§ Mr. Crey rose to make his promised motion on the state of public affairs, and spoke, in substance as follows:I rise for the purpose of calling the attention of the house to the present most critical state of the country, and in doing so I am not aware that 491 any other apology will be necessary, than what the subject itself will afford. Whether we look to our foreign or our domestic state, whether we fix our view on our colonial establishments, on the situation of our commerce, our finances, of our army or navy, whether we look at the state of the war, and the chance of peace, we shall find that on every one of these points, forming in the aggregate the actual state of the empire at large, there is matter of serious consideration, that upon the whole there is room for much anxiety, and that to carry us safe through the present crisis, will demand all the wisdom and energy we possess. To embrace all this variety of subjects in a single discussion, would exceed any abilities, however great; and for me to offer even a slight sketch of them, might seem presumption, were it not that the state of affairs itself so imperiously calls for investigation and the importance of the interests at stake, renders it the duty of a member of parliament to bring the situation of affairs before the public. It is now two years since the commencement of war, a war in which we are still engaged, undertaken after a short, uncertain interval of unavailing peace. It naturally suggests itself, then, to enquire, what were the grounds on which the war was commenced? what the objects to which it was directed? what the prospects of success with which it is attended? and what the best policy in the conduct of it. The first object which presents itself is the state of our finances, a subject of itself sufficient for more than one day's discussion; upon which, however, I shall enter into no detail, particularly as the end of the session, to lay before the house a statement of the public finances, as they stand at the time and I hope an able and hon. friend of mine (Mr. Johnstone),who has already distinguished himself in this business, will this year favour the house with a similar exertion of his industry. At the beginning of the war we were assured, that the war could be carried on for several years, without any addition to the capital of the debt, by borrowing no more than was extinguished by the operation of the sinking fund. I at the time doubted the solidity of this promise, and we are now certain that it was fallacious. For three years of the war forty millions have already been borrowed, and an addition of at least thirty millions made to the capital of our debt, beyond what the sinking 492 fund has redeemed. Such is the effect of the war,as to the capital of our debt already; but when we contemplate the magnitude of our expenditure, when we consider that last year our expense amounted to seventy millions, and that this year in all probability, it will be more, it is impossible not to see that our finances, though undoubtedly they are still great, and with good management adequate to the greatest objects, must deserve the serious attention of every British statesman. They are in such a situation as to render either prodigal administration, or wanton expense, in the highest degree criminal; and in a comparison of our prospects they strongly remind us that war ought not to be pursued, if peace on fair and honourable terms can be obtained. But, it is not the amount of our extraordinary war expenditure only that must increase. Even were war to cease immediately, our permanent expenditure must be greatly increased. I shall not, I believe, be contradicted, when I say that the whole amount of the interest, &c. of our debt, will be at least thirty millions, and looking at the state of Europe after a peace, it cannot be imagined that we could sit down with a peace establishment of less than forty millions a year. At a time, then, when the amount of the taxes is so great, and when for the first time there appears reason to conclude from their produce, that they have been carried as far as they can go, it is the more necessary to enquire whether war be indispensable. But leaving this subject, I shall barely allude to the state of the army, because at the beginning of the session that subject was so completely discussed by my right hon friend (Mr. Windham), and a notice of a motion has been given by an hon. colonel (Craufurd) so well qualified to do it justice. This much however, I may observe generally, that the necessity of an improvement of our army was last year universally admitted. It was so particularly insisted upon by the present minister, in the shape of a charge against his predecessor, that it cannot now be forgotten or disputed. Yet it has been shewn that any improvement that may have taken place is far short both of what the nation had a right to expect, and of what its situation demanded. The supplementary militia has been reduced and this measure, as far as it goes, I do not disapprove of; but let it be remembered, that if it gives us any advantage in point of discipline and quality, it adds nothing to our number for home 493 defence. But allowing as much for this as can be claimed, yet, when we compare our whole military force with that of the enemy, with his increasing means, with his uninterrupted exertions, with the menaced attacks upon us, withdrawing our naval protection to foreign stations, we shall be forced to conclude that we have not kept pace with the progress of the foe; that, in comparison with our danger, our means of security have not advanced, and that in reality the country is now less upon an equality with the preparations, and with the means o France, than it was last year when the right hon. gent. so strongly arraigned the imbecility and incapacity of his predecessors in office. It appears from a paper I have before me, that since January 1805, there have been raised four thousand two or three hundred men, by ordinary recruiting. Of these above two thousand have been for regiments at home. It appears, too, that the casualties within that period, to the regiments at home, is within one hundred and seventy of the whole supplies they have received by ordinary recruiting. Any if we reckon, as doubtless we may, the casualties of regiments on foreign stations, at least as great as of those at home, it will follow that the army, on the footing it now stands, can with difficulty be kept up by the recruits it receives. The reduction of the militia, which makes no addition to the numbers for home defence, is the only augmentation which the army of the country has obtained in the course of the last year. The whole of this subject will be so much more ably stated by the hon. colonel (Craufurd) who has turned his attention to it, that I shall abstain from any further remarks, contenting myself with saying, that those facts which are within the level of every man's observation, are of themselves sufficient to excite anxiety in so important a branch of our defence—I proceed now to that which is the grand bulwark of our safety, the navy; and if, as we have seen, there is no cause to congratulate ourselves on the improvement of our finances, or of our army, I fear that the state of the exultation. Last year at this time we had in commission of the line eighty-eight ships, and at the present moment I understand the number of this class in commission is only ninety-one, being an increase of three since last year. There have been added seven frigates, twenty-two loops, and fifty gun brigs. The 494 number of seamen voted last year was seventy-eight thousand, and the number actually mustered was above eighty-seven thousand, being above nine thousand more than the vote. What the number now mustered is I cannot say, but I apprehend from the difficulty of manning the ships put in commission, of which I have heard something, that the number now mustered is not greater than that mustered this time twelve-month. The addition of line of battle ships, and of frigates, we see, is very small, and though that of gun-brigs is larger in the amount, I do not think it adds greatly to our security. I fear, indeed, that the right hon. gent. has been deceived s to the importance of this class of vessels. Compared with the immense number of the enemy, they are nothing; and if our defence were to depend on them, we should be wretched indeed. The improvement of the navy in that class of ships which must constitute our chief defence against every naval attempt of the enemy is by no means satisfactory. It is admitted, indeed, by many no the other side, that our navy is not in the state in which it ought to be; but this they assert as matter of charge against a former board of admiralty. That charge, and the defence of the accused party, forms just ground of enquiry into the facts. For my own part, I profess to be little versed in the subject, but as far as authority goes, and as far as my own investigations can form the ground of my judgement, I am decidedly of opinion, that the system of lord St. Vincent was the best and that if he had remained in office he would have placed the navy of England in that state of superiority and of power which all friends to the country must desire to see. This, however, I only state incidentally, and after the deserving of examination; and with a view to our situation either for carrying on war with vigour or negotiating with effect, the navy demands the most serious care and attention of the house—If from these topics we turn to our domestic situation, then indeed there is room for a satisfaction unmingled. Never was there a period when the people were more disposed cheerfully to bear the burden imposed upon them by the circumstances of the times. Never was there loyalty more active and more cordial. Never was the spirit of the whole nation more determined to resist every attack on their independence, and to defend themselves at very hazard. But while we congratulate ourselves on this pleasing picture, 495 we cannot help observing, that the burden of taxes presses hard on many classes; and we ought the more to feel that burdens borne with so much loyalty, should be lightened, if possible, at least, should not be increased without necessity. If we look at Ireland, I hope that there too we shall find ground of satisfaction, for, in part, through the conciliating administration of lord Hard wicke, considerable progress has been made in composing that country. More indeed has been done by the example of the consequences of French aid to those who ever looked with any degree of hope to the effects of French co-operation. If the state of Ireland be not yet so satisfactory as it might be, yet there is reason to hope that the Irish now see the advantage of British connexion, and that they know that what they have to expect from the liberality and the policy of Great Britain, would utterly be lost by French conquest; that by contributing to the injury of their natural friends, by a correspondence with France, they would only be adding themselves to the list of, slaves whom France has seduced under her dominion, either in an object dependence, or totally stripped of their name and existence as a nation. Such reflections and such examples must have wrought a great change in the sentiments even of the disaffected. But still there is room for farther improvement. There is room for that entire cordiality between the two countries, or rather between the different parts of the empire, that instead of being our weakness, Ireland should be one of the chief instruments of our greatness; instead of absorbing a large portion of our military force to preserve tranquillity,she might contribute so large a portion to the active military strength of the state. To me it seems, that while any obstacle remains to the entire satisfaction of catholic body, regard to the objects for which they petitioned the legislature, the progress to perfect tranquillity and to complete co-operation must be far short of what it might be. Yet both by legislative measures, and by those of administration, much may be done, I am satisfied that it is the wish of lord Hardwicke to do every thing that depends upon him, but I fear that on the other, side of the channel,as here, they labour under the distraction of a divided government. Lord Hardwicke can never give full effect to his wishes, while the second officer in Ireland is allowed to continue; while the system of the first or second minister of Ireland in this house is so 496 different from that which lord Hardwicke would be disposed to adopt. Much, therefore, as has been done, yet much remains, which a wise administration might accomplish; and Ireland still appears that part of the empire to which it is impossible to look without some anxiety, and without feeling that it merits our utmost vigilance and attention—As to the state of the war, it will be found to afford as little ground of exuitation as any of the topics we have reviewed. The war in India may be thought an exception; but on that branch, as indeed not connected with the war with France, and as already discussed at much detail on a motion of my hon. friend (Mr. Francis), I shall not enlarge. Let us then shortly enquire what has been the effect of the war; what the objects of it, and the chances of their attainment? The general object, independent of the particular causes enumerated at the time, I apprehend to have been the necessity of limiting the aggrandizement and restraining the ambition of France; and some, I believe, went so far as to insist on the necessity of reducing her power. What progress, then has been made in these objects? Is the power of France reduced? Has any barrier against its increase been obtained? On the contrary, has not. Buonaparté placed the iron crown of Italy on his head? Has he not converted Spain from a reluctant tributary into an active and efficient ally? Is not Portugal, because we are unable to defend her,compelled to furnish a subsidy to be employed in the annoyance of her most ancient and most sincere friend? Does not Belgium still continue incorporated with France, and is not Holland entirely under her control? Are not both of them compelled to contribute their exertions for the destruction of this country? Are their ports filled with preparations for invading us? Is not Hanover occupied by France, and compelled to furnish supplies for the enemies of her lawful sovereign? Are not the Alps, the Pyrenees, the Rhine and the ocean the boundaries of France? And, while her power on the continent seems both extended and consolidated is there are any prospect of an efficient confederacy to limit her insolence and reduce her power? On the contrary, are not the great powers of the continent averse from any continental war? Does not France occupy Italy and switzerland as positions from which to fall upon Austria? Does she not hold Hanover to watch the north of Europe? And while her strength seems thus extended, and her 497 position so formidable, is there any thing in her internal situation to afford a rational prospect of relief from time or accident? Are her finances ruined, her army mutinous, or her navy dilapidated? But this year we have had no comparisons from the right hon. gent. between the resources and the credit of France and this country; we have heard no assertion that she was on the verge, nay, in the gulf of bankruptcy; or any hope whatever, that from want of means she would be compelled to give up the contest. Even sir Francis D'Ivernois, perservering in his warfare with the French finances, affords us, at least up to the present moment, little rooms for congratulation. The expose, some time since presented by the French government to the legislature, asserts, that without new imposts, or extraordinary resources or loans, the war will be maintained by the revenue of thirty millions a year, and that if the war were to last ten years, it would add nothing to the debt of France, while that of England would be increased four milliards. This promise resembles that made by the ministers of this country at the beginning of the war, but I am afraid that hitherto, at least it has been better kept, since even sir Francis D'Ivernois admits that her contributions in time of war will cover the deficiency in her receipts, and that her domestic revenues and her foreign contributions have covered her expenses. Her thinks, indeed, that this must cease, since the supplies from Spain are out off by the vigorous policy of this government; a policy, however, which I fear this country will have cause to rue, when we see the tribute exchanged for a co-operation so active and so effectual, as appears now to be displayed. That such a country as France, with an active and ingenious population, should be ruined in her finances, while her expenditure is confined within thirty millions sterling, it were the height of absurdity to suppose. If, then, the war were to be a war of finances, and allowing every thing for the superior industry, capital, and commerce of this country, it would be vain to attempt to conquer by that means, while our own expenditure was little short of eight millions, a year. But, if we cannot raise our hopes on the approaching bankruptcy of France, can we calculate upon the state of her army? Are not its spirit unbroken? Is it not commanded by the most skilful officers? And does it not on every side occupy the most formidable position? 498 Surely this comparison with our own does not encourage any flattering hope of attaining the objects of the war. Is the state of her navy more consolatory to us? We have added three ships of the line to our navy. France, by extraordinary exertions, has in the course of last year, added fleets to hers. The navy of France cannot now be estimated at less than forty-eight ships of the line; the Dutch have eleven sail; Spain in all has sixty-one sail; but, allowing a great number to be unfit for service, I believe I am within the mark when I say, that Spain contributes to the line fit for service, Thus France has in all eighty-three ships of the line at her disposal, being eight less than the force we now have. This disproportion, indeed, is greatly increased, by the superiority of skill and discipline possessed by our seamen. But still we see that France, within so short a space, has made advances towards us altogether unexpected. She has contrived, too, by well combined plans, and through the want of vigour and intelligence in our government, to send to sea considerable expeditions. Occupying large divisions of our fleets in blockades along her whole line of coast, she has equipped armaments that have escaped our vigilance, have gone to our distant colonies, committing depredations, if not to the extend they might have done, depredations highly prejudicial to our interests, and disgraceful to the nation. It certainly is an extraordinary spectacle at the end of two years of a war, undertaken to limit the aggrandizement, and reduce the power of France, and that too under circumstances, particularly as to the naval state of France, peculiarly favourable, that we now continent, growing formidable on the ocean, threatening our foreign possession with a powerful armament, of which though we are ignorant of the destination, we are almost certain that it will go to some quarter where we have not an adequate force to oppose it. The circumstance attending the sailing of the Toulon fleet, and its junction with that of Cudiz, are of themselves sufficiently extraordinary to call for enquiry. The Toulon fleet sailed twice without being met by our fleet in the mediterranean, which not only shews our want of intelligence, but the want of a convenient station in that sea from which to observe the movements of the enemy, a circumstance, by the way, which may serve to illustrate the importance of Malta, to which, at the beginning of the war, so 499 much was attached. It sailed twice, however, without interruption, and having effected a junction with the Spaniards at Cadiz on the 9th of April, proceeded to sea again And is it not an extraordinary circumstance, that now, on the 20th of June, we should be ignorant of the destination of so large an armament, which sailed from Cadiz on the 9th of April, to strike a blow at some of our foreign settlements? Indeed, so extraordinary is this affair, that the house ought not to separate till it be investigated. I must add, too, that the conduct of the officer who commanded our fleet off Cadiz, when the French appeared, on the face of it calls for enquiry. I do not mean to say that sir John Orde may not be able to justify himself; he certainly was greatly inferior in point of numbers. We trust, on many occasions, to the superiority of our navy under great inequality of numbers, but nothing has more tended to create that excellence, which justifies the confidence, than the sound discretion exercised in the appointment of naval commanders, a discretion, on which the Public opinion ought to have no inconsiderable Weight, because that opinion calls forth the merit it rewards. I do not blame sir John Orde because he in stantly put to sea as soon as the French fleet appeared; he was inferior to the enemy doubtless; but there are occasions When high Spirit, and a strong feeling of the public cause, will induce men to run great risks for great objects, and it is on such occasions When bold attempts are often crowned with Success, or at least find the best consolation for disappointment. The striking fact is, that sir John Orde Made a retreat from Cadiz at the Moment when a junction was to be effected, from which the most important consequences, and probably great disasters to this country, were likely to ensue. Sir John Orde, however, maybe Perfectly. Justifiable, I only say that the affair calls for investigation. The state of his fleet May have been such as to make it improper for him to do that which, with a fleet in suitable order, he would attempted. I have Seen a paper which gives an account of the fleet, and of each ship respectively of his fleet. The Glory is stated to have hurt, in her mast, and otherwise out of repair; the Agamemnon was likewise defective in various points, so the Polyphemus and renown. If this representation be correct, it involves a most serious charge against the admiralty; but why the 500 ships should have wanted water, which might have been had from the coast of Portugal, or from Gibraltar, I am at a loss to say. At any rate, however, why did not sir John Orde leave behind some vessels to watch and to trace the enemy, and to give such information, either to lord Nelson, when he Came down the Mediterranean, or to government at house, that the foe might have been pursued with a probability of overtaking him? Why did not sir John Orde, if he thought himself unequal in any Manner to engage the enemy, stand away to Ferrol, and, joining that squadron, obstruct the sailing of the enemy's armament, and perhaps defeat it? Or, might he not have taken a middle station, to watch them till joined by some other squadron? These are all very important circumstances; the public expects the elucidation of them and it is the duty of the house to lead the way in the enquiry. As to the destination of the fleet, Jamaica appears to me the most likely object, and there is a rumour in town, which at least may be true, that it has been attacked. After that, Brazil appears the most probable object, and it is one every way of vast importance: as a military station, it, would give the enemy the command of our India trade. We could not blockade Rio Janeiro; and our India fleets must go Under a Convoy as strong as the enemy on that Station might be. As auxiliary to ultimate views in India, it would be of vast consequence, and it would supply Ship timber; it would afford immense wealth, and it would affect our interest, by depriving us of the Brazil cotton, so essential in our manufactures. If their object, however, be the East Indies, I shall rejoice, because there I am persuaded, that though they may do considerable injury, they least affect our permanent interests, and will, in the end, most certainly be over come; and with such officers as sir Edward, Pellew and sir Thomas Trowbridge in that quarter, there would be little chance of their acquiring any ascendency by sea. In every quarter to which they may go, however, they can meet with no force adequate to oppose them, and the question appears to be only this, Where are they likely to do the least damage? If We escape We can ascribe it only to providence, unless we calculate on the same mismanagement in this that has been conspicuous in their former naval expeditions, which, however, in the present circumstances, is not so likely as on other occasion—Such, then, is the situation of the war that was to limit the ambition 501 and reduce the power of France. But we have resisted the threatened invasion! This appears to me a very futile boast. The invasion was threatened at the beginning of the war, and it is threatened now. If it has not hitherto been attempted, that may be ascribed, not so much to our domestic preparation, as to the superiority of our navy I, for one, never believed that the invasion would immediately be attempted. It has, in a great measure, answered what probably was its end; it has kept the nation in perpetual alarm, and exposed us to immense expense, without at all advancing the objects of the war, and all the preparations for the design are according to the information in the king's speech, still continued That one great object of the enemy was to distract our attention, is highly probable; but; if invasion ever was the object, there is no reason whatever to believe,that it is abandoned. Whatever Buonaparte's character in other respects may be, we have not seen that as a soldier he is subject to passion; he is not to be incited by taunts, to an attempt for which things are not ready; but if affairs here are conducted as they have been, when our fleets are scattered pursuit of the enemy, when our troops are dispersed in foreign settlements, that attempt for which the preparations have never been relaxed a moment, may at last be, tried; and that Buonaparte sees all these combinations there can be no doubt. The boast of not being invaded, is one of the most idle and absurd which it is possible to conceive—Thus, sir, I have shewn, from unquestionable facts, that no material improvement has taken place in our military and naval state; that none of the objects of the war have been attained; and that no progress whatever has been made towards them, or is likely in future. In this situation, it is the imperious duty of the house to call upon ministers to give us some rational prospect of pursuing the war with success, or of explaining to us that peace on equitable and honourable terms not to be obtained—This leads me to notice the state of our continental alliance, as alluded to in the speech from the throne, in the speeches of the minister, or in other communications. On this head, too, I fear there is nothing on which we can congratulate ourselves. While Buonaparte's power on the continent remains unimpaired.,he exercises over his neighbours an influence of Policy or intimidation which at present leaves little room to hope for efficient co-operation. At the beginning of the session we were told, 502 "notwithstanding these transactious, so repugnant to every sentiment of moderation and justice, I have recently received a communication from the French go ermment containing professions of a pacific disposition. I have, in consequence, expressed my earnest desire to embrace the first opportunity of restoring the blessings of peace, on such grounds as may he consistent with the permanent safety and interests of my dominions; but am confident you will agree with me, that those objects are closely connected with the general security of Europe. I have, therefore, not thought it right to enter into any more particular explanation, without previous communication with those powers on the continent with whom I am engaged in confidental intercourse and connexion, with a view to that important object, and especially with the emperor of Russia, Who has given the strongest proof of the wise dignified sentiments by which he is, animated, and of the warm interest be takes in the safety and independence of Europe."—There is no instance, I believe, of the house being thus left so much in the dark, not of the actual state of things, but of the views and objects of government. The former it may be proper to conceal; but of the latter, can it be, fit that the house should be ignorant, when the public is to Undergo the burdens they may involve? The Communications on such. subjects during the war have been generally of three kinds: either they State, that peace, through the spirit and ambition of the enemy, is unattainable; or that propositions received, but not such as to justify relaxation in the conduct of government; or preparations for the war; or, lastly, they have announced negotiations, the result of which would in due time be laid before parliament. But his majesty's speech merely says, that to an overture, on the face of it fair and open, no answer can be given because his majesty is engaged in confidential intercourse with other powers. No views Whatever of the policy to which that intercourse is directed; no hint, whether it is an intercourse pointing to arrangement for peace or for war, is given. Such was the ignorance, of parliament at the opening of the session. from some of the principles stated in another, part of the speech, of which I have read an extract I am so far from dissenting, that I am happy to take this opportunity of expressing my concurrence in them to any fair conse 503 quences to which they can be carried. The speech says, that the interest of this country is connected with that of the continent; and that propositions is peculiarly true in the present circumstances of Great-Britain and of Europe. I therefore distinctly avow my assent to this propositions, because without a great and powerful co-operation on the continent there can be no chance of reducing the power of France; and because unless, failing that, the great powers take a part in negotiation in one shape or other, my hope of permanent peace will be much weakened. But in saying this I must say too that unless the co-operation of the continental powers be such as to afford a rational prospect of success, it would not be desirable. In that case, too, it appears to me that a separate peace, on moderate terms, would be preferable to a mere defensive war. If, indeed, the enemy were to be so unreasonable as to reject all equitable terms, the nation would then not only submit to a defensive war, but to every sacrifice and privation, rather than fall down at the feel of France. then, indeed, it would be proper to make no peace, and the spirit of the country would make none till every resource had been exhausted and every exertion tried; till we could say in the words formerly quoted by the right hon. gent—"Potuit quae plurima virtus, &c."—This extreme case is not likely to occur; but if, reduced to the necessity of that defensive war, which is only not worse than an inadequate peace, it would be the duty of the house to see that it was not so conducted as to be even more dangerous than peace, and to take care that every effort should be well directed, and every expense applied with economy. The other alternative I have mentioned is a separate peace, in case the co-operation of the continent or the concert of other powers in negotiation were unavailing. I hope such a peace will not take make place. It is impossible to say beforehand, however, what such a peace might be; it might be better than a mere defensive war. A great responsibility would be on those who concluded it, as to the time and the terms of it, and obtaining the best securities which circumstances would admit. but at any rate they ought to be such as, if violated, would at once shew, in the strongest light, the injustice and violence of the enemy. Upon these points I shall not dilate, as it is impossible to anticipate either the circumstances that would justify or condemn such a transaction, 504 whether peace were negotiation in conjunction with our allies or under the mediation or guarantee of other powers. Let us now, then, examine the answer sent by our government to Buonaparte's overture. Had we at that time been engaged in alliance with Russia, or had negotiation with that power been so far advanced as to be on the eve of conclusion, it would have been highly proper to decline any negotiation till Russia was consulted. If the negotiations for alliance were in an advanced progress, surely they ought now to have been brought to a conclusion. If they were not might not ministers have answered Buonaparte, and pointed out a negotiation with other powers, as that most likely to lead to peace? As far as appears, there was not sufficient reason, so far as our intercourse with Russia was concerned, for not giving a more direct answer to a direct overture. There is a want of information on the subject, I confess, which leaves us much in the dark in this discussion; but it is to supply that information that the present motion is, in part, intended. Since the opening of the session, however, we have received another communication—the message now on the table. We are told. "that the communications which have taken place, and are still depending, between his majesty and some of the powers of the continent, have not yet been brought to such a point as to enable his majesty to lay the result of them before the house, or to enter into any farther explanation with the sentiments expressed by his majesty at the opening of the present session." I have said that the speech at the opening of the state session left us ignorant of the state of the intercourse with Russia, and the opening of the budget, the right hon. gent. stated that he proposed to reserve five millions to to be voted afterwards, as subsidies to foreign powers, if circumstances rendered it expedient. Five months have elapsed since that time, and still we have no information, either on the actual state of the negotiation or the objects of it, except as far as it may be gathered from the subsidy we are called on to vote. The mode of proceeding, at the beginning of the session, appeared unprecedented, and this still more so; for we are called on to vote money for objects we do not know, ignorant whether the money is to be in the first instance applied to prosecute the war, or only in case the enemy refuse reasonable 505 terms of peace, which it may now be intended to propose. This indeed would be to leave a large discretion with ministers, such as never before was claimed. Last war, indeed, a sum was left at the discretion of ministers, but it was after the object was thoroughly known, the power to which it was granted ascertained, not to mentioned that the amount, a thing of no small practical importance, was so much less. But here the cause, the means, the prospect of co-operation, its value, its application are beforehand unknown, and it is to be left at the discretion of the minister to apply five millions in any manner, to any purpose, and to any power he may think fit. Surely the house will not so far abdicate its functions, as thus, blindfold, to vote away its essential right of controlling the application of the public supplies. Subsidies undoubtedly may sometimes be expedient, but the policy of granting them will depend on the object to which they are directed, the power that is to receive them, and his ability and disposition to render a fair equivalent of service. The time of granting them ought to be considered. But at present how do we know who are the powers to be subsidised? Can we expect an efficient co-operation without one of the great powers, Austria or Prussia? Without them, would the other powers, not to speak of Denmark or Sweden, be worth purchasing? And what is the time? If Russia be the principal power to be subsidised, shall we be told at the end of June that it is necessary to come to this vote for any efficient co-operation this season? Let us at least be informed of the grounds and object of the alliance with Russia. If the negotiation, after so long a delay, be not ready, surely its consummation cannot be distant, if it be at all probable, Then let the house sit till the affair be adjusted; and whatever inconvenience might arise to individuals from a protracted session, it is the duty of all to attend the business of their country on an occasion of such magnitude, involving the highest privileges, and most important functions of house of commons. I have thus laid before the house, at greater length than I could have wished, a few general outlines of the situation of the country, critical, in the opinion of all, beyond any example. Every fact which is before us, every consequence to which those facts evidently lead, impose upon us the duty of investigating our situation; and parliament 506 ought not to separate till it has ascertained the real state of the country. If the motion of which I gave notice appeared to me necessary a few days ago, it appears more fit and seasonable, in consequence of the message presented yesterday; and, when called upon to vote a sum of five millions, without information of any kind, I trust the house will hesitate before they pledge their own credit, and the money of their constituents, in a manner so unusual. I therefore move, "that an humble address be presented to his majesty, praying that he will be graciously pleased not to prorogue his parliament until he shall have been enabled to afford to this house more full information with respect both to his majesty's relations with foreign powers, and to his views and prospects in the contest in which his majesty is engaged."
§ Lord Castlereagh said, he did not mean to follow the hon. gent. through the whole of his statements, but merely to reply to the general points of his argument. The hon. gent. had contended that it was not consistent with the duty of the house to place such a direction in his majesty's government, as the vote of the sum alluded to would amount to; but before he sat down, he trusted he should persuade the house that if they could not intrust such a discretion to the present government, they ought to substitute some other government, to which they could intrust it, and that no case could warrant their with-holding it, but a want of confidence in his majesty's government, that, if an occasion should arise they would not assemble parliament to communicate the matter to them. He concurred in a great part of the speech of the hon. gent. He agreed particularly in what he had stated in the outset of his speech, that there never had been in a period in the history of the country, when the people had been more true to themselves and their real interests. He concurred too with the hon. gent., that if Ireland was not precisely in the state in which it was desirable it should be, it was rapidly advancing towards it. He was ready to join issue with the hon. gent. in his preliminary matter, for he perfectly agreed with him. The hon. gent. might justly call upon his majesty's ministers to justify and explain the manner in which they had applied the resources and facilities of the country, and how they had disposed of them in the prosecution of the war. The hon. gent. had in this view adverted to the state of the army and the 507 navy. It was satisfactory, however, to his right hon. friend, as it must have been to the house, that on the first point to which the hon. gent. had adverted, relative to the finances of the country, he had made no charge against the able administration of that department. The prosperity of the country, which was to be inferred from the flourishing state of its finances, was certainly no argument for the prosecution of a war that was not in itself just and necessary. The hon gent. had stated that the war had been begun under an assurance that no addition would be made to the national debt in the prosecution of it. But the hon. gent. must recollect that this statement had been made in the contemplation of a certain quantum of war expenses, and if that ratio of expenditure had not been exceeded, this country would have been in the singular situation of maintaining a war expenditure of 25,000,000l. annually, without adding to its debt. When the war commenced it had a singular character, the enemy threatened our existence, and we had to provide in that instance only for our defence. Since, however, it had been the policy to apply our military resources not only to the purposes of defence, but for active offensive operations if an occasion should offer. The hon. gent. had stated, that now, at the end of two years of war, our debt, had been increased thirty millions. The fact was, that this was the nominal addition to it, and not more than half that sum had been borrowed. The hon. gent. had animadverted on the state of the army and navy, and had made a charge of want of vigour founded upon it against his majesty's government. He had stated that our military situation had not been improved. The hon. gent. could not have looked attentively at the subject, or he would not have rated so low our general military position, nor stated that it had not undergone a considerable improvement since the period with which he had compared it. As to the general amount of the military force, he should not deny that it was highly desirable to add to our military strength as much as possible, and to carry it even beyond what it was at present. But when the hon. gent. represented it as inadequate, he ought to have compared it with its state at some former period of our history. He was aware that this would not be a just criterion of its present adequacy, but it would be a criterion of the power of calling thrill the military strength of the country, and of the 508 efforts of former governments for that purpose. In the year 1802, our whole regular force, exclusive of militia, was one hundred and seventy-four thousand men on the 1st June, 1805, it was one hundred and seventy-six thousand eight hundred and ninety-nine, so that it was now three thousand more than at the period when it had been higher than at any former period of our history; therefore the picture the hon. gent. had drawn of our military strength was too gloomy and unfounded. If the hon. gent. took the period of the change of administration, it would be found, that the military force had been improved in quality, as well as carried to as high a degree as possible under the circumstances of the country. The gross amount of the military force was, in 1804, two hundred and thirty-two thousand, at present it was two hundred and forty-seven thousand, being an increase of fifteen thousand on the gross force. The troops serving abroad amounted at present to sixty-seven thousand, being an increase of nineteen-thousand above what they were in 1804, so that there was a total increase of thirty-five thousand regular troops since that period. The disposable infantry were, in 1804, ninety-eight thousand; they were now one hundred and twenty thousand, being an increase of twenty-two thousand;. so that our military three was now greater than ever, and proved the country to be in a situation highly encouraging, so far from justifying the gloomy views of the hon. gent. The noble lord then stated, that the regular recruiting had produced within the first four months of this year seven, thousand four hundred and sixty-four, and there had been recruited thirteen thousand front the militia, making together an accession of twenty thousand. There was therefore reason to expect that fifteen thousand more would be obtained by the regular recruiting in the next eight months of the year. By the other means of procuring an accession to the army, three thousand had been obtained during the last five months of last year, and five thousand in the first five months of this year, and without at all interfering with the regular recruiting. The next point to which the hon. member had adverted was the state of the navy. He had considered only the number of ships in commission, but in order to make a fair and impartial comparison, he ought to have taken into his view the number that had been put out of commission. Since the period alluded to there had been added to 509 his majesty's navy twenty-three ships of the line, fifty-eight frigates, eighty-two gunbrigs, and thirty-two fire-Ships, making in all an addition of one hundred and seventy sail; and notwithstanding the number put out of commission from being unfit for service, and casualties, &c. the number of vessels of all descriptions now in commission exceeded those in 1804 by one hundred and sixty sail. But the comparative state of the navy must depend on the exigency of the moment and the duty it had to perform, and on that ground he was prepared to argue it. The hon. member, in that part of his speech wherein he had stated that all the objects of the war had failed, had appeared to have mistated the objects of the war. His impression of the objects of the war was, (and the house would recollect what objects it had sanctioned by its approbation.) not a of speculative hope of reducing the power of France, or its influence on the continent; not the speculative hope of being able to confine it within its present limits, or of reducing these limits: no, it was the conviction irresistibly impressed on the minds of his majesty's ministers, and on time country, that they had no choice, that they had only the alternative whether they should engage in the war with some securities in their possession, or endeavour to conciliate, which he contended would have been criminal, and might have afforded the hon. gent. a ground of charge against his majesty's government. The hon. gent. had stated this object of the war to have been to reduce by our own efforts the whole power of France, and then had charged the increased means of the enemy as a proof of the failure of his majesty's ministers, and the objects of the war. But he should have shewn that the French ruler would not have proceeded in his progress of tyranny and usurpation from the throne of France to that of Italy, from the plunder of Holland to the subjection in which he kept Spain, Switzerland, and the continent, if we had continued at peace, in order to prove his majesty's ministers culpable. The hon gent. after having untruly represented the objects of the war, had proceeded to a criticism on the manner in which it had been conducted. He thought as highly as any one of the naval resources of this country, but he did not think them capable of affording us a commanding superiority on foreign stations, and enabling us to continue the blockades at home. We had to choose whether we should keep down our force on 510 foreign stations or at home. The enemy at first directed their whole attention to the invasion of this country; before they changed that character of war, the hon. gent. would not have approved of the distribution of the naval force by his majesty's ministers, if whilst the enemy's, fleets were in Brest, Rochefort, Toulon, &c. our force at home were to have been weakened to detach squadrons to the West-Indies. It was sufficient to have the mean of sending a force from home to follow the enemy to any part of the world. The arrangements had been made With a view to keep over the enemy a superiority at Toulon and the Mediterranean, at Calais, Ferrol, Rochefort, Brest, &c. There was besides strong squadron off Ireland. No point had been neglected, and the superiority had been maintained in every station. The argument of the hon. member relative to the the enemy's fleet, would go to give up the blockading system altogether. If a fleet could get out of a port where our force was stronger, it could certainly get into a port where it was weakest. The hon. member appeared to insinuate that blame as imputable to sir John Orde and Lord Nelson, for the escape of the Toulon feet. The nature of a blockade was such, that there was perhaps but one or two ports in the world that could be completely blockaded and therefore when the enemy was watching the opportunity, certainly not glorious to himself, of stealing out, it was not surprising that they had succeeded. He hoped, therefore, the hon. gent. would not persevere in detracting from the glories and the laurels of the noble lord, who was equally distinguished as a patriot and a hero. The hon. gent. had charged upon his majesty's ministers that they did not know to what part of the world the enemy's fleet had proceeded; but the information that a government usually had, was as to the force in the harbours of the enemy,and the nature of their equipments, which might lead to a conjecture of their destination. The noble lord who commanded the channel fleet had general instructions to detach in pursuit of any of the enemy's squadrons that should escape from the. western ports; when the enemy changed their mode of warfare, arrangements had been made without delay to follow them to any part of the world. He now came to that part of the hon. gentleman's speech which was most important. He was happy to find that the hon. gent. had no difference with him on the general 511 principles. He admitted that it was impossible to secure the permanent interests of this country, and particularly at this time. The hon. gent. had stated, that the overture of the French government alluded to in the speech from the throne, was frank and open; but if the hon. gent. had adverted to the spirit of the message of the French ruler to his council a few days after, he Would not be likely to designate the overture frank and open, nor would he think that much would have been gained by acting inconsiderately upon it. He trusted the house would adhere to the sentiments in their address, that his majesty would not return any answer to the overture, till he should communicate with the powers of the continent. The hon. gent. had stated, that there were three descriptions of communications usually made to the house at its assembling pending a war, either that the war was to be continued from the impossibility of making peace, or that no eligible terms could be obtained, or that negotiations were going on. As to the latter head, the communication of his majesty's speech was as ample as any the crown usually made. It was impossible that his majesty could give any further communication to parliament, and he called on the house to place confidence in his majesty's ministers. It was impossible, under all the circumstances of the case, to give a more detailed view of the transaction. He asked, whether the negotiations could have been completed in a shorter period? There were three points of view to which our communications with the continent might be directed; whether the powers of the continent would co-operate with us in the war; whether they should co-operate with us in consequence of the refusal on the part of the French government to accept terms of peace; or whether they should act in concert with us, in defensive measures of the continent, to enable the powers there to resist the encroachments of France. He put it to the hon. gent. on the narrowest grounds, whether considering the distance of Russia, and the period of the year, the negotiation could have been brought to a conclusion Sooner? Whether in the present disjointed state of the continent, and the difficulty of communication, the negotiation could be concluded in a shorter period? The hon. gent. seemed to charge it upon his majesty's ministers, that they had not had the negotiations in a more forward state at the commencement of the session, so as to be now more ripe for communication; but 512 the house would recollect that it was about that time that the court of Russia became fatigued with its? friendly interference, the multiplied breaches of treaties by the French government, and an opening of prospects was made for continental co-operation. The hon. gent. had argued that, if his majesty's ministers were not prepared to advise him to bring a detailed communication before the house, parliament should continue sitting till such communication could be made. The adoption of the hon. gentleman's motion would betray a jealousy of his majesty's ministers, that they would not be disposed to assemble parliament, if a necessity should occur. The vote would not tetter parliament as to the discussion of the question at its next meeting. The proceeding would be novel and unusual, and might have a very material effect upon the councils of the powers with whom we are negotiating; it has no precedent in the history of the country. The noble lord recapitulated the principal points to which he had adverted, and, contending that the hon. gent. had made no ground for his motion, concluded by expressing his intention to give it a negative.
§ Mr. Windham observed, that the question to be considered on this occasion was not as the noble lord who just sat down had stated it, whether the amount of the sum proposed to he voted was necessary, or whether that sum would be properly applied, but whether, under all the circumstances of the country, it would be proper that parliament should be prorogued. It was not meant to be argued, nor had any thing of the kind been said by his hon. friend who opened the debate, that ministers could or ought to make any communication to the house at present, with regard to any negotiations they might be engaged in with foreign powers. The position was, that in order to afford the opportunity of making the earliest possible communication upon that important subject, parliament should not prorogued; that was the practical question at issue. But the objection to comply with the motion was, it seemed, that such compliance would imply a want of confidence in his majesty's ministers. To that, however, he would say, that the confidence demanded was more than they or any other ministers were entitled to claim. What! that parliament should separate, leaving the country in such a state, surrounded with such menacing dangers, and so inadequately provided to meet them. Every man out of doors must feel surprise, that the thought 513 could be entertained for a moment at such a crisis. Every man must say that we are at present in such a situation that it was impossible to conceive what plan of proceeding government had in contemplation; at what point their policy was leaved; or to what it was likely to lead; whether to peace or the serious prosecution of the war. Nobody could tell or divine, though all were naturally anxious to ascertain their object. At a time, then, that such doubt and anxiety prevailed, and that there was so little disposition to confide in the discretion of his majesty's ministers, could it be seriously urged that it would be wise in parliament to separate? If the personal convenience of members was offered as a ground for prorogation, he would say with his hon. friend, that such a consideration was not to be put in competition with the reasons that pressed upon the house to continue sitting. The consideration of personal convenience was indeed unworthy to be alleged in that house against the performance of a great public duty, when, to say the least, the affairs of the empire, upon a general view, were in such a situation that parliament ought to continue in a state of immediate superintendance. To continue would not, he maintained, imply any undue want of confidence in his majesty's ministers. But they professed to be of a different opinion, and appeared principally to rest their opposition to the motion upon that basis. The claim to confidence upon the part of ministers on this occasion, naturally led him into an examination of the grounds upon which their title was sustained, and it regarded the ministers themselves, and, secondly, as regarding through them the situation of the country. The more the ministers were undeserving of confidence, the more alarming was the situation of the country, and the greater consequently was the confidence required to be reposed. Now, as applying to both those topics, it was to be observed, that there was a remarkable discordancy between what had taken place since ministers came into office, and what they promised at the time they accepted office. They certainly did not fulfil what they so frequently promised respecting the army, the inefficiency of which was the prominent feature of the charge urged against their predecessors. They army which, it was generally supposed, formed a material ingredient in war, was in this peculiar war in which the country is engaged, almost wholly neglected, that is, with regard to a 514 provision for its permanent supply. Upon this head ministers had certainly rather broken their pledges to parliament and the country, and this was the more deserving of notice, when it was recollected, that the inattention of their predecessors to the army was the principal cause of their removal from office, and the principal articles of accusation, too exhibited against them by some of their present colleagues. This marked inattention to the army he considered quite a sufficient ground, at least, of distrust, in his majesty's ministers; and it discontent throughout the country. On this subject he cautioned the house against the exaggerated statement which the noble lord had made as to the amount of our force. He did not mean that this statement was purposely exaggerated by the noble lord; but he wished to impress on the house the propriety of analysing such statement before it attached much importance to it. The noble lord had said, that our disposable force had received an increase within the year of no less than 35,000 men. But the question was, of what kind was that increase? We had heard of a transfer of from 15 to 16,000 men from the militia; but of what sort were the remainder of the augmentation? Were they of such a descriptions as the corps talked of at New Brunswick or Ceylon? If they were, they surely formed no material addition to a regular army, although they might swell a statement. As to the addition which the army received from the militia, they could claim no credit for that addition who frequently contended that the militia were as efficient and as material to the strength of the country as the regular army. But in point of fact, however ministers might vaunt of the encrease which had taken place in the regular army, there were no means adopted that promised a regular and efficient supply. This was the general complaint. The militia had furnished one supply; 10,000 men had been obtained from Hanover. But then no permanent resource was provided: the men the army had got were not procured by recruiting, nor by any settled system that was likely to continue productive. No; the means by which the army was augment furnished the extent of their capacity once for all; and the army was absolutely left in future to depend for supply on accidents or shifts—The noble lord, the right hon. gent. observed, had passed on from the army to the navy, and gone into as it were the details of two years 515 naval campaigns. But without following the noble lord through all, or any of his details, the general result was before the eyes of parliament and the country, and upon that general result every man could decide. Among all the vicissituoes of war, among all the gloomy and distracting prospects which the present war presented ,parliament and the people were accustomed to hear and derive consolation from the thought that Great Britain had the dominion of the seas. But how did the case now stand? The fleets of the enemy were out in various directions. A formidable forces was shot, and where it might light, time alone could tell us, but that it was likely to give our dominions a serve wound, there was too much reason to dread. Apprehensions were entertained for Ireland, the Indies, &c. Public anxiety eagerly sought the enemy's destination, but all was suspense and uncertainly. The people were uneasy, and the government was ignorant—The right hon. gent. expressed a hope and anxious wish, that notwithstanding the present state of things, particularly with respect to the French fleet, the country should have nothing more in the end to complain of, but the mismanagement of ministers or to enquire about the efficiency or inefficiency of the system of blockade. Every Briton must naturally fell glad if the effect of the present alarming prospects should at least be reparable, and that it should not prove that we had an insecure hold of the dominion of the sea. But he could not help saying, that the appearance of our affairs was by no means calculated to encourage confidence, such as the noble lord endeavoured to excite by a statement that, however, it might tell at a court martial, on the trial of the blockading officer, could make but little impression upon that house, or the thoughtful part of the public, with respect to the general conduct of our finances, the right hon. gent. stated his disinclination to enter into, because he did not think that part of his speech very material to the present question. But yet there was one short remark which he begged to submit. The noble lord, in his endeavour to account for the non performance of that minister's promise, who said, that for a certain period no encrease of our debt would take place, stated indeed, that the disappointment of the expectation excited by that promise (if any one did seriously reply on it), arose from this, that the expenditure was 516 higher than the sum provided. Why, truly, it was in that way that estimates were commonly found to fail. Why it should answer the noble lord's purpose better to state that the expenditure exceeded the income, than to say that income fell short of the expenditure, he was not able to discover. It was the fact of the two not meeting that made the failure, and that failure was an additional reason for not relying with equal confidence upon minister—But the strongest ground for distrust arose from the state of the army. If it were said that this state was not wholly chargeable to the present ministers, he would admit it; for it would have been impossible for them since their accession to power, to have repaired what their predecessors had done, and to have supplied what those predecessors had left undone. But yet the present ministers might have put measures in motion, and those measures might have been now in progress, to remove the evil complained of. This, however, was not the case. The army was left to waste away, unless some other country like Hanover should fall into the hands of the enemy. This was a melancholy consideration, for just in proportion as our danger pressed, whether it was our object to concluded a peace or carry on a war with vigour, a formidable army was essentially necessary. —With all the noble lords observations respecting the propriety of cultivating a conclude a peace or carry on war with vigour, a formidable army was essentially necessary—With all the noble lords observations respecting the propriety of cultivating a continental connexion, the right hon. gent. expressed a decided concurrence. He remembered, however, when quite a different sentiment prevailed in that house, and when some gentlemen justified the peace of Amiens, in consequence of its tendency to put an end to such connexions. But he was glad to witness the change that now appeared, and that gentlemen were become sensible of the propriety of continental connexions for this country. Necessity was a harsh teacher, but then she was not a bad one. Much as the house had heard of the pride and honesty of standing alone, it was now found that solitude in danger was not a very consoling situation. After having made use of tauting language; after having endeavoured, under the affectation of magnanimity and lofty professions, to cover the indiscretion, and even the treachery of insulting and deserting our continental friends, it was now felt necessary to resort to them, to court them. Some of them, however, were not to be found. Sardinia was now no more; 517 and others were in fetters. But such as felt any wish towards us should be sought after, and their support conciliated if possible. There were powers to which ministers might look for aid, with some hope of success. What they had done yet in this way they declined, perhaps very properly, to communicate to the house. But their declining to do so, and the necessity of the continental concert looked for, formed considerations to shew that parliament should continue to sit to watch the manner in which the ministers should exercise the powers vested in their hands, and to receive the earliest intelligence of the result of their negotiations. In the opinion of the noble lord, however, the want of confidence in ministers which, according to his judgment, the adoption of the motion would infer, was a just ground of objection. Because, as the noble lord argued, to refuse confidence to ministers at present would be to reduce them in the estimation of the country, still more of foreign courts, and thus injure the progress of the pending negotiations. If such an argument, however, were admitted, it would operate for universal confidence in ministers. But it became necessary to take a course between two extremes; to take away from ministers a part of the power of doing good lest they should do harm. It was one of the disadvantages of our constitution, and of every other nation in which there existed a popular assembly, that the government must have a limited confidence. This disadvantage, however, was more than compensated by the advantages resulting from such an arrangement. But this was a disadvantage of which all ministers might equally complain, for all ministers were subject to the same control; and, in order to facilitate the exercise of that control, their powers were limited. To preserve this salutary control over the proceedings of ministers at the present important juncture, it was his wish that parliament should not be prorogued—As to the noble lord's quotation of precedents, of which he seemed very fond, the right hon. gent. observed, that the noble lord often resorted to them, where, in point of fact, they did not form a proper criterion. When the noble lord alluded to the army, instead of dwelling upon the peculiar state of the country, and its capacity to produce a large military force, he went back to other periods, and instituted a comparison between times and circumstances, having no analogy whatever. But whether, in constituting an 518# army or demanding confidence, it was the noble lord's pleasure to resort to precedents, it however happened, that the precedent which he had quoted on this occasion could not avail him; for there were not Merely "shades of difference," as the noble lord expressed it, between the circumstances under which the vote of three millions, in 1799, and those which existed at present; but they were essentially different. In the former instance the sum voted was not only much less than that now proposed, but the negotiation was actually concluded, and the line of proceeding clearly marked out, and our continental connexions ascertained. How then, independently of any consideration arising from a difference as to our dangers, could a comparison he said to he as to the two periods? They were, in fact, altogether. dissimilar. Without recollecting all the details, there was, perhaps, one particular reason why that precedent was not applicable. It might very well happen that, although there was an individual in the present administration who also belonged to the administration of 1799, parliament and the country had much more confidence in the administration of 1799 than they were willing to grant to the present—Whether looking to the motion on the broad ground of public safety, or to the degree of confidence due to ministers, the right hon. gent. decidedly thought, that it ought to be acceded to. Parliament would desert its duty if it invested ministers with unlimited power at such a crisis as the present; if it left to them the whole management of public affairs; if it allowed a vast sum of money to be disposed of according to their direction. If all this was to be submitted to, merely in order that prorogation should be preferred to adjournment, it must excite the surprise and discontent of the country—The right hon. gent. concluded with recapitulating his several arguments, and stating that the dangers of the country were such, that whether it was meant to continue the war or take a temporary refuge in peace, it was become necessary always to have in contemplation that we had to contend with an enemy who both followed the ambition of the ancient Romans, and emulated their virtues (if virtues they could be called), and having the same view of universal dominion, was as little likely to desist from it either in war or peace. Into many topics of the noble lord's speech, the right hon. gent. declined to enter for the present, particularly that 519 which related to the army, as an opportunity for fully discussing that subject would offer itself in a few days.
§ Mr. Canning saw no advantage that could be derived from the adoption of the proposition before the house; for if the meeting of a parliament should at any time be necessary, it might be convoked with sufficient promptness and facility even after the prorogation. To keep the members in town at this season, did not appear to him to promise any particular public good, while it might be productive of great public mischief. As to the sum proposed to be voted in consequence of his majesty's message, he could not see why his right hon. friend should assume that it would amount to five millions. The right hon. gent. deprecated the idea of fixing a suspicion on his majesty's ministers, by adopting a motion so contrary to general custom as that before the house, and proclaiming to the country and to foreign courts, that they were unworthy of confidence. What the gentlemen on the other side could propose to obtain by pressing this motion, and preventing a prorogation, he confessed himself quite unable to comprehend. If it was their object to discuss and improve the state of the army, they would have a full Opportunity of communicating their, designs on Monday next, for upon that day the house was aware that a great authority was to come forward with great military plans; in consequence of which, the sessions might close with a new military system, that should do away all the blunders that had been heretofore committed; that should set a new military machine in motion quite free from blemish, and incapable of obstruction; that should, in fact, render it unnecessary for parliament, for years, again to consider a military subject. If it was the wish of gentlemen to enquire into the system of blockade as applicable to the escape of the Toulon fleet, with a view to attribute blame to ministers, he called upon them to institute the enquiry immediately, and they would find that lord Nelson's fleet was more than adequate, in every respect, to the French fleet, of course, that adequate provision wars Made on the part of ministers in that quarter. The right hon. gent. combated the various arguments of his right hon. friend in favour of the motion, and contended that two-thirds of his hon. friend's speech made against the motion. From the motion itself, he saw no good that could arise; nor could he conceive it to have any other object in view, than to express a little 520 spleen, and to proclaim an unfounded want of confidence in his majesty's ministers.
§ Mr. Windham stated, in explanation, that his meaning was, that parliament should continue to sit, and not vote the money required, until it should prove to be actually necessary; thus any improper confidence in ministers would be guarded against.
§ Earl Temple suported the motion of his hon. friend, and particularly argued, that, if his majesty was not yet in a situation that enabled him to make any communication to the house, respecting his foreign relations, they should at least continue to sit, and by that means be in the same situation as at the beginning of the session. What they wanted was, that they should not be out of a situation in which they might receive communications when ready to be made. The sum left at the disposal of the minister, was no doubt great; but it was not the amount to which he objected; it was to the principle, which he regarded as unconstitutional and unprecedented. The vote of credit alluded to in the year 1799, was very different. There was in that case a specific object to which the money was to be applied. There was an existing alliance and an engagement had been formed; but here there was no precise object submitted to the house. The one was a real, the other an eventual expense. There was a great difference, he contended, between adjournment and prorogation. In the one case they were certain of the day of meeting; but in the other, whatever might be the situation of the country, whatever calls there might be for the distribution of the public money, they could have no control over it.
§ Mr. Fox said, he could not reconcile it to his feelings to give a silent vote upon a question so intimately connected as the present with the rights and privileges of parliament, and the policy of the country; he should, however, endeavour to bring what he had to submit to the house, within as short a compass as possible. The first point, he observed, was, that by the three last loans this country had added to the capital of its debt not less than eighty millions of money. This was a matter of grave consideration, considering the former burthens of the country to which this was an addition, notwithstanding the progress of the consolidated fund, and the salutary system of raising war taxes, and providing for so large a portion of our expenditure within the year. With regard to the army of this country, be should touch upon it slightly, because that 521 subject was soon to be discussed at large by an hon. friend of his, who was well qualified for that undertaking (colonel Craufurd); and if that hon. gent. had been thought sanguine as to his plan in that object, yet it must be allowed that the right hon. gent. opposite to him (Mr. Pitt) was also sanguine in his plan, for he had made it one of the great foundations of his attack on the late administration, with part of which he had afterwards joined, that they had not sufficiently provided for the permanent establishment of the army, and he had brought in a bill to supply that defect: that bill had been tried, and without being very sanguine as to the effect of the plan of his hon. friend, he might venture to predict, that if it should be tried, it would be as efficient as the bill of the right hon. gent. for the permanent encrease of our military force; indeed, the bill of the right hon. gent. coming from a person so extraordinary in talents, reminded him of what was said by Dr. Johnson of the poem of Ossian. Being, asked, from what man upon earth, but its author, could it be expected? Did he know any other man upon earth capable of writing such a poem? "O yes," said the doctor, "many men, many women, and many children!" He believed this to be the true description of the bill of the right hon. gent. for the permanent improvement of the army. With regard to the navy, he defended the statement of his hon. friend (Mr. Grey), and maintained that the want of information of our government, with respect to the Toulon and Rochefort squadrons, was much to be lamented; and he did not approve of the manner in which our naval force was disposed of in the Mediterranean, the faults of which he imputed not to any of the gallant officers, but to government, who gave them orders, and who provided the force. Upon the subject of Ireland, the noble lord (Castlereagh) had agreed to much of what had been stated by his hon. friend in the opening of this debate, and he agreed also with them both, that the state of Ireland was good in some respects; but when he used the word good, he used it its the sense to express the idea that Ireland was considerably amended from the condition it had, been in: and here he must hear an honest tribute to the merit of lord Hardwicke, to whom much of the improvement of the condition of the people of that country was owing. This he should have no difficulty in saying, although there were points in the conduct of that noble lord, as lord-lieutenant 522 of Ireland, towards a relation of his (general Fox) while there, which met his disapprobation. However, he could not help lamenting that lord Hardwicke, as he understood from pretty well grounded rumour, was not supported by that cordiality and union, in the administration of that country, which was essential to carry into effect any of the best plans of any government. He understood that some part of the system of that noble lord was opposed by another noble person, who had distinguished himself by his opposition to the catholics (lord Redesdale): much good was not to he expected from any government where perfect harmony did not subsist among all its members. He had had the honour to present to the house a petition on behalf of the catholics of that Country, the prayer of which had been rejected by a large majority. He wished to know, Whether any thing short of that prayer was intended to be granted to that body of persons, containing almost all the population of that country? He had no hesitation in saying, that it behoved government to do all that can be done short of granting the prayer of that petition. He wished the prayer to be granted altogether; but after the sense of parliament had been so fully expressed, he could not expect government to have the same view of that subject. It was not for him who thought the prayer ought to be granted, to point out what other mode should be adopted; but it behoved those who opposed that prayer to look into the case, and devise the best remedy that appeared to them to be applicable to it, for it was not to be expected that the people of that country would be content with every thing remaining exactly in its present condition there. He recommended this subject to the most serious attention of government—He now came to the business of the king's message, and to that which was connected with the speech from the throne, to which he wished the house particularly to attend. The king by that speech told parliament that he had received an offer of negotiation from the French government; that situated as his majesty was, he thought proper to say, that he was engaged in confidential intercourse with a certain great power, meaning the emperor of Russia; that he thought it right to apprise that monarch the overtures which had been made by France to his majesty, and that he must consult with him before he could return any answer to France. Now, he would ask, whit was the nodding of that com- 523 munication. He was not now delivering an opinion what the answer of his majesty ought to be. It was natural enough that his majesty should not make any answer to France until he had consulted with the emperor of Russia, possibly until he had agreed upon a treaty with that monarch; but then it was not so likely a way to negotiate with effect for peace, if his majesty had to say to the enemy, "Stay until I can see whether I shall be able to enter into a treaty with another power, for the purpose of our carrying on the war jointly against you." Now, if his majesty's answer to the overture of France for peace was capable of two constructions, it was not wonderful if this was the construction the French put upon it. The question then was, when that period was to come when the house of commons was to have information upon that subject? When so proper to ask it as when the application was made by the crown for money to carry on the plan, whatever it be, which refers to that very subject? The great and fundamental principle of our constitution was, that the house should demand all necessary explanation of the executive government in these important public concerns, and no time was so proper, because none was likely to be so effectual, as when they were voting money to support the system of government; this was the time when the advice of the house of commons to the throne was most seasonable, and likely to be most respected. This was one of the right uses which the house had to make of its power over the public purse, and ministers should, when they came for money, explain this matter to the house. And here he must remind the house, that the right hon. gent., when this subject was mentioned at the opening of the budget, and the sum of five millions was reserved for the probable use of subsidies, candidly stated, that no member of the house was to be understood to have pledged himself to any opinion whatever, not even to the length of granting the money, or any part of it, unless he should approve of the proposed application. The house of commons did not point out any thing concerning the pecuniary arrangement of this matter; and the right hon. gent. had then hopes of being able to give the house some information upon this subject in the course of the present session. He should now ask the right hon. gent. when he could make the Communication? if he could not answer now, the next point was, since the answer cannot be made at the present period 524 of the session, let the session be made to continue until the answer comes; since the answer cannot be made to accommodate the session, let the session be made to accommodate the answer. He was sure the right hon. gent. would give the house the information if it was in his power; if he could not do so now, he should allow the house to sit until he could. But this mode of asking the minister to continue parliament together until he could give it some information, was holding forth to the public that government was entitled to a mark of want of confidence in the house! Want of confidence was the constitutional character of that house. It was a mark it ought to set upon every minister of the crown, it was a mark he was entitled to ex officio, and that the more especially under the present circumstances; for here was to be a large sum of money, perhaps five millions, to be proposed to be voted, without any information as to its probable application. There was a distinction between the present case and the former vote of credit of three millions, At the time of that vote we were at .war; so we are now, but then we were engaged in a continental war, and it was then expressed what the money on the vote of credit was to he applied to—that of carrying on a continental war, a war frequently discussed and approved of by the house; but now the house did not know what this money was for, nor could the house have any guess what it was for. The house knew nothing but what was to be collected from the king's speech at the opening of the session, and the message of yesterday; but the message was not clearer than the speech, and perhaps it could not at present be clearer; but then the remedy for that was for parliament to remain together until information came. But it was asked, where the difference was between prorogation, when parliament might assemble in fourteen days, and an adjournment for that time? The difference was, that one of these matters was in the power of the minister, the other in the power of the house of commons; which reminded him of a scene in an excellent comedy, wherein the father takes out a bond, and the son says "Let me hold it in my hand." The father says, "What signifies it which of us should hold it—neither of us shell hold it." And then he puts it in his pocket. So it was in this case. The minister asked, what difference there was between an adjournment and a prorogation? The difference was, that he had the bond in his 525 pocket, if there was a prorogation.—He then took notice of the power of parliament to refuse to confirm the engagement of his majesty, in the event of its disapproving of the terms of such engagement, (a power which was unquestionable,) for the purpose of shewing how much right the purpose of shewing how much right the house had to demand explanation before it assented to the granting a vote for a large sum of money; and he apprehended that the government of foreign powers was not so destitute of information of the nature of our constitution as not to be fully aware that all the engagements for our government were subject to the approbation or rejection of parliament; and therefore the argument that this motion, if agreed to, would diminish the respect of foreign powers for our executive government, had no force in it.—He then proceeded to observe on the want of confidence in his majesty's ministers particularly. The right hon. gent. could not expect him to have much confidence in him. He certainly had no particular confidence in the right hon. gent., but he had no difficulty in saying that his want of confidence did not arise from personal considerations, but from his public character as to the situation in which he stood:—the situation in which he stood with reference to the principle on which the present ministry were formed; for the right. hon. gent. was sometimes supported by those with whom he could not agree before his administration was formed, and with whom he could scarcely agree now. It was a system of disputes, forced resignations, and rapid reconciliations; but they now adhered together from a principle which was a very strong one, although it had no cordiality whatever in it, namely, that one party could not remain without the adherence of the other; but when he saw no other principle of cohesion among these persons, he must be allowed to observe that such an administration was not entitled to any peculiar confidence; and without speaking with disrespect of those who composed the present administration, he might fairly say, that, independence of the splendid talents of the right hon. gent. himself, there was nothing in the present administration to entire them to any peculiar confidence, and the house ought to take care not to give too much confidence to them. He was the more confirmed in the appeared in the course of this session, by which he was convinced it was morally impossible for the present administration to expect any extraordinary 526 share of confidence. Who, said the hon. gent., can expect, that we should give extraordinary confidence, or that foreign nations should give any confidence at all, to such an administration a the present? I am, perhaps, less sanguine than others, with respect to the good that could be done by the best administration; but I feel myself sure, that an administration formed to comprehend all that is respectable for rank, talents, character and influence in the country, affords the only chance of safety; and I trust, that nobody can suppose that any individual (however he may disapprove, as I certainly do, the unconstitutional principle of exclusion) would suffer any personal object of ambition, if ambition he had, to stand in the way of the formation of such a ministry.ߞ If the present executive government did not feel this truth, it was time that the people told them of it. What might be the effect of such a combination he knew not, but this he knew, that without it there was no chance of this country weathering the storm, and encountering its perils. By this he did not mean that the country would be annihilated, but that the prosperity of it would be at an end.—The hon. gent. then proceeded to observe on the conduct of government with regard to Russia, and thought ministers ought to have put a short question to that court, whether they would consent to our treating with France, or whether they thought we should relieve altogether? and if Russia refused to answer that question, with all his partiality for Russia, the negotiation would not have been worth having without that explicit answer.—He then entered into our general policy, preferred the alliance of Russia to that of any other power; but confessed he saw no prospect of a speedy termination of our contest by that alliance alone, without the assistance of other powers. He disapproved of the,conduct of France in the late war as well as the present, but he disapproved, if possible, still more of any government pursuing under the title of indemnities a system of partition of states, making some republics, some monarchies, and annihilating the political existence of others, without regard to moral rectitude or to the common feelings of mankind, which considerations had more influence on the affairs of the world than some politicians were aware. The partition of Poland, the seizure of Holland, the subjugation of Switzerland, and the division of states, by the agreement of some, and by the fraud and rapacity of others, had 527 done more to destroy the confidence of mankind in each other, than all the other misconduct of the powers put together. In private society, when men lost their confidence in one another, the compact was dissolved. The same rule applied to states, for they were only aggregates of individuals. He recommended to all the powers of Europe a system of justice and moderation, as the only means of putting an end to the evils under which we labour. He recommended a general congress, and that these principles should be prevalent in its deliberations. He knew he excited a smile when he recommended these notions, because they were thought chimerical; but those who thought so had found their own system had failed, and they had never tried his. Having dwelt on these and other kindred topics for some time, he concluded with giving his hearty concurrence to the motion of his hon. friend.
§ The Chancellor of the Exchequer expressed his regret that the same circumstances which prevented his majesty from making any more direct communication to the house, than that which the message contained, rendered it impossible for him to follow the hon. member who had just sat down, through many of the details which his speech contained. Before he proceeded to offer a few observations on the question immediately before the house, he was anxious to make one or two remarks on those topics with which the hon member who introduced the business had prefaced his motion. These topics had been so ably commented on by his noble friend near bins (lord Castlereagh) that he should not have thought it necessary to refer to them, if the last speaker had not revived and enforced them. Another reason that rendered it the less requisite for him to enlarge on them was, that they were not practically connected with the question submitted to the consideration of the house. The house had heard in succession of the situation of the finances, of the state of the army, of the extent of our navy, and of the present state of the public mind in Ireland. All these points were urged, and in that way too, which gave rise to an idea that the hon, member wished to have them all made the subject of separate discussions, with the view of removing what was defective, and placing every thing on a different establishment; this idea, however, turned out to be erroneous, for the hon. member would be satisfied with a simple adjournment from week to week, or from fortnight to fort- 528 night, not for the purpose of enabling the house to renew any discussions on the general state of our relations, foreign and domestic, but merely for receiving that communication which could not be brought forward under the present circumstances. Such being the state of the case, he was relieved from the necessity of going into any minuteness of detail. Of the state of our finances, he could by no means entertain those gloomy ideas which the hon. gent. entertained. He thought, on the contrary, the prospect they afforded was highly consolatory. As to the promise on which the hon. gent. had insisted, he had to say, that he was not in office at the time it was made, but he was satisfied that if great and unexampled burdens had not been rendered necessary, the pledge would have been amply fulfilled. Even if a sum of seven or eight millions had been sufficient, the sinking fund would have covered it without accumulating more debt. It was consoling and encouraging that, instead of adding to our loans, we could raise by the sinking fund, and the taxes raised within the year, no less a sum than twenty millions this year. This was a most flattering picture of the state of our resources, and the regular payment of near eight millions a year by the sinking fund, in spite of our accumulated difficulties, was the best testimony in favour of public credit. The beneficial effects of this system it was needless for him to insist upon, for they were felt in the general prosperity, industry and comfort of the people. He would not go into detail on this part of the subject, as another opportunity would be afforded him, when an hon. gent., whose ability and accuracy well fitted him for the task, should submit his resolutions to the house. When these resolutions were introduced, he should, he trusted, be able to shew the house that the view which he gave of the financial state of the country was by no means delusive. As to the present state of our army, he declined saying much at present, reserving himself for the day when the subject would be fully discussed. He begged leave however, to allude to what had been said about his promises to place the army on a proper footing, and the disappointment of these promises. He had to complain, that his sentiments and language had on this subject been either misunderstood or misrepresented. As to the actual amount of our military force, he had long since declared that it appeared to him nearly adequate to 529 the circumstances of the country. What he objected to was, principally, the manner in which it was distributed. He had complained too, of our deficiency in disposable force, and to supply this deficiency, his most active exertions had been directed. He did not see then any ground for supposing that, for the accomplishment of so desirable an end, temporary expedients the should not be resorted to, and ministers had accordingly combined these with a plan for the regular recruiting of the army. If from this period last year, down to the present day, twenty or thirty thousand men had been added to our disposable force, he did not see with what justice ministers could be accused of neglecting our military resources. He begged gentlemen to reflect on the difficulties attending the recruiting for the army in this commercial country, and yet with all these difficulties, we had now a disposable force of a hundred and forty thousand well disciplined troops, besides a hundred thousand that were stationary. To these were to be added about four hundred thousand volunteers, forming altogether a force which at once shewed the activity of the government, and the zeal and spirit of our general population. The state of our military strength was indeed such as to remove all diffidence or anxiety. The right hon. member next adverted to the state of the navy. It was true that there was in ships of the line a very trifling increase, but when it was considered how many had been necessarily laid up in the docks to be repaired, he was sure that the exertions of the noble lord lately at the head of the admiralty, to expedite this important branch of the public service, was entitled to the gratitude of the country. Equally entitled to approbation was his zealous activity in providing so stores of every description, and his diligence in hastening the fitting out of that inferior species of naval force Which the peculiar circumstances of the country required. He denied that the escape of the French squadrons at all evinced want of knowledge or activity on the part of the admiralty. On every one of the stations where the squadrons of the enemy were, they had been blockaded, and if by accident the blockade was raised, there was no proof of the least blame attached to any one individual. It was quite impossible, great as was the amount of our naval force, to to have squadrons in all parts of the world to which a hostile fleet might by accident 530 direct its course. He vindicated the conduct of the admiralty as to the first sailing of the Toulon fleet. It was not then ascertained that they had gone out of the Mediterranean. On the contrary, there was then reason to suppose that they had in view an object much nearer than any attempt either on our West-India islands or the Brazils, though he was not at liberty to speak with greater freedom on the subject. He denied that the number of troops on board the Toulon fleet had ever been ascertained. On the contrary the most contradictory accounts had at different times come into the possession of ministers. Every reasonable precaution had been taken on the part of government, but no vigilance, however active, could at all times prevent the escape of an enemy, continually on the watch to elude us. He next touched on the state of Ireland, which he allowed was ground of not a little anxiety. A great improvement had taken place, but much yet remained to be done to perfect the advantages of the union. He trusted that every thing inflammatory would be studiously avoided on a subject so delicate, and at the same time so interesting; as it had only been incidentally alluded to, he should not insist on it on the present occasion. After going through these points, the right hon. gent. proceeded to state what had been his original views of the renewal of hostilities, views from which he had never for a moment departed. He had never supposed or maintained that the military force of this country was adequate to reduce the inordinate ambition, or curtail the overgrown power of France. He had maintained, however, that this country could not, consistently with its safet, now retain the relations of peace and amity with a government whose hostile views were so unequivocally manifested. He had thought that the spirit and energy of this nation, properly displayed, might rouse the spirit of the powers of the continent, and that an opportunity might be found of making a common cause with them against the ambition of an individual restrained by none of those laws which regulate the intercourse of civilized kingdoms. Of the power of this country to repel the invasion he never entertained a doubt, and he trusted that the attempt, if made, would be so repelled as to hold out encouragement to those whom fear had bound in slavish obedience, to rise up and shake off their ignominious chains. Such were the views which he 531 had laid down, and such had been the principles on which the confidential communications alluded to in his majesty's message had been conducted. The principle of joint peace or joint war formed the basis of the negotiations, and he was glad to find the right hon. gent. (Mr. Windham) fully entered into the system. To obtain such a co-operation from Russia was what ministers were desirous of effecting, and what true policy clearly demanded. He allowed, indeed, that Russia alone, independent of other continental powers, was not efficient for effectually reducing the power of France. The interest other powers in the same cause became therefore a matter of the utmost consequence, but to accomplish this, he needed not to apprise the house, was a matter of extreme difficulty. The secresy which such a negotiations required, the discussion of all the circumstances connected with such a close union of interests, and the arrangement of the means by which the different members of the confederacy could be brought to act together, were all reasons why the communication alluded to in the message could not now, after so long an interval, be satisfactorily explained. He trusted, then, the house would not refuse to give on this occasion, the same credit to the message, which other messages, under similar circumstances, had obtained. His majesty stated, that no more distinct communication could be made with safety, and therefore he hoped that no unnecessary obstacle might be thrown in the way of connexions capable of producing the most satisfactory results. The right hon. gent. concluded by giving his negative to the motion.
§ Mr. Grey, in reply, adverted to the declaration respecting the sufficiency of the produce of the surplus of the Consolidated Fund to defray the expenses of the loans for the three first years during the war. Such, he understood it to have been then asserted, although the hon. member now endeavoured to put another construction on it. Upon the army he would not then say any thing, as that subject was to be brought forward by an hon. member. In the observations which he made respecting the navy, he did not state the small comparative increase of it for the purpose of inculpating the late board of admiralty, but to shew that it was not equal to the situation of the country engaged in hostility with France and Spain. The right hon. gent. had insinuated a heavy charge against lord St. Vincent, and which should not have 532 been made unless it was meant to be pursued. The charge, as he could collect, for the right hon. gent. did not openly express it, was, that that noble lord had not exerted himself as he should have done, to supply the usual decay of the navy. But how did the successors of the noble earl supply the deficiencies occasioned by decay? Why, by purchasing from the merchant-yards such sips as might be fairly said to constitute not any portion of the strength, but rather of the weakness of the British navy. He would not deny but that the greatest vigilance might be sometimes baffled, and that a single squadron might escape from the enemy's ports, and yet no blame be imputable either to the board of admiralty, or officer who commanded on the station. But what were the house to think, when one fleet escaped from Toulon, another from Cadiz, two from Rochefort, one of which was now at sea with 2,500 troops on board? surely there was something more than mere accident in so many escapes. He would ask, after two years of war, what had been done? Could ministers say where the fleets of France or Spain were gone? Could they undertake to the assure country, that they were not at the very moment giving a decisive blow to some of the most important interest of the country?—The question being loudly called for, the house divided.
| Ayes | 110 |
| Noes | 261 |
| Majority against Mr. Grey's motion | 151 |
§ Adjourned at a quarter before three o'clock on Friday morning.