Iraq: Procurement of Uranium (Hansard, 16 September 2004)

§ Lord Avebury
asked Her Majesty's Government:
Whether they accept the explanation given by the then Iraq Ambassador to the Holy See to the International Atomic Energy Authority for his visit to Niger in February 1999; and, if not, whether they have provided the authority with any additional evidence on the purpose of that visit since the date of the letter from the authority quoted in paragraph 502 of the Lord Butler of Brockwell's Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction. [HL3926]

§ The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean)
The question of evidence supporting the assertion in the Government's dossier that Iraq had sought to procure uranium from Niger was investigated in detail by the review headed by Lord Butler of Brockwell. The review concluded that there was sufficiently robust evidence to support the assertion.
Based upon this evidence, the Government cannot accept the explanation provided by Ambassador AlZahawi of the purpose of his visit to Niger in 1999.
The evidence on which the assertion in the Government's dossier was based came from the intelligence service of another state. It has not been made available by the UK to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We have not passed any information to the IAEA on this issue.

Strategy FY 2002–03 Budget (£m) FY 2002–03 Spend (£m) % Spent Against Budget FY 2003–04 Budget (£m) FY 2003–04 Spend (£m) % Spent Against Budget

(a) Middle East

Iraq n/a n/a 7.5 5.0 67%

This new strategy underspent in FY 2003–04 because it took some time for projects on the ground to get up and running as a result of difficulties relating to security considerations.

Middle East & North Africa (MENA) 5.1 4.7 92% 4.6 3.4 74%

MENA GCPP Strategy spending is partly driven by the opportunities in relation to the Middle East peace process. The lower spend in FY 2003–04 reflects the difficulties the strategy had in implementing projects on the ground.

(b) Afghanistan 15.7 11.0 70% 23.8 18.5 78%

The strategy was underspent in these financial years.

This is largely the result of the UN and US bodies responsible for implementing the programme of support to the Afghan National Army (ANA) being unable to use £5 million allocated to them in FY 2002–03 (and subsequently FY 2003–04) to pay ANA salaries. But this allocation has now been disbursed and the Afghanistan Main Strategy is well on course to achieve full spend against the £17 million available in FY 2004–05.

¹ All figures rounded to the nearest 100,000; FY 2003–04 spend figures might not be 100 per cent complete as we are still awaiting last minute adjustments.

196WA

§ Lord Avebury
asked Her Majesty's Government:
Whether they are obliged by treaty obligations, and if so by which articles, to notify the International Atomic Energy Authority of any evidence which comes to their attention of attempts to procure uranium ore illegally; and, if so, when they notified the authority of intelligence referred to in paragraph 494 of the Lord Butler of Brockwell's Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction that in 1999 the Iraqi régime made inquiries about the purchase of uranium ore in the Democratic Republic of Congo. [HL3927]

§ Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean
There are no treaty obligations which require any state to report to the International Atomic Energy Agency evidence of attempts to procure uranium ore.
Trade in uranium ore is not prohibited under any international treaties.

Strategy	FY 2002–03 Budget (£m)	FY 2002–03 Spend (£m)	% Spent Against Budget	FY 2003–04 Budget (£m)	FY 2003–04 Spend (£m)	% Spent Against Budget
(a) Middle East
Iraq	n/a	n/a		7.5	5.0	67%
This new strategy underspent in FY 2003–04 because it took some time for projects on the ground to get up and running as a result of difficulties relating to security considerations.
Middle East & North Africa (MENA)	5.1	4.7	92%	4.6	3.4	74%
MENA GCPP Strategy spending is partly driven by the opportunities in relation to the Middle East peace process. The lower spend in FY 2003–04 reflects the difficulties the strategy had in implementing projects on the ground.
(b) Afghanistan	15.7	11.0	70%	23.8	18.5	78%
The strategy was underspent in these financial years.
This is largely the result of the UN and US bodies responsible for implementing the programme of support to the Afghan National Army (ANA) being unable to use £5 million allocated to them in FY 2002–03 (and subsequently FY 2003–04) to pay ANA salaries. But this allocation has now been disbursed and the Afghanistan Main Strategy is well on course to achieve full spend against the £17 million available in FY 2004–05.
¹ All figures rounded to the nearest 100,000; FY 2003–04 spend figures might not be 100 per cent complete as we are still awaiting last minute adjustments.