Defence

HL Deb 13 January 2004 vol 657 cc472-536

3.33 p.m.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Bach) rose to move, That this House takes note of the Defence White Paper: Delivering Security in a Changing World(Cm 6041).

The noble Lord said: My Lords, the Ministry of Defence published a Defence White Paper, Delivering Security in a Changing World, on 11 December, just one month ago.

Noble Lords will recall that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence made a Statement at the time in another place, which I repeated in this House. I am glad that today your Lordships' House has been given an early opportunity to debate the White Paper at greater length than was possible before the Christmas Recess.

In opening this debate I am sure the House will be delighted to hear that I intend to be short, for this is a chance for the House, with its abundance of military experience and knowledge, to express its views. I am particularly pleased that four former Chiefs of Defence Staff and a number of former Ministers and other experts in this field intend to speak. But one voice which will be absent today is that of Lord Hardy of Wath, who will be very much missed by the House in a debate of this kind.

I have particular reason outside of this House, from some years ago, for being grateful to Lord Hardy. He was an acknowledged expert on defence and the House will miss his expertise not just today, but also in the future.

I shall do my best to sum up and answer questions at the end. I hope noble Lords will indulge me if I undertake to write, addressing any points that I am unable to address today.

This is the first occasion in 2004 on which this House has had the opportunity to debate the business of my department. Before I go on to focus on the subject of our debate—related as it is to high level defence policy and the future structure of our Armed Forces—I want to pay tribute to the many thousands of service personnel, sailors, soldiers and air force personnel, who have been serving their country on operational duties over the Christmas and New Year period, most obviously in Iraq but also, it should not be forgotten, in the Balkans, Afghanistan, West Africa, Northern Ireland, the Falkland Islands and Cyprus. Those young men arid women have gone about their business with the steely determination, professionalism and good humour for which the British Armed Forces are deservedly renowned. They and their families deserve our thanks and admiration in equal and generous measure. I am sure the whole House will join me in wishing them well.

It is a truism that since the fall of the Berlin Wall there has been a period—at least in our lifetimes—of unparalleled change in the world of defence and security. Our predecessors had to deal with it and we have to deal with it now. The massive, monolithic threat of the past has gone and the world is undoubtedly the better for that. But gone too are the old certainties. The strategic landscape is very different now from that which we faced 20 years ago. The threats we face are increasingly unpredictable.

The challenge for those engaged in the nation's defence has always been to ensure that the military and other capabilities they sustain match the threats we face, just as at critical moments in our nation's history we need to adjust the capabilities, skills and structure of our Armed Forces to ensure that they are best placed to meet the challenge of today and tomorrow. Resting on the laurels of yesterday is simply not an Option.

The 1998 Strategic Defence Review and the SDR New Chapter, that we published in 2002, unquestionably moved our Armed Forces in the right direction. But the strategic environment does not stand still. And nor must we. Our Armed Forces must continue to evolve if they are to be best placed to confront the key challenges of the early part of this century—the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the threat posed by international terrorism; and the consequences of failed and failing states.

The White Paper provides a comprehensive statement of defence policy set against the context of the strategic environment in which we operate. In doing so, it presents the case for more flexible Armed Forces structured and equipped to deal with the demands of multiple, concurrent small and medium-scale operations; forces that must be capable of operating across the operational spectrum, from war fighting to enduring peace support operations.

Of course, those forces must also retain the flexibility to allow them to be able to reconfigure at longer notice for the much less frequent, large-scale operations, for the most demanding of which it is almost inconceivable that the United States would not be involved, either leading a coalition or as a part of NATO. The White Paper sets out to strike that balance.

Military action is, of course, used only as a last resort when the cross-government effort in crisis prevention and management has been exhausted. The Government are clear that it is most effective when brought to bear through multinational coalitions and alliances. The ability to operate alongside others, particularly our NATO and EU allies and partners, therefore remains at a premium. We must ensure that our Armed Forces are prepared and equipped to lead or act as a framework nation for ESDP or similar ad hoc coalitions where the United States is not engaged. Interoperability, whether with our European, American or other allies, will be at a premium.

As my right honourable friend said on 11 December in his Statement in another place, the department is currently undertaking a significant examination of its capabilities and overheads to establish the precise nature of an appropriate and sustainable force structure and future investment programme to support the policy set out in the White Paper.

A great deal of work is going on within the MoD to examine different aspects of military capability. I should stress that, as with the Strategic Defence Review and the New Chapter before it, this involves expert military and civilian personnel.

One thing is clear. We must exploit new and emerging technologies so that we can exploit the full potential of our military capability and deliver ever more rapid and precise military effect. Critical to this will be the development—and I hope that the House will forgive me if I descend for a moment into the vernacular—of what we call network enabled capabilities. By that I mean the more effective knitting together, via sophisticated communications networks, of intelligence collection, analysis, command and strike assets. Or, put more simply, linking the sensors more effectively to the shooters.

The drive to developing network enabled capabilities will allow us to capture the operational benefits that modern technology, particularly in the realm of communications and information technology, has to offer. It will allow us better to understand developing crises and threats; more effectively to plan for military contingencies; and, ultimately, to conduct military operations faster and with greater precision.

But, my Lords, this is not only about investing in high-tech equipment. Rather it is the restructuring of the Armed Forces so that they are better able both to make use of it and, critically, to undertake the three concurrent small and medium-scale operations, including peace support and counter-terrorism operations that have already become the norm and which we can expect in the future.

Painful as it always is, we must not shirk from making tough choices. In the last spending review we announced the largest sustained increase in planned defence expenditure for 20 years. But our resources must now be directed at those capabilities that are best able to deliver the full range of military effects that we require. We must be rigorous in dispensing with those capabilities that do not. In today's world, not to do so is simply not an option.

The exercise that we are engaged in is about reprioritising. It is about restructuring our Armed Forces and their supporting infrastructure appropriately to meet the changed strategic environment outlined in the White Paper. And it should be seen in the context of the increased resources that were made available to the MoD in the 2002 spending round.

As was indicated in the White Paper, this may mean reductions in some of the older surface vessels, heavy armour and single-role fast jets, but this will be offset by investment in new medium-weight forces and network enabled capabilities. We have already announced the creation of a new light brigade in lieu of one of our armoured brigades, and we expect to be in a position to make further announcements later in the year.

In a changing world, our Armed Forces must continually adapt if they are to stay ahead of potential adversaries. This is nothing new: historically, our Armed Forces have a proud record of adapting successfully to meet the threats with which they are confronted. This White Paper provides the security and policy baseline against which decisions will be made to ensure that our Armed Forces are equipped and structured to meet the challenges of the future. I beg to move.

Moved, That this House takes note of the Defence White Paper: Delivering Security in a Changing World(Cm 6041).—(Lord Bach.)

3.44 p.m.

Lord Vivian

My Lords, it is a great privilege for me to participate in this exceptionally important debate and I should like to thank all noble Lords for taking part in the assessment of the White Paper. I am also very pleased to see that the noble and gallant Lords, Lord Bramall, Lord Vincent of Coleshill, Lord Craig of Radley and Lord Guthrie of Craigiebank, are all contributing to this debate. With their wealth of military experience, I ask your Lordships to pay particular attention not only to their remarks today, but also to the astute and very wise contributions that the noble and gallant Lords made during the Loyal Address.

This debate on the Defence White Paper sets the scene for the future defence of the realm. The White Paper was disappointing in the way that it failed to address the financial implications of what is intended to be a major reorganisation of our Armed Forces. It was also alarming and particularly damaging to the morale of all our servicemen and women in that there was virtually no detail showing how this major reorganisation would take place, what cuts it may involve and over what time-frame. However, it must be said that the morale of troops deployed on operations is currently as high as it has ever been.

The defence of the realm is to protect the United Kingdom and its overseas territories from military threats and terrorism; to safeguard the national interests of the United Kingdom wherever they are threatened and to contribute to world-wide peace and security.

Within this future security environment, the Armed Forces face a broader range of tasks across a wider geographical area than before. The United Kingdom will not be able to contribute militarily to every international crisis. Participation will be in coalitions with other countries. The United Kingdom's Armed Forces must be prepared for asymmetric attacks including the use of weapons of mass destruction and they must be equipped and configured to fulfil the roles of homeland defence, countering international terrorism and high-intensity warfare.

There are three major standard planning assumptions which must not create overstretch through over-commitment. The first is to deal with enduring medium and small-scale peace operations, including a small intervention operation at brigade and battle group level. The second is in a crisis in which the United Kingdom should rapidly carry out the same operations, including a limited duration medium-level intervention operation. Thirdly, the United Kingdom should be capable of carrying out a large-scale intervention operation at divisional level, including a small-scale peace support operation.

What I have briefly outlined are the proposals in the Defence White Paper, with which we do not disagree provided that Her Majesty's Government can give an assurance that there are, and will continue to be, sufficient resources of personnel and equipment for these planning assumptions. However, what is not suggested is how this vast reorganisation is to be achieved through any detailed structural change, apart from on the land forces side, turning the 4th Armoured Brigade into a mechanised brigade and converting the 19th Mechanised Brigade into a light brigade. This lack of information has been especially harmful to the morale of the troops and it is now essential that the MoD states in detail how this reorganisation is to be carried out or whether this White Paper is just another smokescreen disguising severe cuts for the future.

Turning to the maritime situation, delivering a land attack capability and securing access to the theatre of operations are identified as future priorities. The introduction of the future carrier and the joint strike fighter are regarded as vital to increasing the ability to project air power from the sea. The Type 45 air defence destroyer will also be crucial for enhancing the protection of joint and maritime forces and assisting force projection. Will the Minister now confirm how the Royal Navy is to be restructured? How many Type 23 and Type 42 frigates will be paid off; how many of the 12 Type 45 air defence destroyers will actually be ordered; and can the Minister also confirm that the SSN Fleet will shrink to as few as five boats and that they will be delayed coming into service?

Can the Minister confirm that the carrier programme is also being scaled down from the advertised 60,000 tonnes to as little as 50,000 tonnes? This would mean that fewer than 150 joint strike fighters would be ordered. In addition, it remains likely that the in-service date of 2012 will slip to 2015. Furthermore, the Sea Harrier is being withdrawn from this year and the fleet will have no organic air defence cover for 10 years or more. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce, in his excellent maiden speech, alluded to the fact that however clever the technology, it does not deliver the capability to be in two places at the same time, and cutting the number of ships will certainly prevent this.

Turning to the Army and our land assets, the White Paper assesses that the future security of the United Kingdom requires a reorganised force structure and new capabilities. In order to increase the flexibility of the Army to respond to crises a new complement of medium weight forces requires to be developed, as was seen when both 16 Air Assault Brigade and 3 Commando Brigade required heavy armour in order for them to achieve their objectives in Iraq.

It is envisaged that a move towards a more graduated and balanced structure of light, medium and heavy forces will over time lead to a reduced requirement for main battle tanks and other heavy armoured fighting vehicles and heavy artillery. However, it would be most unwise—indeed dangerous—to reduce too much of the Army's heavy weaponry. Just over 17,000 vehicles of ex-Soviet equipment with a heavy war Fighting capability remain in service scattered throughout the world. The military doctrine aims of mobility and lightness are required to be balanced against retaining firepower and protection.

As I have already mentioned, the White Paper outlines the intention to create a new light brigade and reduce the number of armoured brigades from three to two. While this reorganisation would certainly allow for more rapid deployment, no restructuring and no loss of manpower should take place until the future rapid effects system vehicle is in service. It has been ascertained that on present planning some 480 Royal Armoured Corps trained personnel will be lost. This should be prevented, particularly as it is assumed that there will be a requirement for two future rapid effects system regiments when they come into service. Even now the four existing armoured reconnaissance regiments require a fourth Fighting squadron, as was shown in Iraq.

As at 1 October, the Army was below strength by some 4,700 trained troops and in June 55 per cent were deployed on, recovering from or preparing for operations. There is absolutely no justification for any reduction of regiments, battalions or units. Cutting numbers would be an act of sheer folly. If the White Paper involves cuts in any way, we shall oppose them vigorously from these Benches. In fact we need to recruit the under-strength figure of 5,000 as quickly as possible.

The former Chief of Defence Staff, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Guthrie, warned during the Loyal Address against the great dangers in concentrating our efforts to too great an extent on one emerging threat, forgetting that there are other threats which have not gone away and for which we should still be prepared. Numbers of Armed Forces personnel still matter, particularly involving low intensity operations, as shown by the British contingent in Iraq.

It also enables the Army to retain personnel and allows them sufficient time for training and courses, so vital to ensuring successful operations, which I shall cover in a moment. Without the correct number of established troops the gap between operational tours reduces from the recommended 24 months down to as low as six months in some cases, and on average down to 10 months. The more experienced petty officers and NCOs not unreasonably wish to spend more time with their families, and the White Paper has nothing to suggest that there will he less separation. In fact it expresses the exact opposite: that the serviceman's and woman's life will become harder; that there will be more frequent operations at a higher tempo; and that they will he liable to even more separation than before.

Turning to air assets, the White Paper focuses on the projection of air power from both land and sea, offering capabilities across the range of air operations but with a clear emphasis on offensive effect. There has been much speculation about cuts to the Eurofighter. Will the Minister clarify the situation regarding the numbers that will be ordered in tranche two and whether tranche three will he cut completely?

Will the noble Lord also confirm that the Tornado 3 will now not get the helmet-mounted sight for ASRAAM and that Brimstone is being cut back? Will he also confirm that not all the GR7s will get the Pegasus engine and that none of them are getting ASRAAM? Finally, would there not be a saving if the contract for the A400 transport aircraft was cancelled in favour of purchasing more C130s and Cl7s?

I was unable to find any meaningful comment about the defence budget in the defence White Paper. The SDR stated that 2.5 per cent of GDP should be reserved for defence, but the figure has already fallen to 2.3 per cent and is now heading for around 2.2 per cent. As I have said before, we believe that the budget is deeply in the red and that the equipment and the personnel budgets are overspent this year. I wonder whether it is true that cuts of £1 billion per year for the next four years will have to be made.

The Minister, in his courteous reply to me on the recent Statement, although agreeing that sufficient funds would be made available for network-enabled capability, stated that it might not be possible to procure all the other measures that we would like to. If this is the case, what are the projects that will not be funded and, therefore, cancelled?

I now turn briefly to the vital issue of training. Due to budgetary concerns and the shortage of time between operational tours, personnel have not been carrying out sufficient training, leading to a skill shortage among the most experienced soldiers. This involves both field training and individual courses and leads to a loss of crucial battle-winning skills. If we do not allow our forces to have the time to train properly, we will start to lose battles and lives will be lost quite unnecessarily. If this should happen it will not be the fault of commanding officers but of the Government. who have not allowed the resources to be made available for a full-strength army and yet are frequently prepared to over-commit the Army time and time again.

The MoD lists some 350 planned exercises each year. Seventy-two percent of these exercises have been cancelled due to the increased level of operational activity; namely, due to Operations TELIC and FRESCO. Eleven per cent have been cancelled due to decisions by host nations and a further 11 per cent have been subsumed into other exercises or rescheduled for this year. In total some 94 per cent of exercises were lost last year. This situation should be rectified immediately.

In conclusion, we are not giving our Armed Forces a fair deal. At regimental level—although not when troops are operationally deployed, as I have already mentioned—morale is low and has been made worse by publishing a White Paper without the required detail. This has given rise to uncertainty within the ranks as to where their future lies. Many are considering early release. The Armed Forces do not understand why the armed services should be reduced when the threats are greater than ever. They believe that they have put their lives at risk and now they find that their jobs are at risk. They consider that EU defence ambitions pose a threat to NATO and that government cuts are causing unacceptable reductions in operational exercises and readiness, a subject that I have not covered today as there have been two major debates recently on the issue.

Our Armed Forces are the best and command great respect throughout the world even though they are under-equipped and over-stretched, as verified in the recent NAO report. They are to be congratulated on their outstanding achievements in Iraq. I praise our Armed Forces for their dedicated loyalty, their professionalism, their highly efficient skills and their willingness to serve the country. I pay great tribute to their families for the support they provide to their husbands or wives at all times.

It is our duty to ensure that our Armed Forces receive a fair deal and that we provide the resources to ensure that their lives are not put unnecessarily at risk. Currently, I regret that I do not feel that we are giving them the fair deal that they so justly deserve.

4 p.m.

Lord Redesdale

My Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for introducing the debate, and echo his words about Lord Hardy of Wath. He will be missed not only by those on his own side but by all Peers in the House.

The Defence White Paper is a short, aspirational document with exceptionally good photographs. We welcome it, but I hope that the Minister will not be too upset if I start with a complaint. I shall not report him to the ombudsman about it, but perhaps to the campaign for plain English. The MoD may even win an award for this one.

The second paragraph of the second column in Chapter 1 states: Military effectiveness would be enhanced through increased 'Jointery' between the Services". "Jointery" has been given a capital letter. Is it a new expression that will become common parlance in the MoD? I very much hope not, as it is an ugly word, which, although I have not read the report fully, I believe we could do well without.

There is little to disagree with the sentiments set out in the White Paper. However, by reading between the lines, I have one or two concerns about the implications of some of the proposals. Paragraph 3.5 of Chapter 3 states: The most demanding expeditionary operations, involving intervention against state adversaries, can only plausibly be conducted if US forces are engaged, either leading a coalition or in NATO". Obviously the state and the size of our Armed Forces means that that is the case. However, I do not believe that the presumption should be made that we would only go into a US-led coalition—not that I am saying that we would not, but I have an issue with the fact that no mention is made of the United Nations or, indeed, a United Nations mandate. It seems that the state of operations has changed somewhat if we can start talking about a coalition of the willing involved in state intervention without a UN resolution. That may not be the intention, but it seems to be the implication of what has been written. While I do not deny the importance of NATO, or, indeed, the importance of the US—I could not do so with the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, giving me one of his looks—it is unfortunate that this was stated in such a way.

I believe that even the Americans will have difficulty in looking at state intervention in the short term—especially with our present commitments. The Foreign Secretary said that it is unlikely that we will leave Iraq until 2007 at the earliest. I have been given no specific dates on when we will leave Afghanistan. We still have significant commitments in the Balkans. However, we cannot overlook this issue, as it is the basis of overstretch. We have many troops overseas, and I echo the Minister in welcoming the incredible efforts of our armed servicemen —especially those who were serving overseas during the holiday period.

The nature of our present commitments will determine our future commitments. These are not operations in which we put people in and then take them out again; they are all operations where we were involved in the fighting in the first place. We now have a significant and long-term commitment in peacekeeping and peace making.

That is one of the implications of the SDR, which did not envisage such long-term commitments. We cannot depend on high-scale technological innovations to deal with peacekeeping, which relies on boots on the ground and has implications as to how many troops the Armed Forces will require.

Paragraph 3.5 continues: Where the UK chooses to be engaged, we will wish to be able to influence political and military decision making throughout the crisis, including during the post-conflict period". That is an important point, and one that needs further debate. I hope that the Minister will say whether a report is being written about our effect on political decision making and our effect on the post-conflict situation. That will have a major effect on whether we are involved in any further action.

Moving to another aspect of the report, I shall focus on missile defence technology. Paragraph 3.12 is a masterpiece of equivocation. I was most heartened in reading it because it gives no indication that we will spend money on missile defence technology. The Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Vivian, talked about defence cuts. We could save an enormous amount of money by not getting involved in this area in the first place.

The national missile defence programme is not something that can be viewed in the abstract. It has already caused the end of the anti-ballistic missile treaty; it has destroyed an international treaty. Although there might be cost benefits in the development of interceptor technology, the Government will have to be extremely careful about the costs that they will be expected to pay in initiating research and development. Even increasing the missile shield to this country would not outweigh those costs considerably. The size of the budget needed to contemplate an effective missile defence capability would be enormous, and I question from where the budget for such expenditure will come. Obviously, in the short term—up to 2012–2015—there will be considerable difficulties. Any further massive commitment before then is unachievable.

I turn now to the good news that was announced in a Statement yesterday in another place, which is in today's Hansard. I refer to the achievement of the Civil Contingency Reaction Forces to full operating capability. This is a valuable step forward for the reserve forces and should be welcomed. I have a couple of questions about the capabilities of this organisation. The Territorial Army and the reserve forces have had their man-training days cut a number of times. To make that body effective and to have the ability to deal with NBC threats, many man-training days will be needed. I know that because I instructed on NBC drill when I was in the Territorial Army. It was a particularly unpleasant experience standing in a tent filled with CS gas. It is vital that the lessons are learnt properly.

A further question is whether the necessary kit will be available to the Territorial Army to meet that capability. It is a fact that most territorial units do not have the necessary kit to deal with hazardous materials. They have the kit necessary for training, but it does not work. That failure cannot be taken lightly.

Following my comments on kit, I refer to the sad events in Iraq where soldiers lost their lives because of the lack of body armour. That vital piece of kit should now be considered essential to every soldier. Each soldier should he issued with a set of body armour that follows him from each posting as part of his personal kit. It should not be issued "as and when", depending on the operation. I know that there are cost implications, but the sad loss of life means that such body armour is essential.

The Armed Forces (Pensions and Compensation) Bill, which has recently been introduced, pertains to the White Paper. because it refers to this issue. I have asked this question before; I am particularly concerned about it, although I know it will be debated in another place and in this House. The Secretary of State talked about the pensions review being cost-neutral. However, we have already been told that there will be winners—partners are to be considered for pensions. This will have a cost implication, and if there are winners there will also be losers. There is an assumption among members of the Armed Forces that officers' pensions will be raided to meet this added financial commitment. I hope the Minister can assure us that if there are to be losers, the cost-neutral option will not be invoked but new funds will instead be found for it.

I finish on one point that struck me while reading this document. It is a short document, so I was able to read it quite carefully. I refer to defence diplomacy, which seems to have garnered a new meaning in this document. The assumption is made that we will be looking at further state interventions, but of course state interventions will be based on political objectives. These must be considered very carefully. One of the political objectives for going to war was to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. We on these Benches are concerned that the very case for going to war is disappearing quite rapidly. A couple of recent comments caused concern, particularly those made by Mr Bremer, who said that the network of tunnels and laboratories was a red herring. Could the Minister comment on that?

When is the Iraq Survey Group to make its final report? We know that the interim report has been made. A large percentage of personnel have been taken off the Iraq Survey Group and David Kay has resigned from it. On that basis, the survey group must be coming to the end of its natural life, so surely a final report can be expected. I very much hope the Minister can tell us when the ISG will report.

4.12 p.m.

Lord Clark of Windermere

My Lords, I begin by declaring an interest, as a non-executive director of Thales UK plc. I also lead the British delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

I thank the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Redesdale, for the very kind remarks they made about Peter, Lord Hardy of Wath. Peter and I entered the other place in June 1970 and I am very much aware of all the interest he showed in both Houses in defence matters. It was typical of Peter that at his funeral service a poem on flight was read out by a former pilot officer, because he loved the RAF. He had the RAF flag draped on his coffin, and there was a very fine guard by the local ATC, a subject that Peter raised repeatedly on the Floor of the House. We shall miss him, especially in these defence debates, to which he brought a great deal of conviction and belief.

I echo what has been said, and is always said, about the quality of our Armed Forces. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Vivian, who said that they were simply the best, and they are. I hope that I am not causing offence to anyone if I say that it is quite remarkable that, generation after generation after generation, such a high quality of men and women join the ranks of the armed services. The offence that I might cause—but hope I have not—is that I suspect that the young men and women in the forces today are better than the ones who went before. They are certainly as evenly matched. It is a great credit to our country and to the armed services that such qualities of bravery, statesmanship, diplomacy and service are shown among our young people. It gives us a great deal of hope.

Equally, I am delighted that we are having this debate today. It is right and proper that we have an early debate on the White Paper. I am delighted that it is a short document; it builds on the original SDR in the new chapter, and allows us to study it very carefully—almost word by word, as the noble Lord, Lord Redesdale, has demonstrated. If there is a watchword in the White Paper, I guess it is flexibility. That is right and proper.

I am also conscious that in this debate, which I am looking forward to, we have so much expertise, experience and knowledge. I am sure the Ministry of Defence and Ministers will listen to what is said by those who have so much experience of these issues.

I mentioned NATO. I am delighted that almost at the beginning of the White Paper, the Government state unequivocally where they stand vis-a-vis NATO. Paragraph 2.18 says: The UK recognises the pre-eminence of NATO". That is right—it is how it should be and how it must be. There has never been a defence path that has been so successful, against such odds, over such a long period, covering such a wide diversity of nations. As long as we keep NATO at the heart of our efforts, I am quite convinced we will have a robust and credible defence for this country.

Having said that, I am also conscious that there are movements in the European Union which some seek to portray as trying to wreck NATO. That is not how I see it, and I do not think it is how our North American colleagues see it. They have gone on at great length to we Europeans about taking defence seriously—I get it increasingly at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. The reality is that probably only our own country and our neighbours across the Channel in France are devoting sufficient of the national resources to the defence effort. We must find a way of persuading our other European neighbours that they must take defence seriously, and that means spending a bit more money on it. I hope that we will persuade the European Union that if it wants to be taken seriously in defence with the ESDP, it must put some money into it.

Equally, I am conscious that the agreement reached on 12 and 14 December, when we had the failed convention, was a step forward. I do not share the view that the installation of a new planning cell within the ESDP is weakening NATO. What was agreed on 12 and 14 December was a scaled-down operational planning unit, independent of NATO but amenable to the United States.

It is worth repeating in this House what the spokeswoman for the EU High Representative, Mr Solana, said. She said that the planning cell will operate only on very specific types of operations—ones that NATO has passed on to the EU. In that situation, the Berlin Plus arrangement will apply.

It is also interesting to see what else the spokeswoman said. She pointed out that the planning cell combined both the civilian and the military and that it would basically be concerned with reconstruction missions. Thus planning for combined combat missions is not foreseen. As she said: We are not a military organisation. We are a civilian organisation that makes use of military assets". As long as the planning cell focuses on that, we need not be too concerned about the effectiveness of the NATO planning cell.

I mentioned earlier that I thought flexibility was the watchword of the White Paper. It has to take into account the changes of threats—the buzzword is the asymmetric threat, which is certainly true—and the changes in technology. We are starting to utilise technology in the military field to the advantage of our servicemen and women and in order to achieve our objectives. Programs such as Fist or Watchkeeper and the other programs that the Government are advancing will help us along these lines.

However, I wish to raise the matter of communications with the Minister. Communications are critical—they are one of the four C's—to all that we achieve and need to achieve in theatre and in the strategic area. Noble Lords will be aware that the National Audit Office is no soft touch—it is its task to be robust—but its excellent report on Operation TELIC, the UK military operation in Iraq, is well worth reading. Tucked away there, in paragraph 4.8, it says: The majority of communications equipment worked well in the operation, although the force sometimes"— this is the point I want to raise with the Minister— had difficulty maintaining strategic communications between the UK and units in theatre". The report goes on to say that most operations in theatre itself were very effective and achieved their objectives but it pointed out, in a very delicate way, that there were breakdowns between the strategic centre in London and the combat zone.

Indeed, this was further highlighted in Jane's Defence Weekly on 7 December 2003. An officer is quoted describing how a vital secure satellite communications link failed, just as the UK commanders in Qatar were trying to receive authorisation from government Ministers in London to allow the bombing of buildings in Basra. Obviously, this was critical. The report goes on to say that: On the first day of the war, secure communications between London and the commander of UK forces in the Middle East, Air Marshal Brian Burridge at the US Central Command headquarters in Qatar, also failed after a contractor at a switching centre in London fitted new equipment without authorisation". Clearly, that cannot be right. One of the key findings of the NAO report and experience in Iraq is that it is important to learn the lessons. I leave that thought with the Minister, together with the thought that central government is not always very good at IT. Is it not time to think about appointing a chief defence information technology officer to co-ordinate all this and make sure nothing goes wrong in future?

4.20 p.m.

Lord Burnham

My Lords, I support what has been said from other benches about Lord Hardy of Wath; I wonder what his greyhounds are going to do without him.

On around 31 May 1940, my father, having just disembarked from HMS "Worcester", was standing amid a great many dirty, dishevelled and wet soldiers who had, like him, come back from Dunkirk. Suddenly there was a shout and a battalion of Grenadiers—clean, boots clean, marching to attention and having all their small arms with them—came down from a ship and marched ashore. My father said that this convinced him that we were not going to lose the war, that there were these qualities of discipline in the British Army, at least in parts. This was probably largely due to the Guards depot at Caterham where the discipline was incredibly harsh and where soldiers were taught how to behave and how to carry themselves under arms.

Today, 63 years later, one cannot expect the same qualities as were seen then. Life has changed so enormously that this cannot be expected. Nevertheless, a man joining any one of the services has relinquished some of the rights that he has in civilian life. He must do so because it is the only way to get an effective force. In those days, and in the 1940s and the 1950s, great noncommissioned officers, like Regimental Sergeant-Major Lord of the Coldstream Guards and Lynch of the Irish Guards, shouted. They shouted very loudly, but it was through that that much of the discipline was achieved. Today, it is still necessary for non-commissioned officers to shout and attempts that have been made to do I know not what—to transmit orders by e-mail perhaps—are not acceptable. An order is an order. It is not a helpful suggestion.

However, if we say that about discipline, we must differentiate clearly between discipline and bullying. Discipline must be fair. Treatment by senior officers and non-commissioned officers must be seen to be fair and they must tolerate what is needed by a man who comes from civilian life and from a very different sort of behaviour. The discipline is backed by a series of inquiries and of courts, ranging from that of a company commander to a court martial. Here, with the courts martial, we must have considerable doubts as to what is going to happen. I have a Question down for next week which, if I get an answer from the Minister, I shall withdraw. It is undoubtedly true that there is some doubt about the Court of Human Rights and courts martial. I believe I am right in saying that the Navy has suspended all courts martial because the judges in them are naval officers in uniform. That is considered unfair. I do not know when any miscarriage of justice has been carried out since Admiral Byng, but this is the thought.

The discipline that we see is at present different in all three services. The Minister will not be surprised to hear me say that, as I have been chasing him. the noble Baroness, Lady Symons, and the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, before them, to ask what on earth is happening about the tri-service discipline Act that we were led to believe we would get. It has certainly been discussed in the Ministry of Defence since 1991, and I believe that it was discussed a good deal earlier than that.

A tri-service Act is absolutely essential with the jointery—my apologies to the noble Lord, Lord Redesdale—that we have seen among the services, and the operations carried out by people in different services who may have different discipline. That cannot be allowed to continue. I ask the Minister that very urgent steps be put in hand to put a tri-service discipline Act before your Lordships and another place.

It is ironic, given the length of time that has been taken, that the White Paper talks about a new initiative for joint service discipline. Generally, I would not like to insinuate that the Armed Forces are not disciplined; they are, much more so than the Americans or the Israelis. However, we need to he sure that the men whom we send into action are both disciplined and fit.

4.32 p.m.

Lord Craig of Radley

My Lords, it is a pleasure to see the noble Lord, Lord Burnham, in his place, and I am delighted to follow him.

Twenty-four hours before the defence White Paper was published, the Chancellor of the Exchequer said in the other place: British inflation has been at its lowest for 30 years: interest rates are their lowest since 1955 … economic growth in this country is now strengthening … In a world downturn, Britain has achieved growth with low inflation and with high employment".—[0fficial Report. Commons, 10/12/03; col. 1061.] I felt optimistic. If there were good arguments for sustaining—even increasing—the defence budget, the Government were in a sound financial position to do so. But the MoD faces the institutional Treasury view that defence is more than adequately funded.

The Treasury approach seems to be that the Armed Forces have consistently and magnificently achieved good results. The Cold War was won. When faced with the totally unprepared-for invasion of the Falkland Islands, the services surmounted incredible difficulties and succeeded in recovering the islands with some severe losses of ships to air attack but, mercifully, relatively little loss of life. More recently in the Balkans, Afghanistan and now Iraq, and in lesser numbers elsewhere, our services, alone or in conjunction with allies, have met all tasks and challenges. As Mr Hoon says in his foreword to the White Paper, the UK's Armed Forces have consistently risen to the challenges set them, continuing a military tradition of which the whole nation can be proud". How true. So the Treasury can claim that the MoD has been adequately funded, even though the Armed Forces have been grossly over-stretched over many years by the scale and number of commitments thrust upon them.

On the other side of the Treasury's defence balance sheet are the frequent, almost yearly, adverse reports of the National Audit Office and others into waste and poor procurement practices by the MoD. The outrageous delays and cost overruns in getting Eurofighter/Typhoon into Royal Air Force service is a prime example. That and the other many failed procurement fixes in the past 40 or more years do not say much for smart procurement.

There has to be some recognition of the Treasury view that, given better housekeeping and management by the MoD, areas where the shoe is pinching in the defence budget could be helped without dipping further into the nation's resources. So what new thinking has emerged from the MoD's latest work? More resources are clearly not expected.

The White Paper combines to be both opaque and startlingly novel. It is opaque about what will actually be the out-turn for the size and shape of the three services. A series of revelations in the course of this year is promised. One came last week with the announcement that four Type 42 destroyers, the backbone of the fleet's air defence capability, will be mothballed. When the decision to withdraw air defence Sea Harriers was announced in 2002, noble Lords were assured that the fleet would have adequate air defence because of its Type 42s. Now the Royal Navy is going to be in even worse straits if attacked from the air. What more risks must we ask our servicemen and women to endure? Are the lessons of the Falklands conflict, when the fleet air defence was inadequate and half a dozen ships were sunk in as many days by enemy aircraft operating at extreme range from their bases, all forgotten?

The novel aspect was the statement that the Government do not expect to become involved in medium or large-scale operations without the United States. Given the pressures that the US so often places on the UK to participate with it, does that mean that we shall always be playing second fiddle to US foreign and defence objectives? While the government of the day may well wish to work with the United States government, is it really the case that, if faced with a problem of critical importance to the United Kingdom but not so viewed by the United States, such as the Falklands, the Government will not prepare for or be able to deal with it by military force? What valuable intelligence for a potential enemy.

Nevertheless, I welcome the White Paper's endorsement of participation with United States forces, particularly in the air. 1 shall quote from an interesting story among the lessons of Iraq, which reads: Eight thousand miles away and ten time zones to the west, a US Air Force captain was remotely operating a Predator UAV"— an unmanned aerial vehicle— in the skies over Tikrit…The UAV's sensors were searching the ground for signs of Iraqi activity and sending the imagery via satellite back to the continental US. Ordering the Predator to zoom in on a suspicious object, the captain quickly identified an Iraqi SA-2 SAM system that had moved into a position from which it would be able to threaten friendly coalition aircraft". Precise target information was passed to airborne RAF Tornado bombers, which were ordered to attack the SA-2. With a United States Navy carrier-borne jammer aircraft flying in their support, a Tornado crew launched a laser-guided bomb against the target.

Moments later, the Predator's laser designator was switched on to illuminate the SA-2 and guide the bomb to its destination. The Tornado crew watched their target take a catastrophic direct hit. After topping up their fuel from a VC-10 tanker aircraft, the Tornadoes returned to their holding orbit to await their next task. By any measure, that was a fine and by no means unique example of inter-service and international joined-up operations.

An Iraqi staff officer reported after the conflict that the Republican Guard divisions were essentially destroyed by air strikes when still 30 miles from their destinations. The Iraqi will to fight was broken from the air outside Baghdad. The contribution of air power as the arm of first choice for governments and its ability to hit hard—or the possibility of being hit hard by an enemy if our own air defences are inadequate—is an all-important lesson.

While air power played a key role in fighting and winning the war, it falls mainly to ground forces in large numbers to cope with the post-hostilities phase. Only last week the Prime Minister and other senior Ministers were predicting that substantial British Armed Forces will be in Iraq until 2005 or even longer. That concerns me, as it does other noble Lords, because of the numbers of ground and other forces and equipment that will be required to sustain our presence by roulement.

It seems also to contradict the view in Essay I where, following our early involvement we, would expect to play a lesser part in enduring operations where many other countries can contribute". Servicemen and women are the essential element to make all this work. Their motivation and commitment are essential. Therefore, soon after they have been under very great pressure is surely not the time to start cutting back people and equipment required to carry out demanding operational and continuing peacetime tasks.

Given the fine words of the Chancellor on 10 December the forces will feel demoralised and aghast by a whole series of cut announcements. Without reassurance of government support at all levels, retention, reserves and even recruitment will be hit. Commitments would then have to be curtailed even further or the Government will run the risk of some military catastrophe that should not have been allowed to happen.

Finally, I noted the content of the Written Statement of 6 January by the noble Lord, Lord Bach. It reports the implications of the ECHR judgments on two appeals by servicemen who were tried and convicted by their service courts martial. Their sentences were upheld by their service reviewing authorities and their appeals to the courts martial appeals court were unsuccessful. In the case of the naval accused, the European Court ruled that there had been a violation of Article 6.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights because his court martial used serving naval officers. The court judged that this did not provide a sufficiently strong guarantee of the independence of naval courts martial. When the Human Rights Bill was in Committee in February 1998, in answer to concerns which I and other noble Lords had raised about the impact of the Bill on the Armed Forces, the then noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said: I urge your Lordships to be of the view that the convention is a flexible instrument. It poses no threat to the effectiveness of the Armed Forces".—[Official Report, 5/2/98; col.768.] The continuous erosion of longstanding and well understood arrangements for service discipline, of which this ruling about naval courts martial is but a further example, is most unhelpful and damaging to the essential trust and respect that must underpin the relationship between those in authority and those they command in the three Armed Forces. Once again, the assurance that the human rights convention poses no threat to the effectiveness of the Armed Forces is seen to be false.

4.43 p.m.

Baroness Dean of Thornton-le-Fylde

My Lords, I, too, welcome the opportunity to take part in the debate. As noble Lords have said, we sadly miss my noble friend Lord Hardy of Wath—Peter, as we all knew him.

Had this debate taken place this morning, I should have had to declare an interest as chairman of the Armed Forces Pay Review Body. Since I signed off the report at lunchtime today, I have a freedom which I should not otherwise have had. Perhaps I am a "has been"; I do not know.

I do not want to talk about the number of ships or planes but about the personnel who operate those ships, planes and tanks and who take part in the infantry. Every year seven colleagues on the Armed Forces Pay Review Body and myself were able to meet in groups of 10 or 12 about 3,000 personnel in the three services. We talked to them without their superior officers present and obtained a clear view of how they felt about service life.

Whenever there is a debate in this House or another place everyone refers to the professionalism of the UK Armed Forces: that they are the best in the world and how proud we are of them. Those statements are absolutely correct. However, in some areas they are wearing thin. When visiting Kabul in Afghanistan the year before last, I was at a meeting with about 12 young soldiers from the Anglians, two of whom were just 18, straight out of training and into an operational situation in Afghanistan. In the middle of the meeting there was thought to be a rocket attack on the building we were in. I was proud of the way in which the soldiers, including the 18 year-olds, reacted. I believe that it could not have happened without the wonderful training that the Armed Forces give those young people.

That belief was reinforced when I went to Harrogate and met 16 and 17 year-olds who, for the first time in the lives of many of them, had an investment in them and care and support for them which they had not experienced in their family lives. There is no doubt that the training they receive is first class. Following that training, the responsibility they are given at such a young age would never be given in private industry in Britain. So we are right to be proud of our services. But it is no good saying that we are proud of them. We have to back it up by putting our money where our mouths are.

While in Kabul, I also had meetings with General McColl who was highly regarded by the people there, whether young soldiers or some of the civilian population. He demonstrated the best of British leadership in the British Armed Forces. I do not refer just to the soldiering that they undertake but to the sensitive dealing with quite threatening situations by young solders of Tland 19 in the Balkans conflict. Without wearing tin hats or body armour, they dealt sensitively with traumatised members of the population. Often they were young women who had been even more than traumatised and were not wanted by their own community.

In the early 1990s John Major appointed me as a trades union member of the Armed Forces Pay Review Body. There is no doubt that pay was then the number one issue. It is still an issue as it is for anyone who works to earn money. We could always pay people better. We commissioned a survey of 11 peer countries on the overall remuneration package over a career. Britain can, rightly, be proud of its reputation. We come in the top three with regard to every measure in the overall remuneration package. Current pension changes are a concern. Armed Forces need stability and certainty about their lives.

However, the concern expressed this year at every meeting relates to overstretch. The word is used a great deal but it pervades much of the Armed Forces life. Chapter 1 of the White Paper refers to, "more numerous crises", a "wider range", and "frequency and duration" of conflict than were envisaged in the Strategic Defence Review of 1998. I agree with that assessment which was confirmed during our visit.

When considering the recent conflict in Iraq, we mobilised more Armed Forces in a shorter time than in the Gulf War a decade earlier, alongside Operation FRESCO where 19,000 personnel were committed to cover for the fire-fighters' dispute. The White Paper refers to the impact of that on training. But overstretch affects family life. Leave with one's family is cancelled and other issues are involved. For instance, "You have a promotion, but you must miss your leave to take it. If you do not, you will lose your chance of promotion and not have the opportunity of using the training already taken".

The Secretary of State, in an interview in December, said that the average period between tours was 10 months as opposed to the 24 months laid down in the Strategic Defence Review. We know people who have experienced a shorter period between tours. All that comes down to the issue of overstretch. To the Armed Forces, Operation TELIC stood for "Tell everyone leave is cancelled" and they were right.

Every year, the review body conducts a survey on lost leave and hours of work. Until the past two years, the trend had been positive, but it then began to creep back up to the level at which it stood some years ago. That is concerning, but the reason is obvious. Service personnel in a conflict expect to work long hours—frankly, what else is there to do when you are in the middle of a desert in Iraq?—but the average hours worked annually by the forces in Northern Ireland are much longer than those of the civilian population.

The White Paper contained a document called the "essays" and I am particularly interested in Essay 5. It stated that a plan would be in place by April this year. Will we have an opportunity to debate that plan when it is drawn up? I would welcome that. I hope that it contains a section dealing with defence medical services, too. Great efforts are being made to improve them, but there must be a long-term plan with year-on-year improvement.

Recruitment in the Armed Forces has greatly improved, which is to be congratulated. Last year, more than 26,000 personnel were recruited against a, target of 25,000. But having got them in, we need to ensure that they have a modern contract or compact—an overall term of engagement—with the nation. On that, I particularly welcome the White Paper. In many respects, the understanding has not kept pace with how their equivalents in civvy street see their employment and career opportunities. My noble friend Lord Clark mentioned flexibility, but I see it in a different way. People want control over their own lives and contracts and they want choices. Difficult as it is, the Armed Forces must move towards that understanding.

Separation from families is also a difficult area. When I went to Iraq in June, the welfare package was more advanced than it had been the previous year in Afghanistan. The MoD and the Armed Forces are getting much better in that. I accept that the nearness to the UK, the terrain and the environment in Iraq were different, so we would expect it to be better, but it was better. I sincerely believe that the welfare package and the understanding of the arrangements for families has risen up their priority agenda.

I welcome the White Paper and the opportunity to discuss these issues. I welcome the progress that has been made, but there is still a long way to go. I return to where I began: everyone says that we want UK Armed Forces to be proud of. That is a two-way stretch. We can be proud of them, but they need to believe that we share a concern and that we will resource them properly. Many improvements have been made, but the elastic has stretched too far. If we are to maintain our commitments—and we have over-committed—it is essential that the Armed Forces have the resources to back them up. Yes, improvements need to be made, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, said. Yes, there might be a view that no matter how much money is poured into the MoD it will spend it and want more. The blunt fact is that we must ensure that the Armed Forces have the resources they need to carry out the job we expect of them.

4.55 p.m.

Lord Luke

My Lords, first, I want to associate myself with the remarks made by the Minister and other noble Lords concerning the late Lord Hardy of Wath. He was an excellent chairman of the House of Lords Defence Study Group and a very nice man who I was proud to count as a good friend.

As has been emphasised in several excellent speeches in this timely debate, including that of my noble friend Lord Vivian, and in the media, the Defence White Paper is long on policy objectives—mostly welcome on this side of the House it extremely short on detail. However, if leaks and gossip are to be believed—and I would like the Minister to confirm or deny them—the Armed Forces plan to accelerate the retirement of four destroyers; to accelerate the demise of two of the three Invincible-class carriers before their time; and the already announced deplorable departure of the Sea-Harrier jump-jets which play such a vital role in defending the fleet. If these are true, there will be a potentially dangerous series of gaps in the Navy's ability safely to carry out its present and ongoing remit in the next 10 years or so.

I shall now limit my questions and remarks to the two projected aircraft carriers. Am I right in the belief that they are to be called "Queen Elizabeth" and "Prince of Wales"? That sounds entirely appropriate and I hope that it is the case.

Lord Bach

My Lords, the noble Lord is right, as usual.

Lord Luke

My Lords, I am grateful indeed to the Minister for that confirmation. When the project to build these carriers as replacements for the Invincibles was announced, I, like I suspect many of your Lordships, was delighted. However, I wondered even then whether there might be problems with funding and we might find ourselves with only one or even none. I also wondered where they might be built. Well, it appears that we are going to get two carriers—I am delighted—and that they will be built in Britain—and I am even more delighted. The tripartite arrangement between BAE/Thales and the MoD should make for the best of all worlds, provided—and it is a big "provided"—that it works in practice. Is it working as the Minister would wish? Is there a fully integrated management team to run the project?

Can the Minister comment on the various rather dispiriting reports concerning the budget for building these ships? Is it true that whereas the MoD has allocated some £2.8 billion for the construction, the contractors have said that the figure should be more like £4 billion in order to achieve the specification laid down? It has even been suggested that to meet the shortfall the Type 45 destroyer and Astute submarine programmes will be drastically cut. If that happens, would it not seriously affect the protection available for the carrier battle group when it deploys? Who can tell whether a future opponent might have some viable submarines or missiles? Remember the Falklands.

Another solution suggested has been to cut the size of the carriers. This would surely mean that fewer combat aircraft could be carried and it would not be possible to deploy fixed-wing aircraft to scout well ahead of the fleet to give the earliest possible warning of incoming attacks. And it might not be possible to use either ship as a proper floating command and control centre at sea. I understand that there are doubts as to whether the American STOL version of the joint-strike fighter will be ready on time, so it would seem to be essential to provide for the capability to deploy conventional versions of the fighter which it is planned to build and which may be ready earlier. If that is the case, might that not open up the possibility of co-operation with France on its projected new carrier— hence possible cost-sharing, which I am sure would he welcome? What type of engines are envisioned for the carriers? Are we considering nuclear power, as used most successfully by the French and United States carriers? There is also the question of stability. A 60,000 tonne vessel is surely much more efficient at launching and recovering aircraft in rough weather than one of 50,000 or 40,000 tonnes.

Can the Minister assure us that the March deadline for agreeing the production contract is still in place, or has it slipped to June, as suggested in the media? We know where they will be built in Britain, in four different shipyards, and that they will be constructed in individual large blocks that will be shipped on barges to the site for final assembly. Can the Minister assure us that that procedure is both practical and cost-efficient?

Will there be any spare space built into the design of those ships? After all, they will not come on-stream until 2012 and 2015—is that correct?—with a life expectancy of at least 30 years, probably. Surely it is most likely that future advances in technology will require accommodation within the hull of the ship, with little extra cost at the planning stage. As the battle fleet will consist of only two capital ships, rather than the present three, all except major repairs and maintenance will surely have to be carried out at sea when operations are ongoing. In which case, will there not be a requirement for extra Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships to provide on-station engineering facilities?

We have a tradition in this country of being immensely proud of our great ships. The two aircraft carriers are the first proper capital ships to be built in and for this country for more than 50 years. Let us hope that they will be built to be fully capable of doing what the Navy requires. If that turns out to be the case, we shall have ample reason to be enormously proud on the day that they first sail into Portsmouth harbour.

5.2 p.m.

Lord Bramall

My Lords, I want to express my admiration to the noble Baroness the Leader of the House and to the Minister for this early defence debate—and not even on a Friday. That is very gratifying. Its purpose is to discuss the Government's plans, as set out in the latest White Paper, for the future of our Armed Forces, to which the whole country manifestly owes so much—as so many noble Lords have already said, and as the right honourable gentleman the Prime Minister emphasised when he was in Basra.

It was therefore to be hoped—and certainly what the Armed Forces deserve—that there would be a clearly stated intention to match resources to current and likely future commitments, such as probably having to keep troops in Iraq until 2006, and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Dean, said in her marvellous speech, to put right the chronic weaknesses of manning overstretch and, in a few cases but significant respects, equipment shortages.

Sadly, we are presented instead with a document that is long-winded, repetitive and, as the noble Lord, Lord Luke, said, strong on lofty sentiments and virtuous expressions of intent but singularly ill-definedln detail on how those worthy aspirations are to be achieved.

Of course, there are some good things to report on both the capability and performance of our forces, and some sound, if transparently obvious, things to say about the combat and security scenarios and challenges that our forces may face in future. But many of those things are pretty old hat and merely reflect the direction in which our Armed Forces have been moving during the past 20 years.

No—and this is my main criticism—the White Paper represents more an elaborate distraction from the real problems that beset the services, especially from the impending Treasury cuts that are undoubtedly in the wind. In fact, its main purpose seems to be to create a plausible rationale for why certain reductions could be made within a coherent policy, irrespective of the fact that some of them would be damaging to the morale and effectiveness of the Armed Forces, and therefore not in the national interest.

To do that, the White Paper champions at least three illusions or fallacies. First, although, perhaps understandably, not mentioned in the text, but made great play of by Ministers when defending their policy, is that for the first time in about 17 years, the defence budget is actually being marginally increased in real terms during the current three-year period. Incidentally, without that expectation, the Armed Forces would not have been able to deploy for war in Iraq as effectively as they did. But that is largely an illusion.

I suggest to the Minister—he can deny it hotly if I am wrong—that those boasted-about increases are in fact being off-set, and more than off-set, by the money that the Treasury now wants back from the Ministry of Defence because of the new accounting system. That accounting system was forced on the department by the Treasury and is working greatly to its disadvantage because of the large number of expensive pieces of capital equipment on the defence books. That is a clear case of moving the goal posts. In reality, therefore there will be a lower, not a higher, cash flow on which to draw and virtually every vote holder will once again be compelled to do so much, if not more, with less. Hence the injunction to find savings.

The first fallacy centres on the first of two potentially damaging phrases that are given prominence in the White Paper. That is; the requirement for our Forces to be structured and equipped to deploy rapidly for small and medium scale operations". There is nothing wrong with that. But it adds—and this is the point—that those forces must be, capable of reconfiguring at a longer notice for the less frequent, yet more demanding, large scale operations". That is manifestly seeking licence to reduce and save, in men and equipment, on heavier armoured formations.

Even allowing for the premise of longer notice—although deployment in both Gulf Wars and other campaigns had to be at short notice, once political decisions had been made—and ignoring the fact that even medium-scale operations require heavy armour and fully mechanised armoured personnel carriers both for protection and to dominate the opposition, such a deferred reconfiguration makes absolutely no allowance for regular unit and formation training in the operational role with equipment similar to that to be used in war. That could have serious repercussions.

The second fallacy is based on a second damaging statement—again highlighted as especially significant. It states: The focussing of our planning should be on the military effects we require of our Armed Forces"— generated, presumably, by emerging technology— rather than on simple calculations on platforms and unit numbers". Again, that is an attempt to obtain licence to remove platforms and units at will.

Such a policy might have some substance if warfare was always to be of short duration and involve no lengthy aftermath. However, recent events have confirmed that it is invariably easier to get into a conflict than to get out of one; and that to win the peace properly requires troops on the ground for a considerable period, with even more troops, ships and aircraft in the background to help relieve them to sustain the commitment.

No, figuration or configuration of the forces is not the problem. The problem is manning—now and in future—and the stretch to which that manning contributes. Go around any units in the field and that message comes through loud and clear—the noble Baroness has done this; I am sure she has received the same message. The order of battle, which was established by the admirable, albeit progressively underfunded, Strategic Defence Review, has served the country well. It has enable the Armed Forces to move swiftly and easily from internal security, through peacekeeping and peace enforcement, to low-intensity operations and finally to high-intensity warfare. It has not fallen down on rapid deployment for any of those situations. At the same time—this is important—it has provided a proper roulement so that the operational formations have time for unit and formation training, which are so essential for a proper war-fighting capability. However, even that deployable strength has not been able to produce a reasonable interval between operation and training tours away from the home base and families. This is not therefore the time to abandon that order of battle but to strengthen it and to see that it works properly in respect of stretch as well as operations and training.

I am not saying that combat units, particularly infantry, cannot be reorganised to give stronger, more battle-ready and more homogeneous units within a broader regimental system, which would save on overheads and movement costs and facilitate regimental homes where families could base themselves and put down roots. But I am saying that, generally speaking, the current order of battle should be maintained. If there are any areas where force levels can come down—most of those are still problematical—they should provide an opportunity, not to disband units and thus prolong overstretch, but to use the manpower saved to improve the situation. The proven size of the British Army—if it goes much lower it could well lose its critical mass—should not, in these dangerous times, be sacrificed on the wings of still-to-be-proven emerging technology, important adjunct as that may prove to be one day, or the invariably parsimonious attitude of the Treasury.

This Government have tried to do their best for the Armed Forces, but they unnecessarily mucked about with the Territorial Army, our best and most important reserve, which is essential both for the strengthening of the regulars and for dealing with any terrorist threat to the country. It is still too small and being too restricted on training, as the noble Lord said. There are also still gaps in the equipment programme, particularly in communications, especially ground-to-air equipment. In Iraq, our land forces were able to operate effectively with vital air power only by being able to use the ground-air communications of the United States Marine Corps.

The accommodation of our men and women leaves much to be desired. It must be put right if people, to which the White Paper continually refers, are to be properly motivated, retained and receptive to the flesh-and-blood leadership. That leadership now comes more from leaders in the field—commanding officers and the high morale that they can induce—than from vague policies and theories hatched in what the White Paper pleases to call, rather incongruously, the head office.

In a world in which might still manifestly appears to be right, there must be no falling down on defence funding, which now represents such a marginal part of a growing gross national product—hardly 2 per cent. It is so necessary for the Armed Forces of this country—one of its most priceless assets and the most cost-effective means of punching our weight and exercising influence in this dangerous world.

Perhaps it would not be a bad idea—to use a historical analogy from 1900, when what seemed a comprehensive victory then developed into an ongoing struggle—if the next election were a khaki election and perhaps won by those seen to be supporting the Armed Forces, as they deserve, and keeping them in proper working order, at home and abroad, for the very dangerous years that lie ahead.

5.14 p.m.

Lord Lyell

My Lords, it is a privilege to follow the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, which I have had the chance to do once or twice previously. I thank the Minister, and his colleagues, for presenting us with this White Paper. I add my tributes to my former chairman Lord Hardy of Wath, as I am the secretary of the House of Lords Defence Study Group, to whose activities I may refer later. I hope that the Minister will pass on the defence group's thanks to the officer—previously Dr Moonie but now Mr Caplin—who organised and gave enormous assistance to us. I also thank my colleagues who take part in the group's visits, notably, the noble Lords, Lord Rogan, Lord Luke and Lord Brougham and Vaux, who cannot be with us today, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Sharp and Lady Strange, to whom I may refer later.

The most notable speech among the glittering array today was that of the noble Baroness, Lady Dean, who made most of my speech for me. I commented earlier this week, not so much about the hardware, which we could discuss all night, but about the people. To somebody with a young and enquiring mind, as I have been described, despite being well into my seventh decade, I could go on about joint-strike fighters, carriers, missiles, weapons and every kind of equipment. But, as the noble Baroness, Lady Dean, said, we are all concerned about the people.

It is at this stage that I always ask whether the Minister and others will play bingo and open up the happy essays, on which I have commented. Will the Minister glance through paragraph 2 of supporting essay five, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Dean, referred—he need not reply to me today—which refers to the age and demographic pattern of the United Kingdom and the necessity of trying to recruit 26,000 people each year from a shrinking age group of recruitable people? I hope that that can be done. Paragraph 5.5 deals in depth with recruiting, as pointed out by my noble friend Lord Vivian, and refers to the shrinking pool of the population.

Paragraph 5.6 refers to retention. The first sentence states that the skills acquired in the Armed Forces are very marketable and that our personnel represent an attractive recruitment target to other employers. Will the Minister and the Government read that paragraph, which sums up the feelings of many noble Lords, including the noble Baroness, Lady Dean, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall?

Paragraph 5.20 refers to accommodation, to which the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, referred. I hope that it is improving—there is certainly a large amount of investment in it. However, when the noble Lords, Lord Luke and Lord Rogan, accompanied me to Colchester to visit the 16 Air Assault Brigade and the 3rd Battalion Parachute Regiment, some of the accommodation could only be described tactfully as lamentable. Other accommodation could do with improvement, but perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Rogan, and others might carry on with that.

During the past year the Defence Study Group made a number of visits—we do not just study and remain in your Lordships' House to look at glossy brochures. Noble Lords may be amazed that my noble friend Lord Murton of Linisfarne, on his 89th birthday, and 14 other noble Lords accompanied me on a visit to the 1st Battalion Scots Guards, my regiment and that of my noble friend Lord Burnham. It is fairly easily accessible. The commanding officer there accepted the message repeated today by my noble friend Lord Vivian, the noble Baroness, Lady Dean, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, and that will no doubt be repeated by many others: it is essential that we recruit and retain as many servicemen as possible, and that we make them happy and content. That is a continual battle that we hope the Minister and the Government will he able to continue to fight and to win.

During that visit we learned some very interesting facts in a briefing about pay. I shall not go into that today. However, there was one example of the overstretch. There was growing concern in that battalion—they are used to it; indeed these Guardsmen and these soldiers are flexible—but they had to carry out continual public duties, they were also having to watch as reserves for fire problems, and they were living in London when they had been told that in March 2003 they were to go to Munster, be retrained and take their place in the Army group. Certainly, they were to go to Munster. It had been delayed. The commanding officer advised me that they had not been able to train as a battalion for three whole years. Training is fine, you can train right up to battle group level, but to train as a regiment with all the accompanying equipment that we shall hear about is pretty necessary. Just for one battalion or one regiment not to have that for three years is a bit difficult.

We found that morale was enormously high, and if the noble Baroness, Lady Strange, has time, she might let your Lordships know exactly what we saw in the barrack room at left flank, 1st Battalion Scots Guards. She pointed it out to me, and it was an example of superb morale. During the year we also visited young recruits at the Royal Marines Training Centre at Lympstone, where we found everything that the noble Baroness, Lady Dean of Thornton-le-Fylde, had said. We found young men of 18, 19 and 20 extremely well motivated, well trained and keen to move on, but above all superbly supported by every one of their trainers.

We went on to RAF Benson, where we saw helicopters. My noble friend Lord Luke and the noble Lord, Lord Brett, came to Cyprus, where the morale of everyone was enormous. I hope the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, will appreciate that the words of praise spoken by everyone about RAF Akrotiri were still ringing in our ears when we got back and throughout the months afterwards. I hope that the Minister will take that on board.

One of the final visits was to Colchester, where there has been an enormously successful transition. I hope that I have it right that 16th (Air Assault) Brigade or air mobile brigade are there. We also visited the 3rd Battalion the Parachute Regiment. It seems that this has been enormously successful.

I conclude by coming back to the people: the men and women of our defence forces and the Armed Forces. I also remember that of the reserves we met in Cyprus, between 10 and 15 per cent of one of the regiments consisted of reservists. Of the first four to whom I spoke after they had received their Cyprus medals, three of them were reservists.

We look at these lovely, glossy brochures, the essays, the Defence Estimates, all these lovely things that are well produced, and are much appreciated from the Minister. As far as I am concerned, and I hope that your Lordships who float and those who fly will forgive me, but soldiering, and indeed all service life, is not always pretty. It can be harsh, it can be messy. My noble friend Lord Burnham referred to one or two notable people who had formed his career, such as Sergeant Major Lynch, who probably served with my father some 61 years ago. For me it was Drill Sergeant Clements of the Coldstream Guards, who we called Kiwi—a boot polish. He polished his boots, I do not know what else he did, but he certainly formed me and 16 other young men aged 18 into soldiers. Everything that I have seen this year, and other Members of your Lordships' group who have been around will confirm this, shows that the spirit of Drill Sergeant Clements and what he did for me is alive today. It is growing. It is because of people like him that the noble Baroness, Lady Dean of Thornton-le-Fylde, saw those 18 year-olds in Afghanistan who knew what to do in an emergency—they knew what Sergeant Clements told us was the "set drill". Their spirit is also alive today.

There are three, if not four, noble and gallant Lords to follow me, which is why I must sit down. I thank every one of those soldiers, servicemen and women all round the world who serve us: serving yesterday, serving today and serving tomorrow. I hope that the Minister will be able to confirm for us tonight with this White Paper that the Government will make sure that they are able to do their job not just now, but in 20 or 30 years' time, when we are no longer here.

5.24 p.m.

Baroness Strange

My Lords, we are all grateful to the Minister for initiating this debate on the White Paper and welcome with him the "Queen Elizabeth" and the "Prince of Wales". I add, with all noble Lords who have already spoken, my regrets for the loss of Lord Hardy of Wath, who not only headed the defence study group, but was a jolly member on so many visits and is so much missed by all of us, and by all the dogs, which he loved.

Like all those who have already spoken, I am enormously grateful to the gallant men and women of our services who defend us against assaults, who defy terrorism, and who work long, hard and unstintingly on behalf of others at Christmas and on all other holidays too. We are all proud of them, of their courage, professionalism, and all that they do to make the world a better place for us all. As my noble friend Lord Lyell said, I was much impressed by our visit to the Scots Guards. There are forces deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Northern Ireland and other places. They are all suffering severely from overstretch, as so many noble Lords, particularly my noble and gallant friends Lord Bramall and Lord Craig of Radley and the noble Baroness, Lady Dean of Thornton-le-Fylde, and the noble Lord, Lord Redesdale, have already said.

We all know that 24 months between front line unaccompanied tours is the absolute minimum. Now the average is between nine and 10 months, and with some specialised forces, such as the Royal Engineers or Queen Alexandra's Royal Army Nursing Corps, it is sometimes as little as two months.

One must ask why there is so much overstretch. The answer is simple: there are too many holes to fill, and too few people to plug them. We must either cut down on our commitments, which would be unfair to many people around the world who have come to rely on us, or we must employ more people.

I will speak about the Army, as my noble and gallant friend Lord Craig of Radley has already spoken so persuasively on the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. In 1992 we had far fewer commitments than we have now, yet we had 145,000 men in the Army. Today, we are precisely contained with 102,500 men. Why do we not have more men? Is it recruitment? This has been bad, certainly in Scotland with the disastrous attempt to employ a civilian agency for the job, when the numbers fell dramatically. This mismanaged attempt has fortunately now come to an end, and we are back to using the services as recruiters, with much more satisfactory results. Is it retention? Again, though not entirely, that seems to be flattening out.

It must simply be lack of cash. Why? One can only think that there must be some spider sitting in the centre of its web eating up all resources that come its way. Could this by any chance be the Treasury? Surely it would be more productive if people could be recruited from the dole to the armed services, so that they could lean a skill that would stand them in good stead in the future. I only know that as a taxpayer I would rather see my money spent on the services than on illegal immigrants, layabouts and bureaucracy.

There have recently been ill-founded rumours about the Scottish regiments. There are now only six Scottish infantry regiments: the Lowland regiments—the Royal Scots, the Royal Highland Fusiliers, the KOSBs—and the Highland regiments—the Highlanders, who are already an amalgamation of the Queen's Own and the Gordon Highlanders, the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the Black Watch. I checked and counter-checked and asked everyone I could think of, and I was happy to hear that the rumours were ill founded. We need every Scottish soldier and every Scottish regiment, including the cavalry and the Scots Guards.

I shall add a tiny, slightly self-indulgent footnote about my family connections with the Black Watch. A great-great-uncle served in it—or in the 42nd Highlanders, as it then was—in the 19th century. As he was a keen ornithologist and had made a complete stuffed collection of all European birds, being himself a taxidermist, he hoped that his postings would send him on a migratory route—and they did.

My husband's uncle, General Evans, won the VC while in the Black Watch, during the First World War. My father had a varied military career; he was also in the Black Watch. He began by driving an ambulance in France in 1917. In 1918, he was a cadet in the Grenadier Guards. He joined the Black Watch as a captain, in 1939, when he was put to guard the Forth and Clyde canal at Grangemouth. Feeling that the Germans were unlikely to mount an attack there, he returned home to farm and started the Megginch platoon of the Home Guard, in which he ended the war as sergeant major.

5.31 p.m.

Lord Rogan

My Lords, I am again grateful for the opportunity to pay tribute in the House to the professionalism and dexterity of our Armed Forces, in Iraq and in the other theatres of conflict in which we are engaged. I welcome the Government's defence White Paper, but I will draw the House's attention to a number of issues that must be addressed if its implementation is to equip our forces to engage successfully in combat and peacekeeping missions in the post-Cold War world.

My main concern about the Government's proposals is that they may leave our forces understaffed, undertrained and overstretched. We are all aware of the changing nature of conflict operations. Future military engagements are increasingly likely to be largely conducted from operational headquarters, at the expense of the front line. However, we must not let modern technology make us complacent. We must heed the lessons of our colonial past, in order to fulfil our foreign policy commitments, without repeating the errors of previous engagements. I refer, of course, to Iraq.

In 1920, a revolt in Iraq forced our government to install an administration that we had to support with force for 35 years. In the words of our commissioner in Iraq at the time: The main problem facing the occupation authorities was lack of trained officials. Consequently, damaging mistakes were made and uprisings were common, especially in rural areas as the local population chafed under direct rule by European military administrators'". I am not suggesting that our forces should be officers or administrators in areas of conflict or even in peacekeeping engagements. However, the role of our soldier abroad has radically changed in the 21st century, yet we constantly hear of soldiers reminding us that they are not policemen. It seems to me that there is some contradiction between what our soldiers are trained and tasked to do and what their eventual operational duties entail. Our soldiers are no longer simply soldiers. Their modern role requires them to be ambassadors for the British state in its occupying role, peacekeepers in conflict regulation situations and promoters of the democratic ideal that we have taken it upon ourselves to impose.

The warning signs are already there in Iraq. We must act to redress the situation and ensure that our forces are operationally equipped and supported to carry out their task to the best of their ability. By that I mean that our operational planning in such conflict areas must strike a balance between what I call the "micro"—the troops on the ground and their equipment—and the "macro"—the smart bombs and high-tech, sophisticated weaponry of modern war. We must ask ourselves whether we have enough manpower to remain in Iraq until 2006, while successfully fulfilling our other commitments around the world and the increasing demands on our Armed Forces for homeland security. We have been there before, and this time we must get it right. I fear that we will shortly have to face that problem.

On the issue of maintaining the competency required to succeed in our foreign policy goals, I draw the House's attention to the question of the aspirational six-month operational tour with a two-year gap in the force readiness cycle. With approximately 30 per cent of our land forces committed to operations, it is logistically impossible to maintain the cycle of training, operations, rest and recreation and then training. The pressure of that constant rotation has a detrimental effect on service family life.

On the other side of the picture, is it desirable to rotate soldiers on a six-month basis? In Iraq, our soldiers go to considerable lengths to familiarise themselves with the sensitivities of the locals and to promote our message in the post-Saddam era. They are moved on when they could be at their most effective. Iraq, like many other states where we have foreign policy commitments, is a diverse and heterogeneous society. Our troops need the correct training and length of service to fulfil our objectives.

I have considered the role of our men and women as soldiers, sailors and air force personnel. We must also think of them as husbands, fathers or wives. For them to perform at their best, we must ensure that we have the resources to enable them to have sufficient leave, while improving their families' living conditions at home. There is a lack of opportunities for R and R during the operational readiness cycle that must be redressed. As with many things in life, the solution is simple. Happy soldiers make more efficient soldiers, and we will achieve that by having more, not fewer, personnel.

Why do we have a manpower shortage? That question has been asked before in the House. With infantry battalions suffering from under-recruitment and those with new recruits having insufficient time to train them, why cannot the services fill those vacancies? More must be done to promote the military career in schools and universities, so that, once again, our young people find it an attractive option. Young people must be made aware that apprenticeships are available through the Armed Forces. For many., it is a platform on which to build a variety of future careers. Moreover, the problem of increasing numbers leaving the services after nine or 10 years must also be addressed if we are to retain the experience and expertise on which modern armed forces thrive. Operation TELIC highlights some of the problems.

This is the first time in 60 years that we have seen the compulsory mobilisation of our reserve forces. At the same time, we are reducing the Territorial Army. Such contradictory and short-sighted thinking will leave us without the resources to cope with the increasing security demands outlined in the defence White Paper.

The White Paper highlights the fundamental nature of our transatlantic alliance and the global threat presented by international terrorism and failing states. With such a policy, we will be in the front line of future conflicts and at the heart of the peacekeeping and stabilising operations that will follow. As such, it is equally fundamental that we are equipped for the tasks that we will face in this military sphere.

Finally, to meet our foreign policy commitments over the coming years we must harness new technologies, exploit our excellence in operational and logistical expertise, and modernise and develop our military forces in a fashion that matches the security threats facing us. To do that, we must remember that the end product of our foreign policy can match its aims only if we retain sufficient personnel to deliver our goals and ensure that our forces are fully trained and equipped to succeed in the field.

We have military experience gained from our previous operational successes in Northern Ireland, Afghanistan and elsewhere. We must preserve and build on that in order to play a leading role in our conflict regulation commitments and the future foreign policy ventures that the Government White Paper outlines.

5.40 p.m.

Baroness Cox

My Lords, as a civilian I speak with temerity. However, I spend much of my time in conflict zones that are relevant to aspects of the White Paper, including security environment, international terrorism and failing states. I shall refer to Indonesia, Sudan, Nigeria and North Korea, as well as touch on threats at home. The first three countries share a common theme; namely, bitter religious conflicts associated with the disturbing spread of militant Islamism in wars in which many moderate Muslims suffer alongside those of other faiths. I include North Korea as I was there recently with the noble Lord, Lord Alton. Britain's contribution to addressing that critical situation is greatly appreciated.

In Indonesia, Sudan and Nigeria, in total, millions have died in recent years and many more millions have been displaced by religious conflicts associated with militant Islamism, often funded internationally and supported by international jihad warriors. I emphasise that I do not wish to promote Islamophobia. In all those countries, the majority of Muslims live peaceably with their compatriots of other faiths. Many courageously oppose their militant Islamist co-religionists, such as those Muslims in Sudan fighting alongside Christians and traditional believers against the Islamist National Islamic Front regime or those in Indonesia who have been attacked by Lasker jihad warriors for reconciliation initiatives with Christians. They share our concern about the spread of militant Islamism, which underlies many of the conflicts abroad and threats of terrorism here at home.

Indonesia, Nigeria and Sudan have great strategic significance for the United Kingdom. All three are major exporters of oil with huge still untapped reserves. All control major sea lanes of communications—Indonesia controls the Strait of Maluku; Nigeria controls the West Africa corridor; and Sudan controls the Red Sea—which are of great importance to British and allied commerce. Although there are some hopeful developments in Sudan's peace process, there are still major unresolved problems, such as the continuing fighting in Darfur, the NIF's insistence on Sharia law, and the unresolved status of the marginalised regions, which may trigger further conflict and destabilisation.

Both Nigeria and Indonesia are currently containing conflicts associated with militant Islamism, but the situations are very precarious. In Nigeria, we were told by Muslim leaders in the north that they intend to expand the number of states subject to Sharia and, ultimately, to change the Nigerian constitution into an Islamic constitution, with very serious repercussions. In Indonesia, President Megawati is upholding a constitution which enshrines religious tolerance, but she faces challenges from militant leaders who wish to change that constitution to one more conducive to militant Islam.

The slide of those countries, potentially, into instability, further civil war and anarchy, and the spectre of take-over by terrorism-supporting jihadist regimes, threatens the stability of three regions of crucial significance for the UK. Therefore, Her Majesty's Government must take very seriously any signs of impending collapse caused by the rise of militant movements. The global situation indicates that the stability and the viability of a growing number of countries are threatened by militancy, radicalism and terrorism.

Britain, as a country with global strategic, political and economic interests, will be adversely affected because many British forces may find themselves involved in an increasing number of conflicts and crises, such as fighting terrorism and trying to prevent the collapse of states. Thus, it is imperative for Her Majesty's Government to ensure that our Armed Forces are adequately prepared for such intervention operations: that is, expanding and properly equipping the myriad of excellent special forces; increasing the military and intelligence communities' expertise on the special features of crises in developing countries; and preparing dedicated special forces teams for crisis management and interaction with local and indigenous forces.

The UK must also vastly expand its strategic mobility capabilities—both in the air and on the sea—to move forces and to sustain them in many distant corners of the world. The United Kingdom has traditionally had an excellent reputation in those fields among allies and foes alike. The current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan proves that the participation of British forces is sought after because of their excellence, but there are not enough of them and their equipment is lacking. To meet the emerging challenges, it is imperative to increase these forces and to update their equipment.

I turn briefly to some signs of hope in different parts of the world, with developments to be welcomed and encouraged. In Indonesia, reconciliation initiatives have brought sonic respite in Maluku, although Sulawesi is still troubled by conflict. Therefore, there is a need for efforts to promote further reconciliation. Last February, in Jakarta, I was pleased to help to establish the International Islamic Christian Organisation for Reconciliation and Reconstruction—with the much needed and more felicitous acronym of IICORR—with the former President Wahid as its honorary president. Perhaps I may express my gratitude, through the Minister, to the Foreign Office for supporting an IICORR conference to be held in London later this month.

North Korea is another area where there is a possible ray of hope. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, and I, having been robust critics of the widely reported violations of human rights there, returned from our visit with cautious optimism, believing that the time may have come to offer a helping hand if North Korea is beginning to try to embark on a process of glasnost. We therefore established the North Korea/United Kingdom parliamentary group as an arena for continuing dialogue and for raising continuing concerns.

We cannot ignore the situation on the Korean peninsula, if only because the UK has been a member of the UN command in Korea since the Korean War of the early 1950s. While Britain does not have significant forces in north Asia, the UK can still play a significant role in the current crisis, which could escalate into a regional and a nuclear war. Experts have identified that one of the key factors in the heightening of tension in this crisis is North Korea's lack of understanding of the West, particularly the United States.

Many agree that the only viable way out of the current crisis is through meaningful negotiations. But there can be no realistic negotiations when one side—North Korea—has difficulties grasping the overall strategic position because of its prolonged isolation. While the United States has virtually no contacts and communications with North Korea, the United Kingdom has full diplomatic relations. Therefore, one of the key contributions that Britain can make to defusing the crisis on the Korean peninsula is to help the leaders in Pyongyang to adopt pragmatic negotiation positions. Although that point might seem unrelated to the defence White Paper, it is relevant because failure of the current negotiations involving the United States and North Korea could cause the eruption of a regional war likely to include the use of weapons of mass destruction, and Britain has treaty obligations to participate in such a war.

The overarching issue is the threat posed by North Korea's escalation of its nuclear programme. All the government representatives that we met in Pyongyang, including the President of the Praesidium, emphasised a willingness to begin a process of denuclearisation if they could receive two assurances; that is, first, a promise of no pre-emptive first strike by the United States; and, secondly, respect by the international community for peaceful coexistence of two systems within one country. I therefore ask the Minister whether Her Majesty's Government might be able to provide some such reassurances, as appropriate.

Before I conclude, perhaps I may raise one final concern that I have identified on many previous occasions, but to which, as yet, I have received no reply. I refer to the danger of Islamist penetration of key military and strategic institutions in the United Kingdom. One instance involves the employment of firms with responsibility for the installation of security surveillance systems in sensitive establishments. For example, I referred previously to a man who has been a significant shareholder in the firms IEDS and Protech; he is the owner of the Al Shifa plant in Khartoum, and has presumably been closely associated with the National Islamic Front regime which has Al'Qaeda sympathisers among its top leadership. Those firms provided security surveillance to British Army and other Ministry of Defence establishments, as well as our nuclear installations at Dounreay and Sellafield, British Airways and the Houses of Parliament. Could the Minister reassure the House that there is no danger of financial penetration by Islamists in those and other institutions of key military and strategic significance?

In conclusion, I should like to add my tribute to all that has been said in the debate so far on all that has been achieved by our Armed Forces in recent years in Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and, as the Prime Minister recently made clear, in Basra, Iraq. But success is not a recipe for retraction; rather it is an indication of the need for enhancement to fulfil the roles outlined in the White Paper—deterrence, prevention, containment and protection.

Much has been achieved with present capabilities, but there are concerns over many of the proposed reductions. I hope that the Minister will reassure your Lordships that our Armed Forces are and will be fully equipped in every aspect so that they can continue to serve our country, and many peoples around the world, with the professionalism and the commitment for which they are deservedly renowned.

5.51 p.m.

Lord Vincent of Coleshill

My Lords, sometimes there is an understandable perception in defence debates that the same points are being made again and again by succeeding speakers. In one sense that can give the impression that there is not much else to say; but in another, it can indicate more widely held and growing concerns on the same important issues, which I believe is the case today.

I have little to say about the defence White Paper itself. It is a broad, high-level analysis of the changing strategic environment in which our Armed Forces are operating today and will have to operate in the future, inluding the lessons learnt from recent operations.

Given that many of the weapons systems and equipment still in service today are legacies of the Cold War, and that emerging science and technology have a significant influence on our future systems and the way in which they are employed in operations, it would be surprising if such a White Paper did not, at this time, point to the need for further changes. But the real challenge here is delivering those changes in an efficient and timely manner through a clear, well structured and adequately resourced implementation plan, of which there is little sign in this White Paper.

Changes on this scale can be extremely costly and disruptive at a time when members of our Armed Forces, as has been said repeatedly in this debate, relative to their numbers, have been more heavily committed to operations and to non-military duties such as lire fighting than they have for many years—a point made clearly and convincingly by the noble Baroness, Lady Dean, and many others. Nor, once the war fighting phase of an operation has been concluded satisfactorily, are new, so-called "network-enabling" capabilities any substitute for significant numbers of servicemen and women supporting the civil authorities in maintaining law and order and, where needed, dealing with much more violent and life-threatening incidents.

Our experiences in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and now Iraq show how long and demanding some of those post-operational commitments can be. As I said in one of our debates on Iraq before the operation itself started last year, it is all too easy to win the war and lose the peace", unless adequate plans and preparations are made in good time and there is sufficient military manpower to do the job, often over much longer periods than is first assumed.

Nor should we underestimate the enormous challenges to be faced in re-aligning our future weapons and equipment programmes to meet the changing needs identified in this White Paper. For example, the operational capabilities of the Eurofighter, Typhoon, and the numbers required, were originally defined in the Cold War, when there was a significant air threat posed by the then Soviet Union both to this country and in the wider context of possible NATO operations. Today that threat has effectively gone.

Given that each Eurofighter is set to cost nearly £57 million and the overall programme some £20 billion, is that priority to be changed? If so, how is that to be agreed with the other nations concerned with the project, and then refunded realistically in our revised equipment programmes? I ask that not in any way to play down the significance of air power but as one example of the scale and complexity and the potential cost implications of the decisions that lie ahead in implementing the outcome of this White Paper efficiently.

But my greater concern is how the over-committed men and women in today's Armed Forces are going to come out of all this, given the widespread perception that defence as a whole is under increasing financial pressure in real terms. That question was raised by my noble and gallant friend Lord Guthrie in the debate on the Queen's Speech and was never answered.

Unlike any other profession, members of the Armed Forces have no choice on where and when they will be committed to operations and to putting their lives at risk. Apart from the increasingly longer periods of separation from their families which are occurring today, in many cases they are unable to catch up on important training, some of which can bear upon their qualifications for further promotion as well as their readiness for future operations. My main question on the White Paper, therefore, is whether it has been measured against a realistic plan for its practical implementation and not least with adequate resources to fund it effectively.

Supporting Essay No. 6 to the White Paper refers to a series of, Departmental Objectives, supported by a number of targets, which are embedded in the Department's Public Service Agreement with the Treasury". Does that so-called agreement include a clear definition of the changes now needed to implement the new strategic priorities broadly identified in the White Paper, together with the resources required to implement them effectively? If so, can the Minister tell us about that in more detail? Without that greater transparency there will be increasing and justifiable concern that, in the face of growing resource pressures, this broadly drafted White Paper will merely provide a basis for haphazard and ill considered cuts because there is no comprehensive and visible blueprint agreed with the Treasury against which those priorities for change and their affordability can be defined and measured more effectively.

6 p.m.

Lord Selsdon

My Lords, it is always a privilege to listen to your Lordships in defence debates. Not only do you learn a little about military matters, you learn other things as well. The noble Baroness, Lady Strange, reminded me of the great pleasure it was to listen to Lord Hardy talking about wildlife and birds. Had he been here today I would have wanted to ask him whether it is true that mobile telephones are having an adverse effect on racing pigeons—they lose their way—and on the migratory patterns of birds. However, in future I shall ask those questions of the noble Lord, Lord Whitty.

We have before us an essay—to employ the Freudian slip uttered by my noble friend Lord Lyell. It is quite good, although a few things are wrong. I thought for a moment that on page 19 the Union Jack had been photographed upside-down. I expected Mrs Thatcher's head to pop up behind the flag. Reference was made to "UK forces". I think that we should call them "British" forces because that word carries a good deal of weight around the world. Although it is a good essay, if I had written it for one of my tutors, he would have queried my objective in doing so. Violins play in it at certain moments, but the questions are: who are the enemies, where are they and what are we going to do about them?

Those questions are difficult. The paper contains 11 mentions of proliferation of terrorism or weapons of mass destruction. I want to ask only one question, a point that I have raised in the past with the noble Baroness, Lady Symons. I would much appreciate it if someone in the ministry could write me an essay which stated what are considered, these days, to be weapons of mass destruction and what are the antidotes to them?

During the First World War my grandfather was director of the restriction of enemy supply. When we introduce "fear words"—I have said before that terrorism is government by fear—we create fear which may not be necessary. I assume that, these days, our enemies are politicians, and that is because usually it is a political decision that leads to a conflict or troubles between tribes. Often I have to see us as others do because in my life I have unfortunately been condemned to travel among the more difficult and rogue states of the world. When talking recently with some Cuban friends, I asked, "Do you realise that you would not have gone to war with Iraq if Clinton had not sent that boy back to Cuba?". The Cuban vote would have gone the other way and we would have had a different form of government in the United States.

Looking at our relationships with different people today, more often than not we realise that we have to anticipate what kind of political decisions will be made by whom, where and when, which can lead to conflict. To state that our Armed Forces are a force for good is to go one better than to have an "ethical foreign policy", but having read this paper, this essay, I am not quite sure where we are going. There seems to be an element of camouflage within it. Usually in this kind of debate we have a Minister sitting alone, nodding as he realises that every noble Lord is asking for more expenditure while the Treasury is seeking less.

However, in this case, we do not necessarily need more expenditure. If we analyse what our Armed Forces are required to do, it boils down to certain individual requirements: they have to be everything from undertakers to firemen to preachers. It does not matter; they are there.

I was brought up to understand that we are three to one. Thus, although the United States has six times as many armed regular soldiers, sailors and airmen as us, if we are three to one, it is not quite such a big gap. If the rest of NATO has 12 times as many as us, those forces are not even as good as those of the United States, so it is not such a big gap. And if the rest of the Commonwealth has 12 times as many, that is our alliance.

Let us look at where our alliances lie these days. Of course one is with the United States, although occasionally it goes off and invades places like Grenada without actually asking us, even though the ODA was on the ground. Just after I joined the navy, the US objected to the French and British co-operating in Suez. However, it also goes off to do certain things on its own, such as with the Contras or in Iran. We then have to sort things out and wash the dirty linen.

I have friends in those rogue states. I do not want the House to think that I am a rogue Peer; it just so happens that I have spent much of my time in the Middle East and eastern Europe. The break-up of the Soviet Union led to problems in other countries in which the Soviet Union had had influence. As that influence waned, chaos ensued. Let us look even at India and Pakistan. The Soviets provided India with tanks while the West provided them to Pakistan. Yet the armies of those two countries are among the greatest in the world—and many of their soldiers were trained by the British.

I would suggest that our problems lie not with the equipment, but with our people. Perhaps we should look at those forces which are made up of people who are our allies: NATO, the EU and, above all, the Commonwealth. If we are looking for excuses to attack under the heading, "Defend", then that is a dangerous move.

I want to draw an analogy between Iraq and Zimbabwe. I regard the efforts made by the Nigerians at the last Commonwealth conference as quite outstanding as they sought to bring together the Commonwealth to deal with Zimbabwe. However, from the point of view of some of my friends in those states, they ask why we bothered to go down this route; why not just take him out as we did Saddam Hussein. Why did we go through the charade of the weapons of mass destruction that were probably never there when, considering the behaviour in that country, it was perfectly justifiable for someone to interfere? However, the more one interferes, the more enemies or problems are created unless somehow one has captured the high moral ground.

I do not doubt that the individuals who make up our Armed Forces are streets ahead of everyone else in the world. They are not necessarily well remunerated and they are overstretched, but a 20 year-old who has been abroad other than in Northern Ireland for the first time comes back a wiser, braver, more interesting and more reliable man. During my time in the City we used to take whole-page advertisements in the Times and the Financial Times stating that we would welcome the opportunity to recruit people who had served in the Armed Forces and give them a secondary career. In my own family, as I have mentioned before, I have two nephews who served in the American armed forces who almost kicked themselves that they did not see 9/11 coming, because they rather regretted having left. I have another nephew with children in the Blues and Royals who wishes that there were more personnel to relieve him so that he could spend more time with his family.

I turn to another point. Through the Commonwealth or the empire we would train people—in banking and so forth, and in the military. I was rather surprised, therefore, to see on a television report the other day that we are shortly to train the Libyan army. I regard that as a great triumph if that is where we have broken through. Perhaps, given our considerable training abilities, one of our added roles that could be included on page 19 or wherever would be the opportunity to train other forces to be a force for good as well as to be competent.

When I consider some of the people that I have met in odd places, it is clear that you do not need much more than good uniforms, equipment, boots and guns if they are to perform a policing role. It is possible to integrate quite quickly.

I end with a story that has always fascinated me: that of the British fire bucket. I refer to the red bucket filled with sand into which cigarette ends were put. Those buckets were in tremendous demand in Africa and the Middle East because a red British bucket marked with the word "fire" and filled with sand is everything you could want to live with. First you take from someone's truck some petrol, put it in the sand bucket, set light to it, and place your tin on the top to heat up your baked beans. Before that, if you want a cold drink, you turn around the fan belt on the truck—the radiator will have long gone and put the petrol in the bucket. The can of beer is put on top and the fan turned. The evaporating petrol will cool the drink in around 10 minutes. That same story was told to me only the other day by a young soldier who had returned from the Middle East. It is the way to get around.

I have such respect for the military that, unless we bite the bullet and say that we must recruit to our cause more people not only from our own country, but also from other countries, we will suffer for years to come. We have the ability to do what we need to do for the world, and the world is waiting for us. Please can we get on with it?

6.8 p.m.

Viscount Slim

My Lords, the Minister may be surprised to learn that I should like to start by congratulating him. A number of noble Lords have given him a pretty hard time over the medical services for the Armed Forces. However, the latest information suggests that there has been a vast improvement in the position, particularly within the Army medical services. I am told that recruitment is buoyant and that the work being done in operations overseas is excellent: good arrangements, good management, good consultants and good nursing. That is a hopeful sign because noble Lords were very worried about the state of the medical services.

It is not so pleasing that the bedding-in of the Army medical service with the National Health Service has not been a great success. It has not gone with a good swing. This is understandable. The Army medical service had its own esprit de corps and its own proud and well trained people. It must be very difficult to bring the two systems together. The differences are quite marked and consultants are leaving, which is sad.

Germany seems to be the most successful area, where primary, community and secondary care is quite excellent. I have a feeling—the Minister may care to expound on this—that it might be more convenient, and you might get better treatment, if you are wounded, injured or sick in the former Yugoslavia than if it happens to you in Iraq.

Are you, as a casualty in an NHS hospital, on a trolley for too long? Are there special ways of treating a wounded soldier? I have received no complaints from the wounded soldiers I have spoken to but I wonder why we cannot give a member of Her Majesty's Armed Forces outstanding, immediate and proper care in an NHS hospital and ensure that he does not become merely another administrative number.

Like the noble Baroness, Lady Dean of Thorton-le-Fylde, I, too, have had the privilege of visiting the junior soldiers in Yorkshire, both at Catterick and Harrogate. I had a full day at each location and I was most impressed. The noble Lord, Lord Burnham, need not be too worried. The standard of turn-out of all the British Army regiments in both places was quite outstanding.

Harrogate is a beautiful city and a tremendous example. If I were the Minister of Education I would invite my teachers to go there. The education there is quite superb. I suggest that the noble Lord, Lord Lyell, takes a team up there as soon as possible.

As the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Vincent, said, the White Paper represents a look into the future. A number of issues worry us all, but what worries me mostly is that you have almost admitted that you cannot and will not work alone; that you have to work with others. This always presents a problem. We have all had allies and coalition partners. If one looks at the 25 nations of Europe, one sees that some fairly funny coalitions could come about in a military sense. Certainly, good and tough as they may be individually, the armed forces of one or two of those places are a pretty ragamuffin bunch. If certain of them were beside me then, never mind the enemy, I would double my sentries at night.

I do not believe that enough attention has been given to the issue of allies. Many of us have experienced that they are there with you by day, disappear at night, are not there in the morning and you are left in a rather lonely situation. This is what worries me about the possible organisation that you want with light scale, medium and large scale formations. If a formation has to take the brunt of an attack, or whatever may be the problem, I should like to know a little more about how it will be dealt with if we are lightly scaled.

We have perhaps forgotten the lessons of Vietnam. It is not easy, but it is quite possible, to turn a guerrilla-type army into a conventional army. That is what defeated the Americans in the end in Vietnam. You can change armies. We have changed our own armies. In the war in the Far East, people who had only walked for miles and miles in jungles were suddenly able to convert very quickly to mechanised armoured formations.

This was only possible because there was plenty of manpower. The whole weakness of the White Paper is that the Ministry of Defence is relying on new technology. In my experience, whatever the technology, it cannot supplant manpower, the use of the man on the ground. It is a poor excuse to say that you can cut because you have new technology.

Some of this technology is way off in the distance—it is not here. I was interested in the paragraph on the Apache helicopter. Where is it? The last time I asked the Minister, I heard that some were being mothballed; that there were no pilots for them because there was no money to pay for the training. Whatever the situation, there obviously will not be enough of these helicopters, either now or in the future.

Perhaps the Minister can help me. There is a very unconvincing sentence in that paragraph about the fact that we are now reviewing and considering how best to use them. How many? I would have thought that the best way to regard an Apache helicopter—it should not need much consideration—is that it is there to kill and destroy the enemy and to support our forces on the ground. Any colonel of infantry, cavalry or artillery, or a good wing commander in the Royal Air Force, will help you sort that problem out rather quickly.

I know the Minister will not like me for saying it, but the mythical A400 is almost a joke. You say it is due to arrive in 2011. At my age, I cannot promise that I will be here to see it, but I shall do my best. It is bound to be delayed. As I have said to the Minister before, on paper it is a very average aircraft. You have the perfectly marvellous C17s; you have good and improved C130s; you are only keeping the A400 contract to be seen to be active in Europe. That is the reason. Putting it bluntly, it is sucking up to the French and the Germans to say that you are participating in this great project. You would have been far better, as you suggest—I hope that you will—to think again and reconsider the position. There are not many decisions in the White Paper; it is more "considering" and "looking at". Why not go for the C17? Why not improve the situation you have already?

Finally, I am very worried about the sentence that we will carry out large-scale operations if we have time to prepare. There is not often time to prepare. As you quite rightly write, our troops have to be taught about the effects of the defeat and the destruction of an enemy. That is needed—but that is what the troops today are not being taught.

6.20 p.m.

Earl Attlee

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for introducing the debate. I remind the House that I have a peripheral interest.

The noble Viscount, Lord Slim, referred to the A400M aircraft. I agree with his comments, but it would be a little more effective if he were to address the House rather than the Minister.

Ministers trumpet the increase in defence expenditure in absolute terms, but surely the true measure is the percentage of GDP spent on defence. How do we draw the guns and butter curve? We may be in danger of following our continental partners in their defence effort, or lack of it.

Feedback from the defence industry is depressing. Concerns centre on delaying the implementation of programmes—in particular, the cost of maintaining bid teams. Defence contractors are becoming increasingly concerned that, in the end, no contract may be issued, despite the considerable expense of bidding for it.

Many noble Lords have referred to Op TELIC. Op TELIC 1 was undoubtedly an extremely successful operation. On the logistics side, in comparison to Op GRANBY—Gulf War one—we moved twice as much materiel in half the time. I see that the Minister is nodding.

Of course, there were disappointments, which are well known, and which noble Lords have covered. There were problems with stocks of materiel. For operations of a large scale or effort, it is clearly unwise to hold large stocks of materiel that may never be used. But, in transition to war, certain precursor materials may suddenly be in very short supply. An obvious example is activated charcoal. There are others that we need not know about. Perhaps we need to let some contracts to secure the precursor materials and facilities in advance.

Noble Lords have referred to the NAO report, which suggested that intra-theatre communications systems were satisfactory. Whoever wrote that has obviously not tried to use the Ptarmigan secure radio system or to have a conference call.

I believe that many members of the Armed Forces will be extremely grateful for the very thoughtful and informed contribution from the noble Baroness, Lady Dean, who remarked on the wide range of skills of very junior soldiers, especially in the aftermath of conflict. She may be interested to know that at one point in operation TELIC, soldiers undertook "helmets off" policing and social duties, while in another part of the division, heavy armour was still being used aggressively, although not necessarily in anger. We were in two very different phases at the same time. I am pleased that that does not present a problem for our soldiers for the reasons described by the noble Baroness.

The noble Baroness also referred to the operational welfare package. She was quite right. The only difficulty that I had was with the absolute drivel coming from the satellite TV set. At one point we were being told that the operation was facing logistical meltdown—something that we in the logistic headquarters of 1(UK) Armoured Division were totally unaware of.

My final point on Op TELIC is that in the run-up we kept hearing that war was neither imminent nor inevitable. That was not my understanding even at the time. However, I was a little surprised when I got out into theatre to find out how far matters were advanced. It was a mystery to me why there was no overt activity regarding Op TELIC in the defence community, particularly in December. I do not understand Ministers' strategy. Why were they saying up until the last moment that war was neither imminent nor inevitable? Why did they not press the buttons in the defence community to ensure that the right kit was in place?

The 3(UK) Division will have a mechanised brigade replaced by a light brigade, and 1 (UK) Armoured Division is to have an armoured brigade replaced by a mechanised brigade. The formation readiness cycle—FRC—is already a bit ragged, due to the operational tempo. Do the changes make the FRC dead or unworkable? If not, what will happen if it is desired to undertake an operation at a high intensity but a medium scale of effort, but there is no armoured brigade on high readiness year?

The White Paper proposes lighter, more rapidly deployable forces. I think that the deployability of armoured vehicles by air is an overstated requirement, although some air-portability is obviously essential. As a result of the SDR, we now have rapid and effective sea lift.

My noble friend Lord Vivian referred to FRES—future rapid effect system. Our AFV programme seems to be subject to constant revision. Is FRES a platform or a concept? If it is a platform—a vehicle on the drawing board—is it tracked or wheeled? Is it conventionally driven or electrically driven?

On the subject of carriers, I reinforce the point made by my noble friend Lord Luke. Making carriers a little smaller will save minimal capital because the steelwork in a carrier is a relatively small proportion of the actual cost of building it, and an even smaller part of the whole life cost of the carrier. But it will significantly reduce the flexibility of the carriers in future years.

My final points concern manning. During Op TELIC we were desperately short of simple lorry-mounted infantry— just like the TA battalions that were cut in the strategic defence review. On Op TELIC we were unable properly to secure our rear areas. Numerous weapons and ammunition dumps operated by the Iraqi army had to be left completely insecure. The 1 UK armoured divisional support group had 1,000 personnel in theatre, but there was no dedicated guard force available. Even busy staff officers below the rank of major had to go on guard. Fortunately, I was a major.

Cuts in infantry are the last thing we need. I cannot help thinking that the cuts are in response to the feeling that it is impossible to man the Army to the current authorised limit, so the solution is to reduce the establishment. I suggest that such a policy is madness. The noble Viscount, Lord Slim, was a little more diplomatic. It is madness because to reduce the numbers in the Armed Forces will exacerbate overstretch and retention problems. If the Government cannot resist engaging in yet one more operation, we need a much larger Army, not a smaller one.

The noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, when extolling the virtues of the TA, post-SDR, told us that Ministers had provided for far more TA than was required to sustain the scale of operations envisaged in the SDR. What he forgot, and what I overlooked at the time, was the need for a follow-on force—what we now know as Op TELIC 2, 3, 4, 5 and beyond.

The TA cupboard of willing volunteers is practically empty. There are virtually no TA soldiers who could be of use on Op TELIC who have not already been compulsorily mobilised. Putting aside any legal limits, how frequently does the Minister think that TA soldiers can be compulsorily mobilised? I think that he has unrealistic expectations. I would suggest no more than every five years. To do so more often would be contrary to the ethos of the TA and would drastically change it.

6.29 p.m.

Lord Guthrie of Craigiebank

My Lords, there is much to welcome in the White Paper. The services need to change, and there are many examples in history of navies, armies and air forces failing when they did not adapt, restructure, equip and train themselves for new challenges. It must be sensible to take work forward on the Strategic Defence Review.

Defence planners historically have found it difficult to arrive at priorities when new threats appear in addition to those which already exist and have not gone away, and which the services must still be prepared to face. We have to plan for the unexpected. The Falklands War, the first Gulf War, the Balkans, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan were not expected, and there is no reason whatever to suppose that we are now entering a more stable decade and that we will not have to react quickly to the unexpected again. The only certainty is that there will be uncertainty, and the British must be prepared.

The White Paper sensibly judges that more emphasis should be placed on light forces as opposed to our heavy armoured forces. It rightly reminds us of the key role the reserves can play and have played recently. Their contribution in both Afghanistan and Iraq has been immense.

The Civil Contingency Reaction Forces are important and desperately needed. The White Paper gives them the priority they deserve.

The White Paper also rightly seeks to reorganise and improve the logistic system and support services. One wonders, if the Iraq war had gone on for much longer, how we would have managed logistically.

Although I approve the thrust of the White Paper, like the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, I have serious concerns. It does not attempt to go into detail—that is promised at a later time. Will the aspirations in the White Paper be properly funded? As has already been said, it is, as it stands, a bland document and lacks detail. It is full of buzz words and platitudes—flexibility, force multipliers, network-enabled capability. What does it actually mean? Everybody gives me a different answer.

It is difficult to judge whether the White Paper will eventually be good for defence and the country. Does the defence budget have the wherewithal to deliver the necessary coherent programme? Many in the services believe that it will lead to painful cuts; the White Paper is positioning defence in such a way as to make it vulnerable to Treasury assault.

Will there be less money for defence? In the debate on the Queen's Speech, I asked whether the defence budget was under extreme pressure, and whether it was true that around £1 billion savings per year for four years was planned. Nothing I have heard since has reassured me. I asked if this was correct and, if so, was it because of miscalculations or increased and unexpected commitments because of the new resource budgeting system. Are the Ministry of Defence and the Treasury at loggerheads about the interpretation of accounting rules and procedures, as many say, or is it simply straightforward cuts? I would be very interested to hear the true position from the Minister.

The Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Symons of Vernham Dean, did not clearly answer my full question about whether there were plans to cut the budget, as was rumoured, and what the size and the reasons for the problem were. She pointed out that a promised £3 billion increase, announced in the spending review of 2002, was still happening. This is welcome, but, quite honestly, it is wearing a bit thin. Much of the £3 billion was ring-fenced and it has made no difference to the lives of the sailors, soldiers, airmen and women in the front line. Many still live in slum-like conditions; they are denied resources and are overstretched. The noble Lord, Lord Rogan, explained this so well.

Around 50 per cent of combat arms training has been cut this year, due to lack of funds. At a time when the services could recruit, they are not allowed to recruit as many men and women as they wish, through lack of money. As a result, establishments remain unfilled, and overstretch is compounded.

We also hear that the Government are poised to cut the size of the Army the moment the situation in Northern Ireland appears normalised. This seems extraordinary, considering the overstretch problems we have. Training and families are suffering, as the noble Baroness, Lady Dean, described so well.

The men and women of our services are what make the British services what they are. The Government are, one hopes, aware of this, and are trying to alleviate their problems rather than compound them.

I also find it surprising that we are contributing to a European planning cell. Although it is envisaged as small, it is bound to grow in size at a time when financial and human resources are in such short supply in our services. Noble Lords should be under no illusions that the cell will have little or no military value. Its work could perfectly well be done by staff officers already in Belgium at NATO. The cell, some may think, gives political value, but even though it has no military value, defence will have to pay for it when it is faced with far, far more urgent demands. I strongly support the Europeans increasing their military capability, but the cell will do nothing towards this.

I hope I am wrong, but I and many still in the services believe that defence, despite the words of Ministers, is at a crossroads, vulnerable to serious cuts. If this does happen, the Government will be damaging what is probably the most respected institution in the world the British have. To put it crudely—I am emboldened to do so by what the noble Baroness, Lady Dean, has already said—I hope that when the Government announce what the promised detail is, they will reveal they have put their money where their mouth is.

6.38 p.m.

Viscount Brookeborough

My Lords, it is a great privilege, but rather daunting, to follow the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Guthrie. I welcome the White Paper, although I wonder whether, in 10 years' time, we will be able to say that the Government got it right.

First, I must declare a couple of interests. I am Honorary Colonel of the Royal Irish Rangers, the TA infantry battalion for Northern Ireland. I am also a member of the National Employer Advisory Board, which is part of the SaBRE campaign. My chairman, the noble Lord, Lord Glenarthur, is sitting opposite, so I will be careful about what I say. In addition, I have done 22 years in the armed services, of which 17 were in Northern Ireland. That had a connection with a part-time element, which will have some relevance when I talk about reserves.

What we have in the White Paper is a commonsense reaction to the current threats of today's security environment, but that is all. The people of this nation have a right to expect our Government to plan for the present threat and the type of operation likely during the next few years, but we also expect to see some joined-up thinking with the Foreign Office to take us into the medium and longer term. I am disappointed that there is no reference to foreign policy as such, except strategic planning.

I find the White Paper and the supporting essays good light reading. There is nothing in them dramatically new to anyone who keeps themselves up to date with current affairs, particularly military affairs. Essay 2 contains terms such as "military tasks", "strategic tasks" and "strategic effects". Paragraph 2.5 refers to eight strategic effects that the Armed Forces should be able to bring to bear against our opponents. Please note, it says the Armed Forces. They all seem relevant, except for the first, under (a) "prevent"—I think it should really say prevention.

With my military experience in Northern Ireland in supporting the civil power, I cannot agree with all these tasks. Only one out of five tasks under this heading could be considered wholly military. It is the fourth task, which could be achieved with military training to build local capacity to counter an emerging crisis. The third task of reforming the security sector is predominantly political. The other three tasks—I shall save time by not referring to them all—are, in my view, not only entirely beyond military capability but are also entirely political. For example, under the heading "Prevent", the first task is: Address the underlying causes of instability, such as poor governance, political repression, social inequality and economic hardship". In the present campaign in Iraq, that took place in the 20 years before we got there and yet these are military tasks. As an Army officer, I would be extremely reluctant to think that I could do anything about that at all. Does the Minister agree with me that to involve the Armed Forces in these tasks would compromise their neutral stance and even-handedness, even if they were available to do them?

To emphasise the quality of our forces in Op TELIC one only has to look at the three phases of that operation. They excelled in every single one of them: first, the invasion and the battle; secondly, the immediate aftermath of guerrilla warfare, where the remaining enemy concentrated on coalition forces; and, lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the current phase of counter-terrorism and keeping the peace while some of the enemy target, intimidate and kill their own nationals. That is the dividing line between guerrilla warfare and terrorism, and that is where we are now.

The key to achieving such successful results is good preparation, planning and command. However, we must remind ourselves that the critical phase of counter-terrorism and keeping the peace is largely a section task with corporals and privates. We need the hearts and minds programme and campaign and we need soldiers on the ground who have the ability to achieve results. They are vital and irreplaceable.

That brings me to manpower and the reserves. We are all aware of the shortfalls in manpower and skills in the Regular Army. It is evident at all levels from intelligent private soldiers to plastic surgeons. I want to give the Government a serious warning about future manpower levels, especially of the reserves. As I said earlier, the Government are thinking short-term, about our current operations. I am not ignoring the supply of ever more sophisticated equipment, but in this type of operation nothing will ever entirely replace intelligent, well-trained soldiers on the ground who can speak and negotiate with locals. Everyone from commanders on the ground to the Government has emphasised that the support of the reserves was vital to Op TELIC and that continued support is required in the foreseeable future.

The results of compulsory mobilisation of the reserves have been nothing short of remarkable and continue to be a success. We must realise that this has been done by intelligent mobilisation; that is, the mobilising of the people with the right skills and those who were most likely to be available in the first tranches. We have to ask whether this is sustainable in the short term and in the medium term. Several issues have a bearing on this. The first is the Reserve Forces Act that limits compulsory mobilisation for an individual to once in three years. The second is the trained strength of the Territorial Army. The third is employers and the fourth is the families. I believe it may be just sustainable in the short term, if you take the short term to be the three years—one cycle of compulsory mobilisation under the Reserve Forces Act.

The issues here are, first, intelligent mobilisation. Secondly, there is no doubt that the people who have not yet been mobilised do feel a little left out and therefore there is a groundswell of enthusiasm to be included. Thirdly, there is considerable turnover in the TA, which affects it, and strength on paper does not reflect trained strength. Therefore the pool available for operations is not as large as it might at first seem. The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, said that it was almost completely exhausted; it is definitely some way towards it.

We are also talking about the medium term, further ahead than three years from February/March last year when the operation started. The Government seem to agree that we shall still have soldiers in Iraq in 2005 and probably in 2006 and 2007. Also, we cannot forget that we still have reservists forming a large part of our forces in other parts of the world. This medium term is where I have my doubts. I have already mentioned the trained strength of the TA rather than the strength on paper.

I shall mention employers briefly. They have been very supportive, but we have to understand that we are in the first three year period, the first round if you like, and we shall move into uncharted waters at the end of that period. The development of SaBRE and the National Employer Advisory Board are crucial to the future relationship of, and co-operation between, employers and the Ministry of Defence. I shall not go into details in recent SaBRE reports but they should be read carefully. There are issues of concern and warning signs in responses from employers. They will become more relevant as we rely ever more on our reserves.

The families have been nothing less than brilliant but again, as with employers, this is largely first time round. They could hardly be more supportive at present but therefore the trend can only go the other way, gradually perhaps. We must be aware of that.

There are issues that can be addressed. The first is the shortfall in the Regular Army. The Government and senior command seem to shy away from accepting that there are gaps in Army manning and recruiting. From what I have heard, they simply do not refer to them as being gaps and shortfalls; they say that it is all managed, that there is no need to worry; and that it will be all right on the day. It was all right on this day, but wait for the next. However, if the Regular Army were up to establishment then only certain skills and professions required in the short-term would have been mobilised: QED. I do not deny that the reserves should provide for a shortfall, which is why we have them. However, I believe that the present shortfall may be too large to replace with reserves in the period after the first three years. We did have voluntary mobilisation for some time prior to the beginning of last year and that still has some effect on those who might be called up in the near future.

The answer is staring the Government in the face. They should increase the strength of the Regular Army before the over-stretched rubber band snaps and they should provide more funds for more training for the reserve soldiers, thereby increasing the fully trained strength of the reserve.

We cannot be certain of the reaction of employers to repeated mobilisation within the terms of the Reserve Forces Act. They are giving tremendous backing and I am not knocking them at all. They have been brilliant. My experience with part-time forces at home in Northern Ireland was that, about half way through our 30 years of trouble, some employers, including government departments such as the education authority and the housing executive, of which I have personal experience, became reluctant to continue to let people off. That is a fact—it is not fiction—and it will creep in to some extent; not very greatly, I hope. We must be aware of it.

The families are especially crucial. I cannot see any direct reference to them in the reserve forces part of the essays or the White Paper. I think that it is unforgivable. Beware the second time around if we do not look after them properly. It may not be the same.

I have another point on the employers and families. Much could be done, and I shall make one suggestion. Employers already see the value of Territorial Army soldiering to themselves at the present level, but we should not get carried away by trying to tell them that it will benefit a skilled worker and his business to send him into an area of conflict up to once every three years. It will benefit neither the employee nor the employer in business terms if we demand too much too frequently. We will lose their backing.

The Government and MoD should be down on bended knee to the employers and families, recognising that there is little or no added value to them in future in a greatly increased commitment. Employers and families of mobilised personnel should be treated in a privileged manner. For instance, they should be provided with more privileged information about an operation than appears in the Evening Standard or other newspapers or on the airwaves. It is very simple; we are not talking about secrets. Someone cannot be proud of his links with those on operations if those with no connection whatever know more than he does, by virtue of reading a later edition of a newspaper or listening to the latest news broadcast. With modern technology, I am sure that we can do better.

I hope that the Government take notice of this debate, not merely in replying, but in the months to come.

Earl Attlee

My Lords, there seems to be a misunderstanding among noble Lords, and perhaps among Members of another place. It was always intended to use the TA extensively on operations at the large scale of effort.

Viscount Brookeborough

My Lords, I entirely accept that and support it. My remarks were really about going into overstretch. I deleted certain parts of my speech as a result of other excellent speeches, and it would have been inappropriate for me to go through the whole story.

6.52 p.m.

Lord Gilbert

My Lords, it has been a great pleasure to hear how many noble Lords have sought to take note of the passing of Peter Hardy. Like my noble friend Lord Clark of Windermere, I arrived in the other place on the same day as Peter Hardy and in this place on almost the same day as he did. I like to think of him as a very great friend. I shall always remember him as a man of courage, courtesy and humour who was always very loyal to his friends. I shall miss him very much indeed.

On another personal note, I must say how glad I am to see the noble Lord, Lord Burnham, back with us today. He tried very hard to give me a hard time for the first couple of years that I was in this House, but I always enjoyed our exchanges, which were conducted with great good will on both sides.

I was a little startled to hear that the noble Lord, Lord Redesdale, thinks that looks of mine could have any effect on his happy temperament. However, as he referred to me in the context of American policies, perhaps I ought in self-defence to assure him that, while I am a self-confessed Americanophile, I do not slavishly follow all American defence policies. I think that the Americans are quite capable of making huge miscalculations and allocating ridiculous amounts of their obviously huge resources to quite wild projects. I may not carry many noble Lords with me, but I cite in that respect the F22 programme, which is a complete and absolute waste of money, so far as the Americans are concerned.

I would also cite the American expenditure on ballistic missile defence. It may surprise the noble Lord, Lord Redesdale, that I agree again with his words on the implications for this country of our following America down that path very far. The threat is not coming from ballistic missiles, but in the area of home defence. The amount of resources that the Americans are putting into ballistic missile defence compared with homeland defence is quite ridiculous. We are in danger of making much the same sort of mistake in this country, and I would like us to spend far more on intelligence. That is not an area where huge resources can be put in in 12 or 24 months; it takes a long time. One has to train people, get the language skills and so forth, but we are all deeply conscious of the difficulties that we have had in intelligence in the past few years.

There are projects on which we are spending money that we might not be. I assure my noble friend that he will receive no criticism from me if he finds it necessary to cut back on the Eurofighter programme. I was horrified to be reminded by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Vincent, that it will cost £50 million a copy. We would get far more value from it if we took the pilot out and made it into an unmanned aerial vehicle. That is not a flippant suggestion, and I commend it to my noble friend.

Then there is our old friend the A400M. I shall not say much about that today, but I shall say a little. I agreed with every syllable uttered by the noble Viscount, Lord Slim, on that subject, and I was delighted to hear him express himself so vigorously. So far as I am concerned, he was addressing not only the Minister, but the whole House, and I listened to him with great care and enthusiasm. I shall come back to the subject in a moment.

The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Vincent, rightly said that the Eurofighter was a Cold War project. I remember vividly, when I first arrived in the Ministry of Defence in 1976, that the then Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Beecham, came to see me. He said that AST 403 was the most pressing need of the Royal Air Force at that time. AST 403 is now Eurofighter. It was going to be built with the French and optimised in the ground attack role, and would have been the Harrier/Jaguar replacement. I shall not dwell on what actually happened, as all noble Lords will know that we did not get any of that. The first tranche—it will not be cut back, so we shall be stuck with it—is unfortunately the air defence variant, which of course we need least. No doubt the noble Lord will correct me if need be.

I would like the Minister's full attention to what I am about to say, as there is some conflicting evidence on the future of the C17. He has an uncorrected answer in Hansard that says that when the A400Ms arrive, they will replace the C17. I have discussed that with some of his colleagues, and there is a certain ambiguity about that. Paragraph 4.18 of the White Paper talks about our transport capability, stating: The core of this capability will continue to centre on the C-130 fleet, and the A400M when the latter replaces older C-130s from 2011"; we will be lucky if that happens. It goes on: We have already announced that we are considering the options for retaining a small force of C-17s after the A400M enters service". About a year ago, very heavy hints were dropped that we would move from what we then had—four leased C17s—to a total force of six C17s, if we were lucky, the last two of which would probably be purchased. All we have at the moment, a year later, is a certain ambiguity. I realise that we shall move to lighter forces and I applaud that, but we will always need heavy forces. We read in the lessons from Iraq that the Challenger 2 and AS90 proved to be "battle-winning equipment". Of course, the only problem with the A400M is that, even if it arrives in 2011, it will not be able to lift either Challenger 2 or the AS90. That is why, as I am sure my noble friend realises, it is absolutely essential that we maintain the C17 capability.

Perhaps I may add to the remarks of the noble Viscount, Lord Slim. One of the political reasons that we are stuck at present with the A400M programme is that we cancelled the MRAV; we cancelled the "Horizon" frigate. We decided that we have been bad boys enough and that we should be spanked by the French and the Germans if we were to pull out of the A400M programme. That is based on political rather than military reasons.

On UAVs, our contribution in Iraq was extremely effective. But we had an appalling attrition rate. We lost about 25 per cent of UAVs in a campaign which lasted only about three weeks. Obviously one cannot sustain that attrition rate. We have far too small an inventory of UAVs and far too few capabilities. In that field we have been left behind by many other countries. I hope to have a briefing on the subject. I feel strongly about it. When I first went to the MoD in 1976 I asked about UAVs. They patted me on the head and said that a chap called Duncan Sandys was asking about them. Nothing has ever happened. I went back in 1997 and again it was said that a chap called Duncan Sandys was asking about them. Eventually they have been taken seriously. They are no longer treated as a joke but I do not think that they have any serious thrust behind them as a ministry-wide programme.

I used one other set of initials the second time I arrived at the MoD. I referred to NLWs. To this day those initials are guaranteed to produce a blank look on the faces of most MoD officials. I am sure your Lordships are all aware that NLWs are non-lethal weapons. We shall find ourselves needing more non-lethal weapons of the kind we have had for some time in Northern Ireland—rubber bullets. There are no serious signs that the MoD has a dedicated corps of people looking at NLWs. I hope that the Minister will tell me that I am wrong. There is a tendency to regard them as rather foppish and effeminate things. In the United States they are the property of the United States Marine Corps, which is hardly a collection of wimps.

I fully realise my own limitations in talking about personnel matters because when I was in the MoD I dealt with equipment. I am much impressed by the remarks of my noble friend Lady Dean. We are delighted that she is off the leash at last. I hope that we shall hear from her in totally uninhibited form in future debates. There is nothing in the Defence White Paper on the long-term demographic problems facing the Ministry of Defence, which will have to appeal for new recruits for an ever-shrinking workforce, although as the noble Baroness said rightly and fairly it has had some success with recruitment. That is an issue that the MoD will have to face up to. I hope that the Minister can tell us that the MoD is looking at least 20 years ahead and has people with some ideas on what they will do about it. There is not a word about the issue in the Defence White Paper. In the long run that is the most serious problem that the MoD faces.

7.3 p.m.

Lord Roper

My Lords, as with any debate on defence in this House, it has been not only well informed but extremely useful. As many noble Lords have said, we are grateful to the Government for providing time so early. We hope that this is not just a debate and that the Minister will learn from the remarks made today.

I join with noble Lords who have paid tribute to Peter, Lord Hardy of Wath. Like the noble Lords, Lord Gilbert and Lord Clark of Windermere, I entered the House of Commons on the same day in 1970. In the 1970s, I shared an office with Peter Hardy and got to know him extremely well. I also served with him on the Defence Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union, one of the places where he developed a knowledge of and interest in a number of defence issues. He was a considerable parliamentarian and a considerable friend of the Armed Forces of this country. We shall all miss him.

In many ways, this is a new concept for a White Paper. It does not spell out policy. That is what we expected White Papers to do; and they did so in the past. Instead it gives a broad and often over-detailed analysis of current thinking among military analysts. It has been described by some today as more of an essay than a White Paper in the traditional form. Nevertheless, it is welcome as a point of reference from which to start the important discussion of the country's needs for defence in the years ahead. We have started that debate effectively today in this House.

My second major concern with the White Paper is that it lacks any satisfactory appreciation of costs. The point was made by the noble Lord, Lord Vivian, when opening from the Opposition Front Bench. When I saw the White Paper I was reminded of that brilliant remark of the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, when he worked for Sir Alec Douglas-Home in preparation for the 1964 general election. He unkindly—I say that with apologies to the Benches opposite—described the Labour Party's manifesto as the menu without the prices. The phrase could well describe the White Paper we are considering today.

It is clear that the wish list which exists in the White Paper is unaffordable without a considerable rise in budgetary allocations which shows no sign of coming from the Treasury. As the Chief of Defence Staff said in his lecture at the RUSI just before Christmas, this means that there are tough choices to be made. if the Government have not yet made those choices, Parliament needs to take the opportunity, and subsequent opportunities in another place, to make its views known.

Clearly. the issue much in discussion today—the balance of commitments, capabilities and costs for our Armed Forces—has taxed successive governments since the mid-1980s. In the early 1990s, at the end of the Cold War, the noble Lord, Lord King, when Secretary of State—he much regrets that owing to a previous engagement he cannot be with us today—made a bold effort in the light of the newly reduced security commitments to cut unnecessary capabilities and thus try to bring costs into balance. However, as it became clear that first the Balkans and now Iraq were to become longterm commitments in addition to Northern Ireland, his successors have carried out less successful attempts to juggle new commitments while reducing costs. A number of the problems which have dogged our military for a long period stem from measures taken in the mid–1990s. The Defence Medical Services problem, to which the noble Viscount, Lord Slim, referred, is perhaps best known. It fell because of mistakes which were made at that time. I was encouraged to hear that some of the problems are now coming out. It has taken a long time.

Subsequently the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, conducted a well received review when the present Government came into office. Yet it should not be forgotten that capabilities were cut even in that Strategic Defence Review and there was no more money for defence even at the time of the SDR. Since then we have seen the commitments for our forces continue to rise—Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, East Timor, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and still Northern Ireland and the Falklands. But we have also seen the threat to our territory increase radically. The terrible attacks on Washington and New York in 2001 have given us a new and urgent security problem to add to the growing security problems from proliferation, international crime and regional instabilities. On any logic, these increased commitments—some of them volunteered by the Government—coupled with the increase in threat, would require increased resources. Since 1997 the Government have maintained defence spending almost level in real terms if one includes the promised increases. This may be better than their predecessors, but it is the cause of the current difficulties. Either commitments need to be reduced or budgets need to rise significantly across the range of security activities. If neither happens, as is almost certain, choices will be made about which capabilities to sacrifice in order to balance the books. These tough choices had better be well thought out and they had better be well thought through as the possible consequences of thinking badly could be serious.

The first responsibility of any government is the security of their own people. The White Paper makes that clear. In bold letters on page 4, it states: To deliver security for the people of the United Kingdom and the Overseas Territories by defending them, including against terrorism". But what does the White Paper go on to say about this defending role? On page 8, paragraph 3.8, it states: The safety and security of the population of the UK is the responsibility of the Home Office and similar bodies in the devolved Administrations". Really? Are we to understand that the £25 billion cash, or the £32 billion new resource budgeting money, spent on defence each year is to be almost exclusively focused on activities outside these islands? Is that one of the tough choices that has already been made? It is not a semantic point. If the Ministry of Defence sees the defence of the UK territory as primarily a Home Office function, it is scarcely surprising that it makes expeditionary warfare its priority. We need to look at that in a more considered way, including the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, about resources devoted to intelligence.

I wonder now how we should proceed. We need a second White Paper and we need it soon. It will need to do what successive White Papers have alluded to but never totally achieved: to consider security in the wider sense. We all know—and it has been referred to many times today—that vital and excellent as our Armed Forces are, they are only one component of an increasingly complex security picture. We need, first and foremost, to consider again the immediate threats facing the United Kingdom. They do not come from missiles, imaginary or otherwise, at 45-minute notice from Iraq, but from suicidal extremists who could act in our own country. We need to address the longer-term threats from proliferation, instability, crime, terrorism, refugees, corruption, disease and the many vulnerabilities of our technological societies. It may be that the United Kingdom has a greater contribution to make in the use of its Armed Forces in conflict prevention, nation-building and counter-insurgency. The noble Viscount, Lord Brookeborough, referred to our effectiveness in some of those areas.

The United States clearly has the resources and includes research and development money in order to equip itself for high-tech offensive operations. The question which we must begin to ask is whether we should always try to emulate the US in miniature. We could always buy equipment off the shelf if the need arises. What we cannot buy is experienced, trained troops. We must not repeat the mistakes of the Defence Medical Services. Each specialisation has a critical size. Err on the side of caution lest you destroy our very special people capabilities in a number of these specialisms. If we are not prepared to spend more money now, let us spend money on the long-lead items; well trained people in the military. On the other hand, when it comes to procurement issues, let us be careful that there are no sacred industrial cows, whether they are national, European or any other variety.

If the Minister takes only one message from this debate, it should be the respect which exists throughout the House for the people of our Armed Forces and the feeling that has been expressed on all sides today for the need for proper financial provision to be made for them. That is the most important investment we can make in the future of the defence of these islands.

7.15 p.m.

Lord Astor of Hever

My Lords, this has been an excellent debate, which was to be expected given the distinguished and informed list of speakers. I join the Minister and other noble Lords in paying tribute to the late Lord Hardy of Wath. As my noble friend Lord Luke said, he was an excellent chairman of our defence group. I was privileged to share his company on a number of group visits. His wise counsel will be sorely missed in defence debates.

I am also sorry that my noble friend Lady Park of Monmouth had to withdraw from the debate as her contribution would have been outstanding. We wish her a speedy recovery. But it is a great pleasure to see my noble friend Lord Burnham back in his place. His speech brought back happy memories—and some less happy—of my time at the Guards' depot.

We are debating the White Paper against the backdrop of a significant military success in Iraq and I pay tribute to all those who have contributed, and continue to contribute, to our military operations. Our thoughts are with those families suffering the pain of bereavement.

Many noble Lords have made the point that the White Paper is short on detail. It will do nothing to remove the sense of apprehension that hangs over Britain's servicemen and women. They worry that the Chancellor is preparing to take an axe to defence spending—shrinking fleets and culling ancient regiments—at a time when threats are greater than ever.

There is a real danger that the capability of the Armed Forces may be reduced rather than enhanced in the short and medium term by the Government's implementation of network-enabled capability and effects-based operations. They are designed to allow our Armed Forces to do more with less, not less with less. The drive for cost savings must not come at the expense of capability.

The air defence capability of the Royal Navy will be significantly diminished by the combination of the phasing out of the Sea Harrier and the service lives of six Type 42 destroyers being reduced by one year. Will the Minister confirm the mothballing of four additional Type 42 destroyers, as reported last week in the Daily Telegraph?This seems odd. Around £26 million was spent on getting HMS "Nottingham", an older Type 42, back from the rocks of Australia and repaired. Yet the first of their replacements, the Type 45—HMS "Daring"—is not expected in service until later 2007, a date the MoD has itself said is challenging. The next ship of the class will not be in service until 2009. So the Navy will again shrink in size in the next five years.

The White Paper's enthusiasm for lighter, more flexible forces is sensible, but, as my noble kinsman Lord Vivian said, it would be dangerous to reduce too much of the Army's heavy weaponry. Yet cuts seem likely to be made many years before the new generation of equipment can be put in place. As the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce, said during the White Paper Statement, we need reassurance that reductions in our front line will not happen until the new generation of equipment can be put in place.

We will have to get used to a new terminology for military operations and a new way of thinking about combat. Bandwidth of communications will be at least as important as bullets. Combatants will need rapid and reliable access to megabytes of data, as well as the normal offerings of the logistics supply chain.

I hope that the Minister has allowed for generous bandwidth on Skynet 5. Between the first and second Gulf Wars, the US military found that its bandwidth requirements—that is, the rate of demand for digital data—had increased sevenfold. That trend is certain to continue. Yet, according to an article published this month in Jane's Defence Weekly, UK high-level strategic communications collapsed at key points during the Iraq war last March and April because of equipment failures and inherent structural weaknesses in the UK's military networks.

The successful and timely implementation of network-enabled capability will depend on the efficiency of the defence procurement process. Here there is growing reason for pessimism about the ability of the Defence Procurement Agency to deliver major equipment programmes to budget and within a reasonable timescale.

Let us take the future integrated soldier technology (FIST). From initial gate to full operating capability in 2014 is an astonishing 14 years—faster than Bowman or Eurofighter, it is true, but still lamentably slow. Or let us take the future rapid effect system (FRES), mentioned by my noble friend Lord Attlee. The Defence Procurement Agency's website for FRES, under "latest news", states simply: There is currently no available news". That is a worrying indicator of the Government's commitment to that important armoured vehicle platform.

The Apache is late, over budget and, as the noble Viscount, Lord Slim, said, some are already mothballed. We on these Benches strongly agree with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, about C17s and the A400M.

I wish my noble friend Lord Luke a very happy birthday. He addressed the important issue of the two projected carriers. The noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, mentioned UAVs. What plans are there for the urgent operational requirement for a UAV to replace Phoenix, whose stocks are fast depleting and will not be replaced?

There is also growing pessimism about reductions in defence research expenditure. In 1990, the Conservative government were spending about £1 billion on defence research; last year, the Government spent only about £450 million. The White Paper places enormous emphasis on the need to develop technology to promote network-enabled capability. As it is universally accepted that today's technology is a product of yesterday's research investment, I hope that the Minister will tell the House what resources the Government will be ploughing into research to produce that all-important technology.

Why is there reluctance to commit to capital expenditure on the Armed Forces? The answer lies in the Treasury's own spending figures. Comparing two periods of three years each, 1997–2000 and 2003–06, is revealing. Over those two periods, capital expenditure on central government administration is set to rise by 560 per cent to almost £6 billion. Defence capital expenditure, on the other hand, will fall by 14 per cent to £3.25 billion. I hope that the Minister will address the question asked by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Guthrie, in the debate on the gracious Speech, and asked again today by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Vincent: whether the Treasury want £1 billion of defence savings each year for the next four years.

There is also the important issue of resources, especially intelligence, and of homeland defence, raised by the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert. The Ministry of Defence is failing to look after its most precious commodity—its people. The noble Viscount, Lord Slim, touched on the problem that servicemen are experiencing with the NHS. Barracks at home and abroad for all three services are a disgrace. When the Army recently surrendered some barracks for conversion for asylum seekers, they were deemed to need an expensive upgrade before being acceptable to Kosovans or Afghans. Why should our soldiers be expected to inhabit quarters such as those?

Although the improvement programme for single living accommodation—project SLAM—will alleviate that, it is regrettable that it is spread over 10 years and will annually deliver only an average of 1,100 single rooms for junior ranks. What plans are in place for improvements to married quarters for all ranks?

The White Paper mentions the new pension and compensation arrangements. I look forward to scrutinising constructively the Armed Forces (Pensions and Compensation) Bill with my noble kinsman when it reaches this House.

The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Guthrie, and my noble friend Lord Lyell mentioned recruitment. As a result of the violent assault by the Treasury, the Army appears to have frozen some recruitment. Can the Minister confirm that? In the United States, members of Congress from both parties are pushing for the first significant increase in size of the active duty military for 16 years. The bipartisan sentiment is that the Pentagon does not have sufficient well rested, well trained troops for an emergency.

My noble friend Lord Selsdon, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, and the noble Baroness, Lady Dean, who is certainly not a "has been". touched on overstretch. Overstretch is leading the British Army to face a steady loss of the crucial battle-winning skills that it needs. It is hardly surprising that Colonel Tim Collins, the former commander of the Royal Irish Regiment in Iraq, is resigning.

My noble kinsman pointed out that 94 per cent of exercises were lost last year, and my noble friend Lord Lyell spoke of the training problems of the 1st Batallion, Scots Guards. Constant interruption of training will inevitably lead to a gradual decline in professional standards that could lead to a catastrophic failure in operations and high casualty levels.

Several noble Lords mentioned the NAO report. We must not lose sight of the report's statement that overall, Operation TELIC was successful, especially in its deployment. Overall, performance of equipment was good. But it is scandalous that insufficient sets of body armour and other vital life-saving equipment were distributed in theatre, greatly endangering our soldiers and, in the case of Sergeant Roberts of the Royal Tank Regiment, costing his life.

The report criticises the lack of post-war planning and reconstruction. We have pressed the Government on that issue several times. Can the Minister confirm that greater co-ordination in planning is taking place between the department, the FCO and DfID?

Many noble Lords mentioned the valuable role played by the reserve forces, but I noticed that the Minister did not. We welcome attempts to send out full units of TA, albeit small ones. If they train together, they argue, they should fight together. In total, 8,000 reservists of all types were mobilised for Operation TELIC and, as the noble Viscount, Lord Brookeborough, said, were vital to its success. A quarter of forces currently in Iraq are territorials. Why, then, are our reservists not getting a fair deal?

TA officers have been warned of significant cutbacks due to the change in MoD accounting policies mentioned by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall. Many officers and soldiers in theatre say that they will leave the TA when they return because the MoD is not matching their civilian pay when mobilised. Pay is topped up to meet his or her civilian salary, but that is subject to a cap. The cap was modest when set and has not been increased since 1996. British reservists in Iraq are discovering that their pay and conditions are significantly worse than those of their American counterparts. An American reservist does not pay income tax when serving overseas and can earn pension entitlements and contributions towards college fees or receive up to 20 thousand dollars to pay off a student loan. A British reservist receives none of those benefits.

As my noble friend Lady Cox said, our Armed Forces represent the very best of our men and women, and continue to bring credit to us, at home and abroad. But if they are to continue to attract and retain, not just the numbers required, but also the quality, we must ensure that they are trained and equipped to the highest standards and treated fairly. We must not take our Armed Forces for granted.

7.31 p.m.

Lord Bach

My Lords, it has indeed been an excellent debate; I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in it. The noble Viscount, Lord Brookeborough, said that he hoped that the Government would take note of the debate, and the noble Lord, Lord Roper, suggested that they could learn from it. I agree with both those sentiments; the debate has been so good that I think the Hansard that is produced after it will be looked at and read in the Ministry of Defence in the coming months and years.

I will be generous to the two opposition parties, as it is still too early in this Parliament to put them on the spot by asking them what are their defence policies and how they differ from those of Her Majesty's Government. It would not be fair of me to ask them today, but I would have liked to have heard a whisper about what the opposition parties stood for and what they propose to do when they win the next general election, as they no doubt believe they will—whether it will be a khaki election, I do not know. I put the opposition parties on warning, even in this House, that we on this side, having quite rightly taken a lot of criticism with a little praise, will wish to know what they will do when or if they get into government—that includes how much money they will spend on defence. Not only do I ask that question; many noble Lords who spoke from the Cross Benches and the Back Benches on either side will want to know the answer, as will the Armed Forces and the public.

The past five years have heralded this almost unprecedented era of change in our security environment. The shadow of the Cold War, which for the best part of the lifetime of most noble Lords determined the shape of our Armed Forces, has thankfully drawn back from Europe. But, far from it being the end of history, as we were promised and as too many believed, new and very dangerous challenges emerged to take the Cold War's place. We have had to deploy further afield and more frequently to conduct a more varied range of tasks than previously envisaged. The threat that we face is more uncertain, and that trend is set to continue. We need a defence policy that enables us to rise to those challenges as we have in the past.

The White Paper is a government document. Those who try to draw divisions between various departments of state in the Government will not succeed—this is a government-agreed White Paper. It sets out the case for Armed Forces that are flexible, agile, rapidly deployable and capable of delivering even more precise military effect. My noble friend Lord Clark of Windermere was right in mentioning the word "flexibility"; it is the critical word, if there is one, in the White Paper. But, whatever our planning, ultimately it is the Armed Forces—our people—who deliver military success. As has been said throughout the debate, they deliver it magnificently time and again. We must therefore equip them as best we can and maximise the effects of what we already have. The corollary of that is that they need to dispense with systems and structures that are no longer as effective as they once were.

As the Government have made clear, work continues in the Ministry of Defence to translate the White Paper into an appropriate force structure and future investment programme. A series of work streams is studying different aspects of military capability and their associated overheads. We will make announcements, and the House will hear of the results of that work later this year.

Several noble Lords made the point—I shall not express it as strongly as "complained"—that the White Paper is long on policy aspiration and a bit short on the details of implementation—I look particularly at the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Vincent. As I attempted to make clear earlier, we believe that the White Paper sets out the policy baseline against which decisions regarding the Armed Forces will be made in future. Much ongoing activity in the department is aimed at working out in its detailed form the force structure that we need. It would be inappropriate and wrong to go into detail before that work is completed. We aim to make further announcements later.

I wish to make one thing clear: the White Paper is not an exercise about cutting defence; rather, we see it as modernising our Armed Forces and their supporting infrastructure appropriately to meet the changed strategic environment outlined in it. The work must be seen in the context of the increased resources that were made available to the Ministry of Defence in the 2002 spending round.

I was asked about the Ministry of Defence's relations with the Treasury. It is a fair question that I suspect has been asked in this House and in another place for generations past, when some noble Lords who spoke today had great responsibility in running the Armed Forces. The answer today is the same as it was then: we work extremely closely and well with the Treasury, which has been a great supporter, particularly on Iraq. It made helpful and large payments of money so that we could do our duty in that country. We work closely with the Treasury, as is absolutely appropriate. There is no crisis. We must deal with fluctuating financial pressures and ensure that we can live within our budgets; it has been ever thus. There is no doubt that the resource accounting and budgeting approach has an impact. We have had to adjust to that during the first year, a consequence of which has been a higher cash spend than originally anticipated. It is therefore natural that the MoD should carry out a significant examination of defence costs and capabilities. The aim of the exercise is to reduce costs, especially overheads, and, importantly, to allow us choice and flexibility in meeting the priorities of the White Paper.

Many issues have been raised during the debate. I shall try to answer as many as I can, limiting myself to 20 minutes, which may be too long for some. Where I cannot provide a full answer now, I will attempt to write to noble Lords with the answers.

I am sorry if the noble Lord, Lord Astor, has not heard me praise the reserves previously; I think that I have done so on many occasions. If I have not, it is my fault, but I certainly do on this occasion. They are an integral part of the UK's military capability for operations at home and overseas. As TELIC showed, when mobilised, they face exactly the same risks as their regular counterparts and have more than met the challenge demanded of them. We now have to continue the process of development, which started with the SDR, to confirm the contribution of the reserves to all types of operation and to ensure that the correct measures are in place for their support. Achieving this will involve engaging with reservists. their employers and the wider community.

The noble Lord, Lord Vivian, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, the noble Lord, Lord Luke—who I too congratulate on his birthday—and the noble Lord. Lord Astor of Hever, all mentioned decisions or otherwise that they believe have been taken about ships and the Royal Navy. One should not believe all that one reads in the newspapers, even in the Daily Telegraph. The newspaper reports are similar to ones that you and I may have seen in years past, during the annual planning round. Every time there is a spate of stories about possible changes to existing plans, it is pointless and meaningless to fuel that speculation by commenting in detail, and I certainly do riot plan to do so. We are focusing on modifying and adapting our Armed Forces, including the Royal Navy, to ensure that they are best placed to respond to a changing strategic environment.

There is an extremely exciting new naval programme on the books, which, if I may claim praise, originated with this Government. Two aircraft carriers—and I hope to come to them in a short while—Type 45s and other ships will be procured. That is an exciting programme, which has done something to restore the position—never of course to the grand position we were in before—of some of thiscountry's shipyards.

We remain committed to the Typhoon programme. We have a contractual commitment to purchasing 55 Typhoons in the first of three planned production tranches. A memorandum of understanding with our partner nations covers a further 89 in tranche 2 and 88 in tranche 3. Discussions with the four nation members and with industry regarding tranche 2 are taking place now. Given the obvious importance of the contract, our priority is to ensure that industry's proposals for the programme are soundly based and are based on appropriate levels of design maturity. Any commitment to tranche 3 does not need to be expected until 2007.

The noble Lord, Lord Redesdale, made some helpful remarks. I am sorry that he does not like the word "jointery". I am tempted to ask him where he has been all these years. The word "jointery" has been used in defence parlance for a long time, but I will try to make sure that any second edition of the White Paper reduces it so that his sensitivities are not insulted. He described the missile defence part of chapter 3.12 as being full of equivocation. I was not sure whether that was meant to be a compliment or an insult.

Lord Redesdale

A compliment.

Lord Bach

He tells me that it was a compliment. More seriously, as far as he is concerned, is the issue of civil contingency reaction forces, to which the noble Lord, Lord Rogan, also referred. He is in his place. It is significant that that force achieved a full operating capability in accordance with the timetable set out in the new chapter. As noble Lords are no doubt aware, they have been designed to enhance our ability to support the civil police and other civil authorities. Some 14 of them will be available to deploy at short notice to support the civil authorities, if asked, at the scene of an incident, be it a terrorist attack, accident or natural disaster. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Redesdale, that that is good news.

My noble friend Lord Clark of Windermere made a point about communications, as did other noble Lords, and that point is taken on board. I am glad to see the noble Lord, Lord Burnham, in his place, as is the whole House. He will be asking me a Question about court martials next week, and I look forward to that. He also mentioned something that he has concentrated on for many years: a single tri-service Act to replace the separate systems of service law that better meets the services' needs in the modern world. The next five-yearly Armed Forces Bill is due in the 2005–06 Session. We hope that that can be the vehicle for the tri-service legislation, but obviously it will be subject to the availability of parliamentary time for what will be a large Bill.

My noble friend Lady Dean of Thornton-le-Fylde made an outstanding contribution. The noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, said that she would be let loose by freedom, but I do not think that she has been constrained up to now. We are all grateful for the hard work that you—I am addressing the House, I must be careful not to incur the wrath of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee—have put in as chairman and as a member of the Armed Services Pay Review Body. The delivery of recommendations that are fair to service personnel and acceptable to the Government is frankly no mean achievement—thank you. Thank you also for the 2004 report, which has just been submitted to the Prime Minister and to the Secretary of State for Defence. You will not be surprised that I am unable to comment at this stage, but careful consideration will be given to all the recommendations, and we will make the announcement as soon as we possibly can.

A number of noble Lords, along with my noble friend Lady Dean of Thornton-le-Fylde, made comments about overstretch and about personnel matters. The noble Viscount, Lord Brookeborough, the noble Lord, Lord Rogan, the noble Lord, Lord Lyell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Strange, talked about theses matters too. Of course, our Armed Services have been asked to do a huge amount recently. In December 2003, around 32 per cent of the Army was committed to operations, of which 20 per cent was deployed on operations. That compares with 57 per cent committed and 54 per cent deployed in late April 2003. The figure of 10 months as an expression of tour averages for infantry battalions is right, and it relates to a period between August 2002 and July 2003, which of course represented a peak of activity including not only TELIC but Operation FRESCO, which has been referred to as well. A conscious decision was taken to shorten tour intervals to accommodate those operations. However, the average tour interval for the period from January to December 2002 was 22 months.

There are big issues as far as recruitment and retention are concerned. However, last year was an exceptionally good year for recruitment. It is ridiculous to be complacent, because there are many factors working against people coming into the Armed Forces, not least of which is full employment. We must work extremely hard to make sure that people come in for what can be and is a rewarding occupation. Retention too is difficult in this day and age, but I promise that the Government will continue to do everything that they can to increase the retention figures.

In addition on the topic of overstretch, it is worth pointing out that it is precisely because some of our personnel, particularly key enablers such as engineers, signallers and logisticians, are so busy that we need to rebalance our force structure to reflect the challenges of today and tomorrow rather than yesterday. That is what we mean by reprioritisation.

I do not have much longer, so I want to move forward. The noble Lord, Lord Luke, asked some excellent questions about the two aircraft carriers, none of which I intend to answer this evening. He, and all of us, must wait until decisions are taken. The two new aircraft carriers represent an extremely important and exciting development for this country's defences. It is right that questions should constantly be asked about it, but I can say that the three parties—the Ministry of Defence and the two companies that were referred to—work well and closely together to move the project forward. The noble Lord must excuse me if I say no more about that.

The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, made a fiery speech, if I may say so, in his usual manner. I make two points in reply. It is essential to match resources and commitments. I understand the real concern felt by him and others about how they may fall out of kilter or may already be out of kilter. In the decisions on force structure that we must take, we must bear in mind the necessity to match resources and commitments. I say gently and with the greatest respect that I am not convinced that the noble and gallant Lord has paid enough attention to network-enabled capabilities or to the technological revolution that is occurring in the way in which wars will be fought in the future. It is critical that we are not left behind in that technological revolution. If we are, it will be our Armed Forces and our country that suffer.

I shall write to the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, with answers to her queries. She was good enough to let me know beforehand what she was going to say, and I thank her for that. Many other points were made. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Guthrie of Craigiebank, made a point about the unexpected. One of the reasons for the White Paper is that we realise that we must expect the unexpected. I know that he does not like the word "flexibility"—perhaps he thinks that it is over-used—but that is why it is used. We must meet the unexpected, which may confront us every day, and that is the reason for the policy proposals that we put in the White Paper.

If he will forgive me, I shall not engage with the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, on the A400M, save to say that we are convinced that it is the right solution. We believe that a combination of C17 and A400M should provide a more flexible overall capability than either aircraft option alone. The noble Lord will probably agree with that, although I concede that we have our disagreements.

I thank the House for its patience and finish by saying that we cannot predict precisely when or where we will next call on our Armed Forces to deploy. We must try to put in place the right policy to ensure that, when the time comes, our Armed Forces have the inherent flexibility to deploy quickly and to conduct operations successfully in a wide range of scenarios from peace support to war fighting. The White Paper provides the policy baseline that will enable us to do so. What has been said in the House today will help us to decide whether we are right.

On Question, Motion agreed to.