§ Mr. CarringtonTo ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what inspections have so far been carried out by the United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Agency in Iraq under the terms of Security Council resolution 687; and what contribution Britain is making to their work.
§ Mr. Douglas HoggWe are actively supporting the work of the United Nations special commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency—IAEA—as they carry out their mandates under the relevant Security Council resolutions. They have so far completed 20 inspections. These are listed in the table, together with details of the assistance given by Britain. A further two inspections are currently in progress.
In addition to providing assistance for specific inspections, a senior British expert on chemical and 53W biological defence matters is a full-time member of the special commission. Other British experts have taken part in ad hoc specialist meetings, one is chairman of the chemical warfare destruction advisory panel who also took part, together with the British member of the commission, in two fact-finding missions to Iraq on chemical weapons. We have made available to the United Nations information on Iraq's weapons capabilities. The Government also suport in principle the nuclear industry's
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Date1 Inspection2 United Kingdom inspectors3 /Technical experts Equipment/Assistance provided 14–22 May UNSCOM 1—first nuclear inspection by the IAEA. — Eight landrovers and trailers. 9–15 June UNSCOM 2—first chemical weapons inspection. Three Chemical agent monitors, individual protective equipment, tropical bleach and Fullers' Earth for decontamination, sampling kits and RAF transport. CBDE, Porton Down analysed sample. 30 June to 7 July UNSCOM 3—first ballistic missile inspection. One — 22 June to 3 July4 UNSCOM 4—second IAEA nuclear inspection. One Use of British landrovers. 6–19 July UNSCOM 5—third IAEA nuclear inspection. Two Analysis of centrifuge components. 27 July to 10 August UNSCOM 6—fourth IAEA nuclear inspection. Two — 2–8 August UNSCOM 7—first bilogical weapons inspection. Five, including the leader Chemical agent monitors, individual protective equipment, sampling kits, Standby Assay Kits, tropical bleach and RAF transport. CBDE Porton Down analysed samples. 8–15 August UNSCOM 8—third ballistic missile inspection. One — 15–22 August UNSCOM 9—second chemical weapons inspection. One CBDE, Porton Down analysed samples. 18–20 July4 UNSCOM 10—second ballistic missile inspection. — — 30 August to 8 September UNSCOM 11—third chemical weapons inspection. One Chemical agent monitors, individual protective equipment. CBDE Porton Down analysed samples. 30 August to 5 September UNSCOM 12—fourth chemical weapons inspection. One Chemical agent monitors, and individual protective equipment. 6–13 September UNSCOM 13—fourth ballistic missile inspection. One — 14–20 September UNSCOM 14—fifth IAEA nuclear inspection. — — 20 September to 3 October UNSCOM 15—second biological weapons inspection. Two, including the deputy leader Chemical agent monitors, individual protective equipment, sampling kits, kits, Standby Assay Kits, tropical bleach. CBDE Porton Down analysed samples. 21–30 September UNSCOM—sixth IAEA nuclear inspection. Two Assistance with cataloguing and translating documents. 6 October to 9 November UNSCOM 17—fifth chemical weapons inspection. Five in Iraq, including the deputy leader and a CBDE Porton Down analytical team, plus a further CBDE Porton Down analytical team in the area. Chemical agent monitors, sampling kits, individual protective equipment, gas chromatograph—mass spectrometer, infra-red spectrometer, fume cupboards and generator, tropical bleach and Fullers' Earth readiness to assist the IAEA, in partnership with French industry, in the IAEA's task of recovering irradiated nuclear fuel from Iraq.
We shall continue strongly to support the work of the special commission and IAEA, and encourage others to do likewise. It is vitally important for the security of the region and the world that Iraq should not be allowed to retain or redevelop its weapons of mass destruction.
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Date1 Inspection2 United Kingdom inspectors3/Technical experts Equipment/Assistance provided 1–14 October UNSCOM 18—fifth ballistic missile inspection. Two — 11–22 October UNSCOM 19—seventh IAEA nuclear inspection. One — 22 October to 2 November UNSCOM 20—sixth chemical weapons inspection. One Chemical agent monitors and individual protective equipment. 1 Dates for entry/exit into/out of Iraq. 2 UNSCOM denotes "UN Special Commission". 3 Not including UN or IAEA employed UK nationals. 4 Brought forward at short notice.
§ Mr. CarringtonTo ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what progress has been made by the United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency in the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction under Security Council resolutions 687 and 707.
§ Mr. Douglas HoggThe United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency have made substantial progress in dismantling Iraq's weapons of mass destruction—WMD—capability in the 22 inspections which have been mounted since May 1991, despite deception and obstruction by Iraq in flagrant breach of its obligations under Security Council Resolutions 687 and 707.
SCR 687 required Iraq to make a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all the items related to its WMD programmes. In making its original declaration, Iraq denied having a nuclear weapons programme or a biological weapons programme, and declared only some 11,000 chemical munitions and only 52 ballistic missiles, with no mention of a supergun. Revised declarations by Iraq and subsequent inspections have revealed: an enormous covert nuclear weapons development programme; a biological research programme for military purposes; some 46,000 filled chemical munitions, 79,000 unfilled chemical munitions, over 600 tons of chemical weapon agent and some 3,000 tons of chemical precursors; 62 ballistic missiles and supergun assemblies and parts. We do not believe that the full extent of the Iraqi WMD programmes has yet been uncovered.
Under the terms of SCR 687, items relating to Iraq's WMD programmes are to be destroyed, removed or rendered harmless. Inspectors have so far supervised the destruction of 62 ballistic missiles; 10 missile launchers, 18 fixed Scud missile launch pads, 11 dummy missiles, 32 ballistic missile warheads, 127 missile storage support vehicles, a substantial amount of rocket fuel, an assembled 350 mm supergun, components for 350 mm and 1,000 mm superguns, 1 tonne of supergun propellant and over 11,800 unfilled chemical munitions. In addition, inspectors have confirmed the destruction, by coalition bombing, of several missile repair and production facilities. Plans are now in hand for the destruction of the chemical munitions and bulk agents. Destruction of the equipment used in Iraq's nuclear weapons development programme has begun and the IAEA is preparing to remove nuclear weapons usable material from Iraq.
At present sanctions apply to all exports to Iraq other than food, medicine and essential civilian supplies for humanitarian purposes. Under paragraph 22 of SCR 687 56W sanctions will be lifted only when the Security Council agrees that Iraq has completed all the actions concerned with the destruction of its WMD. Even then all states will be required to prevent the sale or supply to Iraq of arms, weapons technology and military training facilities for the foreseeable future, that is, until a further decision of the Security Council.
Moreover, Iraq's ability to use, develop, construct or acquire weapons of mass destruction in future should be precluded by the stringent monitoring and verification regimes embodied in two detailed plans approved under SCR 715 on 11 October. One plan, submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 10 of SCR 687, covers chemical weapons, biological weapons and ballistic missiles. The other, submitted by the director general of the IAEA pursuant to paragraph 12 of SCR 687, covers the nuclear field. The plans entered into force with the adoption of SCR 715 and will remain in force until otherwise determined by the Security Council.