§ General Fitzpatrick.—I rise, sir, to mention a subject on which it is my intention hereafter to submit a motion to the house; and I wish to take the present opportunity of doing so, because it relates to that military administration which is to form part of the business of this day's discussion. The present advanced state of the sessions will prevent my being- able to bring forward any motion, though I wish it much. It is, however, a subject of such extreme importance, that it is necessary for me to take some notice of it. The house may be assured I shall state it in form on a future occasion, and as early as possible. The subject consists of a very gross and alarming evil; one which, I apprehend, has but lately crept into the administration of the military law of this country. I trust, the practice to which I allude is an innovation of not many years standing. I am informed it is. It respects the execution of the duties of the office of judge advocate general of the army. I find, that under the present practice there is in the office of judge advocate the assumption of a power which I conceive is not consistent with that office, and not warranted by the laws and constitution of this country. Every gentleman who hears me knows how great the extent of the royal prerogative is with respect to the military government. Every one knows the power of his majesty to dismiss, without a court martial, any person who bears a commission in the army. I should be the last man to call in questson the royal prerogative, but I am sure no man will contradict me when I say, that a prerogative of such extent ought to be exercised under the 649 advice of responsible ministers. The law of this country enables his majesty to appoint courts martial for military offences. The law places in his majesty the right of confirming or remitting their sentences, but I do not believe that the law or the constitution of this country could ever intend that the officer of the crown, in the exercise of such a prerogative, should be the judge advocate of the army. I believe he is at present the sole adviser of the crown; I believe that this practice has prevailed only during a part of the time the right hon. baronet has been in possession of it. Formerly the transmission of sentences of courts martial was through the office of the secretary at war. The secretary at war of course became responsible for the advice he gave. With respect to his decision, I am not sure that I think that was sufficiently solemn for a decision on so important a point. I cannot conceive why the lives, fortunes, and characters of his majesty's military officers should not be entitled to as solemn a consideration as those of every other subject in the country. Every one knows that those important concerns, as they affect other classes of his majesty's subjects, are decided by his majesty in council. I think the same solemnity ought to be observed with regard to the sentences of courts martial; but that will be a question for future consideration. That this practice does prevail, and has been attended with great hardship to individuals, I shall be enabled to shew in case that has lately occurred, and has spread the greatest alarm throughout the whole army: I allude to the case of Colonel Cochrane Johnstone, a gentleman who, after a trail by a court-martial, and an honourable acquittal, has, at the instance of the judge advocate, been exposed to the penalties and punishment attendant upon guilt. This is what I shall submit to parliament. I am aware that an appeal from the sentence of any court-martial to this house is a delicate question; but in the present case the appeal is in favour of the court-martial, and seeks redress against the effects of undue influence. I beg pardon for dwelling so long on the subject. I have risen to give this notice, and I shall bring forward the motion early next sessions. It will consist of two branches; one will be a complaint against the exercise of the officer, and will suggest some provisions as to the manner of his conducting himself in future.