Automatic Train Protection (Hansard, 3 April 1995)

§ The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Transport (Viscount Goschen)

Serious railway accidents are relatively rare and there has been a significant improvement in railway safety in recent years. Accidents involving signals passed at 5WA danger, overspeeding and buffer stop collisions, which ATP would prevent, are infrequent and account for about 3 per cent. of fatalities and injuries (excluding trespassers and suicides). The trend in the number of serious incidents where signals have been passed at danger (SPAD) has been downward in the last five years. But there is no room for complacency about the need to pursue cost-effective measures to reduce the risk of accidents to the lowest reasonably practicable level.

The British Rail (BR) report on ATP examined the technical feasibility, costs and benefits of two pilot ATP systems. Copies of the report were placed in the Library of the House last July. The HSC and Railtrack have concluded that the report was thorough and sound. We welcome that conclusion.

On the basis of advice we have received from the HSC, we have concluded that applications of ATP, other automatic devices or measures giving protection against ATP-preventable accidents may be justified on parts of the network. In particular, the HSC has asked the Health and Safety Executive to explore with Railtrack the options for tackling ATP-preventable accidents, and the criteria that might be used for identifying parts of the network where such measures could yield value for money, with a view to receiving a proposed strategy from Railtrack by June 1995. In addition and in the longer term, the HSC has advised us that ATP or Automatic Train Control (ATC) should be adopted as standard on new high speed lines including the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, and that full consideration should be given to installing ATP functions within future major resignalling works, such as modernisation of the West, Coast Main Line.

BR and Railtrack have advised us that network wide fitment of ATP as piloted is not justifiable because the costs far outweigh the benefits. The HSC has endorsed this view and, furthermore, considers that there are alternative safety investments which would be likely to yield greater effectiveness in terms of lives saved, and better value for money. The BR report on ATP has demonstrated the importance of assessing the costs and benefits of all investment aimed at improving safety to ensure that funding goes to schemes which maximise the benefits for rail users. Copies of the HSC's full advice, which we accept in full, have been placed in the Library of the House.

British Rail and Railtrack remain committed to a coordinated programme to reduce the risks associated with signals passed at danger, overspeeding and buffer stop collisions. As part of this programme, the feasibility of a drivers' reminder device is being researched which will help prevent drivers stopped at danger signals from inadvertently starting against these signals when the train is ready to move, for example at a station. This is one of the more common type of SPAD leading to serious consequences and such a device could potentially deliver up to 25 per cent. of the benefits of network-wide ATP. An early trial of this device is proposed.

A further project is examining enhancement of the present Automatic Warning System (AWS) so that the 6WA brakes are applied automatically if a train approaches a red signal at excessive A detailed specification is being drawn up.

Risk analysis is also being applied to track layout and signalling design, to ensure that safety factors are taken into account quantitatively in the design of the network. Protective signalling measures have already been introduced at a number of vulnerable locations and examination of other vulnerable locations is ongoing.

Railtrack is giving high priority to the development of appropriate techniques for quantifying the costs and benefits of all these projects and considering their application at individual locations.

ATP and other devices are not the only way of preventing or mitigating certain risks. The human factors involved will continue to be addressed through driver selection, training, motivation and supervision programmes. This includes close attention to driver familiarisation when new rolling stock and signalling is introduced, and a rigorous alcohol and drugs policy.

The Chiltern Line and Great Western pilot ATP installations will continue in service, and ATP will be extended to the new Heathrow Express Link in due course. The scope for improvement in the cost/benefit ratio of ATP will continue to be examined through these schemes.

We have asked the HSC for an overall progress report in July.