HL Deb 21 March 1989 vol 505 cc657-70

House again in Committee on Clause 5.

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington moved Amendment No. 22:

Page 3, line 36, at end insert— ("() Where, by reason only of the denial of a security clearance by the Service, a decision is made to deny employment to an individual or to dismiss, demote or transfer an individual or to deny any office or capacity specified by an individual, the Director-General shall send, within 14 days after the decision is made, a notice informing the individual of the denial of security clearance").

The noble Lord said: Amendment No. 22 provides that the director general shall send a notice informing the individual of the denial of security clearance. That is a very simple guarantee that a person who has been denied employment or whose employment has been detrimentally affected should know and be able to complain. That is the purpose of the amendment.

Article 13 of the European convention guarantees everyone the right of an effective remedy in domestic law with regard to breaches of the convention. The NCCL case of Hewitt and Harman, which has been accepted by the Commission on that basis, is to be heard shortly and so has yet to be decided. However, as I have already mentioned, the tribunal provisions in this Bill stem from cases at the European Court, particularly the case of Malone, regarding the principle of the citizen having an effective remedy. The amendment simply tries to ensure that a person who has been affected in his or her employment, which may be absolutely essential to that person, should be given notice of the fact so that he is able to make a complaint within 14 days. I beg to move.

The Lord Chancellor

It may be convenient to say a few words about the role of the service in respect of vetting. In doing so, I assume that the Committee accepts that it is right that the security service should have a clear duty, under its statutory functions, to help those engaged in matters affecting the security and well-being of the nation to make informed decisions about those who are employed on work where they could present a threat to the nation as a whole. However, as the Committee no doubt understands, the security service does not itself make the decision about the person's employment. Any report that it makes will be one factor, but it is not the final word. In some cases it may not know. It may not necessarily be informed or need to know the final decision.

I must say to the Committee therefore that I do not think it would be reasonable to put an obligation on the director general to inform an employee or job applicant of what the service had disclosed when, even if it were an adverse report, it may not have been the reason for any particular decision, and the service may not even need to know what that decision was. Under our system in this country the decision is properly and necessarily a matter for the employer or potential employer. The advantage of putting the responsibility for such decisions where they properly lie is that it does not require the security service to pass, say to a terrorist seeking employment in a government department, a notice from the service telling him in effect 1hat the service has him on its books. That would be the result of this amendment and I hope that M embers of the Committee will agree that this would be most undesirable. It would be one way to check up whether I had been followed and whether I was recognised as someone that the security service had on its books if an application were made to the security service and it was bound to tell me the result. I hope that Members of the Committee will not press the amendment.

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington

The noble and learned Lord replies at such speed that it is quite difficult to take in. If the Committee will look at the schedule dealing with investigation of complaints, under investigations and determinations, paragraph 3 states: If and so far as the complainant alleges that the Service has disclosed information for use in determining whether he should be employed, or continue to be employed, by any person or in any office or capacity specified by him, the Tribunal shall investigate whether the Service has disclosed information for that purpose and, if the Tribunal find that it has done so, they shall determine whether the Service had reasonable grounds for believing the information to be true". I read that only because there is a later amendment proposed to the wording. The noble and learned Lord always takes the case of the terrorist. The position surely with these enormous powers that the service has is that if a report is made that affects someone's employment, the case of the terrorist is incredibly unlikely. In the vast majority of cases it is a question of someone possibly being in some way subversive; it could be completely wrong information that the person belongs to some association or group which has been targeted by the service; it could be quite wrong targeting. That person, finding himself out of his employment or unable to obtain employment, must surely be told that such a situation has arisen so that he can make a complaint. Is all this to be governed by the possibility that a person might be a terrorist and therefore his employment is made impossible? I do not find that a proper answer to this amendment. At this moment in the evening it is quite pointless to go to a Division. However, this matter must be considered more carefully. No doubt we shall come back to it at a later stage. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 5 agreed to.

Clauses 6 and 7 agreed to.

8.45 p.m.

Schedule 1 [Investigation of Complaints]:

Lord Annan moved Amendment No. 23:

Page 5, line 20, at end insert ("always providing that these inquiries are directed solely, to establishing such membership").

The noble Lord said: My purpose in moving this amendment is simply this. It is perfectly understandable that the security services will make inquiries about somebody to see whether he is a member of an organisation—the Communist Party, the IRA or Militant Tendency. However, the question is this. Are these inquiries to be solely directed to whether he is a member? I ask this because it has often been suggested that they go far beyond their remit and include questions as to whether a man is homosexual, what his bank balance is, whether he has filed income tax returns, and generally widen the whole scope of the inquiry to try to find out something disreputable about him. I put this amendment down to test whether it is solely the question of membership that comes under this clause.

The Lord Chancellor

I have a little difficulty with this amendment in regard to the position at which it arises. I believe that the noble Lord moved it from its first position on the Marshalled List. I am not absolutely clear about its position now. However, it may help if I try to describe the situation. It might be helpful if I said that the tribunal would exercise its functions in response to a complaint in this way.

Under paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 anyone may complain if he is aggrieved by anything which he believes the security service has done against him. Except where the tribunal considers the complaint is frivolous or vexatious, it is required to investigate under paragraph 2 of the schedule whether the complainant has been the subject of inquiries by the service.

If the tribunal finds that inquiries about the complainant were continuing at the time of the complaint, then under paragraph 2(3) of the schedule it must determine whether, at that time, the service had reasonable grounds for deciding to continue inquiries about the complainant in the discharge of its functions. That is what the tribunal has to consider on a continuing inquiry: did the service have reasonable grounds for deciding to continue its inquiries at that time in the discharge of its functions?

To take the example that the noble Lord has given, the test might well be this. Was there reasonable ground to continue inquiries in relation to that case at the time in question? If it had found out everything that was reasonable to be found out before that, presumably it would not be reasonable to continue the inquiries at the stage in question. Perhaps that answers the point.

Sub-paragraph (4) raises another question about membership. Noble Lords will notice that the concept of membership of an organisation is not necessarily relevant to the tribunal's consideration of the decision. It only becomes relevant when the security service is making its inquiries on the grounds of a person's membership of a category of persons requiring investigations. That might be the case; it might not. It is set out in sub-paragraph (4), to which we shall come later.

I hope that I have answered the question which the noble Lord has raised on this amendment.

Lord Annan

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his explanation. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Elwyn-Jones moved Amendment No. 24:

Page 5, line 21, leave out sub-paragraph (4).

The noble and learned Lord said: The considerable burden of moving this amendment falls on me. Amendment No. 24 proposes to leave out sub-paragraph (4) of Schedule 1, paragraph 2. The ground for doing so is that it relates to categories of persons regarded by the service as requiring investigation in the discharge of its functions. The paragraph states: The Tribunal shall regard the Service as having reasonable grounds for deciding to institute or continue inquiries about the complainant if the Tribunal consider that the Service had reasonable grounds for believing him to be a member of that category". There has been strong feeling about proceedings against categories of persons on the ground that we may be moving towards the suggestion that they are guilty by association. This was thought to be undesirable, as indeed it is, and an objectionable part of the schedule. That is why the amendment proposes the removal of sub-paragraph (4). I beg to move.

Lord Trafford

If one were to accept this amendment it would suggest that the membership of many organisations, which might be regarded as dubious to say the least, could claim an escape, unless directly involved, from any form of investigation. I am the first to agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, that guilt by association is not acceptable. However, I would submit that the sub-paragraph is saying, in effect, that members of an organisation that itself is suspect, even though they themselves have not been proven or shown to have done something suspect, nevertheless by the fact of their membership of the organisation are reasonably subject to inquiry. That, in terms of security, does not seem to me to be unreasonable.

There are many examples which I do not think it is too difficult for the Committee to think of, where organisations are undoubtedly, to use a word not liked much today, subversive, and although the person being investigated may not at that moment or previously have been proved to be involved, nevertheless some doubt has been raised about his intentions or his probity if by his nature he joins such an organisation. In this sense as part of a category of people it does not seem to me to be unreasonable, and for that reason I would oppose the amendment.

The Lord Chancellor

The paragraph which the noble and learned Lord seeks to leave out is in these terms: Where it appears to the Tribunal that the inquiries had been or were being made about the complainant on the ground of his membership of a category of persons regarded by the Service as requiring investigation in the discharge of its functions". The Committee can easily think of a category; let us call it the X society. X society is regarded as a society requiring investigation, because it has been decided that it poses a threat. The tribunal shall regard the service as having reasonable grounds for deciding to institute or continue inquiries about the complainant if the tribunal considers that the service had reasonable grounds for believing him to be a member of X. The fact that he is associated with X is not a question of guilt by association. What is being considered is that if X is regarded as, let us say, a subversive organisation then the tribunal is to proceed on the basis that the service has perfectly good grounds to continue its inquiries about the complainant if the service had reasonable grounds for believing him to belong to X. That seems eminently reasonable. I cannot see any objection to that.

If one is considering whether X should have been investigated in the first place, then one moves on to the commissioner's power. But the assumption is that X is bad and it is right to investigate Y if there were reasonable grounds for believing that he was a member of X. I cannot see any objection to that. I entirely agree that guilt by association may not be a general concept to which one could give effect in every circumstance. But as the noble and learned Lord knows well, there can be guilt by association in some situations and this is membership of an organisation which in itself is regarded as posing a threat.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

There is a great fear of the extension of these provisions to cover perfectly law-abiding organisations which are worried by this kind of provision. The provision is all-embracing, and although the technical phrase of "guilt by association" may not be wholly appropriate it extends the strong arm of the security service rather far. I shall examine the observations of the noble and learned Lord and perhaps return to this at a later stage. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 25 and 26 not moved.]

Schedule 1 agreed to.

Schedule 2 [The Tribunal]:

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington moved Amendment No. 27:

Page 7, line 8, leave out ("each of whom shall be a barrister, advocate or solicitor") and insert ("the majority of whom shall be barristers, advocates or solicitors").

The noble Lord said: Paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 2 states: 'The Tribunal shall consist of not less than t free or more than five members each of whom shall be a barrister, advocate or solicitor of not less than 10 years' standing". The amendment proposes the insertion of the words: the majority of whom shall be barristers, advocates or solicitors". It seems extraordinary that the public should put their faith in a tribunal consisting entirely of lawyers. Should there not be an input of enlightened, unprejudiced, balanced, ungrasping, honest. disinterested persons on this committee of persons who are unqualified, who are not used to sifting evidence, who are capable of giving a good commonsense adjudication not weighed down by any long training in the ability to sift truth from falsehood? That is the basis of the amendment and it gives me the greatest possible pleasure to move it.

Lord Campbell of Croy

I should like to add a word because my noble and learned friend will remember that in my speech on Second Reading I queried the fact that all these good people would have to be lawyers. With respect to the distinguished members of the legal profession here this evening, I am interested in the Government's reason. This is an opportunity for the Government to explain why they took the decision, which I found surprising when I saw it, that every member of the tribunal would have to be a lawyer. I understand that if they are to be lawyers they must have a considerable background with 10 years' experience. I should be interested to hear the Government's reason for deciding that the tribunal should be made up completely of people with legal qualifications.

Lord Mayhew

As one of the few people present belonging to the category of persons described by my noble friend as honest and disinterested, compared with the legal lights here, I wish to support the amendment moved by my noble friend and to inquire by what reasoning the noble and learned Lord is supporting a legal monopoly. Fortunately he has the reputation of being against legal monopolies and we look forward to his explanation of his volte face in this matter.

Lord Trafford

I have now sat through the debate on this Committee stage for six hours or more. I am delighted that this is the first occasion on which I can fully agree with the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington. I was very puzzled during Second Reading to hear my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor suggest that because lawyers were most concerned with matters of truth and justice and were most involved with dealing with such matters, they were therefore the most appropriate people.

The immediate conclusion that I drew at that time was that if we were to have a further commission on crime, clearly the best people to put on this commission would be criminals and it did not seem to me to be a proper sequitur. So I hope very much that my noble and learned friend will indeed pay attention to the amendment that is put forward tonight.

9 p.m.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

While I do not for a moment share the motivation or the reasons put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson, in denigrating the undoubted merits of the legal profession and its ability fully to man such a tribunal, there is some word of truth in the proposition that it should necessarily be a monopoly.

The Lord Chancellor

The tribunal in this situation is a tribunal that will have an important adjudicatory role with finality, and the Government felt that the right people to compose this tribunal would be people who generally were equipped by professional qualification to adjudicate. It is for that reason that we took the view that the tribunal should consist of members of the legal profession with long experience. The tribunal is concerned with administering justice to individuals and it must be known to be equipped to deal scrupulously fairly and with legal expertise with matters which may be highly complex.

Not long ago, amendments were moved to exclude the Secretary of State from the grant of warrants and to put a judge or the commissioner in his place. I resisted those amendments and so far they have not been given effect to, so there is of course a lay element of a strong character in this system already. But when it comes to the adjudicatory role, in the ordinary case adjudications of challenge to Executive decisions of this kind would go to a court. I do not think it would be regarded as very monopolistic to have a court that was composed of members of the legal profession with 10 years' experience or more. Indeed I have heard it said that, at least in some parts of the higher judiciary, appointments should be even more restricted. But I am going for the most open structure that is available for adjudication at this level; namely, barristers—and we notice whom we put first—advocates or solicitors.

It certainly appears to me that where it is an adjudicatory role of a high order, it is right that one should produce a tribunal which is of comparable qualification and authority to the kind of court that one would have in mind at this level. Accordingly, the Government believe that if the tribunal are to be regarded as sufficiently authoritative to perform adjudicatory functions of this kind, and of the very special kind that is given to them—we have gone over this ground to some extent already, and these are quite difficult tasks of a legal nature that are given to them—it is right that the tribunal should be composed of those who are well versed in the law, with considerable experience.

I have no doubt that if this proposal in the Bill stands as it is, the Secretary of State will make every effort to secure barristers, advocates or solicitors well equipped to carry out this task. But essentially this is a task of an adjudicatory kind involving quite delicate questions of law, and therefore appropriate for those well qualified in law to adjudicate upon them.

Lord Thurlow

If I may intrude a purely personal comment at this stage in the Committee's proceedings, I am a mere member of the same class as the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew. But I happen to have a duplicate, who is qualified under the terms of the Bill to serve on the tribunal, because he happens to be an identical twin. I have no hesitation in saying that my learned kinsman would be infinitely better qualified to discharge these responsibilities than I should be myself.

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington

The noble and learned Lord has made a most convincing reply to this amendment and rather nervously, having regard to the support which I have had, I am prepared at the moment to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Elwyn-Jones moved Amendment No. 28:

Page 7, line 36, at end insert ("and to attend before the Tribunal should the Tribunal so require.").

The noble and learned Lord said: This is an amendment to Schedule 2. Schedule 2 proposes at page 7, line 36, paragraph 4(1): It shall be the duty of every member of the Service to disclose or give to the Tribunal such documents or information as they may require for the purpose of enabling them to carry out their functions under this Act". That is obviously necessary. It is proposed by the amendment to add the words and to attend before the Tribunal should the Tribunal so require. That seems to be a clear act of justice and necessity. I beg to move.

The Lord Chancellor

Under paragraph 4(1) of Schedule 2 the service is under a duty to provide all the information and documentation required by the tribunal to enable it to perform its functions. There is no suggestion that that requirement is confined in any way and, in particular, no suggestion that the requirement in respect of information is restricted to information in writing. If therefore in a particular case the tribunal required that information to be given by a member of the service attending on the tribunal, assuming such a request was for the purpose of discharging the tribunal's functions, as obviously it would be in the scope of the amendment, then it would be in accordance with the duty already in paragraph 4(1) of Schedule 2 for that request to be met. In short, my answer is that that is already covered by the powers given to the tribunal. Therefore, the amendment is unnecessary.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

One can only hope that that will be drawn to the attention of the relevant tribunals, and that they will act accordingly. One never has total confidence in those matters and it is better to see it set out as a duty on the face of the Bill. However, in the circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Elwyn-Jones moved Amendment No. 29:

Page 7, line 37, leave out sub-paragraph (2) and insert— ("

  1. (2) In the course of an investigation of a complaint by the Tribunal, the complainant shall be given an opportunity to make representations to the Tribunal, to present evidence and to be heard personally or by counsel.
  2. (2A) The complainant shall be entitled to have access to any documents or information disclosed or given to the Tribunal unless the Tribunal considers that, in the circumstances, such access would be prejudicial to National Security.
").

The noble and learned Lord said: This amendment proposes to leave out the somewhat complex sub-paragraph (2) and to put in its place two provisions which I greatly hope will give the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor the opportunity to concede something to those of us who have opposed so many matters contained in this Bill. At least that will be a token of a willingness not only to listen, which we know to be the great quality of the noble and learned Lord, but also to listen and occasionally to obey or at least comply with what is put forward by the Opposition.

It is proposed to insert in place of that complex paragraph 4(2), which is not easy to follow and which refers to disclosure by any persons, the provisions in the amendment that: In the course of an investigation of a complaint by the Tribunal, the complainant shall be given an opportunity to make representations to the Tribunal, to present evidence and to be heard personally or by counsel". That is an elementary requirement of justice in any tribunal however humble, modest or great. It then inserts that: The complainant shall be entitled to have access to any documents or information disclosed or given to the Tribunal unless the Tribunal considers that, in the circumstances, such access would be prejudicial to National Security". Seldom has a more moderate proposal been brought forward which is full of consciousness of the security element in the cautious terms of sub-paragraph (2A). I greatly hope, with some confidence, that we may at last see an acceptance of an amendment.

The Lord Chancellor

The important matter in considering this amendment is to consider the nature of a tribunal and its functions. I hope to persuade the Committee that the Bill makes proper and adequate provisions for the tribunal in its handling of complaints while avoiding the exploitation of its procedures by those who seek to threaten the security and well-being of the country.

I do not believe it is either necessary, nor would it be practicable, to give a right of oral representation to every complaint to the tribunal. The tribunal must, after all, consider the reasonableness of decisions made by the security service. The complainant may give the tribunal what evidence he wishes to substantiate his complaint. There is no need for this amendment in order to achieve that. But equally, the complainant is under no obligation to offer any evidence to substantiate his complaint. He only needs to make a complaint. He does not need to offer evidence to substantiate it. It is for the service, not the complainant, to respond to the tribunal's investigations. That is surely the right focus of the tribunal's work; and, if that is right, it could only be time consuming and unhelpful to give each and every complainant a statutory right to put his grievances and allegations in person, or through counsel. What if the tribunal finds that the complainant was not the subject of inquiries by the service? It would be fruitless for the complainant and his counsel to exercise their right to make full and elaborate explanations of suspicions which the tribunal knew, but for good reasons could not tell the complainant, were completely unfounded.

But of course there may be cases where the tribunal considers the complainant should be asked to attend in person or to be represented. Under the Bill, the tribunal is free to determine its own procedure subject only to restrictions concerning the disclosure of information provided to them. There is nothing in the Bill to preclude the tribunal from hearing oral evidence from the complainant or from others on their behalf where this would help them to discharge its functions. Perhaps I may revert to the previous amendment. That is one reason why it is wise to have a tribunal consisting of persons who know the procedures which are necessary in order to achieve justice in delicate situations.

If a complainant were to be invited to attend in person he could, of course, ask to be represented or accompanied. There is certainly no bar to a complainant taking legal advice or being legally represented. Under the Interception of Communications Act 1985, for example, the applications form to the Interception Tribunal requires the applicant personally to sign the form but makes it clear that he or she may ask a solicitor to submit the application to the tribunal on his or her behalf.

I do not think the Committee would be right to assume that all complaints will be the same in complexity, seriousness or content. Nor can it be right or necessary in all circumstances for the complainant to decide that he or she must appear before the tribunal. The tribunal comprises people of independence and judgment. They will be able to form their own judgment on what is needed in the light of the circumstances of the particular complaint.

Finally, I must suggest to the Committee that the part of the amendment proposing that information disclosed to the tribunal in the discharge of its function should be made available to individual complainants, subject only to the tribunal's discretion in respect of national security risks, is perhaps unwise. The fact is that it is fundamental to the security of the nation that the work of the security service is not publicly revealed. The purpose of this amendment appears to be to give the complainant the right to comment on the accuracy or otherwise of any information which the security service may hold on him. But what an opportunity that would give. Either he would be provided with the information by the tribunal, in which case he would know what the security service knew about him, or he could demand of the tribunal his right to see any such documents—and a refusal to do so could be even more revealing. The tribunal must not become a means for those who threaten the nation to find out what the security service may know about them, or even to get confirmation that they are known at all.

I do not believe that this amendment is necessary in order to give the complainant a proper opportunity to make his complaint or to ensure that the security service is required to explain its decisions and the basis for its decisions; or indeed to ensure that the tribunal can do a good and fair job. I believe that the category of tribunal which we have sought to establish in this Bill will give that degree of competence. I hope that in the light of that explanation the noble and learned Lord will not press the amendment.

9.15 p.m.

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington

Perhaps I may say a few words before the noble and learned Lord replies to the Lord Chancelllor. This is, if I may say so, a very sad day for civil rights in this country. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said that we have to be careful not to give an opportunity for the exploitation of the procedures; that there is nothing to preclude the tribunal from coming to is own conclusions and, if it wishes, to hear oral evidence or submissions that the person concerned may wish to make; and that it is able to form its own judgment. That is authoritarianism, is it not?

The whole purpose of this amendment, as I understand it, is to see that the person has rights based on natural justice. As the noble and learned Lord said in moving the amendment, someone put in this position should have, as every other person has (subject, of course, to national security) the basic, simple obligation towards the administration of justice and the ascertaining of the truth; the right to make representations, to present any evidence that he feels will be of help and, if necessary, to be heard in his own defence.

When it was suggested that a person should be entitled to see the document on which the surveillance, or whatever, may be based—and which document may be completely ill-founded—the answer given was that to provide him with an opportunity to comment on any information held by the security service would be in itself detrimental. If it is detrimental to national security there is not a person in this Committee who would not agree that that is absolutely right. That is exactly what this amendment proposes. The person should be permitted to see the documents unless the tribunal considers—and the decision is entirely in its hands —that such access would be prejudicial. If it is prejudicial, the person should not see it. If it is not prejudicial can there be any conceivable reason why he should not be entitled to see the document and deal with it?

It is a very sad day when the authoritarianism of this Government is disclosed in this Bill and in Bill after Bill that comes before this Chamber. One finds buried away in Schedule 2 that once again ordinary people's civil rights are simply trampled upon. I suggest that the amendment should be looked at with more seriousness and that the Members of the Committee should appreciate what the situation is. One must make a stand, and continue to do so, in order that people's rights are maintained even in this area and to give a blanket right to this tribunal of lawyers that they are not to disclose information that is against national security. Everybody agrees about that. But for goodness sake we must arrive at a position where even in this area what the Executive and the security service say shall not be allowed to stand without an ordinary person being entitled to put forward his defence and his view and to feel that at least his basic rights are upheld. I suggest that this amendment should not be withdrawn.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

I confess that I was deeply dismayed at the immediate response of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor to this amendment. The individual or fellow citizen—he may be an immigrant or a foreigner—has been given what is deemed to be something of a privilege to appear before this tribunal. Therefore one would expect that he would be given a reasonable opportunity to put his case. But no, because if he puts his case fully he may endanger security. Is he to sit there silent? So far as I can see, there is not a word in the schedule about the procedures of the tribunal as to the circumstances in which the individual is entitled to give evidence or to put his case.

The impression that one gets from the words of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor is that it is rather dangerous that he should be allowed to open his mouth at all. It will not do. This tribunal has been set up and it has been acclaimed as one of the features of this new pattern for the security service to secure the rights of the subject—the ordinary human being whether he is from Llanelli or London. When he is faced with the proceedings at the tribunal, he may conceivably be innocent of what is alleged against him. That possibility does not appear to be represented in the procedures that are provided for. There is not a word about the rights of the complainant. That really will not do. It is regrettable that at this hour and after long debate there are not more Members of the Committee here to know and learn what is going on. I hope that the noble and learned Lord will think again about this matter.

Is there no response from the Lord Chancellor?

The Lord Chancellor

I believe it is important to notice that the person in question is a complainant. It is not a question of someone defending himself as I believe the noble and learned Lord said and also the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington. It is a question of a person complaining about something else. I am saying that the tribunal has a very distinct character of quality and independence because it is to be appointed by Royal Warrant. A member of the tribunal may not be removed from office except on an Address presented to Her Majesty by both Houses of Parliament. So it is a very independent tribunal with the right to determine its own procedure. I have no doubt that the procedure adopted will be fair in every case. It does not seem sensible to require a right to appear before the tribunal for everyone. Apart from anything else, the tribunal has the duty of investigating the situation and the actions taken by the security service whether any evidence is put before it on behalf of the complainant or not so long as it is a serious complaint. Therefore a good deal of what is said about persons being entitled to defend themselves and about the authoritarian nature of the Bill is utterly misplaced. I believe that the arrangements proposed in the Bill are adequate and suitable ones for the delicate task with which the tribunal is to be entrusted.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

It is obvious that argument will not take the matter further. One has a tribunal provided for in an Act of Parliament and a procedure that says not one word about the rights and facilities of the person who may come before it. This is a sad moment at the end of a difficult day, We shall have to return to the matter at a later stage in the Bill. In the circumstances, I beg leave, sadly, to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Schedule 2 agreed to.

House resumed: Bill reported without amendment.

House adjourned at twenty-eight minutes past nine o'clock.