Nuclear Weapons (Hansard, 10 January 2000)

§ Mr. Corbyn
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what information senior officers on Trident submarines are given on the specific yields and likely targets of the missiles they are responsible for. [104077]

§ Mr. Hoon
The Trident missiles on which our nuclear deterrent is based have been de-targeted since 1994. In the circumstances of our having to use our nuclear weapons, 95W members of the patrolling submarine crew would be provided with the information they need to discharge their duties. I am withholding the details of this information under Exemption 1 of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information relating to defence, security and international relations.

§ Mr. Corbyn
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what discussions he has had, and with whom, on the application of international humanitarian law to the use of Trident. [104072]

§ Mr. Hoon
I have had no specific discussions on the application of international humanitarian law to the use of Trident. The United Kingdom's minimum nuclear deterrent is consistent with international law.

§ Mr. Corbyn
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) if he will make a statement on the application of the Nuremberg Principles to military personnel ordered to use, or to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons; [104075]
(2) what measures he has taken to make military personnel who operate Trident aware of their obligations under international law since the International Court of Justice delivered its Advisory Opinion on nuclear weapons; [104076]
(3) how a member of the armed services would obtain an account of the Government's submission to the International Court of Justice on the legality of its nuclear deterrence policy; and if he will place a copy of the submission in the Library. [104078]

§ Mr. Hoon
The United Kingdom's minimum nuclear deterrent is consistent with international law. It follows that UK military personnel engaged in the operation or support of Trident are acting legally under the Nuremberg Principals. This has been made clear down the chain of command, and members of the Armed Services who seek further guidance on these issues can in the first instance do so through their chain of command.
Guidance on the Law of Armed Conflict for the Armed Services is set out in the draft Joint Service Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict (Joint Service Publication 383) currently under preparation. We aim to publish this later this year, as we pledged at the 50th Anniversary Conference of the International Red Cross in November 1999. When it is published a copy will be placed in the Library of the House. The relevant section on Nuclear Weapons was reconfirmed following the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It reads: There is no specific rule of international law, express or implied, which prohibits the use of nuclear weapons. The legality of their use depends upon the application of the general rules of international law, including those regulating the inherent right of self defence and the conduct of hostilities. Those rules cannot be applied in isolation from any factual context to imply a prohibition of a general nature. Whether the use, or threatened use, of nuclear weapons in a particular case is lawful depends on all the circumstances. Nuclear weapons fall to be dealt with by reference to the same general principles as apply to conventional weapons. However, the new rules introduced in Additional Protocol I [to the Geneva Conventions] are not intended to have any effect on and do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons.
96W

§ Mr. Corbyn
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) what assessment his Department has carried out of the long-term effects of a 100 kiloton Trident on a military target; [104074]
(2) what assessment his Department has carried out of the effects of a 100 kiloton Trident warhead detonation on the civilian population living near military targets. [104073]

§ Mr. Hoon
The Trident missiles on which our nuclear deterrent is based have been de-targeted since 1994. Our judgment of the minimum level of deterrence required is supported by comprehensive computer modelling which enables us to assess the effects of nuclear detonations. A number of factors are taken into account in this assessment. As Lord Robertson made clear to my hon. Friend the Member for Newport, West (Mr. Flynn) on 4 February 1998,Official Report, column 655W, these include the yield and design of the weapon used; the accuracy of the delivery system employed; the nature and construction of the target; the characteristics of the surrounding terrain; the height of the detonation; and geological and weather conditions. I am withholding information on UK nuclear warhead yield under Exemption 1 of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information, relating to defence, security and international relations.