Nuclear Weapons: Non-Proliferation

HL Deb 24 March 1993 vol 544 cc368-403

5.28 p.m.

Lord Mayhew rose to call attention to the case for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and ending all nuclear testing; and to move for Papers.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, the world is faced with many serious problems, but it may be that this Motion raises the most urgent and important of them all.

We are faced with the prospect of nuclear weapons slipping into more and more insecure and irresponsible hands. The first nuclear powers, the five permanent Members of the Security Council, have, with one or two lapses, handled their possession of nuclear weapons with a proper degree of responsibility. However, possession has passed to South Africa, India, Israel and, at present, to Khazakhstan, Ukraine and Belorussia. It may soon pass also to Iran and North Korea. It is not inconceivable that from there it may pass in crude form to the hands of terrorist organisations, drug barons and the Mafia.

This danger, of course, had been seen from the moment of the explosion of the first bomb. The world did well to form the non-proliferation treaty 23 years ago. When we look back we see that since then fewer countries have obtained nuclear weapons than many people believed was likely. I have heard today encouraging news of a statement by President de Klerk that South Africa made six nuclear bombs which they dismantled. They were all dismantled by 1990 at which time South Africa joined the non-proliferation treaty. The President has invited the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect South Africa's nuclear facilities. That shows that the position is not all gloom: that the non-proliferation treaty has results. For example, in Latin America, under the statesman-like leadership of Argentina and Brazil, the whole area is well set to achieve a non-nuclear weapon zone. That is the target that we must surely have in mind. We must apply the same non-proliferation regime to the remainder of the world.

What is needed to do that? I believe that there are two measures which will be agreed on all sides and which are accepted by the Government. First, in 1995 we should ask for and negotiate the indefinite extension of the non-proliferation treaty, as the treaty stands, rather than trying to amend it, which might well be counter-productive. Secondly—this is an issue which will be generally agreed —the powers of the International Atomic Energy Agency need to be greatly strengthened. That was most dramatically and clearly proved by the Gulf War. Before the Gulf War, Iraq had joined the non-proliferation treaty. It had permitted inspections by the agency in declared sites. However, because the agency had no power to inspect non-declared sites, the whole of Iraq's powerful efforts to achieve a nuclear weapon went totally undetected by the agency. But then, after the Gulf War, when the Security Council had armed the agency with much more intrusive powers, the agency was able to identify and destroy Iraq's nuclear facilities, although even then it was difficult, and even now perhaps some element of doubt remains.

It seems to me clear that, whereas such intrusive powers are a threat to the sovereignty of any country subjected to them, nevertheless so great are the issues at stake that I believe all countries ought to be willing to pay that price. Countries which evade or resist inspection, or bypass or breach the treaty, should be met in the first instance, as appropriate, by diplomatic pressure, offers of security guarantees, and the withholding or granting of aid. But in the last resort those countries should be coerced by the Security Council.

Such action could be politically possible if, and only if, the five nuclear powers which are primarily responsible have carried out most scrupulously the obligations laid on them by the treaty. That they are not yet doing. It is true that, belatedly, the Americans and Russians have fulfilled the first obligation on them in the treaty. That was to end the nuclear arms race. They have also taken steps towards the second obligation, on general and complete disarmament. However, the other three permanent members have taken no notice of those obligations. In particular, the United Kingdom, unbelievably, is actually increasing its nuclear weapons capability, first, by raising the range, accuracy and number of war heads on the deterrent and, secondly, so it tells us, by contemplating a new, additional air-to-surface nuclear missile system.

It is hard to imagine a greater provocation to the non-nuclear members of the non-proliferation treaty. My guess is that when the noble Baroness replies, she will say, "We have not said that we shall have more warheads on Trident. We have not said that we shall have an additional nuclear missile system". But if that is so, why on earth do we not say so? As it is, we are putting ourselves wholly out of court with the treaty and its signatories. How will British delegates attending the conference, or the preparatory sessions which begin this year which will lead up to the conference, answer the strong and understandable resentment of the non-nuclear countries? Will they say to them, "Unlike you, Britain can be trusted not only with the possession of nuclear weapons but to increase them—and, incidentally, to keep the increase secret"? If the noble Baroness wishes to tell us how many warheads are going on Trident, we shall be very interested.

Knowing that those figures and facts are essential for disarmament verification, the United States and the Russians tell us the number of their warheads. But again, the Government seem to believe that they have a privileged position on concealing from the world the number and nature of our nuclear weapons.

If the non-proliferation regime is to be strengthened, the nuclear powers, not only Britain, need to develop some humility and self-criticism. It was not North Korea which introduced nuclear weapons into Korea; it was the Americans. It was not Iran or Iraq which introduced nuclear weapons into the Middle East; it was Israel, supported by American business and with the open connivance of the United States Government.

However, the worst infringement of the treaty by the nuclear powers has been their failure over the 23 years of its operation to negotiate an end to nuclear tests. On that subject I speak with the support of the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman, who regrets that he cannot participate in the debate. He is a world authority on the subject and his recent article in Nature ought to be required reading for us all.

On 11th March, the noble Baroness said, quite rightly, that a comprehensive test ban treaty would be no guarantee against proliferation of nuclear weapons. Of course, that is right, although I am not aware of anyone who has ever taken that line. It is equally clear that such a ban would be a severe discouragement to would-be proliferators. In 1980, in the Defence White Paper, the Conservative Government said, Non-proliferation would also be served by a comprehensive ban on testing nuclear weapons". That is the position of almost everybody. It shows that earlier Conservative governments took a much more responsible line on nuclear weapons than the present Conservative Government.

In 1990 the Americans and the British, to the open resentment of the remainder of the non-proliferation treaty members, refused to enter negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty. Since then the American attitude has changed. It has joined Russia and France in declaring a moratorium on tests. There is now Congressional legislation, which was opposed by President Reagan, but is apparently now supported now by President Clinton, laying down that tests shall be limited to 15 only in future, and that there shall be no tests after 1996. It also calls for negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty to be completed by 1996.

The noble Viscount, Lord Cranborne, speaking for the Government on 16th November, 1992, described the Congressional legislation as "unfortunate and misguided". He was supported by vigorous canvassing of Congress by the British Embassy in Washington against the proposed ban or the limitation of tests.

That resistance by the United Kingdom to the ending of tests is not only a set-back to the non-proliferation regime, but it points us in the direction of a very awkward confrontation with our closest ally. It is entirely unnecessary. Again, I quote the noble Viscount, Lord Cranborne, who said on 16th November: any future testing from now relates not to the safety of the Trident system itself but very much to the safety of future systems and the capabilities of the teams we have in place in this country" [Official Report, 16/11/92; col. 448.] So no tests are needed for our strategic deterrent. That is very important.

However, what are the "future systems"? I am genuinely puzzled and perhaps the noble Baroness will enlighten us, as it is an important matter. After all, the "future systems" seem to be the sole reason that we confront the American Congress in resisting tests. What are they? What is meant by them? I believe that we should know.

There is a further question. If, for the benefit of the "future systems", the Government wish to test after 1996, where will they conduct the tests? I believe that that question is unanswerable. I suspect that the noble Baroness will reply that the Government do not intend to conduct tests after 1996. But if that is so, would it not have been wiser, instead of castigating the Congressional legislation, to have welcomed it and to have worked with the United States towards a comprehensive test ban treaty in 1996? That would be welcome on this side of the House and it should be the policy of the Government.

To sum up, there is a real prospect of preventing further nuclear proliferation. We have had welcome news from South Africa. There is a real prospect: but it needs a stronger contribution from the five Permanent Members of the Security Council and from the United Kingdom Government in particular. The Government are increasing the fire-power of our strategic deterrent. They propose an additional air-to-surface nuclear missile system. They pay lip service to a comprehensive test ban treaty, but in practice, as everyone can see, they hold up progress towards it.

Those policies are not assisting the cause of non-proliferation; they are holding it up. I urge the noble Baroness to use all her influence to get these policies changed. I beg to move for Papers.

5.43 p.m.

Lord Ennals

My Lords, first, I wish to thank the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, for introducing the debate at this important time. He was quite right to point out the danger that other countries—and he mentioned them, so I need not go through them—will have the capacity to develop nuclear weapons. I agree with the view that, although with the ending of the Cold War the world is not facing a great danger of a confrontation, a holocaust or a battle between one major side and the other, we now face the much greater danger in reality of minor conflicts because there is a much less stable situation.

I think the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, was wise to raise the subject at this time because of the meeting that we hope will shortly take place between President Clinton and President Yeltsin. One of the issues on their agenda will, of course, be how to move forward towards a comprehensive test ban treaty. It is most important that the President should hear from a Foreign Office Minister that we support the policies that are being pursued at the moment by both those two countries which have declared a moratorium, rather than what I thought was the rather disturbing statement of the noble Viscount, Lord Cranborne, referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew. I am glad that the reply is being given by a Foreign Office Minister and not by the Minister with responsibility for defence.

President Clinton was known to have a different policy from his predecessor, and it was unfortunate that just a few days after the American election we should appear to have been challenging the decision of Congress on this vital issue.

We are looking at two different regimes and I wish to say something about both of them. The first is the nuclear proliferation treaty. When the treaty was negotiated in the late 1960s it was given an initial operating period of 25 years. In 1995 there will be a conference to decide on the future of that treaty. We certainly cannot assume that it will be guaranteed. We should like to see it extended and I hope that the Government would like to see it extended. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, said, it will very much depend on the policies of the nuclear weapon countries.

It is widely acknowledged that without the non-proliferation treaty the world would be a more dangerous place. The outcome of the 1995 conference will depend in no minor part on how the policies of the. United Kingdom and the other nuclear weapon states are perceived by the other parties, especially those, from the less industrialised world. Although the, functioning of the NPT is judged by almost all nations to have been of benefit, it is certainly not without controversy. I know that because I led the British delegation to the review conference of the NPT in 1975, when a great deal of concern was expressed, Happily, at that conference we were able to reach agreement at the end. I am afraid that in 1980 and 1990 the review conferences were so divided that no agreement was reached.

There is great anxiety and many non-nuclear weapon states believe that the treaty has discriminated against them and that the nuclear weapon states operate on a double standard: "Do as we say and not as we do". It will not be easy; at the 1995 conference an extension of the treaty will not be plain sailing. We must recognise that, in return for renouncing nuclear weapons under the NPT, the non-nuclear weapon states expected, first, arms control negotiations to reduce the worldwide stocks of nuclear arms. All right, that is happening at the moment and it is art encouraging situation. Secondly, they expected negotiations to end nuclear testing. I shall come to that in a few minutes. They expected security assurances for protection against attack by nuclear weapons and free access to nuclear power for peaceful purposes. The perceptions by non-nuclear weapon states of how those expectations have been fulfilled will influence the intentions and behaviour of many of those states at the 1995 conference. I think that we must address those issues now and certainly, as a depository state of the NPT, the United Kingdom has a major role to play.

The second regime is the partial test ban treaty. It has been the agreed policy on both sides of the House that that should be extended, when it can be, to a comprehensive test ban treaty. In 1963 the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, failed to get a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons. Since then he and we have had to be satisfied with a partial test ban treaty. However, he made it absolutely clear in his negotiations on behalf of HMG that the wish of the Government in 1963 was to have a comprehensive test ban treaty. It was the aim of the Government then to achieve a comprehensive agreement and to the best of my knowledge that has always been the case—except now when we have reason to be concerned about where the Government stand. Certainly, when I was at the review conference in 1975 I reaffirmed the intention of the British Government to negotiate energetically to achieve a comprehensive test ban treaty.

Members of this House will remember that at Question Time on 11th March, my noble friend, Lord Healey drew the attention of the House—and the same Minister replied—to what had been said by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, as Foreign Secretary, when addressing a conference of the United Nations Association in 1980. I happened to be present, and a distinguished speech it was. The noble Lord said: A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty … will demonstrate our good faith towards those countries which, under the NPT, have formally surrendered the right to develop nuclear weapons … The countries which have signed the NPT expect the Nuclear Weapon States to honour their undertaking to seek an end to nuclear testing". That was a very important statement.

I was also interested in the comment made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, when on the same day, 11th March, he said that, the situation with which we were then confronted has altered dramatically since the collapse of communism … we were then faced with a confrontation between two power groups … we are now faced with something rather like a number of loose cannons rolling about on the quarter deck and running into each other. Fragmentation is the danger … that dramatically alters the nature of the argument that we are now pursuing?".—[Official Report, 11/3/93; col. 1147.] The purport of what he said was that from that point of view we are now in a more dangerous situation than we were then.

The noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, pointed out that the other nuclear weapon powers in most cases seek to bring about an agreement. We know that a moratorium has been accepted by the United States, as it has by President Yeltsin. I feel sure that they will confirm that at their meeting in a few days' time. France has also entered into an agreement about a moratorium—a very welcome and encouraging sign. China is not currently conducting a moratorium. Her traditional position regarding a ban on nuclear testing has been that the United States and the USSR should reduce their strategic arsenals by 50 per cent. before China would consider becoming involved in talks. That is now in prospect. It appears unlikely that China would remain outside a comprehensive test ban treaty negotiation if all other nuclear weapon states participated. It is therefore absolutely vital that the British Government should say what their position is and whether they are prepared now to negotiate an agreement together with the other four nuclear powers. The Threshold Test Treaty Ban in 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty in 1976 limited the yields of tests. Neither treaty was ratified until recently, and as the yield limit is so high they are widely considered to be of little value. Nevertheless, the 1977 tripartite talks resumed and some progress was made.

It is essential that we look at the American position and, I believe, support it. In October 1992 the US Congress passed the FY 1993 Energy and Water Appropriations Bill, which initiated a nine months' moratorium on American underground nuclear tests until July 1993, after which the US may conduct a further 15 underground nuclear tests before September 1996, with no more than five in any one year. The US legislation has gone further. It will mean an end to all United States and UK testing after September 1996. President Clinton is currently preparing a plan for the resumption of negotiations with Russia towards a comprehensive treaty with a view to achieving the treaty by 1996. If there is a movement towards, and a strong possibility of, a treaty by 1996, the review conference in 1995 is likely to extend the life of the non-proliferation treaty, and that is what I hope we will do.

Where do the British Government stand? Obviously, we hope to get a clear and encouraging statement from the Minister. Certainly, the statement made by her noble friend Viscount Cranborne, was very discouraging. I thought it was a bit rich to endanger our relationship with the United States so soon after it has a new President. Although the British Government continue to say that a comprehensive test ban treaty remains a long-term goal, they cited arguments in favour of continuing testing. One argument is reliability. All weapons are said to have a "shelf life" necessitating the testing of a representative sample to ensure reliability. The Army Minister, Mr. Hamilton, said on 24th February this year: As other nuclear systems are developed we have to be able to test them and we must be able to test improvements in safety, and so on. If that is not done, the viability of the deterrent deteriorates".—[Official Report, Commons, 24/2/93; cols. 893–4.] Another argument is safety—the development of safety techniques and the safeguarding of technology. But that applies only to future systems, not to the Trident programme, as was said by the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, when he introduced the debate.

It remains to be seen how the UK will react if asked to participate in resumed CTBT negotiations. Certainly it will be asked to participate. The position of the British Government must be clear, and it must be positive. I believe that a refusal to participate would be a break with the policy adopted by previous UK governments and could be construed as obstructive to the US policy of seeking a comprehensive test ban treaty by 1996. It would be extraordinary, given that the UK uses US facilities at which to conduct its tests. Not only would it be extraordinary, it would be tragic at this moment in our history when the prospects of getting a world-wide agreement are better than they have been; when Russia is taking a position quite different from that taken by the Soviet Union; when the United States is taking a position quite different from that under President Bush; when China is moving in the right direction; and when France has declared a moratorium. Now is the time when there could be progress. It would be a tragedy if the British Government were to drag their feet and prove to be the one member of the five permanent nuclear powers which seems to be against a comprehensive treaty. I therefore hope that the Minister will give us firm, clear and encouraging assurances that the British Government are in favour of the position now taken by the American President.

5.57 p.m.

Earl Attlee

My Lords, I feel very humble, following the two previous speakers, who spoke with such great experience. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew for introducing the debate. I see that we have 14 minutes for each speaker. Noble Lords will be pleased to hear that I have no intention of speaking at such length.

I should like to understand why the original nuclear powers are prepared to allow the proliferation of their technology to anyone with the means to pay for it. The list of countries with a nuclear reactor research programme is so long that I would tax the patience of noble Lords were I to read it out. According to Greenpeace, there are at least 34 non-G7 countries which have a research nuclear reactor. Some interesting members of that club are: Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria. If I have unfairly named any country I apologise.

I believe I am right when I say that all those countries have vast fossil fuel reserves. What possible justification can they have for a civil nuclear programme? For instance, take Syria. In the early 1980s Syria's proven oil reserves were 1,890 million barrels of oil. Its gas reserves were 91,000 million cubic metres. Why is there investment in that very expensive nuclear technology, which must absorb many of its best scientists and engineers? Surely burning fossil fuels in local power stations or diesel generators would be much more economic than having a nuclear power programme. The answer is that Israel is a nuclear threat to Syria. Israel has a nuclear programme and it is suspected that it has a nuclear weapon, as the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, said. The same argument applies to Iraq and Iran. What peaceful use can they have for nuclear power when they have such large fuel reserves? I accept that there may possibly be a case for countries which do not have oil reserves—Japan, for instance—to have a civil nuclear power programme.

Once foreign governments have a civil nuclear programme, they have access to all kinds of plant that is of no use outside the nuclear industry. What use has a uranium hexafluoride compressor outside the nuclear industry? If those countries were not allowed a nuclear civil programme, they would not have access to nuclear technology at all.

I turn my attention to this Government's testing of nuclear weapons. Initially it seems surprising that we continue to test nuclear weapons when others are ceasing to do so. It would be interesting to be told officially the technical reasons for that. However, I doubt whether the noble Baroness herself knows; the reason being that, like other noble Lords, she does not need to know. Presumably her right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence in another place has been convinced by the technical reasons and the case for continuing the tests against the opposition of so many.

I am not privy to any classified information in this area. I can only guess that the reasons for the tests must be to test new designs of warhead. One test may be to determine the yield from a device. It is not a very convincing argument. Compared with a one mega ton bomb, a 1.25 megaton bomb will make much the same sized bang and both will do considerable damage. A small difference in yield would not make much difference to the deterrence value of the weapon. However, closely allied to the yield test must be the issue of whether a device will produce a clean or a dirty explosion with lots of radioactive or toxic fallout. The latter would be a little like a poison pill and might not have the deterrent value of a clean weapon. Presumably, today third world nuclear devices would be dirty.

Another purpose may be to determine reliability—the certainty that the device will detonate at the desired moment. Surely that is determined by statistical analysis of the component parts and calculation of the reliability of the whole device.

Many people are worried about the safety of nuclear weapons. Could a nuclear explosion be initiated as a result of a serious road traffic accident? Would a conventional explosion near a nuclear warhead initiate it? If so, would the explosion develop its full yield and if not how much would it yield? Would it have to be a dirty explosion? Could the warhead be initiated if fired on by small arms when on a transporter in the UK? Such information can only be determined by experiment. I hope that the result will be a new generation of warheads that are even more resistant to premature explosion than their predecessors.

With regard to the already developed Trident warhead, there may be modifications which have to be tested. The suggestion has been made that there is no need to test because the threat is now comparatively low. That is obviously true. Apart from the safety issue, there is another problem. Once having stopped testing, it will be very provocative to start it again, especially in a period of rising tension. One cannot quietly test a nuclear device.

I do not like the idea of nuclear testing but I cannot pass judgment on it because I do not officially know the technical reasons for doing the tests. I am sure however that we should never have allowed the proliferation of a civil nuclear programme, let alone nuclear weapons.

6.5 p.m.

Lord Jenkins of Putney

My Lords, the noble Earl said that there may be technical reasons to continue nuclear testing which have not yet been vouchsafed or revealed to the public. I am sure he will agree that if such technical reasons are valid for this country, equally they must be valid for other nuclear nations.

If they can manage without tests, why do we alone seem so enthusiastic to continue testing and so reluctant to enter into a treaty to forbid it?

Earl Attlee

My Lords, perhaps the noble Lord will give way. There is the possibility that our weapons may be more reliable than their weapons.

Lord Jenkins of Putney

There are all kinds of possibilities, but such possibilities apply equally to other nations. If there are such good reasons to continue testing, why are we not told what they are? Is it so secret? Surely there can be no good reason for concealing the matter. I suspect that there is a feeling that somehow or other we have got into a test regime and once in that situation it is difficult to renounce it, especially as we are somewhat behind the Americans in developing Trident and its missiles. There is a certain, if not large, differentiation in the development area and perhaps we feel that need.

However, it seems to me that we have learned to live with the bomb. There are certain dangers in that. In the period immediately after the one and only time the bomb was used in warfare and in anger, the world as a whole was shocked by what it had done. For the first time in a single action we —I say "we" because in a sense it was the collective responsibility of mankind—had destroyed about 55,000 people, just like that. That was a new experience for the world. We were alarmed at the revelation of the new powers that we had taken unto ourselves. We were frightened that we might misuse those powers. Indeed, we had a shrewd suspicion that we had already misused them and that the explosions at Nagasaki and Hiroshima were a grave error of judgment. They launched the world into a position where the bomb had been used.

However, time marched on and there appeared to be no accidents and no further use of those bombs. I said "no accidents", but there were some accidents as the years passed and some people lost their lives as a result. But there was a bump of alarm and this country—I admit, under a Labour government—decided to develop the hydrogen bomb, which was a very substantial development of the original bomb. We saw the kind of damage that the bombs had done at Nagasaki and Hiroshima, and we wondered what kind of situation could arise when bombs which were many times more powerful began to spread throughout the world. That is the background against which we are talking since we got used to the situation. It is not something that we can approach or leave alone as we wish.

The world is in very great danger. The fact that we have got used to it does not make the situation any better. Perhaps to some extent it makes it worse. We have begun to take it for granted. We have lost the sense of urgency that we once had and the feeling that we had to get rid of the bomb or it would get rid of us. That feeling is no longer with us. We feel that we should like to get rid of the bomb, but if we do not manage to do so perhaps we can continue to live with it.

I suspect that a number of speakers have in the backs of their minds the fear that we are approaching the time when we can no longer live with the bomb. As the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, said in opening the debate, proliferation means ultimately that the bomb finds its way into less responsible hands. That is not because smaller nations are more wicked; it is that the process of their development and administration is less than it is in the larger nations. There arises therefore the possibility suggested by the noble Lord that the hands may not be even those of government. It is conceivable that they are the hands of anti-government groups and of terrorists.

That is not an impossibility because another alarming factor is that the physical size of the bomb is becoming smaller in proportion to the damage it can cause. Much smaller weapons are now capable of wreaking many times the havoc of the Hiroshima bomb. The position therefore is extremely dangerous. It is against that background that we are speaking tonight.

The motives of government are not usually difficult to discern. But in the case of nuclear weapons the Government appear to be speaking with a forked tongue. On 15th March at col. 1220 of Hansard, the noble Baroness said, the benefits of restraints on testing in countering proliferation must be examined carefully". I am not sure what that means, especially as a little later she said, a determined proliferator could still produce and deploy crude nuclear weapons without first establishing their safety or reliability through testing". What do those two statements together mean? If testing is not essential to a pre-nuclear state, and it is not essential—with the possible exception of China—to existing nuclear states, why is it essential to us? Why is it even desirable to us? Perhaps I am dim, but I have not heard the Government give a convincing answer to that question. Why are we alone the main power to say, "Irrespective of what the rest of you do, we must be more careful than you; we must be more cautious than you; we must approach it so slowly that people will think that we are walking backwards rather than advancing towards a non-nuclear world. We are retreating into the spurious safety that we believe our own nuclear world will give"? There is no such safety to be found in the nuclear world.

My first question therefore is why is it necessary for us? I hope that when the noble Baroness answers the debate she will try and clarify that point. The Minister said that the Government are not opposing the comprehensive test ban treaty. But nor are they supporting it. Where precisely do they stand in the matter? They certainly have no enthusiasm for it, we can be sure of that. Is the Government's real position that if possible they want all testing to stop except ours? That is the only conceivable conclusion to which we can come in the face of the rather confusing answers we have been given on the point. Such a proposition may seem ludicrous but I suspect that that is what the Government really want, if it is possible.

As the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, and my noble friend Lord Ennals, said, or at least suggested, an ounce of example is worth a ton of precept. Since the noble Baroness spoke, the Prime Minister emphasised in another place the need to develop an effective system of verification. What do the Government say to the widely held view that it is time to give the IAEA the necessary powers and teeth to carry out that verification? What is the Government's position on that? Do they agree with the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman, who made the point at an earlier time, and with the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew? Why should not the IAEA he asked to do the job? It is eager to do it if given the power and authority to carry it out.

If we could obtain answers to those two simple questions this evening we should be able to clarify the position. Once clarified we can march with greater hope towards the ultimate aim which we must surely all share; that is, to finish up with a world free from the immediate threat of nuclear destruction.

6.16 p.m.

Lord Mackie of Benshie

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for introducing the debate. I am happy to say that I agree with everything that he said, which is most unusual. There is no question but that we in this country should be much more virtuous. It is absolute nonsense to proliferate the number of warheads when we have a new and more efficient system. To ballot in the face of the world for more is a provocation to all the decent countries which are sticking to the treaties they have agreed and which do not wish to see the spread of nuclear weapons.

However, as has been said so far by every speaker, we are living in an extremely dangerous world. There is little doubt that it is even more dangerous now than when there were two opposing systems. If those stable blocs had been mad enough to start a war, we would have found ourselves in a holocaust but in fact, because of their stability, they backed off whenever there was a danger of nuclear war. However, now we are in an extremely unstable position. We have had proliferation through the break-up of the Soviet Union. The Ukraine now claims control of the nuclear weapons in its territory. They say that the Russians are in full control in Kazakhstan and Belorussia. That may be so. But the situation inside Russia is terrifying.

Most people probably saw the article in The Times of 10th March, corroborating many other stories, headed: A Russian army out of orders". The incidents mentioned are disturbing. In the Russian forces, both in the forces still stationed in Eastern Europe and those who have joined the Ukraine Army, there is a lack of pay and an inability to feed their families. They are selling weapons in order to keep the whole system going. There is corruption on a grand scale. The Black Sea fleet is full of nuclear capability, and is next door to one of the most tricky areas with which we are dealing. It is next door to Iraq, a country which we cannot trust and which is still trying, illegally, to develop nuclear capacity, totally against its commitments under the treaty.

Other countries around the globe are like that and, as the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, said, they are unstable and in many cases are populated by people who believe, with good cause, that the next world may be a better place than this one. That view is not entirely held in this country, where the standard of living is much higher, but those countries have a terrorist position. The late Lord Cheshire, who had good reason to understand this, was very frightened at the prospect of a terrorist taking a simple atomic bomb—if there is such a thing—in an aircraft and dropping it on some great city of the West. That is perfectly feasible in today's climate.

One of the best points my noble friend made in his speech is that much greater power should be given to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Without that I do not see how we can control the dangerous situation in which we find ourselves. My noble friend said that if other methods fail we have to consider the use of force. That must be right. We have the case of North Korea at the present time. The maximum pressure should be put on North Korea and it should understand that if it does not conform action will be taken.

All our present day actions over Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia indicate that we do not have the political will to do so. It is important that the Minister should address the point. Without a new role for NATO, which is not yet defined, without a definite and far greater cohesion within Europe and the Western European Union and without co-ordination of the nuclear sections of the British and French forces we are unlikely to have the political will to deal with the great dangers facing us around the globe. It appears to me that that is the main problem facing us. We have the equipment. I agree that the first thing we must do is to show that we mean what we say and to show that Britain and her allies are virtuous. We must also make up our minds that we will tackle the dangers to peace which confront us in a great many parts of the world.

6.23 p.m.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, I shall talk principally about two cases—the case of North Korea and the case of Ukraine. I am glad that the noble Baroness, Lady Chalker, is with us today. At Question Time last week, perhaps trying to get rather too much into a supplementary, I began to set out some of the reasons why I thought North Korea had taken the distressing action which it has taken. She inferred from that that I was sympathetic to the North Korean position. Well, not really. I was only reporting a part of the world in the way that others see it, which is always worth doing in this House.

I say at once that if either she or I had been the dictator of North Korea, I am quite sure that we would not have left the treaty non-proliferation system. But we are not, and no one like either of us possibly could be. Communist dictatorships breed a special kind of person with a limited view of the world—they are sensitive and, as their number decreases and they become smaller and weaker relatively, they become more sensitive and more paranoid. It is important that one should at least know, without sympathising, how they see the world.

What has happened in international law is that we are about to see one new country added to the list of non-signatory weapons states of the non-proliferation treaty. Going out of the non-proliferation treaty is expressly permitted by the treaty if in the judgment of the country concerned its supreme national interest is threatened. Moreover, there is nothing in international law or in United Nations resolutions which prevents North Korea going for nuclear weapons when it is no longer a signatory of the treaty.

We have to understand why this has happened. For many years an exercise called Team Spirit took place. This was a large inter-service joint exercise by American and South Korean forces on the territory of and the seas off South Korea. It was extremely large, and the North Korean government over the years took it amiss. They felt threatened by the size of it. That might have been among the reasons why in 1991 President Bush announced not only that there would be no Team Spirit exercise in 1992, but also that he was withdrawing all American tactical nuclear weapons world-wide. North Korea had signed the NPT in 1985, but it was only in 1991—and I suggest because of President Bush's wise decision—that it accepted international agency inspection. At the same time North Korea began to negotiate with South Korea about a whole range of things, including—this is the important point—non-nuclear status for the whole Korean peninsula. It was a moment of high hope in that part of the world.

To achieve this non-nuclear status it would have been necessary for all three countries concerned to agree to inspection: a potentially nuclear North Korea, a non-nuclear South Korea, and the greatest nuclear power in the world, the United States, which had weapons stationed in South Korea. Unfortunately, the United States would not agree to the inspection of its bases in South Korea, although it had stated that it had withdrawn all nuclear weapons. North Korea had to rely on the word of South Korea that there were no nuclear weapons left there.

Then towards the end of last year, when his electoral campaign was beginning to flag, Mr. Bush thought better of all this, and felt perhaps that a bit of sabre rattling might revive his campaign. He reinstated Team Spirit for the spring of 1993. It was, I believe, an extraordinary mistake of the incoming Clinton Administration not to cancel the Team Spirit exercise earlier this year. But it did not, and thus we have seen what has been the most massive military exercise in the world for I do not know how long—120,000 men using both the new American nuclear bomber types, Stealth and B1-B, which are of course nuclear capable platforms and are designated as such under the SALT and START agreements, as well as aircraft carriers, submarines and live ammunition. Wisely enough our Government, who had taken part in Team Spirit in earlier years, stayed out of it this year. It is noticeable that Mr. Clinton had doubts about it while it was even going on; he said that they wished they could terminate it. One might have thought that perhaps they could.

The United States is apparently now reviving its last year's plan to take out North Korea's nuclear capacity by bombing. It dropped this plan last autumn when China and South Korea objected to it. It would have to be a unilateral action if it carried the plan out, because the Security Council is quite unlikely to authorise any such thing. China, moreover, has said that it will veto it. China does not want war on its doorstep; nor does Japan; nor does South Korea, as it informed the US Administration last autumn. President Clinton does not need a war: he is quite popular and sensible enough, and may well appreciate just how gravely international law was undermined by the bombing last January of what the Bush Administration claimed was an Iraqi nuclear-related building. Nevertheless, well-connected columnists in American papers are still writing about the need to take out North Korea's suspected nuclear facilities. Of course, no country has any right whatever in international law to bomb the nuclear facilities of any other. Israel had no right to bomb Iraq's nuclear facilities in 1981, and much good did it do them.

I am continuing to narrate how North Korea sees the world. North Korea believes that the evidence for the development of nuclear weapons on its territory has been fabricated by the United States. The story is that the United States has produced satellite images showing two buildings near the known nuclear plant in North Korea. It maintains that the effluent from those buildings shows that North Korea has been separating plutonium for a longer period than North Korea says it has.

Mr. Blix is the head of IAEA. His proposal, made a year or two ago, was that the agency should have its own satellite intelligence operation. But objections to that proposal forced him back on the present strange procedure, of which I would like to remind the House. Member states of the IAEA may, if they wish, submit evidence to one of his underlings, but not to him. That is perhaps because he does not have US security clearance, since he is Swedish. Evidence of the kind in question can never come formally before the agency and to its board, as such.

If that is even roughly the shape of things, it would mean that the military installations of one signatory to the NPT —in this case North Korea—would have to be opened up on the say-so of the intelligence activity of a more powerful adversary, in this case the United States, which is also a member of the agency. If that were so in this case, all other signatories' military installations, not only nuclear ones, would have to be opened up on the say-so of one other member country. I say "not only nuclear ones", because the North Koreans maintain that the two buildings in question, although military, are not nuclear.

The consequence of such a situation requires a good deal of reflection. What does the rest of the world say? Let us listen to what it says about the situation in East Asia in general now. The chief of the Japanese general staff says that foreign pressure on North Korea would be unwise. Russia is against timetables for inspection requirements from the international agency: the agency has recently moved from requesting North Korea to do the right thing to requiring it to do so.

All through East Asia the situation is sharply deteriorating. China is accelerating its arms procurement. With exercises like Team Spirit being conducted in the neighbourhood, can one be surprised? Indonesia is buying one-third of the East German navy which includes 30 frigates, landing ships and minesweepers; and is getting three new submarines from Germany. President Kohl has stopped Taiwan buying 20 German frigates and submarines, but Taiwan is nevertheless buying from the United States and France. We must clearly hope most urgently that the behind-the-scenes contacts in Peking between the United States and North Korea lead soon to a fruitful outcome.

A year ago in a debate on proliferation, I said that if we wanted to avoid it we had to address individual countries' motives for wishing to develop and hold nuclear weapons. That is still so today. I now turn to Ukraine. Mr. Yeltsin's decision to rule by personal decree, in defiance of Russia's constitutional court, has provoked Ukraine to state that it will not hand over the ex-Soviet strategic nuclear weapons on its soil to Russia and—here is the point—will not sign the non-proliferation treaty, as Yeltsin's Western supporters could have anticipated. But that is for next week's debate.

Mr. Yeltsin has been suggesting that the international community should recognise his right to interfere throughout the ex-Soviet Union. But Ukraine is frightened of Russia. If we want to stop proliferation, that is the issue which we must address. It is the fears of weaker countries which are yet strong enough to become nuclear. It is not enough to keep repeating in this case that Mr. Yeltsin is a very good man for free markets.

There is also the whole shape of the 1968 non-proliferation treaty. That was a deal struck between the nuclear-capable powers and, broadly speaking, nuclear weapons-incapable powers. The deal was that no more countries should get nuclear weapons. That is well remembered, and that is what we always debate.

There were two other parts to the deal. One was that the nuclear weapons countries, as they then were, should negotiate seriously and in good faith and make progress towards disarmament. That was begun only about four years ago, although it has been the duty of those countries for the past 25 years. The third part of the deal was that certain security guarantees were offered by the nuclear countries to non-nuclear weapon signatories. They were an inducement to them to sign the treaty. I wonder where those guarantees are now, in the case of the Korean peninsula.

As regards testing I have little to add to what the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, and my noble friends have said. I have always been in favour of Britain independently holding nuclear weapons as long as any other country did. I have also long thought it quite mistaken for our Government to suppose that, while we depend on the United States for the weapons and for testing them, that amounted to our holding the weapons independently. The Government are dependent.

Where do the Government want to carry out these famous tests in future? The only place I can think of is Novaya Zemlya, which the Russians would surely let us do if we paid them. The fact is that the Government have been caught by the end of the Cold War at an awkward moment in the replacement cycle of their own nuclear force. I think we can all understand that. This fact, which is awkward financially, politically and even industrially, should give rise to a big rethink, and that should be done in common with France. I do not know whether that feeling has anything to do with the fact that no single Conservative Back-Bencher is speaking in support of Government policy this evening. I hope that it does, because I do not feel that any government can maintain the present position much longer—that is to say, being the only country to test, with nowhere to do it, and being the only country to have rising levels of nuclear armament.

6.38 p.m.

Lord Plant of Highfield

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, for initiating the debate. I certainly agree with a good deal of what he had to say. I wish to start by declaring an interest which is perhaps an odd thing to do in a debate on nuclear non-proliferation. But it is an interest which explains why I am speaking this evening. My department at Southampton University has been the centre of a programme for promoting nuclear non-proliferation., an international programme funded to the tune of many hundreds of thousands of dollars by British, American, German and Japanese charities and foundations. It is directed by my colleagues Professor Simpson and Dr. Howlett. It conducts academic work on technical and political aspects of non-proliferation and publishes widely respected news briefs and studies. I know that many Members of your Lordships' House subscribe to those publications.

The programme in Southampton also brings together diplomats and officials from nonproliferation treaty (NPT) states, as well as officials from the International Atomic Energy Agency, for conferences and for consultation to create a climate of serious work on problems of non-proliferation in between the review conferences of the nonproliferation treaty. Officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office also attend those consultations. The programme had NGO status at the last non-proliferation treaty review conference.

The key problem facing the regime of nonproliferation is that its cornerstone, the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is due to be extended at a conference of its 157 parties to be convened for that purpose in the spring of 1995. The treaty acts as the cornerstone since it is the legal instrument through which states renounce their freedom to acquire nuclear weapons and accept safeguard inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency to assure others that they are conforming to that commitment. Without those two elements, the existing non-proliferation regime would probably fragment and collapse.

In 1995 the treaty does not terminate, nor has it to be renewed: the sole issue is how long it will continue. The parties to the treaty face three choices: to extend the treaty for a single period of time after which it will terminate; to extend it for a series of fixed periods and agree a mechanism for moving from one period to the next; or to extend it indefinitely which, I understand, is Her Majesty's Government's expressed wish.

Two processes exist for taking the decision: by a vote of a majority of the parties (that is, by 79 states voting for one of the options) or by a consensus decision of all the parties present at the conference. The majority of the parties to the treaty are developing states. The first process suggests an absolute need to make sure that a majority of the parties are present at the conference who agree on one of the options. Its drawback is obvious—that a significant number of parties may not agree with the option chosen, and vote against it. Such public disagreement among the parties would result in a weakening of the authority and credibility of both the treaty and the regime.

The second process—the consensus approach—is the more desirable as it demonstrates that all parties present at the conference support the extension decision. Yet the evidence of previous NPT conferences suggests that this is unlikely to be feasible unless the nuclear weapons states, including the United Kingdom, are seen to be negotiating seriously to achieve a comprehensive nuclear testing ban. This is not necessarily because such an agreement will produce a significant brake on proliferation, but because developing states have always insisted that the NPT involved a bargain under which they would forfeit their rights to acquire nuclear weapons in return for the nuclear weapon states engaging in a process of nuclear disarmament. Indeed, that is not just the view of the developing states. The Federal Republic of Germany, for example, took the same view, as Willy Brandt made clear in an interview in Die Welt on 18th February 1967 when the treaty was under consideration. The Italian Government took the same view in the same period. For the past 20 years, the test of whether the nuclear weapons states were fulfilling their disarmament pledges has always been regarded by the developing states, on whose votes the renewal of the treaty rests, as their willingness to engage in negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty.

If the British Government wish for a consensus decision on the extension of the NPT for a long period of time, and even possibly indefinitely as is their current policy, their willingness to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) is the price they may have to be prepared to pay for that. The choice may indeed become very stark: either negotiate on a CTBT at the expense of reducing future options for Britain's own nuclear weapon capabilities (if that is how it is seen) or see the nuclear non-proliferation system become significantly weakened in the conference in 1995. The latter alternative cannot be desirable.

The changing international environment has left us with four groups of states which raise concerns over their nuclear weapons status. The first are states which, as parties to the NPT, have failed to fulfil their undertakings not to seek to develop nuclear weapons; the second are states which have significant nuclear facilities that they have not placed under IAEA safeguards; the third set comprises some of the states emerging from the break-up of the USSR which still have nuclear weapons on their territory; and the fourth are states with civil nuclear facilities which feel insecure as a consequence of the loss or degradation of nuclear guarantees from the former nuclear bloc leaders.

In the first category, it is essential that the British Government continue to take a firm line over Iraq: it will be many years before it can be trusted again with nuclear technology. Similarly, it may be necessary, as the noble Lord, Lord Mackie, argued, to refuse to accept the withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT and to insist that the uncertainties uncovered by IAEA inspectors are resolved, as well as pressing for greater transparency for all nuclear activities in all NPT parties.

In the second category, the British Government, both unilaterally and through the EC, should encourage a nuclear confidence-building process in the Middle East. They should also seek to encourage such a process between India and Pakistan by offering development assistance, which might include civil nuclear material or otherwise, in return for more binding non-proliferation commitments.

In the third category, a similar strategy of developmental carrots and sticks should be pursued over Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine, by making it clear that not acceding to the NPT will lead to a withholding of the development aid that might flow to them were they to accede to the treaty.

Finally, it is necessary to tackle urgently the perceptions of insecurity that may follow from the degradation of the security guarantees provided by the nuclear alliance leaders. The British Government, as a nuclear weapons state, are well equipped to take an initiative in this field by making proposals to strengthen both the positive security guarantees that the US and the Soviet Union offered through UN Security Council Resolution 255 of 1968 and the negative assurance unilaterally offered by the Government to non-nuclear weapons states in 1978 that they would not use nuclear weapons against them except in certain specified instances. Such initiatives would also have the important effect of strengthening the prospects for a smooth extension of the NPT in 1995, as obtaining such assurances has been high on the agenda of influential developing states such as Egypt and Nigeria. In short, they could kill two birds with one stone: extend the treaty and make the world a safer place.

6.47 p.m.

The Earl of Clanwilliam

My Lords, I am most grateful to your Lordships for allowing me to make what I promise will be a very short intervention. It takes the form of a somewhat hypothetical question to my noble friend on the Front Bench. I must apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, for being unable to be present to hear his speech.

Several noble Lords have spoken about the danger of atomic powers being in the hands of terrorists. My anxiety over that relates particularly to South Africa. I believe that Mr. Mandela has been quoted as being the state president in waiting and I, for one (like, I am sure, every Member of your Lordships' House) would have great faith in his activities if he were to control a nuclear power, which is what South Africa is. However, toppling state presidents is the name of the game at the moment, and Mr. Mandela may not get there. What worries me is that if he were to be toppled, it would be the first time that an acknowledged terrorist force has had access to fully prepared nuclear capabilities. I wonder whether my noble friend Lady Chalker could comment on that point.

6.49 p.m.

Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank

My Lords, I shall speak only briefly and should like to resist the indulgence of repeating what other noble Lords have said this afternoon. Like others, I am most grateful to my noble friend Lord Mayhew for initiating the debate. I think that we have all benefited from the exchanges that have taken place.

I was interested in what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Plant, about the studies in progress at Southampton University. They may be known to others but were not previously known to me. I hope that some steps will be taken to bring them to the notice of a wider audience because on the basis of what he said tonight there are important matters to learn.

I wish to focus briefly on the central issue. In so doing, I shall inevitably endorse a great deal of what has been said. It is a depressing irony that, having lived for a generation under a bipolar system sustained by a balance of nuclear terror, when the system came to an end we found ourselves in a world seriously destabled and therefore representing a greater threat. In that respect I agree with the remarks made by my noble friend Lord Mackie, and the noble Lord, Lord Ennals. It would be pleasing to believe that once the threat of a nuclear war between East and West had departed we should return to a more peaceful world where we could see a de-escalation of our nuclear forces and a greater hope of living in peace. That has not been the case. Today we are seeing a return to the diplomacy of a pre-1914 period. We are learning from the long history of the rise and fall of the great powers and their unforeseen consequences.

One of those consequences is reflected in the actions of North Korea. I do not know but I am prepared to believe that the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, was correct in saying that the United States exercise, "Team Spirit", played some part in the decision which was taken. However, I doubt whether that is the whole story. Either way, it is likely that had it not been for the ending of the role of North Korea as a client state of the Soviet Union we might not have seen ourselves faced with the events of recent times.

It follows from the disordered world in which we all live that we must be careful to retain a sufficient capacity for our proper defence. I say that because I should not wish anyone to pretend that because we are concerned with the dangers of proliferation, we are less concerned with the proper defence of Britain, which must continue to contain a nuclear element. Of course, there have been changes; and of course we must look at our conventional capacity which was employed in the Falklands and in the Gulf and now in a different role in Yugoslavia. However, I do not believe that simply because the Cold War has come to an end we can drop our nuclear shield and believe that there are no comparable problems in the uncertain world ahead.

A dozen years ago I thought that there was no need to replace Polaris with Trident. That was too expensive a system and would divert many of our resources. But that time has passed and I should be satisfied if, as my noble friend Lord Mayhew said, the number of warheads on the new Trident boats were restricted to 48. That seems to be compatible with a proper and necessary nuclear defence and with what is required in the world today.

Nothing in the need to maintain a nuclear defence justifies abandoning a comprehensive test-ban treaty to which successive governments were committed for many years; or pursuing less energetically the objects of the non-proliferation treaty. If the shock of the events in North Korea does anything it emphasises the importance attached to non-proliferation. The remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Plant, about the way in which the several countries should be approached with a view to their support for non-proliferation were wise words. Whether in the Middle East or in the Far East, encouraging countries to sign and remain within the non-proliferation treaty must be a major objective of the policy of the United Kingdom Government.

I do not believe that there is any direct causal relationship—certainly none can be demonstrated—between a comprehensive test-ban treaty and proliferation. But equally it is the case—and that has been the view of successive governments—that it was at least more likely that we should be able to prevent proliferation if the existing nuclear powers were riot seeking to improve their weapons through testing. Even if that is no more than a balance of probability and there is no direct causal relationship, surely it is a cause to which we should be committed.

There have been several references today to the remarks made by the noble Baroness, Lady Chalker, in this House on 11th March. The words that she chose to use were interesting. She said: We would contest his conclusion [the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman] that a comprehensive test ban would itself be an effective counter-proliferation measure".—[Official Report. 11/3/93; col. 1145.] The important words are "would itself". I do not believe that any of us would argue that by itself it would be an effective counter-proliferation measure. All we are saying is that it could be a contributory factor. The noble Baroness went on to say: I cannot agree with those who say … that a comprehensive test ban among existing nuclear powers would be sufficient to prevent others from pursuing the acquisition of a nuclear capability".—[Official Report, 11/3/93; col. 1146] I agree that that would not be sufficient but if it is a factor which influences other countries towards our non-proliferation objective, it is a course worth pursuing.

The noble Lord, Lord Ennals, and other noble Lords referred to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, made on 24th October, 1980. It was in a sense an attempt to say that a comprehensive test-ban treaty would represent good faith, which was a fair summary of the position. No reference has been made today to a later statement made in another place by the then Minister of State, David Mellor in a Written Answer. Those of us who are aware of the ways of government will know that a Written Answer from a Minister of State is an indication of an important policy decision which the Government believe needs putting on the record without too much attention being drawn to it. That was the nature of the statement made at that time.

If it were not the case—and I see that the noble Baroness looks sceptical—why was that statement made in that way at that time by that Minister? Did it not represent a major change of policy? It might be said that between the remarks made in 1980 by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, and the remarks made in 1988 by David Mellor there were other significant shifts in government policy. The noble Baroness nods her head. I should be grateful if she could refer precisely to when they were made. I know of no remarks made on the record by Ministers in either House of Parliament which indicate that before the statement made by the Minister of State on 27th June 1988 there had been a significant shift of policy—

Lord Ennals

My Lords, I do not know what the statement contains, and the noble Lord has not read it out. Will he do the House the courtesy of reading out the statement so that we can see the import of his comments?

Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank

My Lords, it is a fairly long Written Answer; but, as the noble Lord has requested it I shall read it. It states: For the foreseeable future the United Kingdom's security will depend on deterrence based, in part, on the possession of nuclear weapons. That will mean a continuing requirement to conduct underground nuclear tests to ensure that our nuclear weapons remain effective and up to date … A comprehensive test ban remains a long-term goal. Progress will be made only by a step-by-step approach".—[Official Report, Commons, 27/6/88; col. 66.] He then refers to verification.

Taken as a whole, it was a commitment to a comprehensive test ban but it was clearly pushed further away. I seek from the noble Baroness an indication as to why that statement was made and why there was a change of policy at that time. Was it related to the break up of the Soviet Union? It seems to me that it predates that event. Was it something in our nuclear programme?

Indeed, there are alternatives. It could be that over a long period of years successive Ministers in different governments were playing an elaborate game of bluff and that we never intended to sign a comprehensive test ban treaty. We kept on talking about it up to the moment when it became a possibility, and at that moment we decided that we did not want it after all. Is that the other possibility? There are three possibilities: an elaborate game of bluff; an unexpected need to test; a major change of policy. Which of those alternatives was it?

Lord Ennals

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for reading that out. Can the noble Lord say who asked that Question? Knowledge of another place and knowledge of who asked the Question might indicate why the statement was made.

Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank

My Lords, I confess that I do not know who asked the Question. I have spoken rather more fully than I intended. Having set out the question which I wished to put to the noble Baroness, I do not wish to pursue these issues further this evening.

As I say, it is a balance of argument which leads us to believe that, irrespective of the merits of a comprehensive test ban treaty, it seems more than likely that our pursuit of a comprehensive test ban treaty and preparedness to sign one would at least push those countries which at present do not have nuclear weapons towards signing a non-proliferation treaty.

The dangers are very real. I have not argued for a great leap in the dark. I have sought only to persuade the Minister, in keeping with the debate which my noble friend has initiated, to look back again at previous policy. If it has not changed, will she explain to the House why that statement was made five years ago and why she spoke in the terms that she did in this House less than a week ago?

Lord Howell

My Lords, we could not be debating these issues at a time of greater concern for the future of our world and at a time of greater political complexity. Therefore, we must all be grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, for providing us with this opportunity today.

As the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, said, it is a day with some remarkably good news from South Africa. I do not believe that the noble Earl, Lord Clanwilliam, could have yet digested that news. South Africa has dismantled its atomic bombs in accordance with the non-proliferation treaty. That is excellent news which I hope the noble Earl will welcome in spite of what he said about state president Mandela lying in wait. That was a regrettable part of his intervention.

The Earl of Clanwilliam

My Lords, I did not say that he was lying in wait. I said that he is a state president in waiting, as has been said in The Times.

Lord Howell

My Lords, I accept that but the inference is that as a state president in waiting of a country which possesses nuclear weapons, he could hardly be trusted. I do not take that view, but I am grateful that the South African Government have moved as they have done today.

I endorse the position which the noble Lord, Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank, has adopted. I am an unrepentant multi-lateral disarmer and I remember many battles with former colleagues. However, the point to make is that I was a disarmer. I believe that that was the position of my colleagues on the Labour Benches. We were multi-lateral disarmers. We did not want to give up our nuclear weapons unilaterally but we believed that we should continue to move towards disarmament. That is the stance we take now.

I rather liked the phrase used by my noble friend Lord Jenkins of Putney who spelt out the dangers of the Government's present position when he said that we have learned to live with the bomb. That is the danger which faces us at this time.

I am glad that the position of the Labour Party was itself re-stated last week in a statement from the Parliamentary Committee which expressed the view, following the break-up of the Soviet Union and the signing of the START 1 and 2 agreements, that the time is now right to take further steps to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons by means of a comprehensive test ban.

We must be critical, as so many noble Lords have been this evening, of the British Government's refusal to join France, Russia and the United States which have announced a moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons. I find it odd that our Government are in the sole company of China as regards that decision.

The Labour Party does not believe that the Trident programme requires us to carry out any further tests, and I shall return to that matter. We accept that any further work can he conducted under laboratory conditions, a view which commands wide support among the scientific community. The non-proliferation treaty should be made permanent or strengthened long before it is due to expire in 1995.

Finally, the Labour Party has stated that we believe that the Government must be much more vigorous in assistance to such countries as the Ukraine in ensuring that they honour their commitments to rid themselves of nuclear weapons.

We are well aware of the present crisis in Russia. We hope and pray that the people there will be able to solve their conflicts sensibly and will return to good order. However, I do not believe that it would be right —indeed, it would be a great mistake—for the West to make any assumptions this time to the effect that any Russian Government would go back on their signature to the START agreement. That would be a profound mistake and I do not believe that it would be correct.

Therefore, we believe that the Government are making a great error of judgment in not endorsing the moratorium on testing of nuclear weapons, especially in departing from the position of our principle ally; namely, the United States. So many people have pressed the noble Baroness as regards that matter that I shall not take it any further. However, I hope that the noble Baroness will be able to comment in detail on that matter and I endorse the welcome given to the fact that she is replying to the debate.

We are aware of the position that President Clinton has taken. I believe that he is giving decisive leadership, and so is the US Congress. No one can doubt that underground testing in Nevada will soon come to an end. In October last year, Congress passed the Energy and Water Appropriations Bill which initiated a nine-month moratorium upon American underground tests. After July of this year, 15 further tests may be conducted before September 1996 (of which I believe three may be British). But after that time, all US and UK tests will be banned unless a foreign state carries out a test first. That point was made by the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew. I fully endorse it.

It is incomprehensible to me to believe that we can persist with a policy of wanting to carry out underground tests in Nevada when the Congress of that country says that all such tests are to come to an end. If it is not absolutely necessary, I think that it is also important for us to end the testing regime, especially from the point of view that we must give no encouragement whatever to any foreign country to start testing or to continue with present testing. That seems to me to be the essence of the American position. It will be a national shame for us if we, the British, do not support it.

In practice, I believe that we have no choice, the US Government will cease to test in Nevada and so we will not be able to do so. We look forward to hearing the answer to that dilemma in Government policy.

The noble Viscount, Lord Cranborne, has been quoted many times, but when he said in Hansard on 16th November last (col. 467) that the position of the United States is, "unfortunate and misguided", I think that that can only apply to his own remarks. Given the present circumstances, it seems to me that no Minister has ever made a more unfortunate or misguided statement. It is not a tenable position in which to find ourselves.

It is no academic question. I should like to spend a few moments on the question of underground testing. While it is certainly preferable to air or surface testing, it is not free from serious danger. Underground tests generate large quantities of radioactive material. Massive quantities of radio active waste are left unmonitored with no safeguards, except the assumption that the ability of the rock will contain the effect of such testing for a thousand years. In fact, a nuclear explosion underground fractures the rock, even where the geological situation is stable, such as in Nevada. However, there already seems to be evidence of the venting of radioactive gases and there is certainly a concern about pollution of the water table. No wonder President Clinton and Congress want to bring the situation to an end.

I am pleased to note that our Prime Minister seems to be edging very slowly in that direction. We should encourage him to do so. I notice the reply that he gave in another place on Monday of this week in a Written Answer to a Question from Mr. Paul Flynn. It reads: We support the ultimate goal of a comprehensive test ban. The factors which will influence the rate at which progress towards a ban can be made will include the need to develop an effective system of verification. We will also need to be confident that we have the necessary technologies and expertise to maintain the safety of our nuclear weapons at the highest level without testing".—[Official Report, Commons, 22/3/93; col. 467.] It seems to me that those are reasonable assumptions. I believe that those assumptions have been met, as has already been said in the debate. There are many authorities one could quote. For example, Mr Ray Kidder, who is a senior scientist at the Laurance Livermore, said in 1987: Warheads that have been thoroughly tested prior to deployment can be expected to remain reliable". Moreover, Mr. J. Carson Mark, head of the theoretical division at Los Alamos National Laboratory, said: The reliability, effectiveness, safety and security of our nuclear arsenal can be maintained without nuclear tests". I entirely agree with what noble Lords have said, especially the noble Lord, Lord Mackie. The noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman himself, whom we all respect in this House as an authority on the matter, has thoroughly endorsed those statements. There is no need to continue testing in order to maintain the adequacy of our own nuclear weapons. That is a matter of major importance.

It seems to me that we cannot prevent the dangers of proliferation unless we start here at home. Why on earth do we need more and more nuclear warheads? When I used passionately to argue the case for multilateral disarmament, I remember always saying that the policy was successful because no one else had ever dropped a bomb since Hiroshima. All we needed was the ability to make potential enemies understand that we could deliver one bomb effectively if we wanted to do so. But how can we move from that argument to the belief that we must have hundreds and hundreds of nuclear warheads? That is the situation. Why on earth do we need all these nuclear warheads?

Let us remind ourselves that the bomb at Hiroshima killed 70,000 people and wounded 90,000 others. A US congressional paper in 1989 estimated that a Polaris was capable of inflicting between 6 million and 21 million casualties. Therefore, what justification is there for the Government's position? I believe that the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, raised that issue. The Trident needs even more warheads than Polaris. It is inconceivable to me that we should adopt a policy on that basis. Polaris has 192 warheads, (48 per boat) while Trident is planned for 512 warheads —whether or not they are all provided; that is the provision —which means 128 per boat. That is the logic of the madhouse.

The late Lord Louis Mountbatten expressed himself very strongly and very intelligently when he said: During my six years on the NATO military committee, I never missed an opportunity of saying loud and clear, that the actual use of tactical nuclear weapons could end in the escalation to global nuclear destruction and for that reason no one in their senses would contemplate their use". I do not know that I would go entirely the whole way with Lord Mountbatten but, nevertheless, we all fully understand what he was saying. Mercifully, no one has yet used tactical nuclear weapons. But, on the other hand, it is worth saying in parenthesis that conventional wars seem to be spreading like wildfire at present.

It may be something of an aside, but I cannot resist expressing my own view that the Government would be better advised to review their Options for Change policy in the direction of switching some of their financial resources from the nuclear to the conventional field. I believe that that would make much more sense in the world in which we live.

The essence of the debate is to ask the question: how best can we prevent other nations from taking up the nuclear option? In that regard, we have not yet had a proper explanation from the British Government as to whether either knowingly or unknowingly we were involved in breaching our own guidelines on the export of nuclear weapon technology to Iraq. We must hope that Lord Justice Scott will uncover the truth of the situation. As has been stated, we must remember that Iraq signed up for the nuclear test ban treaty. It was only after the Gulf War that Iraq was found to be in a rather contemptible breach of the treaty.

I shall not go through the list of the other nations that have been mentioned because of the lack of time. However I should like to say a few words about the Ukraine. As a member of the Technical Committee of the General Assembly of NATO, I take heart that the Ukraine has invited us to visit the country in a month or two and participate in a seminar on these matters. We shall watch that situation carefully.

Finally, I support the view that has been expressed that we should move towards a fully comprehensive test ban. That means giving more authority and power to the United Nations and to NATO and giving full support to the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is important that we support the IAEA in every way we can by facilitating frequent inspections, particularly of undeclared facilities, and by establishing it as a national intelligence agency. We must refer to the Security Council any requests of the IAEA for inspections that are refused.

The Korean peninsular, the Indian Sub-Continent, the Near East, the Middle East and the Far East are all areas that give rise to concern. That situation should drive us to develop a policy to prevent nuclear proliferation by all means in our power. In that area the British Government should show us the leadership we expect from them. I hope the Minister will announce a change from the Government's previously stated position when she replies to the debate tonight.

7.21 p.m.

The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Chalker of Wallasey)

My Lords, I wish to say right at the outset how grateful I am to the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, for giving us a longer opportunity to discuss these critical issues than would ever be possible at Question Time. Proliferation is a grave threat to international security. With the ending of East-West confrontation we are turning our attention to the important task of seeking to reduce the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons.

I wish to pay tribute to the Southampton University Group—that was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Plant of Highfield—and its director, Professor John Simpson, for the work it does on non-proliferation. I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Plant, that we share his desire to achieve a consensus decision for the indefinite extension of the NPT at the 1995 conference. I shall go into that in a little more detail in a moment.

I was interested to hear the noble Lord, Lord Howell, in winding up for the Opposition, refer to the statements of the Prime Minister on 22nd March (at col. 467 of the Written Answers of Hansard of another place). The Prime Minister, in writing about this matter, used the most appropriate phraseology it was possible to use. I am delighted that the noble Lord, Lord Howell, with all his authority, wished to put that on the record. I can only endorse every word of the Prime Minister's statements. In the same column of Hansard of another place my right honourable friend the Prime Minister used the phrases I have used when I have replied to questions. He wrote: A comprehensive test ban would not in itself prevent a proliferator from producing and deploying a crude nuclear weapon without recourse to testing, and from obtaining the materials with which to do this. But associated measures for verification and inspection, if sufficiently rigorous, and applicable to the stales concerned, might constrain potential proliferations".—[Official Report, Commons, 22/3/93; Col. WA 467.] Those are obviously measures that we wish to implement. As I said recently at Question Time—this was pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Plant—Iraq has graphically demonstrated the dangers to which the Prime Minister referred in his Written Answer of 22nd March. It is quite clear that despite being a party to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons —the NPT——and despite being subject to a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iraq made considerable progress in developing a covert military nuclear programme.

However, as many noble Lords have said in our debate tonight, there are also risks in the former Soviet Union. A state with a vast nuclear arsenal has splintered into a number of separate states. This has raised an enormous number of acute questions about the nuclear status of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, where former Soviet nuclear weapons are stationed. It has also raised concerns, quite rightly, about the control of nuclear materials and expertise. That is why I say, beyond any doubt, that to act against proliferation, international co-operation is absolutely essential. Steps to counter proliferation taken by individual states acting alone can have only limited effect. They may encourage but they will never achieve what we are after, which is the indefinite extension of non-proliferation. I believe we also need total international co-operation if we are ever to achieve the ultimate goal of a comprehensive test ban.

There has been some good progress. The outstanding achievement is the conclusion and signing of the new Chemical Weapons Convention. This for the first time bans the possession and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Perhaps the most notable feature of that convention is its far-reaching verification provisions. In the nuclear field the Nuclear Suppliers Group has been reactivated and last year adopted controls on nuclear dual use items. That is progress but more is needed.

The noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, in opening this debate, and also the noble Lord, Lord Ennals, spoke of the challenges ahead. There are two major challenges. The first is to achieve the indefinite extension of the NPT, as I have already said. The second, which is no less important, is to strengthen the verification of compliance with the NPT. Without strengthening the verification of compliance with the NPT, which is the responsibility of the IAEA, the use of an extended NPT will not be complete.

The NPT came into force in 1970 for a period of 25 years. The 1995 conference will decide by how long, not whether, it should be extended. As a co-depositary of the NPT, with the United States and Russia, the United Kingdom is already working for that indefinite, extension. I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, that we most definitely want that indefinite extension.

There are still 34 states, some of them nuclear threshold states, which are not parties to the treaty. A further objective therefore must be to continue to increase the number of parties to the treaty. Good progress has been made recently with the accession of China, France and South Africa. We have heard a little more about South Africa tonight and I shall, return to that matter later if there is time.

As for verification of compliance with the treaty, we are working to strengthen the safeguards regime administered by the IAEA. I believe it was the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, who referred to strengthening the safeguards regime. It has been strengthened by the reaffirmation of the IAEA's right to conduct special inspections of undeclared but suspect sites. It is necessary that this right is upheld, particularly in the case of North Korea as I told the House some days ago. I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, that I believe it was the action of the IAEA in conducting the special inspections in North Korea—whatever the grounds for that, that body had the right to conduct the inspections—that caused the action of North Korea. I do not believe it would have mattered where the information given to the IAEA came from, that body would still have protested because of what that country was seeking to hide from inspection.

Tonight and in recent weeks many noble Lords have discussed the case for a comprehensive test ban and how, in the opinion of noble Lords, such a ban would contribute to efforts to counter the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We all wish to stop the development of nuclear weapons.

As a number of noble Lords have reminded us, there have been two previous periods in which negotiations have been conducted towards a comprehensive test ban. On neither occasion was the objective of a fully comprehensive test ban achieved, despite the great efforts of the noble Lord, Lord Ennals, and many other noble Lords and Members of another place in discussions.

Those earlier efforts were made under the threatening shadow of a nuclear arms race. An end to testing was seen as the most promising means of bringing that frightening competition under control. Today the international scene is very different. The arms race has gone into reverse. The United States and Russia, the possessors still of by far the largest nuclear arsenals among the nuclear powers, have agreed to reduce their deployed strategic warheads to around one third of the totals at which they stood when the last comprehensive test ban negotiations were broken off in 1980. Many more tactical nuclear weapons are being withdrawn from deployment, a process to which the United Kingdom is making a significant and substantial contribution, as I outlined to the House earlier this month.

The challenge we now face is different, but no less critical. It is to ensure that the welcome reductions in the arsenals of the recognised nuclear powers are not counterbalanced by the proliferation of nuclear weapons to states which have not hitherto possessed them, and in particular to states which might be tempted to use the possession of nuclear weapons to increase instability.

Tonight many of your Lordships, particularly the noble Lords, Lord Mayhew and Lord Ennals, and others, have left the listener with the impression that the UK is out of line with the other nuclear powers. Perhaps I may explain the position. The United States is conducting a thorough review of policy. Legislation passed by Congress in October 1992 recognises the need for more tests for safety purposes. It does not say that they are unnecessary. France has indeed announced a moratorium. It extends to April this year and may, subject to the views of the new government in France, be extended. We understand that in France, too, searching questions are being asked about the implications of stopping all testing for its national deterrent. Russia has conducted a testing programme which has led to enormous environmental pressure for it to stop. The economic pressures are also likely to be great in Russia. Russia has made it clear that it may well test again before 1996.

Why is there no UK moratorium on testing? The noble Lord, Lord Howell, specifically put that question to me. When the legislation was introduced in the US last year to suspend nuclear testing we did not announce our own moratorium. However, we accepted and made clear publicly that that meant that we would not be testing while the US moratorium continued. We were not convinced that unco-ordinated and unnegotiated moratoria were the right next step towards an international regime for restraints on nuclear testing. As I have said previously, it is critical that we move together in a united way to make sure that a comprehensive test ban would be totally effective in stopping any proliferation.

There have been many calls for a comprehensive test ban treaty to be negotiated in advance of the NPT extension conference in 1995. The NPT is the most effective measure for countering nuclear proliferation. The arguments in favour of its indefinite extension are strong, as many of your Lordships have said, regardless of how far we have progressed towards an end to nuclear testing. We need to ensure that that extension of the NPT is not held hostage to the conclusion of any test ban negotiations, which will inevitably take time if they are to achieve the results that we all want.

We must also ask whether we can be confident of succeeding in securing the agreement of all parties to such a ban to a fully effective verification regime. The Government believe that such a regime would necessarily have to include provision for intrusive monitoring for it to be fully credible. The most important factor would be stronger means of verifying compliance with the non-proliferation treaty itself.

In the UK we must also ask ourselves a further question: what are the implications of a comprehensive test ban for our own ability to maintain over time a safe and credible deterrent. In maintaining our support for a comprehensive test ban as an ultimate goal we constantly address that question. It has rightly been raised on all sides in both Houses of Parliament.

I believe that it was the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, who questioned the purpose of testing. I should now like to take up the questions that he, the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, and the noble Lord, Lord Mackie of Benshie, raised.

Our minimal programme of testing since the partial test ban treaty came into force in 1963–21 tests in total—has enabled nuclear warhead scientists to keep their designs under review and to deepen their understanding of how those highly complex weapons work. By testing their design assumptions against an observed result they are able to maintain the competence to modify designs and to improve the safety of devices such that the confidence in the inherent safety of our deterrent has been made at the highest possible level. It is not a question, as the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, seemed to believe, of it being difficult to give up that testing. The question is when it will be safe to do so. I suggest to your Lordships that it will be safe when we have a proper and internationally verifiable test ban and the non-proliferation treaty is extended indefinitely with the means to verify it.

Lord Jenkins of Putney

My Lords, may I ask the noble Baroness a question on that? Will she add to what she has just said? Why is it the case that other nations, including the United States, believe that it is safe to give up now whereas we do not?

Baroness Chalker of Wallasey

My Lords, a moratorium, which is what the United States has agreed upon and which I have just touched upon in my recent remarks, does not mean that they have given up testing for all time. I believe that we have to have agreement on an international basis before even the United States will take that step.

The safeguards regime of the IAEA is the most important matter for the near future. Our experience with Iraq, as the noble Lord, Lord Plant, said, has highlighted that. The IAEA has already taken a number of steps to overcome the shortcomings which it found in trying to carry out its work with Iraq. We consider that an important element of the inspection regime is that right to conduct special inspections, as was the case in North Korea.

We have to be quite clear that in aiming to maintain confidence in those weapons which we have and hope never to use we must have the best means of ensuring that they are safe. We have already referred in Questions to the alternative techniques of simulation in computer modelling. Those already contribute valuably. However, as I said two weeks ago, we are not yet satisfied that they represent an entirely adequate substitute. This is an area where we are seeking to develop our capability to reduce reliance on testing.

Lord Mayhew

My Lords, perhaps the noble Baroness will allow me to ask one question. I quoted the noble Viscount, Lord Cranborne. We have been informed that it is the Government's view that testing is riot required for the safety of Trident but only for future systems. In my speech I asked the noble Baroness to explain what are those future systems.

Baroness Chalker of Wallasey

My Lords, I did hear the noble Lord in that question. I shall wish to consider what my noble friend Lord Cranborne said. I shall also wish to find out what lay behind his Answer to the House because it would not be right for me—I am not a defence Minister—to reply off-the-cuff to the noble Lord. I shall do so by letter when I have examined the matter more fully.

In carrying out the thorough review in the US of the nuclear testing policy, the United States has assured us that British interests are being taken fully into account in its review. We have begun the process of exploring with the United States how best we might reconcile the needs that I have outlined tonight: the need to maintain the highest possible level of confidence in the safety of our nuclear weapons; and the need for effective action in support of a strong counter proliferation regime.

When the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, asked what future systems testing was needed, he was, I believe, referring to the WE177 free fall bombs. That was the matter to which my noble friend Lord Cranborne had referred. I am told that those go out of service in the next decade. We are satisfied that the development of a warhead for any new option could be completed before 1996, but perhaps we shall be successful and that will not be needed. I shall come back to the noble Lord on the wider issue that he raised a few moments ago.

The noble Lord, Lord Ennals, asked me about the safety arguments applying only to new systems. I believe that we have a responsibility to ensure that we maintain the safety of all our weapons over time. Testing has certainly played a most important part in enabling us to do that. The noble Lord also asked me what security assurances were needed to help in ensuring the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. Our negative security assurance already applies to all non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT and to other internationally binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices. That assurance is that the UK will not use nuclear weapons against such states except in the case of an attack on the UK, its dependent territories, its Armed Forces, or its allies by such a state in association or alliance with a nuclear weapons state. That is the official definition and answer to the noble Lord's question.

The noble Lord, Lord Attlee, asked me about safety of warheads. Perhaps he was thinking of a road accident or something of that kind. We are confident that even in a very severe motorway accident there would be no hazardous release of warhead material. But of course, we would seek not to move it around anyway. However, I understand his genuine inquiry.

The noble Lord also asked me how we prevent those countries who do not need civil nuclear programmes from acquiring them. Obviously countries which accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states undertake to sign safeguard agreements with the IAEA of their civil facilities and not to develop or seek to acquire nuclear weapons. But it is not open to any single member state to stop a state which wishes to develop a civil programme from doing so. We cannot speculate on whether or not countries need to have civil programmes due to their large oil reserves. That must be for them to decide.

A number of noble Lords today have asked questions about other countries. In the brief time for the remainder of the debate, and allowing the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, time to respond, let me say this in response to the noble Lord, Lord Kennet. He spoke about Exercise Team Spirit. That is not an occasional thing. Exercise Team Spirit has been a regular event run almost every year for at least a decade. The noble Lord also spoke in the debate about North Korea. He spoke as though North Korea was already out of the NPT. The Democratic People's Republic or Korea having been a party since 1985, and having signed early in 1992 a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, it is not out of the NPT at this moment. Indeed, what we should do in view of what has happened is to seek to persuade North Korea to change its mind and remain in. It will remain a party until at least 12th June.

The whole of the action by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is unprecedented. It requires a firm but measured response by all states concerned to uphold the non-proliferation regime. The objective of the international community must be to find a way to persuade North Korea to change its mind but not at the expense of weakening the non-proliferation treaty or the IAEA safeguards regime.

An extraordinary meeting of the board of governors of the IAEA on 18th March adopted a resolution which affirmed confidence in the director-general of the IAEA and confirms that the DPRK remains bound by its safeguards agreement. There will be a further meeting of the board on 31st March to consider what action should be taken if North Korea fails to meet tomorrow's deadline for complying. As the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, no doubt knows, the board is empowered to refer non-compliance with the agreement to the Security Council. We shall therefore wait to see what happens at the board on 31st March.

Many noble Lords spoke of the dangers in the Ukraine. Perhaps I may say this to them all. The Ukraine Government have publicly and repeatedly committed themselves to a future without nuclear weapons. Last month President Kravchuk told the Prime Minister, here in London, that he was determined to see those commitments fulfilled. They have made it clear to us and to others that they will not be able to do that without difficulty. I fully accept what the noble Lord, Lord Howell, said. We have helped them by addressing their security concerns and have made it clear that when they accede to the NPT we are prepared to make the security assurances to them based on the assurances that we have given to all non-nuclear weapon states which are parties to the NPT and our commitments to the CSCE framework. The US and Russia have said that they are prepared to do likewise. I sincerely hope that that will go ahead.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, the noble Baroness does not state—does she?—that the Ukraine has not stated in the past couple of days, since Mr. Yeltsin's speech, that it would not be signing the NPT.

Baroness Chalker of Wallasey

My Lords, no, I have not stated that. I have said exactly what the situation was when President Kravchuk was in this country, when we talked to him about it. To the best of my knowledge, that remains exactly the situation. Certainly nothing to the contrary has been received.

In response to a question that the noble Lord, Lord Plant of Highfield, asked about India and Pakistan, perhaps I may say that we have frequently urged both countries to accede to the NPT. They have significant unsafeguarded civil nuclear facilities and they are both widely believed to have the capability to build nuclear weapons, as his group will have told him. We need them to resolve the speculation about their nuclear programmes. Of course, we shall support all proposals aimed at building confidence and promoting security between those countries. We welcome Pakistani and American proposals for five-power talks on nuclear restraint in South Asia. We urge India also to participate. I sincerely hope that both those nations, and all others, will refrain from efforts to deploy ballistic missiles.

Early in the debate the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, and subsequently my noble friend Lord Clanwilliam, made comments about South Africa. South Africa's recent accession as a non-nuclear weapon state to the NPT was most welcome. Since then it has demonstrated a considerable degree of co-operation with the IAEA allowing inspectors to visit undeclared facilities. That is exactly what North Korea has refused to do. Perhaps I may say this to my noble friend Lord Clanwilliam. Should Mr. Nelson Mandela be elected president in the future, I am quite certain that the wish in that nation, as in all others, and among many members of the black community who fully support the ANC, will be that South Africa continues to be a signatory to the NPT and to make sure that we have peace in that nation. I see no danger such as my noble friend implied; nor do I see any in the response by the noble Lord, Lord Howell.

We in this House are all well aware of the dangers of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme and I shall not go over it again.

I should like to use my last few minutes to try to respond to the noble Lord, Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank, in his questions about the comment of my noble friend, Lord Carrington, in 1980 and the Written Answer by David Mellor when Minister of State in the Foreign Office in 1988.

I do not believe that David Mellor's statement reflected any major change in policy or any reaction to a particular event. I was already a Foreign Office Minister at the time and I think it is a matter of putting the situation on the record. I do not know who the questioner was, I cannot give the noble Lord, Lord Ennals, the answer to that at the Dispatch Box tonight. However, policy and security matters have to keep pace with the changes in the environment in which that policy is made. As I explained earlier in the debate, we live in a very different world now. The world in 1988 was very different from the world in 1980. Of course, it was in 1980 that the last CTB negotiations stopped. I shall have a further look at the logistics of the comments and write to the noble Lord, Lord Rodgers, but I think he seeks to introduce something into the debate which is not a difference at all.

I chose my words with care on 11th March in answering the Question of the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney. I said that I would contest the conclusion of the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman, that a comprehensive test ban would itself be an effective counter-proliferation measure. Since then, I have written to the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman, about that and sent a copy of the letter to the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins. In our efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban, which I am sure will come, we have to be sure about the defence of this country at each and every stage.

In conclusion, perhaps I may repeat the words of the President of the Security Council which he used following the summit last year: The proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The members of the Council commit themselves to working to prevent the spread of technology related to the research for or production of such weapons and to take appropriate action to that end". Non-proliferation is not a new objective. It has achieved a new prominence, not just because of the bad news such as North Korea, but also because of good news: the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention which was a major step towards a safer world. The immediate challenge for the NPT regime is clearly to resolve the North Korean situation in a manner which keeps North Korea in the treaty but without weakening it or the accompanying safeguard system.

However, in the longer term our goal is achieving the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. It has served us well for a quarter of a century and it continues to attract new parties. Many states have already pledged themselves to support this goal and we shall carry on working to persuade others to do so, as well as urging those few remaining non-parties to accede to the treaty. We do that because we have seen just how valuable a tool the NPT has been in turbulent times. We know that without it, the world would have been a far more dangerous place.

We are working for the future and for a better future. While I may not be able to give noble Lords all the answers that they have sought tonight, I ask them to think carefully that we go through uncertain times and are determined to make the world a safer place.

7.54 p.m.

Lord Mayhew

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have contributed to the debate. It gave particular pleasure to my noble friend Lord Rodgers and myself to find ourselves speaking in perfect harmony with the noble Lord, Lord Howell, on nuclear weapons in the manner in which we did year after year in the 1960s in the Labour Party against CND.

I should also like to thank the noble Baroness most warmly for her detailed and patient answers to our questions. I am afraid that as things stand the British delegates to the non-proliferation conference will have a tough time. It occurred to me that the noble Baroness is most likely to be given the role of British representative at the conference. No one would perform the role better than her, but if I may venture a highly respectful recommendation, I recommend that she does not take it on until there are changes in British policy. I beg leave to withdraw the Motion.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.