§ Mr. BluntTo ask the Prime Minister what discussions he had with his Ministers prior to his decision to authorise armed action against Iraq on 14 November; and when. [60651]
§ The Prime MinisterIt is the normal convention under this and previous Governments that discussions which take place between the Prime Minister and Ministers are not routinely disclosed.
§ Mr. DalyellTo ask the Prime Minister, pursuant to his oral statement of 16 November 1998,Official Report, column 610, what support there is in (a) the Arab world, (b) Iran, (c) the Islamic world and (d) Asia for sustained bombing of Iraq if Saddam Hussein again obstructs the work of the UNSCOM inspectors. [60730]
§ The Prime MinisterThe UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1205, condemning Iraq's decision to cease co-operation with UNSCOM as a flagrant violation of UN resolutions. The Damascus Declaration states (Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,750W Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and UAE) announced that Iraq would be responsible for any consequences if it did not reverse its decision. The international community has lost patience with Iraqi intransigence and non-co-operation.
§ Mr. DalyellTo ask the Prime Minister what assessment he has made of whether Baghdad received warning of an imminent attack, and from what source. [60732]
§ The Prime MinisterAs I made clear in my statement on 16 November 1998,Official Report, columns 607-10, a private warning from the UK was delivered directly to the Iraqi Permanent Representative at the UN on 12 November. When the Iraqi government climbed down, they had clearly assessed that this and other warnings were serious and that military action was imminent.
§ Mr. DalyellTo ask the Prime Minister what assessment he has made of the collateral damage to civilian Iraqi people which would result from a military air strike against Iraq. [60742]
§ The Prime MinisterThe risk of collateral damage is a major consideration in selecting targets and only precision guided weaponry would be used. Military action can never be risk-free, but the combination of precision weaponry and careful planning offers by far the best chance of minimising such dangers.
§ Mr. DalyellTo ask the Prime Minister, pursuant to his oral statement of 16 November 1998,Official Report, column 610, what the basis was for his statement about Iraqi propaganda being repeated in Britain. [60733]
§ The Prime MinisterI was commenting on the tendency of some sections of the British media to report Iraqi Government information as fact.
Iraq claims that the suffering of its people is due to sanctions. But the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights concluded in his October interim report that the Government of Iraq bear the primary responsibility for their continuing suffering. Reasons for this include Iraq's decision to prohibit shipments of humanitarian aid from third countries and its decision to stop supplying its food ration to the Iraqi people. Iraq complains that its people are starving, but it is selling wheat and barley to Jordan and Syria at low prices.
§ Mr. DalyellTo ask the Prime Minister (1) pursuant to his oral statement of 16 November 1998,Official Report, column 610, what consultation he has had with international lawyers about attacking Iraq without further warning; [60731]
(2) pursuant to his oral statement of 16 November 1998, Official Report, column 611, what consultation he has had with international lawyers about removing a head of state. [60735]
§ The Prime MinisterNone.
§ Mr. DalyellTo ask the Prime Minister, pursuant to his oral statement of 16 November 1998,Official Report, column 609, for what reasons there is to be no negotiation with Iraq.[60729]
§ The Prime MinisterIraq's obligations under the relevant UN Security Council resolutions are clear. There is no need for negotiations.
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§ Mr. DalyellTo ask the Prime Minister, pursuant to his oral statement of 16 November 1998,Official Report, column 608, what representations he has received from (a) Iran, (b) Jordan, (c) Saudi Arabia, (d) Syria, (e) other Arab states and (f) Israel about the risks to them from Iraq's behaviour. [60728]
§ The Prime MinisterThe risks posed by Iraq's behaviour are well-documented: Iraq fired nearly 200 Scud missiles against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war; during the Gulf War it fired Scud missiles indiscriminately against Saudi and Israeli cities.
§ Mr. DalyellTo ask the Prime Minister if he will list the UNSCOM officials paid 180,000 US dollars a year or more. [60740]
§ The Prime MinisterWe do not keep this information. This is a matter for UNSCOM.
§ Mr. DalyellTo ask the Prime Minister, pursuant to his oral statement of 16 November 1998,Official Report, column 614, what assessment he has made of the threat from pollution to Arab neighbours if missiles are unleashed against targets in Iraq. [60739]
§ The Prime MinisterIn selecting targets for military action, all relevant factors are taken into account.
§ Mr. DalyellTo ask the Prime Minister, pursuant to his oral statement of 16 November 1998,Official Report, column 608, if he will list the materials found at presidential sites by UNSCOM. [60727]
§ The Prime MinisterAs I told my hon. Friend on 16 November 1998,Official Report, column 372, a full report on the UNSCOM/IAEA Presidential site inspections was submitted to United Nations Security Council members on 15 April. The report recorded that the sites had very obviously been extensively cleared before the inspectors entered.
§ Mr. DalyellTo ask the Prime Minister what assessment he has made of the recent statement by Mr. Denis Halliday concerning oil for food arrangements in Iraq. [60734]
§ The Prime MinisterWe regret Mr. Halliday's criticisms of "oil for food" at a time when the UN's latest report shows that the programme is bringing greater benefits to the Iraqi people. But we agree with him that it is unfortunate the UN has been obliged to sustain the sanctions regime against Iraq for so long. This is entirely the fault of Iraq.
§ Mr. DalyellTo ask the Prime Minister, pursuant to his oral statement of 16 November 1998,Official Report, column 617, to which words of the UN Secretary-General he was referring. [60741]
§ The Prime MinisterI was referring to the UN Secretary General's statement to the press on 15 November, saying that Iraq's agreement to resume full co-operation
is a victory for all those who expressed their firm determination that UN resolutions must be respected".
§ Mr. DalyellTo ask the Prime Minister, pursuant to his oral statement of 16 November 1998,Official Report, column 613, what evidence underlay his statement that money for the food programme has gone to elite people around Saddam Hussein; and whom he includes as members of that group. [60738]
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§ The Prime MinisterThe Iraqi regime does not have direct access to "oil for food" funds. But as soon as "oil for food" started the Iraqi government reduced their own spending on essential humanitarian goods for the Iraqi people and diverted these funds to other purposes.
§ Mr. DalyellTo ask the Prime Minister, pursuant to his oral statement of 16 November 1998,Official Report, columns 613-14, what is the nature of the support expressed by Arab states, and what measures they supported. [60737]
§ The Prime MinisterAfter their 11-12 November meeting in Doha, the Foreign Ministers of the Damascus Declaration states (Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and UAE) called on Iraq to rescind its decision to halt co-operation with UNSCOM and to implement all relevant Security Council resolutions. The Ministers held Iraq responsible for any consequences resulting from Iraq's refusal to rescind that decision.
§ Mr. DalyellTo ask the Prime Minister if he will make a statement on the reasons for establishing an Iraq media unit within Her Majesty's Government. [60811]
§ The Prime MinisterThe Government have set up an ad hoc inter-departmental group chaired by the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, Central (Mr. Fatchett). The group ensures that the Government's media response to the Iraq crisis is properly co-ordinated.
§ Mr. DalyellTo ask the Prime Minister, pursuant to his oral statement of 16 November 1998,Official Report, column 612, concerning the views of the international community, what evidence he has obtained that (a) the UN Secretary General, (b) Iran, (c) the Arab world, (d) Russia, (e) China and (f) France accept that next time Iraq obstructs the work of UN inspectors there will be no formal negotiation regardless of last minute pleas and letters. [60736]
§ The Prime MinisterOn 15 November the UN Secretary-General stated that, if there were a next time, he was not sure that there would be time for further diplomatic initiatives and appeals. France has acknowledged the role of the threat of force in resolving this crisis. The Security Council as a whole has called for Iraq to demonstrate unconditional and sustained co-operation with UN inspectors and the Damascus Declaration states (Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and UAE) held Iraq responsible for any consequences resulting from a refusal to resume co-operation with UNSCOM.
§ Mr. FabricantTo ask the Prime Minister if the Iraqi Government signified to the Secretary-General of the United Nations their willingness to co-operate with the UNSCOM inspectors after the orders had been given by the Prime Minister to launch an attack; how long before the attack on targets in Iraq was due to commence, the communication from the Iraqi Government were received by the United Nations; and what was the source from which the Iraqi Government learned that an attack was imminent. [60668]
§ The Prime MinisterAs I made clear in my statement on 16 November 1998,Official Report, columns 607-10, a private warning from the UK was delivered directly to the Iraqi Permanent Representative at the UN on 12 November.
753WOn the morning of 14 November I gave final authorisation for the use of force against Iraq that afternoon. Just over two hours before the attack was due to commence, we learned that the UN Secretary-General had received a message from the Iraqis. The Iraqis can have been in no doubt about our resolve to take action.
§ Mr. FabricantTo ask the Prime Minister which countries were aware that orders had been given to initiate an attack on targets in Iraq. [60746]
§ The Prime MinisterWe have been in close contact with many countries throughout this crisis. As has been the practice under this and previous administrations, it is not Government policy to disclose the content of these conversations.