§ Mr. Prescottasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he is able to make a statement on the report by the Chief Inspector of the Prison Service on the cause and circumstances of the events at Her Majesty's Prison, Hull, during the period 31st August to 3rd September 1976.
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§ Mr. Merlyn ReesYes. The report is being published today, and I trust that it will be welcomed by the House as giving unique insight into some of the major problems in our penal system.
As the House knows from my reply to a Question by the hon. and gallant Member for Winchester (Rear-Admiral Morgan-Giles) on 3rd March, allegations that certain prisoners were maltreated by Hull staff after the riot ended have been referred to the Humberside police for investigation. Those investigations, which are quite separate from the report by the Chief Inspector of the Prison Service, are still continuing, and I can obviously say nothing about them now.
The riot did not involve any loss of life or severe injury. As to its cause, I accept the Chief Inspector's conclusion that there was no single precipitating factor. One thing is clear. The Chief Inspector does not consider that Hull had been a prison marked by a harsh or repressive régime, or by the maltreatment of prisoners by officers. The Chief Inspector's own opinion is that the incident began as a demonstration that was intended to be passive, but was exploited by certain prisoners. I do not think that we shall ever arrive at a more valid opinion than that.
It is clear from the Chief Inspector's report that the escalation of the incident also owed something to faults in the handling of security intelligence in the prison and to operational decisions on the spot that can, with hindsight, be seen as errors of judgment. I accept these criticisms. But it should be remembered that the aim of a dispersal prison such as Hull is to achieve a relaxed and purposeful régime within a secure perimeter, and any errors of judgment that there may have been must be seen in that context. A relaxed régime is intrinsically more liable to exploitation by inmates than a repressive one. I consider that the real importance of the Chief Inspector's report is to bring out the nature of the difficulties that face staff in dispersal prisons and to enable us to learn the right lesson from the Hull riot.
The Chief Inspector has set out in his report a number of areas of prison administration that he recommended for review in the light of the riot. Many of the Chief Inspector's suggestions, especially those 211W dealing with the actual handling of incidents and the administrative organisation of the Prison Department of the Home Office, are of a professional or technical nature. Some of his suggestions would cost a lot of money. At this stage I can do no more than undertake that the subjects he identifies will all be reviewed as a matter of urgency, in consultation with the Staff Associations concerned.
I should, however, make it clear from the outset that there is nothing in the report that makes me reconsider my belief that we are right to continue with the dispersal policy advocated by the Radzinowicz Committee. I do not intend to turn towards a policy of concentrating dangerous prisoners in one or two establishments. Having said that, I believe that there can be no doubt that the nature and temper of the prison population has changed significantly since the Radzinowicz Committee reported in 1968 Nobody, and least of all myself, should underestimate the control problems that confront our prison staff in endeavouring to implement the Radzinowicz Committee's approach in the circumstances of 1977. It is an enormously difficult task to operate a relaxed régime for the containment of sophisticated and violent prisoners, many of whom are mentally or emotionally unstable. Achieving the right balance requires the highest degree of professionalism, and our prison staff deserve all the support that we can give them. It is with this in mind that I will consider all the suggestions that the Chief Inspector has made.