§ Mr. CohenTo ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions (1) for each London Underground line, what is the nature of the planned principal improvement works to be funded under the public private partnership in each of the next 15 years; what is the cost of each of the works at current prices; and how much of the capital expenditure on each line can be attributed to past funding constraints on the London Underground network; [100929]
(2) what provision the London Underground public private partnership includes for new rolling stock. [100930]
§ Mr. HillThis information cannot be supplied in the form requested. PPP companies will be required to implement a combination of specific projects and performance enhancements specified in output terms. The
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London Underground Limited Investment and maintenance spend for rolling stock, signalling and track for the financial years 1994–95 to 1998–99 £ million (in 1998–99 prices) 1994–95 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98 1998–99 Business unit Investment Maintenance Investment Maintenance Investment Maintenance Investment Maintenance Investment Maintenance Bakerloo Rolling stock 10.0 4.7 1.7 4.4 1.9 4.3 3.4 4.7 6.2 4.6 Track 0.1 3.6 2.7 3.4 3.1 3.0 4.5 1.9 5.4 1.8 Signals 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.0 0.9 0.3 0.6 Central Rolling stock 90.5 8.9 3.4 10.1 4.5 10.8 1.4 10.6 4.8 12.4 Track 11.5 8.8 20.2 7.3 18.1 7.4 17.6 7.7 16.3 8.2 Signals 23.7 3.0 8.0 3.4 5.4 4.5 10.6 4.9 15.4 4.8 District Rolling stock 3.5 9.5 8.2 8.9 4.2 8.3 1.9 8.1 4.3 8.8 Track 1.8 8.3 11.3 5.9 5.5 6.8 7.1 5.3 4.2 6.6 Signals 0.5 2.4 2.3 2.5 1.8 2.7 1.9 2.7 3.7 3.1 PPP will not, therefore, in general specify particular amounts of money to be spent, nor particular works to be carried out, nor rolling stock to be purchased.
London Underground have made the following line-by-line estimates of how much it will cost to implement the performance regime being developed for the first 15 years of this proposed Public Private Partnership. They estimate that £1.2 billion of the total projected expenditure of £7.36 billion can be attributed to disinvestment due to past funding constraints on the Underground network.
Indicative projection of 15 year investment expenditure Line £ million 1999–2000 prices Bakerloo 390 Central, Waterloo and City 780 Victoria 900 Northern1 950 Jubilee2 280 Piccadilly 1,190 Metropolitan, Circle, Hammersmith and City 1,700 District 970 East London3 200 Total 7,360 1 Northern Line train investment costs are contracted for under a separate PH scheme and are excluded from these figures. 2 Excludes operating and maintenance costs for the Jubilee Line Extension project. 3 Excludes costs from potential project for extending East London Line.
§ Mr. BrakeTo ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions if he will make a statement on the maintenance and investment budget, in real terms, for rolling stock, signalling and track in each financial year since 1994–95 for(a) each line of the London Underground and (b) the London Underground as a whole. [100951]
§ Mr. Hill[holding answer 6 December 1999]: This is an operational matter for London Underground which has provided the information in the following table.
The figures for 1994–95 and 1995–96 reflect expenditure to modernise the Central Line.
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London Underground Limited Investment and maintenance spend for rolling stock, signalling and track for the financial years 1994–95 to 1998–99 £ million (in 1998–99 prices) 1994–95 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98 1998–99 Business unit Investment Maintenance Investment Maintenance Investment Maintenance Investment Maintenance Investment Maintenance Jubilee/ELL Rolling stock 0.1 3.8 0.0 3.8 0.0 3.6 0.0 3.8 00 7.0 Track 1.1 2.9 5.6 2.9 7.7 3.4 7.6 3.3 1.0 3.4 Signals 3.0 1.0 3.1 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.2 1.1 0.0 1.9 Metropolitan/Circle Rolling stock 14.6 15.5 25.1 13.5 16.4 13.1 16.8 12.7 1.0 14.6 Track 1.2 9.9 13.6 8.2 5.1 6.5 5.6 7.0 9.0 8.2 Signals 1.2 7.3 2.9 6.9 5.9 3.2 5.1 3.1 3.6 3.1 Northern Rolling stock 11.9 10.3 5.1 11.5 0.5 11.6 5.2 14.5 5.5 14.1 Track 2.1 6.8 19.3 6.9 17.3 6.4 12.2 5.8 17.8 6.7 Signals 0.0 2.7 2.5 2.8 1.3 2.9 0.6 3.1 1.6 3.4 Piccadilly Rolling stock 7.8 8.8 14.6 8.2 22.8 8.3 22.5 8.9 22.9 10.0 Track 2.3 6.9 9.8 6.5 2.8 7.1 3.8 7.2 9.4 7.7 Signals 0.8 2.4 1.3 2.4 1.1 2.2 0.3 2.5 0.1 2.4 Victoria Rolling stock 11.3 7.0 0.4 7.0 0.4 6.9 1.1 6.5 0.7 6.7 Track 0.8 2.6 6.7 1.9 2.6 2.3 5.6 2.6 9.9 3.1 Signals 0.0 1.2 0.2 1.3 0.1 1.4 0.1 1.3 0.2 1.3 Network Rolling stock 4.1 0.0 5.9 0.0 3.7 0.0 0.5 0.0 5.8 0.0 Track 38.1 0.0 16.5 0.0 6.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 14.5 0.0 Signals 1.9 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.0 4.0 0.5 3.6 2.8 3.5 Asset Type Rolling stock 253.8 68.5 64.5 67.4 54.4 66.9 52.8 69.9 51.2 78.3 Track 59 49.8 105.7 43 68.1 42.9 65.2 40.7 87.5 45.8 Signalling 31.5 20.7 22.3 21.2 17.7 22.7 19.2 23.3 27.7 24.1 Total 244.4 139.0 192.5 131.6 140.2 132.5 137.1 134.0 166.4 148.2 Notes: 1. Figures exclude investment undertaken under the Jubilee Line Extension Project 2. Figures exclude ALSTOM PFI leasing charge 3. Network figures are the projects which span more than one line
§ Mr. BrakeTo ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions if he will make a statement on(a) train, (b) signal and (c) track failures for each line of the London Underground since May 1997. [100948]
§ Mr. Hill[holding answer 6 December 1999]: This is an operational matter for London Underground. However, I understand that the following numbers summarise the failures under the headings requested for passenger journeys (to provide the breakdown would incur disproportionate expense):
Service disruption due to failures in: 1996–97 1997–98 1998–99 1999–20001 Rolling stock 14,873 18,088 20,159 8,067 Signal/points 2,323 2,827 2,756 1,111 Other track 1,007 907 869 402 1 24 weeks only London Underground Limited's data collection year covers 1 April to 31 March. The 1999–2000 figures represent 24 weeks to 18 September 1999 only.
This is in a period when the general trend of train kilometres per year is increasing.
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Million 1996–97 58.6 1997–98 62.1 1998–99 61.2 1999–20001 29.5 1 24 weeks only
§ Mr. BrakeTo ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions if he will break down the £3 billion efficiency savings identified in the PricewaterhouseCoopers report about PPP and London Underground. [103564]
§ Mr. Hill[holding answer 20 December 1999]: The saving that PricewaterhouseCoopers identified in their briefing note—£4.5 billion in total over the first 15 years of the PPP, once financing costs are taken into account—assumes that the private sector PPP infrastructure companies will bring an efficiency improvement of 20 per cent.
This is considered to be a conservative estimate, based on what London Underground and their advisers believe the PPP process could deliver, and the scale of efficiency savings that have been delivered previously when the 525W financing and management of similar infrastructure programmes have been transferred from the public to private sectors.
Mr. Gareth R. ThomasTo ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions if he will make a statement on the recent developments on the London underground public private partnership. [104003]
§ Mr. HillI am confident that the public-private partnership—publicly owned, publicly run, and properly financed—is the best way to deliver the improved underground system London needs.
London Transport is today launching a public-private partnership for the sub-surface lines (Circle, District, Hammersmith and City, Metropolitan, East London lines). A notice inviting expressions of interest from prospective bidders will appear shortly in the "Official Journal of the European Communities".
London Transport is also today inviting expressions of interest in a new public-private partnership for the future management of London Underground's non-operational property estate and for property which is surplus to the requirements of the operational railway.
This public-private partnership comprises the disposal of some surplus, non-operational properties, allied to longterm contracts for the provision of property management services and for the future development of non-operational property. Non-operational property includes commercially let property outside the boundaries of the operational railway, car parks, railway arches, office buildings, development sites and areas made available for the generation of non-fare income (e.g. shops, commercial advertising, vending and cash machines) within the operational boundary.
This partnership would enable London Underground to arrange for its non-operational property portfolio more efficiently and to concentrate on its core task of providing transport services throughout the capital. Together with the public private partnerships for the sub-surface and deep tube lines, it will deliver better station facilities and real improvements for passengers.
It is envisaged that negotiations for the partnership will be concluded in line with the sub-surface and deep tube line public- private partnerships.
Pursuant to the answers of 13 January 1999, Official Report, column 212W and 12 May 1999, Official Report, columns 154–55W, I understand from London Transport that their expenditure on external consultants from 20 March 1998 (the date of the Government's announcement) to 13 November 1999 for work on the PPP and restructuring London Underground was £48.06 million. The Underground PPP proposals are expected to generate £8 billion new investment in the Underground over the next 15 years.
§ Mr. PoundTo ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions when he expects to publish the public sector comparator that is being developed for the London Underground Public Private Partnership. [104064]
§ Mr. HillWe are developing a Public Sector Comparator to show how much it would cost if a wholly public sector London Underground were to deliver the526W outputs that will be specified under the public-private partnership contracts. We will only enter into the PPP if bids demonstrate best value when compared against this benchmark.
We will publish the methodology underlying the Public Sector Comparator before contracts for the London Underground public-private partnership are signed. The comparative cash values of the Comparator will then be released after negotiations have been completed. To publish these results any earlier would expose the taxpayer's negotiating position and jeopardise our chances of getting best value.