§ From the moment that hostilities had commenced between Great Britain and France, a sufficient ground of war against Spain, on the part of G. Britain, necessarily followed from the treaty of St. Ildephonso, if not disclaimed by Spain.—That treaty, in fact, identified Spain with the republican govt. of France, by a virtual acknowledgment of unqualified vassalage, and by specific stipulations of unconditional offence,—By the articles of that treaty Spain covenanted to furnish a stated contingent of naval and military force for the prosecution of any war in which the French republic might think proper to engage, She specifically surrendered any right or pretension to enquire into the nature, origin, or justice of that war. She stipulated, in the first instance, a contingent of troops and ships, which, of itself, comprises no moderate proportion of the means at her disposal; but in the event of this contingent being at any time found insufficient for the purposes of France, she fur- 125 ther bound herself to put into a state of activity the utmost force, both by sea and land, that it should be in her power to collect. She covenanted that this force should be at the disposal of France, to be employed conjointly or separately for the annoyance of the common enemy; thus submitting her entire power and resources to be used as the instruments of French ambition and aggression, and to be applied in whatever proportion France might think proper, for the avowed purpose of endeavouring to subvert the govt. and destroy the national existence of G. Britain.—The character of such a treaty gave G. Brit, an incontestible right to declare to Spain, that unless she decidedly renounced the treaty, or gave assurances that she would not perform the obligations of it, she would not be considered as a neutral power.—This right, however, for prudential reasons, and from motives of forbearance and tenderness towards Spain, was not exercised in its full extent; and, in consequence of assurances of a pacific disposition on the part of the Spanish govt. his maj. did not, in the first instance, insist on a distinct and formal renunciation of the treaty. It does not appear that any express demand of succour had been made by France before the month of July 1803; and on the first notification of the war, his maj.'s minister at the court of Madrid was led to believe, in consequence of communications which passed between him and the Spanish govt. that his Catholic maj. did not consider himself as necessarily bound by the mere fact of the existence of a war between G. Brit, and France, without subsequent explanation and discussion, to fulfil the stipulations of the treaty of St. Ildephonso, though the articles of that treaty would certainly give rise to a different interpretation. In the month of Oct. a convention was signed, by which Spain agreed to pay to France a certain sum monthly, in lieu of the naval and military succours which they had stipulated by the treaty to provide; but of the amount of this sum, or of the nature of any other stipulations which that convention might contain, no official information whatever was given.—It was immediately slated by his maj.'s ministers at Madrid to the Spanish govt. that a subsidy as large as that which they were supposed to have engaged to pay to France, far exceeded the bounds of forbearance; that it could only meet with a temporary connivance, as, if it was con- 126 tinued, it might prove in fact a greater injury than any other hostility. In reply to these remonstrances, it was represented as an expedient to gain time, and assurances were given, which were confirmed by circumstances, which came to his maj.'s knowledge from other quarters, that the disposition of the Spanish govt. would induce them to extricate themselves from this engagement, if the course of events should admit of their doing so with safety. When his maj. had first reason to believe that such a convention was concluded, he directed his minister at the court of Madrid to declare that his forbearing to consider Spain as an enemy must depend in some degree upon the amount of the succours, and upon her maintaining a perfect neutrality in all other respects; but that it would be impossible for him to consider a permanent payment, to the amount of that which was stated to have been in agitation in any other light than as a direct subsidy for war. His maj.'s envoy was directed, therefore, first to protest against the convention, as a violation of neutrality, and a justifiable cause of war; secondly, to declare, that our abstaining from hostilities must depend upon its being only a temporary measure, and that we must be at liberty to consider a perseverance in it as a cause of war; thirdly, that the entrance of any French troops into Spain must be refused; fourthly, that any naval preparation must be a great cause of jealousy, and any attempt to give naval assistance to France an immediate cause of war; fifthly, that the Spanish ports must remain open to our commerce, and that our ships of war must have equal treatment with those of France. His maj.'s minister was also instructed, if any French troops entered Spain, or if he received authentic information of any naval armaments preparing for the assistance of France, to leave Madrid, and to give immediate notice to our naval commanders, that they might proceed to hostilities without the delay that might be occasioned by a reference home.—The execution of these instructions produced a variety of discussions; during which his maj.'s minister told M. Cevallos, in answer to his question, Whether a continuance of such pecuniary succours to France would be considered as a ground of war, and whether he was authorised to declare it? that he was so authorised, and that war would be the infallible consequence.—It was, however, still thought desirable by 127 his maj. to protract, if possible, the decision of this question; and it was therefore stated in the instructions to his minister at Madrid, that as the subsidy was represented by the Spanish govt. to be merely a temporary measure, his maj. might still continue to overlook it for a time; but that his decision hi this respect must depend upon knowing the precise nature of all the stipulations between Spain and France, and upon the Spanish govt. being determined to cause their neutrality to be respected in all other particulars. That until these questions were answered in a satisfactory manner, and the convention communicated to him, he could give no positive answer whether he would make the pecuniary succours a cause of war or not.—Before the receipt of these instructions, dated Jan. 21, 1804, the report of some naval armaments in the ports of Spain had occasioned a fresh correspondence between his maj.'s minister and the Spanish govt. In one of the notes presented by the former, he declares, that if the king was forced to begin a war, he would want no other declaration than what he had already made. The answers of the Spanish govt. were at first of an evasive nature; his maj.'s minister closed the correspondence on his part by a note delivered on the 18th Feb. in which he declares that all farther forbearance on the part of England must depend upon the cessation of all naval armaments, and a prohibition of the sale of prizes in their ports; and unless these points were agreed to without modification, he had orders to leave Madrid. On the 2nd of these points a satisfactory-answer was given, and orders issued accordingly; on the 1st a reference was made to former declarations. To the question about disclosing the treaty with France, no satisfactory answer was ever given. As, however, no naval preparations appeared to be proceeding at that period in the ports of Spain, the matter was allowed to remain there for a time.—In the month of July 1804, the govt. of Spain gave assurances of faithful and settled neutrality, and disavowed any orders to arm in their port; yet in the subsequent month, when these assurances were recent, and a confident reliance reposed in them, the British charge d'affaires received advice from the admiral commanding his maj.'s ships off the port of Ferrol, that reinforcements of Soldiers and sailors had arrived through Spain for the fleets at Toulon and Ferrol. 128 On this intelligence, two notes were presented to the Spanish ministers, but no answer received to either of them. Towards the end of the month of Sept. information was received in London from the British admiral stationed off Ferrol, that orders had actually been given by the court of Madrid for arming, without loss of time, at that port, 4 ships of the line, 2 frigates, and other smaller vessels; that (according to his intelligence) similar orders had been given at Carthagena and Cadiz, and particularly that 3 first-rate ships of the line were directed to sail from the last-mentioned port; and, as an additional proof of hostile intentions, that orders had been given to arm the pacquets as in time of war.—Here then appeared a direct and unequivocal violation of the terms On which the continuance of peace had been acquiesced in; previous notice having been given to the Spanish govt. that a state of war would be the immediate consequence of such a measure, his maj. on this event stood almost pledged to an instant commencement of hostilities; the King, however, preferred a persevering adherence to the system of moderation so congenial to his disposition: he resolved to leave still an opening for accommodation, if Spain should be still allowed the liberty to adopt the course prescribed by a just sense of her own interests and security. It is here worthy of remark, that the groundless and ungrateful imputations thrown out against his maj.'s conduct in the Spanish manifesto, are built upon the foundation of this forbearance alone. Had his maj. exercised without reserve his just rights of war, the representations so falsely asserted, and so insidiously dwelt upon, could not have been even stated under any colourable pretext: the indulgence, therefore, which postponed the actual state of war, was not only misrepresented, but transformed into a ground of complaint, because the forbearance extended to the aggressors was not carried to a dangerous and inadmissible extreme. In consequence of the intelligence above stated, directions were sent to his maj.'s minister at Madrid, to make representations and remonstrances to the Spanish court, to demand explanations relative to the existing conventions between Spain and France; and, above all, to insist, that the naval armaments fit their ports should be placed on the same footing as they were previous to the com- 129 mencement of hostilities between G. Brit, and France: and he was further directed, explicitly to state to the Spanish govt. that his maj. felt a duty imposed upon him of taking, without delay', every measure of precaution; and particularly of giving orders to his admiral off the port of Ferrol, to prevent any of the Spanish ships of war sailing from that port, or any additional ships of war from entering it.—No substantial redress, no satisfactory explanation, was afforded in consequence of these repeated representations; whilst, under the cover of his maj.'s forbearance, the enemy had received considerable remittances of treasure, together with the facility of procuring other supplies.—Every circumstance of the general conduct of Spain was peculiarly calculated to excite the vigilant attention of the British govt.: the removal of Spanish ships out of their docks, to make room for the accommodation of the men of war of France; the march of French troops and seamen through the Spanish territory; the equipment of naval armaments at Ferrol; the consideration that the junction of this armament with the French ships already in that harbour, would create a decided superiority of numbers over his maj.'s squadron cruising off that port; the additional naval exertions, and the consequent increase of expence which this conduct of Spain necessarily imposed upon G. Brit. All these together required those precautions, both of representation and action, to which his maj. had immediate recourse. While official notice was given of his maj.'s intention to adopt those necessary measures, the Spanish govt. was at the same time assured, that his maj. still felt an earnest desire to maintain a good understanding with Spain; but that the continuance of such a state of things must be subject to the condition of abstaining on their part from all hostile preparations, and on making, without hesitation or reserve, that full and explicit disclosure of the nature and extent of the subsisting engagements with France, which had hitherto been so frequently and fruitlessly demanded; The precautions adopted by his maj. were such only as he deemed indispensably necessary to guard against the augmentation by Spain other means of naval preparation during the discussion, and against the possible consequences of the safe arrival of the expected American treasure in the Spanish ports; an event which, has more 130 than once, in former times, become the epoch of the termination of discussions, and of the commencement of hostility on the part of Spain.—The orders issued by his maj. on this occasion, to the admirals commanding his fleets, afford the most striking example of a scrupulous and indulgent forbearance; the most strict limitation was given as to the extent and object of the measures proposed; and the execution of those orders was guarded with the strongest injunctions to avoid, by every means consistent with the attainment of their object, any act of violence or hostility against the dominions or subjects of his Cath. maj. The hostile preparations in the harbour of Ferrol rendered it necessary, in the first instance, that a reinforcement should be added to the squadron cruizing off that port; and orders were, at the same time, conveyed to the British admirals, to send intimation to the Spanish govt. of the instructions they had received, and of their determination in consequence to resist, under the present circumstances, the sailing either of the French or Spanish fleets, if any attempt for that purpose should be made by either of them.—His maj.'s pleasure was at the same signified, that they were not to detain, in the first instance, any ship belonging to his Cath. maj. sailing from a port of Spain; but to require the commander of such ship to return directly to the port from whence she came, and only, in the event of his refusing to comply with such requisition, to detain or send her to Gibraltar, or to England.—Further directions were given not to detain any Spanish homeward-bound ships of war, unless they should have treasure on board, nor merchant ships of that nation, however laden, on any account whatsoever. That, in the prosecution of these measures of precaution, many valuable lives should have been sacrificed, is a subject of much regret to his maj. who laments it as an event produced alone by an unhappy concurrence of circumstances, but which in no degree affect the merits of the case. The question of the just principle, and due exercise of his maj.'s right, rests upon every foundation of the laws of nature and of nations, which enjoin and justify the adoption of such measures as are requisite for defence, and the prevention of aggression.—It remains only further to observe, that if any additional proof were requisite of the wisdom and necessity of precautionary measures, that proof would be found even 131 in the declaration relied upon in the manifesto of Spain, in which its govt. now states itself to have contemplated from the beginning of the war, the necessity of making itself a party to it, in support of the pretensions of France, expressly declaring, that "Spain and Holland, who treated conjointly with France at Amiens, and whose interests and political relations were so closely connected with her, must have with difficulty refrained from taking part against the injuries and insults offered to their ally.—It will further appear by a reference to the dates and results of the several representations made by his maj.'s charge d'affaires at the court of Spain, that the detention of the Spanish treasure ships never was in question during the discussions which preceded his departure from Madrid. That ground of complaint, therefore, which has since been so much relied upon, formed no part of the motive of the previous hostile character so strongly manifested by the Spanish court in their mode of treating the points in discussion, nor, as will appear in the sequel, of the final rupture of the negotiation at Madrid.—On the 26th of Oct. 1804, his maj.'s charge d'affaires presented a note to the Spanish minister, in which the following conditions were insisted upon, as preliminary to the appointment of a minister from G. Brit, who might treat of the adjustment of other matters which remained for discussion. The conditions were three, first, "that the orders given at Ferrol Cadiz, and Carthagena, should be countermanded, as well for the equipment of ships of war in any of those ports as for their removal from one of those ports to another. 2d, that not only the present armaments should be discontinued, but that the establishment of ships of war in the different ports should be replaced on the footing on which they stood at the commencement of hostilities between England and France. 3d. that a full disclosure should be made of the existing engagements, and of the future intentions of Spain with respect to France. From the period above-mentioned to the 2d of Nov. several official notes passed between his maj.'s charge d'affaires and the Spanish minister, consisting, with little variation in their tenor, of urgent demands of satisfaction on the one side, and of evasive and unsatisfactory replies on the other. After repeated delays and reiterated applications, his maj.'s charge d'affaires received his passports on the 7th of Nov. and departed from Madrid on the 14th of that month, During 132 the whole of this negotiation, no mention was made of the detention of the Spanish treasure ships, nor does it any where appear, that an account had been received at Madrid of that transaction. It is evident, therefore, notwithstanding the attempt made by the Spanish court to avail itself of that event, in the manifesto which has been since published, that the state of war must equally have arisen between G. Brit, and Spain, had the detention never taken place; and that, in point of fact, the rupture ultimately took place upon grounds distinct from, and totally unconnected with, that measure.—The leading circumstances which characterise the reiterated abuse of his maj.'s moderation, were each of them of a nature to have exhausted any less settled system of lenity and forbearance. Succours afforded to his enemies; explanations refused or evaded, after repeated demands; conditions violated, after distinct notice, that on them depended the continuance of peace. Such has been the conduct of the Spanish court; and it is, under these circumstances, that his maj. finds the domineering influence of France exerted, and the Spanish nation in a state of declared and open war.—His maj. appeals with confidence to all Europe for the acknowledgment of his exemplary moderation in the whole course of these transactions. His maj. feels, with regret, the necessity which places him in a state of hostility with Spain; and would, with heartfelt satisfaction observe, on the part of that country, the assumption of a more dignified sense of national importance, and a more independent exercise of sovereign rights.—His maj. would, indeed, be most happy to discover in the councils of Spain, a reviving sense of those ancient feelings and honourable propensities, which have at all times been so congenial to the Spanish character, and which, in better limes, have marked the conduct of its govt. His maj. will, on his part, eagerly embrace the first, opportunity thus offered, of resuming a state of peace and confidence with a nation, which has so many ties of common interest to connect it with G. Brit, and which he has hitherto been ever disposed to regard with sentiments of the utmost consideration and esteem.