HL Deb 17 December 1998 vol 595 c165WA
Lord Lester of Herne Hill

asked Her Majesty's Government:

In relation to the statement made by the Lord Chancellor under Section 19 of the Human Rights Act 1998 that in his view the provisions of the Access to Justice Bill [H.L.] are compatible with Convention rights, what are the provisions in the Bill which secure the right of effective access to justice in the determination of an individual's civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge, in accordance with Article 6 of the Convention. [HL224]

The Lord Chancellor (Lord Irvine of Lairg)

The powers contained in Part 1 of the Bill, to provide help in civil and criminal matters, are more than sufficient to enable the Government to meet their obligations under Article 6 of the Convention, through the provision of legal and related services.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill

asked Her Majesty's Government:

In relation to the statement made by the Lord Chancellor under Section 19 of the Human Rights Act 1998 that in his view the provision of the Access to Justice Bill [H.L.] are compatible with Convention rights, how the Bill will ensure that individuals claiming to be victims of breaches of the Convention rights are able to enjoy effective access to the courts and tribunal, in accordance with Article 6 of the Convention, without being deterred by the risk of having to pay the costs of defendant or respondent if their claims fail. [HL223]

The Lord Chancellor

As I told the noble and learned Lord in reply to his question of 10 November (Official Report, 10 November 1998; col. WA 70) the general position is that the courts have a wide discretion in respect of costs and can take into account their impact on a person's ability to bring proceedings. The Bill, in so far as it provides for publicly funded services, contains powers in Clause 11 for the Lord Chancellor to prescribe the circumstances (by regulations subject to the affirmative resolution procedure) in which the amount of any costs order made against a person receiving such services may be limited or enforced. It does not in any other way limit the normal judicial discretion in these matters.