On the motion of the chancellor of the exchequer, the house resolved itself into a committee of supply, to which his majesty's messages, and several other papers, were referred.
Mr. Secretary Canning ,in moving the house to grant the sums which were the subject of his majesty's messages, should content himself with stating shortly, that the first sum of 80,000l. was the same which had already been made the subject of a communication from his majesty in March last, and which had been suffered to lie over without being made good, in order that an opportunity might be afforded of a fuller view of what should be necessary to be proposed. The message he had brought down the other day, divided itself into two parts. One, the measure of subsidizing an increased number of Swedish troops; the other, the advance to Prussia, and the proposed treaty of subsidy with that power. The arrangement with Sweden, though it was thought a fact proper to be communicated to parliament, and though payments might come to be made upon it, yet as none had yet been made, and as no vote was to be called for this night, he should 1026 not enter into further than to state, that, in May last, in consequence of a determination to make a concerted effort with the aid of Prussia, Russia, and such assistance as could be afforded from this country, it was thought adviseable to push the exertions of Sweden as far as the resources of that country would afford. Previous to that time, while there was no appearance of any service being rendered in that quarter by the power of Sweden alone, no augmentation of the Swedish troops was thought of. But when the king of Prussia agreed to furnish 10,000 men to act in Pomerania, when a Russian detachment also was expected in that quarter, and when it was in contemplation to send a force from this country, an arrangement was made for bringing into action a Swedish force of 16,000 men instead of 12,000 before employed. The additional 4000 men were to be furnished at rather a cheaper rate than the terms of the former subsidy. As no money had yet been paid, in consequence of this addition, and as the utmost that could become payable in this year could be no more than 40 or 50,000l. which would be fully covered by the vote of credit passed according to custom, he did not think it necessary to look further into this point, being prepared to give any explanation that might be demanded. With regard to the advances to Prussia, in consequence of the urgency of affairs on the continent, the advances in money, notwithstanding they might be authorized by the message in March, would not have been made if the exigency of the case could have admitted of waiting, for the conclusion of the treaty then in contemplation. When the treaty was made, however, it was stipulated that the two sums of 80,000l. and 100,000l. should be deducted from the first payment of the subsidy, and the amount of the arms from the future payments. Unquestionably, the objects of the treaty were of a large extent, and the subsidy of a large amount, if the contingencies on which it was to take effect had happened, and if the events that had arisen had not put an end to the engagements, and left us the charge of making good these advances. The arms had been supplied from the offices to which that charge belonged, and the expence when made out, would be covered by the vote of credit; all that would be necessary therefore for the house to vote, would be the sums advanced to his Prussian majesty, on account of the urgency of affairs 1027 on the continent; which be moved accordingly.
§ Lord H. Pettyhad no objection to the motion. The first advance had been made by the government to which he had the honour to belong. While these advances were intrusted to the management of such safe hands as those of lord Hutchinson, the public might rely with confidence on having its interests fully guarded; for, along with the military enterprize that belonged in so high a degree to that distinguished person, there were blended in his character a caution and a prudence which afforded a perfect assurance of the safe and judicious exercise of the discretion reposed in him. With respect to the additional engagements with Sweden, he had no objection to them, if they could be brought to answer any purpose of practical utility. But when these engagements should come to be made the ground of a vote, it would be proper to enquire how far there existed the means of carrying them into effect on the part of his Swedish majesty, who, he understood, had not completed the first force of 12,000 he had stipulated to employ in Pomerania.
Lord Castlereaghassured the noble lord, that at the time of concluding the additional engagement, the force serving at Stralsund exceeded the 12,000 men stipulated in the other treaty.
§ Mr. Whitbreadwished to know, whether the stipulations of the treaty with Prussia would be laid before the house.
Mr. Canningsaid, he did not see how such a communication could with propriety be made by his majesty's ministers. If, however, the hon. gent. wished particularly for information on the subject, he might move for it, and the house would then determine whether it ought to be granted. For his own part he regretted, as much as the hon. gent., that the treaties could not with propriety be laid open, for he wished the conduct of the present government to be enquired into. They were well convinced of the propriety and policy of their measures, and proud of what they had done. In both instances the advances been made in cases of great and pressing emergency, and formed only a small part of the subsidy which was to have been paid in consequence of the treaties, had they been completed.
§ Mr. Whitbreadconsidered it as very important, that every means should be of forded of judging of the continental policy, for which his majesty's ministers promised 1028 so largely, and in which they were ready to pledge the country so deeply. For it was stated expressly, that the 10,000l. advanced, was part of a much larger sum, which would have been to be paid if the treaty had taken place. This led to the question of the policy of making so large an engagement. Knowing the situation in which the king of Prussia was at the time when the arrangement was made, it was matter of desire to know what were the particulars of the arrangement. It might, perhaps, be possible to frame a motion so as to get at the treaty, or at least the substance of it. By considering the policy of what ministers had done in framing that treaty, it would be possible to judge of the policy of what they would have done if a larger opportunity had been afforded to them, and of their general views and general policy with respect to the continent.
Mr. Secretary Canningwas still of opinion, that the treaty itself could not possibly be laid before the house; but it was competent to the hon. gent. to frame a motion for any information he might wish for; the house would exercise its discretion as to the propriety of granting such information, and in the discussion the hon. member would have an opportunity of knowing, and commenting upon much of the continental policy of his majesty's servants. He could assure him that there was no shyness on his part, or that of his colleagues; to submit their conduct to the judgment and investigation of the house, and they challenged that investigation with as full confidence as those who had preceded them. If the hon. gent. felt any jealousy at this time in particular, let him call for any information he wished for. The vote now before the committee rested on the some ground as the advance made by the late government in March. The only difference was, that the advance then made was specific, and distinct in itself; while the subsequent advance was made in prospect of a subsidy, from which, if this treaty had taken effect, it would have been deducted. This advance might have been stated to the house as a distinct thing, like the other; but his majesty's government thought it better to profess the whole truth without disguise. He lamented, that invincible impediments of form prevented the house from having the treaty before it.
§ Mr. Whitbreadwas ready to admit that the right hon. gent. and his colleagues, acted from the best view they had of what 1029 was a proper course of continental policy; and therefore he could suppose them very ready to give every explanation that could be required of them. It had been stated on a former occasion, by a noble friend of his, now absent (lord Howick), that though the advance of 80,000l. had been made for the particular purpose of providing for the defence of Silesia, which it was politic to provide for at the time, yet that there was no intention of entering into any engagement of subsidy, and that none would be entered into without that caution which past experience had shewn to be so necessary for the protection of the public interest. This 100,000l. was, in fact, part of a million which was to have been paid to Prussia, if the campaign had gone on. The house, which had voted away much larger sum for subsidies within the last 14 years, with so little benefit, ought to be particularly jealous of any considerable expence on that head now. His noble friend, now absent had decidedly disclaimed the policy of inviting the continental powers, by the temptation of subsidies, to enter into wars in which they were not previously disposed to engage; but finding them engaged in a war for objects that concerned the common interest, the policy of assisting them with subsidies, granted on sure grounds and with good discretion, would lie open. But the first consideration in granting a subsidy was, what was to be got in return, and what possible means had the king of Prussia, at the time this treaty was entered into, to perform any service adequate to the million he was to receive? Was it not physically impossible that he could bring into action a force proportionate to it? It was rumoured, moreover, he knew not on what authority, that the sum that had already been paid to Prussia in the prospect of this subsidiary service, had been expended for purposes to which this country Would not willingly contribute a single shilling, for the purpose of maintaining certain establishments at Berlin, with the expences of which Bonaparte charged the king of Prussia, and for which those about that monarch had engaged him to pay. If the king of Prussia was in a situation to submit to have money extorted from him by the emperor of France, that certainly was not a time at which this country ought to advance money to the king of Prussia. He thought it would be possible to frame an address to his majesty, so as to cause the treaty to be laid before the house. Next, with respect to the engagements 1030 with Sweden, it was said that his Swedish majesty had not so many troops as his first subsidy bound him to furnish; he was glad to hear from the right hon. gent. what he had; but the means and the utility of making the augmentation were still uncertain.
Mr. Secretary Canning ,though he could not say he was prepared to second an motion the hon, gent. might make with view to obtain information, was yet willing to give him every possible facility with respect to the object he had in view. The advance of 100,000l. would not have been made, except in the prospect of the contingency on which the treaty turned, nor till the exigency became so pressing, that it came to the alternative, whether the king of Prussia would be able to make a further struggle or not. With respect to the security of the due application of the money to services not foreign to British interests, the advance was made when the removal of the ministers devoted to the French government, and the appointment of baron Hardenberg to the head of the Prussian cabinet, afforded a sufficient guarantee. As long as there was reason to suppose that any sums saved from the wreck of the Prussian treasures at Berlin, remained unexhausted; as long as there was room to suspect that any sums at the disposal of the Prussian government were applied to any purposes inconsistent with British objects; so long all advances had been withheld. It was not till all these objections had been removed, that British liberality had been extended. He had further to assure the house, that till the very end of the campaign, the king of Prussia had had a considerable effective force, which lord Hutchinson stated to be most vigorously and effectively employed. Whatever might have been the result of this unfortunate campaign, it was at least a consolation to this country, that its aid had been twice the means of saving the gallant garrison of Colberg, which had held out to the end of the conflict, and which now stood with undiminished honour among the subjugated cities around.
§ Mr. Whitbreadwished to know whether lord Hutchinson was a party to the treaty of subsidy. He wished also, as it had been said by some of the gentlemen on another day, that the situation of the continent had come upon them unexpectedly; he wished to know, whether they had not received from lord Hutchinson information, the effect of which was to prognosti- 1031 cate the events that had taken place. With the proximity of Russia to her frontier, pushed as she was close up to it, her means of recruiting must be so convenient, that the aid she could derive from them could not fail to be distinctly visible. It in this situation Russia was not able to stand a general battle, her failure must be obvious, Now, did the right hon. gent. opposite receive such assurances of the unbroken strength of Russia as to justify them in delaying, as they had stated that as the ground of the delay in bringing forward the measures they now urged, as essentially necessary to the defence of the country?
Mr. Secretary Canningwould not decline answering the hon. gent.'s question, on the ground that it had no reference to the matter in debate. Lord Hutchinson had certainly always given reason to expect, that unless certain things should be done, it was likely that a general battle, if given, would be lost. It was possible, however, that a general battle might be avoided, as the obvious and avowed policy was to avoid it. Another contingency was the arrival of Military aid from Britain. The first communication the present ministers had received on entering into Office, conveyed the expectation of that aid: whether the expectation was authorized, he knew not; but the aid was expected, and no preparation was made to afford it either by descent in a certain point, or by diversion. But instead of having made any preparations to contribute in either way, the whole of the transports in foreign service had been dismissed some time before the change of administrtaion. The other contingency put by lord Hutchinson was, that unless Prussia should be supported by military as well as pecuniary aid, it would be impossible to go on. Lord Hutchinson's naked opinion was certainly discouraging. But, taking the chance of its being possible to avoid a general battle, and of supporting with pecuniary and military aid the efforts that remained to be made, there was still room to hope for a different issue: his majesty's government immediately supplied pecuniary aid to the extent which it thought right, and was prepared to afford military aid as far as that should be possible. He was sorry to have been compelled to go so far into this discussion in the absence of a noble lord (Howick), in the hope of whose presence the consideration of his majesty's message 1032 had been deferred till this day; but the discussion had been rendered indispensable to his own vindication, and if it had turned out injurious to those whose interests the hon. gent. had particularly at heart, he was not to be blamed.
§ Mr. Whitbreaddid not conceive that the reputation of the noble lord, for whom he was particularly interested, was at all brought into hazard by the discussion that had arisen: but even if it were, the superior importance to the country, of bringing forth the explanations that were so essentially necessary, would have been a prior consideration with him. It was allowed, that lord Hutchinson held forth but a discouraging prospect of the issue of the last campaign. But the right hon. gent. hedged in some contingencies which might have retarded or retrieved the otherwise inevitable disaster. One thing, however, was sufficient to prove that there was no hope to be entertained from Russia. Driven back as she was to her frontier, if she felt still under a necessity of avoiding a general engagement, her case was absolutely hopeless. If there were from the beginning, persons who entertained hopes of success, where he confessed he saw no prospect, exaggerated as every little advantage on the side of Russia was, and extenuated as were the successes of France; if in such a situation, no prospect of success was seen, except in avoiding a general engagement, all hope was gone. Then, it was said that lord Hutchinson had intimated, that there was an impression that British aid would be afforded on the continent. He asked the right hon. gent. whether, when the contest broke out between France and Prussia, the latter was not at war with Great Britain for Hanover, which she refused to give up, except it should be wrested from her by force of arms. This was in November. Then, what possibility was there, even if it should be expedient to send a British force, to dispatch that force before the change in administration? He for one thought it inexpedient to send a British force. For,if Russia, drawn to her frontiers, could not make a stand there, no possible aid that British troops could give, would avail. The right hon. gent. then said, that when the present ministers came into office they found no means of carrying their views of continental co-operation into effect. They came into office in April, when they immediately felt the necessity of sending military aid to Prussia, and of increasing the 1033 Swedish subsidy. It was not till the middle of June, however, that they had collected transports, and even then they were collected for a different service. Now, they had embarked upwards of 28,000 men in a fortnight. If that could be done in July, why might it not have been done in April? When the urgency of the occasion was felt from the outset, why was not the aid prompt in proportion? He saw a great military character (general Tarleton) on the opposite benches, and he should be glad to hear what he called his military ideas on this point. If the preparations, the want of which was now complained of, had been kept up, 40,000l. a month would have continued to be paid for transports, and the expedition would not have sailed sooner; whereas it was now found that when troops were ready, transports could be collected at a moment's warning. This went to justify the late administration, as far as facts could go.
Lord Castlereaghsaid, the hon, gent. had touched on points which would render it necessary for him to go more at length into the subject in debate, than he should otherwise have been disposed to do. The hon. gent. in the independent comments which he was very properly in the habit of exercising, had on this occasion glanced on matters, the consideration of which could not be very favourable to his right hon friends. He denied that by the mere accident of being at war with Prussia at the time the government of this country was justified in omitting to prepare to wart off the blow, which sound policy would never warrant it in suffering to fall upon Prussia. During the whole period in which the late ministers had suffered themselves to be made dupes at Paris, in negociations in which all the principles that ought to characterize statesmen were belied and adandoned, it was matter of notoriety, even to persons out of the government, that, though Prussia was nominally at war with this country (for it was never more than a nominal war), there were discussions of so angry a nature, that it was probable it would involve these two power in a war, in which Russia also would eventually participate. Under these circumstances the policy that should have marked the conduct of a wise British government was obvious: but the very reverse was exhibited in the conduct of the late government. Instead of being prepared to act for the best advantage upon the opportu- 1034 nity about to be afforded, the late ministers suffered themselves to be duped and cajoled at Paris, even for a long time after the commencement of hostile proceedings between France and Prussia. This, then, was one of the brilliant æras selected to do honour to the late ministers; when the military power of Prussia was about to be crushed, after so many other powers had been crushed before it, no means were prepared to avert or repel the impending fate, no thought seemed to be entertained of interposing to avert it. Then these ministers, who held themselves justified in giving no aid at all, accused him and his colleagues of giving their aid too late. He had also to state, that Prussia, at the time of the formation of this treaty of subsidy, was not so impotent as it was thought by some. In the battle of Eylau, when France felt herself engaged with an enemy so different from any she had hitherto encountered, the Prussian corps, under general Lestocq, had been vigorously engaged, and had materially contributed to the fortunate issue of the day. When the treaty was concluded, the Prussian force, including the garrisons in Silesia, the new levies waiting for the arms some time before dispatched from this country, and the 10,000 men which were to act at Stralsund, amounted to no less than 90,000 men. Thus, however reduced, the great military power of Prussia afforded yet a great remnant, which it was highly politic in us to maintain and uphold. With respect to the military aid expected from this country, the late ministers should have taken care not to suffer such an expectation to be held out or formed; but lord Hutchinson stated that expectation so strongly, that unless the present ministers were disposed to commit what would be nothing short of a breach of faith, they could not avoid sending the aid so expected. When he and his colleagues came into office, however, they found no means whatever of conveying that aid. It was whimsical enough, that while the aid expected by the king of Sweden was looked for entirely in cavalry, and the excellence of the British cavalry rendered it naturally desirable where cavalry. could act, there was not a single arrangement to transport that cavalry. There was but one cavalry transport engaged, as it were for a curiosity, or in order that there might be always a model of a cavalry transport in the service. The first dispatch that had been received by the present mi- 1035 nisters, expressed great disappointment that the cavalry had not arrived; and yet, any person who knew the difficulty of providing cavalry transports, besides the time and trouble of fitting up, must be sensible, that unless a supply had been left by their predecessors, the present ministers could not send off the aid sooner. He could easily make it appear, that the total discharge of transports, except those necessary for home service, was far from being a saving of 40,000l. a month. Motives of economy might be the reason of having no supply of transports. The total dismantling of that department might have been contrived to fall in with the plan of finance of the noble lord (H. Petty), which proceeded throughout on fallacious data, being built upon the supposition of a continued war expenditure of 32 million, when the war expenditure was, in fact, in no one year so little. This was a false economy, leading evidently to great and not distant profuseness, accompanied with much greater mischief. An order had been sent by the late government to the transport office, to pay off all the transports then engaged. This produced a representation of the great expence that would attend making good all the contracts, to the expiration of the terms of engagement, when in a few days it would be necessary to take up other transports for the public service. The mandate of dismissal came from the treasury, though the transport office properly was under the secretary for the war department, the right hon. secretary (Mr. Windham) was therefore not to blame for the order, which coming from the treasury was probably intended to promote the objects of the grand plan of finance to which he had already alluded. The order was executed so far as to dismiss all transports but those necessary to the communication between G. Britain and Ireland, and Guernsey and Jersey. The saving made did not amount to 40,000l. but only to 4,000l. a Month; and after the quantity of transport tonnage sent abroad on the distant expedition of the right hon. gent. there ought to have been an increase rather than a diminution. Government had received 60,000 tons of transports from its predecessors. If the late ministers did not mean to abandon all connection with the continent, they ought to have kept up a sufficient supply of tonnage. Then as to the question, why the present expedition was not dispatched in May, rather than in July? the answer was, the complete state of destitution in 1036 which the present ministers found themselves in on entering into office, with respect to every preparation for a continental expedition, rendered an earlier dispatch impossible. The first thing done was, to give orders to prepare transports; but from the active state of our trade, they could not be sooner collected, and thus it had been impossible to send to the king of Sweden the aid of cavalry which we were bound to afford. With respect to the question of the hon. gent., if such a number of troops were now embarked in a fortnight, why were they not embarked before? the answer was, a wise government always had its arrangements made in such a manner, that it could carry into effect its military enterprises in so short a time, that those who were the objects of them would only hear of the preparation when they felt the blow. But if no preparations were left, our military strength could only be exhibited in an inert and inactive state upon our own shores, till the deficiency should have been supplied. If the preparations had been made, the military energy would have been exerted without delay. He trusted that what had been done now would prove a lesson to every future government, a lesson not to postpone preparation till the moment was come for striking the blow. If the necessary preparations had been left by the late ministers, the exertion might have been made at an earlier period, when it might have contributed to ward off what had happened. Russia had expected our co-operation,and if the late government did not give that aid, it was owing to a false economy which, for the object of a trifling saving, crippled the means of the country, at the moment when it was most essential to exert them. To have exhibited preparations for any considerable embarkation, would have obliged Buonaparte to leave at least 50,000 men in France of what since appeared on the Vistula. It was the advantage of our insulated and central position, that if we had preparations for an expedition in or near the Downs, ready to move to any quarter thought proper, France would be under the necessity of keeping a protecting force in Holland, in the Netherlands, at Boulogne, and at Brest, at the same time, from the impossibility of ascertaining which of those points was to be attacked. It was in this respect that this country, though essentially naval, could bring its military power to be of great weight against France, The late Ministers came into the 1037 means of making great exertions, but they parted with those means apparently for no other purpose but that of registering their abandonment of the continent. Whether the battle of Eylau awakened them to a sense of their criminal omission, he could not say; or whether they had begun to be fearful of falling into disgrace with the whole country, for having postponed their aid so long; but he did find some traces in his office, that indicated a disposition to rouse from its guilty lethargy; but nothing like an active step had been taken to succour those who expected our aid.
§ Mr. Windhamcomplimented the noble lord on his prudence in reserving these extensive accusations for an occasion when they were only incidentally introduced, and when no specific answer could be made to them. He could excuse the temporary warmth with which the right hon. gent. had launched out on one of those topics of accusation; but the noble lord had brought forth a grand declamation, had assumed facts totally unproved, and had made statements wholly without foundation, for the purpose of censuring the general conduct of the war by the late administration. He had prudently forborne producing these general charges until near the close of the session, then incidentally, when no reply could be given to them, having omitted to bring forward any allegations during four months that he had been in power. As far as he could, he would distinctly go over the statements of the noble lord. His first general charge against his majesty's late ministers, was of supineness and abandonment of the continent. Whether an army ought to have been sent at all to the continent, whether it thought to have been sent to one place or to another—these were grand questions of policy not to be decided immediately, or obliquely. If the gentlemen opposite had a mind to arraign the conduct of the late administration on this subject, in God's name let them appoint a day for that purpose. The question was, whether it would not have been ridiculous for an insular power, like Great Britain, to attack the considerable armies on the continent, when the very next minute, her own defence might require the presence at home of every soldier whom she could collect? When he said this he did not mean to go so far as to assert, that no occasion could in his opinion arise, in which such a cooperation on our part would be unadviseable. So with regard to subsidies, were 1038 we to be merely the great bank of Europe, on which the different nations should be empowered to draw in defence of their own existence? Was that a good habit to give them? Was not the result likely to be that they would make no spontaneous exertions? But in asking these questions, did he say, that subsidies ought never to be granted? These were great questions of national importance, and not to be decided upon by a declamatory speech, but to the discussion of which the house ought to come with a full knowledge of all the circumstances of the case. The noble lord asserted, that the late administration ought to have subsidized and sent troops to the continent. He, on the other hand, asserted, that they ought to have done neither the one nor the other more than they did do. When they came into office, the season was improper for sending out troops, and when the proper season came, was not such aid out of the question? Could it be hoped, that when the mighty powers of Europe, for some time poised in air, had taken their pitch and direction, any military effort made by this country could avail? That the continental powers called for our assistance, might be easily supposed; but when the noble lord asserted that we had given assurances of assistance, and particularly of cavalry, all he could say was, that he did not know that such assurances had been given, and that he did believe that they bad been given. This fact withdrawn, down fell the whole pile of argument which the noble lord had been erecting. "For," said the noble lord, "you made no preparations to send assistance." Very true; because no assistance had been promised, nor was immediately in view. But the noble lord was surprized why no show of assistance had been made. He would assure the noble lord, not from economical motives (any more than the discharge of transports, which the noble lord had so fallaciously stated arose from the decision of the late ministry to terminate all communication with the continent), but from the consideration that in the state of Europe at that time, it was not wise to make a show, as by such a demonstration the enemy would be put upon their guard, and might be able to defeat objects, otherwise attainable. When the noble lord talked of sending 25,000 men to the armies of Russia and Prussia, the thing was so absurd, that it was unnecessary to answer him. With regard to the army, it had, in point of fact, 1039 grown in the hands of his majesty's late government, who had left the regular force 8000, and the general force 10,000 men, stronger than what they received it from their predecessors. Such, by the accounts on the table, was the increase of the army, from March 1806, to March 1807, from whatever causes that increase might have arisen. The late administration had been also attacked on their conduct, with regard to Buenos Ayres. The original expedition to that place, though certainly not under the orders of the gentlemen opposite, was undertaken by an officer of their appointment: and whose conduct had since been justified by pretty strong marks of their approbation: for, having been found guilty by a court martial of a very serious offence, he had, as a reward, when fresh from the censure of that court martial, and in mockery of its proceedings, been appointed out of his turn to another and most important command. A most mischievous step, and one fraught with consequences highly dangerous to the interests of the navy! By this step, however, the noble lord and his colleagues recognized and adopted the attack on Buenos Ayres, and now he had the modesty (for he would not call it by its proper name) to accuse the late administration of doing that which, what had been done without their control rendered necessary. As to the transports, the noble lord said, that he (Mr. W.) had made a magnificent statement of the many thousand tons of transports taken up by the late administration. All his magnificence was this fact, that while his majesty's late ministers parted with the larger class of transports, the three months' ships, for which they had no immediate use, and which were easily to be got if wanted, they had taken up as many as they could procure of coppered and sheathed ships, which were not to be obtained in a hurry, and in which a sudden demand created a great advance of price, Of this last description they had left, he believed, a greater number than they found, at least such he knew was the comparative state of the transport service not long before his quitting office. He had thought it necessary to say thus much, in answer to the grand flourish of the noble lord, which was calculated to make an impression at a time of the session when it could not be duly met, and which it was, no doubt, hoped would work to the country during the summer. The country, however, would not forget that his majesty's ministers had 1040 been four months in office, and had been repeatedly, but in vain, called on to bring forward distinct allegations against their predecessors.
Lord Castlereaghsaid, that in affirming that the 9th regiment of dragoons had returned from pursuing its destination, consequence of the state of the transports in winch they had embarked, he was not guilty of mis-statement—they came back to request copper-bottoms. The grand policy of his late right hon. friend (Mr.Pitt) was, that there was always, during his administration, every thing in readiness for the immediate embarkation of at least 10,000 men; a striking instance of that policy, and the good consequences resulting from it, was in the successful expedition of sir David Baird to the Cape; whereas, on his coining into office, there was not above 11,000 tonnage of copper-bottomed transports. But certainly the policy between the two governments was different, for the right hon. gent. had candidly admitted that his government had no intention whatever of sending out troops to the continent.
§ Mr. Windhamdenied that he had ever made such admission; what he had said was, that the government had then no immediate intention of sending out troops to the continent, and he had endeavoured to prove that they were then right, in, at that time, acting up to such a policy. As to the transports, there was not a single ship fit for that purpose, that was rejected by the transport office.
Lord Castlereaghsaid, that all who were conversant in the nature of preparing expeditions, must know that copper-bottomed transports, amounting to 10,000 tons, could embark only 4000 men. He had said, that the late ministers left in employ behind them but 11,000 tonnage, and he contended that such was a conclusive proof that the late government had not then in idea any effort for the relief of the continent.
§ Mr. Windhamsaid, that if the noble lord took up transports with the same avidity with which he took up facts, the present government could never be deficient in transports. He (Mr. W.) could not then speak from memory, and therefore he would not, as the noble lord had done, throw out vague charges and loose assertions; but he did believe that it was not as the noble lord had so confidently stated; and admitting the truth of the statement, how 1041 did it affect the question at issue? At a certain period every thing was out in due readiness for the embarkation of troops to the continent, and therefore the continent was abandoned by the minister of the day! This mode of arguing might be new as argument, but not new as argument coming from the noble lord.
Mr. Rosedefended the appointment of sir Home Popham, which had been so pointedly alludes to by the right hon. gent. Sir Home Popham had been selected by admiral Gambier as his captain, and his right of selection was not to be disputed. Lord Howe had selected sir Roger Curtis, and that selection had given rise to no animadversion.
§ Lord H. Pettysaid, that the animadversions on the appointment of sir Home Popham naturally followed from what had been said on the other side with respect to that expedition, which had originated with a former ministry, who had been active in bringing forward that officer. As to the precedent that had been cited, he could not accede to it; for he well knew that the appointment of sir Roger Curtis had given rise to very general dissatisfaction, and he had reason to believe that the selection of sir Home Popham had also given rise to great dissatisfaction, and he would add, that were not that officer now absent, on the service of his country, he Should feel it his duty to submit to parliament a motion relative to an enquiry into a certain bargaining transaction at the Cape, in which the expedition to South America had originated, and in which that office was not a little concerned. The noble lord opposite to him, in his strictures on the late administration, had taken an opportunity of giving him his share of the general censure. The imputation thrown on him by the noble lord, he should ever consider as a merit, because it was an imputation of economy. He should not be ashamed of having used his humble efforts to husband the resources of the country in a crisis like the present, when there was such demand for the wise, and useful, and considerate application of them. The noble lord opposite should be, therefore, the less surprized if his own financial propositions had not met with the fullest approbation from one who thought too well of economy to approve of any plan that went to scout it. In that case, too the noble lord had not forgotten to deal out his usual imputations against him, when that noble lord was submitting to that house a plan 1042 which, if it did not contain a sublime system of economy, certainly did [...] a sublime contempt of figures—A great deal had been said of the supineness of the late government, in not aiding the efforts of our allies upon the continent. It was, however, worthy of observation, that since the year 1793, down to the present period, it had been the constant and uniform plan of one set of Men in this country, to talk of rescuing the continent; of saving. restoring, and establishing Europe. That had been their undeviating policy; and yet this great and mighty plan had either not yet been rightly conceived, or if so, had entirely failed, and contributed to increase that power it was meant to overthrow. It was ridiculous to talk of saving Europe, if Europe could not save herself. It was not in the desperate affairs of the continent that England could step in and save her. No; she had only to look to better times. She could be most useful in following up victory, not in remedying defeat; and therefore, was a government wise in keeping up and refusing to exhaust the resources of the country until they could be useful? "Et rebus vosmet servate secundis." If, however, it was thought by gentlemen opposite, that a continental expedition ought to have been forwarded and might have had effect, he called upon those gentlemen to state, at what one period they would have taken upon themselves to have advised such a measure. He defied the present ministers to state the specific time, during that period, in which they would say such an expedition would have been serviceable. The æra of the battle of Eylau had been generally spoken of; but were the immediate events of that battle forgotten? Here the noble lord entered into a comparative statement of the affairs of the continent, subsequently to the battles of Eylau and Ulm, and contended that for three months after the latter period, the British troops had not reached the continent: had, however, the warning voice of his right hon. friend, now no more, (Mr. Fox,) been then attended to, the prostration of Europe might have been prevented; for what contributed more to the subjugation of the continent than the coalitions which were successively embarked in?
Mr. Secretary Canningwarmly reprobated the policy that had been laid down by the noble lord, and contended that either that noble lord had been directing his censures 1043 against the late premier (lord Grenville), who was of old such an advocate for continental co-operation, or that that nobleman had lately become the convert of the economical late chancellor of the exchequer; he ridiculed the application of the classical quotation with which the noble lord had favoured the house—"et rebus vosmet servate secundis;"—for, if it meant any thing so applied, it was to be rendered thus—"while victory is with you, we will be with you; but the moment it leaves you, we shall leave you, and wait for better times." He said, that from his own official documents he had authority in stating that our allies upon the continent had the fullest expectations of assistance and co-operation on our parts; and of all the difficulties he had to contend with since his coming into office, the most difficult was that of endeavouring to satisfy foreign ministers for the gross failure, on our part, in answering these expectations. That difficulty was now, however, in a great degree removed by what had fallen, in the course of the present debate, from the right hon. gent. (Mr. Windham). And, as it was well known, that by some means or other what passed within that house went out to the public, to the country, and to the world; he rejoiced that the country and others would thereby be put in possession of what fell from the right hon. gent., when he admitted with that candour, of which certainly he could not divest himself if he would, that the late government had not in view any expedition to the continent. And why, he asked, had they not? Would they deny opportunity the most favourable? Here the right hon. secretary went into a detail of the history of the late campaign, as affecting Prussia, and contended, that never was there an occasion in which assistance on the part of Great Britain would have been in ore opportune or more effective; and as to the sincerity of Prussia, there could not exist a doubt from the very nature of the contest; besides that Prussia had, since her rupture with France, refused peace with that power, unless concluded in concert with Russia. In 1795, it was thought wise to subsidize Prussia and co-operate with her in order to induce her to go beyond her frontiers; but in the late campaign, when she was so deeply interested and had so deeply ventured, it was thought hazardous, unwise and impolitic to join with her in the common cause. But the right hon. gent. had 1044 joked upon the uselessness of "making a show," that is, of making every necessary preparation for immediate embarkation; he could only say, that he knew too well how to prize that right hon. gent's ingenuity to suppose for a moment that that gentleman did not perfectly understand the nature of, and good consequences that might result from, a well-managed diversion.— He was perfectly ready to confess, that his noble friend ought to retract one part of his accusation, and that was, that the right hon. gent. had not acted dextrously on his own plan; for if he had determined completely to abandon the continent, certainly he acted on that plan with the greatest assiduity and effect. When the right hon. gent. urged, that it was for the interest of this country to shut itself up, and abandon the continent, and when the noble lord stated the benefits of economy, he put it to them to declare, whether they actually believed that either an economical war, or an efficient peace, could be secured by abandoning the continent, and thus setting the continent the example of abandoning this country. It was not true, that in the last war the negociations with Prance had always been commenced by the continental powers; the instances were numerous in which they had been led by Great Britain. In the present war, Great Britain and Russia were on equal terms. Russia had but a remote interest in the contest: if, therefore, it were said, that by making peace with France, Russia had abandoned us, he would answer, that we had engaged with Russia—not for the purchase of her blood and exertions, but that, seeing her manfully struggling against the common enemy, we had engaged to lend her our aid. Russia, however, finding that no assistance was at hand, and that the promises of Great Britain had vanished in air, after sheaving how well she could bear up against the overwhelming torrent of French power, had agreed to make peace. The late coalition had certainly terminated with regard to us in a manner different from any of the former ones. In former coalitions, the powers of the continent left us alone, and fled from their engagements; now they had left us alone, but they had not fled from their engagements, nor in the slightest degree violated their faith. If the right hon. gent. disputed this, he would go step by step to the proof.
The Solicitor-Generalfor Scotland depre- 1045 cated the manner in which the name and appointment of an hon. officer (sir H. Popham) had been introduced into the discussion by a noble lord opposite. If that noble lord thought that there was any thing culpable imputable to that officer, it was his duty to bring forward a charge against him, whilst he was in that house, and had an opportunity of defending himself. When he looked to the manner in which that topic bad been that evening introduced, he must say that he thought it highly indecent. If the noble lord had attended to the result of a former enquiry instituted in that house against the same gallant officer, it might have had the effect of inducing him to abstain from the charges which he had that night urged. For his own part, he must deny, that there had been any thing in that enquiry, or in the judgement of the court martial upon his conduct, that could render his appointment as captain of the fleet, improper or irregular. The noble lord might have found, in the case of a junior officer, captain Bowen, who had been appointed by the late to commander-in-chief of the channel fleet, captain of the fleet, just ground of complaint. He did not mean to say, that the officer to whose appointment he alluded, was not a most meritorious officer, or that he had not performed the duties of the station to which he had been appointed with ability and credit, but he mentioned the circumstance only to shew, that that appointment was not strictly conformable to the practice of the service. He hoped the noble lord would feel, that it was not justifiable by such charges as he had made, in the absence of the individual against whom they were directed, to endeavour to whisper away the character of any officer.
§ Mr. Whitbreadsaid, that any thing which occurred in that house could not be characterized as whispering upon the subject to which it applied. His noble friend had adverted to a transaction that had already appeared in all the newspapers, the agreement entered into between sir H. Popham and sir D. Baird, respecting the division of the prize money, before a single man had been embarked on the expedition against Buenos Ayres, which, he said, was a fit subject to be enquired into in that house. In fact, the matter was at present the subject of a suit in one of the courts of law. As to the appointment of sir H. Popham to the post he filled, he must say, that it had given general dissatisfaction in the 1046 navy. As to the right hon. gent. opposite (Mr. Canning), he had placed himself in an awkward situation, by the statement. which he had that night made. If he, or his friends, thought that the late ministers had not done their duty, they should bring a charge against them; and he would pledge himself, if they should make out a case, to support them. But he was relieved from that duty, by the mis-statements of the noble lord (Castlereagh) and the right hon. gent. That noble lord had, in utter contempt of all historical fact, and in perversion of all circumstances and dates, imputed to the late administration of 14 months, all the evils of the preceding 14 years administration. The house, to judge of this, should recollect how the contest had begun. It would appear from the dispatches of lord G. L. Gower in 1805, that Austria had been dragged into the war, when she declared herself that she was not prepared for it. After having brought Austria to her ruin, and subsidized disinterested Russia, the right hon. gentleman now charged all the evils that resulted from such measures upon his hon. friends, who had succeeded to the end of that contest. Now, it was charged upon the late administration, that they had ruined the continent. He denied the fact; it was Mr. Pitt, and the measures pursued under his administration, that had ruined the continent; and highly as he respected the character of lord Grenville, of whom he had not the honour of much personal knowledge, he had not discovered any ground for altering the opinion he formerly entertained upon that subject. It was unnecessary to recur to the rapid events that had occurred from the battle of Auerstadt to the battle of Friedland, events which no force that could be sent from this country could have averted for a single day, or a single hour. As to the offers of peace to Prussia, from the moment of the flight of the king from Jena, she was as incapable of making peace without the consent of Russia, as of carrying on the war after the armistice of Tilsit. The noble lord had observed of him, that he shewed his independence by animadverting upon his friends, as well as his adversaries. For his part, he was as much attached to party as any man could be; but on such public questions he should never suffer any consideration to influence his unbiassed judgment; and in the part he took upon such occasions, he wished to benefit his country by eliciting the truth from both sides upon these 1047 important subjects. As to lord Grenville every one would allow him to be an able politician, and this he would say of him, that he had disapproved of the Spanish war. The noble lord opposite had said, that after the negotiation hart broken off, an army should have been sent to the support of Prussia: but Prussia was then at war with us, and, after the battle of Auerstadt,the winter season rendered it impossible to send any expedition. Where could men have been then sent to co-operate with the Russians, even after the battle of Eylau, which he still looked upon to have been disastrous for the Russians? It had been said, that Prussia, by joining the coalition before the battle of Austerlitz, might have turned the scale, which he did not think would have been the case, but she neglected that opportunity, and had brought herself into her present situation, as he had before said, by her insane rashness. Here this country then was without an ally. If the late ministers had brought it into that situation, a charge ought to be brought against them for it, rather than by misrepresentation, to impute blame to them. Even at this late period of the session, he should think the enquiry might be gone into, and he hoped that there would be no objection to the production of all communications with the Prussian government. The right hon. gentlemen opposite, when after the dissolution they had arranged every thing for the election, then turned their attention to the continent. The expeditions they had sent out he wished might prove successful, but he hoped they would not prove an example of that dispersion of the disposeable force of the country, which had been charged upon his right hon. friends.
Mr. Secretary Canningsaid, that it was no more the duty of the present ministers to bring a charge against their predecessors, that, it was the duty of their predecessors to bring a charge against them. He thought his predecessors wrong, and that they had ruined the continent. But as the conduct of an existing government might involve the country in disaster, if the gentlemen opposite thought them wrong they ought to bring a charge against them.
§ Mr. Windham roseto clear himself from some misrepresentations of the right honourable secretary of state. He liked his ingenuity and eloquence very well; but did not think his arguments the most respectable. He imputed opinions and assertions to gentlemen, that he might 1048 answer them himself, by which means he had always enough to say. A man might very easily be affluent who coined his own money. There was no want of words, where he had a manufactory of epithets. The right hon. gent. went on briskly, for the rode very light, and carried no weight.— He then shewed the difference between the system of the last ministers, as to contmental affairs, and that which was imputed to them. They had not seen any proper opportunity for a diversion, or they would have made it. They had made no promise and neglected it. After various explanatory remarks, he begged gentlemen to prefer their charges fairly and seriously, and he would Meet them. He requested the house to mark the right hon. secretary's receipt for making speeches. He put all sorts of ridiculous things into the mouths of his political opponents, that he might wake out his speech, by answering them. He made them something like a second person, in a dialogue, who was made to talk a good deal of nonsense, to set off his opponent in the argument. But though he liked eloquence very well, he could not praise the respectability of the right hon. gent's arguments.—The resolution was then put, and carried.
On the question, that 15,000l. be granted for Inspecting Field-officers of Volunteers,
§ Mr. Windhamcontended, that even in the opinion of the volunteers themselves, these were useless. They might be inspected by the generals of the districts. This had been a project to answer election purposes. As it had done all the good it could do in that way, he thought the ministers might give up the matter, and save some expence to the public.
The Secretary at Warwished to know if the inspection by generals of districts had been practised during the right hon. gent's administration. The number of volunteers, he believed, was in many instances greater where there were no general officers. As to the idea of a job, he asserted that the inspecting field-officers had in general, or rather without an exception, been re-appointed, without regard to the degree of interest they might posses. It could, therefore, be of little consequence whether the re-appointment had taken place on the eve of an election or not. He contended that the Volunteer spirit had greatly subsided in many counties since that right hon. gent. had come into office.
§ Mr. Windhamadmitted that a relaxation to the volunteering spirit had taken place; but maintained that it had manifested itself some considerable time previous to his coming into office.
§ General Tarletonsaid, the volunteers in the district in which he had the honour to command, could never have reached the state of discipline to which they had arrived but for the exertions of the Inspecting Field-officers. If an invasion had taken place two years ago, they would have been able, from that district, in the course of two days, to have produced 30,000 men within ten miles of the metropolis.
§ Mr. Calcraftstated that before his right hon. friend (Mr. Windham)came into office, the Volunteer force had decreased from 400.000 to 318,000, and during his administration they had fallen off in a much less proportion, not having decreased above 20 or 25,000 men. He remembered that he himself as a volunteer, had been inspected by Major-generals and lieutenant-generals, and he did not see why that practice might not be continued. The gallant general (Tarleton) had now his head-quarters at Bath, and it was a great pity that the parliament did not sit there, as in such a case the gallant general could reconcile his senatorial duties with the duties of commanding officer of the district, and in such case he might again honour the volunteers so far as to review them.
§ General Tarletonsaid a few words in explanation, and imputed to the hon. gent. great military ignorance.
Mr. Roseretorted the charge of a job, by alluding to th 300 surveyors of taxes, proposed to have been appointed by the late administration.
Mr. Beresforddeprecated the system of recrimination which had become so much the practice of members on both sides of the house. As to the subject immediately before the house, he felt himself necessitated to say, that the language held in that house by the right hon. gent. and the measures adopted by him, had such an effect on the volunteers in Ireland, as to make at least one half of those who had been most zealous in the service, turn their backs upon it.
The Solicitor-Generalof Scotland spoke in praise of the Scotch volunteers, whom he also stated to have been very much discouraged by the language of Mr. Windham.
§ Mr. WindhamSaid, the arguments of the last hon. and learned gent. were merely 1050 to the old tune, "No pay, no Swiss." This wonderful relaxation of the spirit of the Scotch volunteers, was to be attributed to some diminution of the former allowances. If, however, the number of the Scotch volunteers was much diminished, it must be allowed, that this diminution begun long before he came into Office, or had any prospect of coming into office, and therefore these gentlemen must have had the gift of second sight, to know both that he would come into office, and what he was to propose. He had often objected to what was called the volunteer system: but as to the individuals themselves, it was impossible that any one could pretend to turn into ridicule the population of England, Ireland, or Scotland, or that proportion of the population which evidently appeared most ardent in the general defence. As to what an hon. gent. had said about the disgrace of crimination and recrimination between the different parties, he agreed so far in that opinion, that he did not wish unnecessarily to indulge in it; but if it obviously occurred in the course of a discussion, he was not content to pair off.
§ Dr. Laurencesaid, he recollected a very different history respecting that corps. They were a corps that wanted greater allowances to be made to them than what was usual. An hon. general (Tarleton) had, in his explanation, accused an hon. friend of his of gross ignorance in military matters. The house would, however, recollect that about a fortnight ago, the hon. general had exerted all his military calculation to persuade the house that Bonaparte had advanced so far in Poland that it was next to impossible he should ever be able to retreat. After so recent a promulgation of his military opinions, he thought the house would not believe that every military man was completely ignorant of his profession, who might differ in opinion from the. hon. general.— After some conversation, the committee divided: For the vote 34; Against it 24.
A vote of credit, amounting to 4,500,000l. for Great Britain, and 500,000l. for Ireland, was also proposed and agreed to, after some opposition from lord H Petty, sir J. Newport, and Mr. Windham. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in answer to the observations against the amount, said, that there were many exigencies which might call for the employment of the surplus. A case, for example, might be supposed to arise, when it might be necessary, to call 1051 put the volunteers and place them on full pay.—The several other grants having been put and carried, the house resumed, and the report was ordered to be received to-morrow.