HC Deb 22 October 1968 vol 770 cc240-4W

Outline of Work

  1. 1. With the arrival of the Polish Representative and the Representatives of the Organisation of African Unity there were more Observers available to cover the ground of the 3rd Marine Commando Division. The group split into two teams one visiting the areas Aba, Owerri and Port Harcourt, the other Calabar Uyo and Kot Ekpene. The visit lasted from the 5th to the 10th of October. In addition to visiting hospitals, camps for displaced persons etc., as enumerated in our First Interim Report we saw and interviewed a number of internees, prisoners of war and some educated Ibos.
  2. 2. The group received excellent co-operation from the military authorities, civilian and volunteer workers. We were free to question detainees, prisoners of war and displaced persons in private. We arranged our own programme and visited forward areas.
  3. 3. It has become more apparent that the future efficacy of Observers will depend largely on their continued presence throughout the whole area and their ability to visit without undue delay, the places where incidents are reported as taking place. It will also depend on good communications both in the matter of air and ground transport and wireless. These are lacking at the present time. The group is not constituted to be able to follow the method of operation suggested above. We therefore recommend that the organisation of the group should be changed to enable it to have certain of its members permanently on the ground in each divisional sector. We consider this matter to be urgent and would be happy to discuss it with the Federal Government at an early date.

State of the Civil Population

4. We did not see as many Ibos as in the north since a large part of the area is populated by rivers people and minority tribes. Most of the Ibos who were working in places such as Port Harcourt fled with the dissidents. In addition towns like Aba and Owerri are still close to the fighting line. It is the pattern in such areas that the local inhabitants either flee with the dissidents or take to the bush. Very few stay in the fighting zone. Over half the people we saw in camps, either rivers people, Ibos or minority tribes, were in a fair state of health and well cared for but a large number including small children are in a state of malnutrition. It is also apparent that the aid on the ground e.g. army, Red Cross, missionaries etc. does not operate on the same scale as it did in the area of the 1st Division, except in the Calabar area. For example there is great shortage of doctors. We took note of the fact that the Nigerian Red Cross is beginning to operate in the Port Harcourt area. In the Calabar area the co-operation between the army, the Red Cross and the National Rehabilitation Commission seemed excellent. If the numbers coming out of the bush increased as appears to be the case, the army, the civil administration and voluntary agencies could be overwhelmed. At the moment not many Ibos have come out of the bush, but already relief resources are overtaxed.

The Military Situation

5. There has been more fighting on this front than on any other at any rate recently. The divisional commanders primary aim is to defeat his enemy. Therefore every thing else takes second place to this, his main object. This factor has had an effect on the civil population The noise of fighting, heavy expenditure of ammunition, and the aggressive military tactics of the troops appear to have instilled more fear into the Ibo population than is the case on the northern front. The Ibos have therefore been slower to come out of the bush and slower still to return to their villages.

6. The troops are aware of the code of coduct and their military discipline appears good. Their officers are in firm control.

Rehabilitation and Resettlement

7. At present there does not appear to be any overall policy, for resettlement of inhabitants back in their villages, the matter being handed individually by sector commanders. The efficiency of this process varies with the personality and operational task of the individual commander. We believe that there should be an overall policy for resettlement laid down by the divisional commander in conjunction with the civilian administration. Unless people can get back to the villages and to their land a crop will be missed. This will further accentuate the food problem. We suggest that the commander considers declaring areas 10 miles or more behind the fighting line as White or clear of dissidents. Villagers, after rehabilitation in displaced persons camps, should be allowed to return to these areas and restart village life. The forward areas to be declared Red and closed to all civilians on security grounds. When feasible, control of the White areas should be handed over to the civilian administration and in particular to the civil police. This would constitute a visible sign that conditions are returning to normal apart from relieving the military of the responsibility which due to intensive operational activity they are finding hard to execute. We understand teat such a policy is already under active consideration at divisional level.

Relations military/Ibos/Rivers People/Minority Tribes

8. Discussions indicate that the relationship between rivers people, the minority tribes and the Ibos is at present strained, the rivers people and minority tribes appear to have no love for the Ibo. It is reported that they settled many old scores when Federal troops moved in. In Port Harcourt some Ibo leaders are advising their people to stay in displaced persons camps until after the war is over. Their reason for doing so appears to be that if the war is not finished soon and the Federal Forces suffered any reverses, Ibos outside protection camps might be in danger. The Federal Government allows Ibos to remain in these camps if they wish to do so. In Port Harcourt they live as family units.

9. It is impossible for us to generalise as a result of isolated incidents. However we did report to the divisional commander a case of a regimental sergeant major maltreating an Ibo who had been picked up in the front line dressed in civilian clothes, a practice often followed by dissident soldiers before surrender. This practice is said to be the reason why Federal troops are suspicious of all Ibos of military age, however dressed. Despite this, as many of the Federal officers themselves pointed out, Nigeria has to live as one when the war is over and maltreatment of suspected persons is not going to make this task easier.

10. Ibos in displaced persons camps have a healthy respect for the troops but mutual contact appears to be gradually dispelling the fear that has undoubtedly existed. Due to the intensity of military operations contact between villages and the military is less than in 1st Division area and therefore the process of dispelling fear slower.

11. Prisoners of war and internees appear to be in good health. However there are points which should receive early attention by the military commanders: for example the prisoners do not appear to be given any constructive work to do, nor exercise. Accommodation is inadequate. They have little to read and some appear to have been kept in custody unnecessarily. Internees and many Ibo displaced persons have no money and are therefore unable to buy anything to supplement the issue rations. We consider that prisoners, internees and displaced persons who are unable at present to earn their living should be given a small weekly allowance in addition to the initial payment most of them receive. It is also important that a record be kept of money and personal possessions taken from prisoners/internees, so that these can be returned to them when they are released from custody. As is customary the Red Cross should be invited to visit prisoners and internees. These points have been drawn to the attention of the divisional commanders.

Deliberate Destruction of Property

12. We saw evidence of destruction of property particularly in villages along the route of advance Federal Forces. Most of this we assume is the result of the fighting and cannot be ascribed specifically to either side. We did see and hear evidence of looting. From the evidence we have heard we consider that the looting has been carried out by the civilians and the military of both sides.

Deliberate Destruction of Life

13. We neither saw nor heard any evidence of deliberate wholesale destruction of the Ibo people by the Federal Troops. The basis for this statement includes private discussions with a number of educated Ibos who spoke good English. There is evidence that some of the civilians received fairly rough treatment from the troops of both sides and that there is some apprehension among a number of Ibo people now behind the Federal lines. Practically all Ibos testify to the fair treatment they received from officers but some assert that on a number of occasions they have been insulted by other ranks. We therefore consider that selection of army personnel to look after prisoners, internees and displaced persons should be very carefully done. We did see seven dead bodies in Owerri hospital. As these people had been dead for some time and were in an advanced state of decomposition, it is impossible for the Observers to draw any conclusions.

Summary

14. In summary, in the areas of the 3rd Nigerian Marine Commando Division which the Observers visited we found

  1. (a) That we had unrestricted freedom of movement.
  2. (b) Conduct of Federal Troops. The conduct of Federal troops appears to vary between sectors as does their attitude to the civil population. The degree of positive action taken to obtain the confidence of the local Ibos depends at present on the attitude of the sector commander. The troops appear to be under the firm control of their officers.
  3. (c) Conduct of the civilian inhabitants. The rivers people and the minority tribes who are the main inhabitants of the areas visited are returning from the bush in increasing numbers and once out have no fear of Federal troops. Those Ibos who are now behind Federal lines are apprehensive and some, prefer to stay in displaced persons camps where they feel safe rather than return to their homes before the war is over.
  4. (d) Rehabilitation. We believe that a clear policy for allowing people to return to their villages in the rural areas should he put into effect. The policy of declaring Red and White areas could be a solution.
  5. (e) Genocide. There is no evidence supporting the allegations of genocide by the Federal Forces against the Ibo people. There are a number of Ibo people alive and well behind the Federal lines. This speaks for itself. However the majority of the Ibos who lived in the area have not yet returned.
  6. (f) Food and Medical Assistance. The majority of work in this connection is being carried out by the army assisted in the Calabar area by the Nigerian Red Cross, the International Red Cross and the National Rehabilitation Commission. The civil administration is very short of doctors, the Nigerian Red Cross has just arrived in Port Harcourt. This latter constitutes a move 244 in the right direction. The supply of food is adequate but will not remain so unless a more rapid return to villages can be arranged. The supply of drugs and medical assistance varies from sector to sector but overall is inadequate.
  7. (g) Destruction of Property.

Some property, that is houses and public buildings, has been seriously damaged. Such damage as has occurred took place during the fighting in towns and villages behind the roads. The damage was probably inflicted by the armed forces of both sides. There has been considerable looting, some by the dissidents during their retreat, some by the civil population and some by Federal forces. Most property is completely unguarded and it is surprising that more looting has not taken place. Undoubtedly there will be a large amount of movable property within the Ibo heartland once the fighting is over.

It is therefore necessary that strict orders are applied to the troops. There is also a need for civil police to move up behind the forward troops.

  1. (h) Administration. The divisional commander requires to be relieved of administration responsibility in the rear areas.

Future Action

15. (a) It is proposed to make our next visit to the area of the 2nd Nigerian Division.

(b) We would like to discuss a certain reorganisation of the Observer group in order to carry out our future task more efficiently.

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