§ On the motion for the third reading of this bill,
Mr. Yorke, pursuant to his notice, rose, he said, to deliver his sentiments, not merely upon the subject of this bill, but on that of the English Local Militia, which he had not an opportunity of attending in its progress, and upon the defensive state of the country. He began, by expressing his regret, that the people did not now seem so feelingly alive to the danger with which they were threatened, in consequence of the accumulated means and determined intentions of the enemy, as they were a very few years since, when that danger was much more distant, and when impediments, numerous and formidable, stood in the way, which had been since removed. The country seemed to repose in a fatal security, as if people imagined, that because there was not a formidable army now encamped at Boulogne, the danger was less imminent, or the purpose of the enemy less certain. But, for his own part, he was convinced, the more time the French emperor took in preparation, the more certain was our danger; because the greater would be his power, and the more 948 mature his plans. Having now conquered or humbled to his purpose almost all the powers of the continent, and having no diversion to apprehend from thence, but, on the contrary, the means of all the continent superadded to his own, there was not room left for the slightest doubt of his long-threatened and immoveable purpose, to concentre all his means, for the purpose of adding this country and Ireland to the number of his conquests. It was consequently the duty of the government to make every possible preparation. He entered at considerable length into a review of the different means to increase the number of armed men in these, kingdoms. He was glad to find his noble friend had, in addition to the General Militia and Volunteer systems, and the Local Militia, determined to retain also the Training bill in England, as a part of his plan; but he could see no just reason why the principle of the Training bill should not be carried into operation also in Scotland, as well as that of the Local Militia; or why any difference in this respect should be made between the two countries. When he had the honour to introduce the Training bill in 1802, he included Scotland. With respect to the principle of militia force, he owned that he should prefer a much greater limitation of that force, and an enlargement of the force for general service, both in Great Britain and Ireland, who might be interchanged as occasion required, and continuing the training system to the utmost extent, so as to keep a trained force always prepared, in case of emergency, to join the army; the men thus trained, to be termed the Army of Reserve, or any other appropriate title; but in case of actual emergency, he was confident resort must inevitably be had to some sort of conscription, by ballot, or otherwise, as it would be useless to depend upon voluntary enlistments to fill up the ranks. He was apprehensive that much confusion would arise from carrying on at the same time the two ballots for the General and the Local Militias, which could not be prevented without the utmost care of the parties to whom the business should fall. He answered some comparisons which had been made on a former night between the different systems of discipline in the British and French armies; and he gave a decided preference to the former. Upon the whole, he thought, that under the operation of the various plans on foot for increasing the number of armed men in the country, 949 the numerical force was carried to pretty nearly its utmost pitch; and he was also glad to find that the regular, militia, and volunteer forces of the country had attained to a pitch of numbers and discipline beyond any thing that was ever thought of. It was by sedulously keeping up this system of force and discipline, under judicious commanders, added to the native valour of the people, that we must place our sale hopes of security; so that when an enemy such as we had to contend with, should view with a soldier's eye the extent and disposition of our force, and see that we were well defended at all points, he would naturally decline to meddle with a country so circumstanced, and which, he must see, he could not touch without burning his fingers. But, of the intention of the emperor of France to use every means in his power to conquer these countries there could not remain a doubt: of his formidable power, his prowess, and his talents, the world were witnesses; and if valour, talents, and prowess, could give any man claims to royal power, it must be acknowledged no man ever merited more the title of Emperor of France. Of his morals, or the means he sometimes used to compass his ends, he would say nothing; but as a conqueror, it must be admitted he was equal, if not superior, to Cæsar or Alexander. Such an enemy, armed with the means he possessed, was not to be viewed without apprehension: he had already conquered much the greater part, if not the whole, of Europe. There might be those who flattered themselves he had work enough cut out for him in Spain, to divert his attention from this country; but it was to be feared the spark lately struck in that kingdom, had kindled but a feeble flame, and of short duration; for how was it to be expected, a people, whose government had treacherously conspired with its own enemy to surrender them to French slavery and rivet their chains, could escape the machinations so long preparing against them, and terminated by the base and degrading surrender of the last crown of the Bourbon family, to which the Spanish monarch had proved himself a disgrace? Every man must have seen from the moment that the Spanish army was divided, and one branch sent to Portugal and the other to the opposite frontier, while a French force was suffered to march into the heart of the country and make themselves masters of the capital, that the people were betrayed. That was the mo- 950 ment when any interference on the part of this country might have been successful; but now, he feared, it was too late, and that scarcely a hope remained that the struggles of the Spanish people would be successful.—As to Sweden, he feared there was as little room to hope for a successful issue in that quarter; or that the Swedish power, however praiseworthy the magnanimous and princely spirit of the monarch, could have any chance of holding out against the combined force of Russia and France. Those countries reduced under the power of that man, whose sleepless activity and vigilant ambition, marked his views as nothing short of the subjugation of Europe, perhaps of the world, he would then possess the whole force of Europe, and command every port from the Baltic to Cadiz, to detach its force against us. It was, he thought, quite impossible to expect any thing else than that his success against Spain and Sweden, would be immediately followed by an attempt on Great Britain or Ireland; and of the latter country, he would only say, that though it was the left arm of the empire, it would require the force of the right to keep down rebellion, in case of such an attack. It was notorious that the French emperor, on a landing in that country, looked to the assistance of a numerous party, whose object it always was to effect a separation from this; for though the great body of the people were loyal, and attached to British government, still there was a numerous party in Ireland ever since the days of queen Elizabeth, with whom separation from this country was a favourite project, and who only postponed the attempt for want of a favourable opportunity in the aid of some foreign power. This was the main purpose, disguised under the clamour of Catholic emancipation, for which, as was acknowledged by one of the leaders of the last Irish rebellion to the Secret Committee of parliament, the people did not care one farthing.—As to the means of our defence, too many there were who looked to British fleets as impregnable bulwarks against the enemy's designs; but history furnished many instances to shew, that a reliance solely upon such a security was dangerous in the extreme. He instanced the case of the French fleet and army, consisting of 13 sail of the line, and as many frigates, with 300 transports, and 40,000 men, which sailed from Malta in 1798 to attack Egypt, and although admiral Nelson was in pursuit of them, and 951 so near that his fleet passed their sternmost ships in the night, yet they were able to effect their landing, and take possession of the country.—It would be recollected, that at the time that lord Bridport was before Brest, a French fleet went out of that harbour, ran up into the Mediterranean, touched at Cadiz, and returned to Brest without any loss, and carrying in the Spanish fleet with them: it was but the other day that the Rochefort squadron left that port, sailed up the Mediterranean, went to Corfu, did the business upon which it was sent, and then arrived at Toulon in safety. In neither of these cases was the slightest blame to be attached to the officers who commanded; but, from the difficulties of the service itself, it was utterly impossible to prevent the recurrence of such things. We knew the formidable power which was opposed to this country, and the formidable mode in which that power was usually applied. The French government had called out and selected all those institutions which could best promote the great object which they had in view. They had completely adopted the old Roman principle, of making use of the armies they had conquered. It was, therefore, impossible to calculate the number of soldiers which France could collect from the extensive regions under her influence, for the invasion of this country. The great means of attack were principally derived from the adoption of this principle. There was another strong feudal principle which had been revived by Buonaparte, that of giving fiefs to his generals and officers in the conquered countries. If an invasion were successful in this country, or rather in Ireland, we might depend upon seeing the same system realized, that was acted upon at the Norman conquest. Nobody should flatter himself that it would be possible, after an unsuccessful campaign in this country, to patch up any kind of peace with France that would preserve property in its present channel. The victorious armies would be distributed over the country to colonize the soil that they had conquered.—Had our navy not been in the state it was, this misfortune might have fallen on the country before now. It therefore became wise and prudent statesmen to consider of such measures, that if ever out navy should be inferior to the enemy, as it was for a short time during the American war, or in case any accident should befal our fleet, either from conflagration or tempest, such accident should not leave 952 the country without defence, or give it up into the hands of the enemy. The game that was now playing was altogether in favour of the enemy; for this country was contending for its last stake, while its enemy was exposed to no such risk. Suppose an army of the enemy to be landed in this country, and beaten, what would be the consequence? It would only be that their army would surrender, that its officers would be treated with kindness, as we always did treat officers who were prisoners, and that the surrendering army would only give us a number of prisoners to be maintained at a great expence. The loss of one army would scarcely be felt by France, but the success of that army would be the absolute ruin of this country. To meet such dangers, he thought a system should be immediately adopted to strengthen and fortify the country itself, as well as to prepare the best means of bringing up its whole force to oppose the enemy. It was well known that vast sums of money had been granted for fortifications, and he should feel it his duty next session to move for a Secret Committee, to examine in what manner those sums had been expended. As to the defence of the coast, he believed the coasts of Kent and Sussex were pretty well protected; but he wished to know why the coasts of Essex and Suffolk were not equally fortified. He thought that the entire coast from Portsmouth to Yarmouth, including these towns, should be put in a perfect state of defence. Neither should the western coast of England, or the coast of Scotland be neglected. The French had put almost the whole of their coast in such a state of fortification, that a boat could hardly pass any where without meeting obstruction from some battery. The communication with Ireland should also be attended to, and the enemy should never be allowed, as was the case about the time of the Union, to cruize in the narrow part between the two islands.—He should next advert to the internal defence of the country, and in, the first place of its capital. It was well known, that at the commencement of the war, he had delivered his opinion against fortifying London. Austria was, however, at that time unbroken; Prussia was powerful; and the colossal power of Russia had not been brought to the test. This opinion was, however, now entirely changed with the circumstances of the times. Now that Austria was in chains, and dared not look her conqueror in the face; 953 now that Prussia had vanished from the earth, and the weakness of the colossal power of Russia had been proved, he thought that measures ought to be taken for securing the capital by fortifications, which, defended by the physical force of London, might stop an enemy, at least until our main force could come up. He thought the strong passes in Kent and Sussex should now be fortified, so as to afford strong positions to our armies. He thought that equal pains should be taken to defend the approaches to London through Suffolk and Essex; but that if, after all, London should be taken, the country ought not to be given up. He should, even then, think that the heart of the country, which he considered to be on the banks of the Severn, the Trent and the Mersey, should still be defended, and the communication being kept up with Ireland, might supply fresh armies to fight the last battle for the defence of the country. He considered fortifications as absolutely necessary for the defence of any country, and very often the principal cause of its success in war. It was from the care that Lewis the 14th had taken to secure the frontiers of France with impregnable fortresses, that the expedition commanded by the duke of Brunswick so completely failed. Buonaparte knew so well the value of fortifications, that in his most successful campaigns he took care to secure himself, every step that he advanced, by such means. He thought the fort of Brannau of such importance, that he would not surrender it to Austria until the war with Russia and Prussia was finished; neither would he permit Austria now to raise fresh fortifications. He thought the disasters which Austria had met with proceeded in a great measure from the want of fortifications; and that the extinction of Prussia was owing to her not having properly provided for defence the fortresses she had; and that it was not so much the loss of the battle of Friedland, as the want of strong places to stop the victorious enemy, that obliged the emperor of Russia to sign a most disgraceful peace. The fortifications which he would recommend, would greatly contribute to the defensive strength of the country, without menacing its liberties, which last was the dread objection that our ancestors had to large standing armies. After dwelling, at some length, on these topics, he concluded by strongly recommending to ministers to adopt every possible means of strengthening the national de- 954 fence now, while there was time to do so, and not to put those measures off, until the danger should be more imminent.
Lord Castlereaghexpressed great obligations to his right hon. friend for the manner in which he had stated his opinions; and declared his willingness to give every explanation that his duty would allow him, respecting the measures taken for the defence of the country. He agreed with his right hon. friend, that it would be a great fault in ministers to endeavour to lull the country into a false sense of security. He allowed that the danger was great, although perhaps not immediate. There was certainly danger enough stirring abroad, to make it necessary for the country to consider anxiously of the best means for its defence. If, on the one hand, he would not wish the country to entertain a false idea of its security, on the other hand, he thought it was but fair and right that it should know what had already been done by its government, to promote that security. In the first place, there was a number of regulars and militia, equal to what his right hon. friend had always considered as the greatest exertion that the country could be called upon to make. He had always said, that he had never found fault with the numerical force, or with the quality of those troops; and he had confessed, that it was as large an army as was wanting, or as this country could afford to keep up. As to the deficiency in point of fortification, it would be obvious to his right hon. friend, that no country could at once so completely change its system and character, as, from a naked country, to become a strongly-fortified one. When it was considered how very low the establishment of the Ordnance was at the beginning of the late war, it was astonishing that it should have started forth from almost nothing to its present most respectable stale. There was no service which required more time to bring to a state of perfection. Engineers were not to be made in a day, or by an act of parliament. As to the defence of the coast, there had been considerable exertions, in this respect. Dover, Chatham, and the whole course of the Medway, were placed in a very strong state of defence. He believed the whole line of coast from Portsmouth to the Thames might be considered in a very perfect state of defence, and much more strongly fortified than any part of the enemy's coast. The enemy were, indeed, 955 obliged to erect many batteries on their coast, not for the purpose of repelling invasion, but to protect their coasting vessels. They had latterly made the coast very strong between Boulogne and Ostend, that their boats might creep along near the shores in security, out of the reach of our frigates. The shores of the southern district were, however, as strongly fortified as any part of the French coast, and under the former administration of lord Chatham, a system had been adopted for putting the coasts of the eastern district in a similar stale of defence. This system had been suspended under the late administration, who certainly could not have been expected to adopt it, without taking time to give it the most serious consideration. A considerable deal had also been done in Ireland for the protection of the principal harbours, particularly Cork harbour and Bantry Bay. His lordship concluded with some observations on the advantages which he thought the country would derive from the Local Militia bill.
§ Mr. Windhamconsidered, that the danger which this country was exposed to was greater than all the plans of the noble lord, even with the addition of the proposed system of fortification, would be able to meet. The question which remained between him and the noble lord, was, whether one or 200,000 men, enrolled under the Training act, and liable to be called upon in case of actual invasion, to recruit the army, was, or was not, a more effectual means for the defence of the country than the establishment of this Local Militia? He was sorry to find that ministers had not yet made up their minds upon the subject of fortifications for the internal defence of the country; but as to those works, which were projected by lord Chatham, the noble lord did justice to the late administration, in saying that they were bound in duty not to adopt such a system without the fullest consideration. There was scarcely any subject on which there was a greater contrariety of opinion; and the opinion of the general officers who were to command in the field, was of at least as much consequence as that of the engineers who were to execute the works. He complained of the noble lord, however, for weakening the military system that was handed down to him by the late administration. He had found the system of recruiting so productive and exuberant, that he doubtless 956 thought it his duty to apply the pruning knife, and he understood the recruiting service had suffered considerably by the measures of the noble lord.
Mr. Herbert, of Kerry, recommended to the consideration of the noble lord the propriety of an interchange of the militias of the two countries. Such a measure would come with peculiar propriety from that noble lord, to whom Ireland had already contracted such a debt of gratitude, by his effecting the grand object of an union. Whatever might be the ultimate determination of government on the grand subject of internal defence, by fortification, it would be well worth the attention of the noble lord to consider of the most effectual means of securing the country in the time of danger. Much had been done, and yet much remained, particularly in Ireland. He had however little doubt, that under the superintendance of the noble lord nothing would be left unattempted which could prove serviceable to the public security, or honourable to the exertions of himself and his colleagues.—The bill was then read a third time, and passed.
§ Mr. Windhamgave notice of a motion for the next session, probably when the Mutiny act should be before the house, the object of which would be the protection of soldiers who had entered for limited service, in consequence of the regulations of the year before last. His proposition would be to prevent such soldiers from consenting to extend their service for life, until the expiration of the engagement which they had already contracted.