MUTINY BILL.

HC Deb 02 June 1806 vol 7 cc483-506

Mr. Secretary Windham

moved the order of the day, for the house to go into a committee on the Mutiny bill. The house having resolved itself into the committee, and the question for filling up the blanks, in the form of the oath to be taken by the soldiers hereafter to be inlisted, with the number bevel being put,

Lord Castlereagh rose.

He thought that the whole of the clause relating to the limits of service should be left out. He took that opportunity of stating his objections to the clause, which the more he considered, the more forcibly convince him of the paramount duty of pressing his objections upon the attention of the house. He should, however, avoid going into the detail arising out of the question, and confine himself in that instance to the prominent features of the measure. Every member must be aware of the painful difficulties, and the embarrassing situation in which the house was placed, by being called on to decide on a detailed military question, with little notice, and little detailed information. If the right hon. secretary, with all his advantages, was four months in settling the details of his plan, it was rather embarrassing for parliament to decide upon it only three or four days after. the Chelsea, bill had been laid on the table, which was absolutely necessary in order to form any correct opinion upon it; and there was; additional difficulty, as the blanks in the clause were not now filled up, and as much was matter of regulation. But it was unnecessarily embarrassing, because ministers withheld that body of valuable information which they possessed, and even changed their opinions on some points, before their resolutions had passed. He owned he thought that we came to the consideration of this plan under circumstances disgraceful to the character of parliament and to the government. The noble lord then proceeded to object strongly to the measure, as trenching on the prerogative of the crown. There was no occasion for bringing this to parliament at all, as it was acknowledged on the other side, that the crown might execute the measures which ministers had in view. In such a case it had never been the practice of parliament to proceed without a communication with the crown. When additional pay was granted to the navy in 1796, there was an act of parliament, indeed, on that occasion, but then there was a previous order of council, and, therefore, this could not by any means be stated as a precedent. This was depriving the crown in some measure of the power of the sword, which belonged by the constitution solely to the executive authority, under the controul of parliament. In no instance was it ever proposed to trench upon this power, except in the tory administration under queen Anne. He contended that his right hon. friend (Mr. Caning) had been much misunderstood by the right hon. secretary of state (Mr. Fox) the other night, in stating the difference between a parliamentary army, and an army peculiarly belonging to the crown. In such kinds of force as the militia and the additional force, raised for. home defence, the parliament there might make terms and regulations, but such a thing was never attempted, except in the above-mentioned instance, with regard to the regular army. Now, he wished to consider in what situation the crown stood at present, and in what situation it would stand, should the present plan be adopted. The crown at present might levy men in any mode, and under whatever regulations. it thought proper, within the numbers and the expence limited by parliament. If this measure passed, it would be impossible for a it to raise men except for the term of 7 years, as directed by the schedule A. in this bill. It therefore limited a the power of the crown prodigiously in raising men. Where was the necessity for this? It was said that the soldier would have the security of parliament for the performance of engagements. It was improper a and invidious in this case to make a dis- tinction between parliamentary security. and the security afforded by the crown; but unfortunately for this statement, the purpose might have been completely answered by directing an alteration in the articles of war, which were considered as law, and under which, after such alteration, the soldier might move his habeas corpus, and be regularly discharged at the proper time. He thought this then a most unadvised attack on the prerogative of the crown. But the means used were also highly objectionable. By looking at the journals of the house, it would be found, something similar to this was attempted in 1749, by Mr. Thomas Pitt, who, at a time when a great jealousy prevailed respecting the power of the crown, brought in a bill to provide that no officer should be retained in the service beyond a certain period. This was rejected by a great majority. But Mr. Thomas Pitt rested the matter on its own merits, whereas ministers now skulked behind the mutiny bill. By this means the house was deprived of the proper forms; and the house of lords was prevented from saying "No" to the measure, by its being tacked to a money bill, so that the lords could make no amendment without risking the loss of the bill altogether. But what was the situation of the crown when it came to exercise its negative power on this bill? It would not have the power to object to it, otherwise, by the loss of the bill, it would be left without an army, or at least without the means of controlling it. It was impossible, then, that the measure could be considered as having been submitted to the house with any degree of fairness upon its own merits. It was open to all the objections that existed to the tacking of measure which might be offensive to the crown, but which the commons wished to carry, to money bills. Upon the impropriety of such a proceeding, he read a quotation from Mr. Hatsell, who stated that such conduct was highly irregular, aid a breach of the rules and orders of parliament. He also read his observations upon the tory measure in 1704, when they wished to carry the bill against occasional conformity Their proceedings, Mr. HatSell stated, as tending to create confusion in the government, to force a peace, and to render on allies disposed to accept of such-terms a they could procure for themselves, and as France would offer. These observation be thought very applicable to the present case. He concluded this point with saying, that the crown was degraded by the measure, as it could not even raise a black regiment for the defence of the colonies, except on the terms here prescribed. The noble lord then proceeded to observe, that he agreed in the propriety of raising a greater force than we had at present, though, at the same time, he contended that having now 25,000 men more than we ever had before, the events of the late unfortunate campaign were not owing to our want of a large disposeable force, as, besides the 25,000 men which had been sent abroad, it was intended to have sent 40,000 men, forming the finest army ever sent from this country, had circumstances turned out in a way that could have permitted it. But as more men were certainly wanted than we had at present, he would proceed to the policy of the plan itself. If he had proposed the plan, it would certainly have been supposed that he had committed a blunder, when he began his increasing the army by abolishing a plan which procured, about 15,000 men annually, and by dismissing 6,000 veterans; and all those who had completed their twenty-one years' service. He commented On the wildness of the scheme, and the romantic disposition of the right hon. gent. with his agricultural arguments, which had been so well answered by his right hon. friend near him (Mr. Canning). But before he considered whether the measure would increase the army, he must observe, that we should stand worse with this plan, than with our three species of force. It was the policy of this country to have a great part of our force of such a description that it could be reduced in time of peace, and easily assembled again in time of war. The militia was of this nature, but the regulations relative to its officers made it impossible to carry it to a proper extent, and therefore it was in the contemplation of his late right hon. friend (Mr. Pitt) to have had another force, which might be officered in the regular way, and still have the advantage of being disbanded in time of peace, and readily assembled in time of war. But, under the present plan, when the soldier was engaged for general service, we had no alternative left to keep him even, in time of peace or discharge him altogether. The plan therefore was a bad one, supposing it to be successful, which he did not think it would be. But, then it was said, that the soldiers would be of a better description, as they would have opportunities of seeing more service. But, he contended that, supposing regiments that went abroad, to stay ten years, very little of the entire mass could be accustomed to foreign service. But if he was of opinion that the plan. was a misfortune, even if it succeeded, how could he suppose that it would be able to meet all the waste which it would be called upon to supply? He adverted to the experiment that had been made of limited service during the American war, on grounds more inviting than at present, and stated, that in one year during that war, 25,000 men had been procured, but that during the late war, 42,000 men had been recruited in one year. But we were not without the means of forming some estimate of the effects of limited service on the recruiting even at present. About 500 parties had been lately recruiting for general service, and they had in one year raised above 11,000 men for general service, and for life, while 260 parties, recruiting for limited service, had raised only 4,500 men. He further supported his argument by adverting to the recruiting for general and limited service from the militia at different periods, and especially to the recruiting from the Irish militia, where a bounty of ten guineas was offered by marquis Cornwallis for limited service, and of twelve guineas for general service. In that instance, 9000 had accepted of the 12 guineas for general service, and 300 only had accepted the ten guineas for limited service, and that too by the advice of their colonel. Now after this, what dependence could be placed upon limited service, considered as an inducement to the recruits? He contended that, in giving a vested right to the soldier to a future advantage, the crown must be degraded in his eyes, and the principle was, besides, fallacious even us to its own objects. The incentives which the ;right hon. secretary held out to induce men ,to enter the service, would have but little .effect with inconsiderate people, who would .prefer half-a-crown at the moment, to any prospect of future advantage. But the right hon. secretary was alarmed at the waste which his plan would occasion, and accordingly, in order to guard against it, reduced himself to greater and greater difficulties. By his plan a soldier who had served 8 years, might have a pension of 18l. though he served more. But, as to the discipline of the troops, there was no doubt that this would be superior in troops who served for life, than in the army which would be established upon. his mercantile principles. But there were two bad effects of the plan which could not be denied by the author of it. He had often, while on the opposition side of the house, declaimed against the plan of re-enlisting men, yet his army would be liable to this objection in a high degree; and besides, how were the places of those men to be supplied, whose time was almost out, when a regiment was to be sent on colonial service? An hon. colonel (Craufurd) had said that they might be supplied from the second battalions; but this was resorting to the old abominable system of drafting After all the discussion on this plan, then, we were only to come to this, that, in stating these evils, a hope was expressed that they might be remedied. The right hon. secretary had either very modestly or very boldly stated, that he would not enter upon a detailed calculation of the waste and the expense that would attend his plan. But as. he had not done it, it was the more necessary that others should do it. His lordship then took the number of the army, including cavalry, artillery, and non-commissioned officers, at 250,000 men; which was as high a rate as could be on any hand expected from this plan. He had not a return, however, upon which he could calculate as to the army in general; but he had returns of the seven battalions of the guards, from which an idea might be formed, though a vague one, of the whole, An hon. friend of his had stated that the expence of every individual to the country would be 230l. per man more than at present. But a calculation of the expense of one man was not sufficient. According to his lordship's calculation, there would be a. waste of 30,000 men in each year after the period of 14 years had elapsed, supposing that none enlisted afterwards; but supposing that one-half of them enlisted again, still there would be a waste of 15,000 men annually, under this plan, without reckoning the ordinary casualties. His lordship then entered upon a calculation of the expense. He thought that the right hon. gent. could not, with any hopes of success, reduce the present bounty one sixpence. Supposing, then, 16 guineas bounty to each man for the original recruiting, and 8 guineas for the subsequent periods, the annual sum would be 360,000 guineas, or 380,000l. Then he came to the increased pay, which .he calculated at 162,000l. a year. But the most gloomy part of the whole was the subject of the pensions; for it would have very little effect as to the recruiting, and would he tremendous in point of expense. The pensions allowed at the end of 14 years, he contended, were a bounty for leaving the service, which would, for the most part, be almost irresistible. He supposed that, at the end of 14 years' service, the average age of each man might be about 40 years, By a reference to the tables of Halley, and to the insurance offices, he found that the average calculations upon a man's life, from that period, were 22 years. The amount of the expense, therefore, at the end of 22 years from the second period of service, would he 792,000l. His lordship then calculated the expense of those who should have their pensions after having completed their 21 years' service, and this proceeding upon the same data as to the value of their lives, he found would in the end amount to 684,000l. per annum. The whole would stand thus: bounties, 380,000l; increased pay, 162,000l.; pensions at the end of 14 years' service, 792,000l; pensions at the same rate after 21 years' service, 684,000l; making a total of 2,013,000l., independent of any additional pay that might be in contemplation for the Officers of the army. It might be said, that this would admit of a reduction in time of peace, but, unfortunately, the plan left the qualification of the men going on, even in time of peace, when they were exposed to very little service, which left no chance of a reduction. Upon a subject of such material importance to the welfare of the country he did not see how any principle of delicacy, or fancied danger, should deter him, as a member of parliament, from a performance of his duty, in considering the application which this system had to the other essential service of the navy. He would appeal to the noble lord at the head of the admiralty board, and ask him, .whether it was right or just that the nation should be embarked in this new system of expense, to make future provisions for soldiers, and make no corresponding one for sailors? How would it be felt, or what impression was it likely to create, if the marines on board a ship were, at the expiration of certain periods, to be entitled to advantages which were withheld from the sailors, who completed the same period of service, were exposed to the same or greater hardships and dangers, and to whom the country was so much indebted for its security and safety. It was true, that they were liable, according to ancient usage, to be dragged into the service by compulsion, without being offered any additional inducement; but was it consistent with po- licy or liberality, that this argument of peculiar hardship was to be turned against them? If then, which he must suppose to be the case, the marines were meant to be included in the new arrangements to arise out of this system, the annual expense upon the country could not be calculated at less than three millions of money. These last observations, he said he thought it his duty merely to advert to, but not for any invidious purpose, or with the view of provoking any discussion of them at present. His lordship then proceeded to observe on the seriousness of such an additional expense upon the country: much to the credit, as he thought, of the present administration, they had in a late instance most wisely and manfully come to the resolution of raising so large a proportion of the supplies within the year, as an augmentation of 10 millions by means of an extension of the property tax, and that for time purpose of relieving posterity from the pressure of no more than half a million annually which would be sufficient to defray the interest of that sum of money; but posterity would have but little reason to applaud the spirit and liberality of the present times, if, at the same time that we were preserving them from the pressure of half a million, we should, by this extravagant and inconsiderate system, saddle them with a burthen of three millions a-year. He then concluded with a recapitulation of his arguments, in which he trusted, that he had satisfactorily shewn, that the plan was a wanton encroachment on the prerogative of the crown; that it could not make the army better than it was before; that there was no ground from past experience for supposing that a limited would produce more men than an unlimited service; that it subverted the relation in which the crown now stood with the army of the country; that it would be injurious to the discipline of the service; that it would create great waste, not only of the effective numbers of the army, but of that treasure also which the country could not bear if it should have to contend for its existence by the exertion of its own remaining resources; and finally, that being fatal in all these points, it would also materially abridge the power of the crown.

Mr. Grattan

thought the noble lord might have been more moderate in his strictures on this plan, when some plan was confessedly necessary, and neither the noble lord himself, nor any of his associates, had any plan to offer Something calculated to keep up and recruit our military force was, on all hands, allowed to be desirable; and the only question was, as to that which was most advisable to promote the object which all professed a wish to promote. Several recommended a reliance on the ordinary recruiting alone, which, it was now evident, could not be conducted without high bounties; but the opinion of the majority, with whom he certainly concurred, was, that limited service should be resorted to. Much encouragement to act upon this opinion was to be derived from experience. Notwithstanding the assertion of the noble lord, that all experience was against the experiment of the right hon. secretary, he asserted the contrary. For, in the American war, 78,000 men had been raised upon terms of limited service; and such a number surely served to shew, that these terms were not likely to be ineffective. These terms had, indeed, always proved productive. They were so in the last French war. But how did they succeed in the operation of those measures, in the support of which the noble lord himself was so forward? What were the Army of Reserve and the Additional Force acts, but measures of limited service? The manner in which the noble lord had argued on this occasion, in opposition to a principle which he had so often supported before, was certainly somewhat liable to the charge of inconsistency. The noble lord had gone into a long calculation, to shew that immense expence would result from the adoption of the proposed plan; which expence was to consist of bonusses to the army; and yet, at the conclusion of the noble lord's speech, he asserted, that this expence would have no effect whatever upon the recruiting of that army. An increase of pay was to be the consequence of 7 years' service; a stir greater increase, of 14-years; and further advantages were to be the reward of remaining 21 years in the service. Still, according to the noble lord, this improvement of the soldier's condition was to form no additional allurement to those disposed to engage in the military life. If the noble lord's statement were just, that, in general, men were rather inclined, to prefer unlimited to limited service; that the one was productive to a great degree, and the other. to a very little, there was an egregious error in the calculation, of those ministers who drew up the Army of Reserve and. Additional Force ,acts for, instead of granting a bounty to such men as volunteered from limited to unlimited service, government should have had a drawback from them. But, to be serious, it was impossible that the limitation of service should have no influence in obtaining recruits, or that men should not be more willing to engage for 7 years, than for an indefinite period. Among other calculations, which seemed to rest upon very questionable data, the noble lord had estimated the life of a man at the age of 40 so high as 22 years. He was ready to admit, that the noble lord must have had much difficulty to encounter in such calculations; but yet it must be felt by every man, that when the noble lord was calculating upon grounds very little better than loose conjecture, with a view to deprecate a system for which he offered no substitute whatever, he ought, at least, to have kept within the bounds of moderation. If the noble lord had made any proposition in lieu of that which he condemned, he would have been much more entitled to attention. But the noble lord offered nothing. Ordinary recruiting, the noble lord had, for years, repeatedly maintained was inadequate to supply the wants of the army, and therefore he could not recommend it in the present instance; nor did he say that the ballot ought to be revived, or a requisition attempted. Even the Additional Force act the noble lord would not enforce; for, to enforce it would be to produce no men, but money, as the noble lord knew. The question was, as to the choice between requisition and inducement. What would the noble lord desire? He would not surely support requisition; nor would he attempt to support unlimited bounties; yet, if those bounties were not tolerated, recourse must be had to other inducements. Parliament must resort to the one or to the other; either to unlimited bounties, which operated as a premium for desertion, or limited service, which held out allurements to the recruit, by conferring a benefit upon the soldier.—In one part of the noble lord's speech, it was remarkable that he talked much of the length of a man's life, which, according to-his estimate, generally reached to 60 years. Here, however, it was the noble lord's object, to enlarge the amount of the expence to be incurred by the right hon. secretary's project. But yet, when he .came to that part where it was desirable to .him to depreciate the operation of this project, the noble lordmaintained, that, 7 years being equal to the general estimate of a man's life, the people would be as little influenced by the mention of that period, as if it were proposed to them to inlist for life. Upon such an estimate of a man's life, and the observation deduced from it, it. was unnecessary to argue. Common sense must suggest to any man a sufficient answer to it. He would appeal to the plainest understanding, whether, it a tenant who held a lease for 7 years, were to apply to his landlord to exchange it for a lease of his life, the landlord would listen to the proposition? or whether, if a tenant held a lease for life, he would accede to the. proposal of his landlord, to exchange it for one of 7-years? To state such a case, was enough to expose the futility of the remark alluded to. But to return to the subject of limited service, the principle was not only sanctioned by the measures to which he. had already referred, but particularly recognized by that provision which granted a bounty to such men as volunteered from the limited to unlimited service. There was, however, much more. in the right hon. secretary's plan than mere limited service, to procure soldiers, and to please the public But the noble lord's objection seemed principally to apply to limited service. The noble lord. himself, however, bore testimony to the effects which. must arise from such a measure, when he stated that its adoption would tend to nothing less than to create a mutiny among the veterans in the army, and also to excite discontents in the navy. And why? truly because it proposed to confer what the noble lord considered as an extraordinary benefit on the army. But, upon this point, it was to be recollected, that although in the American war 78,000 men. were raised for limited service, and in the last French war 40,000, still no symptom of discontent appeared among the veterans or the navy. But the idea of such discontent existing was quite preposterous. To suppose that any discontent could arise in the navy in consequence of any military arrangement benefiting the soldiery, would be to indulge a supposition by no means honourable to, or consistent with, the character of those who belonged to our navy. As to the veterans, the noble lord's argument stood thus: the army were satisfied without any addition to their pay or pensions; and yet, when an addition was to be made to both, they were, the noble lord stated, to become extremely discontented. So much with regard to the noble lord's allusion to the discontents likely to arise from the plan, and the new operation of the inducements which it held out. Now, as to the connection which the, project under discussion had with the cause of liberty, the noble lord seemed to argue is if to give the soldier an interest in civil, liberty, to furnish him with additional reasons for attachment to the constitution of his country, was to damp his zeal. What! that when the pay of a soldier was increased; when his period of service was, limited; when he had the prospect of returning to the enjoyment of his country's rights, that he would be less eager in her. cause! If that were really the case, that when all the motives were afforded which? could serve to animate a soldier's mind, that an English soldier would be insensible; that he would be damped; the thing was incredible; but, if it were so, then England was to be defended by satellites, and not by soldiers; and the constitution was to rely, for its security, on an army in sensible to its value, and unworthy of living under its auspices. If the English were really such a.force, then the old excitement to patriotic valour, the pro aris et focis, had ceased to. have its weight. If such degeneracy had taken place, an:army of Persians, or Mamelukes, would answer as, well for the. defence of this country; for, according to. this, our army was, become mere machines, and ceased to be English men; if such were the case, how much had. all the provisions failed, which were taken; to attach the military to the constitution of the country! in fact, to interfuse, as much as was practicable, the .military with the civil character. With that view, military officers were permitted to sit in parliament, notwithstanding their dependence on the crown. This permission was always allowed, from the evident policy of cultivating an intercourse between the military and the constitution of the country. The officer from such an intercourse, was, of course, more likely to excite, in the ,minds, of the soldiery, a just reverence for freedom; and, when a soldier was furnished with a comfortable livelihood, that must naturally tend to enhance his estimate of himself and his country. Indeed, none was ever to be found, in the military character, by whom liberty had been always so highly prized, as by the old English soldiers —One of the objects of the right hon secretary's plan was, to give the soldier a competent subsistence; and of this he particularly approved. Every Sentiment of humanity, justice, and policy, called for the assignment of an adequate provision to the soldiery, after they had become unable to serve. This, too, holding out to them the prospect of having a permanent interest in the state, formed an additional stimulus to their zeal while in the service. To create this interest had always been the policy of wise states. The Romans would admit none into the army, but those who were possessed of property; because, without it, they did not suppose that men were likely to feel much interest in the state. In consequence of this, the population were divided into six classes; the lowest of whom, because destitute, were deemed unworthy to be trusted with arms. That wise people were, therefore, particular about the construction and character of their army; and so they continued until towards the period of their decline. They then changed their system; they entrusted their defence to præorian bands, and their liberty was soon. the victim. Their hands became bad soldiers, as well as bad subjects; and they soon waited on their emperor, to request his order to assassinate the senate. This institution having extinguished the liberty of the Romans, that people,. because they soon felt they had nothing to fight for, speedily lost their greatness, their independence, and character. The consequences the Romans experienced, from committing their country to the protection of satellites, were twofold: first, their constitution was lost; secondly, their army degenerated, and became terrible only to their friends, while they became insignificant in the estimation of their enemies. Another reason for keeping up and improving the character of our army, arose out of-a consideration of our present circumstances with regard to France. The flower of the French, said the right hon. gent., which is prepared to act against you, must not be opposed by the refuse of the English. I do not, of course, mean to call the generality of your army the refuse of your country; but, certainly, you may have a better sort; and, unless you combat the flower of the enemy with the flower of your own people, your case is perilous. But, if you will bring forward the force which it is in your power to collect, inspired with the disposition which Englishmen never fail to feel when contending for their country; fired with that spirit which is the natural result of their constitution, with the public mind, as it were, marching along their lines, there can be no doubt as to the issue of the contest. What any army are competent to, the British people are competent to, when properly marshalled; and the right hon. secretary's plan is calculated to produce that effect. The people are to be trained; and thus the casualties in the army, in the event of invasion, may be filled up. By similar means, the Fabian general was enabled to maintain himself upon the Sabine hill,until he found it convenient to come down upon the enemy. If the Romans were not a military people, Fabius could not have so acted, and saved Rome; and, if you are placed on the same footing, neither your independence nor your liberty are safe; you must, indeed, become either a military government or a military people; you have such an armed regular army in the country, at this moment, as leave your liberties, notwithstanding your volunteers, almost at the mercy of the crown, if a king chose to try the experiment. I know we have every security against any such attempt in the character of the present family on the throne; but I wish to consider the king in the abstract, without considering who may be king at the time. I would exhort you to take every means of interweaving the interests of the army with your civil rights. Such conduct is necessary to maintain the character of your army, and the safety and the constitution of your country. As to your constitution, indeed, if that were gone, your national safety could not long survive; for the spirit which results from the one is that, alone, which can preserve the other. If your constitution were no more, the conflicts to be expected between the crown and the people would speedily bring you to fight he battles of France in England. Therefore, the right hon. secretary has been wise, in so connecting the popular with the regular army, and so interesting the latter in popular rights, as to guard against such dangers as I have alluded to. This brings me to consider the assertion, that the interference of this house is an encroachment on he royal prerogative. But the annual discussion of the Mutiny bill is a sufficient anwer to that assertion. The assertion I ave alluded to, I maintain to be, in the highest degree, unconstitutional; and that he troops of the line are, strictly speaking, parliamentary army. The Mutiny bill, indeed, on the face of it, recognizes the right and authority to which I refer; and any king, or any minister who should advise a king to deal with that army in any manner inconsistent with the prescription of parliament, would be guilty of a breach of the Bill of Rights. The noble lord, instead of augmenting the difficulties which the right hon . secretary had to encounter, should rather endeavour to remove them. The public mind should go along with the measure. (Hear! hear!) You should be more adverse to France than to one another; and this is not a time to be occupied about little objects. You must; said the right hon. gent., direct your minds to higher considerations, than those discontents which, we are told, may possibly arise among the navy, or among veteran soldiers. Let your difficulties be measured by your danger; and those difficulties must be great, that should obstruct your progress. Look at the perilous grandeur of the power that assails you, and reflect upon the means necessary to maintain your own elevation. Do not suffer yourselves to be drawn aside from the proper provisions for your security by financial calculations. You were told, that America could not support her expenditure, and must, therefore, submit to your arms. The same argument was applied to France. But the calculation was wrong with respect to both. The Americans and the French were victorious. When a great nation determines to sacrifice wealth, and maintain a great principle, there may be danger; there may be such a thing as death; but there cannot he defeat.

The Master of the Rolls

said, he well, knew, and greatly respected, the abilities of the right hon. gent. who spoke last; but he thought him mistaken in his view of the noble lord's argument. The right hon. gent. argued, that if the measure did not produce men, it would not be attended with expence: now, the objection was, that it would be attended with immense expence, without producing any men. .The right hon. gent. commended the measure for merits which it did not possess: for, surely, it did not go to give any new civic benefits to the subject. The right hon. gent. also differed very widely from what the right hon. mover of this measure thought the soldier ought to be. If the right hon. gent. had heard the right hon. secretary's opening speech, he would have heard him say, that the character of the soldier ought to be distinct from every thing else. The right hon. gent. contended, that it ought to be united and blended with the character of the artisan. One general objection to the trial of this experiment was, that we had no experience to direct us; for, there was no example of any country trying it, in the same manner, to the same extent, and under the same circumstances. The example of France was cited, but with all admission, that there the principle was found inconvenient as soon as the American war broke out, and departed from by a precise ordonnance, that no man was to be discharged during the war. If an act of parliament could be violated with as much levity here, as a royal ordonnance was there, the consideration would not be so serious. He was sure the hon, officer opposite, when he said, the other night, that the country would have the benefit of this measure ten years before it would have any of the ill effects, did not mean, that, when the ill effects were approaching, the bill might be repealed. Before the public faith was pledged, it ought to be considered whether it could be kept, rather than lightly to give occasion for circumstances, in which the public faith and public safety would be at variance. As to the authority of the crown, the Mutiny act took no power from the king which, by the constitution, he had; but came in aid of his authority, by fresh powers. Without the power of the Mutiny act, the king could not keep the army together, nor .govern it in time of peace; and, in many respects, there would be much difficulty in governing it, in time of war, by the mere force of the prerogative. But this bill went to take from the king a power which, by the constitution, he was entitled to exercise; namely, that of inlisting men on any terms of service he should think proper. The idea, that the same faith was not to be placed in a pledge from the crown and a pledge from parliament, was highly to be censured. The faith of the crown had been always most scrupulously adhered to, though, sometimes, particular officers may have been guilty of misrepresentation or misconception. When a trial was made under the prerogative, the antient system would be more easily reverted to, if the new one was found not to be satisfactory. In recent times, several species of inlistment had been tried by the authority of the crown: for life, for term of years, for service unlimited in space, and service more or less limited in that respect; and all these without prescribing any one cause, so that the general system of unlimited service was easily reverted to, when it was found desirable. But now, when the nation was told it was relieved from a slavery, by the discontinuance of service for life, and that a boon was given in the inlistment for term of years, how could the antient system be resorted to with justice or with safety, if, at the end of 10 years, it should be necessary? The difficulty of re-engaging men would be in proportion to the desire to have the men. In the denial of the production of the opinions of the general officers; the house was left to its own lights to judge of the question. He was particularly at a loss to conceive, how the right hon. gentleman's plan could be applied to the colonies. This was always the opinion of military men on this subject, so far as he could collect. The right hon. gent. ought to have shown how the plan could be reconciled with the service of the colonies. The right hon. gent. was averse to his plan being called theory; but it was the most fanciful of all theories, if it was to be considered without reference to practicability. What would the right hon. gent. have said to any of the constitution-makers seven years ago, if they had offered a particular constitution, saying, it is very good as it stands, but I know not whether it will be applicable to practice? When the exigency was put to the men, at the end of their term of years, they would not understand any thing but their discharge. The removal of the men whose term was nearly expiring, to the 2d battalions, when the new regiment was ordered to the colonies, was a renewal of the odious system of drafting; it would keep at home the veterans, exclusively fit for colonial service, and send out raw recruits, to whom the climate was particularly fatal. This was to render out best soldiers an indisposable force. The enormous expence was a most important consideration, when our finances laboured so vitally under the burthens brought on by this war. These burthens would make it question, whether an actual increase of out disposable force was desirable, at an expence likely to be ruinous. But when that ruinous expence was to be incurred for a trifling and uncertain increase, there was reason to hesitate indeed. He wishes the measure to be withdrawn for the present, and brought forward in a separate form, with the proper lights to direct the judgment of the house upon it In its present shape, the measure would counteract the very good it was expected to produce. Suppose it did not add to the numbers produced by the ordinary recruiting, and the vast proportion of discharge were to come on in 7 years, how would they be provided for? It was possible that he produce might be sufficient to cover the discharges; but that, or the probability of it, should be made to appear. The discharges would operate when the men were perfect in discipline. It was true, the right hon. gent. calculated that the men would re-inlist; but the house could not take the right hon. gentleman's word for that, particularly when he gave the men the option of so great a benefit. A less numerous army, in a perfect state of discipline, was more desirable than a more numerous one, less perfect. When a man thought of going into the army, he did not calculate the time. Seven years was, besides, almost as much as a man's life, with respect to a removal from any occupation to which the soldier might wish to return, after having gratified his desire of military glory. When the period was near expiring, they would think of nothing but home. he saw no reason why a man might not be content to become a soldier in life, as well as a carpenter, a blacksmith, &c. unless the disgust for such long service was created by the supporters of the present system. The instance of general Washington's army, in the America war, afforded a most striking example. But the Americans resorted to the means from necessity; whereas, we were about to resort to it from design, and without necessity. It was only in cases of compulsory service that a limitation had been, hitherto, adopted; now, it was proposed to extend it to volunteers. He was of opinion that, after the removal of the ballot of the Army of Reserve act, and the Additional Force act, and competition incurred by them, the ordinary recruiting would do a great deal, and he wished the experiment to be tried. It was not so much the engagement for life that kept men out of the army; but the things that had been connected with it. He wished the right hon. gent. would consent to withdraw the measure for the present, for the purpose of trying what we could do without it. If the right hon. gent. would not consent to that, at least that it should be sent back to the place from whence it came, to be brought forward again in a more digested form. If they would do neither of these, he must make use of the rights he had, and give his decided opposition to the measure.

The Solicitor General

said, he felt as much disappointed that his right hon friend had not treated the subject in a Constitutional point of view, as his right hon. and learned friend had expressed himself to be, that the hon. gent. who preceded him had not adverted to the calculations of the noble lord. He had expected from his learned friend a check to those novel doctrines and distinctions which had been that night introduced. The form in which the question was brought before the house had been objected to; it was said likewise that it ought not to be a subject of legislative consideration, and a noble lord had asserted, that the discussion of it in parliament was attended with danger to the royal prerogative. He would ask the house what they were discussing? The mutiny bill. In that bill, it was declared lawful for his majesty to make articles of war for one year only. In that bill, it was declared lawful for his majesty to establish courts martial for one year only. In that bill, the bill of rights was recited. In that bill was contained a declaration limiting the power of his majesty to quarter his soldiers on his lawful subjects. And now in the clause under discussion, the oath to be taken by each recruit was, to serve his majesty for at least 7 years, and yet it was asserted that the prerogative of the crown had been infringed! Unless the gentlemen opposite were prepared to say that all the doctrines hitherto maintained on this subject were erroneous, it would be impossible for them to defend their position. His right hon. and learned friend had said, that if the measure now under discussion had been carried into effect by the crown, it might easily be undone; but that being accomplished by parliament, it. would be difficult for parliament to retread their steps. He had argued, that if parliament once promulgated the great advantages which the soldier would derive from enlisting for a limited time, no man would in future be found willing to enlist for an unlimited time. And yet his learned friend had afterwards said, that the consideration of limited or unlimited time would, were the proposed measure to be adopted, be a matter of indifference to the recruit. It seemed, therefore, that the recruit was thought to be so completely ignorant, that he could not judge on this subject for himself, but that he must avail himself of the sentiments of parliament, and of parliament alone, for if his majesty expressed that opinion, the house were told (notwithstanding that a noble lord had said, that the army ought to look up to his majesty, and that the soldiers should suck in with their very exist- ence the conviction that the favour and countenance of the crown ought to be their chief reward), that the army would not listen to his majesty's representations. He wished much to know how' the gentlemen opposite could reconcile their declaration, that, in the first place, it was ungracious to give this boon to the army, through the medium of parliament, and not through that of the throne, with their other declaration, that it was in reality no boon, as it would not succeed in inducing men to enlist? With regard to the objection which, had been started, that this measure should not have been contained in a clause in the. Mutiny bill, but should have formed a distinct act of parliament, he replied, that any novelty in military armies was usually included in the mutiny bill, and that this especially belonged to its character. If such an alteration were proposed in our military, system as the abolishing of capital punishments, he would ask, ought that. not to be contained in the Mutiny bill? If the constitution of courts-martial were to undergo a reform, would not that be prescribed in. the Mutiny bill? Now, as to the policy of enlistment for a limited term considered constitutionally, he differed entirely from those who contended that it was a dangerous innovation. He had always understood, that in the best times of the British history, jealousy had been ever excited against standing armies, because the men had been enlisted for an indefinite time. The preference given to the militia was grounded expressly on the circumstance that they were enlisted for a limited time. For a while they took up the character of the soldier, afterwards to resume, that of the citizen. Nor would this jealousy of the one class of men, and preference of the other, be surprising, when it was considered how inestimable were the privileges which a recruit resigned on entering into the army, and how different must be the character of the man who surrendered them forever, and the man who surrendered them only for a short period. He was unwilling to intrude any authorities on the house upon this subject; but he could not refrain from quoting the opinion of that most respectable and venerable judge, whose sentiments on every subject, and more particularly on those subjects immediately connected with the care of our free constitution, were such as entitled him to the most profound attention. Judge Blackstone, in the first. volume of his Commentaries, says, that"in a land of liberty it is extremely dangerous to make a distinct order of the profession of arms. In absolute monarchies, this is necessary for the safety of the prince, and arises from the main principle of their constitution, which is that of governing by fear: but in free states the profession of a soldier, taken singly and merely as a profession; is justly an object of jealousy. In these no man should take up arms, but with a view to defend his country and its laws: he puts not off the citizen when he enters the camp; but it is because he is a citizen, and would wish to continue so, that he makes himself, for a while, a soldier. The laws therefore, and constitution of these kingdoms, know no such state as that of a perpetual standing soldier, bred up to no other profession than that of war: and it was not until the reign of Henry VII. that the kings of England had so much as a guard about their persons. Nothing, then, according to these principles, ought to be more guarded against in a free state, than making the military power, when such a one is necessary to be kept on foot, a body too distinct from the people. Like ours, it should wholly be composed of natural subjects; it ought only to be enlisted for a short and limited time; the soldiers also should live intermixed with the people; no separate camp, no barracks, no inland fortresses, should be allowed. And, perhaps, it might be still better, if, by dismissing a stated number, and enlisting others at every renewal of their term, a circulation could be kept up between the army and the people, and the citizen and the soldier be more intimately connected together." What was it that had happened since this luminous author published his Commentaries, that should diminish this jealousy of a standing army? Was it because the standing army was three times as numerous? Was it because it had been necessary to establish barracks? Was it because a great military despotism had been expanding itself over Europe, or because, every advancing year, the vestiges of liberty were progressively destroyed amongst the surrounding empires? It was in this circumstance that the difference must ever consist between our own troops and those of-the enemy. The corporeal advantages of the former, their superior skill, discipline, and power of sustaining fatigues and privations, could be but small. In one view they indeed possessed the advantage; the superiority of the cause in which they were engaged. The armies of our enemy fought only to extend the glory and to sati- ate the ambition of a master; our armies fought for their own rights, and those of their country. It our soldiers triumphed, it was the triumph of justice and freedom, over injustice and despotism. If they fell, they fell the martyrs to patriotism, and the love of liberty. In another point of view he highly approved of the plan of his right hon. friend. While on the one hand, it made the soldiers citizens; on the other, it made the citizens soldiers. It had been objected to this plan, that the execution of it would be attended with considerable expense. Adverting to the calculations of his learned friend (Mr. Perceval) the other evening, he contended that they were formed on erroneous grounds, and that his learned friend was not justified in saying that the present administration had economy on their lips, but extravagance in their hearts. The calculations of his learned friend had for the moment made him forget that humanity and liberality winch he well knew belonged to his real character. The gentlemen opposite seemed to think that his majesty's ministers laid succeeded to a luxurious situation. He only wished that some of them had been present (as it certainly was their duty to be present) in the discussions of the property tax, that they had heard the various claims on the humanity of his noble friend, first for the small annuitants, then for widows, afterwards for persons with large families, ? that they had witnessed the painful situation of his noble friend, compelled by the imperious sense of his public duty to resist every demand, however strongly urged; that they had been in the house to see his noble friend (to quote au expression of cruel mockery)" reposing upon a bed of roses." For his part, heavy as he felt that the burthens were which had been imposed on the community, he was convinced that the very poorest would cheerfully part with a portion of their scanty pittance, to reward the valour of those who fought to defend that, without which, property; and life itself, were not worth the preservation.

General Norton

spoke against the clause, and suggested an amendment, that troops in the home islands should be attested to serve not only during the term of seven years, but until 6 months after the termination of any war in which their time should expire; troops in the Mediterranean or West Indies to serve for 12 months, and in the East Indies for 18 months after the termination of such war.

Colonel Craufurd

replied to some of the calculations of increased expences to the service which would be annually produced by this arrangement, which he contended would only be an increase of 1,637,000l. instead of 1,633,000l. stated by the noble lord (Castlereagh); which was an error of above a million.

Sir W. Lemon

congratulated the house on having heard the most constitutional speech from the Solicitor General, which; in the course of 30 or 40 years, he had ever beard in that house. The greatest grievance which could attend a free country, was a great standing army. If such must be maintained, the most constitutional way in which it could be established, the better. On that ground he approved of the speech of the Solicitor General.

Lord Lovaine

wished to be informed, if the present army of the country was not established on constitutional principles?

General Stuart,

notwithstanding the arguments which had been offered by several learned gentlemen, and by an hon. Irish orator (Mr. Grattan), who spoke early in the debate, could not agree in the good consequences that were anticipated from this plan. It was said, it would not only procure a rapid supply of men, but those of a better description. He did not conceive the army could have a better description thau that of soldiers; and as to better orders of men, he thought the common day-labourers made better soldiers than tradesmen or clerks; he spoke from the experience of ten years as a commanding officer; and he could not coincide in the opinions of the hon. Irish orator.

Mr. Grattan

felt it necessary to say a word or two in answer to the hon. general who had just sat down, and who had thrown some of his scattering shot towards that side of the house. The hon. general, though he did not deliver his sentiments in the style of an Irish orator, seemed to betray some symptoms of an Irish understanding; but he could wish the hon: general had evinced a little better acquaintance with Irish order. But notwithstanding the confidence of the hon. general in the opinion he avowed, he (Mr. Grattan) begged leave to decline his authority, either as an Irish orator or an Irish officer.

General Stuart

replied, that though he did not profess to be an Irish orator, he hoped he should. always maintain the character of an Irish soldier.

Mr. Bankes

spoke at some length against the principle of discharging men during the war, and considered this the great and radical objection.

Lord Garlies ,

after complimenting the master of the rolls on his very argumentative speech, declared his main objection to the measure to proceed from the bad effect it must have on the naval service. It might happen that we had an expedition going on, combined both of naval and military force, and that one part might be entitled to demand their discharge, while the other could not. He would ask how it could be possible to reconcile the one to the idea of being bound to continue in their service while the other was discharged? The question being then very generally called for, the house divided: For the question, 206; Against it, 105; Majority, 101. —The blanks ,were then filled up, and the bill passed through the committee without any further discussion. After which, the house having resumed, the report was brought up, and ordered to be taken into consideration to-morrow.