Mr. Canning rose , and said:—I cannot reconcile it, sir, to my sense of duty as a member of parliament, to suffer a question of such magnitude to be hurried to a decision in this extraordinary manner. Instead of that precipitancy which now appears to be intended, we surely ought to proceed with more than usual caution in a case which involves so important an innovation in one of the most important establishments of the country. Ministers must either have a most extraordinary confidence in themselves, or expect an unlimited confidence from others, if they imagine that the house can be prevailed upon to concur in a measure of such magnitude, and to sanction changes so hazardous with no better reasons than they have yet assigned, and no more satisfactory explanation than they have yet condescended to give to the objections which have been stated. I cannot but consider the manner in which this subject has been brought forward, as being, almost as great an innovation in the constitutional practice of parliament, as the measure itself is in the system of our army. This, I believe, is the first instance in our parliamentary history, in which it has been attempted to introduce a fundamental change in an established system, merely by a clause introduced in a committee upon a bill, and that bill one which must of necessity be passed within a limited time, at the hazard of leaving us without an army. The mutiny bill has already been renewed three tunes in the course of the present year: the last which we passed will expire on a given day; and we are plainly told, that we must abridge our deliberations on this bill which is now before us, in order that it may receive the sanction of the legislature, before that which it is to replace expires. I desire the house to consider, whether this was a fair and fit situation in which to place us, for the discussion of a question requiring so much caution and deliberation. I have always understood it to be the practice of this house, when any matter of great importance, and especially any matter that goes to affect the fundamental establishments of the country, was to be submitted to its consideration, to multiply the stages of discussion, by originating the subject of the bill in a previous committee of the whole house. In that committee, it may be matter of debate, whether any measure upon the subject shall be received for discussion; and after that question has been deliberated and affirmed, then remain all the ordinary stages in which the bill itself is liable to discussion. But I am confident that this is the first instance in which the opportunities of deliberation have been diminished in proportion to the novelty, magnitude, and doubtful policy of the measure; in which a project for effecting a complete revolution in one part of our national defence has been proposed to be passed into a law through fewer stages of deliberation than a turnpike bill. I beg pardon the first it is not; my right hon. friend (Mr. Yorke) has already referred to the solitary and disgraceful precedent of the last year of queen Anne, when a clause of similar purport was introduced into the mutiny bill, apparently without the notice or knowledge of the parliament of that time. But with this exception, the right hon. gent. will not easily find any thing in history to countenance his practice; and I am sure he will not find any thing to justify it. The right hon. gent. has reduced parliament to the dilemma either of foregoing the due exercise of its deliberative functions on a measure so momentous in its consequences, or of suffering the army to disband, while we are considering on the best mode of maintaining it. And if this observation applies to this house, where we have the bill now before us, and where, I trust, we shall persist in keeping it as long as we continue to entertain doubts of its policy, how much more forcibly does it apply to the House of Lords, where, in exact proportion to the difficulties which are felt here, and the time which is taken to remove them, the, means and opportunities of that discussion which the lords are equally entitled to give to every subject of national interest, must necessarily be abridged and taken away! How much more forcibly does it apply to the third power of the constitution, to the crown; to whom it is probable that this bill, changing the whole tenure by which the army of the crown is held, must be presented for that approbation which is to pass it into a law, within a period so near to the expiration of the present mutiny bill, that the king can hardly have a moment to pause, much less to exercise his judgment and discretion! I admit that this last objection would not generally apply to a measure introduced into the house by the king's ministers, because the introduction by them would generally imply the approbation and recommendation of the crown:—that this is not the case in the present instance, we have but too much reason to apprehend—I should rather say perhaps we have great reason to hope; because I should trust that there might be a chance of some interposition on the part of the crown, if not in the legislative enactments, at least in the practical execution of this measure, such as might remedy, in some degree, the consequences, if it could not entirely prevent the first effect of the rashness and precipitancy of ministers;—I say I should hope this, if it were not that the clause which we are discussing, is so framed (and I must say I think must improperly so framed) as to take away all discretion from the crown hereafter, in the executive regulation, no less than in the legislative provision; to curtail and abridge the royal prerogative, in that particular in which it has been the practice (and I think the wisdom) of all states to leave the executive government in possession of the fullest control, namely the discipline and internal economy of the regular army. I am not now arguing the expediency or inexpediency of the limitation of service; I am not talking of the merits or demerits of the project I shall come to that by-and-by: but I am at the outset protesting against the course which ministers have followed, which is such, that even if the measure itself were in my judgment unexceptionable, I should still object to the mode of its introduction. If limited service be ever so desirable an experiment, still why incorporate it in the mutiny act? Why make it the subject of legislative enactment at all? Why not pass the mutiny act according to its usual form, for the purpose of giving to parliament the constitutional control over the crown and its army? (which the mutiny act alone enables the crown to raise and maintain), which it alone enables the crown to pay; and under that controul, why may not the mode of raising and maintaining the army be safely left, as it has always hitherto been, to the executive government? If there be one political truth more undeniable than another, it is this, that no good has ever arisen from the interference of public assemblies with the military force of the state. Any attempt on the part of such assemblies to become popular with the army, is sure to lead to difficulty, and in the end, not seldom to confusion. The plain proof of this is what we know to be historically true, and what we feel at this moment in our own instance, that every such act of interference must be accompanied with a donative or largess, as a sort of compensation for our intrusion; we have at this moment an estimate on the table, of an additional charge of 300,000l. annual expenditure—the first fruits, and, we may depend upon it, the very least part of what 'we may expect from restless and meddling spirit of regulation; and this price we pay for liberty to confer what is represented as a benefit to the army—the change of the term of service. How, if some years hence, when this device shall have failed, and it shall become necessary to repeal it, how shall we find funds sufficient to accompany and alone for such an alteration? I think, sir, we have seen symptoms that this truth is felt, and that its consequences extend beyond the army even, to the other services of the country. I grudge .nothing that is given in bounty or in kindness; but I think the recommendation to such acts is best and most safely lodged with the crown; and I am not willing to purchase, at an unnecessary expence, a right of interference which I think dangerous in its exercise. The right hon. secretary (Mr. Windham) has contended, that in new-modelling the army according to his plan, parliament, will be doing no more than it has been accustomed to do at all times, but especially since the beginning of the present war. What, he asks, has been the business and occupation of the administration which preceded the present, but to frame measure after measure, and to propound law after law, for the augmentation and regulation of the military force of the country?—Undoubtedly for the augmentation and regulation of that part of the military force, which is more immediately of the cognizance of parliament; which cannot otherwise be raised than by parliamentary measures; which is obtained from the country by different modifications of a compulsory process, none of which the crown could possibly be enabled to originate or to apply, without the specific authority and detailed regulation of parliament. The militia, the army of reserve, the additional force, are all of this description; constituting the defensive and limited force of the country, and that which may fairly be called the parliamentary army, in contradistinction to that regular army of the crown, which the crown has at all times raised for itself, subject to the controul of the annual mutiny bill. All these measures therefore which the right hon. gent. cites as precedents, are in fact directly in contrast with that which he now recommends. They were in fact enabling statutes in aid of the prerogative of the crown; to give to the king a power of doing that which was necessary for the safety of the state, but which he could not do without the direct assistance of parliament. This is, to limit or take from him a power which he already has, and to subject him to restrictions and disabilities, at once encroaching on the prerogative, and prejudicing the service of the country. The right hon. gent. opposite appears to doubt the truth of this construction. I ask, in what possible way any statute can operate upon the prerogative of the crown, except in one of these three;—either as giving some power, which the crown had not before; or as explaining and confirming some doubtful or obsolete prerogative (as was the case in the bill for calling out the levy-en-masse), at the same time prescribing the mode of its exercise; or, thirdly, as directly limiting, restraining, or abolishing some power, which the crown had hitherto been in the habit of exercising without dispute? In which of these three ways does the present measure operate? Does it give to the King, as a new power, the right of raising men for limited service, or has not the crown always had and often exercised that right of limitation? Does it revive or explain any prerogative of doubtful construction? Does it even leave the power and prerogatives of the crown as it finds them? Has not the crown at present, and has it not always had, in addition to the power of limiting the service, that of enlisting men for an indefinite time, subject to discharge at its own pleasure? and will not the clause now under consideration, if sanctioned by the legislature, take that power completely away? And for what object, and from what necessity is this alteration of the constitution projected? Cannot the experiment be tried as well by that authority which has always hitherto exclusively regulated the terms of enlistment and the internal economy of the army; leaving with that authority the discretion of trying it at such times, and to such extent as may be most favourable to the experiment; (leaving the discretion also of suspending that trial, if its result should be found less beneficial than is expected):—cannot, I say, this experiment be made in this way, wish as much advantage, and with much less danger, than by pledging the whole legislature, not only to try it, but to abide the issue of that trial, without any alternative, and without the possibility of retreat? Does not the right hon. gent. feel, that a regulation by the crown would be equally effectual; while, if necessary, it could be recalled, without inconvenience? Does he not feel that a partial experiment in the first instance, will be amply sufficient to ascertain the merits of his plan; while, if unsuccessful, it might be abandoned or suspended, without difficulty? Does he not feel, that by making this great change, the work of the whole legislature, and the rule of the whole service, while he adds nothing to the facilities of experiment, he enhances incalculably the dangers of failure? And if this be the case, I do not ask what necessity, but what pretence, what decent apology can the king's ministers offer, for laying the foundation of their plan for remodelling the army, by dismembering the ancient prerogatives of the crown? These, sir, are the grounds on which I should object to the mode in which the measure is brought under our discussion, even if from the measure itself I entertained sanguine expectations of good, instead of anticipating, as I confess I do, abundant evils and dangers. I object to establishing that as a system, which is confessedly to be tried as an experiment: I object to limiting the king's prerogative, for the undesirable purpose of putting the management of the recruiting and the detailed economy of the army into the hands of parliament: I object to this, even if the experiment is to succeed and the system to become permanent: but if there be the remotest chance of failure, and of a necessity for recurring to the old system again, I object doubly to a pledge on the part of parliament which must embarrass, beyond all calculation, the difficulty of a retreat. But the right hon. gent. and his friends are confident that the experiment cannot fail. One of his friends, indeed, the hon. colonel (colonel Craufurd) is much more sanguine than the right hon. gent. himself, and rebukes the right hon. gent. for having admitted that no immediate good was to be expected. The hon. colonel is of a very different opinion; and, with an estimate upon the table, of 330,000l. annual expence, to be added at one stroke, immediately,—with the admission of the right hon. author of the project, that he looks for no immediate advantage,—the hon. colonel has the boldness to contend that the advantages are immediate, and the inconveniences and burthens, if any, contingent and remote. I can hardly presume to decide between such great authorities, especially when I find them differing upon. a point which they might be supposed to have settled in the course of their daily official communica- tion. But I confess I am inclined in this, though perhaps in no other single instance, to adopt the opinion of the right hon. gent. (Mr. Windham), and to give him credit for the remoteness and precariousness of any possible advantage from his plan; while the paper on your table, containing as it does but one item of the expense to be incurred, is of itself a sufficient proof that some part of the burthen at least is to be felt immediately. The right hon. gent. very ingenuously told us, that he wished he had looked a little more narrowly into the calculations of expence: I wish he had—perhaps it was in some degree his duty to do so; and he would at least have been enabled to make good his argument against his hon. friend (colonel Craufurd) and to correct his inaccuracy in one instance, as he disclaims his sanguineness in another. But as to the powerful effects and inducements which belong to the limitation of the term of service, there is no difference of opinion between the right hon. gent. and his friend. It is to fill the ranks of the army, and to fill them with a better description of people. To this we presume to answer, that if limitation of service be so alluring, we have already tried the force of that allurement, by limiting not the term only, but the space; by inviting men to serve not for a few years only, but for those few years at home: the trial has been not wholly without success; far from it;—but it has not had such striking and splendid success, as (compared with the general term of enlistment) to prove, that the limitations are so all-powerful as the hon. gentlemen represented them; and above it has not, according to the hon. gentlemen themselves, produced a materially better description of men to the service. "Oh!—but," say the hon. gentlemen, "that is because you limited too much. The men that we want to get at, are those who wish to serve for a short time, but to serve abroad. You have no receptacle for men of that sort."—Well, then, let us have one; with all my heart—but do not let us make up our minds to have no other sort: for, assuredly, however possible it may be that a reasonable proportion of such men may be found, it is a little too much to expect, that with an army to such an extent as we have at present, with an auxiliary force for home defence, in great part consisting of volunteers, (not one man of either of which establishments has required the inducement of this peculiar species of limitation),—it is, I think, a little too much to expect us to agree, that no other than this limitation can possibly be effectual. But I suppose it is amongst this bettermost description of men only, that the peculiar taste prevails. It is amongst them that we are to look for the persons who, according to the right hon. gentlemen, like very little service, but choose to have that service foreign; like the, man who, describing the sort of weather that best pleased him, declared that be would have "but little wind, but that little high." These are the persons whom the right hon. gent. describes as likely to enter into the army for the sake of seeing the world; who, leaving their village Desdemonas at home, would embark for the West Indies, for the purpose of returning like so many Othellos, with a collection of stories to woo them with upon their return. Unquestionably this theory, is a most delightful one; but I still have my doubts as to the extent, at least, of its possible operation. I cannot help thinking that that class of society, from which the ranks of our army have hitherto been chiefly supplied, must, even after the refinements of the right hon. gent., and all the lectures of the hon. colonel, on the necessary and practical operation of those refinements, still continue to be the only very efficient source of the supply. Upon this class—I mean the lowest and labouring class of the community, the peasant and the inferior artisan, I suppose it is not contended that these fancies will work very powerfully: and as to mounting higher, in order that you may obtain a more numerous recruitment, it seems to me that that notion proceeds upon a false estimate of the relative proportions of the different classes of society. Society has often been compared to a pyramid; but I never yet heard that the point was nearest the earth, and the broadest surface at the top. If that were the true view of it, the hon. colonel would be right, and the higher you mounted, the larger superficies you would have to act upon; but if the lowest class be, as it is, infinitely the most extensive, I do not see that much would be gained by looking in preference to a higher level for your supply. I really believe, sir, after all, that even when this system is in its fullest operation, the hon. colonel must still be content to draw his recruits from the plough, and from the fair, rather than from St. James's Street and the Royal Exchange. But if, after all, we are wrong in this supposition; if there be such a race as the right hon. colonel supposes, of such peculiar and characteristic disposition; of such small, and at the same time delicate stomachs for military service; whom none of the modes of service hitherto invented, have been able to satisfy; I am far from, contending, that this variety of the military species may not be worth comprehending in any general plan of military establishment. By all means, let us have all that we can get; but do not let us, in attempting to catch this rare and non-descript creature, weave the meshes of our laws too close to answer any more useful or general purpose. But by all means let there be a class of this sort of service; let there be certain regiments raised with this particular term of enlistment; let the second battalions, as has been more than once suggested by the hon. genral (sir J. Pulteney), be appropriate to it. For this, no act of parliament is necessary, no new .power need be given. The crown may raise regiments, or appoint battalions for this purpose; and wherever these singular individual; are to be found, wherever the right hon. gent. or the hon. colonel has heard of them, in whatever part of the country they are latitating and circumcursitating, there the king's recruiting writ may run and secure them, if they are to be had, for his majesty's service. But where is the necessity of sacrificing every other chance to try this one, which may as well be tried without it? The right hon. gent. meets this question with an argument the most singular and the most hardy that can well be conceived. He admits that the trial of this principle has been made; and he admits, or rather contends, that its success has not been all that could be desired: "but," says he, "this failure has proceeded from its having been tried partially: make it the general rule of your service; recruit solely on this principle; leave nothing in competition with it; rely upon it alone, and be assured it will not fail you." Why, sir, this might be very well, if the interests hazarded upon the issue of the experiment, were any thing less than the safety and existence of the empire; and I could understand the argument, if its application were to circumstances directly the reverse to those which are now under our consideration. If the principle of our service had hitherto been the limitation of the term; if the innovation now proposed were to enlist for a term indefinite; if this new method had been tried partially, and had not answered, I could perfectly understand any advocate for indefinite service, who should say: "No wonder this experiment has not yet succeeded; it has not had fair play: and so long as the limited service is suffered to bid in competition with it, its complete success cannot reasonably be expected."—But it certainly is not an equally obvious truth, that the existence of the indefinite service affords a competition which must be fatal to the trial of the experiment of the limited term. I therefore cannot conceive a more unreasonable demand than that of the right hon. gent., that we should consent to abolish a mode of enlistment, which, if not so alluring in theory, has been found effectual in practice, in order to try, with better chance of success, (for which we have nothing but his word,) an experiment which, having failed when we risked but little upon it, he contends we ought now to risk every thing upon it, and try it again. Such being the only temptation which we have, according to the right hon. gent.'s acknowledgment, from the experience of our own country; we have naturally been desired to look abroad for the encouragement which was not to he found at home. Here, I think, however, the assertions of, the hon. gentlemen have been somewhat, mitigated, and their tone, of confidence somewhat lowered since the last discussion upon this subject. We no longer hear the general and sweeping declarations that all the great military powers have uniformly acted upon the system which the right hon. gent. recommends; that we have stood alone among nations, and that it becomes us as soon as possible to conform to the general example. Ancient France is, I think, tonight, the solitary instance upon which the hon. gentlemen rely, to which indeed is added the example of Switzerland, with respect to the troops which she has been in the habit of hiring out to foreign powers. As to the Swiss, it requires, I think, but very few words to shew that the mode of raising troops (however brave and valuable those troops may be), to be employed in the service of other powers, cannot fairly be cited as a precedent for an army upon, which the defence of their native country is to depend. It is perfectly manifest that it might be utterly impossible to induce men to quit their country for life, especially men amongst whom the love of their country exists in so strong a degree; and as to the foreign power in whose pay they served, it is equally manifest that the acceptance of their service for a limited term, proves no predilection or partiality on the part of that power for such a species of service, inasmuch as the troops were to be had on no other. The example of ancient France has been as confidently relied upon by the right hon. gent. (Mr. Windham) as before; but the remarks of the hon. general behind me (sir James Pulteney) have, I think, not a little diminished the force of the argument; and the illustrations of the hon. colonel (Craufurd), who intended, I suppose, to sustain the proposition of his right hon. friend, have done what little was left undone by the hon. general, to demolish it. It is allowed on all hands that faith must be kept with the soldier; that whatever period you fix for the termination of his engagement, at that period when it arrives, under whatever circumstances, under the pressure of whatever necessity, the soldier must have his discharge if he claims it. It follows that no example can fairly be stated in favour of this plan, which does not chew not only that such engagements were made, but that they were kept sacred and inviolable; and one instance, even one solitary instance, of the violation of such an engagement on the part of any government which is held out to us as an object of imitation, ought, in my opinion, to operate not as a light to guide us, but as a beacon to alarm and warn us of our danger. How then stands the example of ancient France? It was stated on a former night by the hon. general, and then sturdily denied, that the engagement of the French government with their soldiery had been violated at the beginning of the American war; that by an ordinance then published, the right of claiming discharges was suspended. Tonight this fact has been admitted; but the admission was accompanied by the right hon. gent. with a whimsical sort of triumph, because forsooth there was but this one instance to be found of such a violation of faith, and because this was a formal ordinance; as if the formality with which faith was broken in this instance, was a sort of proof how sacredly it had been kept before. But the hon. colonel has not been contented that the matter should rest there, and in order to satisfy us how unwillingly the government of France ever consented to the violation of its engagements, he has quoted the indignant expressions of Marshal Saxe against officers who did not keep their engagements with the soldiery. Marshal Saxe's indignation, virtuous as it was, pro- bably was not without cause. So here is another instance of the same breach of faith; or rather, in all fair reasoning, a complete proof that, even in Marshal Saxe's time, it had grown upon into a practice. What then is the true result of this single example of ancient France? why, surely, that if in that extensive and populous country, a country at all times capable of affording a great proportion of its population to the profession of arms, the government has nevertheless found it impossible to keep its word with the soldiery, it is wild and hazardous in the extremest degree to act upon the supposition, that in a country comparatively, limited in population, and that population called upon as it is to supply such an extent of manufactories, such a prodigious commercial marine, and a .navy which absorbs alone such numbers as bear no small proportion to the armies of the continent, it would be possible in all instances to keep faith with the soldier, if unfortunately this clause should pass into a law. That if we foresee the smallest probability of being driven by any necessity to a violation of our engagement, we ought not to enter into it: that we ought not to run after the example of France in her policy, at the risk of being obliged to imitate her bad faith, is surely not necessary to be argued in a. British house of commons. Having succeeded no better in his history from abroad than in precedent at home, the right hon. gent. has betaken himself, as usual, to analogy, and derives his analogies, as usual, from objects which at least amuse, if they do not enlighten. He admits in some degree the hazard of diminution to the army in the first instance, by keeping faith with the soldier; but this diminution is to be repaid with interest. He is not surprised that a colonel of a regiment, or the captain of a fine company of grenadiers should feel loth to part with any number of his men at the expiration of a limited period. Just so, says the right hon. gent., it goes to one's heart to thin a fine grove of young and growing trees, till we reflect that, by taking some away, the remainder will grow finer and taller. The right hon. gent. hardly needs be informed that this simile is not perfectly accurate, unless he means that the remaining grenadiers are to increase in height and corpulence in proportion as their comrades are removed. Still more unfortunate is the right hon. gent. in the field of turnips into which he has wandered, though led there by an apparently happy ambiguity of words, which might have misled a less ingenious speculator. Does not the drill husbandman hoe his turnips, says the right hon. gent.; and what should prevent the drill serjeant in like manner from hoeing his battalion? The remaining turnips thrive and swell—but here again unluckily is the same mistake of size for number; and I cannot help fearing, that the right hon. gent.'s system of husbandry will turn out nearly as unprofitable as that of the theorist, of whom the story is told in La Fontaine, who contrived to have nothing but the leaves of his turnips to carry to market. I very much fear that the right hon. gent., when, at the eve of any war, or in the middle of any campaign, he is fulfilling his engagements with the soldiers whose services are. expired, will find that he is depriving his battalions of all that forms their substance, their solidity, and their strength, and that what he suffers to remain will be comparatively but the leaves of the turnips. To this apprehension, however, the right hon. gent. opposes the confident persuasion that the men will not claim their discharge when due. The hon. colonel, to be sure, rather differs from his leader in this, as in other respects, and thinks. that they will; but he thinks, that being discharged, they will do a good almost more than equivalent to their military service, by instigating others to take the places which they have quitted, and that their precept will countervail their example. It would really be a great advantage to us in these debates, if the right. hon. gent. and his friend would argue a little more precisely as to their own objects, and would agree upon the expectation which they would wish us to entertain; especially when they are so eager in rejecting the imputation of theory, and desire to be considered as reckoning upon nothing which has not experience and example in its favour. But I am willing to take the hon. colonel's view of the subject as that which their own examples go nearest to establish. The Swiss, I presume, did return home at the expiration of their service; and that the prevailing habit in France was to claim the discharge which became, due, is fairly to be inferred; as well from the ordinance of 1788, as from what the hon. colonel has informed us of Marsha

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Saxe's opinions many years before. What do we learn from the hon. colonel to have been Marshal Saxe's opinion upon this subject? He prescribes that faith shall be inviolably and invariably kept with the soldier, that the discharge when due shall be given to every man that claims it; and does he then reckon upon their not claiming it? No such thing; on the contrary, he follows up this recommendation with a proposition, which shews at once his persuasion that the discharges, will be claimed, and his sense of the difficulty which will arise from granting them in time of war. And what is that proposition? The hon. colonel tells us that he suggests something very like the present system of conscription in France. This I confess, sir, is the very thing which I have all along apprehended as the ultimate and-most undesirable end of the right hon. gent.'s refinements and theories. The right hon. gent. is offended by the word theories as applied to his system. He will permit me at least to class them with the meditations of Marshal Saxe: and, as the Marshal was not ashamed to characterize them by the name of reveries,.I shall, unless I am positively, prohibited, take the liberty of applying the same term to the speculations of the right hon. gent. If that may not be, let us contrast, the whimsical, fanciful, visionary reveries of this same speculative marshal, with. the solid practical judgment and profound military knowledge of the right hon. gent. Marshal. Saxe did not reckon upon the re-enlistment; the right hon. gent. does:—but I think the right hon. gent. must at least agree with Marshal Saxe, that if the re-enlistments do not. take place, and if, good faith is kept as to the discharge, and if the mere prospect of that discharge has not been found sufficient here, as it was not found sufficient in France, to keep up the army by voluntary enlistment to the establishment requisite for war; the right hon. gent., I say, must see, as Marshal Saxe did, that some other means then must be resorted to; and in the state of things which the right hon. gent.'s system will have produced, after it has been a few years in full operation, I should be, glad to know what expedient for that purpose the right hon. gent. himself has in view. short of conscription. The right hon. gent. has told us very truly, that there are but three ways by which a military force can be raised; either by voluntary enrolment, or by compulsory; or by a mixture of the two. The compulsory enrolment he deprecates; cuncta prius tentanda; he would resort to it only in the last extremity; but my complaint against the right hon. gent.'s system is, that it tends directly and inevitably to bring this extremity upon us. It is against all experience that voluntary enrolment alone should suffice for all the military purposes of a great nation; there is no instance in the world in which it has been found sufficient. Recognizing this truth, we have in this country had recourse to a mixture of compulsory service; we have applied compulsion in its most mitigated form, and to borne service only; for foreign service we have recruited by voluntary enlistment, but finding the difficulty of filling our ranks by those means, we have not hitherto thought it wise to increase that difficulty by multiplying threefold the opportunities of quitting the service. This the right hon. gent. now proposes to do. He proposes, in addition, to discourage, more or less,—in some instances he has suspended, and in some he has abandoned, the modes of compulsory enlistment. I ask him, if his theory should fail, what refuge has he left him but conscription? I say that his attempt to square every thing to a theory will lead to the necessity, at some time or other, of employing rude force; that his delicate and fastidious refinements will be the parent of a severe and undiscriminating necessity. It will be too late to retread our steps when the hour of that necessity arrives. In God's name, let us not precipitate it; at least, let us not be persuaded to do so, by such arguments as we have heard this night! What argument in fact have we heard upon this subject, to solve the obvious difficulties which are in every body's mind, but more especially that difficulty which of itself is conclusive against the adoption of the right hon. gent.'s system, as a general system, and which I have reserved to this period of what I had to say, as that which distinguishes the case of this country from that of any other; and as that to which, unsatisfactory as the answers from the other side of the house have been upon every other point, they are so peculiarly and singularly unsatisfactory, as to provoke not remark only, but indignation! The house will readily apprehend that I allude to the colonial service. It is plain, that if the example of all other countries, if the example of France, were as distinctly encouraging as they have been shewn to be the reverse, till the extensive colonial possessions of this country, and the great proportion of our army which it is necessary to employ in their defence, would alone be sufficient to discourage the adoption of the system by this country. I will not take up the time of the house by pointing out the obvious difficulties and dangers arising from this system to the defence of our colonies;—but mark the answer, and the only answer which has been attempted to be given to them!—The right hon. gent. expressed a hope, in which the hon. colonel faithfully followed, that the danger might not be quite so great as it appeared; and that before it actually occurred, means might be found to remedy it: and this is all!—After so many years debate, after so many months of official deliberation, the right hon. gent., in bringing forward a plan for the complete alteration of the established military system of the country, is no otherwise prepared to meet the objection which every man in this house, and out of this house; which every man who has either written, or spoken, or conversed, or thought upon the subject, has had uppermost in his mind, than by a vague and distant hope, that at some time or other, somebody or other may, in some way or other, discover something or other, which shall, some how or other, remedy someone or other, of the manifold inconveniences and dangers which we all concur in apprehending!—As to the right hon. gent. himself, he washes his hands of it: it is not to him that we are to look for the solution of the difficulty; and with this explanation parliament is to be satisfied! Sir, to such a plan as this, introduced in such a manner, supported by such arguments, fraught with such difficulties and dangers; a plan unnecessarily invading the prerogative of the crown, and unadvisedly committing the faith and discretion of parliament,—I cannot but give my most decided and unqualified opposition. I do not thereby mean to pronounce any opinion against the expediency of trying the experiment of limited service.—The crown has already the power to try it. Let the right hon. gent.—let the king's ministers exercise their constitutional right to advise the crown to make the trial, if they shall think fit: but let them not insist upon making parliament a party to their experiment. No practical advantage is gained by our interference; and by abstaining from interposing, we shall at least avoid many practical disadvantages which may result from it.

Mr. Secretary Fox

rose, in reply to the right hon. gent. He said, that before he entered into any discussion of the principles of the bill, he must first answer some interlocutory objections that had been made. As to the complaint of its being hurried forward with such precipitation, just as the mutiny bill was going to expire, he must remind that right hon. gent. (Mr. Canning) and his friends, that, a few days ago, they had contended that the discussion should be delayed two days longer, as they had wished the discussion not to come on before Monday next. If he and his friends persisted in fixing it for the present night, and not putting it off, it was merely that parliament should have as much time for the discussion as could be given before the expiration of the Mutiny bill. If they had fixed it for Monday, the complaint would have been, why did not you bring it in sooner; why did not you give us more time to discuss it? This was a tolerable sample of the general style of the right hon. gentleman's arguments. If the measure had been introduced in the Mutiny bill, it was because such was the constant usage of parliament. The right hon. gent. next found fault with popular assemblies, and parliament's meddling, with the army of the crown. Where was it that he made that objection? In a house where the Mutiny bill is annually, passed, for the avowed purpose of subjecting the army of the country, in some measure, to parliamentary controul. "But," said the right hon, gent., "we spent our time much better when we were in administration; we never interfered with the army of the crown; but we provided a constitutional and a parliamentary army to be a balance to it, and at the same time to assist it with recruits." For his part, he must say, he never heard of a parliamentary army before, except in the year 1641; and as for the distinction which had been made, of royal army and parliamentary army, it was what no writer, no speaker, nor no man at all acquainted with the principles of the constitution, had ever taken notice of. Every army in this country was royal, and every army was also parliamentary. The right hon. gent. seemed to consider the disposable force as the king's army, and every other description of force as a sort of balance to it. The militia, indeed, from its composition, and the description of its officers, might be, in some degree, considered in that light; but as to the additional force raised by the parish bill, nothing could be more ridiculous than to call them a parliamentary force, which was to be a balance to any other, as they were offered by persons appointed by the crown, and taken from the king's army. An hon. general (sir J. Pulteney) had, on a former night, roundly asserted, that no other nation in Europe had ever adopted the limited service recommended; but that night he was pleased to retract something from his assertion, and only said, that the general practice of the European nations, was against it. The hon. general had not stated the case fairly, when he represented, that, if old France adopted the system, her armies were the worse for it, and that in the 7 years war they had been every where defeated. The hon. general should not have confined himself to the 7 years war, but should have also taken the war preceding it. In that war he would have found, that though the French lost the battle of Dettingen, they won that of Fontenoy, and were, in the whole of the war, most conspicuously successful. Even in the 7 years war, the conduct of the French armies was by no means treated with that levity in the writings of the king of Prussia, that it had been by the hon. general. As the ordonnance subsisted from 1710 to 1787, it was not fair merely to take 7 years of that period as a criterion, when for 77 years they had acquired and supported a high military reputation. The argument which his right hon. friend (Mr. Windham) had drawn from the Swiss, was, in his opinion, a very strong one, and completely unanswered. If it were said, that the moral excellence of the soldier's character was destroyed by the thoughts of leaving the service and returning to his home, he should ask, do not the Swiss also feel a strong desire of returning to their native country, and have not the Swiss been at the same time good soldiers? Has not even the circumstance of their joyful return to their homes and families, been made a means of encouragement to others to inlist? When the young men of the country saw the soldier return to his borne with more reputation, more happiness, more of every thing that could give satisfaction to mankind, they wished to embark in the same career. As for the measure proposed being a novel theory, he should only say, that it had been urged in that house 25 years ago, and it was no less than 16 years since his right hon. friend had stated the advantages which might be expected from changing the term of service. In the system proposed, he thought great advantages would be derived, both from the soldiers who stayed after their term was expired, and from those who left the service. Every one who left the service would show to his townsmen, or neighbours, the liberty that was granted to soldiers to return to their homes, and this, he thought, would immediately have a strong effect in recruiting the army. It was strange, that those who had so often argued that there was something in real service, and in the regular army, which attracted persons who inlisted for home service, should, upon the present occasion, contend that it had no such attraction, and that every one must prefer the home service. It was no wild speculation or theory, to calculate upon the common sense and common feelings of mankind. There was no doubt but, that any body who had a horse to dispose of, would rather sell him for twenty guineas than for ten; and there could be no doubt, but that the military profession must be rendered more attractive by being made more eligible. A right hon. gent. (Mr. Yorke) had asked, was it necessary to extend our military system? Had we not an army which, both in discipline and in numbers, was every thing that could be wished; which was fully efficient for every purpose? For his part, he could not allow that we did possess an army efficient for all the purposes of the country. It must be remembered, that in the unfortunate campaign on the continent, the country was placed in such a situation, as to witness the defeat of its allies, without a British soldier having an opportunity of striking a blow in their defence. If it be said, that the country had, at that time, an army fully efficient, what must be thought of those ministers who did not apply the means they were possessed of for the annoyance of the enemy, and the support of our allies? That most disastrous campaign was decided without a British arm being raised, or a musket fired, in defence of the continent of Europe. What would the great duke of Marlborough have said, if the ministers of that day had told him, "you are certainly the best general in Europe, and our army is very fine, and efficient to all the .purposes of the country; but we cannot give you any force, either to protect our rallies or to attack the enemy?" It has been often said, What occasion has this country for a great army, when its fleets ride triumphant in every sea? He felt considerable confidence in our navy, and shared in that pride which every Briton must feel at the brilliant victories our fleets had obtained over the enemy; but at the same time he must say, that by our naval superiority alone we should never be able to prevent France from extending her conquests over the continent of Europe. O! but, say others, we have plenty of money; we can afford to subsidize nations, and hire foreigners to fight our Cattles. In answer to that he must observe, that all history shewed that such are not the means by which greatness and national honour are to be defended. This country had, at many periods, made great and astonishing exertions. When William III. was at the head of the confederacy of Europe, this country acquired considerable renown. Again, in the reign of queen Anne, when the duke of Marlborough commanded our armies, although the native British troops that he commanded were a small portion in number to their German allies, yet they ranked high in military reputation, and contributed powerfully to the common cause. In the seven years' war, a few British regiments, under the command of prince Ferdinand, contributed essentially to the victory at Minden. It was this way the country acquired renown, "Sic itur ad astra." It was by the valour of her troops, and not merely by the power of subsidising foreigners, that, in the best times of her history, she had gained so high a character among the nations. These wars had been undertaken, in a great measure, to preserve the balance of power; and, however this idea might be ridiculed, our ancestors saw, what we have felt, that this balance of power could not be destroyed without the most serious evils resulting to Europe, and without our being exposed to the domineering influence of France. The situation in which the country was placed was this: it must either trust entirely to its navy, its commerce, and its ships, and patiently submit to see the power of France extending over every nation in Europe; or else, it must think, at some future period, of being able to afford some relief to nations that are oppressed, and of preserving its connection with the continent of Europe. If this was the determination of the house, it was evident, that the only means of accomplishing these things was, to improve our armies; but if the country should prefer what he considered the ignominious alternative (which he, for his part, would never consent to) of separating itself from the interests of other nations, and endeavouring to preserve an insulated greatness, he conceived that such a conduct would be still more dangerous, than it would be to follow a more generous policy, and one more befitting the character of the British nation. He should also have an objection to the alternative, even upon constitutional grounds. It was known, that the character of the House of Brunswick was to resist every attempt that might be made against the constitution of this country, and especially any attacks which might be made by France, or with French assistance. The character, however, of any other family which had reigned in this country had been very different. If, then, it could ever be supposed, at some remote period, that any sovereign of this country could act on the principles that sonic sovereigns had acted on, when there was a compromise between England and France, that one was to rule by sea, and the other by land, the assistance of France might be requested against the liberties of the subjects of this realm. Although he did not state this as a case very probable, yet he thought the bare possibility of it made it an object worth consideration. As to the navy, he bad such a high opinion both of the skill of its officers, and of the great reputation it had gained (a reputation which would do more than any thing else to preserve its superiority), that he felt confident that France and Spain could never equal it. He therefore differed much from some of his honourable friends on the subject of invasion. He by no means dreaded invasion. He thought we had, in the first place, a powerful security in the superiority of our navy; and, in the second place, in the spirit of the British nation, which, he was convinced, was abundantly sufficient to triumph, ultimately, over any army that could invade this country. When he was asked, then, why do you want a greater army? have we not soldiers enough to defend the country? he should answer, "we have enough, and more than enough." So far from thinking the number too few to defend the country, he would state most distinctly, that if he saw any prospect of recovering for Europe what had been lost in the late unfortunate campaign, he should have no objection to risk a part of the army we possess in the attempt. He thought, that we should think of acting offensively in the war, as far as our powers extended. Although the disposable force of this country bore but a small proportion to the French armies; yet, it did not follow, that we should not be able, at some future period, to give a powerful and effectual assistance to some of those nation which France, in her ambition for extending her power, may hereafter choose to attack. He was always an eager and ardent friend of peace, and he was still a friend of peace. He indeed wished for such a peace as could be made on tolerable terms; but then the character of the peace he wished for was, that it should preserve our connections with the continent of Europe, and not give up any thing which the point of honour forbade us to give up. If such a peace were made, he hoped the nation would not uselessly retain the passions of war in a time of peace. As to what regarded the point of honour, he considered it still, as he had often stated it, as a matter of the highest importance among nations, and one of the few legitimate grounds of war. In the consideration of the force that the country required at the present time, it would not be sufficient to talk of what it was in the time of king William and queen Anne, and say, that it is now double or treble what it was at that time. The question was, what was sufficient for the circumstances in which the country was now placed, and for the objects it had in view? If its objects were, us he conceived they ought to be, to be able to render, at some future day, important services to the continental nations, it was evident that our army ought to be increased; and he knew no better means of doing it, than by adopting the system which was proposed by his right hon. friend. The military measures which had been proposed in the course of the war, were merely temporary measures. When a great alarm of invasion had been spread, it was natural to call upon all hands to repel it. The object, at the present day, was not so much to repel invasion, as to recover for the country that military rank and influence which it had, till very recently, preserved in Europe. He was more sanguine in the immediate advantages of this measure, than was his right hon. friend, who introduced it, although, perhaps, not quite so sanguine as the hon. colonel (col. Craufurd): he did conceive, that the great obstacle to the recruiting service, at present, was, the prejudices of parents, who conceived that their children were utterly lost and ruined, if they entered into the army, whether in the cavalry or infantry. If this measure could remove this prejudice from the minds of fathers or mothers, it would remove the greatest obstacle that now stood in the way of the recruiting service. It would not only get a better description of recruits, but would make the recruiting service operate on a much more extensive description, by taking in the inhabitants of the country, as well as the population of the manufacturing towns. He was sorry the navy had been at all mentioned; but, with respect to the allusion which had been made by the hon. gent. to a late regulation, upon a principle similar to that now proposed, namely, inlisting them, instead of for life, only for a term of years, or during the war, he was surprised that the hon. gent. was not acquainted who were the authors of that arrangement; he would, however, inform the hon. gent. that it was made by his own friends, the late administration, as the last act, of their official authority, and it certainly was the best of their whole administration; and, so far, as it, went, it was an irrefragable proof of the efficacy of the principle, as well in procuring a numerous and rapid supply of recruits for the marine service, unparalleled upon any former, occasion, as in obtaining them from a better order of men. In answer to the arguments of the hon. gent. Against extending the same principle to the army in general, he could only say, the principle, so far as it had been tried in the case just alluded to, and according to the most general opinions of persons whom he considered the first military authorities, not only in the present day, but some years back, he considered, was a good and an eligible one; and having heard no other plan, as yet proposed, at all likely to produce similar effects, he should, therefore, adhere to and, support this. Much clamour had been raised against this principle, as new and untried; and the alarm was loudly sounded, to warn his majesty's ministers, against its adoption, lest, they should render themselves unpopular to the whole country; but, highly sensible as he was of the excessive solicitude of those who used such arguments for the popularity of those ministers, he must beg leave to say, that however unwilling they were to oppose their, own opinions against those expressed by the majority, or any great portion of the people of England, still they felt it their bounden duty, at a crisis so ardent as the present, not to temporise upon a measure of such vital importance to the security of the, country, under any apprehension of risking a temporary unpopularity; for, if they were to suffer their conduct, in concerns of such importance, to be swayed by such considerations, they might do that which would be popular with one party to-day, and unpopular with another to-morrow, and, in the mean time, sacrifice to popular caprice, or selfish considerations, the real interest and security of the empire, instead of doing that which was their indispensable duty, independent of all minor considerations; namely, adhering firmly to those measures which appeared best in their conviction, regardless of any risk to which their popularity might be exposed: nor did any man, in his mind, deserve the name of statesman, who would not, under such circumstances, firmly adhere to this principle. On the contrary, that minister who would abandon it under such circumstances, would swerve from his duty, and act the part of fool and a coward. In times like these, they ought not to temporise. If they were to be content to go on from day to day, from expedient to expedient, trusting to chance, and consulting every fluctuation of popular opinion, their task would be easy. The course was before them, like virtue and pleasure in the Grecian writer: the path, to which the one led, arduous and difficult; the other, smooth and easy. But, if they wished to be really useful to their country, they must often risk both their power and their popularity. Holding a firm and systematic attention to public good, they might sometimes find it necessary to act against the momentary influence of both; but, if they hesitated to do so, they would be political cowards. They would violate their duty, both as the servants of the crown, and as members of parliament, if they were deferred, by such considerations, from giving their opinions, and pursuing what they, thought right.

Mr. Perceval ,

after apologising for an attempt to trespass on the house at so advanced an hour, promised to do it very briefly, and to confine himself to the question: in doing this, it would be impossible for him to follow the right hon. gent. through the wide and desultory field of argument he had adopted. To some points of his speech, however, it would be necessary to advert. Nobody, at least that he had heard, had made any such assertion, as that it was not necessary to increase the army. The question was not about the necessity of increase, but the mode of effecting it; and the point now for the house to consider was, whether the measure proposed was not much more likely to diminish than to increase the public force, Such was the effect, however, which, he was convinced, it was most likely to have. He was glad to hear from the right hon. gent, such a declaration as, that it was necessary, even in time of peace, to keep up a considerable force, under the existing circumstances of this country and of Europe, considering the kind of enemy with whom we had to contend; and he was the more glad to hear this declaration, because it was so diametrically opposite to an opinion formerly declared by the same right hon. gent., who said that our army ought to be reduced to the lowest possible peace establishment; and that we ought to consider Buonaparte merely as a rival in commerce. He complained much of the predicament, into which the introduction of the proposed measure into a mutiny bill would throw the legislature, .as by the introduction of a clause, having for its object the disposal of public money, if the other house of parliament should exercise a privilege with that clause, which they had been often it, the habit of assuming, the inevitable consequences would be, that the bill would be thrown out by this house, the existing Mutiny bill would expire, and the army of the country be, de facto, disbanded. The house, then, was pushed to the unfair alternative, of either adopting those propositions without discussion, or, in taking time to discuss them properly, incur the risk of disbanding the army. He was, therefore, of opinion, that the Mutiny bill ought not to be clogged with those clauses; but that they should be the subject of a separate bill, and thereby ample time allowed for discussion. The right hon. gent. had affected to ridicule the arguments of those who had before complained of delay in bringing forward those propositions, and now complained of the precipitancy of urging them to a decision: but he would ask, was it not much more ridiculous for those who had so tardily protracted their own proposition, to endeavour to atone for their delay by an unwarrantable precipitancy, in hurrying the house to a decision upon a measure without time to discuss it. Such was the consequence of that miserable botchery of legislature, so disgraceful to ministers, in twice successively coming forward with a Mutiny bill for a month, instead of taking, as he had advised the secretary at war, two months for the last Mutiny bill at once, which would have afforded ample time to discuss those propositions! But he not only complained of the precipitancy with which the house was pushed to a decision; but that they were called on to decide, without being allowed that light upon the subject, which the opinions received from military officers of distinction, by his majesty's ministers, would have reflected. He argued, that the great majority of those officers were decidedly against the discharge of men in time of war; and that the opinions of marine officers, and still more especially of artillery officers, had not been consulted; although it was their unanimous opinion, that the discharging men at the end of seven years would be the ruin of their corps, who would only have completed their training by that time. The hon. and learned member then proceeded to compare the expences at which the country would derive the services of the soldier for a hinted period, with those which it now paid for the services of the soldier for life. In the latter case, the highest bounty was but 16 guineas; upon the former, though the hon. gent. had not condescended to name any rate, yet it could not be presumed less than 12 guineas; and then 5 guineas for renewal of bounty at the expiration of 7 years. The weekly sixpences on the second 7 years, would amount to 9l. 2s.; then the renewed bounty for the last 7 years, reckoned at only 3 guineas; the weekly shillings would add 18l. 4s. more. The soldier, then, supposing he inlisted at twenty, would be aged forty-one years when he would be entitled to his discharge and pay for life, at per day; which, reckoning it only at eight years purchase, and adding it to the former sums, would amount to a bounty, or bonus, altogether, of 230l. per man; while, at present, the country derived the unlimited service of the soldier, for life, at a total expence of only 16 guineas; and supposing the soldier, in the former instance, to claim his discharge at the end of 14 years, he would then have stood the country in 80l, or 90l.; considering, therefore, the comparative expence as enormous, and the adoption of such an expence wholly unnecessary, as the country already possessed ample means of recruiting its armies without, he should oppose the motion,—The committee then divided on bringing up the clause: For the clause 254; Against it 125; Majority 129.

Upon our return into the gallery, we found the house in debate, which lasted till half past six o'clock. The ministers wished to have the clause read a second time. No less than seven divisions took place; four of which were upon a repetition of the motion, "That the chairman do now leave the chair.". The business terminated by the speaker's suggesting, that an amendment should be proposed on Monday, pro formá, so as to admit of a further discussion on the principle of the clause.