§ No. 1—Copy of a Dispatch from Lord Hawskesbury to J. H. Frere, Esq. dated Downing-street, 1st Oct. 1802.—Sir; The accustomed political relations between this country and Spain being re-established, it is important that I should inform you of the line of conduct which it will be pro- 290 per for you to adopt, and of the language which you ought to hold in your communications with the Spanish govt. at his maj.'s minister at Madrid.—You will omit no opportunity of assuring the ministers of his Catholic maj. conformably to your instructions, of the sincere and anxious desire of the king to cultivate a good understanding between the two countries; and, in order to give a full effect to these sentiments, you will manifest, in all your proceedings, the most friendly and conciliatory conduct.—There are 3 objects of different value in themselves, which you should always bear in mind in your com—rhunications with the Spanish govt. and which you will bring forward as circumstances will permit.—The 1st would be to establish an unreserved confidence, and a friendly connection between our two governments; this, though highly desirable, may be attended with insurmountable difficulties from the prevalence either of the French interest in the Spanish councils, or from the dread of French power. The success of it will depend in a great measure upon the characters and disposition of the Spanish ministers. The object is, however, so important, that no means, to which we can with prudence resort, ought to be neglected for its accomplishment. The 2d object would be to secure the neutrality of Spain in the event of another war between his maj. and France. All the reasoning applied to the 1st object will be applicable, in a still greater degree, to the 2d: and there may be circumstances under which this object may be attainable, when the 1st must be necessarily abandoned. The 3d object proceeds upon the ground of the two former being found impracticable, and of the impossibility of dissolving the connection which has subsisted between France and Spain. In that case our utmost endeavours should be used to render Spain, in the event of a war, an unwilling and tardy enemy. It it scarcely necessary for me to inform you, that much would be obtained even by success in this particular, for if, in the event of a war, the Spanish govt. could be induced to enter, even slowly, into the views of France, and to create as many delays as possible by negotiation before they had recourse to hostilities, his maj. would have the advantage of being able to direct the whole of his force in the first instance against France, and would not be under the necessity, at the commencement of a war, when the 291 disposable naval force of this country is necessarily less considerable than it is at succeeding periods, of diverting this force to too many quarters, at the time when he is least prepared. These different objects are to be preferred in the order in which they stand, and his maj. relies on your zeal to give effect to the instructions he has given you respecting them. I am, &c HAWKESBURY.
§ No. 2.—Copy of a Dispatch from Lord Hawkesbury, to J. H. Frere, Esq. dated Downing-Street, 27th Oct. 1802.— Sir; Since I wrote my last dispatch, No 1. Events have occurred which may possibly lead to a rupture between his maj. and the French govt. I think it important that you should be apprised of them; and I therefore inclose you a copy of the note verbale which I presented to M. Otto, on the affairs of Switzerland, and of the instructions which have been given to Mr. Moore on the same subject. You will consider these communications as made to you in the strictest confidence; but if, as may be expected, any conversation should arise between you and the Spanish govt. on the subject, you will not fail to represent the system of encroachment and aggrandizement which has been invariably manifested by the French govt. since the conclusion of the definitive treaty, in its proper colours, and how essential it is that every independent state should unite in resisting the exorbitant pretensions of France. You will conform yourself, in your communications on this subject, as much as possible to the general instructions contained in my dispatch, No. I. and you will, above all, endeavour to impress upon the Spanish govt. his maj.'s anxious desire that, in the event of a war between him and France, the,, court of Madrid may be induced at least to preserve a strict neutrality, and his maj.'s determination, in that case, to respect that neutrality by every means in his power.—I am, &c. HAWKESBURY.
§ No. 3.—Translation of a Memorandum without Signature or Date, from the Chev. D'Anduaga; received 29th Aug. 1803— Difference between the family compact of 1761, and the treaty of alliance of 1796, between Spain and France.
| Family Compact. | Treaty of 1796. |
| According to the family compact, the 2 powers will consider as their enemy every power who shall become enemy to other promises, engages, 1 of the 2 crowns. Art. 1. | According to the treaty of 1796, if 1 of the 2 powers finds itself threatened or attacked, the other promises, engages, at obliges itself to be |
| —The inviolable and inutual guarantee shall be supported by all their forces; and their majesties, according to the principle which is the basis of this treaty, agree that whoever attacks the one crown attacks the other. Art. 2. Here follow the articles relative to the first succours. | aiding with its good offices, at to assist it when so required, according to the stipulation of the following articles. Art 2. (Here follow the articles relative to the succours. |
| The first succours are to be considered as an obligation inseparable from the ties of relation ship and intimate union, and these succours shall be the least that the power required can do for the power who may stand in need of assistance; but as the intention of the 2 kings is, that a war once begun by or against 1 of the 2 crowns, shall become proper and per to the other; it is agreed, that as soon as the 2 kings shall be in a state of war with the same enemy or enemies, the obligation of the said succours shall cease, and and should only act as in lieu thereof the 2 crowns shall be bound to make war conjointly in employing therein the whole of their force. Art. 16. | If the said succours are or should become insufficient, the 2 powers shall put in action the greatest force in their power, as well by sea as by land, against the enemy of the power attacked, which power shall employ the said forces either conjointly or separately, according to a plan that shall be concerted between them. Art. II. |
| The succours stipulated by the preceding article shall be furnished in any war which the contracting powers may have to carry on, even should the party required not be directly interested therein, at should only act as auxiliary, Art. 12. |
§ In case the motives for hostilities should be so prejudicial to both parties as to induce them to declare war by common consent against one or more powers, the limitations established in the preceding articles shall cease to have effect, and the 2 contracting powers shall be bound to employ against the common enemy the whole of their forces by sea and land, and to concert plans to direct such forces either collectively or separately, towards such points as may be deemed most adviseable. They also bind themselves in the case pointed out in this art. not to treat for peace, but by common consent, and in such a manner as that each party may obtain that satisfaction, to which they are entitled. Art 13.—In case one of the powers should act only as auxiliary, that power which alone shall be attacked may treat for peace separately, but so as to prevent any prejudice resulting there from to the auxiliary power, and moreover so as it may tend as much as possible to its direct advantage; for which purpose notice shall be given to the auxiliary power, of the mode and time agreed upon for the opening of the negociations. Art. 14.—REMARKS.—Bysimplycomparing the 293 most striking articles of the two treaties, it clearly appears that the family compact was in reality a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive, since it stipulated, that the allied power who was not at war should consider the enemy of his ally as his own, whilst the alliance of 1796 is in itself merely defensive, inasmuch as it only exacts certain succours from the allied power who may be menaced or attacked, and that the alliance does not become offensive, unless the motives for hostilities being prejudicial to both parties, they should declare war by common consent. This observation is so much the more necessary, as the 1st art. of the treaty of 1796 has this expression: "there shall exist a "perpetual alliance offensive and defensive between the French republic and his "Catholic maj. the king of Spain." Those who may not attentively peruse the treaty, and those particularly who may not compare it with the family compact, might be led from this vague expression, to believe that an offensive and defensive alliance actually exists at one and the same time; that is to say, that the ally of the power attacked must ipso facto consider, the enemy of that power as his own, and believe himself in a state of war with him, and consequently as out of his power to continue neutral towards him.— It is equally important to attend to the text of the 11th art. of the treaty of 1796, and particularly to the phrase, "shall put in action the greatest "force in their power," for this force is, and can only be, an augmentation of the succours to be made to the stipulated succours, but it is an augmentation which can take place, 1st, only in the event of the succours furnished not being sufficient; and, 2ndly, only according to the power and means which the party required may have for making the augmentation. One sees at once that it cannot be otherwise 1st, because if by the aforesaid phrase it was meant that the power required should be considered as bound to put in action all his forces, it would be absurd, since he could not do more even where he himself at war with the enemy of his ally: 2dly, because the 13th art. of the same treaty exacts the employment of the whole of the forces of the power required, only in the case wherein the two powers should declare war by common consent against other powers.
§ No. 4.—Translation of a Memorandum, without Signature or Date, from the Chev. d'Anduaga; received 1st Sept, 1803,—Spain, 294 the ally of France, and at the same time a friend of England, finds herself at this moment called upon to fulfil towards each of them the respective duties of alliance and of friendship.—The treaty of alliance concluded with France in 1796, although termed an offensive and defensive alliance, being only, properly speaking, an alliance strictly defensive, according to the tenour of all its articles, and the striking difference which exists between its engagements, and those contained in the family compact of 1761, his catholic maj. trusts, he can reconcile his engagements to furnish to France the succours stipulated by the treaty of 1796, with his most ardent desire to maintain his friendly connections with his Brit. maj. The perfect harmony and good understanding, which have subsisted between the two monarchs since the re-establishment of the last peace; the reciprocal proceedings and the principles of the law of nations to be pursued under circumstances similar to those in which G. Brit. and Spain are actually placed, are so many reasons, which prove the justice and the necessity of the conduct, which his Cathalic maj. proposes to pursue at the present moment. France confining herself to the requisition of the stipulated succours, and Spain to furnishing them to her, but without allowing herself to commit any act of direct hostility against England; his Catholic maj. cannot for a moment doubt of his Brit, maj.'s disposition to observe a like conduct on his part. —By such a conduct, his Brit. maj. would, in the first instance, afford to Spain, and to all Europe, a proof of his justice, of his wisdom, and of his impartiality. He would make a distinction between a friendly power who did not furnish succours to his enemies through ambition, resentment, any vicious views, or others inimical to him, but solely to fulfil general eventual engagements previously contracted, and the power who should form connections inimical to England with her enemy, in the very moment of war, and with the same hostile spirit and views as its ally. His Brit, maj. would obtain for the people of G. Brit, and Ireland the great advantage of the continuance of their commerce with Spain, not only during the present war, but also in all those in which neither party having any subject of complaint against the other, England would remain in friendship with Spain, notwithstanding her being at war with France. His Brit, maj. would besides establish from this moment the just idea 295 which should be entertained, especially in England, that a rupture with France does not necessarily produce ipso facto, and, according to treaties, a rupture with Spain. —His Brit. maj. and his ministry are too just and too enlightened for it to be supposed that they can entertain an opinion contrary to the principles above stated, or to the advantages which England would derive from them, even should she agree to the system of conduct pursued by Spain. Sc fully convinced is the king of this, that he cannot, entertain the smallest doubt upon the subject; and he expects with perfect confidence to receive, in the concurrence of his Brit. maj. and of his govt. in the system of the king's conduct, a new proof of their rectitude, and of their friendly sentiments towards the king and the Spanish, people.
§ No. 5.—Translation of Memorandum from the. Chev. d'Anduaga, without Signature or Date, received 1st Sept. 1803.—The question, whether England shall acknowledge the' neutrality of Spain, appears to be reduced to the determining whether the treaty of that power, with France of the year 1796, is an offensive or defensive alliance. It is agreed, that if this treaty merely contains stipulations of limited succours, it might be considered as no alliance strictly defensive; but as it is staled in the 1st art of the treaty, "there shall exist a perpetual offensive and defensive alliance between the French republic and his Catholic maj. t" and moreover, in the 2d art. that if the stipulated succours were or should become insufficient, the two powers should put in action' the greatest forces in their power; it is pretended, that by this new obligation the succours become unlimited, and therefore the alliance takes an offensive character.—With respect to the 1st art. of the treaty, it is to be observed, that the offensive and defensive alliance spoken of is in fact two alliances each of a different kind, and which refer to two different periods. The 1st is that in which the power, whose ally is threatened or attacked, acts merely as an auxiliary. The 2d is that in which both powers should declare war by common consent against one or more powers. The 1st period relates to defensive, the 2d to offensive alliance; and although the 1st art. embraces the two periods collectively, the other articles of the treaty distinguish them in the clearest planner; and it is evident that the defensive alliance takes place in one case, and the-offensive alliance in another; which 296 latter is merely hypothetical, as it cannot take place, but when the two allies shall declare war by common consent; consequently the defensive alliance may exist, without its becoming an offensive one, and without being in contradiction to the lstart. which speaks of the one and the other at the same time. —This same distinction of the two alliances, and of the two periods, serves equally to explain the 11th article in its true sense, and with that justice which is required by the definition of a treaty, on the nature and extent of which doubts have arisen. The treaty itself fixes and separates in its articles the two alliances, and the two periods, in such a manner as, that, on the bare reading of it, one discovers that the art. 12. closes the 1st period; and that the 2d commences at art. 13. that is to say, that art. 11. relates to the defensive alliance, and art. 13. to offensive alliance, from which it results, that art. 11. as relating to the period of defensive alliance, should be explained according to the nature of that alliance, and according to the analogy which the accessory condition contained in art. 11. has with the principal conditions mentioned in the preceding articles.—The nature of defensive alliances is to compel an auxiliary to furnish to his ally limited succours; and this is the case in the alliance in question; for the expression, "shall put in action the greatest force in their power," neither can nor ought to be construed as if the auxiliary was compelled to make the same efforts as the ally, but each one in proportion to the nature of his situation. The one puts in action all his forces to defend himself against the enemy, or to do him all possible injury; the other adds to the succours to be furnished any other in his power, to assist his ally, but always in quality of auxiliary, and in proportion to the stipulated succours. That expression of art. II. which appears in the 1st instance to Call upon the auxiliary to furnish ultimately as much or more to his ally, has, in fact, no other meaning than this; the auxiliary shall make whatever addition may be in his power to the stipulated succours:" and, although the amount of the new succours is not fixed in article 11. it is evident, that it is because much cannot be required of the auxiliary, after having received that which, according to the nature of the alliance, the auxiliary was bound to furnish. And it is also an advantage to the auxiliary, that art. 11. does not specify the amount; to be added to the first succours, for, 297 otherwise, the ally would have the power to prescribe how much the auxiliary ought to furnish him in conformity to the treaty; instead of which at present it is the auxiliary himself who is to fix the extent of the succours, according to his position and his own interests, but, however, without failing in his engagements. The auxiliary being called upon to decide upon this point, can never depart from the rule which he ought to follow in his proceedings, if he means to preserve his character of auxiliary, and to consult his own interests. One of his first interests is that of preserving his connections of friendship and good understanding with the power who may be at war with his ally, since, if the auxiliary should exceed the limits of his duty towards the ally by furnishing considerable succours, he would degenerate into the real enemy of the said power. This consideration is likewise the surest guarantee to that power, that the auxiliary will confine himself within the boundaries which his situation prescribes It therefore follows, that, conformably to the rules of justice and equity, and of the position of an auxiliary towards his ally, the proportion of subsidies to be added should rather be lessened; because, infixing the. line of demarcation between a- defensive and offensive alliance, the more one shall incline to the latter, the more the auxiliary power would incur the risk of being forced into a war, and the more would she deprive herself of those forces of which she would stand in need for her own preservation, in case she herself should have a war to sustain.—All this reasoning is founded upon the treaty of 1796 itself; because, after having spoken of the succours to be-furnished in the first instance, and afterwards of putting in action the greatest force which both powers can bring forward, it is stated, in the 13th art that, when they declare war by common consent, the "limitations established" in the preceding articles shall cease to have effect. From whence it is clear, that even, according to art. 13, the additional succours are acknowledged to be limited succours.
§ No. —Extract of a Dispatch from Ld. Harrowby to J.H. Frere, Esq. dated Downing-Street, 11th July 1804.—As it is the wish of his maj. to persevere as long as possible in the,, system of forbearance which has hitherto been pursued towards Spain; and for that purpose to attempt once more to press upon the Spanish govt. the neces- 298 sity of making an unreserved communication of its engagements with France, and; of its views with respect to Portugal; it is evident that no such attempt can be made with any prospect of success, while circumstances of personal irritation prevent any intercourse between the British minister and the most leading person in the Spanish councils.
§ No. 7.—Translation of a Letter from, the Chev. d'Anduaga to Lord Harrowby, dated Portland Place, 4th Nov. 1804.—My lord, immediately after the receipt of dispatches from my court the day before, yesterday, I called at the office for foreign-affairs requesting an interview with your excl. Having learned from Mr. Hammond that you were unwell, but notwithstanding ready to see me in case I should absolutely require it, I judged it would be indiscreet to intrude upon you, and contented myself with mentioning to Mr. Hammond the subject of the conversation I wished to have with your excl. requesting him at the same time to induce your 1dp. to grant me an audience as soon as possible. In the mean time I hasten to inform you, that I have received by the last packet from Lisbon a copy of Mr. Frere's note of the 37th Sept. and of the answer of my court thereto.—I cannot conceal from your excl. the surprise which the perusal of Mr. Frere's letter has occasioned me, when compared with the striking contrast displayed in the noble, frank, and moderate style and tone held by the Spanish minister. Mr. Frere in too easily taking for granted a fact of which he should previously have ascertained the existence and the precise nature, protests against a naval armament preparing at Ferrol. Mr. Frere has been led into an error when he gave credit to such an armament, since none exists of a nature to justify the complaints which he has brought forward in hi? letter.—If in the beginning of Sept. the king my master thought proper to give orders for some ships of war to sail for Biscay, in order to transport ships thither, his maj. was unfortunately but too well justified by the troubles which had just broken out there in taking that step. Mr. Frere could not be ignorant of this circumstance, and consequently ought never to have attributed such odious intentions to preparations the destination of which it was so easy to discover-Neither had the Brit. govt. any ground for alarm in hearing of these. preparations, since the Naiad, the frigate which brought the account of these pretended armaments, 299 brought also several letters, announcing, in a positive and uniform manner, the real object of them. I mentioned them myself to your excl. in my conference of the 24th Sept. and on the 26th I had the honour of presenting Mr. Brickdale, lieut. col. of the regt. of Hibernia, who shewed your excl. two letters which he had received from his colonel, dated 5ih and 11th Sept. These letters, dated from Ferrol, written by the commander of a corps in garrison there, and filled with details respecting the destination of the troops, of which his own regiment, itself was to form a part, were convincing testimonies, and well calculated to remove the shadow of a doubt. But this is not all: If it were necessary to furnish other data in order to re-establish confidence in the British govt. subsequent advices from Ferrol of the 18th Sept. must have completely convinced your excl. of the entirely pacific intentions of my court; inasmuch as at that moment his maj. had actually ordered every preparation to be suspended, and the troops destined to re-establish tranquillity in Biscay to be sent by land.—After this, how is it possible that Mr. Frere, in his note of the 27th Sept. has not hesitated to treat as "an hostile aggression," an armament (if it can be so called) which had ceased for several days, and which by the notoriety of its destination could not have merited, under any case, so extraordinary a denomination? How could he represent to the king in such unfavourable and unjust colours a measure not less foreign to the interests of England than indispensable for the support of Older in a province of Spain? How could he think it necessary to call the attention of the Spanish govt. "to the serious consequences which must result from their "answer, lest they should plunge Spain "unnecessarily into a ruinous war?"—How different from the tone of bitter menace which pervades the whole of Mr. Frere's letter is the language, full of dignity and good faith, of moderation and of frankness, in which the note of the Spanish ministry is expressed; strong in the purity of the views with which the king's mind has been ever guided, the Spanish ministry in their answer content themselves with the assurance "that his maj. never entertained "an idea of being wanting to his engagements with the Brittsh govt.; that they "would continue, as they had hitherto "done, to prevent any armament being "fitted out against Gt. Brit, and that every "report which might have reached Mr. "Frere contrary to such assurance is ab- 300 "solutely void of foundation, and injurious "to the reputation which the Spanish govt. "so justly possesses."—This answer, which is in no degree contradicted by the information received by the British ministry relative to the pretended armament, being perfectly consonant with the loyal and systematic conduct which my court has invariably followed since the rupture between G. Brit, and France, ought to inspire the British govt. with confidence as to the pacific sentiments which his maj. has never ceased to cherish with regard to England. Moreover, the king has the welfare of his people too much at heart; he attaches too much interest to what he owes to other sovereigns, to permit him, in the midst of peace, setting treaties at defiance, and in opposition to his most solemn and sacred promises, to venture on a step which would draw down on his kingdoms the most cruel of all scourges, would deal a deadly blow against his fame, and tear from him that treasure which his maj. values beyond all others, the testimony of his conscience.—I am, &c.
§ The Chev. D'ANDUAGA.
§ No. 8.—Translation of a Letter from the Chev. d'Anduaga, to Lord Harrowby, dated Portland Place, 11th Nov. 1804.— My lord, your excl. will doubtless have already learned the arrival at Portsmouth of the Spanish frigate Mathilde, which was detained on the 23d Oct. and carried into the above named port on the 8th inst. by the Medusa. The circumstances of this new instance of detention, of which I have been informed by the Spanish captain's report, only render more odious the effects of that order issued by the British govt. which has given rise to it. The Spanish frigate which left Cadiz on the 22d Oct. last, with all the security naturally inspired by the completely pacific relations which were supposed still to subsist between Spain and England, having on the following day fallen in. with the Donegal of 84 guns, and the Medusa of 44; this latter ship, after having fired one gun, which, in the usual manner, the Mathilde returned, made not the least scruple of discharging at her a whole broadside. The Spanish capt. astonished at such a proceeding, complained of it' to the commander of the Donegal, who having asked him some questions with regard to the time of his departure, and the number of the sick who were on board the frigate, requested him to send him a boat. The Spanish capt. sent him accordingly the 301 boat with an officer of the navy, who speaks English, and directed him to convey to the British commander the expression of all those sentiments which naturally arise in similar occasions between officers belonging to two friendly govts. Perceiving, that the Spanish officer was detained too long, the capt. of the Mathilde requested the English commander to send him back as soon as possible, in order that he might be enabled to continue his voyage. To this the commander replied that he was occupied in writing a letter, which was soon after sent to him. The import of this letter, which was written in English, was, that the differences which had arisen between the two courts having obliged that of London to order the detention of all Spanish ships of war, the commander was under the necessity of detaining the Mathilde, and summoned the captain to surrender without making any resistance, and in the space of 5 minutes, "if he did not wish to be sunk." The Spanish capt. not understanding English, directed the officer who was the bearer of this letter, to explain to him the subject of it; but what was his surprise, when the ship of the line and the frigate began to fire on the Mathilde, before the above-mentioned officer could get at the contents of the letter. The Spanish capt. defended himself with courage against this unforeseen attack, and did not surrender to so prodigious a superiority of force till after a resistance as honourable as it was useless, in which 2 of his ship's crew were killed, and several others wounded.—I will abstain from any reflections on the manner in which the English commander conducted himself on this occasion. Proceedings of this nature cannot but dishonour those who are guilty of them; they are too openly repugnant to the laws of honour not to excite indignation in every mind endowed with the noble sentiments which it inspires.—But I think it my duty to observe to your excl. that this new violation of the law of nations can only tend to augment the doubts to which the unfortunate event of the 5th of Oct. will necessarily have given rise in his maj.'s mind, as to the sentiments which the British ministry entertains towards him; at the same time that it will convince his maj. of the inutility of the efforts which he has made to maintain his amicable relations with England.—That the British govt. should have been alarmed, on 302 learning the first accounts of our preparations at Ferrol, when they were transmitted to them through channels which seemed to take pleasure in disfiguring the truth, and in representing it in a light altogether unfavourable; that under the first emotion of surprise, to which nevertheless it never should have so easily yielded, it should have given that extraordinary order, the unhappy consequences of which will have struck with astonishment all the courts of Europe, was doubtless a proceeding as opposite to the most sacred principles, as it was unexpected from the relations subsisting between the two courts; but it still left the hope, that, recovering from its former alarms, and after having received more correct intelligence on the nature and the object of our preparations, the British govt. would give express orders to its ships to respect henceforward the Spanish flag, and would await with the tranquillity natural to a ministry sincerely desirous of the continuance of peace, the issue of the negotiations entered upon with Spain.—But when Spain shall perceive that nothing will cause the British ministry to desist from its hostile measures: that neither the impartial conduct which my court has constantly manifested since the commencement of hostilities between France and England, nor the total suspension of the preparations at Ferrol, the only motive alleged by England to: justify the system which she seems to have made it a rule to adopt for this some time past, nor the frank and moderate answer made to the exaggerated representations of the English charge d'affaires residing at Madrid, can secure his maj. from the insults which his flag continually receives, will it not warrant a suspicion that England purposes to accumulate on Spain every kind of aggression, in order to bring on a rupture, which the well-known sentiments of his maj. and his constant eagerness to prevent every subject of reciprocal complaint, ought to render impossible? I will confess to you, my lord, in frankness, however animated the king my master may be with the sincere desire {o maintain his relations of friendship-, with the British govt. however ready he may. be to make still more sacrifices for the. maintenance of peace; if England perseveres if the system which its govt. has lately developed, his maj. will find himself obliged to stifle the pacific sentiments of his heart, in order to attend only to the interest. 303 which he takes in the welfare of his people, and in the complete security of his kingdoms.—It only depends, therefore, on the British govt. to prevent the disastrous consequences of such an event, by putting an end to those hostile measures, the continuance of which would be an incontestible proof in the eyes of all Europe, that it was absolutely decided upon to make war on Spain. I avail myself, &c. (THE Chev. D'ANDUAGA.
§ No. 9.—Copy of a Letter from W. Marsden, Esq. to G. Hammond, Esq, dated Admiralty Office, 15th Nov. 1804.—Sir; I have received and communicated to my lords commissioners of the admiralty, your letter to me of yesterday's date, inclosing a copy of one from the Chev. d'Anduaga; and I have their ldp.'s commands to acquaint you, that no time shall be lost in making a strict inquiry into the circumstances therein stated; which appear to them the more extraordinary, as in the report made to them by the captain of the Donegal, mention is made only of a few shot fired at the expiration of the time limited for the surrender. I am, &c. W. MARSDEN.
§ No. 10——Extract of a Letter from W. Marsden, Esq. to G. Hammond, Esq. dated Admiralty Office, 16th Nov. 1804. —I am commanded by my lords commissioners of the admiralty to transmit to you the inclosed, for the information of lord Harrowby, copy of a letter from captain Gore, of the Medusa, in answer to the statement he was called upon to make of the circumstances attending the surrender of the Spanish frigate Mathilde.
§ (Inclosure in No. 10.)—Medusa, at the Motherbank, l6th Nov. 1804.—Sir; I have received your letter of the 13th inst. and in reply thereto I have to acquaint you, that during a very squally night of the 22d ult. the Donegal and Medusa were separated, and that on the morning of the 23d, at half past 7, A. M. we saw a ship in the N. E. which we judged to be a man of war (and not the Donegal); I consequently wore and made sail towards her. As we approached, I observed she was evidently a Spanish frigate, and making sail to cross us. She going on a wind to the S. W. we to the northward, wind at W. N. W. I consequently let two reefs out, and hoisted an English St. George's ensign. Nearly at the same moment I saw the Donegal in the N. W. hull de- 304 pressed, boarding a merchant brig, and soon after bear up and make sail to words us.—At about half past 9, the strange ships crossed our weather bow about. 1 mile, under Spanish colours and a press of sail, I ordered a shot to be fired far a-head of her, which she answered by a gun without a shot, but did not bring to. I fired a 2d and 3d, when she fired I shotted; and when she was upon our weather beam, I ordered the broadside to be fired over her, and tacked; she then brought to. During this time the Donegal had closed, and while I was working the Medusa up, some communication had passed between sir R. Strachan and the Spanish capt. and about half past 10 sir Rd. summoned me on' board by signal (their lordships are already in possession of the result of our determination, which was the effect of mature' deliberation; after which a quarter past noon, I returned to my ship, and the space of 10 minutes being elapsed from the time the Spanish officer had gone on board his ship, sir Rd. made the Medusa's signal to wear and engage (I must here observe that the Medusa was about pistol shot distant upon the Mathilde's lee beam, and the Donegal advanced upon her weather bow), having previously urged, me to be cautious not to hurt any one on board the Spanish frigate, if it was possible to be avoided, and to give my orders to fire over her; and previous to my quitting the Donegal, I heard sir Rd. charge his officers to the same effect.—I did so, and upon our firing our broadside a head, a-stern, and over her, she struck her colours; but the situation of the Donegal prevented sir Rd. Strachan perceiving it, and as the Spanish broad pendant was still flying, the Donegal fired her quarter deck and poop carronades, but not a single gun (her lower deck guns were not run out), nor did the Medusa fire a gun a 2d time. Only 2 shot struck the Mathilde; I from the Donegal entered her larboard bow in the carpenter's store room, and I from the Medusa entered her side at the gangway; and I most roundly assert, that neither officer nor man was killed or wounded on board her, both from our own knowledge and the declaration of capt. de la Guardia, and all his officers, for it was the 1st question I asked when they came on board the Medusa, and the Spanish capt. has repeatedly told me, that all our shot, except 2, went clear of the Mathilde.—And how he could deliberately assert that we had killed 2, 305 and wounded several of the crew, I am at a loss to conceive, more particularly as that letter was written in my cabin, and I furnished him with data, and ultimately sent his letter to the Spanish minister, with the dispatches to their lordships, on the day of our arrival, which is the only circumstance in this transaction of which I can charge myself with having acted improperly, and even here I trust I can acquit myself, for I did it with the motive of befriending capt. de la Guardia, his officers and crew, and of obtaining them that relief which I had it not in my power to bestow.—The following copy of sir It. Strachan's letter to capt. dela Guardia refutes his assertion, that the capt. of the Donegal recommended him to surrender without resistance ("s'il ne vouloit pas être coulè bas.") "His Maj.'s Ship Donegal, 23d Oct. 1804.—Sir; The negotiations which are pending between our two govts. render it my duty to prevent his Catholic maj.'s frigate Mathilde under your command, from proceeding upon her present voyage, and that I must detain her until my sovereign's pleasure is further known. I therefore request you will surrender to our wishes, and I allow you the space of 5 minutes to determine. I beg leave to call your attention to the very great superiority of force now before you, and that any resistance on your part must be unavailing; and I must add, that if his maj.'s. ships or subjects receive any injury, you must expect it to be retaliated severely. I have, &c. R. I. STRACHAN."—Facts speak strongly in this case, for had it been our intention to have struck the Mathilde, situated as the Donegal and Medusa were, one broadside from each would have annihilated her; instead of which neither mast, yard, sail, or rope, were touched. Did it become me to follow the example of the Spanish capt. to censure and reprobate the conduct of the Spanish govt. the occurrences during the last 12 months, when I have been entrusted with the command as senior officer of his maj.'s ships and vessels on the Gibraltar station, afford me ample subject for animadversion; and I do not hesitate saying, that the open partiality they have marked towards our enemies merits any chastisement his maj. may think proper to inflict. I am, &c. JOHN GORE.
§ No. 11.—Extract of a Dispatch from Ld. Hawkesbury, to J. H. Frere. Esq. dated Downing Street, 20th May, 1803.—Sir; Your several dispatches to No. 12. inclu- 306 sive, have been received at laid before the king.—I send you inclosed for your information the copy of a message from his maj. to both houses of parliament, from which you will perceive that the discussions which have subsisted between his maj.'s govt. and that of France, have been brought to an unfavourable conclusion.—I shall forward the papers which his maj. has deemed it proper to communicate to parliament, by a messenger whom I shall dispatch to you in the course of a few days, for the purpose of furnishing you with precise instructions for the regulation of your conduct at the present important period.—In the mean time I have to signify to you his maj.'s pleasure, that you take an early opportunity to assure the Spanish govt. of the king's sincere and anxious desire that the relations of peace and amity which have been so happily re-established between him and his Catholic maj. may be preserved. I am; &c. HAWKESBURT.