§ No. I.—Dispatch from, Benj. Garlike, esq. his majesty's envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the court of Denmark, to visc. Howick, dated Copenhagen, 11th Nov. 1806.—Received 29th Nov.
§ My lord; Your ldp. will have received accounts of an affair which has taken place on the Holstein frontier, between the Da- 761 nish troops and those of France; of which I beg leave to transmit the following particulars.—On the 6th inst. a corps of Prussians, under the command of gen. Blucher, were on their way to take refuge in the town of Lubeck. They were pursued by a French corps under the command of gen. Murat. The object of the latter was to turn the wing of the Prussians in order to intercept their passage. In attempting this manœvre the French troops crossed a strip of Danish territory, and, heedless of the notice given by the advanced posts, brought on a skirmish, in which 2 or 3 persons were killed on both sides, and 2 Danish cannon taken. Three Danish officers, lieut. col. Kardorff, commander of a battalion of light infantry; maj. Gruner, aide de camp to the prince royal; and lieut. Schow, adj. to col. Kardorff, who were proceeding in an open Holstein carriage to the Danish advanced guard commanded by maj. gen. Evald, were also made prisoners by the enemy.—Gen. Evald proceeded himself to gen. Murat, to learn the cause of what had happened; he was coarsely received, and informed, possibly with more haste than reflection, that the French troops would pursue their enemies wherever they were to be found. On gen. Evald's return, the prince royal dispatched an aide de camp, capt. Romeling of the engineers, to acquaint gen. Murat, that the king his father having entrusted the army on the frontier to his command, he thought it his duty to his majesty and to the army to require satisfaction for the insult.—Since these first accounts reached Copenhagen, a packet boat has arrived from Kiel, and it is pretended that the answer returned by gen. Murat has been deemed satisfactory by the prince royal; but I am unable to ascertain this latter circumstance before the post goes out.—The Danish troops on the advanced post are chasseurs; the colour of their uniform (green) is different from that of the rest of the army. Some persons here are willing, therefore, to persuade themselves that the Danish troops were mistaken for Prussians; and in the same manner to account for a blow of a sabre given to a Danish officer in a Danish village through which the French were passing. It is presumed the officers are released. I have, &c.
§ B. GARLIKE.
§ No. II.—Dispatch from Benj. Garlike, esq. to visc. Howick, dated Copenhagen, 14th Nov. 1806.—Received 29th Nov.
762§ My lord; The answer required by the prince royal of Denmark to his representations to M. de Murat, has been received. He retorts on the Danish troops the accusation of violating their neutrality, but declares that he had no intention to commit hostilities against Denmark; and has the more reason to regret the mistake, as he has lost one of his best officers in the action. This answer is considered as satisfactory. The loss on time Danish side amounts to 25 men killed. The French escort given to gen. Evald, on his return to the Danish advanced guard, carried off his horse, his watch, and some other articles. Two of the officers, maj. Gruner and lieut. Schow, are returned to their posts; but lieut. col. Kardorff is missing. The French troops (marauders) have also committed further depredations on the Danish territory, have burnt a village, plundered the estate, and destroyed the cattle belonging to count Bernstorff. I have, &c.
§ B. GARLIKE.
§ No. 3.—Extract of a Dispatch from Benj. Garlike, esq. to visc. Howick, dated Copenhagen, 14th Nov. 1806. —Received 29th Nov.
§
I have the honour to inform your. ldp. that I have used my utmost endeavours to impress count Bernstorff with the sentiments contained in your lordship's dispatch, of No. 3 *, and it is with extreme regret that I have not been able to obtain the desired success.—Although the progress of the French arms opposite the very coasts of Denmark the insults and hostility committed on the Danish frontier, and the Proclamation of gen. Mortier to the people of Hesse, are facts more powerful than any language I could use, and with sentiments of grief must excite those of the keenest resentment; it does not apppear that the Danish government are more disposed to prepare against the infliction of similar violence and dishonour; on the contrary, that they derive from those events the confirmation of their present system of neutrality, and the still stricter observance of all its
*This Dispatch is verbatim the same with the Dispatch to Mr. Pierrepoint, No. 2. of the Papers presented to the House of Commons, by his majesty's command, in pursuance of their Address of the 16th;of Feb; with the variation only of "Court of Copenhagen" for "Court of Stockholm," See p. 621.
763
obligations.—Such at least is the language which, in explanation of that neutrality, the Danish ministers think it right to hold to me. They do not, however, shut their eyes on the scene before them; they know what they may expect from the wanton abuse of the power of France; or what is worse, from the determined method and perseverance with which France is subduing the states and directing the resources of the continent against G. Britain.—I have dwelt on these topics in formal conference and familiar conversation with count Bernstorff, as also in the frequent occasions I have of seeing—and the ministers of the cabinet. They avow the precarious tenour even of their present disturbed existence; but their fears are paramount; they consider the Prussian monarchy as annihilated for the present, and believe if they resolve on further measures of defence, that they would draw on this country the worst consequences that may be apprehended.—In the mean time, they regard the actual state of Denmark as of the utmost importance to the allies; and persuade themselves that for the sake of the common cause, as well as of Denmark, it behoves them to adopt no measure which may augment their difficulties, or hasten the disasters they would avert. They therefore, conclude, that their best policy will be the continuation of their present defensive system, and of their reliance on the friendship of G. Britain and Russia; of which policy they say the merit and best effect would be the assistance of those powers when Denmark is endangered by an attack from France. I asked count Bernstorff the direct question, If it was intended to arm such a part of the fleet as might be useful in defeating an expedition from the ports now falling into the hands of France? He replied, that this was not the season.—Disposed as your ldp. may be to allow for these apprehensions in the present calamities of the north of Germany, and to coincide with the Danish ministers as to the readiness of G. Britain and Russia to afford every practicable assistance against the enemy, you will probably not less lament that no preparations have hitherto been made, in concert with the natural allies of Denmark, either to resist a sudden attack, or to impede the gradual encroachments France will continue to make, till she is in an attitude to require the exclusion of British ships from Danish ports, and the surrender of the Copenhagen dock-yard to her purposes against G. Britain.—By pre-
764
parations I do not so much mean a display of military force which this court calls a defiance of the enemy, and the seeking of their own undoing, as some previous concert, some signal for succour or combined operations, some stipulated degree or disposition of force, some security to the powers at war, for the proper application of the assistance they may be able to furnish.—I have this day urged these remarks, and it is readily allowed, that however well-disposed the powers on whom Denmark may rely in the hour of danger, the greatest inconvenience must arise from distance and delay; and that in such an emergency, whatever is irresolute, or timid, or bad, will endeavour to perplex the public councils, for want of a direct recourse to a steady and provident system.—Yet the Danish ministers shrink at all appearance of concert, and at the responsibility of a written engagement. They dread the effects of its publicity, which they think unavoidable; and as count Bernstorff has told me, believe that the mere suspicion of such a concert, though conceived for the duties of defence alone, would on such art occasion as that of the 6th inst. have determined immediate war against Denmark.—I should think it unnecessary to lay these remarks before your ldp. if I had not to make the melancholy addition, that several of the principal departments (I except the ministers of the council and for foreign affairs) as well as many of the inferior ones with their dependencies, are filled by persons in a state of delusion and blind attachment to the interests of France.—The only check to the more open display of these dispositions, is the character of the prince royal.— who marks in the strongest terms his sense of the firmness of his royal highness, observed to me yesterday, that the most entire reliance may be placed on his not yielding to the proposals it may be expected France would make——But too many precautions could not perhaps be taken against the efforts of deluded or ill-disposed persons to perplex or mislead the government in an emergency that may well be foreseen, and when no preconcerted system would be opposed to such attempts, except that of confidence towards G. Britain and Russia; which, however real or well-founded, is not it seems to be acknowledged or carried into effect, till France is in the act. of binding this country never to make the attempt—Among the measures which have already been recommended to the attention
765
of the government, there is one which appears to unite many opinions and interests in this country; namely, that in case of an attack from France, Holstein, Sleswick, and Jutland shall be abandoned, and the principal force be concentered in the defence of the Islands, (even with the exclusion of Fionia.) This project has never been mentioned to me by one of the ministers, but without any reserve by several leading persons; and it would be seriously supported by many who see the principal strength of the monarchy in the island of Zealand; Its fleet and arsenals in Norway, in the West India possessions, and in the commerce of the country. A military person of rank who has been employed in a very confidential station, and now fills an important post at this place, is occupied in writing a Memorial to be sent to the prince, in support of this measure, with the additional advice, to put it into immediate execution by the recall of the army and the return of the prince royal to Zealand.—From all these considerations your ldp. will best judge how far it may be advisable to make a joint formal representation on the part of his majesty and the emperor of Russia, for the purpose of concerting with this country the best means of counteracting the projects France, which are but too clearly avowed in her practice and declarations, and become every day more alarming, from the extent and nature of her acquisitions in the Baltick.—It is indeed possible that the operations about to commence in Poland may suspend for a while the intention of attacking this country; but those operations must so much the more call for every effort that may be to be made, either against the body of France, or to prevent that success in her present undertakings, which will otherwise certainly overwhelm this country.—I shall continue in every event to be entirely guided by your lordship's instructions, and to use my utmost endeavours for the success of the objects to which they are directed.
§ No. IV.—Dispatch from viscount Howick to Benj. Garlike, esq. dated Downing Street, 3d Dec. 1806.
§ Sir, your dispatches to No.—inclusive. have been received and laid before the king. The language of count Bernstorff and the Danish ministers, as described by you, is such as was naturally to be expected from their former policy, and from the effect of the recent events in the north of Germany. Any endeavour to induce 766 them to adopt other sentiments, if indeed such an attempt were adviseable, would, at the present moment, probably be without a hope of success.—At the time of writing the Dispatch to which yours is an answer, the extent of those extraordinary misfortunes which have since happened, was far from being foreseen or expected. A hope was then entertained, though not unmixed with doubt and apprehension, that the power of the Prussian monarchy, aided by the neighbouring states, and by the allies, might have opposed an effectual resistance to the armies of France. But since the afflicting events which have ended in the total dispersion of the Prussian army, the question no longer is whether Denmark should give her aid to a powerful ally, but whether she should, without any continental support, expose herself alone to the resentment of France. So long as the question remains on this footing, it cannot be expected, nor is it to be wished, that the court of Copenhagen should take any measures of direct hostility against France. But the care of its own safety requires more vigilance than ever. While France abstains from any attack, or from any direct menace, a prudent system of neutrality, which shall not impair the means of future defence, is probably the best. But that this forbearance on the part of the French government should last longer than may be found convenient for the execution of those further schemes of ambition in which Buonaparte is at present engaged, seems to me very improbable. After the accomplishment of his more immediate objects, demands may be expected equally inconsistent with the neutrality and the independence of Denmark; and it is for that government to consider whether it will place itself in a situation to defend those parts of the Danish dominions which possess effectual means of resistance, or whether it will follow the example of so many states, which, by seeking safety in submission, have successively fallen under the dominion of France. In looking forward, however, to the probable conduct of France, there is one point which cannot be too soon understood between this government and that of Denmark. Though his majesty must experience the deepest regret from any interruption in the relations now so happily subsisting between the two powers, it would be impossible for the king to acquiesce in any arrangement whereby the whole, or any part, of the Danish navy might be 767 placed at the disposal of France. If therefore it should so happen that in order to secure the German dominions of the Crown of Denmark, that power should be induced to comply with a demand of this nature, his majesty could not avoid taking such measures as in that case would become indispensible for the honour of his crown and the interests of his people. Should any question of this sort arise, you will at once state distinctly and unequivocally the feelings of this government upon it. But the king is far from believing, though it is necessary to provide against it as a possible case, that any thing so injurious to both countries, as the submission of Denmark to so humiliating a condition, is likely to happen. His majesty relies with entire confidence on the wisdom, the spirit, and the honour of the prince royal; and I revert with pleasure to a more pleasing part of my duty, that of authorizing you to repeat the assurances already given, of his majesty's constant disposition to afford to the court of Denmark the most effectual assistance and support, if that government, deceived in the hopes which it seems at present to derive from the observance of a strict neutrality, should ultimately be forced into a war with France for the preservation of its own independence.—In such a case, it is obvious that, notwithstanding the great continental superiority of France, the attack of the Danish islands would present many great difficulties, such as might indeed with proper exertion on the part of that court, prove insurmountable. To this supposition, it is therefore, the king's pleasure that you should particularly direct the attention of the Danish ministers. The king would see with pleasure a successful defence of Holstein, and offers for assisting in this, have this morning been communicated to me by M. Rehausen on the part of his Swedish majesty, who proposes to unite a corps of 25,000 men to the Danish army in Holstein for this purpose. With such a force, it is to be hoped, not only that Holstein might be defended, but that the most beneficial effects for the safety of the north of Germany might ensue from its position in the rear and on the flank of the operations of the French army. You will therefore recommend this offer of his Swedish majesty, which probably will have been communicated to the court of Denmark before this reaches you, to the most serious attention of the Danish ministers. It that government should decline entering into 768 any measures of this nature, or should deem the defence of Holstein impracticable, his majesty still trusts that no effort will be omitted to put the Danish islands in a proper state of defence, and he would gladly co-operate in naval measures necessary for that purpose, if Denmark should really stand in need of such aid, I am, &c.
§ Howick.
§ No. V.—Dispatch from visc. Howick to Benj. Garlike, esq. dated Downing Street, 9th Dec. 1806.
§ Though no dispatches have been received from you since my last, the accounts which have reached this country of the retreat of the Danish Army from Holstein, and the advance of the French to the Eyder, from which river there is reason to apprehend that his majesty's flag has been excluded, render it necessary that I should instruct you immediately to require of the Danish government a frank explanation of the motives which have produced measures apparently so injurious to the interests of his majesty; and also of the system of policy which that government means in future to pursue in its relations with this country and with France.—This explanation you will require in the most friendly terms, but at the same time in such a manner as to prevent any delay. The interests of Denmark itself and the known character of the prince royal, encourage his majesty still to entertain a confident expectation that, notwithstanding present appearances, the answer will be such as the friendship which has so long subsisted between the two governments requires.—With respect to the views entertained by his majesty's government on the present alarming crisis, and the advantage which may be derived from the generous offer of the king of Sweden to assist in the defence of Denmark, I must refer you to my last dispatches. I am, &c.
§ HOWICK.
§ No. VI.—Dispatch from Benj. Garlike esq. to visc. Howick, dated Copenhagen, 24th Nov. 1806.—Received 11th Dec.
§ My lord; The reports of the declared intention of general Mortier to occupy Hamburgh, had been in circulation here for some days. The intelligence of his having entered the town with a number from seven to eight thousand men, was received last night. This government did not appear to believe the event was probable. There seems now to remain a stand of opinion, that the French troops will pro- 769 ceed no further in this direction, but that they will respect the neutrality of Denmark.—With regard to Holstein, it would not only be a vain endeavour to urge this country to other measures of defence than those they have already adopted; but there are no measures of a nature purely military, which could now be taken in concert with other countries, to second the efforts of the Army which is there established, if it should be brought into immediate action. What I have now principally to submit to your lordship, is accordingly meant to apply only to the case of hostilities being actually commenced by France against Denmark, in the duty of Holstein.—Nothing, I imagine, need be urged to prove, that if the French troops succeed in occupying that part of Denmark, the sole purpose cannot be the shutting of the ports of Tonningen and Husum against the British Flag; there must also exist the intention of seizing these islands, and of directing their resources against the interests of Great Britain and Russia.—The conduct of the Danish government, if Holstein and the Peninsula should fall, must, I suppose, be that which has been so often insisted on, namely, a perseverance in the firmest resolution to resist the enemy; and, as count Bernstorff informed me this morning, the immediate arming of the fleet for the defence of this and the adjacent Islands.—But having said this, it is my duty not to conceal from your lordship how much my apprehensions increase with respect to the persons in high though not in the first offices, to whom great confidence will be shewn in the hour of danger, and who must have considerable influence in the direction of the public opinion, and of the means of repelling the enemy.—The character and bias of these individuals (many of whom I know personally) were undoubted before the present continental war took place. Their language in all the changes which occur, leave nothing but a formal declaration of their principles, to convince me of what may be expected from them when the enemy is in possession of Holstein. They will represent the danger to be less than it is, in order to prevent the activity of others, and will exaggerate it with the chance of securing and extending their own authority. These persons will then be capable of imputing as a crime, that more effectual means were not concerted for the defence of the country; and will recommend an accommodation with France, 770 through the voice of the populace not as an avowal of their choice, but as a measure of the necessity to which they have been reduced.—The danger of a war with Great Britain, which, in such circumstances, is already foreseen by the thinking part of the country, would not overrule those who are guided only by their prejudices and their ambition; or if that danger were attended to in the general tumult, it would be only as a reason for arming and stationing whatever could be found in the arsenals of this place, assisted by the supplies of the Mecklenburg and Pomeranian coasts, for purposes of which France would assume the direction.—These are not idle surmises. I do not pretend to describe by what gradations they will be realized; but I cannot observe the confidence and listlessness of some, with the activity and growing hopes of others, or attend to the conversation of this place for a day, without being this day more than the preceding, justified in pointing to the most melancholy results, not as a determination of the government, but as a consequence of the confusion of late measures against an active enemy, amidst undecided and misguided friends.—The contrary too may take place. The activity, firmness, spirit, and popularity of the prince royal, may have the fullest effect against all internal impediments of whatever nature.—In the possibility of one or the other course of these events, I would submit to your lordship the two following considerations: 1st, How far, after the attack or possession of Holstein by the French troops, it may be proper to reduce his majesty's offer of assistance to some specific shape, especially of a maritime nature, for the defence of this and the neighbouring islands. The Danish government will continue to be so totally unprepared for a defence of this nature, as possibly not to be able to bring it forward on a very sudden emergency. 2d, Whether it may not be proper, on such opportunities as occur, without formal declaration, or menace, to give it to be understood, or even finally to announce, that such an arrangement with the French government, as may be attempted in the circumstances I have described, will infallibly lead to open and active war on the part of Great Britain.—I have seen count Bernstorff since I wrote the above. He expresses himself without, any alarm from the presence of the French troops at Hamburgh or Lubeek.—I understand from him clearly, that the Danish troops are re- 771 tiring from the frontiers; and I make no doubt that this has been done at the desire of the French emperor. I beg leave to transmit, as nearly as I can, the very phrases he made use of, in this unasked-for intelligence. "Loin de nous alarmer sur ce qui vient d'arriver, le prince Royal a cru devoir retirer une partie des troupes rassemblées sur la frontiere du Holstein. C'est à dire qu'elles ne resteront pas aussi concentrées qu'elles ont été depuis quelque temps. En effet nous n'avons par les mênies motifs pour les y tenir. Ni les Prussiens ni les Suedois ne s'y trouvant plus, il n'est plus aussi probable que les Hostilités s'engagent sur notre propre territoire; de sorte que la plupart des régimens avaient réçu l'orde de se retirer du coté de Sleswick avant l'occupation de Hamburg; et nous ne voyons point dans cet évenement qu'il y ait lieu à le contremander. Mais le quartier géneral sera toujours a Kiel." The Danish army then, except the small garrisons of Gluckstadt, Kiel, and Ploen, and an advanced guard under general Evald, may be considered as having retreated to the Dutchy of Sleswick behind the Eyder. The French minister at Hamburg, and M. de Mortier, have conveyed the most positive assurances to this government of the respect which will be shewn to its neutrality; and as a proof of it, have insisted on the precautions taken in the march of the troops from Bergedorff to Hamburg, to avoid a portion of Danish territory, which lies more conveniently for the road between the two places. I have, &c. B. GARLIKE.
§ No. VII.—Extract of a Dispatch from Benj. Garlike, esq. to visc. Howick, dated Copenhagen, 29th Nov. 1806.—Received 11th Dec.
§ It was perhaps to be expected that as the Danish troops had remained on the Holstein frontier, when there was no war in the north of Germany, and had actually been engaged with those of France, their sudden retreat to the Eyder would give rise to the supposition of some arrangement between the Danish and French governments.—Mr. Pierrepont will have informed your lordship of the very unfavourable construction of that retreat, which has been transmitted to his Swedish majesty, and of the strong measures of precaution which that monarch has judged it proper to adopt against the new danger that would result to his own interests and to those of the allies.—Your lordship will have borne in mind, that the very essence of the neu- 772 tral system maintained in this country has been repeatedly declared to be the guarding against every dishonourable proposition that might be recommended to the adoption of the prince royal.—With this recollection on my part, it did not even occur to me, that his r. h. could consent to a concession so much in his abhorrence as that of the abandonment of the duchy of Holstein to the French troops, for the sake of the quiet retreat of those of Denmark to the banks of the Eyder; that is to say, that the richest province of the crown should be gratuitously ceded to the enemy, with increased disadvantage and insecurity to Denmark; and though the cession (of Holstein) would not have included Tonningen and Husum, both being in Sleswick, yet that the French troops should be brought within sight of one of those ports, and within a few English miles of the other.—Your lordship will therefore judge of the earnestness and of the caution with which I brought this subject forward with count Bernstorff, as soon as possible after I had received Mr. Pierrepont's letter, for the purpose of learning if any and what conditions had been stipulated with France on the retreat of the Danish troops to the Sleswick frontier; and I have the satisfaction of assuring your lordship, that, in terms and manner to which I give my perfect confidence, did count Bernstorff endeavour to remove the suspicions (which in truth I had not entertained) by assuring me, that no transaction whatever had taken place relative to the respective positions of the French and Danish troops, either in the shape of condition or of explanation, or by any communication between the two governments, and even that the retreat of the prince royal, and the assurances of security conveyed by M. de Mortier and M. de Bourienne, had not depended on each other.—Count Bernstorff was further earliest that I should understand that the retreat had not been determined on at the suggestion of France. But as it may be impossible for count Bernstorff himself to explain how a suggestion of this nature may have been conveyed or admitted, this last circumstance did not so particularly engage my attention.—The retreat having taken place with the approbation of the prince royal, there may be occasion to regret that M. de Mortier and M. de Bourienne were not every way competent to the assurances in which they have abounded, that Holstein will not be attacked. The 773 danger to which that duchy was exposed, is at best not less than it was; and every account transmitted within these few days to Copenhagen, except those received by the government, encreases our apprehensions that the attack is not far off.—This possibility is at least now become so familiar to the government as to shew that they place their principal strength and hopes in the defence of the islands; and I have now, for the first time, some reason to believe that measures of precaution begin to be taken for the case of withdrawing the troops from Holstein, and of establishing some points of union and supply. I have not this intelligence from the government. If measures of this nature have been considered as advisable, they will not be pursued without the strictest secrecy, on the ground of not forfeiting by preparations which may invite the enemy, the advantages of the system in which they have persevered so long. I mean that they will not avow any measure of defence respecting the islands, till Holstein be really attacked by France, and certainly not take any of an ostensible description.—This disposition of the government makes the difficulty of affording or concerting the assistance of which they may stand in need. It is of that apprehensive nature, as would refuse to admit the most effectual succour that might be sent to the country, before it has been determined to adopt a course of undisguised and active war; and it must be on that occasion the more natural to hope, that however they may veil the attempt, every secret preparation for a sudden display of force will be the daily and earnest labour of the Danish ministers.—To this object I have directed my conversation with count Bernstorff. I should hope also, that there is fair ground to urge the courts of Copenhagen and Stockholm to some well concerted common measure of defence of the Danish islands. If the prejudices of the two countries are not insurmountable, Denmark and Sweden have the motives and means of self-defence within themselves. They have local knowledge, and ships of war fitted to the coast; the proximity of Sweden and her actual hostilities may give the readiest assistance; and favour even the timidity with which Denmark may be disposed to come forward.— I am aware that the approaching season may render the operations of a fleet neither safe nor practicable; and that the main passage to be defended between Zealand 774 and Fionia (Fiunen) may require vessels large enough to be able to keep the sea, and small enough to shelter in the common ports of the islands. If these are difficulties, they are to be subdued by the governments themselves. My purpose can only be to advert incessantly to the subject in every direction likely to produce the good understanding and concert, without which Zealand must become the passage for French troops into Sweden, and the seat of every mischievous operation against all the powers interested in the defence of the Baltic.—Hitherto I have not been able to engage the Danish ministers in a satisfactory discussion of the points in question; but I shall make the attempts with the greater earnestness at this moment, as I learn from Mr. Pierrepont that the king of Sweden intends without loss of time to propose an interview with the prince royal; the object of which I would flatter myself must be, their endeavour to concert the best means of their common defence.
§ No. VIII.—Dispatch from visc. Howick to Benj. Garlike, esq. dated Downing street, 26th Dec. 1806.
§ Sir; The apprehension entertained here, at the time of writing my last dispatch, of the entrance of the French troops into Holstein, I am happy to find, was unfounded. But I cannot regard the respect which has hitherto been paid by the enemy to the neutrality of the Danish territory as any thing more than the effect of a policy which for the moment is more convenient to themselves.—It would be madness to trust to any assurances which may have been received from the French government on this point, so far as to neglect a timely preparation of those means of defence which to be effectual must not be left to be sought for in a moment of immediate and pressing danger.—I have urged the necessity of precautionary measures, which might be so conducted as neither to provoke nor to afford a pretext of hostilities on the part of the French, in the strongest manner to Mr. Rist. Above all, it is necessary that no time should be lost in concerting measures of common defence with the court of Sweden, to which so good an opportunity has been offered by the prompt and generous offer of his Swedish majesty.—You will continue therefore to request from the court of Denmark a frank communication of its views, and to urge their immediate attention to the important objects above stated. I have, &c.
§ HOWICK.
775§ No. IX.—Dispatch from Benj. Garlike, esq. to viscount Howick, dated Copenhagen, 20th Dec. 1806.—Received 7th Jan. 1807.
§ My lord, I deferred the honour of writing to your lordship on my communication to count Bernstorff of the principal points of your dispatch of the 3d December till I had an opportunity of seeing that minister again, after he had submitted them to the cabinet ministers. I advert first, to the proposal of his Swedish majesty for the co-operation of 25,000 Swedish troops with those of his Danish majesty in Holstein. I cannot yet say in what manner this overture has been made to the prince royal; but on both the occasions which I have had of discussing the subject here, I have found it attended with the most undisguised aversion; as incongruous at this moment from a power at war to a power at peace; inapplicable with respect to time, if relied on when the attack of Holstein is no longer a problem; unseasonable when no new circumstance has occurred, except the repetition of friendly assurances on the part of France; and dangerous above all, as inviting, or rather immediately committing, the country to unavoidable war.—I endeavoured in the gentlest manner possible to rescue the Swedish proposal from the weight of objections, which thus tend to enervate every wise and provident scheme of self-defence, and carried one degree further, must leave the country prostrate to no good-will, but that of the enemy.— I think it natural to suppose, that the Danish minister urged his objections in this instance with more than usual quickness, from his consciousness that the resolution is already taken to withdraw the Danish troops from Holstein. I felt the conversation clogged on my side with the knowledge of that resolution; but it was not openly noticed on either.—Count Bernstorff than asked me, if 1 believed the king of Sweden could spare from his own dominions any number of men, which approached that of 25,000? This was not a question for me to answer; but I pressed the Danish minister to consider, as exceedingly probable, that when his Swedish majesty resolved on making the offer, he was alarmed for the safety of the Danish peninsula; and that if such a force could not well be spared from Sweden, nothing could be a stronger proof of his Swedish majesty's friendship, than the prompt desire which he must have enter- 776 tained to raise it by extraordinary means.—It occurred to me before this last conference took place, how little the probability was that the measure thus recommended by his maj. would meet with the success it deserved. I therefore previously prepared myself for endeavouring to derive from it at least the next and very important advantage, that of familiarizing the Danish minister with the prospect of sincere co-operation on the part of Sweden, and of impressing them with the notion that, whatever be the fate of the Swedish overture, the ground-work is thereby laid of a real good understanding between the two countries.—Count Bernstorff acknowledged that his Swedish majesty's desire to have an interview with the prince royal, and the communication of the present overture, would be felt by the entire government; and he assured me, that if Holstein were attacked, the concert between Denmark and Sweden, G. Britain and Russia, would be de facto established, and that this country would be most willing to add every resource of the monarchy to the assistance the allies could furnish.— returned to Copenhagen a few days ago. I saw him the next day. He was more than usually prompt and clear as to the necessity of maintaining the present system. He was averse to the admission of a Swedish army into Holstein, but was persuaded of the advantage of an unreserved intercourse with Sweden. He acknowledged, I may say, the propriety of not defending Holstein (that is, the peninsula,) and as proof of his sincerity in this opinion, remarked that the abandonment of those provinces would expose his own estates to the ravages of the French army. He thought the nature of the embarrassments of Denmark called for the utmost frankness towards enemies as well as friends, and believed that as little remains to be explained to France as to any other country. He appeared on all these points to speak as of so many fresh decisions of council, and desirous I should so understand them.— I make no doubt that the withdrawing of the troops sent to Holstein last year will be completely effected, (Count Bernstorff, however, always speaks of a cordon that will remain,) and that the government is sincere in the determination to oppose every thing to France, if she abuse the extreme condescension to which the prince royal has been brought.—glanced of his own accord to the consequences of a contrary line of conduct, and 777 of further compliance towards the French government, and did not scruple to declare, that the effects alone of a war with England must destroy the Danish monarchy in a couple of years.—According, then, to this language, matters have advanced to an epoch in the neutrality of Denmark. Holstein will be deprived of its main defence; it is foreseen that it may be occupied by the troops of France; Denmark will then be in a state of war with France, and will openly concert with G. Britain and Russia, and possibly with Sweden, for the defence of the Danish islands and the Baltic.—To these, the only measures that remain, the different parties may be desirous of directing their own views, and encouraging each other; but I have not scrupled, in conversation with the proper persons here, to speak of this position as fallacious and insecure, because weak in its nature, and liable to be surprised by the arts and activity of the enemy, and by the events which will arise.—If, however, the Danish navy is in the state of forwardness which has been represented, and nothing intervene to disturb the good intelligence of G. Britain and Russia with Denmark, it may still be hoped that every effort of France will fail against the power and resources of the Danish islands.—I have not failed to repeat to this government his majesty's most gracious and friendly offer of assistance and support, if Denmark should ultimately be forced into a war with France for the preservation of her own independence; and I have the pleasure of informing your lordship, that the assurances of this constant disposition on the part of his majesty have been received with every expression that can interpret the fullest sense of the obligations and thankfulness of the Danish government. I have, &c.
§ B. GARLIKE.
§ No. X.—Extract of a Dispatch from visc. Howick to Benj. Garlike, esq. dated Downing Street, Jan 9th, 1807.
§ His majesty has received with satisfaction the assurances that the court of Denmark is determined to resist the demands of France, if pushed to a point that should be inconsistent with the honour and independence of that power. Of the sincerity and constancy of this determination his majesty's government will not allow itself to doubt. But it is necessary to repeat, that to make such determination effectual, timely measures should be taken.—An immediate junction of a Swedish force to the 778 army of Denmark might, as has been stated by count Bernstorff, put an end at once to the neutrality which the latter government still wishes to preserve. But a previous and confidential explanation and concert with Sweden on the measures necessary for the common defence of the two powers, could not have this effect, and is evidently necessary to render the co-operation offered by Sweden of any advantage, whenever the time shall arrive at which the court of Denmark may find itself desirous of availing itself of this offer.—Upon the best means of defence it is impossible for this government to pretend to form a satisfactory opinion. It may be true that the peninsula affords no position in which the force of Denmark could hope to withstand the power of France; and it may be advisable, therefore, to withdraw the troops for the defence of the islands.
§ No. XI.—Extract of a Dispatch from Benj. Garlike, esq. to visc. Howick, dated Copenhagen, 28th Dec. 1806.—Received 12th Jan. 1807.
§ My lord; In your lordship's dispatch of the 3d Dec. the passage relative to the possible sacrifice of a part of the Danish navy to the French, concludes with these words: "Should any question of this sort arise, you will at once state, distinctly, and unequivocally, the feelings of this government upon it."—I have presumed, that this passage gave me some latitude to judge of the propriety, as to time, of making the declaration which the chance of such a transaction would necessarily call for. It is therefore important that I should inform your ldp. that I have not communicated that part of the dispatch to the Danish government. The ground on which I have ventured on such a discretionary reserve is the strong belief, I trust I am justified in entertaining, not only that no proposition of the nature in question has as yet been submitted to the prince royal; but that the military progress of the French arms is not yet such as to suggest an arrangement so incompatible with the sentiments and principles which are known to predominate in that prince's character.—Without, therefore, some new and describable appearance to engage my attention, different from those which had possibly been conveyed to England when the dispatch was written, I humbly trust it is consonant to the feelings of his majesty's government towards that of Denmark, not to have taken a step, which might at this moment only wound the prin- 779 cipal persons, and repel the confidence they seem willing to manifest.—The explanation into which I have entered, will, I hope, guard me from the supposition of not endeavouring to give the proper effect to the Instructions in question, on any change of circumstances leading to the supposition of your lordship's dispatch. If I have already expressed some alarm on the chances of so bold an attempt on the part of the French government as that to which I allude, it has not been from apprehension of dishonourable compromise on the part of Denmark, but of the consequences of timidity and inadequate preparation, by which the enemy might be enabled rather to seize the fleet than treat for it.—Your lordship's dispatch No. 7. having been written on the presumption that the French troops had entered Holstein; and probably after your lordship had received the report of the enquiries I had made as to the retreat of those of Denmark (in my No.) I have also for the present desisted from a formal application on the subject of that dispatch; and humbly hope that my conduct in both these instances will not have met with his majesty's disapprobation.—I find it difficult to obtain precise information as to the number of Danish troops in Holstein, because it is not ascertained how far the regiments still there have been reduced. Two regiments have returned to Funen. The Sleswick and Jutland regiments have also returned. Two regiments belonging to the garrison of this place, are left at Kiel, Ploen, and Gluckstadt. Count Bernstorff tells me that four thousand men are on the line between those places; but these must be in the towns and villages. The garrisons just mentioned, and that of Rendsburgh, compose therefore the only remaining active force against the enemy. I shall resume this subject without delay. I have &c.
§ B. GARLIKE.
§ No. XII.—Extract of a Dispatch from visc. Howick to Benj. Garlike, esq. dated Downing Street, 22d Jan. 1807.
§ Upon the points referred to in your dispatches, I have already sent you full instructions. However desirous his majesty may be of preventing any embarrassment to the court of Denmark with respect to the neutrality which that government is desirous of preserving; this consideration, it is evident, can only apply to a real neutrality, and cannot be carried so far as to admit of a succession of measures dictated by the fear of France, which would in ef- 780 fect place Denmark in a situation of aiding the hostilities of that power.—It so nearly concerns the safety of both powers to cultivate the most friendly understanding, in order to prepare the means of defence against a danger which equally threatens both, that this alone ought to obliterate the jealousies which have too much prevailed between the courts of Stockholm and Copenhagen.—So obvious and so pressing a consideration, it is, however, but too evident from the tenor of your dispatches, has not had its due weight; and your constant attention and good offices will be employed to remove, as much as possible, the causes of that mutual suspicion and distrust, which must favour the designs of the common enemy. The evident necessity of providing for the security of his own dominions must, as I have formerly stated, sufficiently account for the preparations of the king of Sweden. Situated as he is, it is as clearly necessary for his Swedish majesty to require an explanation of the intentions of the court of Copenhagen. You will therefore support any requisition of this nature, which may be made in a friendly manner by the Swedish minister, with a view to those preparations of defence so imperiously called for by the present crisis.