§ Mr. FlynnTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to his answer of 26 January 1998,Official Report, column 27, for what reasons he decided that details of the number of warheads deployed on Trident should be covered by exemption 1 of the code of Practice on Access to Government Information relating to defence, security and international relations; and if he will make a statement. [26569]
§ Mr. George RobertsonMaintaining some uncertainty about our precise nuclear capabilities enhances deterrence. Disclosure of the details of the exact number of warheads deployed on Trident would therefore harm our defence.
§ Mr. FlynnTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to his answer of 26 January 1998,Official Report, column 27, if Trident requires more warheads than Chevaline in order to maintain the ability of the United Kingdom's strategic deterrent to overcome anti-missile systems. [26568]
§ Mr. George RobertsonTrident's greater payload capacity helps to give it a capability to overcome ballistic missile defences against which Chevaline had become less effective.
§ Mr. FlynnTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to his answer of 26 January 1998,Official Report, column 30, if he will list the factors which his Department takes into account when assessing the United Kingdom's deterrence requirements with regard to the destructive effect that would result from the use of a nuclear weapon. [26570]
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§ Mr. George RobertsonFactors that determine the destructive effect of a nuclear weapon are: the yield and design of the weapon; the accuracy of the delivery system; the nature and construction of the target; the geographical characteristics of the surrounding terrain; geological conditions in the target area; the height of weapon burst; the weather conditions at the target. The United Kingdom would only ever contemplate the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances of self-defence.