HC Deb 26 November 1992 vol 214 cc820-1W
Mr. Llew Smith

To ask the President of the Board of trade if he will make a statement on the improvements instituted in export control procedures for sensitive technologies since November 1990.

Mr. Needham

The improvements instituted in export control procedures for sensitive technologies since November 1990 are as followsthe establishment of a new section within the Export Control Organisation to process export licence applications for sensitive destination. The identification of sensitive destinations embrace a wide range of policy interests and concerns and is kept under regular review. The sensitive destinations are primarily of concern for chemical and biological weapons, nuclear weapons and missile delivery purposes; the introduction of revised procedures including:

  1. (i) a requirement in all cases for comprehensive documentation covering the capability of goods to be exported to accompany the export licence application.
  2. (ii) detailed technical assessment of all licence applications for sensitive destinations;
  3. (iii) a requirement in all cases for a full and unambiguous statement of the intended end-use and end-user;
  4. (iv) a requirement for rating requests to be made in writing. Exporters are asked when making enquiries to write to ECO;
  5. (v) revision of the rating request form. Exporters must make clear if the goods are for military chemical, nuclear or missile applications;
  6. (vi) revision to the export licence application form to incorporate an explicit question on whether the goods are for use for military purposes;
the extension of computerisation within the ECO to improve the capability for processing export licence applications; the publication of more detailed and comprehensive guidance to exporters in guidance notes accompanying application forms and in literature describing in detail the purpose of controls and their operation; the introduction in December 1990 of an "end-use" control which places a legal responsibility on the exporter to take all reasonable steps to ensure that goods are not being exported for use for CBW purposes, and making it an offence to export goods without a licence whether the exporter knows or suspects they are for use for such purposes. This was extended in 1991 to cover nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems; developing closer links and improving co-ordination with and among other Government Departments which advise DTI on licence applications.

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