§ The Chancellor of the Exchequer moved the order of the day for a committee of the whole house to consider of the supply to be granted to his majesty. His majesty's message, the estimates for the British museum, the Westminster court-house, the accounts of exchequer bills, the estimates of the board of first fruits, and the usual annual parliamentary grants for offices in Ireland, were referred to the committee. The house having resolved itself into the committee, and his majesty's mes sage being read from the chair,
§ The Chancellor of the Exchequer stated that, as the subject of his majesty's message had been fully discussed in the long debate that had taken place the preceding night, it would not be necessary for him to enter into any explanation of the general ground upon which the house was called on to agree in the vote which it was his intention to propose. It was the less necessary for him to do so, because, in the course of that debate, he had had an opportunity of offering to the house those observations which applied more particularly to the present question; on the general proposition for furnishing his majesty with the means of availing himself of any favourable conjuncture for giving effect to a concert with the other powers of Europe, and for bringing the present contest to a termination, consistent with the essential interests of this country, and the future security of Europe, as far as the same had been 536 recommended in his majesty's message. The only subject to which he had to direct the attention of the committee was the amount of the sum to be voted, being three millions and a half. It would on all hands be allowed, that it was desirable, if an opportunity should offer for making a vigorous effort, under circumstances shewing it to be practicable that such an effort could be made on a large scale, that would be likely to command success and insure the eventual attainment of the object we had in prospect. Gentlemen would recollect, that when he had proposed a sum of five millions for this purpose, it had been at an early period of the session, when the whole year was before them, and there was a probability of a great and continued exertion. He desired, however, not to be understood to mean that it was less desirable now than at a former period, that a co-operation on an extended scale should take place, and he proposed to vote the smaller sum only because at this advanced period of the season there could be no prospect of a continuance of exertion through any considerable portion of the year. He should confine himself to moving, "that a sum, not exceeding three millions five hundred thousand pounds, be granted to his majesty, to enable his majesty to enter into such engagements, and to take such measures as the exigency of affairs may require."—On the question being put,
§ Mr. Fox observed, that after what had passed, both the right hon. gent. and the public would expect that he should give a direct negative to this vote. The right hon. gent. had said that it was not necessary for him to enter into any further explanation on the subject now. He had said the preceding night that it was impossible, and if he still adhered to the same declaration it would be equally valid now as then. This circumstance he adverted to only to shew that the necessity of explanation had not been superseded by any communication to the house. When a minister came to that house for a vote of money, for Purposes which he left them to the wildes flights of imagination to conjecture, and aid, that it was his duty not to give information, he should reply, that it was his duty to give no money. No one would deny, that it was desirable that we should have as extensive co-operation as possible, but the house had not expressed an opinion on that subject. After what had passed, it was a matter of less delicacy to express an opinion on hypothesis, as to the purpose for which 537 the vote was called for; whether on the hypothesis that it was to enable us to make terms of peace, or on the hypothesis that it was to engage the powers of the continent to co-operate with us in the war. On this head he should state briefly his opinion. It seemed to be the prevailing opinion, that to engage with Russia alone would make our situation more difficult than at present, unless Prussia or Austria could be included in the confederacy: of the first of these powers co-operating there was less hope, of the latter more, though he thought fear a more proper term than hope in the latter case. Without a sure prospect of efficient co-operation, he should feel most unhappy if he were to suffer this vote to pass without entering his protest against it, without warning this country and Europe against the consequences. No man could tell what would be the issue of war; but when they looked to the past, he asked, with what rational hope such a war as the late one could be begun, and with what rational ground of success? Was it intended that, at the present period of the year, when Austria was unprepared, any operations should be undertaken, or only that every thing should be prepared to begin the war in the next campaign? If Austria were to move, and the consequence should be, what was not improbable, productive of serious disasters, what would become of our hopes of continental connexions? what of the liberties of Europe? what of the prospect of setting limits to the power of France, justly and rationally considered already too formidable? Under such circumstances, and on such information, it became wise men to consider well before they should grant any money where the chances were one hundred to one against success. But it was the manner in which the matter was proposed that weighed with him. If we had remained at peace, as he wished we had, and Austria, Russia, or Prussia, had applied to us for assistance in their quarrel, no man would be more ready than himself to agree to granting it. But when we had dashed singly into the war, and, as had been argued the preceding night, for the purpose of rousing the powers of Europe by our example, which we could only exhibit in the case of invasion, that put the question on a different footing. He disliked the phrase to rouse Europe, because the attempt to do so had the effect of producing a disinclination to co-operate with us. Every man knew that the charac 538 ter of the British government in Europe was, that it was actuated by selfish motives in instigating the powers of the continent to war for British interests. He hoped that this opinion was false; but if we should attempt to instigate the powers of the continent to a renewal of hostilities, whilst they wished to remain at peace, whether for the purpose of regaining strength or recruiting their resources, or for whatever other reason, it would alienate the affections of Europe more from us than any inefficiency that could take place in the conduct of the war. If Austria alone were to embark with us in the war, she could not use her exertions With advantage to herself or to us. The interests of both would be identified, could not be Separated, and consequently neither could enjoy the full benefit of her exertions. This was a ground for thinking that the result could not be favourable. Austria would be driven to the alternative of concluding a treaty under the same circumstances which obliged her to conclude the treaty of Leoben and Luneville, and to submit to such terms as France should dictate; for it was contrary to all experience and history to suppose, as had been argued, that being engaged to Russia and England, she would be bound to hold out to the last. No country could be obliged by any treaty to hold out to its destruction and lie down under its ruin. There was another alternative which Austria might adopt, which was, to hold out to the end; and might not that conduct endanger the total extinction of the second power in Europe? If she chose, as he thought she would, the former alternative, we should then be driven, after all our efforts and expense, either to make a separate peace, or to carry on a defensive war. He hoped we should not be reduced to that alternative, and should not discuss what should be our conduct in such a case. If would be highly indiscreet in us to form an alliance for the purpose of a continental war with Russia and Austria, and it would be still more indiscreet in Austria, for Russia and Great-Britain would be in a far different situation from that of their ally. If such an alliance could be formed with Russia, Austria, Prussia, and the other powers of the continent, as would gain their good will, without attempting to rouse them before their own interests, in their own view of them, would call for their exertions, such an alliance would afford hopes that we might obtain reasonable terms of peace. 539 His reason for not voting for the sum proposed was, because no answer had been returned to the propositions of the French government. Time enough had elapsed for obtaining the consent of Russia; and the effect of with-holding explanation from the house on the subject must be, that they would not place any confidence in his majesty's ministers. Was any reputation gained by not returning an answer? Were they not, until some explanation should be given, in the odious situation of having left a pacific proposition six months unanswered? But it had been said, that a few days after the proposition, a message had been sent to the French council in terms not very complimentary to the British government. Certainly we should not be the foremost to notice such expressions, for even the message under consideration contained language not very complimentary to the French government. He was ignorant what propositions his majesty's ministers intended to make, but he had no doubt that they ought to be kept secret till they should be made known at a general congress. If it was their intention to propose terms through Russia to France, he took that opportunity of entreating his majesty's ministers, that they might be reasonable. He did not mean that the propositions should be exactly what they would insist upon as their ultimatum, but that the difference between the extremes of what they should at first demand, and what they should afterwards consent to accept, should be as small as may be. If the propositions should be such as Europe should think unreasonable, or as this government, if in the place of the French government, would think unreasonable, to be accepted; if they should be such only as were to form the grounds of a manifesto on the part of powers previously determined on war, though you should engage the continent in a new war, you would alienate the disposition of Europe from yon more than if no terms should be proposed at all. He spoke thus generally, because totally in the dark on the subject, and guided only by conjecture. Whatever we might say of our disinterestedness, whatever of moderation and forbearance, Europe had a different opinion, which might possibly be wrong but we had a character to gain or retrieve on the occasion. Let the answer to be returned contain propositions reasonable in the extreme, if such a contradiction of terms could be used, the effect would be that they might be accepted, and that Would be the only mischief that 540 could result from proposing them. We should then make a separate peace, and could any man contend that there was comparatively any great difference as to the object, whether a peace was to be concluded by Great-Britain and Russia, or upon terms that would be approved of by all Europe, and which all the powers of Europe would possibly guarantee? But if the terms should not be accepted, as some gentlemen were disposed to think that there was no inclination in the French government, though for himself he had some doubts of it, whilst the leaning of his mind was the other way, this would strengthen the argument of those who urged the necessity of rousing Europe. The more reasonable the terms that should be rejected, the greater would be the indignation of Europe at their rejection. He could not help thinking, that Europe had been through peace and war against us, and with France. France has now given us an advantage to conciliate all the world, and we should manage it. It was not enough that the indignation of Europe was excited, we should persuade the continent that we had reason on our side, and that the injustice was on the part of France. He was glad of this opportunity of stating his opinion on the general question. As to the particular subject now under discussion, he had nothing to add to what he had stated at the outset, that he could not agree to it. If it was a vote of credit, that would not be novel. When last war a subsidiary treaty had been arranged with Russia, a sum of money had been voted, but then the house knew for what object. In the present case they were told nothing. They did not know whether it was intended for Austria or Russia, or for purposes of enabling us to procure terms of peace, and they had no security that it would not be applied in the manner the house was most apprehensive of. He should therefore give the vote a decided negative.
§ The Chancellor of the Exchequer replied, that when he had said that it was needless to enter further on this question now, he had rested his assertion on the general views which the house had of the object which was designed to be answered by this vote of credit. That object was to form such a cooperation with the continental powers, as would ultimately lead to a secure and lasting peace. Now what he conceived the house to have distinctly agreed in was, that a general concert would be far better than if any 541 attempt had been made at a separate pacification. That was the general opinion, and even the opinion of many of those who did not exactly agree with him. But from what the hon. gent. had now said, he thought that he had abandoned this principle, so far as to say that a separate peace would be better than any concert formed for the purpose either of peace or of war. His observations seemed to go this length, that all attempts at releasing ourselves from our present situation were improper, because it might happen that our affairs might be made worse. This was a mode of reasoning that would lead all the powers of the continent to remain supine under the oppression of France, and never attempt to oppose her schemes of ambition and aggrandizement. Why? because, in opposing these schemes, they ran a risk of making matters worse. But were they to wait till the power of France was much more increased, and much more confirmed? till their own resources were much more reduced than they were at present, and till the power of resistance was gone? This would indeed be exposing themselves to a certainty of having theirs made worse. Surely the hon. gent. could never intend to carry the opinion to this extent. But then he said, that we ought to wait till they were ready, and not to place ourselves in the odious character of the disturbers of Europe. If he were at liberty to enter upon a statement of facts, he might perhaps satisfy even the hon. gent. on that head. This he was not at liberty to do. However, if we were at peace with a country, and endeavoured to excite other nations against it, for views and purposes of our own, undoubtedly this would be to expose ourselves to the odium to which he alluded. But he could not conceive what odium could attach to you, when you were unjustly attacked, if you endeavoured to bring others to your assistance, especially if their interests were equally concerned. No odium, then, could justly be attached to us on this account. It might be perhaps, invidious to involve other nations in war, when your own interest alone was concerned; but in the present case, our own interest and that of the continent were closely connected, as the security of both in a great measure depended upon their co-operation. If you therefore could open the eyes of the continental nations to their true interests, if you could clearly shew them that not only their interests but their salvation depended upon their joining you in opposing, an enemy whose object it was to de 542 stroy you both, then surely it was not only not unjust, but it was even meritorious, to secure their co-operation if possible. But it ought to be observed, that this might in point of fact be the case, though he only meant to put it hypothetically. The powers of the continent might have doubts as to their ability for prosecuting the war. Now might it not happen that these doubts might arise from their being much more powerful in any other way than in their finances? In this case we might have the ability to remove all these doubts. Was not this altogether fair and desirable? If you were enabled to remove their objections, and to hold out an expectation that they would be supplied where they were most deficient, would it not be both for their interest and your own to do so? When the hon. gent. recurred to the idea of a peace guaranteed by the other notions of Europe, it was above all things to be considered, what was the situation of those powers who were to be the guarantees, and what were their means of preserving it. If they were in such a state of weakness as not to be able to punish a violation of the treaty, to what effectual purpose would their guarantee serve? Viewing the subject in this light, it appeared to him necessary that there should be some concentred system agreed on between us and other powers, before we could properly explain ourselves to France, with respect to that sort of peace which we might think necessary for our own security, and the security of Europe. To establish this sort of concert among the other nations was certainly a subject of much delicacy and difficulty, and it was therefore not at all surprising that the negotiations were not now in such a state of maturity as to allow of a communication respecting them. The hon. gent. seemed to misunderstand the spirit of the answer which was given by his majesty to the overture of peace on the part of France. Nothing could have been more loose or general than the terms of that overture, and certainly the answer was not disdainful or scornful; it was all that the country, under the existing circumstances, could say; for it stated our desire of peace, but at the same time the necessity we felt of consulting the other nations of Europe, with whom we were in confidential intercourse. The French overture stated no specific terms upon which peace could be granted; but the messages of the French government to the legislative body, lay down as a sine qua non of peace, that we shall agree not only to 543 the treaty of Amiens, but to their construction of that treaty on the particular points which occasioned the present war. It would be recollected, that the cause of the present war, as had been expressly stated, proceeded from the general encroachments of France upon all other nations, accompanied by a peremptory demand that we should relinquish that which, in the opinion of our government, and in his private opinion, the country could not, under all circumstances, be called upon to relinquish by the treaty. He did not know how far the judgment of the other nations of Exrope might be induced by the arts and misrepresentations of France to consider the cause of this country as unjust, but he considered, and he trusted the house did, that the war was on our part most strictly just. There was one proposition of the hon. gent. to which every body must agree, namely, that peace should, if possible, be concluded upon reasonable terms. This general proposition was most undeniable, but the difference still existed upon what terms were to be considered reasonable. The hon. gent. seemed to consider, that in order to make the terms reasonable, they should be such as the enemy would accept of. This was a most strange conclusion; at a time when we are at war professedly for the purpose of defending ourselves against the schemes of inordinate ambition which France has manifested, it would be extraordinary to make the criterion of a reasonable peace that which would please France. He was ready to allow that the alliance of Russia alone would not promise such efficacious or powerful co-operation as would make it worth while to protract the war on account of any hope it would hold, or even equivalent for the large vote of credit which was demanded; but it was his opinion that even the limited co-operation of a few of the powers, and for a short time, might be of material service in the course of the war, in protecting those points which the enemy appeared particularly anxious to attack.
§ Mr. Fox replied, that what he had stated, the preceding night was, that the chance of loss in this war appeared to him considerably more than that of any adyantage. He considered that this applied also to those powers whom it appeared that he wished to instigate to the war. As far as he was informed of the state of Europe, he believed that if Austria could be allured, and tempted by any subsidy we offered, to engage in a war with France, she would expose herself to 544 the most extreme peril, to a danger far beyond any chance of advantage. In point of fact, he believed the general opinion of Europe was, that in the present war we were in the wrong. This opinion, he feared, was not only very general, but very just. On the general principle of the right of instigating other nations to take part in our quarrel, the only difference between him and the right hon. gent. seemed to be this; the right hon. gent. spoke theoretically, but he spoke practically. He never talked of the injustice of exciting Austria to war, he merely spoke of the impolicy of it, on account of the dangers to which it would expose that power. He never heard any body so sanguine as to expect the assistance of both Austria and Prussia, and if they were on opposite sides we might lose as much on one as we would gain on the other. Perhaps after receiving our subsidy, the two powers might think it better to pair off, as gentlemen often do in this house when they do not chuse to wait for the division. As the right hon. gent. had thought he had not exposed himself with sufficient precision in talking of reasonable terms of peace, he should explain himself as to what he meant by reasonable terms. He thought the criterion of what was reasonable could only be determined by supposing ourselves in the place of the enemy. Such terms as we evidently could not listen to were we in his situation, were terms which would certainly not be reasonable for us to propose or insist on.
§ Lord Henry Petty supported the opinion of his hon. friend who had just sat down. When we were called upon to come to a vote of credit, unparalleled in amount, and under such extraordinary circumstances, we ought certainly to be in possession of all possible information on the subject. Ministers had, however, been labouring for six months to procure information for the house, but in vain; and this, in his opinion, sufficiently evinced the true state of the case. In the absence of all official information, we must have recourse to that inferior species of information which it was in the power of every man to possess. How did that represent the state of Europe? Look to Austria. There was nothing in that quarter to induce us to believe her finances or her armies were in such a situation as to enable her to take the lead in the confederacy against France. The intimate connexion which Prussia had for many years had with France did not seem lessened, but was rather confirmed. Russia 545 evinced no disposition to depart from that cautious policy, which originating with Catherine, and departed from by Paul, was again pursued by Alexander. As to Germany, the homage shewn to the French emperor in his progress down the Rhone, sufficiently proved sentiments of that country. Every ground was wanting on which such a vote could be justified—the number of the powers, and the character of those powers, the knowledge of [...]com-me basis on which they would agree to act, and that that action had peace for its object. We were told we are to vote this money out of the abundant resources of the country. That the resources of the country. That the resources of the country were such as, by making great sacrifices, might enable to assist another power in making efforts which parliament should consider as adviseable, he would not deny; but as no information whatever had been communicated to the house, by which they were qualified to judge of the propriety of appropriating a single shilling of the public money to that purpose, he should give his decided negative to the motion.
§ Mr. Bankes, in voting for the motion, declared, that he should not consider himself bound to approve of the subsequent application of the money so voted. He deprecated the system of carrying on wars by subsides, and contended, that from an examination of the history of the last century, it would be found, that in no case had a foreign power remained in our interest for more than two or three years, after such power had received our money. He said this, because it seemed to be insinuated the preceding night, that some new light had broken in upon those who had formerly held opinions adverse to continental connexions, and that they were ready to come and make the amende honorable for ever having entertained such sentiments.
§ Mr. W. Smith thought the hon. gent. (Mr. Bankes) would have acted more consistently with his protest against being bound to approve of the disposition of the money to be raised by the vote of credit proposed had he withheld his consent to that proposition until he had ascertained what was to be done with it. He dissented from the motion, on the grounds which had been so ably stated by his hon. friend near him (Mr. Fox). He called on the right hon. gent. opposite to consider the precipice to the brink of which he had brought the country, and the dreadful responsibility that hung over him. There was not a point in which the situation of the 546 country was not infinitely worse than it was when the overture from France was made, and if the negotiation with Russia should fail, the consequence might be most serious.—The question was then put, and carried without a division.—Resolutions for providing a sum sufficient to cover the outstanding exchequer bills January, and the miscellaneous grants for Ireland, &c. were agreed to.
§ Mr. Long said, that the committee to whom the petition of the trustees of the British museum, praying a sum of 20,000l. for the purchase, of certain models of ancient sculpture, late the property, and in the possession of Charles Townley, esq. deceased, had been referred, had made their report in favour of granting that sum, as they thought the purchase a very cheep one, and that it could not fail to prove of the greatest advantage to the artists, and the fine arts, in this country. Having stated this as the opinion of the committee, he would not trespass on their time further, than to move,"that a sum not exceeding 20,000l. be granted to his majesty, to enable the trustees of the British museum to purchase the said collection."
§ Mr. W. Smith said a few words in favour of the motion, and gave it as his opinion, that it was the best bargain that ever was made for the public.
§ Mr. Bankes spoke in the highest terms of the excellence of the collection, and the great benefit the fine arts in this country would certainly derive from its being accessible, to the public. He mentioned, however, that Mr. Townley had, by his will, left a sum of 4,500l. towards building a gallery to contain the said collection, for the purpose of letting the public have access to it. The brother had relatives of Mr Townley were persons of large fortune, and very liberal sentiments, and had offered the collection to the public at a very cheap purchase, rather than be at the trouble of building a gallery, and at the risk of breaking those valuable marbles in the removal. He thought, therefore, there was a chance, if the house did not agree to the purchase, that in the end the public might perhaps get the collection for nothing. He hoped, if the purchase was made, some care would be taken by the house to make regulations in favour of the public.—Sir W. Young, Mr. Corry, and Mr. Wilberforce, said each a few Words, in favour of the purchase, and in praise of the collection.
§ Mr. Windham said, that the hon. gent. 547 (Mr. Bankes) who had spoken so favourably of this collection, as well as of the liberality of the present owners, had supposed, that if the house did not agree to the purchase, the public might get them for nothing. Yet he begged the committee to consider, that if the house did not agree to the purchase, by the same rule, the public might not get them at all. He retained, therefore, the same opinion he had expressed in the committee, that the collection was highly valuable, and the purchase a cheap one.—This resolution was then unanimously agreed to, and the house having resumed, the report was ordered to be received on Monday.
§ The house then, on the motion of the chancellor of the exchequer, resolved itself into a committee of the whole house to consider of the ways and means for raising a supply, in which a resolution was agreed to for appropriating towards the supply 14,500,000l. arising, or to arise, from acts of the 43d, 44th, and 45th years of his majesty, for granting certain duties during the present war, after deducting what had been applied for the service of the last year.—Also resolutions were voted for raising eight millions, two millions five hundred thousand pounds, and one million five hundred thousand pounds, by loans on exchequer bills. The house being resumed, the report was ordered to be received on Monday, on which day the house agreed to go into a further committee of ways and means.