§ Mr. Foulkesasked the Prime Minister if she will publish in the Official Report the texts of her letters to the hon. Member for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley of 19 September and 8 October.
§ The Prime MinisterYes.
Following are the texts:
Dear Mr. Foulkes,
Thank you for your further letter of 27 September about events at the end of April and the beginning of May 1982.
The tone of your further letter suggests a remarkable absence of understanding or sympathy for the overriding concern of Ministers and their senior advisers at that time to protect the lives of those serving with the Task Force. Nor do you seem to appreciate that timely decisions had to be taken, in constantly changing circumstances and on the basis of sometimes limited and imperfect information. If, as you seem to imply, you believe that Ministers did not act in good faith and reasonably, I would prefer you to say so openly. I am myself entirely content to accept the verdict of the British people on whether the Government were right to respond to Argentine aggression and to take those actions which we and our senior professional advisers believed necessary to protect British lives.
As I explained in my letter to you of 19 September and in my letter of today's date to Dr. David Owen (copy attached) John Nott's statement of 4 May must be seen in the context of the preoccupations of Ministers and Parliament at that time. It is also simply not true to suggest that the Government has not sought to rectify "the errors and misleading impressions", as you put it, in that statement. My letter of 4 April 1984 to Mr. Denzil Davies dealt with the question of when the General Belgrano was first sighted by HMS CONQUEROR. The Annex to my letter to you of 19 September gave a great deal of further detail about events at that time including the question of the Belgrano's course and position. My letter to Dr. Owen deals with the question of the alleged attack by CONQUEROR on one of the Belgrano's escorting destroyers. I have to say that the provision of this further information seems merely to prompt further questions of 469W an increasingly detailed kind. Some, at least of these questions seem to be of doubtful relevance. None of this further detail has altered the Government's explanation of why it was necessary to alter the Rules of Engagement on 2 May and to attack the General Belgrano. Nor does it cast doubt in any way on our rejection, since questioning began on this issue, of alternative hypotheses put forward by Mr. Dalyell and others. I have explained previously that it is now possible to give some of this further information which we were reluctant to reveal in 1982, as it has lost some of its operational significance.
You ask a number of questions about the reasoning behind the creation of the MEZ and the TEZ and the changes which were made in the Rules of Engagement. These are matters which the Foreign Affairs Committee can no doubt address, if they wish, when the Defence Secretary appears before them. I cannot say with certainty what influence the MEZ and the TEZ exerted on Argentine operations. At all times the Task Force had Rules of Engagement which enabled it to respond to the threat presented by Argentine forces, but the precise circumstances in which Argentine ships and aircraft could be engaged varied as the situation—and in particular the position of the Task Force and the threat which Argentine military forces could pose against it —developed. The warning which was issued to the Argentine Government on 23 April was reported to the United Nations on 24 April and met our obligations with regard to the attack on the Belgrano. The changes that were made in the Rules of Engagement took full account of diplomatic, military and legal considerations and of our best assessment of the threat. The Chief of the Defence Staff and the Service Chiefs of Staff were responsible for giving professional military advice, taking account of the views of the operational commanders.
You ask a number of questions about the activities of the "War Cabinet". As was explained in the White Paper on the Falklands Campaign, the group of Ministers who conducted the higher management of the crisis met almost daily. The Foreign Secretary raised in writing on 1 May whether there was a need for a further warning to the Argentine Government. The Attorney General was present when Ministers met on 2 May. My letter to Dr. Owen deals with the question of when Ministers knew of the precise course of the Belgrano on 2 May. I have already explained to you that this was irrelevant to the decision to permit the ship to be attacked.
It would not be right for me to comment on questions 8 and 14 in your letter. Nor will 1 place the log of CONQUEROR's movements in the Library of the House of Commons: the submarine's log is classified.
Finally, you ask whether any material has been made available to Ministers since May 1982 which would have led us to take different actions then. I dealt with this point directly in my letter to you of 19 September, but I repeat that no evidence has at any time become available to the Government which would make Ministers change the judgment they reached on 2 May that the Belgrano posed a threat to the Task Force. The ship was sunk solely for that reason.
Yours sincerely,
Margaret Thatcher.
George Foulkes, Esq., M.P.
Dear Mr. Foulkes,
You wrote to me on 23 August and 14 September about decisions taken by the Government at the time of the Falklands conflict.
Your questions reflect a number of fundamental misconceptions about the situation in the South Atlantic in April and May 1982. I am enclosing, as an Annex to this letter, a statement of the position which should clear up these misconceptions, and remove any doubts in your mind about the reasons for our actions.
To put the matter briefly, in April 1982 Argentina had attacked and invaded British territory; despite intense and continuing diplomatic efforts, Argentina refused to comply with a mandatory resolution of the United Nations Security Council to withdraw its forces; with all-party support, and in exercise of our inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, the British Government despatched the Task Force to the South Atlantic; by the end of April as it approached the Falkland Islands the Task Force was increasingly vulnerable to Argentine attack; by 2 May it had already been attacked by Argentine aircraft and there were clear and unequivocal 470W indications that it was under further threat from a strong and coordinated pincer movement by the major units of the Argentine Navy, including the cruiser 'General Belgrano' and the aircraft carrier '25 de Mayo'. The then Argentine Operations Commander, South Atlantic, has since confirmed publicly that his warships had indeed been ordered to attack. No Government with a proper sense of responsibility could have refrained from taking appropriate measures to counter the threats to the Task Force, and to ensure its safety to the maximum extent possible. Risks could not be taken, especially when hostilities had been so clearly embarked upon by the Argentines.
Your questions about the Argentine aircraft carrier and the events on 2 May are answered in the Annex.
You also asked whether a Polaris submarine was deployed as described in the New Statesman article on 23 August. There was no change in the standard deployment pattern of our Polaris submarines during the conflict. Moreover, the Government gave a categorical assurance at the time that nuclear weapons would not be used in the Falklands conflict (see the statement made by Viscount Trenchard in the House of Lords on 27 April 1982—Hansard Vol. 429, Col. 778).
I have given you in the Annex as full an account of these matters as, I am advised, is consistent with national security. I must make it clear that it would be, and will remain, quite wrong for me to disclose all the material that was available to Ministers at the time. To do so would still risk irreparable damage to national security and could put lives at risk in the future.
Those who seek to criticise the Government's actions (including people outside this country who have every reason to discredit the Government of the United Kingdom) are not subject to the same constraints and have felt free to make a large number of assertions. I have already explained why I cannot make public everything which would make it possible to discuss whether those assertions are true or false. In these circumstances, I must emphasise the central point. On the basis of all the material that was available to Ministers at the time, my colleagues and I were satisfied that we took the right decisions in order to protect the lives of our forces. Nothing that has since been put forward—and I can assure you that it has all been examined with the utmost care—has led me or any of my colleagues to have any doubts that we were right.
Yours sincerely,
Margaret Thatcher.
George Foulkes, Esq., MP.
§ Mr. Foulkesasked the Prime Minister when did (a) Northwood and (b) the War Cabinet learn of Argentinian orders for their ships to return to base during the early stages of the Falklands campaign.
§ The Prime MinisterI have already made it clear to the hon. Gentleman that it would not be right for me to comment on this question.
§ Mr. Foulkesasked the Prime Minister at what time on 2 May 1982 did Admiral Woodward seek a change in the rules of engagement and why a change was not sought immediately after visual contact had been established with the General Belgrano.
§ The Prime MinisterAdmiral Woodward sought a change in the rules of engagement to enable the General Belgrano to be attacked outside the total exclusion zone early on the morning of 2 May 1982. The reasons for the change in the rules of engagement, and why the change was made on 2May, were explained in my letter to the right hon. Member for Llanelli (Mr. Davies) of 4 April 1984, which was printed in theOfficial Report, columns 383–84.
§ Mr. Foulkesasked the Prime Minister if she will list all communications made by Her Majesty's Government to the United Nations Security Council during April and May 1982.
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§ The Prime MinisterWe communicated to the President of the United Nations Security Council on the following dates during April and May 1982:
- April 1, 2, 9, 11, 13 (twice), 19, 20, 24, 26, 28, 29, 30 (twice).
- May 1, 2, 3, 4 (twice), 8, 10, 14, 15, 20, 23, 25, 27, 28, 31.
All these communications related to the conflict in the south Atlantic. Copies are available in the Library of the House.
§ Mr. Foulkesasked the Prime Minister whether the rules of engagement for the Falklands task force were altered on or after 30 April 1982 to deal with the apparent threat posed by the Argentinian aircraft carrier 25th of May.
§ The Prime MinisterAn alteration was made to the rules of engagement for the Falklands task force on 30 April 1982 to permit our forces to attack the Argentine aircraft carrier 25 de Mayo on the high seas, both within and outside the total exclusion zone, in circumstances in which it posed a military threat to the task force.
§ Mr. Foulkesasked the Prime Minister whether she was one of the Ministers who were informed in November 1982 of the precise course of the General Belgrano at the time it was sunk.
§ The Prime MinisterThe Ministers referred to were Defence Ministers.
§ Mr. Foulkesasked the Prime Minister what information was available to HMS Conqueror on 3 May 1982 concerning the operational state of the General Belgrano on that day.
§ The Prime MinisterI am not prepared to comment on this.
§ Mr. Foulkesasked the Prime Minister what criteria were used in establishing the maritime and total exclusion zones around the Falkland Islands in 1982 and in particular to the use of 200 miles as the limit of the zone.
§ The Prime MinisterThe maritime exclusion zone established on 12 April 1982 was intended to assist in bringing an end to the illegal Argentine occupation of the Falkland Islands by denying the Argentine forces reinforcement and resupply from the mainland. The selection of a 200 nautical mile radius was judged at that time to provide sufficient scope for submarine operations to enforce the zone, without being excessively large. The total exclusion zone, established on 30 April 1982, followed directly from this.
§ Mr. Foulkesasked the Prime Minister if she will list all other changes in the rules of engagement beyond that of 2 May 1982 stating their extent and by whom they were sought.
§ The Prime MinisterNo.
§ Mr. Foulkesasked the Prime Minister whether the changes in the rules of engagement agreed by Ministers on 2 May 1982 were exactly those sought by Admiral Woodward.
§ The Prime MinisterI am not prepared to discuss in detail the advice given to Ministers by their senior military advisers.
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§ Mr. Foulkesasked the Prime Minister if she will deposit in the Library those parts of HMS Conqueror's log for 2 to 4 May 1982 which are not classified for security reasons.
§ The Prime MinisterI have already answered the hon. Gentleman's question in my letter to him of 8 October, a copy of which has been placed in the Library.
§ Mr. Foulkesasked the Prime Minister whether HMS Conqueror was under direct control from Northwood, or under the control of Admiral Woodward during the Falklands campaign.
§ The Prime MinisterHMS Conqueror, like other submarines, operated under the control of the Flag Officer Submarines at Northwood during the Falklands conflict. The command arrangements for the campaign are set out in the official despatch of the Commander-in-Chief.