§ 60. Major Beamishasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on what grounds the Czechoslovakian Government has refused to allow His Majesty's Government to publish and distribute a weekly Czech-language newspaper in Prague; what is the circulation in this country of the Czechoslovakian Government weekly newspaper, the "New Central European Observer"; how much newsprint in excess of eight cwt. per four-monthly licensing period is given for this newspaper; and if His Majesty's Government will make the continued appearance of this newspaper conditional or the Czechoslovakian Government being prepared to grant reciprocal arrangements in Czechoslovakia.
§ Mr. BevinThe Czechoslovak Government gave as their reason for refusal the fact that "Britaky Magazin," a Czech periodical to which we supply material, is already being published in Czechoslovakia. His Majesty's Government's intention of replacing this magazine with the proposed weekly newspaper had, 75W however, already been made clear to the Czechoslovak Government. I am now considering whether a further approach to the Czechoslovak Government would be appropriate. I have no exact information regarding the circulation of the "New Central European Observer"; but as the publication relies entirely on the eight cwt. of paper per four-monthly licensing period it must be extremely limited. Under existing regulations His Majesty's Government have no power to prevent the continued appearance of the "New Central European Observer," provided that it uses only the eight cwt. of paper per four-monthly licensing period.
§ 61. Major Beamishasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs how much newsprint in excess of eight cwts. per four-monthly licensing period is provided for the Polish Government newspaper, "Polish Facts and Figures," published in this country; to what extent this newspaper is subject to any form of control or censorship; how much newsprint is allowed to His Majesty's Government for publication in Poland of a Polish-language newspaper; to what form of censorship this newspaper is subject; and if he will print in the OFFICIAL REPORT a typical censored passage.
§ Mr. BevinNo newsprint in excess of eight cwts. per four-monthly licensing period is provided for this publication, which is not subject to any form of control or censorship.
His Majesty's Government are allowed enough newsprint for a maximum print order of 50,000 copies per week for their Polish-language newspaper, "The Voice of Britain" published in Poland. The entire contents of this publication are subject to Polish censorship. Although the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs have agreed verbally to the publication of verbatim statements by British Ministers, in practice these statements have sometimes suffered severed cuts. In spite of the representations which we have made these cuts continue to be made from time to time, and I am considering what action would be appropriate. To illustrate the extent of Polish censorship, I propose to print in the OFFICIAL REPORT excerpts from my speech in the House on 22nd September last.
76WFollowing are the excerpts from the Secretary of State's speech in the House of Commons on 22nd September, 1948:
(Text as received in Poland by morse-transmission)
(Deletions made by Polish censor are shown between [] brackets)
"One of steps we had been faced with over a long time was question of currency reform … We had been trying to get four power agreement but we decided reform currency in our own Zone and we limited it to Western zones. … When we did this we had no intention interfering in any way with Soviet currency in Berlin. … Still we are prepared to have Soviet mark as sole currency provided, so far as Berlin is concerned, it is dealt with under quadripartite authority.
[If we dealt with it in any other way it would mean we should be subject to pressure just as bad as blockade itself and it would possibly paralyse our work and administration there.] It proved however impossible obtain Soviet agreement to uniform currency in Berlin and therefore we were faced with difficulty and we accordingly proceeded to introduction of our own currency in Western sectors of Berlin. … [Initial justification for interference with our traffic by Russians was based on technical grounds. It was only later that Soviet came into the open and declared they were compelled to take this action because of our currency reform."] … [It was presumed by Soviet that in few weeks we should be in such difficulties we should have had to abandon Berlin; that starvation would follow so quickly and disorder be fomented so easily that our position would be untenable. Western Powers did everything in their power prevent these "terrible prophecies" being fulfilled.]…
While he could not go into great detail because it was not in the public interest that he should do so he could say that [if this "senseless blockade" continued and there was no let up and worst came to the worst] "we are confident after careful examination of all factors, including weather and calculating it on one of worst winters we have had for some time in Europe, that with combination of the two air forces and with immensely augmented effort of United States we can look forward with confidence that we shall be able see winter through although there will be some discomfort for Berlin people if blockade is continued."…
He stated that he'd undertaken careful personal consideration of blockade and we'd called our advisers together to consider whole implications and whole strategy to counter present difficulties [and counter other measures which might be taken to weaken our position in Berlin].
"Our position therefore is as it was when I addressed House 29th July. That is, that we regard lifting of blockade as essential condition on which any settlement must be based." He said we'd agreed to have Soviet currency in Berlin subject to quadripartite authority … and added "I've noticed in press and elsewhere there have been rumours of disagreement between three Western powers, but not only are 77W we in absolute agreement as to policy of air lift and defending ourselves in Berlin but in policy we shall jointly pursue if that fails."…
[We'd made provisions to save Berlin from worse effects which those who thought up this dastardly scheme had expected would put on allies who'd stood with them during the war. "It's poor reward so soon afterwards" commented Bevin.]…
In conclusion Bevin said "I hope notwithstanding the gravity of the Berlin situation this House will keep whole question of Germany and Central Europe in their minds and in their thinking. [You see indications in press this morning that there will be manoeuvres to upset Western allies in Germany and in Western Europe. We are going to have a terrible lot of propaganda. But we are firmly resolved to go on with our policy and I trust we shall have wholehearted support of the House and nation because I am convinced it is essential for peace and our security for many years to come.] … [It reminds me of 1940 after Dunkirk. It will be remembered the Prime Minister then discussing position we were in said 'whatever you give and wherever you go to meet demands of Nazis you cannot settle.' He was right in this case if you try going any further in making concessions of territory it does not satisfy demands. There is the conflict. We have to make our own position firm and secure. Berlin stands out now as symbol of resistance—a sort of salient.] I felt when the blockade was put on a grave choice had to be made. We made it.
[It was either to stand firm there or to go South to another Munich. That was the issue with which we were faced.] I believe East and West have to live together. I am ready to live together and ready to say you live in peace in area you have."