Social Security Bill

HL Deb 20 April 1998 vol 588 cc922-33

3.4 p.m.

Report received.

Lord Goodhart

moved Amendment No. 1: After Clause 1, insert the following new clause— ADJUDICATION STANDARDS COMMISSIONER (" .—(1) The Secretary of State shall appoint an Adjudication Standards Commissioner. (2) The Adjudication Standards Commissioner shall keep under review the exercise by the Secretary of State of the functions transferred to him by paragraph (a) of section 1 above and in particular the accuracy of decisions made by him or on his behalf under sections 9, 10 and 11 below, and the time within which such decisions are made. (3) The Adjudication Standards Commissioner shall report annually to the Secretary of State in the light of the review referred to in subsection (2) above and the Secretary of State shall lay a copy of his report before Parliament."). The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 1 in a House which, although rapidly emptying, is still somewhat fuller than it has been for almost the whole of the previous debate on the Bill.

The amendment brings back part of an amendment that I moved at Committee stage. In its original form, the amendment made the adjudication standards commissioner responsible for giving guidance on law and for ensuring the proper training of persons making first tier social security decisions as well as for reviewing the standards of decision making. The additional guidance and training functions were criticised by the noble Lord, Lord Higgins. On reconsideration, I believe that he was correct to criticise them. Therefore this amendment drops those functions. The present amendment leaves the adjudication standards commissioner responsible only for reviewing and reporting on standards of first tier adjudication.

Adjudication standards are, sadly, low. The chief adjudication officer's report for 1996–97 found that there were adjudication deficiencies in 45 per cent. of income support cases examined by him, and in 37 per cent. of family credit cases. The chief child support officer found that there were deficiencies in 57 per cent. of child support cases examined by him. That is a lamentable record and indicates that close and continuous monitoring of standards is essential.

How is that to be achieved? At col. 50 of Hansard of 30th March, the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, said that agency chief executives would be responsible for the monitoring and general oversight of the system. She continued that there would also be external monitoring of that system. But the only external monitoring that she mentioned was by the National Audit Office and by the president of the appeal tribunals. National Audit Office monitoring is mainly concerned with the audit of the accounts of the Department of Social Security. The National Audit Office is quite plainly a body which is unsuitable to review adjudication standards.

The president of tribunals will report only on those cases which go to appeal. That is useful so far as it goes, but he will be dealing only with a limited and unrepresentative sample. It follows therefore that the main responsibility is, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, said, on the chief executives to monitor their own agencies. Chief executives, like the rest of us, are only human and it is an inevitable tendency, of which I think we are all aware, that when we report on the performance of our own organisation we aim to present it in the best possible light.

At Committee stage I quoted from the comments of the presidents of the Independent Tribunal Services of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. I shall do so again. The quotation appears at col. 46 of Hansard of 30th March. It states: 'Once the Chief Adjudication Officer … ceases to exist, there will be no independent means of assessing consistency and reliability of decision-making. If such a system is not established, and it is left to the Chief Executive of the relevant agencies, we fear that it may not achieve the priority it deserves when competing for funds in a pressured business environment. The absence of such a system may actually threaten achievable efficiency at first-tier level"'. External monitoring of the performance of those responsible for taking the first year decisions is of the highest importance to the maintenance of proper standards of adjudication. The Government's proposal in Amendment No. 68, grouped with this one, is for internal monitoring only. The proposal for an independent adjudication standards commissioner is a better way of achieving the higher standards which I am sure all of us in this House wish to ensure. I therefore ask the Government to think again on this question.

Lord Higgins

My Lords, I have listened with care to the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, who rightly recounted what occurred in Committee. He rightly draws attention to concern in relation to the standard of the decisions that are being made. However, I note that government Amendment No. 68 may also be relevant to this matter. We shall no doubt wish to consider carefully the Minister's remarks on this subject.

We are about to enter into what may well turn out to be a fairly exciting Report stage. Perhaps I may say a word about the situation that has now arisen. In addition to Amendment No. 68, just referred to, there are a very large number of government amendments. That is in many ways extraordinary, given that the other place dealt with the matter in Committee over many weeks. At the beginning of the Committee stage, I thought it right to draw your Lordships' attention to a particular group of government amendments; namely, those which in effect implement a large part—indeed, perhaps the central piece—of the Chancellor of the Exchequer's Budget. Since I am not fully conversant with the technical side, perhaps I may ask the Minister to respond in her normal sympathetic way and say whether there have been financial resolutions in the other place supporting these amendments, and whether, if they are carried in this place, it is the Government's intention to move them in another place.

There is considerable concern that the way in which these amendments are being put forward means that they are likely to bypass totally the normal procedure for examining amendments in another place. They are appearing for the first time in this place; they will then return to the Commons as Lords' amendments but with no Committee stage during which the other place can take them into account, nor indeed a Report stage. I therefore hope that the Government might, at an appropriate moment in the discussions—the matter may arise more clearly on Thursday—be able to give us some indication as to exactly how they intend to continue. Would it be possible for these matters to be introduced in a further social security Bill which I believe the Government have in mind when the normal courtesies to the other place could be fulfilled and there would be a reasonable opportunity for Members there to examine the matters in considerable detail?

I do not wish to detain the House further on this matter. However, as we proceed through the mass of amendments before us, we shall need to examine carefully the extent to which the Government's method of proceeding is appropriate. My own feeling is that there are grave dangers in going about the matter in this way, since the legislation will not receive appropriate detailed examination. That said, we look forward to hearing the noble Baroness's comments on Amendment No. 68.

3.15 p.m.

Earl Russell

My Lords, I cannot follow the noble Lord, Lord Higgins, down the very tempting path that he has indicated. It is a basic parliamentary principle that each House is sovereign over its own proceedings. Another place is perfectly capable of making its feelings clear to us should it so wish. I do not believe that we have the authority or the competence to set ourselves up as champions of the procedure of another place. It will do that if it so wishes.

I welcome, as I did previously, government Amendment No. 68, which, so far as it goes, is a good one. However, I remember saying in Committee that I should very much hope to find in that amendment the word "independent". I cannot find it, and that is a significant omission. It is a basic principle that one should not be judge and party in one's own court. Under this Bill, the Secretary of State will at least run the risk of appearing to infringe that principle. It is therefore important that somewhere in the system an element of genuine independence should be inserted.

I have just been reading the Minister's reply to this amendment in Committee. She spoke the language of authority over the judicial process. She stated: we will ensure that decision-making under the new system is of the highest quality".—[Official Report, 30/3/98; co1.49.] There appears to be no doubt in the Minister's mind that this is a proper subject for the Secretary of State's own authority.

I should feel a good deal happier if there were at least some independent monitoring of this process. So before we enter into a great constitutional argument and refer to courts and so on and so forth, the Minister might avoid a good deal of trouble were she to accept this amendment in the revised form in which it now stands.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Social Security (Baroness Hollis of Heigham)

My Lords, in responding to this amendment and Amendment No. 68 with which it is grouped, perhaps I may revisit the points made rather ingeniously by the noble Lord, Lord Higgins, in terms of House procedures. I endorse the view put by the noble Earl that it is for the Commons to champion its procedures rather than for us. However, so that there need be no misunderstanding between us, I do not believe that the way in which we are handling this matter necessarily bears the interpretation put upon it by the noble Lord. It might therefore be for the convenience of the House if I repeat the Government's position on that in order to provide an opportunity to return to the matter on reflection, either later on Report or at Third Reading.

My understanding is that national insurance matters come under social security legislation and therefore cannot be included in a finance Bill. As all governments must, the Government have to respond to changing circumstances. It would not be unusual for government amendments to be tabled in respect of Bills that have passed through the Commons and are proceeding through this House. Were that not to be the case, this House could never introduce new material into any Bill, and by definition, when the Bill returns to the Commons, there is the opportunity to amend or reject our amendments and, if the House is so minded—though Heaven forfend$—enter into a game of ping-pong. So in that sense we are doing nothing different. Were we to follow the line of the noble Lord's thinking—namely, that this House is somehow invading the Commons' privilege if it introduces new material which has not been subject to Standing Committee scrutiny in the Commons—the House of Lords would indeed be turned into a poodle and do nothing ever more than comment on the drafting, punctuation and syntax of Commons' debates and never introduce or raise policy issue debates. That is an important consideration in relation to a Bill which, for all kinds of reasons of which your Lordships are aware, has taken a great deal of time to handle. Furthermore, between the beginning of the Bill and the Report stage in this House we have had not only the Budget but the welfare reform Green Paper, both of which introduced new and relevant matters.

As regards the issue of Commons' privilege, it is true that contributions payable into the National Insurance Fund are the subject of Commons' privilege. But it is a privilege that Members of the Commons are able to waive. They will be invited to do so when the Bill returns there. The national insurance changes have been broadly welcomed. During this Session, we must legislate to give businesses the time that they need to be able to operate the system from April 1999. That is why we are handling the matter in this way. The money resolution passed at Second Reading in the other place covers all similar new measures. It is the case, is it not, that the noble Lords, Lord Higgins and Lord Goodhart, may still pursue some of their more detailed concerns in relation to national insurance? I entirely take their point. This is not a party-political matter. We are all concerned to achieve the right solutions. I believe we share a common diagnosis of the problems and any contributions the noble Lords can give us that we could take on board would be warmly welcomed. As a former Minister, the noble Lord will understand that one is dependent upon the professional advice that one receives on the matter. I have tried to address the issues of procedure and money resolutions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Higgins, in rather ingeniously supporting an amendment which had nothing to do with the subject.

I turn now to Amendment No. 1 moved by the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, and government Amendment No. 68 with which, for the convenience of the House, it is grouped. Both amendments are concerned with the arrangements for overseeing the new decision-making system. Amendment No. 1 seeks to raise again the issue of independent monitoring of decisions made under the new arrangements as set out in the Bill. I shall discuss later why we do not feel we can accept the amendment. Amendment No. 68 is a consequence of the debate on Clause 1 of the Bill at Committee stage when my noble friends Lord Evans of Parkside and Baroness Turner of Camden tabled amendments, with support from all sides of the House, to make it a requirement on the face of the Bill for there to be annual reports on standards of decision-making. In the light of that discussion, I was happy to accept the spirit of the amendment and to give a commitment to come back at Report stage with an appropriate government amendment to put the requirement on the face of the Bill. Amendment No. 68 does just that: it makes it a requirement for a report on standards of decision-making to be prepared annually or at such times or intervals as may be prescribed.

I can assure the House that it is our intention to produce reports annually or as near to each year as possible. Our current thinking is that reports on standards of decision-making will be included as part of the annual departmental report. Publication dates are prone to vary slightly according to the timing of the Budget.

I also wish to follow up a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Higgins, at Committee stage. He asked whether there would be targets against which standards of decision-making should be judged, and again I promised to consider the matter and come back to him. The reports on the quality of decision-making produced by the Secretary of State will include measurements as regards achievement of targets and the standards to which decisions have been made. We shall discuss with agencies what form these targets will take.

The amendment meets the concerns expressed in both Houses on reports on standards of decision-making. It sets out a clear requirement for there to be reports on standards of decision-making on an annual or near-annual basis. It also makes it a requirement for such reports to be laid before each House of Parliament.

Amendment No. 1, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, and the noble Earl, Lord Russell, seeks to go much further and to reintroduce independent monitoring. It seeks the appointment of an adjudication standards commissioner to oversee and report on the accuracy and speed of decision-making. We do not believe that that would achieve any improvement in the standard of decision-making but would instead add an additional layer of bureaucracy.

There seem to us to be two particular issues which are at the heart of the amendment: first, the achievement of consistent and reliable decision-making across the agencies; and, secondly, an independent—the word emphasised by the noble Earl, Lord Russell—oversight of the decision-making process.

We believe that the measures we are putting in place will fully address these issues. Furthermore, we believe that our approach makes ongoing improvements to the quality of decision-making an integral part of the process, not an optional add-on.

Consistency will be achieved through the setting of challenging targets and standards for each agency by the Secretary of State, those targets and standards being publicly known. Agency chief executives will be directly accountable to her for the achievement of those standards. Amendments to achieve that will be embodied in the reporting structure.

We believe that this line of accountability is a crucial element of our strategy for making improvements. Agencies have given considerable thought as to how they are to meet their new responsibilities. The standards committees and arrangements for training that I described in Committee are among the many initiatives that will aid quality decision-making. They demonstrate the commitment that is felt across the department to getting this right. High standards will be achieved by making accountability for quality a central feature for every agency, not through a distant and effectively powerless monitoring body.

That brings me to the question of independence. I have sought to explain why we think that accountability, rather than an independent monitoring body alone, is the key to ensuring good service. But, of course, we recognise that there must be public confidence in the integrity of the system, and independent monitoring is important for that. That is why the National Audit Office will have its role in this area extended. We have been discussing with it how to enhance its monitoring of quality. It is not true to say that the National Audit Office is concerned only with the monitoring of accounts. We are already working with it on the implementation of the new procedures. There will be a value-for-money study in the early stages of implementation, in addition to the usual audit.

I hope that your Lordships will accept that, in bringing forward the new clause on Report, we have reflected the will of the House, and I commend Amendment No. 68 to your Lordships. However, we believe that we have in place robust monitoring arrangements to make sure that high quality decision-making is achieved and maintained. We shall have the annual reports by the chief executives of agencies, together with demanding targets. The degree to which those targets have been met can be scrutinised. We shall also have the annual report of the Secretary of State, the annual reports of the presidents of tribunals and the report and extended monitoring role of the National Audit Office. We believe that we have in place a full network of monitoring and audit which will ensure accountability as well as integrity of decision-making. I therefore hope that your Lordships will not be minded to accept Amendment No. 1.

Lord Goodhart

My Lords, I have to confess that I am disappointed by the Minister's reply and her failure to accept the principle of fully independent monitoring. In the circumstances, this is not an amendment which I propose to take further and I therefore beg leave to withdraw it.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Baroness Anelay of St. Johns

moved Amendment No. 2: Page 3, line 27, leave out ("subsection (3)") and insert ("subsections (3) and (3A)"). The noble Baroness said: My Lords, in moving Amendment No. 2, I shall, with the permission of the House, speak also to Amendment No. 3. These amendments were tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Archer of Sandwell, in Committee and supported by my noble friend Lord Higgins. They could not be moved at that stage because we were all struck by a pre-emption which caught us all by surprise. I have explained to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Archer of Sandwell, that I am not trying to steal his very good ideas on this matter. I was aware that he was away last week and therefore might not be able to table these amendments. Because I supported them so strongly, I did not wish them to go by default.

I am concerned about the position of members of tribunals who are appointed for their medical expertise but who simultaneously receive payments from the Secretary of State for medical reports prepared in connection with the award of incapacity and disability benefits. Tribunals must not only be independent and impartial, as I firmly believe they are; it is also important that they are perceived to be so by all parties to appeals, most importantly by those appearing before them as appellants.

The number of those who are potentially involved in compromising the impartiality of the tribunal is, I believe, significant. Figures were released in March 1997 showing that 232 medical members of disability appeal tribunals are also approved by the Benefits Agency medical services to examine people in connection with disability living allowance or attendance allowance. Those figures were given in another place on 11th March 1997. Fees are paid by the Secretary of State to the doctors who carry out such examinations.

In February last year, of 24,401 examinations carried out in connection with DLA and AA cases, approximately 5 per cent. were allocated to doctors who also sit on DLA tribunals as members hearing appeals against the refusal of those same benefits. Details of those figures were given in another place on 18th March last year. In most cases the refusal of benefit will have been based on the medical examination itself.

A further 88 doctors simultaneously sit on disability appeal tribunals and perform work for the Benefits Agency on a fee-paid basis concerning incapacity benefit.

When an ordinary person appears before a tribunal as an appellant, it must seem to them self-evident that a doctor who is being paid by the DSS to carry out medical examinations on the basis of which benefit is then awarded should not at the same time sit on the very tribunal which has been set up to consider whether a decision by the DSS is correct. It is even more vital when that doctor is paid to carry out examinations in connection with the same benefit which is the subject of the appeal.

The practice of appointing to disability appeal tribunals those doctors who perform work for the Secretary of State in connection with DLA was recently accepted by a social security commissioner. However, I note that the president of the Independent Tribunal Service pointed out the controversial nature of that decision, which also has implications for the appointment of medical members to hear incapacity benefit appeals.

At present the argument is that a conflict of interest is only accepted if the doctor who is sitting on the tribunal comes across an appellant appearing before that same tribunal whom he or she had previously examined in connection with the claim for benefit actually under appeal. Indeed, that is a general rule covering all members of appeal tribunals. When I sat as a lay member of a tribunal that situation could arise. I would appear at a tribunal and only then discover that Mr. or Mrs. Smith or Mr. or Mrs. Brown who appeared before me were people whom I had advised in my capacity as a worker at the citizens' advice bureau. I would then withdraw. That same rule is applied to doctors. But the problem with that situation is that recognition of the appellant comes too late. They have prepared their case; they have prepared themselves for the trauma of appearing before a tribunal and only when they appear do they find that the case cannot be heard by one of the panel members. It may well be that the whole case is adjourned until another date.

I believe therefore that we need the amendment in order to be sure that doctors, as a group, do not have their credibility as effective members of appeal tribunals undermined. I beg to move.

3.30 p.m.

Lord Archer of Sandwell

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, for tabling this amendment. It is true that we were not able to discuss this matter in Committee because of the procedural hiccup which none of us foresaw until the net had closed.

I will not attempt to repeat the argument stated so clearly by the noble Baroness. I agree that possibly the best example of the principle to which my amendments in Committee were directed is the example of the doctor who feels that he might be under pressure if he were to displease the Department of Health. That is a genuine problem which I hope my noble friend will consider.

However, I hope the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, will forgive me if I say that I cannot go with her across the whole width of her amendment. She seeks to disqualify anyone in the employment of the Crown from being a member of a tribunal. A number of people who are in the employment of the Crown are effective and dedicated members of tribunals and do an extremely good job. They may face no danger of a conflict of interest. For example, a scientist working in the Crown's research laboratories would not necessarily have any reason to fear a conflict of interest in this kind of situation.

The amendment goes rather wider than the initiative it seeks to meet. Having said that, I will listen with great care to the reply of my noble friend because the narrower issue is one which should be addressed.

Lord Goodhart

My Lords, I rise to support the amendment and will do so briefly because all the points that could properly be made on it have been made already by the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Archer.

The present situation breaches the vital principle that a tribunal should be seen to be independent and impartial. A doctor who is employed by the DSS on other matters relating to disability may face a conflict of interest. I accept also the qualifications of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Archer, that that does not apply across the board and that there are other holders of government posts who could properly sit as members of an appeal tribunal.

The primary point is that made by the noble Baroness. It is an important one and I hope that the Government will see fit to accept the amendment.

Lord Borrie

My Lords, I feel extremely doubtful about the amendment, not only for the reasons given by my noble and learned friend Lord Archer of Sandwell—namely, that the amendment is exceedingly broad—but also on the basis that the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, tabled the amendment in a way which concerns the credibility of medical practitioners.

As the noble Baroness explained, we are not talking here about a case where the medical practitioner is involved in examining patient A and then finds himself or herself sitting on the appeal tribunal concerning patient A. In that situation there is immediate conflict and there would be a standing down of the medical practitioner involved. But the scope of the amendment means that several hundred—I believe the number was 237—doctors who are currently employed to examine people for the DSS and act also as medical members of appeal tribunals would have to be barred. That is a drastic decision to take. It would deprive a great many people with experience in the field of examining people applying for benefit under the social security system of membership of appeal tribunals.

The noble Baroness referred to the credibility of medical practitioners. But credibility also involves integrity. The noble Baroness appears to be questioning the professional integrity of medical practitioners by suggesting that if they are employed by the Crown to examine individuals on behalf of the department on one day they are incapable of sitting on another day as a member of a tribunal hearing decisions about different individuals.

Lawyers—two lawyers have already spoken broadly in favour of the amendment—particularly barristers but nowadays solicitors as well, may act in a judicial capacity on a number of days a month or a year in fields in which their expertise arises, and continue to practise on behalf of a plaintiff or defendant in similar cases. Their professional integrity is not questioned. Indeed, it is a feature of their professional integrity that they are capable of acting in a judicially impartial capacity on some days of the year and on other days of being the most partisan on behalf of an individual and being employed by government departments to be partisan advocates.

Therefore, for practical reasons of depriving the tribunal service of a large number of valuable members, and for reasons concerned with maintaining professional integrity, the amendment is not a suitable one for this House to pass.

The Lord Advocate (Lord Hardie)

My Lords, I am sure that the reason this amendment was tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, was a desire on her part, and also on the part of noble Lords who spoke to it, to ensure that appeals are dealt with in a fair and impartial manner; but not only that. It was in order to ensure that there is a perception of fairness and impartiality. Very often the perception is as important, if not at times more important, than the reality.

The Government share this view and believe that public confidence in the independence and impartiality of the tribunals, and of tribunal members, is crucial to the success of any appeals service, in particular to the new appeals service. While I cannot agree with the manner in which the noble Baroness is seeking to achieve our shared objective, I believe I can reassure her and other noble Lords that there will be sufficient safeguards in place to make these amendments unnecessary.

My noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor believes that the independence of panel members is most effectively guaranteed if the power of appointment is vested in him alone, as it is in respect of other judicial appointments to tribunals for which the Lord Chancellor is responsible. We share the Lord Chancellor's view and we have therefore made provision in Clause 6 for all appointments to the panel to be made by him. The nature of the appointments will ensure judicial independence and freedom from political pressure or other influence in the selection process.

The effect of Amendments Nos. 2 and 3 would be to preclude the Lord Chancellor from appointing to the panel set up under Clause 6 anyone who is "in the employment of the Crown". I associate myself with the comments of my noble and learned friend Lord Archer of Sandwell, the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, and my noble friend Lord Borrie that the way in which the amendment is framed is far too wide. It would exclude any employee of the Crown. Noble Lords will be aware that the meaning of the expression has caused much debate generally. It may help if I explain that the Lord Chancellor does not currently appoint persons such as serving civil servants to any tribunal where the state is a party to the proceedings. That would continue.

I turn to the question of the medical members, which is the crux of the matter in so far as I understand the position of the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay. The point has been made that there may be a possible conflict of interest for doctors who are involved in benefit determinations and who are also appointed to the panel. Perhaps I may, as my noble friend Lord Borrie did, split this category of doctors into two. Clearly, if the doctor has examined someone who is appearing before the panel of which the doctor is himself or herself a member, it would be inappropriate for the doctor to sit in such a case. At present, there are regulations which provide for that. The noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, referred to this point. I would hope that the problem which she experienced would not arise very frequently in the case of doctors. Unlike the noble Baroness, who would be giving advice in the context of the voluntary sector to a variety of people, where it might be difficult to identify them from reading the papers in the case of a doctor who had examined a patient, I think that difficulty is less likely to arise. However, in the event that it did arise, in terms of the existing regulations and in terms of the new regulations which will mirror them, he or she would be obliged to decline to act in that case. I appreciate that that would cause inconvenience, which is to be regretted, but in the interests of fairness and impartiality it is a necessary requirement.

I turn to the issue as to whether any doctor who has responsibility for examining a patient on behalf of the state should be allowed to sit as a panel member. On a practical level, I am advised that it would be difficult to find a doctor who had not at some time offered advice to the Secretary of State on a medical issue. We could not obtain sufficient panel members with the appropriate medical qualifications and expertise to run the appeal tribunals effectively—this point was made by my noble friend Lord Borrie—if doctors who had advised the Secretary of State at some point were precluded from appointment to the panel.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, observed, this issue was looked at very carefully by a social security commissioner in 1995. I appreciate that Judge Bassingthwaighte indicated that this matter should not be overlooked despite the decision of the commissioner. But one must bear in mind that the commissioner is the ultimate authority. The commissioner has greater authority on such matters than the president of the tribunal service. However, after exhaustive consideration of the role of doctors in the adjudication system, the commissioner in 1995 concluded that natural justice was not compromised by the presence on an appeal tribunal of a doctor who also provided fee-paid assistance and advice to the department in respect of other patients. Nothing in the Bill would change that position.

We understand that there could be concern from an individual appellant that a panel member sitting on a tribunal had previously been involved with him in relation to social security matters. In that situation the doctor would be required not to sit on the tribunal. I should like to reassure noble Lords that the Government will be bringing forward regulations containing similar provisions to those which now exist, which explicitly preclude any chairman or member from considering on appeal a case in which they have had any personal involvement. Currently, it is a condition of their appointment that all ITS members must be independent and impartial. If they realise from the appeal papers or when they turn up that there is a conflict, they themselves have an obligation to draw that to the attention of the authorities and to withdraw from the hearing. I can assure noble Lords that similar arrangements will apply for persons appointed to the panel. In the light of these reassurances, I hope that the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.

3.45 p.m.

Baroness Anelay of St. Johns

My Lords, I begin by referring to the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Borne, as to whether I question the integrity of doctors who sit on appeal tribunals. Perhaps the noble Lord will recall that when I opened my remarks I said that I had found tribunals to be trustworthy and full of integrity. I did not myself question that. But those who appear in front of them might well say with regard to myself, "Well, she would say that, wouldn't she?", as I sat as a member for 14 years. I was trying to put myself in the position of those who appear before the tribunal. It is certainly my experience that people who appear in front of tribunals do not have the same perception as those who sit on them and that there have been occasions when appellants who had been through a series of medical decisions—if one is suffering from severe medical problems one tends to appeal again and again—found that there was a person on the tribunal who had some time back sat on one of their cases and had rejected them but was not debarred at that stage from dealing with that appeal.

I accept the point made so clearly by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Archer of Sandwell, that my amendment goes too wide. The noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, made the same comment. I was trying only to look at the compromise situation of doctors employed by the DSS. On that basis alone, I would ask leave to withdraw the amendment, and I also take encouragement from the words of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate with regard to the safeguards which the Government intend to introduce. If there were to be further rules with regard to the position of doctors and others who find themselves hearing cases where they had been personally involved, I would welcome that. In those circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 3 not moved.]