HC Deb 03 August 1807 vol 9 cc1052-44

On the order of the day, for the further consideration of this bill,

Mr. Frankland

argued against the principle of the bill, and thought that the militia had many advantages over the regulars. The man that was good at the foil, could not be unskilful at the sword; and he thought the illustration applied well to the. militia. The latter was a more settled and compact force, and were less liable to the ill effects of a constant succession of new officers, than the regular, forces. The hon. gent. dwelt on the importance of uniting, as much as possible, the character of the soldier and the citizen. The militia force was a most constitutional body, and ought not by any means to be discouraged, as would be done by the present bill. He must also object to it as going obliquely to undermine the system of military service introduced last year by his right. hon. friend, while it was not directly and manfully brought under the consideration of the house.

Mr. Whitshed Keene

rose and said: In this late stage of the important subject now before the house, I beg leave to trouble it for a short time. I am one of those that voted for the measures proposed by his majesty's ministers, not that. I thought them complete for the purpose, or that they were the best that might have been devised, but because, after having considered every thing that has been thrown out on the different sides of the house, (who all agree in the end although they differ as to the means) I thought this mode preferable, from a persuasion that as it was apparent a large deficiency must exist for some time in our military, establishments, it was the interest of our country, under the present exigency, the deficiency should be thrown on the militia, rather than on our regular force; both on the probability of that deficiency, being sooner filled up with trained soldiers, applicable to every purpose, than by any other mode proposed; and again, on the probability of that deficiency in the militia, being made good in an easier and more economical manner, than it would be if it existed in the troops of the line. The length to which this session has been protracted, by the circumstances which have occurred, may, perhaps, justify the officers of government in not proposing to this house at present further measures, which possibly might retard this measure, which promises expeditiously a great increase of that force of the country adapted either to offensive or defensive operations. As government has the best means of judging how far the danger may be more or less imminent, on them lies the responsibility of thinking no more need be done in the present session. However inconvenient a further attendance might be, that inconvenience would plead but little, should any injury to our country take place, which might have been prevented by further measures. I trust they are not mistaken, and I have the satisfaction of believing from what has fallen from ministers, that they intend taking the earliest opportunity to ameliorate, extend and organize a more complete system of defence and offence; it would be wasting he time of the house, to occupy it, in endeavouring to prove an imperious necessity, which must overrule all minor objections to such measures as may put our internal security on the best footing, and also afford the best means of preserving our external greatness. Every thinking man's mind being naturally employed on those great objects, may I be permitted to submit to the house some Suggestions, which I humbly conceive are well worth being considered, and that they may be so modeled as to promise to effect this great object as far as the physical powers of our country will admit. They are the Suggestions of a man, who having served many years at the head of the militia of the county of which he was also lord, (and had therefore better means of being acquainted with the bearing and operation of the militia laws in the different situations of our country,) and during several of the campaigns in the American war, in many of the last war with France, and in various parts of Great Britain, employed a strong understanding in weighing the advantages and disadvantages attending this service, according to the different circumstances of our country. Sir, I apprehend, however great our gratitude ought and must be to those enlightened and provident patriots who introduced and established this most important mode of national defence, however competent it has proved to its object during former times, yet no man will contend that, in the present state of Europe, (which it is necessary only to allude to) the same system must be applicable. I here must beg leave to advert to what many gentlemen in this house must recollect in 1799, when a French detachment had landed in Ireland; many of the regiments of the militia of this country volunteered their services to the sister kingdom, with an alacrity and zeal never to be forgotten. As the laws stood and now stand, an act of the legislature was necessary to legalize the acceptance of their services. This French detachment after some success, and having advanced considerably into the country, being disappointed in their expectations of a faithful, numerous, and zealous co-operation for which purpose they had brought many arms, surrendered. Had they not been disappointed in this expectation, it is not easy to appreciate, the important advantages that must have resulted from this patriotic act of the British militia; the act of the legislature however in its progress through the houses of parliament met with much opposition. In mentioning this, I am far from intending to impute any blame to those gentlemen who made that opposition. I am persuaded they acted, according to their view of the subject, in the manner most conducive to the best interest of their country. Gentlemen will also recollect, that on the renewal of hostilities with France, when Buonaparte lined the coast opposite to ours with his legions, and began to assemble his flotilla at Boulogne, many regiments of the Irish militia, seeing England threatened, seized the opportunity of testifying their gratitude by offering to come here; at the same time some regiments of English militia again volunteered to go to Ireland: at that moment, some most respectable leading characters in that service, thought proper to publish Resolutions expressing strong disapprobation of that measure, and stopped it. I cannot help lamenting that they thought [...] their duty so to act, as it is obvious that the facility of mutual defence was and will be thereby embarrassed; and what is of no less importance, though not so obvious, that it prevents the intermixture of a considerable part of the population of the two countries; a measure which would go further in seven years to render the union not merely nominal, but real, than the present mode of proceeding will do in fifty. Sir, I know too well the zeal with which the gentlemen of the militia have acted, the privations to which they have so long submitted, not to be persuaded that they on that occasion also acted according to their views of the best interest of their country, and that, had they thought the exigency required it, they would readily have gone there. At the same time that I think so highly of their patriotism, I am not less persuaded that from their good sense they would rather meet the enemy in Munster or Connaught, than in Yorkshire or Kent. As these latter considerations do not immediately belong to the question before us, I shall say no more on them at present; if it was permitted for so insignificant an individual as I am, to mention himself, I would say, that having had the honour to serve several campaigns in different parts of Europe, having, had the honour to serve 39 years in this house, and having attended all the discussions on these important subjects, I presume to think myself not totally incompetent on them; and concurring, as I do, in the soundness of these Suggestions, and persuaded that great national advantage may be derived from them, I will take the liberty to lay them before the house, They are as follow:—1. "To enable Volunteers to propose to his majesty's lieutenants of counties, to form themselves into local militia, to be regularly trained for 28 days, with the same establishment, in the same manner, and under the same regulations as the old militia used to be in time of peace. To leave their counties only in case of invasion or imminent danger thereof." The object of this clause is to establish, at little expence, under command and under officers of some experience, a large body of men, which may be speedily applied to the public service in case of emergency. I would wish this source of supply to be extended to the number of 160,000. It may also, if it shall be consonant with the wisdom of parliament, to adopt the next proposition, be made a source whence may be drawn a supply of men to keep the embodied militia constantly full.—2. "To enable his majesty to accept the voluntary services of one fourth part of the embodied militia annually, to serve in the regular army. And if the men so volunteering, were put invariably into the regiments that are reputed to belong to the counties from whence the men come, whenever those regiments shall want recruits or be augmented; if ensigncies were sometimes given on the recommendation of the lords lieutenants, to young men of those counties; these two measures could not fail of adding much to the facility of keeping our regular force complete; but as those two last arrangements are within the power of the commander-in-chief, that illustrious personage will certainly adopt whatever on consideration shall appear calculated for such important purposes." The object of this clause is to give (as is obvious) a regular supply of efficient men to the regular army. I would wish this force, the embodied militia, to be carried to the extent of 80,000 for Great Britain, giving annually a recruit of 20,000 men to the army, and establishing a force commensurate (as I apprehend) for the ordinary purposes of the kingdom; thereby leaving the whole, or the greatest part of the regular army, a disposeable force.—3. "To enable lieutenants of counties to accept the voluntary services of as many men from the local militia as would fill up the deficiency occasioned by the drafts from the embodied militia into the army. If there shall be a deficiency of volunteers for filling up the embodied militia, that deficiency to be made good by a ballot, without exemptions, and deficiencies in the local militia to be supplied annually by a similar ballot." The object of this clause is to make use of the ballot only when indispensable, and then in a manner little burthensome.—4. "To enable lieutenants of counties to employ the staff of the local militia in training the men intended to be transferred to the embodied militia, during the time such staff may not be actually on duty with the kcal militia." The object of this clause is to have the embodied militia complete in members acquainted with the use of arms.—5. "To enable his majesty to direct lieutenants of counties, if he should see it proper so to do, to employ the said staff of the local militia, when not otherwise employed in exercising the persons bound to serve under the provisions of the Training act." The object of this clause is to give farther efficiency to the Training act, which is admirable, as giving to the crown the positive command of a large body of men in case of emergency, but which in its actual progress amounts to a muster of men.—I humbly conceive that it is no small recommendation of these Suggestions, that at the same time, that if adopted together, they would draw forth the physical powers of the population in a most efficient and in the least expensive manner, and mutually strengthen each other, they may be applied with advantage separate, without adopting the whole. The one, to which the greatest objections would be made, is that of enabling his majesty to accept annually so considerable a number of volunteers into the regular army. This is not the moment to discuss this most important subject, I shall not therefore intrude longer on the time of the house.

The Secretary at War

thought the present measure might have been assented to without entering upon the plan of last year; but as it had been brought forward so often, he would call the attention of the house to some facts relative to that plan, as they appeared by the papers on the table of the house. The object of that plan was to provide a great increase for the regular army, and if it had failed in that, there was an end to the argument against the present measure, as trenching upon it. The right hon. secretary then stated from the returns, that the numbers recruited in the first six mouths of 1806, were 9,933 men. These were the numbers enlisted, and allowances were certainly to be made for those above the military age, and under the size; but it was to be considered, that during 3 of these months the recruiting, under the Additional Force act, was cramped by its being understood that it was to be repealed, Boys he put out of the question on both sides. But if he allowed 900 men for the number rejected, he thought it would be fully sufficient. The numbers procured under the right hon. gent.'s system, in the first six months, were 9,091 men. This view of the case was certainly not very favourable to the plan, as it procured no more that the old system. It was also to be considered, that the right hon. gent.'s system had been in full operation during the six months adverted to. It was true that the last six months had been more productive than the preceding period, but that was accounted for by the additional number of recruiting parties appointed, and the threat of dissolving the second battalions, unless they procured a certain number of men by a given time. The casualties of the whole army were about 18,000 men, and this was all the plan provided for, without taking into account the number who would claim their discharge. The number of desertions, too, appeared to be equal among the recruits under his plan and the former system, though the last six months was rather in favour of the former.

Dr. Laurence

begged to call the attention of the house to the conduct of the present ministers, vho never rested their measures on their own merit, but always went to comparisons. When in opposition, they had perpetually called for his right hon, friend's plan before he had been two months in office, and yet, after a lapse of 4 months, they themselves had come forward with this magnificent measure! They had taken care, too, to bring it forward at this late period of the session, and had reserved the most obnoxious clause—that of granting an option to enlist for a term of years, or for life, which destroyed in a great measure the effects of the plan of his right hon. friend, till the committee, that there might be no opportunity to consider it on the second reading, which was the time for debating it. The consequence was that many had gone out of town with a wrong impression of the nature of this measure. He then entered upon a defence of his right hon. friend's system. It was intended to supply the whole casualties of the army, in which the former system was grossly deficient. But this was not all the effect of the plan; it would have a much greater, in his opinion, whatever the noble lord opposite might think and say of it. It was natural for the noble lord to smile at a philosophic measure, as he tauntingly called it, who had never conceived any grand scheme in his life—who never could generalize—who from two figures before him could scarcely draw a legitimate conclusion—who could do nothing but go on in the common routine way, and endeavour to impose himself on the multitude as a great statesman, but who had only this in common with his colleagues, that he was as great a statesman as he could be. The right hon. secretary had made allowances for the former method of recruiting, but none for that of his right hon. friend. He forgot the diminished bounties, and was for putting the boys out of the question, because he knew that, in this view, the advantage would have appeared greatly on the side of his right hon. friend's plan. He then talked of his right hon. friend's forgetting his measure. The right hon. secretary well knew there were offices which that plan had to go through—offices to which one set of ministers might be more agreeable than another. At all events the dispatch did not entirely depend on his right hon. friend. But this was the way of ministers, they always set up a vague and indefinite cry. Sometimes the church was in danger, sometimes one mode of recruiting was good, sometimes another. But his right hon. friend long ago had felt the unfitness of temporary expedients for permanent evils. Even in the school of the great founder of expedients (Mr. Pitt), he had not entirely approved of these, but had only acquiesced in giving them a trial. Ministers talked of emergency, but there was no end of their emergencies, and in stead of having a permanent system to meet real emergencies; they were always calling out emergencies, and resorting to expedients to meet them. But these expedients could not always answer, and they were attended with this mischief, that they exhausted the country, and by that means destroyed the materials on which a permanent measure would have to work.

Mr. Wilberforce

supported the bill. It was highly necessary to increase the force of the country, for now that Buonaparte had been so successful on the continent, he would be induced to attempt achievements to which even his bold spirit had not hitherto prompted him.

Mr. Windham

said, his hon. and learned friend (Dr. Laurence) had been mistaken and mis-stated as well as himself, and both had been charged with uttering opinions that the country was in no danger. They had never said so; but had only contended that ministers had not shewn an emergency which required that this particular measure should be resorted to. The first question on this head was, what was the nature of the emergency, and, the next, if the measure now proposed was calculated to meet that emergency? He denied that it was. It was nothing more than a temporary remedy to guard against a permanent mischief. They ought to look forward, and provide permanent remedies to meet and counteract permanent evils. If they went on in this manner, living from hand to mouth, providing only for the present, and taking no thought for the future, they would come at last to a state in which the present could no longer be provided for. They might safely neglect the future as long as it was future, but they should recollect, that what was future would in time become present. His own measure was on the contrary calculated to provide a permanent force, to meet a danger which was equally permanent, and to operate at all times the defence of the country. Those temporary expedients only placed the country in the situation of a person who was supported by drams and cordials, which, however they might give an apparent increase of animal spirits, must in the end destroy his health, constitution, and life. This measure professed to make an addition in the course of 12 months, and to provide a force of 40,000 men, and immediately to obtain 28,000 men by a transfer from the militia to the army; but this was a fallacious way of reckoning, for in respect to the transfer if one service gained, the other lost so many, and when they reckoned on those they would gain by the ballot, they would take into the account those they would lose by recruiting, which this measure would cut up entirely. He concluded by desiring to impress upon the recollection of the house, the debate of this night, and the project now to be substituted upon mere speculation, in place of another which had been found effective, was not allowed time for fair experiment; but which had, in the last 3 months, produced at the rate of 24,000 men per annum, and must in every moral certainty improve, nay, perhaps, double its operation in another year, while the present measure would operate effectively in the first instance, but exhaust the sources of future strength. The house would find, when next called on for the annual supply of the public force, that this measure would fail, and destroy, in one way, the strength it produced in another.

Lord Castlereagh

replied in support of his bill, which he said would in six months add a force to the army of the country, which the right hon. gent.'s plan would not have added in six years; for it was only calculated to feed the ordinary deficiencies by casualty, to keep its strength just where it stood. Besides, at the end of seven years by that plan, 53,000 men would be entitled to their discharge, which, added to the ordinary deficiences for the year, would create such a chasm in the public force, as the right hon. gent. would find impossible to recruit in a year: and as to the Training act, it was impossible to bring it in operation before the commencement of next session.—The report was then taken into further consideration, and upon the clause substituting the option of unlimited for limited service, a division took place; when there appeared,. For the clause 96; against it 46.