at present before the house be assented to, contained a most direct and positive censure on the board of admiralty, couched in the strongest terms of reprobation. As he, therefore, considered all the preliminary Resolutions as vehicles for the last, he should move the previous question on them, and meet the last with a direct negative. Above all things he deprecated any delay in the decision of the house on the subject. Let us have it out now, added the hon. gent, my situation is not a sinecure, and I am unwilling that any proportion of my time should be uselesly diverted from the public service. If, however, the hon. gent, is determined, to fight another day, I am ready to meet him; but I can assure the house, that from the first agitation of this business, I have felt considerable uneasiness; not from the slightest apprehension as to the result, but because I was aware that I should be drawn off from that which is the immediate object of my anxiety and ambition.

Sir Charles Pole

totally differed from the hon. gent, who had just sat down, both as to the facts themselves, and the inferences which he drew from them: he read extracts from many different letters on the table, by which he shewed that the fleet off Rochfort were very badly provided, and could not have followed the enemy move than three or four days. The power of dispatching ships to relieve sir R. Strachan, it was plain, was not vested in lord Gardner; else he surely would not have sent off five different and anxious letters to the admiralty on the subject. He read extracts from a letter, dated 11th of Dec. stating to the admiralty the distress of the fleet, which letter was answered by the admiralty on the 18th, sending a supply of provisions in one victualling ship: although this ship was intended for the supply of three squadrons, namely, that off L' Orient, off Ferrol, and Rochefort, yet she did not convey more than equal to sixteen days bread, for the line of battle ships off Rochefort alone. He said, if every pound of bread, which had been so sent, had been received by the Rochefort fleet alone, it would not have put it in a situation to follow the enemy. Such inattention on the part of the admiralty was the greatest blow England could receive, as it would be the greatest triumph the enemy could obtain. That day was perilous to us indeed, when we found ourselves unable to furnish 7 sail of the line sufficiently to keep their stations. He could not conceive what was meant by sending one store-ship out to supply such a fleet with bread, wine, and water. He could not foretel what would be the decision of the house, but he knew well what would be the sense of the country on such conduct: the house might divide three to one in its favour, but the nation would not be a whit the more convinced. He then read an extract from a letter to the board of admiralty, dated the 15th Dec. in which it was declared, that the fleet was in total want both of sails, water, and every other necessary with which a fleet should be provided. In consequence of such a situation, sir Richard Strachan was compelled to quit his anchorage, to look out for victuallers; what was the event? The enemy, taking the advantage of his absence, escaped out of Rochefort, which they never could have done, or would have attempted, had sir Richard been sufficiently provided to have kept his station in Basque Roads. At length, however, he did obtain a supply of 346 tons of water, which exactly provided his fleet for 26 days; and although he admitted that the Superb and Colossus further increased his store, still they did not so increase it as to enable him to pursue the enemy with safety. On the 28th, the Admiralty had an acknowledgment from the fleet of 23 days bread, 45 days water, and 24 days wine; this supply, added to the former supplies, exactly made a total of eight weeks and three days provisions; and he would ask, was that a sufficiency for a pursuit; for instance, to the Cape of Good Hope? The present board of Admiralty might be actuated by as pure and praiseworthy a zeal as possible, but he lamented their talents were not equal to that zeal. He said, as to sir Rd. Strachan's squadron quitting Basque Roads, he believed there was a reason for it, but too serious for him to state in that house. As to the transports which it had been stated were sent to relieve the squadron, although three had been sent, still but one arrived. He complained loudly of the mischief which would ensue from keeping ships at sea on urgent duty, waiting for the arrival of transports; they should be so situated as totally to feel above contingencies; but here so fatal was the adoption of a contrary course, that even had our blockading admiral seen the fleet which he blockaded standing out to sea on the 21st of Jan. he could not have chased them 20 leagues from land! From the very weekly accounts laid upon the table for the perusal of the country, it appeared that there was at that time on board the fleet only bread for 16, wine for four, and water for 25 days! He did not wish idly to declaim against the measures of any man or set of men, but he solemnly declared, that had a charge of the nature of this enquiry been brought before a court martial, and no other justification than what the papers on the table of the house offered, he should have no hesitation in deciding on his oath, that the British squadron off Rochefort had not been supplied in the manner which the exigency of the service required and the safety of the country demanded. He could not conceive how men could bring themselves to sport thus with the feelings of a gallant and deserving officer. What must those feelings have been, when, after all his hope, his anxiety, and fatigue, he had seen the French fleet stealing out of Rochefort unable to follow and defeat them, from the unmerited neglect with which he had been treated. The arrival of the Colossus and Superb had, however, been much dwelt upon, and after all, even when they had divided their supplies among the fleet, what provision had it? Exactly seven days bread, 63 days wine and spirits, and 40 days water! He was ashamed to take up the time and trouble of the house in detailing such broad and simple facts as these, when in fact any observation on the subject was rendered quite unnecessary by the able statement of the hon. gent, who opened the debate. This was a question to which the house should give all its attention; it involved the dearest interests of the country, whose safety was identified with the welfare of her fleet. As to the new system which the hon. gent. (Mr. Pole) had broached to-night, he was sorry to see any such attempted; if its effects were to be the allowing a ship to remain at sea for eleven months, and when she had remained at home only as many days, sending her out again—if such were to be its effects, he disclaimed and denounced such a measure: the name of the ship so treated he said was the Defiance. He deprecated leaving ships so long and so ill-provided at sea for such a length of time. He did not profess himself friendly to a vote of censure on the Admiralty, however he might have thought them inefficient; before such a measure was adopted, evidence should be heard at the bar of the house; and then, and not until then, a censure could be warrantably passed on so public and respectable a board; but what must the squadron off Rochefort think, nay what must be the feelings of the whole British fleet and of the country at large, when an impartial and temperate examination of the papers laid on the table of the house by the Admiralty, proved, that the blockading squadron had been cruelly neglected; and admitting for the sake of argument, that every pound of bread, and every gallon of wine and spirits, which reached sir Rd. Strachan before the departure of the French squadron, had been correctly distributed, still it was most notorious that the British squadron would not have been in a state to have followed the enemy.

Mr. R. Ward

stated, that the general plan pursued by every Admiralty, was to keep a sufficient, force off every blockaded port, adequately equipped and provisioned to watch the force of the enemy. The mode of relieving these squadrons was by sending out vessels, ship by ship, provided, not only with their own equipments, but loaded also for the equipment of others. The commander in chief of the Channel Fleet was the person to see that they were properly victualled, and regularly relieved, and he corresponded for that purpose with the port admiral at Portsmouth and Plymouth. Every page of the papers shewed that lord Gardner had acted in that manner. It might happen, however, that this plan of blockade, during a naval campaign, might, under the pressure of more important objects, be altogether suspended. At the time to which the papers referred, the expedition to Copenhagen, and the return of the fleet and the prizes, had occupied much of the attention of the Admiralty. Squadrons were also provided to blockade the Tagus, and to convey the Royal Family of Portugal to the Brazils. Another squadron was also assembled at Spithead, of sufficient force to meet the Russian fleet then expected to come up the Channel. He called upon the gentlemen opposite, who were disposed to be fair, to give credit to the letter of sir Rd. Strachan, declaring his approbation of the attention of the Admiralty to his squadron. It appeared by the papers, that, in November, the squadron had ten weeks provisions on board, and that 18 days after, ten transports, one of which was immediately driven back, and only four of which were able to reach their destination, had been sent out with 700 ton of water to the squadron. The large ship was sent out with a temporary supply only, and he admitted that the Admiralty was answerable for every thing up to 21st of December, at which date the squadron had six weeks water, six weeks and four days bread, and eight or nine weeks beef, pork, and wine. It might be a question why the Mediator had not sailed till the 6th of Jan.; but he shewed from the letters from admiral Young, that the weather alone prevented her sailing, and he was confident the hon. gent. would not question the authority of that, gallant officer. He denied most positively, and challenged any gentleman to prove, that sir Rd. Strachan had for a single moment, left his station. The hon. bart. had fallen into an error, when he asserted, that the Admiralty was blamable for not sending out the supplies earlier. They could not contend with the elements, and it appeared from the papers, that the state of the weather was such, that from the 3d of Dec. to the 28th of Jan. during a period of 55 days, as not to allow the vessels to sail. Was the Admiralty to blame for that? As well might they be blamed for a vessel's foundering at sea, as the Admiralty of the day be blamed for the unfortunate loss of the Royal George. He should not trespass longer upon the attention of the house, though he had felt it not unnecessary to add these general observations to the able and impregnable arguments of his hon. friend. Philip II. of Spain, the greatest tyrant the annals of history exhibited, on hearing of the fate of his Armada, exclaimed, 'Thank God it is no worse!' That consideration which a tyrant manifested for the interposition of the elements, the Admiralty had a right to expect from a British senate.

Mr. G. Ponsonby

observed, that the Resolution went to say that sir R. Strachan's squadron was not supplied with provisions, and that was proved by the documents on the table, beyond a question. It had been said, that sir Richard had never left his station on account of the want of provisions. A letter from him, dated the 21st of Nov., says, 'The wind having veered to the Northward, he stretched out to sea to try to meet some of the transports that he had expected.' Why proceed to sea, in an uncertain pursuit, to look after transports, if not in want of provisions? and if he did proceed to sea, he must have gone off his station. The letter of sir Richard, upon which the hon. gentlemen prided themselves so much, contained not a particle of any thing that could support them. Sir Richard had written several letters to his commanding officer, lord Gardner, stating the situation of the squadron, and its want of provisions; but finding the supplies did not come, he wrote to the Board of Admiralty. The consequence was, he received a supply; and this boasted prize, this letter, commending the board, went just so far as to say, he thanked them for the attention they had paid to his communication. Did this exculpate them? Did he say any thing about what had been the situation of the fleet? No: but look to his letter of the 23d of Jan., four days after the French had got out, and what does he say, after all the boasted supplies reached him? 'That if his provision and water would last him, he would follow the enemy over the world.' A blockading squadron ought to have pro- visions on board equal to what the fleet they were blockading could possibly procure. The Board of Admiralty could not think that the enemy's squadron would go no farther than what two months' provision would allow them. That must have been their supposition, or that there was an understanding between the board and the enemy; for When sir Richard went in pursuit, he had but two months' provision. He would challenge any person to prove the squadron ever had more than two months' provision, although an hon. gent, had found out that every British squadron ought to have five months' provision. It was the most novel defence he had ever heard set up. It went to say, 'the enemy's squadron has got out of Rochfort, and, if you say nothing about it, we will take care it never shall be so again.' They next brought tempests and hurricanes, and said, they could not fight against the elements, as an excuse. He had never heard that the Bay of Biscay was very serene and calm in the months of Dec. and January. Every person knew the westerly winds generally prevailed at that season of the year; and could the Board of Admiralty be ignorant of it? If they were, it was not a wonder that sir Richard's squadron suffered from the want of provision; and if they did know it, they were the more blamable for not having provided against it. He did not charge the Board of Admiralty with intentional neglect, but he charged them with want of judgment.

The house then divided on the previous question, Ayes 146; Noes 69. Majority against the Resolution 77.