QUESTIONS AS TO SENTENCING—SUPPLEMENTARY

HL Deb 29 October 1987 vol 489 cc718-72

1. Subject to rules of court made under section 53(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal under section (Questions as to sentencing) above shall be exercised by the criminal division of the Court, and references to the Court of Appeal in Part IIIA of this Act (including references in this Schedule) shall he construed as references to that division.

2. Notice of an application for leave to refer a case to the Court of Appeal under section (Questions as to sentencing) above shall be given within 28 days from the day on which the sentence, or the last of the sentences, in the case was passed.

3. The power to grant leave may be exercised by a judge of the Court of Appeal or the High Court, but if a single judge refuses an application, the Attorney General shall he entitled to have it determined by the Court of Appeal.

4. If the registrar of criminal appeals is given notice of a reference or application to the Court of Appeal under section (Questions as to sentencing) above, he shall—

1. (a) take all necessary steps for obtaining a hearing of the reference or application; and
2. (b) obtain and lay before the Court in proper form all documents, exhibits and other things which appear necessary for the proper determination of the reference or application.

5. Rules of court may enable a person to whose sentencing such a reference or application relates to obtain from the registrar any documents or things, including copies or reproductions of documents, required for the reference or application and may authorise the registrar to make charges for them in accordance with scales and rates fixed from time to time by the Treasury.

6. An application to the Court of Appeal for leave to refer a case to the House of Lords under section (Questions as to sentencing) (4) above shall he made within the period of 14 days beginning with the date on which the Court of Appeal conclude their review of the case; and an application to the House of Lords for leave shall be made within the period of 14 days beginning with the date on which the Court of Appeal conclude their review or refuse leave to refer the case to the House of Lords.

7. The time during which a person whose case has been referred for review under section (Questions as to sentencing) above is in custody pending its review and pending any reference to the House of Lords under subsection (4) of that section shall be reckoned as part of the term of any sentence to which he is for the time being subject.

8. Except as provided by paragraphs 9 and 10 below, a person whose sentencing is the subject of a reference to the Court of Appeal under section (Questions as to sentencing) above shall be entitled to be present, if he wishes it, on the hearing of the reference, although he may be in custody.

9. A person in custody shall not be entitled to be present:

1. (a) on an application by the Attorney General for leave to refer a case; or
2. (b) on any proceedings preliminary or incidental to a reference;

unless the Court of Appeal give him leave to be present.

10. The power of the Court of Appeal to pass sentence on a person may be exercised although he is not present.

11. A person whose sentencing is the subject of a reference to the House of Lords under section (Questions as to sentencing) (4) above and who is detained pending the hearing of that reference shall not be entitled to be present on the hearing of the reference or of any proceeding preliminary or incidental thereto except where an order of the House authorises him to be present or where the House or the Court of Appeal, as the case may be, give him leave to be present.

12. The term of any sentence passed by the Court of Appeal or House of Lords under section (Questions as to sentencing) above shall, unless they otherwise direct, begin to run from the time when it would have begun to run if passed in the proceeding in relation to which the reference was made.

13. Where on a reference to the Court of Appeal under section (Questions as to sentencing) above or a reference to the House of Lords under subsection (4) of that section the person whose sentencing is the subject of the reference appears by counsel for the purpose of presenting any argument to the court or the House, he shall be entitled to his costs, that is to say to the payment out of central funds of such funds as are reasonably sufficient to compensate him for expenses properly incurred by him for the purpose of being represented on the reference; and any amount recoverable under this paragraph shall be ascertained, as soon as practicable, by the registrar of criminal appeals or, as the case may be, such offer as may be prescribed by order of the House of Lords.").

The noble Earl said: I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, wishes to say a few words upon this amendment, although it has already been spoken to with Amendments Nos. 40 and 41.

Lord Wigoder

I am grateful to the noble Earl. This is a consequential amendment. It is the amendment which sets up the machinery by which there is to be implemented the clause passed by the Committee against my advice, giving the prosecution the right of appeal against lenient or over-lenient sentences.

In the course of that very long debate, no reference was made to the actual machinery set out in Amendment No. 31 and I simply want to make one comment on this proposed machinery with a genuine desire to be helpful. It concerns the proposal that where appeals are thus made there should be a preliminary sieve, before the case goes to the full Court of Appeal, of a single judge giving leave for that purpose. I want to query whether that is in fact necessary or desirable.

I can understand the present practice whereby, if an appellant is appealing against a sentence which he alleges is too severe, the single judge is used as a sieve, because many such appeals are totally unmeritorious, frivolous and without foundation and the use of the single judge allows them to be eliminated. I could understand using a single judge similarly, if the proposal now was that the prosecution might have a general right of appeal on the grounds of an over-lenient sentence, because there might be some prosecuting counsel, or prosecuting authorities, who might use that power, or seek to use it, in a somewhat oppressive way, and it would be helpful if the single judge were there to sieve those appeals out before they reach the full court.

We decided that the Attorney-General would be responsible for bringing such appeals. He is a person of manifest independence, as we all know. The Government said that the number of appeals would be somewhere in the region of a dozen a year. There will therefore obviously be the cases that appear to the Attorney-General to be the most flagant apparently over-lenient sentences. I cannot believe that using a single judge as a sieve in those circumstances is in any way necessary.

The proceedings before the single judge as I understand it will be ex parte: the defendant will not be entitled to be heard. The single judge will be looking at the documents. I find it inconceivable that the single judge in those circumstances could differ from the Attorney-General on a view that here was a matter worth being considered by the full Court of Appeal.

Using a single judge in the way that is now proposed for appeals by the Attorney-General I think has two disadvantages. First, it will involve additional work for the single judge, who is already heavily occupied. Secondly, it is an extra stage in the proceedings that could usefully be dispensed with because it would then enable the full appeal to come on more quickly. I think that, for any defendant who may have the misfortune of finding himself sentenced on a second occasion and perhaps more severely, the quicker that is done, the nearer it is to the trial, the better.

I ask only that the Government look at whether it is essential to retain the use of the single judge in this machinery set out in Amendment No. 31. It might be—it is not for me advise the Government what to do—that they will think it appropriate to have a word with the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice, who presides over the criminal division of the Court of Appeal. I suspect that, if the Government were good enough to do that they might then be able to come back at the next stage of the Bill with some amendments that were mutually acceptable.

The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Strabolgi)

I remind the Committee that we have not yet had a Motion. I think that the noble Earl, Lord Arran, should move Amendment No. 31 before we go any further.

The Earl of Arran

I beg to move Amendment No. 31.

Lord Harris of Greenwich

I very much agree with what my noble friend Lord Wigoder has just said. Like him, I much regret the decision taken by the Committee earlier this week. Given the fact that that decision has been taken, I do not begin to understand the argument for the single judge. As my noble friend has pointed out, it will undoubtedly lead to additional work for a hard-pressed judge in any event. I do not believe that it will do other than add to the delay for a defendant who would know that the Attorney-General was asking for his case to go to the Court of Appeal. I think that the case, if it is authorised as it has to be by the Attorney-General, should sensibly go direct to the Court of Appeal. I believe that the case for this is made out. No doubt there is some belief that this is in some way a more fair-minded approach. As I have indicated, I hope that the Government will look at this matter between now and Report.

The Earl of Arran

I am grateful for the comments of the noble Lords, Lord Wigoder and Lord Harris of Greenwich. In the circumstances, I think that they would not expect me to comment upon this myself; but I shall of course refer it to my noble friend Lord Caithness.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Schedule 3 agreed to.

Clause 62 agreed to.

Clause 63 [Statements, etc. relevant to making confiscation orders]:

The Earl of Arran moved Amendment No. 80: Page 41, line 27, leave out ("account") and insert ("consideration").

The noble Lord said: With this it would be appropriate to take Amendments Nos. 81, 82 and 83. These are drafting amendments. The first two change the expression "taken into account" in Clause 63 to "taken into consideration", which is the expression used elsewhere in this Part of the Bill. The last two amendments remove the redundant words "obtained or" in two places in Clause 64(8). Subsection (8) concerns validation of gifts received by third parties. The expression "obtained" relates to property obtained from an offence and belongs in earlier subsections. It should, therefore, be deleted. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

8.30 p.m.

The Earl of Arran moved Amendment No. 81: Page 41, line 32, leave out ("taken into account") and insert ("so taken into consideration").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 63, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 64 [Definition of principal terms used]:

The Earl of Arran moved Amendment No. 82: Page 43, line 41, leave out ("obtained or").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Arran moved Amendment No. 83: Page 44, line 2, leave out ("obtained or").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 64, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 65 and 66 agreed to.

Clause 67 [Restraint orders]:

Lord Irvine of Lairg moved Amendment No. 84:

Page 47, line 4, at end insert— ("(4A) An application for a restraint order shall:

1. (a) State particulars of the offence or offences with which the defendant is charged
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2. (b) Give particulars of the allegations made against the defendant and fairly state the points made against them by the defendant
3. (c) Give grounds for belief that:
1. (i) the defendant has benefited from the offence or offences
2. (ii) the value of his proceeds of the offence or. as the case may be, the aggregate value of his proceeds of the offences, and the amount that might be realised, are at least £10,000
3. (iii) there is a risk that dealings in the defendant's realisable property may defeat the making or enforcement of a confiscation order,
4. (d) Where the realisable property is held by a specified person not being the defendant give particulars of the circumstances on which it is so held.
5. (e) Give an undertaking to pay to the specified person compensation assessed in accordance with section 79(3) of this Act in the circumstances specified in section 79(1) of this Act.").

The noble Lord said: Clause 61 provides for orders to confiscate property representing the benefit obtained from the commission of an offence. An order of that kind, that is, an order to confiscate property, must await a conviction. It is evidently a necessary provision in order to prevent a defendant who expects with good reason that he will be convicted from putting such property out of reach of the authorities in the meantime. Thus the explanation for Clauses 66 to 69 is that they provide for restraint orders and charging orders which look to an earlier stage in the proceedings so that that is not their sole function. Such orders may even be made before proceedings are instituted at all. Put at its shortest, their effect is to freeze the property in question.

Members of the Committee will immediately see that that is a sweeping and strong order to make at a time when no one has been found guilty of anything; but we make no complaint about that. Similar orders in recent years have become well known to the civil law. They are called Mareva injunctions after the case in which that order was first made.

I am a little disappointed to observe that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, has not remained in his seat at this hour of the night. He did not, I think, invent the Mareva injunction. So shortly afterwards someone did. He rationalised it and popularised it, as both activities were his wont. My purpose in bringing these amendments forward in the context of this Bill is to introduce into the criminal law safeguards for individuals not yet found guilty. no less than the safeguards which today apply in ordinary civil or commercial litigation.

Like the orders now envisaged by the Bill and characteristically and for obvious reasons applied for ex parte (that is, the person seeking the orders goes along to the court without telling the other side), that is exactly what happens in relation to Clause 61 orders. By the time the owner of the property finds out about it, the application under Clause 61 having been made ex parte, his property is frozen and he cannot lawfully deal with it except by going to the court to get the order discharged or varied.

Because of this one-sided application the civil courts have insisted that the party who is applying for the order must show strong grounds for it to be made and must be absolutely frank with the court. In a recent case in 1985 the present Master of the Rolls said that the Mareva injunction in the civil law was a draconian remedy. He went so far as to describe it as a nuclear weapon of the law. It is indeed a strong order but I do not think it is quite as strong as that. That concern to protect the defendant who is subject to a Mareva order in the civil law, made as it were quite properly behind his back, is to be contrasted with the free and easy approach of the Bill. I could have said, uncharitably, that the Government might have been expected to show a little more respect for rights of property unless perhaps it is the presumption of innocence for which its affection is limited.

All that is really needed to get the order is for the prosecutor to satisfy the court that a confiscation order may be made in the proceedings. The purpose of these amendments is simply to adopt the matters that must be dealt with by a plaintiff in civil litigation seeking a Mareva injunction. In fact they were laid down by the Court of Appeal in 1979. The court then hoped and anticipated that the requirements would in no way reduce the efficacy of the remedy. Experience has shown that they have not.

The objective is to save the court to which application is made from having to decide the point in a state of ignorance and the aim is to do justice to defendants, potential defendants and third parties, all of whom I would emphasise are as yet presumed to be innocent.

I am sure that the noble Earl would agree that there is no reason for the protection to be any less in criminal proceedings than it is in civil proceedings. Equally an undertaking to pay compensation if the proceedings prove ill-founded is standard in the case of a Mareva injunction in civil proceedings. That is why paragraph (a) in each of the amendments which I have brought forward imposes a similar obligation on the prosecutor, defined by reference to the compensation provisions which already exist in Clause 79 of the Bill.

I shall shortly be moving a further amendment to delete the compensation provisions of Clause 79 in so far as they depend upon showing a serious default by some official. But that is a wholly independent point and in accepting these amendments the Committee is in no order prejudging the argument on that amendment, which is for future discussion. It is for reasons that I shall give when I move the amendment to Clause 79 of the Bill that the prosecutor who seeks and obtains an order should undertake to pay compensation if the prosecution proves ill-founded. I mention that so that the noble Earl has it in mind, but he can take it from me that acceptance of the amendments which I now propose to Clauses 67 and 68 in no way relates to acceptance of the amendments that I shall be proposing to Clause 79.

So however Clause 79 ultimately emerges in the Bill the quite independent justifications for these amendments to Clauses 67 and 68 which I now propose remain, but I have been careful to formulate them in the way that I have so that they link in to Clause 79, however it should emerge in the Bill. The noble Earl may think that this is a serious proposal and one which gives no less a protection to persons who are subject to this kind of order than they would have if they were defendants in civil litigation, and I hope that he will feel able to say that it merits his taking it away and giving it careful thought.

The Earl of Arran

The noble Lord has raised interesting questions about the procedures for obtaining restraint and charging orders. Before I reply in some detail to the amendments, it may help if I just remind the Committee of the purpose and nature of these powers. Under the Bill the perpetrators of highly profitable serious crimes will become liable to confiscation of the value of their unlawful proceeds. But the confiscation powers will not become effective unless there is also power at an early stage in the proceedings to freeze assets so that they cannot be dissipated before the case comes to trial. Thus the Bill gives powers to the High Court to make restraint and charging orders.

The important thing about the orders is that they are only interim measures. That means two things in particular. It means that speed is of the essence. It must be possible for the prosecution to get in ahead of the criminal by obtaining an order quickly and with the minimum of procedural hurdles necessary to ensure fairness.

However, being only interim measures these orders have limited effect once they are in place. The value of the restrained property must be preserved until the issue of confiscation is decided one way or the other. The orders themselves and their terms and conditions are open to challenge at any time by the defendant or by any other affected party. This is written into the Bill in Clauses 67(5) and 68(8). The conditions for making restraint and charging orders are set out in Clause 66, which immediately precedes the clauses to which these amendments apply.

The first condition is that criminal proceedings must either be in progress or about to be started. That flexibility is important because it enables the prosecuting authorities to secure the suspect's arrest and the restraint of his assets at more or less the same time. If they could not do that they would risk allowing either the suspect or the assets to disappear.

The second condition for making a restraint or charging order is that there must either be a confiscation order in force or, more usually, a prospect of one being made upon a suspected offender's conviction. That is an important condition because of course these powers must only be used to preserve assets which are liable to be confiscated. That is their purpose.

Against this background I wish to turn to the substance of the noble Lord's amendments. It lies in the requirements of paragraphs (a) to (e) which it is proposed should be met by the prosecutor when applying for either a restraint or charging order.

The Committee will wish to bear in mind the point that speed is of the essence if the orders are to achieve their purpose but that they are only interim measures. The first requirement suggested in paragraph (a) seems unobjectionable as far as it goes. Clearly the application will have to specify any charges brought if the High Court is to be satisfied that proceedings have been instituted.

On the other hand, the requirement would not make sense in the other sort of case where a restraint order is made on the basis that the proceedings are to be instituted. As I have explained, that may be necessary in some cases and Clause 66 accordingly allows it. The second requirement in paragraph (c) is that the application should fairly state the allegations against the defendant and his reply. It is not the business of the High Court to prejudge the criminal trial by way of prosecution and defence arguments as to the criminal matter itself. Indeed there may not yet be specific allegations at the stage when the restraint order is applied for. The defendant may very well have said nothing. If a restraint order were to depend on an examination of the merits of the prosecution case, it is unlikely it could be made in time to be effective.

I am less unhappy with the requirements suggested in paragraph (c). The prosecutor must certainly show grounds for believing that there has been a benefit of such an order—the £10,000 threshold—at which the confiscation powers come into play. But it would be wrong, I think, to expect the prosecution at this stage of the proceedings to show that precisely £10,000 or more has been made. The prosecutor may just have had a good suspicion that more proceeds would come to light during further investigation. That should be enough to allow a restraint order to be made in an appropriate case.

I am not exactly certain what is meant by paragraph (d) in these amendments, but I believe that paragraph (e) is unnecessary. Compensation under Clause 79 is awarded by the High Court. If the prosecutor is ordered to pay compensation naturally he will; otherwise he would be in contempt of court. I am sure our prosecutors will not get into that position and therefore it is unnecessary to require the prosecutor to undertake to pay any compensation under Clause 79.

I conclude from this examination that some of the additional requirements proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Irvine, would not fit in with the scheme for making restraint and charging orders but would hold up the making of these orders, and so defeat their purpose.

On the other hand, some of the noble Lord's suggestions really go to procedural matters which we envisage will be dealt with under the rules of the High Court in the established way. We already have rules in Order 116 of the Supreme Court which govern the procedures for restraint, and charging orders under the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986. They cover matters such as the contents of the affidavit, which must support any application by the prosecutor and the procedure for the affected parties to be notified of the making of the order and to seek if they wish its discharge and variation. I am sure it would be right to deal in a similar way with procedural matters arising from similar provisions in this Bill. I hope that in view of the explanation I have given, the noble Lord will not feel constrained to press these amendments.

Lord Irvine of Lairg

I am bound to say that at the outset of his reply, the noble Earl was stating only what is well accepted on this side: that is to say, the purpose of these provisions, which we completely support. The only question—and that is the purpose of bringing forward these amendments—is whether thought could and should be given to incorporating as appropriate, for the benefit of those made subject to these orders, some of the protections that exist in civil proceedings that can usefully be adapted to this remedy without prejudicing the overall purpose of these orders, which we entirely support.

We entirely recognise of course that speed is necessary and that these are only interim measures. I understood the noble Earl to say that, for example, (a) was unobjectionable but that it did not cover the case where no charge has as yet been made. That would be covered of course by the addition of the words, "or is to be" so that (a) would read: state particulars of the offence or offences with which the defendant is or is to be charged". The noble Earl said in relation to (b) that it was not for the judge to adjudicate upon the particulars given of the allegation if the amendment were accepted. We would agree not to judge, but should it not be incumbent upon the prosecutor at least to give these particulars? I hope the noble Earl will feel able to say, having heard the argument from this side, that at least he will give some thought to whether some additional provision giving some, as appropriate, of these protections that exist in the civil law to the defendant made subject to this kind of order should be made. If he can indicate that he will, that will enable me to seek leave to withdraw these amendments.

8.45 p.m.

The Earl of Arran

These provisions ensure that a restraint or charging order may only be made on good grounds and that there is ample opportunity for challenge by the affected parties. To incorporate more hurdles into the procedure, as the noble Lord has suggested, would risk defeating the whole purpose of these confiscation powers by allowing sophisticated and experienced criminals to move their assets out of reach of the courts while the prosecution sought to marshall their case. I really believe that the balance in the Bill is right as it stands. In the circumstances I ask the noble Lord not to press these amendments.

Lord Irvine of Lairg

I will study with care what the noble Earl has said, and in the meanwhile I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 67 agreed to.

Clause 68 [Charging orders in respect of land, securities, etc.]:

[Amendment No. 85 not moved.]

Clause 68 agreed to.

Clauses 69 and 70 agreed to.

Clause 71 [Application of proceeds of realisation and other sums]:

The Earl of Arran moved Amendment No. 86: Page 50, line 27, leave out from beginning to ("property") in line 28 and insert—

1. ("(a) the proceeds of the enforcement of any charge imposed under section 68 above:
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2. (b) the proceeds of the realisation, other than by the enforcement of such a charge, of any property under section 67 or 70 above; and
3. (c) any other sums, being").

The noble Earl said: In moving Amendment No. 86 I think it would be appropriate if I could also talk to Amendments Nos. 87 through to 98 inclusive. These amendments correct a number of drafting errors and one anomaly in Clause 71 which determines what happens to money raised in enforcement of a confiscation order. The amendments are all linked with one another but it may be convenient to look at them in three clusters, which I propose to explain in turn.

The first cluster of four amendments—Nos. 86, 87, 88 and 89—correct mistakes which have unfortunately crept into the drafting of subsections (1) and (2) of Clause 71. The amendments ensure that the clause applies to all sums realised by receivers under the Bill, not just of proceeds but of enforcing a charge made under Clause 68. They make one or two other minor corrections.

The second cluster in respect of anomalies covers Amendments Nos. 91, 92 and 93, all referring to subsection (3), which determines the order in which the justice's clerk responsible for enforcement is to apply money paid into court in satisfaction of a confiscation order. Payment should first be made to any insolvency officer acting on the property who has a claim to expenses not already met under subsection (1). The next step is to pay any receiver's costs.

Paragraph (b) in this subsection allows the receiver to recover these direct if he himself pays in the money, but there has been omitted in error another paragraph allowing payment of any expenses already advanced to the receiver by the prosecutor. The purpose of Amendment No. 92 is to reinstate that paragraph. Amendments Nos. 91 and 93 are consequential.

Amendments Nos. 94 to 98 make minor adjustments to subsection (4). That subsection deals with the situation where the sentencing court has directed, under Clause 62(4), that part of the sums recovered under a confiscation order shall be applied in payment of a compensation order because of an apparent shortfall in the offender's means. In that situation it is provided that a deduction should be made from the amount of compensation paid out of confiscated assets by way of a contribution towards the costs of any receiver. The principle behind this is that the help of expert receivers working under the direction of the High Court to trace and realise assets would not normally be available to a person seeking compensation unless they were to undertake expensive civil actions privately. It is therefore right and fair that the beneficiary of a receiver's action should make a contribution to the costs involved.

However, the present provision contains an anomaly. It provides for the contribution to be made only where the compensation money comes directly from a receiver. It does not take account of the case where the receiver's action in tracing the assets in effect forces the defendant to pay up, even though it is not actually the receiver himself who collects the money. Nor does it necessarily cover the case where the receiver works to the benefit of the compensated person by keeping up the value of assets entrusted to him under a restraining order.

We consider it to be right that the person receiving compensation should also contribute to the receiver's costs in these cases. Accordingly, the amendments would make contributions due in any case where the receiver has done work towards the recovery of assets which subsequently help to satisfy a compensation order. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Arran moved Amendments Nos. 87 to 98:

Page 50, line 30, after ("77") insert ("(2)").

Page 50, line 31, leave out ("proceeds and").

Page 50, line 40, leave out from ("may") to end of line 41 and insert ("direct after giving a reasonable opportunity for such persons to make representations to the court").

Page 51, line 3, after ("77") insert ("(2)").

Page 51, line 4, leave out ("so paid, shall first be applied in payment of the receiver's") and insert ("paid by a receiver under subsection (1) above, shall first be applied in payment of his").

Page 51, line 5, at end insert— ("(bb) subject to paragraph (b) above, shall be applied in reimbursement of any sums paid by the prosecutor under section 78(2) below:").

Page 51, line 6, leave out ("and (b)") and insert ("to (bb)").

Page 51, line 13, leave out from ("Where") to ("shall") in line 15 and insert ("under subsections (3) above a sum falls to be applied in payment both of compensation and of other outgoings— (a) the person entitled to the compensation").

Page 51, line 17, leave out from ("remuneration") to first ("the") in line 18 and insert ("or expenses").

Page 51, line 20, leave out ("under which the sum was recovered").

Page 51, line 22, leave out from ("clerk") to ("an") in line 23 and insert ("shall deduct from the amount falling to be applied in payment of the compensation").

Page 51, line 27, leave out from ("person") to ("and") in line 29 and insert ("entitled to the compensation shall be treated as having received the whole amount which falls to be applied in payment of it").

The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendments No. 87 to 98.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 71, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 72 and 73 agreed to.

Lord Irvine of Lairg moved Amendment No. 99: After Clause 73, insert the following new clause:

("Duty to give notice when realisable property exceeds amount of the confiscation order

.—(1) A receiver appointed by the Court in respect of realisable property under section 70(2) above shall be under a duty to give notice in writing to the prosecutor when it appears to him that the amount of realisable property exceeds the amount of the confiscation order, specifying the amount of such excess.

(2) If, on an application by the prosecutor in respect of a confiscation order, the High Court is satisfied that the realisable property exceeds the amount of the confiscation order, the Court shall issue a certificate to that effect, giving its reasons, and specifying the amount of such excess.

(3) Where a certificate has been issued under subsection (2) above the prosecutor may apply—

1. (a) where the confiscation order was made by the Crown Court. to that Court; and
2. (b) where the confiscation order was made by a magistrates' court, to a magistrates' court for the same area.

for the amount to be recovered under the order to be increased.

(4) The Crown Court shall, on an application under subsection (3) above—

1. (a) substitute for the amount to be recovered under the order such greater amount as the Court thinks just in all the circumstances of the case; and
2. (b) substitute for the term of imprisonment or of detention fixed under subsection (2) of section 31 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Acts 1973 in respect of the amount to be recovered under the order a longer term determined in accordance with that section in respect of the greater amount.

(56) A magistrates' court shall, on an application under subsection (3) above, substitute for the amount to be recovered under the order such greater amount as the Court thinks just in all the circumstances of the case.")

The noble Lord said: I hope that this new section which I am proposing finds more favour with the noble Earl. It is proposed in order to fill what would appear to me to be a major gap or imbalance in the scheme of the Bill. That is a gap which could, in some cases, seriously inhibit the overall effectiveness of the provisions. I observe that it is a gap which likewise exists in the drug trafficking legislation of 1986.

Just as a confiscation order may be revised downwards in favour of a defendant, the point of the amendment is that it should be capable of being revised upwards if the receiver discovers that the realisable property in fact exceeds (it may be, very substantially) what the Crown Court or the magistrates' court was led to believe.

Suppose a bank robber has made, let us say, £500,000 from three robberies. The Crown Court is minded to make a confiscation order in that sum of £500,000. The defendant then says, "You cannot do that. I have prior obligations amounting to £450,000". And so he has. Therefore, the confiscation order that is made is made for £50,000 only. That would be made under Clause 64(3)(d). Alternatively, let us say that the robber has made his £500,000 from three robberies but he persuades the court that all he has left in the world is £50,000. Therefore, that is all that can be realised. That order would be made under Clause 61(6)(b). Those are very realistic examples.

Not to put too fine a point on it, suppose that he succeeds in conning the court. Either he may have more assets than he has said or they are worth a good deal more than the court is led to believe. In the major cases of which we are speaking, where a receiver is appointed under Clause 70(2), it seems to me that it is a serious gap in the legislation when there is no power to revise a confiscation order upwards, although there is a power to revise such orders downwards.

Not only is it obvious that the receiver is better able to ferret out the truth than was the court when it made the order, but suppose, for example, that the receiver was able to track £10 million in a Swiss bank account. That money would be realisable if the defendant co-operated and unlocked the account. Surely it would be a salutary spur to the defendant to unlock the bank account to increase the amount of the order, providing a longer sentence of imprisonment in default under subsection (4) if the confiscation order in the greater amount was not satisfied.

I bring the matter forward as a point of principle, as to whether confiscation orders should not be capable of being revised upwards as well as downwards if the receiver discovers that the court has been conned.

The Earl of Arran

I recognise that the noble Lord's concern in this amendment is partly to avoid undue burdens on the sentencing court in trying to assess precisely the available property. However, I do not think that those burdens will be as great as he fears. In the more complex cases involving substantial assets, a great deal of investigative work will have been done in gathering evidence and securing restraint of assets before the trial. The procedure in Clause 63 enables the necessary information to be put before the court and, in disputed matters, determined in an orderly way.

However, in view of the words which the noble Lord has used, we should like to re-examine this particular matter without commitment to see if there is any further change or addition than can be made.

Lord Irvine of Lairg

I am grateful to the noble Lord. He appreciates that I am in no way criticising the procedures that the court will apply. So far as I am concerned, and I say this with genuine respect for the draftsmen of the Bill, it is about as good as could be devised. All I am pointing out is that there is no procedure ever devised that is capable of preventing a court from being deceived. We are dealing with defendants who, par excellence, have an interest in deceiving the court. I am pointing out that if the receiver—and he is the man who, at leisure, is in a position to discover whether the court was deceived as to assets—discovers greater assets, then surely it is manifestly clear that there should be a power to increase the amount of confiscation order upwards. For then, ex hypothesi, it has been discovered that the court was deceived. I am grateful to the noble Lord for saying that the matter will be considered further. For my own part, I believe that there is something serious to be considered.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 74 agreed to.

Clause 75 [Sequestration in Scotland of defendant, etc.]:

The Earl of Arran moved Amendment No. 100:

Page 54, line 36, at end insert:— ("and it shall not he competent to submit a claim in relation to the confiscation order to the permanent trustee in accordance with section 48 of that Act.").

The noble Earl said: In moving Amendment No. 100, I should like to speak also to Amendments Nos. 101 and No. 102. These are minor amendments of a rather technical nature and I shall be very brief.

Clauses 74 to 77 cover the relationship between various kinds of insolvency proceedings and restraint and confiscation under the Bill where the same property is liable to both kinds of action at once. It has been drawn to our attention that the fact that an amount is owing under a confiscation order should not he the basis for instituting sequestration or liquidation proceedings. The two kinds of action, insolvency and confiscation, may arise separately or even simultaneously but they should not cause each other to happen. These amendments will ensure that they cannot. The Committee will note that they apply only to Scottish insolvency actions. That is because the matter is already dealt with in the rules for the purposes of insolvency in England and Wales. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 75, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 76 [Winding up of company holding realisable property]:

The Earl of Arran moved Amendment No. 101:

Page 56, line 15, at end insert:— (4A) For the purposes of the application of Parts IV and V of the Insolvency Act 1986 (winding up of registered companies and winding up of unregistered companies) to a company which the Court of Session has jurisdiction to wind up, a person is not a creditor in so far as any sum due to him by the company is due in respect of a confiscation order.".

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Arran moved Amendment No. 102: Page 56, line 31, leave out ("that Act") and insert ("the Insolvency Act 1986").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 76, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 77 and 78 agreed to.

Clause 79 [Compensation]:

9 p.m.

Lord Irvine of Lairg moved Amendment No. 103: Page 58, leave out from beginning of line 11 to end of line 15.

The noble Lord said: I understand that Amendments Nos. 103 and 106 are to be taken together and therefore I deal with them together.

I hope I have already made it plain to the Committee that I, like other noble Lords on this side of the Committee, am totally in favour of proper legislative provision designed to stop offenders enjoying their ill-gotten gains. Confiscation orders, restraint orders, charging orders—these are all necessary weapons in the armoury of powers needed to achieve that end. I need not be told by the noble Earl of the worth of orders of this kind, because on this side of the Committee that is totally accepted.

The point of this amendment is that, like all powerful weapons, they are capable of wounding the innocent as well as the guilty. For my part I am reluctant that Parliament should, as it were, release the safety catch without making proper provision for the compensation of innocent victims.

Clause 79 looks to the situation where proceedings eventually result in an acquittal or in a conviction being quashed on appeal or in the offender being pardoned. In the meantime a person has suffered loss because one of these three orders has affected his property.

The first principle is that that person has suffered an injustice and he ought to be compensated. I think Clause 79 recognises that. The purpose of this amendment is to deal with two restrictions which I suggest are unjustifiable and which these amendments would seek to remove.

First, the High Court must be satisfied that the applicant has suffered substantial loss: that is provided for in subsection (2)(b). If that means that there must be some loss which is not merely negligible or nominal, then it hardly seems worthy of inclusion. I welcome hearing what the noble Earl has to say on this subject. If the expression "substantial loss" confines, or is intended to confine, the jurisdiction to cases where the loss is large, then I ask, why should the applicant who has suffered a small but real loss be shut out from compensation?

There is obviously a real risk, and indeed perhaps a likelihood, that the courts will interpret the provision as it at present stands as meaning that the loss must be large.

The question which I invite the noble Earl to deal with specifically is this. Why should the applicant who has suffered a real loss although not a large one be shut out from compensation? I do not know of any principle that losses which are not large but which are real losses should not be compensated. I cannot think of any reason why such a principle should be imported here.

Secondly, and I think more importantly, there is a very important restriction contained in subsection (2)(a). The proceedings must have been instituted or continued as the result of serious default—and I emphasise "serious default—by one of the persons mentioned in subsection (4)—that is to say, essentially, serious default on the part of the investigating or prosecuting authorities.

Never mind the hours of wasted time that will be devoted to argument about whether there was default and if so whether it was "serious"—whatever that may mean. Never mind that the court will have to trawl through reams of evidence about how the investigation and the prosecution were actually conducted so as to arrive at an answer. Never mind the damage to the morale of the police and the Crown prosecution service. The point is this. Here is a draconian order which the court has been empowered to make—quite rightly—in order that society as a whole shall be better protected from criminal activity. Here is a person who has suffered loss through that order. It now transpires that the order undoubtedly was not justified. Why should society not, in these circumstances, be ready to pay compensation? Does it really matter whether the error was the result of someone's negligence or serious default or whether it was simply one of those unfortunate things that seemed a good idea at the time? I can see no reason—and I should be interested to hear what a good reason would be—why the individual, in all probability already subjected to considerable inconvenience and stigma, should bear the loss as well.

Those are the two points on which I invite the noble Earl to give some careful thought. In the expectation that he may be willing to do so I continue in this way. If compensation ceases to be dependent on proof of serious default, subsection (4) cannot stand in its present form. Therefore, I have moved that it be deleted. That leaves no provision as to the person or body by whom compensation is to be paid, but no doubt the Government will be able to introduce such a provision on Report. I favour payment out of central government funds.

I should add that if the amendments moved to Clauses 67 and 68 find favour with the Minister—though I had little comfort from him at an earlier stage—this problem would be solved where the loss results from the imposition of a restraint order or a charging order. That is because the prosecutor will have undertaken to pay compensation in accordance with Clause 79. However, where the loss results from an order made following a conviction which was subsequently quashed on appeal, provision would still have to be made. If the Minister is minded to give consideration to this, then my last points will need to be borne in mind.

Although subsection (3) is no doubt wide enough as it stands to cover the situation, I should have thought it desirable to make clear that a person who has brought suspicion on himself may very well expect to lose some or all of his compensation, and that was the purpose of the proposed addition to that subsection. I beg to move. I am also moving Amendments Nos. 104, 105 and 106, as everything I said applies to them.

The Deputy Chairman of Committees

The procedure is that the noble Lord has sought the permission of the Committee to speak to the other amendments. He has moved the first amendment and the others will be dealt with subsequently.

The Earl of Arran

I must begin by saying that there is nothing new in the provision in Clause 79. It has never been accepted that compensation should he payable simply because the prosecution has been unable to discharge the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in relation to the specific charge that was brought. The circumstances in which compensation may be paid under Clause 79 are broadly those in which successive governments have paid ex gratia compensation to people who have been imprisoned after a wrongful conviction; and they are the same conditions as those applied in identical circumstances, but in relation to drug trafficking cases, by Section 19 of the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986. Compensation is payable at the discretion of the High Court in the case of a defendant or, indeed, a third party who has suffered substantial loss, where the prosecution would not have been brought or continued but for the serious default of someone involved in the investigation or prosecution.

These amendments invite us to take a different approach and to depart from the policy reaffirmed only last year in the Drug Trafficking Offences Act. I do not think it would be right to do so. First, the amendments would remove the requirement on the High Court to be satisfied that there was serious default in the investigation or prosecution. Instead of compensation being payable where the prosecution was clearly at fault, and therefore responsible for the applicant's loss, there would be a presumption in favour of compensation. The presumption would be there even if the prosecution case had failed on a technicality. It would be wrong to create a presumption of compensation which inhibited the prosecution from acting in the public interest in these serious cases, bearing in mind the safeguards built into the procedures and the burden of proof the prosecution must discharge.

Secondly, the amendment would change the requirement to show "substantial loss" to one of simply "loss". There is no intention to penalise those whom a jury fail to convict; but equally it would be wrong to allow scope for frivolous or trivial claims. The High Court could be drawn into considerable work deciding in relation to small amounts whether a person whose assets were restrained and managed by a receiver was better or worse off than if they had continued to manage it themselves. That is a good reason for confining this power to cases where serious damage has been done to a person's wealth or livelihood and where the fault for that lies clearly with the prosecution. I hope therefore in these circumstances that the noble Lord will reconsider his amendments and will not press them.

9.15 p.m.

Lord Irvine of Lairg

I shall not for obvious reasons press them. I see no need to reconsider because I am distinctly unimpressed by the answers that have been given to the points that I have made. The noble Lord has repeated the Government's position without meeting the arguments that have been put. In passing, he appears to have devalued the value of an acquittal. It appears to me to be quite obvious if a defendant is acquitted that he should be compensated for the loss he has suffered and that it should not be dependent upon the proof of serious default on the part of those responsible for prosecuting him. I would dispute the proposition that a claim is frivolous because the amount claimed is not substantial. However, I appreciate that the argument has not fallen upon receptive ears and I therefore seek to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 104 to 106 not moved.]

Clause 79 agreed to.

Clauses 80 to 90 agreed to.

Clause 91 [Part V—Interpretation]:

The Earl of Arran moved Amendment No. 107: Page 65, line 37, leave out ("and (5)") and insert ("to (6)").

The noble Earl said: In moving Amendment No. 107 I also wish to speak to Amendment No. 108. These are drafting amendments designed to make clearer and simpler certain provisions in Clause 91 which governs the interpretation of key terms used in this part of the Bill.

Clause 91(2) is a form of index showing where the definitions of certain terms are to be found in the body of Part V.

The last term listed, "value of property", is shown as being defined in clause 64, subsections (4) and (5). That is indeed where the value of property, in the ordinary sense, is defined. However, subsection (6) of the same clause goes on to define the value of property in the special sense of the property an offender has obtained from his offence: in other words, his proceeds. The purpose of the first of these amendments is to ensure that the definition of "value of property" extends to that subsection as well.

The second of these amendments is designed to simplify subsection (13) of Clause 91. That subsection defines the circumstances in which, for the purposes of this Part of the Bill, a confiscation order is to be treated as subject to appeal. This is important because until any appeal is heard and until the ordinary time for appeal has elapsed, no action may be taken by the High Court to enforce a confiscation order by realising the property of the offender or of third parties. That is an important safeguard. However, the present rather complicated definition in subsection (13) contains a possible loophole. If a confiscation order were made not at the time of conviction but by the Court of Appeal on appeal from the Crown Court, and a further appeal to the House of Lords was pending, the order might under this definition not be regarded as subject to appeal.

In seeking to remedy this defect we have concluded that the substance of this provision could be expressed more straightforwardly simply by saying that an order is subject to appeal for as long as there is no further possibility of an appeal on which the order could be varied or set aside. Appeals out of time must of course be disregarded otherwise enforcement action could never take place.

The amendment is an improvement on the existing provisions and I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Arran moved Amendment No. 108: Page 67, line 1, leave out from first ("appeal") to end of line 5 and insert ("until (disregarding any power of a court to grant leave to appeal out of time) there is no further possibility of an appeal on which the order could be varied or set aside.").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 91, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 92 agreed to.

Schedule 4 [Drug trafficking amendments]:

The Earl of Arran moved Amendment No. 109: Page 104, line 1, leave out paragraph 6.

The noble Earl said: In moving Amendment No. 109 I should also like to take en bloc Amendments Nos. 110 to 118. Very briefly, these amendments make various necessary minor changes in Schedule 4. The first and larger part of that schedule is a list of small amendments to the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 which introduced the powers of confiscation under which the provisions in Part V of this Bill are very much based. With the benefit of more time for reflection, we have been able in the Bill to improve on the earlier model in a few small respects. It seems helpful to make the small adjustments necessary to bring the Drug Trafficking Offences Act into line. Consistency on these detailed points will help the courts and prosecuting services and avoid unnecessary confusion.

The Committee has already agreed a number of further small amendments to the Bill, and the amendments now before us for the most part bring Schedule 4, and therefore the Drug Trafficking Offences Act, into line. Amendment No. 110 has the same effect in that Act as Amendments Nos. 86 to 89 in the Bill, Amendments Nos. 112 to 114 the same as Amendment No. 100, and Amendment No. 117 the same as Amendment No. 108. Amendments Nos. 115 and 116 are consequential upon Amendment No. 110. Amendments Nos. 109 and 111 simply correct drafting errors in Schedule 4.

The second part of Schedule 4 corrects a few minor drafting defects in the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1987, which have come to attention since the Act was passed. Amendment No. 118 will enable two further such changes to be made. The first is needed simply to eliminate a non sequitur in Section 34(6)(d) of the Scottish Act. The second inserts in Section 38(5) of that Act some words, omitted in error, which enable Customs officers as well as police officers to exercise the powers of entry under that section. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Arran moved Amendments Nos. 110 to 118:

Page 104, line 5, at end insert— ("6A.—(1) Section 12 (application of proceeds of realisation and other sums) shall be amended as follows. (2) The following paragraph shall be inserted in subsection (3) after the word "follows"— (za) if not paid by a receiver under subsection (1) above it shall first be applied in payment of such expenses as are payable under section 17A(2) of this Act; (3) In paragraph (b), for the word "paragraph there shall shall be substituted the words "paragraphs (za) and".").

Page 104, line 5, at end insert— ("6B. In section 15 (bankruptcy of defendant etc.)—

1. (a) subsection (5)(b) and (c) shall cease to have effect; and
2. (b) the following paragraph shall be substituted for subsection (7)(d)—

"(d) subsection (2)(b) is omitted.".").

Page 104, leave out lines 6 and 7 and insert— ("7.—(1) Section 16 (sequestration in Scotland of defendant etc.) shall be amended as follows. (2) At the end of subsection (2) there shall be inserted the words "and it shall not be competent to submit a claim in relation to the confiscation order to the permanent trustee in accordance with section 48 of that Act". (3) The following subsection shall be substituted for subsection (5)—").

Page 104, line 14, leave out sub-paragraph (2).

Page 104, line 17, leave out paragraph 8.

Page 105, line 12, leave out ("(a)") and insert ("za)").

Page 105, line 25, leave out paragraph 11.

Page 106, line 42, at end insert— ("13A. The following subsection shall be substituted for subsection (13) of section 38 (general interpretation)— (13) An order is subject to appeal until (disregarding) any power of a court to grant leave to appeal out of time) there is no further possibility of an appeal on which the order could he varied or set aside.". ("13B. In section 40(4) (effect of Act in Scotland). in paragraph (b), for "17" there shall be substituted "17A".").

Page 107, line 4, at end insert— ("17. In section 34(6)(d) (bankruptcy in England and Wales of person holding realisable property) for the words "subsections (2)(b) and (4) are" there shall be substituted the words "subsection (2)(b) is". 18. In subsection (5) of section 38 (order to permit entry to premises) after the word "constable" there shall be inserted the words "or person commissioned as aforesaid".").

The noble Earl said: I beg to move.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Schedule 4, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 93 agreed to.

Lord Elwyn-Jones moved Amendment No. 119: After Clause 93, insert the following new clause:

("Compensation for persons convicted but later exonerated.

.The Secretary of State shall make provision for the payment of compensation to any person who has been convicted of a criminal offence and whose conviction has subsequently been reversed, or who has been pardoned, on the ground that a new, or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, unless it is proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him.").

The noble and learned Lord said: It is time to take pause, because we now move to a very important amendment indeed. I am delighted that the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington, is here. Unhappily the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scarman, is not able to be with us. This amendment breaks important new ground. It is long overdue because it gives effect to a convention which we entered into 21 years ago, namely the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. We are bound by that convention and no reservations have been made with regard to it.

The relevant part, which is in substance set out in the new clause, provides in Article 14, paragraph 6: When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as the result of such conviction shall be compensated according to law"— I stress the words "according to law— unless it is proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him". Amendment No. 119 sets out that language, as the Committee will see, if the amendment is studied. The article in question, to which we seek to give effect to achieve compliance, provides that compensation shall be paid in the circumstances described in the article and in the amendment, namely, on the ground that there has been a reversal of the conviction or a pardon, on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice". Then there is the safeguarding provision: unless it is proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him".

At present, the Home Secretary administers an ex-gratia compensation scheme for such cases. The scope of that he described in an Answer to a Written Question in another place on 29th November, 1985. He then said that he was: prepared to pay compensation to all such persons where this is required by our international obligations".—[Official Report, House of Commons; 29/11/85; c 691.] Fine. So far, so good! But what followed? The scheme that he then described remains only ex-gratia, subject entirely to his discretion. As I understand it, it is not enforceable. In my submission it still leaves the United Kingdom, instead of proceeding according to law as the convention requires, unnecessarily in breach of those obligations.

The amendment seeks to remedy that undesirable position by putting the Secretary of State under an express statutory obligation, but without requiring him to do anything that he does not already claim to do and without setting up any new bureaucracy or new or special tribunals.

Our submission is that compensation for wrongful imprisonment is, in any case, too important to be left to ministerial discretion, particularly where the Minister concerned is responsible for some of the bodies—for example, the police, whose actions from time to time have led to wrongful conviction. It should be noted that the amendment is modest in its attempted embrace. It does not require the Secretary of State to pay compensation in a number of other cases where there is frequently a demand for compensation, such as directed acquittals by the judge after long remands in custody—that is one of the black features of our administration of justice, but it is not provided for—or the quashing of convictions because of substantial misdirections by the judge at the trial. Alas, that happens from time to time.

In such cases it might well be argued that there is a strong case for compensation. It is felt, however, that that would undoubtedly raise some difficult consequential problems, such as the introduction of a new concept of degrees of innocence and other difficulties: so in this amendment we have confined the protection and the compensation to the injured citizen to the irreducible minimum with which we are required to comply by international law and by our acceptance of the convention. The amendment is confined to what our obligations are. It does not extend the nature of those obligations. Accordingly, I hope that on this matter at any rate we shall get an early acceptance of this clear international obligation that falls upon us. I beg to move.

9.30 p.m.

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington

I think I spy a slight gleam in the eye of the Minister, and therefore I shall say only a few words in supporting this amendment. I do so with great humility having regard to the distinction of those noble and learned Lords whose names appear with mine. We are dealing with deprivation of liberty—wrongful imprisonment—and surely that is one of the most serious injuries than can be done to a citizen.

If ever there were a civil right, surely this is it. It is so serious that compensation must be far too important a matter to be left to ministerial discretion, particularly, as the noble and learned Lord has said, when the Minister in question is responsible for the police. Compensation should be according to law, and this amendment surely also provides for the very minimum situation that should be met according to our international obligations.

No doubt one day, if this becomes part of the statute, we shall reach compensation for directed acquittals and compensation for quashing as a result of judicial mistakes, and shall get over the view which still hangs around, I am afraid, of a presumption of guilt when someone is acquitted in that way. I would ask the Minister at long last actually to accept an amendment.

The Earl of Caithness

I should say at once that the Government fully appreciate the purpose of the amendment proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones. As he has explained, the amendment seeks to enact the provisions of an article in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As the noble and learned Lord has pointed out, paragraph 6 of Article 14 states that compensation should be paid according to law. He has argued most eloquently that for the United Kingdom fully and properly to meet the provisions of the article there should be legislation to make sure that compensation is paid to those who have had their convictions reversed in the circumstances which it sets out.

I should make it clear that the Government believe that we do already fully follow the spirit of these obligations.

As the noble and learned Lord said, our arrangements for the payment of compensation to those who have been wrongly convicted were set out by my right honourable friend the Home Secretary in reply to a parliamentary Question in another place on 29th November 1985. As he explained, there is no statutory provision for the payment of compensation to those who turn out to have been wrongly convicted.

Nevertheless, the arrangements he set out take full account of our international obligations. Indeed, they go some way beyond them, for my right honourable friend has made it clear that he reserves the discretion to make an ex gratia award in cases to which paragraph 6 of Article 14 would not apply. The Government believe, therefore, that there is no question but that this country fully meets the spirit of its obligations under the article.

Nevertheless, we have some sympathy with the intentions of the noble and learned Lords' amendment. We understand why it has been introduced. We accept that to have our arrangements for the kind of case defined in the article enshrined in legislation would place our compliance beyond doubt. However, sadly, I have to tell the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson, that I do not believe we can accept the amendment as it is drafted because it is in a particular respect different from the provisions of Article 14.6.

The words of paragraph 6 of Article 14 make it clear that it envisages compensation being paid only in these cases where a conviction is reversed after "final decision". This clearly means a decision which is no longer open to challenge under the normal judicial process. We therefore take those words "final decision" to exclude from the obligation to compensate a case in which the decision taken by the court of trial was to acquit or an appeal court set aside a conviction under the appeal procedure. Our understanding of the article's intentions is that the compensation should be paid in circumstances where a new fact has emerged and where the normal working of the judicial system has not revealed the wrongful conviction. I have to say also that the amendment is in a practical but important respect somewhat vague and that it merely empowers the Secretary of State to make provision for the payment of compensation but does not say in what form or with what sort of machinery he is to do so.

I hope that the Committee will agree that some more elaborate and detailed provision is needed if we are to give proper effect to the provisions of Article 14 paragraph 6. Nevertheless, I can say that we shall consider sympathetically whether it is possible to devise a provision which could be added without overloading what is an already heavy Bill. It is only fair to say to the Committee that it may not be possible to complete this consideration by Report stage.

I hope that that promise will be sufficient to persuade the noble and learned Lord to withdraw the amendment. I repeat that I undertake that we shall consider it very carefully and fully understand the intentions behind the noble and learned Lord's amendment.

Lord Mishcon

I too thought that there was a glint in the eye of the Minister but it must have been that he had decided at that stage to reward the Committee with a speech in which he said that everything in the amendment moved by my noble and learned friend was understandable and good but that unfortunately there was a reason why it could not be inserted in this Bill. Possibly the glint was an indication that the Minister thought that with those words he would satisfy the Committee. Perhaps I may say that in those circumstances I do not think that the glint was at all justified.

The case has been made out for an international obligation and, as the Minister said, for it properly to become a legal obligation and not a discretionary right. I would remind him that we used to have those arguments in regard to compensation for those who were injured as a result of crime. That compensation was going to be discretionary, and it was argued that it was all right for it to be discretionary, but Parliament decided that it was not all right. We now have a promise of that becoming a statutory obligation. There is no difference between the two.

The Committee stage of a Bill in this Chamber is a stage at which principles are adumbrated and adopted or not. I respectfully remind the Minister that this Chamber never deals with amendments by way of esoteric criticism, saying that the words possibly are not suitable or that some part of the amendment is not practicable when the major part of it can be implemented.

I had hoped that, having conceded that it was right for there to be such an obligation and having conceded our international duty and the Government's intention to perform it, the Minister would say, "In principle, this amendment is accepted. There may be parts of it which, in order to accord with Article 14, paragraph 6, will have to be altered, but the Government will bring in an amendment at Report stage which deals precisely with the obligations under that article and therefore the principle of the management is accepted". The Minister will disappoint all of us it he does not say in frankness that that is the Government's position at this stage.

Lord Wigoder

Will the Minister be good enough to consider taking the advice of the Law Lords on this matter before the next stage of the Bill? It is extremely unfortunate that so far, on every occasion that we have discussed this Bill, when there has been a proposal that might increase the likelihood of conviction the Law Lords have been present and expressed themselves in force and strength, but when we finally reach the stage of what happens if there is a wrongful conviction, unhappily none of them is able to be here.

Lord Harris of Greenwich

It is very rare for me to disagree with my noble friend Lord Hutchinson of Lullington, but this appears to be one of those rare occasions when his judgment was at fault when he thought he was able to detect a gleam of hope from the features of the noble Earl.

The fact is that I agree very much with what was just said by the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon. With great respect to the noble Earl, so far as the language of this convention is concerned we are not interested in living within the spirit of the convention. What we wish to do, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones said, is to live within the letter of this convention and, with great respect to the noble Earl, he did not meet that argument at all.

I take his point about Report stage, which is only 13 days away from the last day on which we are considering this Bill, but if he is prepared now to indicate that if he cannot do it at Report stage he will do it at Third Reading in this House, I think he will put our minds at rest. We do not wish to be unreasonable about this. We accept the immense pressure of work so far as the department is concerned in what is a very limited period of time. But I think he must go further than he has gone so far and indicate to us in clear and unequivocal language that by the time we reach Third Reading there will he a government amendment on this point.

The Earl of Caithness

I take the point that the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, made about accepting the principle and not necessarily the wording of the amendment. I remember that from my days as a Back-Bencher when I was particularly keen, and I hope that I have bent over backwards to meet that particular concern.

I do not know whether I can make the promise that the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, wants. The promise I can make is that I will consider the matter very sympathetically, as I said when I responded to the arguments put forward. It needs consideration with the Law Officers, and indeed with my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor. Whether we can do it by Third Reading I am not sure. If we can, I would very much like to bring forward the necessary amendment to this House. But I think it is important that we get it right rather than hurry it through. I had a long and detailed discussion this morning with the legal advisers on this matter. It is not just a simple amendment of about 10 lines, because there are various additions to be included. I think it is right that we get it correct, but I can say that it will he looked at very sympathetically.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

I am very glad to get that assurance. I am bound to say that great care has been taken in preparing the new clause to comply as exactly as possible with the actual language of the convention. The only matter that is slightly in dispute is one very small part of paragraph 6, when a person has by a final decision been convicted. But I should have thought that was clear enough and that there is a clear obligation. As the noble Lord who has just spoken said, to state that the Government have endeavoured to comply with the spirit of the matter just is not good enough. It may indeed in a certain sense go further, but that is not what we have in issue. There is a clear duty here. We as a country take some pride in compliance with the obligations that we entered into on these conventions. That is why we do not enter into too many of them.

But unless we have the assurance that, certainly before this Bill leaves this House, something will be done to achieve precise compliance with the terms of the convention—earthquakes may happen, we may have another ghastly Friday, I know not; we are subject to the problems of human survival and all the rest of it—and get a governmental undertaking in clear terms, we shall be deeply disappointed.

If I may say so, as yet there has not been much sign of the giving of concessions, but this is a matter of fundamental importance, affecting not only the interests of our fellow subjects but our standing in the international comity in respect of compliance with our international duties. From the silent response to what I have said, may I gather that I can rest upon a prospect of the kind that I have indicated?

9.45 p.m.

The Earl of Caithness

I remained seated because I felt that I could add no more to what I said earlier. I can only repeat that I shall discuss this as a matter of urgency with my right honourable friend. If we can come back before the Bill leaves this House, we shall endeavour to do so. From the advice that I received this morning, however, it seems more complicated than one short amendment. In view of what I have said, I hope that the noble and learned Lord will appreciate that.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

Happily, there are other stages ahead. I do not know whether my presence in the United States celebrating the bicentennial of its constitution will enable me to be present on Report, but noble colleagues in different parts of the Chamber have been listening carefully. We shall come back to it stage by stage as the matter proceeds because there is a clear obligation with which a law-abiding government I hope will comply. In those circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 94 [Enforcement of compensation orders]:

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 120: Page 69, line 3, leave out from beginning to end of line 4 on page 70 and insert—

("Enforcement and appeals.

36.—(1) A person in whose favour a compensation order is made shall not he entitled to receive the amount due to him until (disregarding any power of a court to grant leave to appeal out of time) there is no further possibility of an appeal on which the order could be varied or set aside.").

The noble Earl said: This is a drafting amendment. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 121:

Page 70, line 12, at end insert— ("(3) The Court of Appeal may by order annul or vary any compensation order made by the court of trial, although the conviction is not quashed: and the order, if annulled, shall not take effect and, if varied, shall take effect as varied. (4) Where the House of Lords restores a conviction, it may make any compensation order which the court of trial could have made. (5) Where a compensation order has been made against any person in respect of an offence taken into consideration in determining his sentence—

1. (a) the order shall cease to have effect if he successfully appeals against his conviction of the offence or, if more than one, all the offences, of which he was convicted in the proceedings in which the order was made;
2. (b) he may appeal against the order as if it were part of the sentence imposed in respect of the offence or, if more than one, any of the offences, of which he was so convicted.").

The noble Earl said: This is a drafting amendment. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 122: Page 70, line 16, after ("pay") insert ("but at a time when (disregarding any power of a court to grant leave to appeal out of time) there is no further possibility of an appeal on which the order could be varied or set aside").

The noble Earl said: The effect of this amendment is to restrict the court's powers to discharge or reduce the amount of a compensation order until there is no further possibility of an appeal on which the order could be varied or set aside. The power of the court to grant leave to appeal out of time would be disregarded for the purpose of deciding whether there is a further possibility of appeal. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 123: Page 70, line 52, leave out from ("but") to end of line 33 on page 71 and insert ("the plaintiff may only recover an amount equal to the aggregate of the following:

1. (a) any amount by which they exceed the compensation; and
2. (b) a sum equal to any portion of the compensation which he fails to recover,

and may not enforce the judgment, so far as it relates to a sum such as is mentioned in paragraph (b) above, without the leave of the court.").

The noble Earl said: This is a drafting amendment. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 94, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 95 to 97 agreed to.

Schedule 5 agreed to.

Schedule 6 [Compensation]:

The Chairman of Committees

If Amendment No. 124 is agreed to, I shall not call Amendment No. 125 or Amendment No. 126.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom moved Amendment No. 124: Page 111, leave out lines 3 to 28 and insert—

("Claims for compensation.

1. The Board shall not award compensation to a person unless, in addition to any other conditions relating to it being satisfied, he has made a claim for it—

1. (a) before the end of the relevant period; and
2. (b) in the manner prescribed under paragraph 17 below.

1A.—(l) Subject to the following provisions of this paragraph, application for compensation shall be entertained only if made within three years of the incident giving rise to the injury, except that the Board may in exceptional circumstances waive this requirement.

(2) If the Board have previously awarded compensation in respect of the injury, an application for compensation in respect of it may be made within three years beginning with the date of the award, or latest award, in respect of it.

(3) The Board may entertain a claim made at any time for compensation in respect of an injury in respect of which they have made a previous award if—

1. (a) at the time of that award they stated that the evidence before them showed that a particular medical condition might arise as a result of the injury; and
2. (b) the claim is in respect of such a condition.").

The noble and learned Lord said: The amendment does not alter the purpose of a paragraph but serves to separate the proposition that a claim must be made in time and in the appropriate form from the details about the time limits for making a claim. It also corrects an omission. The appropriate time is the date of the incident that gave rise to the injury, as at present the non-statutory scheme provides. The three-year time limit will run from the date of the incident in all cases except where the board has previously awarded compensation for the same injury when time runs from the date of the award or the latest award.

It may be convenient if I comment upon the two subsequent amendments, Amendments Nos. 124A and 124B and indicate that I shall in each case look at the point raised. In Amendment No. 124A instances where no claim is made by or on behalf of an injured person who then dies as a result of the injury more than three years after the incident are likely to be extremely rare or sufficiently rare perhaps to be left to the discretion that the board provided for in the present amendment. However, I accept that there may be a case for making a specific provision and I undertake to look at that.

As regards Amendment No. 124B I am not sure that it would be right, as this amendment provides, to allow applications for further awards after a deterioration in an injury to be made as a matter of course many years after the date of the last award. But the present amendment, No. 124, will preserve the board's power to waive the three-year time limit in the case of first applications where there are exceptional circumstances.

Whether a similar discretion should be maintained for cases where an unforeseen deterioration has occurred is a matter for argument upon which I should like to reflect further. On that basis perhaps the member of the Committee who tabled that amendment might wish to consider the position in the light of what I have said. I beg to move.

Lord Morton of Shuna moved, as an amendment to Amendment No. 124, Amendment No. 124A: In paragraph 1A.—(1), line 3, after ("injury") insert ("or in the case of death caused by the incident, of the date of death").

The noble Lord said: First, I have to declare an interest as I am a member of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. I have the honour to have been a member since 1979.

This is another of the occurrences which seem to happen fairly regularly to those members of the Committee who have a predilection to returning to their wives north of the Border. It seems that their amendments tend to get dealt with late on a Thursday evening. That is unfortunate.

More pertinently, this is a very important part of the Bill. Victims of crimes of violence are numerous among the citizens of this state. The number of claims to the board has increased by something like 10 per cent. per annum. It is now running at 45,000 per year. It is very unfortunate that at this late stage of the evening these provisions should be discussed when there is not apparently going to be very much beyond a discussion between the noble and learned Lord opposite and myself, with the assistance I hope of the noble Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg.

It is unfortunate that this matter, in which the innocent victims of crime have a considerable interest, should be left to the Committee to discuss at seven minutes to ten, with the stated intention that we should get through 90 amendments before we rise this evening. We do not appear to be giving an advertisement of a very careful consideration of the amendments.

For a dependant who wishes to claim as the result of the death of somebody which occurred because of a crime of violence the date which is interesting is the date of death. People should take any time limit from the date of death. That is the period which I sought in Amendment No. 124A and that is the reason for it. One can think of many cases where people are kept alive after an assault and then unfortunately die. If they die, say, two years after the assault, that leaves the relatives who have a right of action only one year in which to get going, whereas in any other case they have three years. Therefore I am glad that the noble and learned Lord is prepared to think about that.

As regards Amendment No. 124B, the attitude of the noble Lord astonishes me. It appears that the department for which he is speaking at the moment has never heard of' the AIDS disease, which has at least come to the notice of the Department of Health and Social Security.

If one thinks of the victims of rape, prison officers and police officers who get assaulted and frequently bitten in assaults by people who may or may not be carrying the AIDS virus, they are in a situation where, if my information is correct, it may be five years before anyone can be certain that they are not carrying the virus, and it will be a very much longer time before anybody can be certain that they are not going to contract the disease.

It seems to me wildly inappropriate to say that somebody who is bitten gets an award and if he gets it and four years later develops AIDS, he should have no claim. It is equally inappropriate in the many cases that the board has had to deal with where some years after an assault people develop arthritis, which causes them to have to give up their job. I hope this will be considered with rather more care than appears to have been expressed in the brief— because it cannot have been the considered thinking of the noble and learned Lord—with which he has been provided.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

I have indicated that I will look at this matter, and of course I shall read what the noble Lord has just said.

Lord Morton of Shuna

In view of that assurance, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment to the amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 124B not moved.]

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendments Nos. 125 and 126 not moved.]

Lord Morton of Shuna moved Amendment No. 127.

Page 111, line 28, at end insert— ("(5) A decision by the Chairman of the Board or a member of the Board nominated by him not to allow the application to be made out of time, or not to allow a claim under section 100(2) to be made, shall be final.").

The noble Lord said: This is a provision which is operated by the board at the moment under the scheme which is in operation where if a claim is made at the time it goes to the chairman or, in his unavoidable absence, to someone he nominates to decide whether the claim should be considered. One must have, as a matter of practical politics, some finality somewhere, and I would have thought there was something to he said for this amendment. I beg to move.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

I am grateful to the noble Lord. We should like to consider whether changes should be made to allow this point to be covered in the rules or whether to cover it in Schedule 6 as proposed. I hope that will satisfy the noble Lord.

Lord Morton of Shuna

In view of that undertaking, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Morton of Shuna moved Amendment No. 128. Page 111, line 36, leave out sub-paragraph (4).

The noble Lord said: Sub-paragraph (4) of this schedule is a very difficult concept. It suggests that the board having determined to limit the scope of the hearing and the claimant being aggrieved, should be able to have the claim fully reconsidered. It appears to me that those who are advising the noble and learned Lord do not understand the point of this. There are cases where the board considers whether the low limit has been met.

We consider that before we consider whether the crime of violence has happened at all. If we come to the view that on no consideration can the award reach the low limit, it seems totally unreasonable to ask for a power so that we have to go back and consider whether in fact there has been a crime of violence which comes within the scheme. It does not really matter whether a person has or has not had a black eye, if it is not going to come into the lower limit level. That is why we consider that this paragraph is wholly misconceived and can only have been propounded by those who have no real experience of how the hearing system works as it does at the moment.

10 p.m.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

With great respect to the noble Lord, I think that we understand how the scheme operates. The provision was designed to allow an applicant to apply for a second hearing where the board had excluded at the first hearing an issue which the applicant wished to be considered in the determination of his case. Indeed, the ability of the board to hold a hearing which only goes to certain issues such as eligibility is a feature of the current scheme.

The Bill provides that the board may hold a hearing in relation to specific issues and then deal with other issues, such as, for example, the quantum of the award, on the case papers. That gives the board flexibility to deal with selected issues at a hearing, leaving other hearings to be dealt with on the papers. At the same time it gives the applicant scope to challenge the actions of the board should he feel aggrieved.

In our view, it is preferable in the circumstances to give an aggrieved applicant a further opportunity of being heard by the board rather than leaving him no other avenue for remedy than appeal to the High Court. Having said that, perhaps the noble Lord might like to ponder on what I have said. Equally, I shall read with care the point which he raises. I think there may be something which we ought to look at, although I give no undertaking that I shall necessarily propose any change.

Lord Morton of Shuna

It appears to me that this is a matter in which there is a lack of understanding between the different sides of the Committee. For example, the position may be that someone with a very long list of convictions for crimes of violence who sustains a broken nose will not get an award whether or not he was an innocent victim. There is no point in insisting on a board hearing as to whether he has been the victim in those circumstances. However, I shall certainly study what the noble and learned Lord has said. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Morton of Shuna moved Amendment No. 129: Page 112, line 9, leave out from ("that") to end of the line and insert ("there are exceptional reasons for doing so.").

The noble Lord said: This amendment is intended to set the same standard for taking an exceptional course throughout the Bill. I understand that it meets with some approval from the noble and learned Lord. I beg to move.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

I am content to accept the amendment.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Irvine of Lairg moved Amendments Nos. 130 and 131: Page 112, line 14, after ("Wales") insert ("or where as part of their determination the Board have certified that in their opinion no prima facie case for an award of compensation was disclosed by an applicant for compensation."). Page 112, line 18, after ("Scotland") insert ("or where as part of their determination the Board have certified that in their opinion no prima facie case for an award of compensation was disclosed by an application for compensation.").

The noble Lord said: I propose Amendments Nos. 130 and 131 together. The general position under this legislation is that an adverse decision, made without a hearing, can be the subject of an application for a claim to be reconsidered after a hearing. That is referred to in Schedule 6, paragraphs 2(2) and 2(4). If the board denies the claim for the application to be reconsidered after a hearing, then mandamus may lie under paragraph 2(8). If the board adds the magic words in originally rejecting the claim that the claimant has no prima facie case, then the claimant has under paragraph 2(5) no right to apply for the reconsideration of his claim by the board and therefore no right to seek a mandamus. I can read these provisions in no other way and I am entirely confident that that is what they mean.

I suggest it is monstrous that a claimant should be without any remedy in such a case where, for example, a single member of the board, perhaps without any hearing, has been satisfied that there is no case. I have known a fair number of cases in the High Court which have ultimately succeeded in the Court of Appeal, where a single judge of the High Court thought that there was no prima facie case and said so.

What this comes down to is a very serious gap in the protection available to the claimant. Where the board says "No" to a claimant without any hearing at all or indeed says "No" after a hearing on limited issues, then the claimant can apply for the claim to be reconsidered—or for the excluded issues to be reconsidered—after a hearing. That is paragraph 2(2) and 2(4) respectively of Schedule 6. If the board rules against that application—that is for the claim to be reconsidered or the excluded issues to be reconsidered—then the claimant can apply to the High Court in England and Wales for an order of mandamus. He can apply to the Court of Session in Scotland for a direction requiring the board to reconsider the claim after a hearing. That is paragraph 2(8) of Schedule 6 for England and Wales and paragraph 2(9) for Scotland. If the board simply certifies that in its opinion no prima facie case for an award of compensation was disclosed by the claimant, then the claimant is totally remedy-less. He has been denied any hearing by the board and he cannot test the board's opinion that his case is hopeless.

It is no answer to say, as was sought to be said in another place when this point was taken, that the claimant can apply again with fuller reasons. It is no answer because he may get the same answer, that he has no prima facie case. As I say, I know from a good deal of experience of judicial review cases in the Divisional Court, that the Divisional Court can refuse leave on the basis that the case is hopeless. The Court of Appeal can then grant leave and the applicant who was told at first that his case was hopeless, succeeds in the Court of Appeal.

Therefore, this is an important point to which I hope the Lord Advocate will give close thought. The board should not be empowered to deny a hearing simply by saying there is no prima facie case and then leave the citizen without any redress whatever. For these reasons I commend this amendment to the House. I beg to move.

Lord Morton of Shuna

I support this amendment. It seems to be an omission from the provisions and it would he a necessary matter to put right.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

As the noble Lord opposite has indicated, paragraph 2(5) provides that where, the Board have certified that in their opinion no prima facie case… was disclosed by his application the claimant is not entitled to make an application For a hearing under paragraph 2.

The purpose of that procedure is to relieve the board of that time consuming and expensive task of reconsidering cases in which there is no case for an award. The noble Lord, Lord Morton, referred to this in an earlier debate.

It is not intended that the procedure would be used except in clear cases and the noble Lord, Lord Morton, will no doubt agree that the board would be very careful in the consideration of these kinds of cases. It must be accepted that like all public bodies the board receives a number of outlandish, if not bizarre, requests for consideration. For example, these may be in the nature of requests for compensation for injuries caused by sinister invisible rays or by ill-disposed beings from foreign planets. That does not mean that the person making the request is not fully persuaded of the justice of the case and is not prepared vigorously to pursue it. In such cases, and in others where there is no hope of a claim succeeding, it seems right to prevent a case from proceeding further with the additional costs and effects on other meritorious cases which would result.

I have to say that in the last resort a person who remains aggrieved by the board's decision can seek judicial review of the decision and would no doubt do so only after receiving good advice that there is a case. There is therefore not a question of there being no remedy, but I think one has to proceed on the bona fides of the board. The noble Lord has already said that one can come back with a further application with better particulars. For those reasons, I regret that I cannot accept the amendment.

Lord Irvine of Lairg

I am bound to say that I am startled by what has come from the noble and learned Lord, In my experience, I have heard too often about clear cases which are hopeless—decided by conscientious men and judges—only to learn subsequently that what appeared to be clearly hopeless was clearly right. I would be astonished if the noble and learned Lord's experience did not likewise extend to such cases.

Of course, I do not doubt that the large majority of cases which are said to be cases which are clear, and where it is said that there is no prima facie case, are cases that are correctly so described. In such a case of course leave to issue a mandamus would no doubt not be granted; but we are concerned with the rare case where the board is wrong and has wrongly said, without a hearing perhaps on the say-so of a single member of the board, that the case is hopeless. I repeat that I would be astonished if the noble and learned Lord has not himself known cases where a single judge has said that and has been proved to be wrong by a Court of Appeal. How much more cogent therefore is this point when a decision may have been made, without a hearing, by a single member of the board?

The noble and learned Lord further says that there is no need to expand the power to make an order of mandamus, as this amendment suggests, to cover this class of case. He says that this class of case would be covered by an application for judicial review. Can he point to any provision in the Bill that demonstrates that to be so? As I read these provisions, it is mandamus or nothing, and on necessary construction of the provisions of this part of Schedule 6 mandamus cannot go to complain about a decision of no prima facie case which is said to be wrong in law or perverse.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

I accept, as regards court proceedings, that the noble Lord opposite may be correct in saying that at times a single judge may be wrong. The point I was making in my earlier answer is that refusal of an application is not refusal forever and a day, and the claimant may come back with further and better particulars. In that sense I say that matter is vastly different from a court case.

That is the reason why, as I have indicated, I have said that an application has the possibility of coming back to the board if he feels that he has not given sufficient information but has a good case; but at the end of the day the bizarre cases must have an end, and for that reason I do not feel able to accept this amendment.

10.15 p.m.

Lord Irvine of Lairg

As I understand the answer which the noble and learned Lord has just given it is to acknowledge judicial review in the sense that an application to the High Court would not run. It now appears that the noble Lord was using "judicial review" in the sense of going back again with further supporting reasons to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. That I would not call judicial review; I would simply call it going back to the same body, the board, that had said there was no prima facie case in the first instance. If the same body, without a hearing, simply mouths or certifies the magic words, "no prima facie case", again, what remedy has the citizen if the board is wrong? The answer is none; and why should there be no remedy?

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

I do not think I accepted that there was no provision which would allow the dissatisfied applicant to seek judicial review. I should have thought that that would lie anyway. I am saying that we do not provide within this Bill a specific right of appeal of the kind which is suggested. For that reason I also made clear the view of the Government.

Lord Morton of Shuna

I would suggest to the noble and learned Lord that he might reconsider it. Some of the prima facie cases that would be refused are refused because the board takes a view as to whether it comes within the scheme or not, not because the applicant is necessarily a believer in things coming from space to attack him. However, that type of situation has been reviewed before. I am thinking of the case of Ince, where a police car going to a sounding burglar alarm, goes through a red light. It is that kind of case. No additional facts can be put forward. It is a view whether it is within or without the scheme. It is a pure point of law. It is turned down because there is no prima facie case because the board members in this instance decide wrongly. Speaking for myself, and I should think every other member of the board, we would all say that we are no better and probably a lot worse than judges. We make mistakes. We are human beings, and judges are there to put us right. This is a matter that has to be put right. Perhaps the noble and learned Lord would be prepared to have a look at it.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

I have made clear what our position is here. Indeed the noble Lord has confirmed the very point which I was seeking to make previously. Judicial review lies in cases where the board may be seen to have acted wrongly in saying that a matter is outwith the scheme when it is truly within the scheme. That remedy still lies and for that reason we do not feel it necessary to add an additional provision that would give a general right of appeal.

Lord Irvine of Lairg

I rise to my feet again only to appeal to the noble and learned Lord's well known sense of fairness. Since he accepts that there is the class of case to which the noble Lord, Lord Morton of Shuna, refers, where the board could certify no prima facie case simply because of an error of law, how could that error of law ever be demonstrated if all that the board does is to certify "no prima facie case full stop"? The noble Lord is asserting that a remedy exists and that there would be no material which would allow it to be exercised. The relevant remedy in such a case is surely a mandamus that the case be properly heard and argued.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

Obviously as with any proceedings in this Committee I shall look at what has been said. However, I have indicated the present view of the Government.

Lord Irvine of Lairg

I am much obliged. Perhaps I may seek leave to withdraw this amendment.

Amendments, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Morton of Shuna moved Amendment No. 132: Page 112, line 28, at end insert ("or that the proceedings are likely to be prejudiced by the determination of a claim.").

The noble Lord said: This is a provision about which I am certainly very worried. The provisions of paragraph 4(1) read: The Board may only defer the determination of a claim on the ground that criminal proceedings are current if they"— that is, the board— consider that the proceedings are likely to be material to their determination of the claim". My noble friend Lord Irvine and I seek to put in the phrase, or that the proceedings"— that is, the criminal proceedings— are likely to be prejudiced by the determination of a claim". This provision appears to have come to light because of a public outcry that arose after the Brighton bombing and before the trial, as a result of that case when the board, after the people were arrested, decided to cease to process the claims until the trial of the accused. The chairman of the board took the view that it might be argued if the board had made awards that that might prejudice the fair conduct of the trial.

The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice stated publicly that he agreed with that view—or at least he allowed the chairman of the board to state that that was his view. I know from counsel who was acting for one of the accused in the Brighton trial that if the board had continued to make awards that would have been used as part of the argument that was advanced that a fair trial could not take place. That was a very special circumstance, but the noble and learned Lord opposite knows as well as I do that in the criminal courts in Scotland quite frequently it will be suggested to the injured party who is the complainer in an action that the only reason he went to the police was in order to make a claim to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. If the complainer is able to say, "Yes, that is so and I have the money", the jury may well consider that he is an innocent victim, whereas the fact may be that a self-defence defence should be upheld.

I can see very great difficulties indeed if we, the board, are under an obligation to defer determination only on the ground that the criminal proceedings will help us in the determination of the claim and we shall make difficult the determination of the guilt or innocence of accused in criminal trials, which, with all respect to the importance of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, is something far more important and necessary to protect. I beg to move.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

I am aware that, as the noble Lord opposite has reminded us, the board has followed a practice in the past of not making awards while related criminal proceedings are pending because of the possible effects on its own proceedings or the possibility of prejudice to the criminal proceedings.

We are not persuaded that the second safeguard is necessary in practice, although obviously I shall read what the noble Lord has said. The noble Lord has reminded the Committee of the Brighton bombing case, although in that case the decision was taken despite a police statement to the board that the deaths and injuries were a result of a bomb explosion and there was no question in that case that those who suffered were in any way responsible for the crime.

Our view is that in circumstances where there is prima facie evidence of a crime and no suggestion that the victim has contributed to it, then the board should proceed with its determination. In taking this view we are fortified by experience in Northern Ireland, where generally the compensation and criminal processes in Northern Ireland proceed independently of one another. In that comparatively long experience no statutory provision of the kind proposed in the amendment has been found necessary. That experience does not suggest that we need the provision here. I believe that it could result in unnecessary extra delays in settling claims, and for those reasons I am not disposed to accept the amendment.

This is a late hour and again I shall obviously read what has been said. I am aware of the kind of question that the noble Lord, Lord Morton, has referred to being asked in a criminal trial. I am bound to say that I do not recollect the answer being given in that form. My recollection is that the witness may have said, "Yes, a claim has been made", but did not expatitate on whether the claim had been dealt with, which would be irrelevant to the material of the trial.

I should have thought that that was a small price to pay for the fact that those who have been injured, or the dependants of those who have died as a result of a violent crime, should await the resolution of the criminal proceedings before the board can proceed to deal with compensation. In certain cases that may be long before those proceedings come to trial. For those reasons, I do not feel disposed to accept the amendment, hut I shall go away and read what has been said.

Lord Morton of Shuna

The noble and learned Lord has had experience for a number of years in the Crown Office. All that I can do is to remind him that so far I have had slightly more experience in that office. There are many cases where the accused persons comprise one group in a fight and the Crown witnesses another. The Crown witnesses and the accused may all have made claims to the compensation hoard. Paragraph 4(1) is asking the hoard to determine guilt and conduct before the jury does so. That seems to us to be entirely wrong. We have not done that up until now, because we have waited for the trial unless there has been an outstanding warrant and the offender has not been caught.

This is a serious matter which has not been properly looked at. I will withdraw the amendment at this stage, but I hope that the noble and learned Lord will look at it seriously.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Morton of Shuna moved Amendment No. 133: Page 112, line 40, after ("or) insert ("the").

The noble Lord said: This is a pure matter of English. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Morton of Shuna moved Amendment No. 134: Page 112, line 42, leave out ("97") and insert ("100").

The noble Lord said: I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 136, 153 and 155. This is an occasion where the Government's word processor has been unable to count, because when there are references to Clause 97 they should be to Clause 100. As no one else seems to have noticed this, we thought it better to put it right. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Morton of Shuna moved Amendment No. 135: Page 112, line 45, leave out from ("to") to end of line 49 and insert ("clothing and any personal adjuncts arising from the injury to which the claim relates, but personal adjuncts do not include jewellery, watches or rings and compensation shall not be payable under paragraph (b) above for any other loss of or damage to property.").

The noble Lord said: I think that I am intended to speak also to Amendments Nos. 138 and 139, which are consequential. The scheme under which the board operates at the moment provides that clothing which a victim of a crime of violence is wearing at the time he is assaulted and which is damaged in that assault is one of the items for which compensation is given.

With the care and interest which the Government obviously have for the well-being of victims of crimes of violence, they intend to deny any compensation for clothing from that scheme. I ask the noble and learned Lord seriously to consider this matter again. Many people have, so to speak, one good suit of clothes and one good coat. An old age pensioner goes out in her good, warm coat on a winter evening and is mugged and the coat is thereafter useless. She is now to be denied compensation for that coat.

We are not talking about a large sum of money. The total cost of the board was rather over £50 million in the year to March 1987. It is rather less than this country considers appropriate to spend on military bands. I have nothing against military bands, they are a good thing, but it shows the level of the costs that we are talking about. It is extremely important especially to the more impoverished victims of crimes of violence. It is a meanness which is unnecessary, and in order to restore the position to what it was under the scheme I move Amendment No. 135.

10.30 p.m.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

It is estimated that the board pays out about £400,000 a year to compensate those who have suffered a loss of, or damage to, their clothing as a result of a crime of violence. While this may be praiseworthy, the cost and administrative effort expended by the board in verifying such claims is considerable. As a result, a significant amount of the board's time and funding is being deflected from the fundamental aim of the scheme, which is to compensate for personal injury or death. Instead it is trying to gauge the value of partly-worn clothing with very little means of checking its age, condition or value. The average payments made are in the region of £15 to £20, which must be little more than the cost of the arrangements for checking the claim and making the payment.

The question of the board's continuing to compensate applicants for the loss of, or damage to, clothing was considered by the Interdepartmental Working Party in 1986. This was a working party which included representatives drawn from the staff of the board.

They considered it anomalous, as it indeed is, that a scheme devised to compensate victims for personal injury should pay for the replacement or restoration of their clothing. Clothing may be more personal than some other property but if clothing is covered by the scheme there is not much logic in excluding other uninsured property damaged as a result of crime. Such a scheme would be very generous and very expensive but it would not be a scheme to compensate for personal injury.

The effect of the damage to, or loss of, a victim's personal adjuncts which are relied upon as a physical aid are in a special category. We accept that spectacles, dentures and hearing aids should continue to be covered by the statutory scheme as the articles are so closely connected with the physical faculties of the victim. There is not the same strong case for the board to continue to pay for property such as clothing or other personal property which is not a physical aid.

In these circumstances, despite the noble Lord's eloquent plea, I regret to say that I cannot accept this amendment.

Lord Harris of Greenwich

If I may say so, this sounds rather like a proposal to save £400,000 of public money. Having listened to this debate, I very much hope, despite the lateness of the hour, that the noble and learned Lord will look at this argument again. A substantial number of people would probably not make any demand on the scheme for the relatively small cost involved in damage to clothing. But for persons of limited income—as the noble Lord, Lord Morton of Shuna, has said old age pensioners who have very limited resources are—this could be quite an important issue. They not only have the shock of the attack, for which in terms of injury they may receive some degree of compensation, but they also have damage to a limited quantity of personal clothing. It seems to me most unfortunate that, as part of an arrangement whereby we are trying to put this whole scheme on a statutory basis, this rather mean-minded approach has been adopted.

Lord Morton of Shuna

I find the argument of the noble and learned Lord rather unsatisfactory. The total administrative expense of the board, which includes every cost, is about 10 per cent. of its total cost. It is not a board that is running away with costs of administration, as is the court system. It is a board for which the administrative cost is very low. It seems a great meanness.

I remind the noble and learned Lord that the victim support groups have raised this as a matter of great importance. Those groups consist of people who are in the front line, because they meet the victims. An interdepartmental working party from the Treasury, the Scottish Office and the Home Office does not necessarily have such close affinity to the victims of crimes of violence. However, in the confident hope that the noble and learned Lord will look again at this proposal, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Morton of Shuna moved Amendment No.136: Page 113, line 1, leave out ("97") and insert ("100").

The noble Lord said: This amendment covers a formality and again gets right the numbers of the clauses. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Morton of Shuna moved Amendment No.137: Page 113, line 22, after ("was") insert ("reasonably").

The noble Lord said: This provision is another example of total meanness. It may sound rather odd that I am speaking from these Benches in favour of meeting the costs of private medicine in certain circumstances. The earlier provision in the existing scheme requires that the costs of private medical care were bound to be met where they were reasonably incurred. We now have the provision that we are to be entitled to meet such costs out of public funds only if the treatment is essential.

The amendment seeks to add the word "reasonably". I quite appreciate that to a lawyer it is a little difficult to interpret the words "reasonably essential", but it seems to me that it is quite wrong to say to someone who has a four-inch scar across his or her face—and there is what must seem an interminable wait of about eight, nine or 10 years for plastic surgery which is only performed for the sake of improving the appearance—that it is not essential to have the scar revised. Of course it is not essential; that person can go on living without having the scar revised. But anyone who takes a reasonable view would say that it was reasonably essential, especially if the person is a young lady who depends to any extent upon her appearance.

In view of the present state of waiting lists—and certainly members of the board are regularly told that in cases where plastic surgery is required to correct noses, for example, and operations are needed to correct injuries to ankles and so on the waiting list will be four or five years—it seems that something more reasonable should be applicable for this type of situation. I beg to move.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

The provision as it stands reflects the recommendation of the working party that the board should pay the cost of private medical treatment but only where such treatment is essential and the cost is reasonable. We believe that that is the right approach and that the provision for treatment to be essential is the right test to apply before public funds are disbursed to pay for private medical treatment.

We should not, therefore, wish to see any qualification of the essentiality of treatment, which will be a matter on which the board will need to be satisfied. If the treatment is essential and indispensable I suggest that it cannot be qualified in the way proposed in this amendment. The noble Lord produced an example. I wonder whether in that case he would have found difficulty if the word "essential" only appeared in deciding the case other than in favour of the claimant. I do not know. But I have indicated the Government's view and, in these circumstances, I regret to say that I cannot give the noble Lord any real hope that we shall alter it in the light of what he has just said.

Lord Irvine of Lairg

Is the noble and learned Lord indicating that in his view, if a lady, the victim of a criminal injury, suffered a scar that required revision and was concerned about her appearance because it was injuring her sense of well-being not to have this plastic surgery privately, the board would be perfectly entitled to regard that treatment as essential, so that the only question would be whether the expense was reasonable?

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

I have resisted giving an answer. All I am saying is that that would be a matter for the board, in the light of the circumstances which are produced and the arguments placed before it. I am simply saying that we think that the recommendation of the working party in relation to this is correct, and that the board would require to be satisfied that the treatment was essential and the costs reasonable, before it would allow public funds to be disbursed to pay for private medical treatment.

Lord Harris of Greenwich

I think that a number of us are going to have to read Hansard rather carefully tomorrow, because I certainly interpreted the noble and learned Lord's observations to the noble Lord, Lord Morton of Shuna, to indicate that the board would he entitled to authorise payment in the particular case he cited. Did the noble and learned Lord mean that or did he not?

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

I think I made it clear that the test is one of essentiality and reasonableness of the cost. That is what I put and that would be a matter for the board to be satisfied about on the material placed before it. I think perhaps I should resist any blandishment to give an opinion upon any particular case. If I appear to have done so, then perhaps I should make it clear that I do not do so in this debate, other than to say that the Government's view as to the test is quite clear.

Lord Harris of Greenwich

I think the noble and learned Lord will find when he looks at Hansard tomorrow that he went rather further than he imagined. I think this is a matter of some importance. It is most unreasonable, no doubt, to keep on asking the noble and learned Lord to consider these matters when there are only a limited number of us in the Committee at the moment. However, I think that this question raises so very many important issues that it requires some careful study.

It seems to me that if a young woman, or a young man, is affected in this way and needs cosmetic surgery of a kind described by the noble Lord, Lord Morton of Shuna, given the fact that that is consequent upon a serious assault, it is right and wholly reasonable that expenditure of this sort should be met by the board. I very much hope that between now and the Report stage those concerned will look again at this matter, and see whether we can tighten up the language of this clause.

Lord Morton of Shuna

The real trouble is the word "essential"—essential for what? What is it to be essential to—the life of the applicant, the good temper of the applicant, or what? "Essential" is a very difficult word to ask the board to interpret in these circumstances. If you are dealing with plastic surgery, or the ability to breathe properly through one's nose—and these are the types of cases which arise most frequently—it is very difficult to see how "essential" really helps us. It is not essential for the life of anybody that she should have a four-inch scar removed from her face, but it makes a difference. How much of a difference becomes "essential" is the real issue, and it really will not do for Parliament to leave the board with a completely unanswerable question and expect it to make sense of it.

As it is fairly late in the evening, now is not the time to test the opinion of the Committee. I therefore beg leave to withdraw the amendment. I give an assurance that we will come back on this.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 138 and 139 not moved.]

10.45 p.m.

Lord Morton of Shuna moved Amendment No. 140: Page 113, line 34, after ("there") insert ("or within the limits of the territorial waters adjacent to Scotland or on, under or above waters to which section 99(1)(e) of this Act applies, or on a ship, aircraft or hovercraft registered in or operating from Scotland:").

The noble Lord said: I speak not so much as a member of the board but as a resident in Scotland. If one considers in the case of a fishing boat setting out from the North-East of Scotland that one fisherman attacks another somewhere between Shetland and Norway, it is apparently the law of England and Wales that is to apply. This seems rather odd. I should be delighted to see an English court trying to deal with the accents of Buchan. However, that is a feature that we probably will not see!

The intention of the amendment is to put to Scotland the things that are Scottish and to leave to England and Wales the things that belong to England and Wales and not to the rest of the world, which seems to be the approach of the draftsman.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

I am grateful to the noble Lord for having tabled the amendment. There is a government amendment with regard to the waters referred to in Clause 99(2)(e). That in part meets what is proposed in the noble Lord's amendment. However, he goes further and wishes to include the territorial waters adjacent to Scotland and ships, aircraft or hovercraft registered in or operating from Scotland.

As to the law, the jurisdiction of the courts in Scotland extends to the territorial waters adjacent to Scotland and to incidents on or above the waters referred to in Clause 99(2)(e). I should add that a court in Edinburgh probably has as much difficulty in dealing with Buchan accents as does a court further south!

Like the noble Lord, I wish to ensure that any incident occurring in any of the waters off the coast of Scotland would be treated by the board as having occurred in Scotland. Therefore, I should be happy to look at the provision again to ensure that it achieves the end that we all seek.

Regarding the proposition to include injuries sustained on a ship, aircraft or hovercraft registered in or operating from Scotland, I think that we are again in broad agreement. However, the amendment cannot be accepted as it stands. A ship registered in Scotland would come within the terms of the Bill. I take the noble Lord's point that, if an incident occurred on a Scottish registered ship, the Bill as presently drafted would assign jurisdiction to the courts of England and Wales. I am happy to undertake to look at the point again to ensure that the appropriate jurisdiction is assigned.

As to aircraft, these are registered centrally for the United Kingdom by the Civil Aviation Authority. Similarly there is a central register for hovercraft maintained by the Department of Transport. The proposed amendment could not therefore be given effect in regard to either of these modes of transport. I have to reject that ships operating from Scotland should be included. A Norwegian or Danish ship could be operating from Scotland, for example, ferrying supplies to oilfields. The amendment would allow a member of the Norwegian or Danish crew to make a claim to the board if he was attacked and injured by a fellow crewman. The same would apply to aircraft where international flights may operate from Scotland. If that was so we would have claims from France, Germany, Italy or wherever where there was no connection with this country at all apart from the geographical location of the port or airport of departure or destination. However I take the essential point which the Member was making and I shall undertake to look at this to improve the terminology and to get the correct jurisdiction.

Lord Morton of Shuna

I am very much obliged. It may be that if the view of a Lord Chancellor who is perhaps not wholly inimical to Scotland prevailed the sort of drafting that takes place on lines 34 and 35 would not occur so often. Moreover, I wish also to bring to the noble and learned Lord's attention the fact that in May of this year we were in Aberdeenshire dealing with an accident which had unfortunately occurred off Shetland when a helicopter had fallen into the sea. If that had been a crime, as the Bill is drafted English law would have applied to those fatalities. That must be totally wrong. I am very glad to see that aspect is to be looked at again. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

The Chairman of Committees

If Amendment No. 141 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment No. 142.

Lord Morton of Shuna moved Amendment No. 141 Page 113, line 36, leave out paragraph 6.

The noble Lord said: I have tabled this amendment to leave out paragraph 6 more to get this discussed than to have any opposition to the principal, although I must say that I am very dubious in the sense of not having made up my mind whether or not this is an appropriate course to take. This is a provision that did not appear at all in the scheme which with a variety of amendments through the years has been in existence since 1964.

What is being suggested is that where there is a rape in the course of which a child is conceived and the claimant gives birth to the child and intends to keep it she should receive a flat rate payment of £5,000 in addition to the benefits that she may be entitled to as a result of having been raped.

That may or may not be a good idea. I am far from certain. It is not clear to me, for example, what happens or what is intended to happen if nine months after the rape the claimant gives birth, makes a claim to the board, the board pays out £5,000 and the lady says: "Thank you very much. I shall now place the child for adoption". How long is the intention intended to be for? There is nothing to give us a view on that.

I personally would be extremely unhappy if the board were to enter into any form of demanding proof of the paternity of a child in these circumstances. That would very much increase the distress that victims of rape suffer and I am on the whole unhappy about this whole provision which came out of the blue in the working party's report. Nobody else has suggested it. Somebody in the working party seems to have thought of it. So far as I am aware, this is not a matter on which there has been any public concern and I am totally unaware of how many cases of rape there are in which a child is born and the mother wishes to keep the child. Has the noble and learned Lord any information on that? But at this stage I merely move the amendment.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

The noble Lord opposite is correct in saying that the provision stems from a recommendation made by the interdepartmental working party. It felt that although the scheme should not in any general way be looked to for the maintenance of the child, it would be appropriate nevertheless for the scheme to recognise in a more limited way the particular difficulties faced by a woman in those circumstances. The scheme itself of course provides entitlement to compensation in respect of the general physical and psychological effects of this heinous crime upon any woman.

The purpose of paragraph 6 is to empower the scheme to make additional specific provision in recognition of the particular emotional and practical consequences which can arise where the mother gives birth to and keeps a child conceived as a result of rape. It is difficult to suggest the number of cases where this is likely to happen. We think it is probably very rare, but we believe it is right to give some financial consideration to a woman in that situation over and above the compensation for the psychological upset.

I take the point the noble Lord made about proof of intention to keep the child. Perhaps we may ponder what he said, but it seemed to the Government that this was a reasonable point made by the interdepartmental working party and that their recommendation was worthy of inclusion in the scheme.

Lord Morton of Shuna

This is another occasion on which there are many Members of your Lordships' Committee whose views would have been of great value on a matter such as this but who, due to the lateness of the hour, cannot be here. I am thinking particularly of those who have social work experience and expertise. In the circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment, in the hope that I may return to it at a more convenient hour at a later stage of the Bill.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom moved Amendment No. 142: Page 114, line 4, leave out sub-paragraph (6).

The noble and learned Lord said: This is merely the deletion of a redundant sub-paragraph. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Chairman of Committees

I call Amendment No. 143. I have to point out that, if this amendment is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment No. 144.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom moved Amendment No. 143: Page 114, line 6, leave out sub-paragraph (1).

The noble and learned Lord said: In speaking to this amendment, I would speak also to Amendments Nos. 145 to 147, 149. 151, 154 and 196. The purpose of these amendments is to insert into Clause 100 a clearer statement of who is entitled to make a claim for compensation and how compensation is restricted for certain categories of claimant. As a result, the main grounds of entitlement will be found in the body of the statute, subsidiary matters being left to the schedules. If noble Lords wish any further explanation, I shall be happy to give it. I beg to move.

Lord Morton of Shuna

The difficulty about these amendments is that if one leaves out sub-paragraph (1) one then has sub-paragraph (2) standing by itself and applying the Fatal Accidents Act to unspecified cases. Then when one comes to a similar amendment in paragraph 8 one gets the same thing applying the Damages (Scotland) Act. I am not at all certain that this really puts the matter clearly from the point of view of the public.

I see what is being aimed at, but I am not sure that it has been achieved. It is very late at night and I think we have reached a stage when I might with all deference suggest that useful discussion has really ceased on this very difficult drafting of a schedule; but I am not opposing the amendment.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

I am grateful for what the noble Lord says. I think actually that the matter will be clear once these amendments are made, but obviously I will bear in mind what he has said. If there is any ambiguity, it should be cured.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendment No. 144 not moved.]

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom moved Amendments Nos. 145, 146 and 147: Page 114, line 12, leave out ("payable under this paragraph") and insert ("for a dependant of a person who died as a result of a qualifying injury"). Page 114, line 14, leave out sub-paragraph (3). Page 114, line 18, leave out sub-paragraph (4).

The noble and learned Lord said: I spoke to Amendment No. 145 with Amendment No. 143, as I did to Amendments Nos. 146 and 147. I beg to move Amendments Nos. 145 to 147.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

11 p.m.

Lord Morton of Shuna moved Amendment No. 148: Page 114, line 18, after ("any") insert ("reasonable").

The noble Lord said: Perhaps I may speak also to Amendment No. 156. The provision here lays on the board the duty to pay funeral expenses. It is suggested that there should he some restriction and that the expenses should be reasonable. For example, the whole population of California should not be brought to a funeral. I beg to move.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

I think that it is right to point out that Amendment No. 196 in the name of my noble friend, if accepted, will correct the omission and transfer the provision of compensation for funeral expenses to Clause 100. The word "reasonable" appears there. In the circumstances, perhaps I may accept the amendment in principle. But, as the noble Lord will see, we endeavour to cure the omission at a later point.

Lord Morton of Shuna

I withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

The Chairman of Committees

I remind the Committee in calling Amendment No. 149 that if it is agreed to I cannot call Amendment No. 150.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom moved Amendment 149: Page 114, line 20, leave out sub-paragraph (1).

The noble and learned Lord said: This amendment is consequential upon Amendment No. 143. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendment No. 150 not moved.]

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom moved Amendment No. 151: Page 114, line 24, leave out ("under this paragraph") and insert ("in respect of a qualifying injury").

The noble and learned Lord said: This amendment is consequential to Amendment No. 143. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Chairman of Committees

In calling Amendment No. 152 I remind the Committee that if this amendment is agreed I cannot call Amendment No. 153:

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom moved Amendment 152:

Page 114, line 26, leave out paragraph 9 and insert— ("9.—The Board may award compensation to a dependant of a person who died otherwise than as a result of a qualifying injury in respect—

1. (a) of any loss of earnings (not being prospective earnings) by the deceased; and
2. (b) of expenses and liabilities incurred by the deceased, as a result of the injury.").

The noble and learned Lord said: The working party recommended that the board should continue to be able to pay compensation to a limited extent to dependants of victims of criminal injury who die from other causes before receiving an award from the board. The wording of paragraph 9 as it stands leaves open the possibility that potential earnings lost by the deceased after his death might be included in the compensation payable to a dependant. That was not intended and the amendment excludes that possibility. It also clarifies a certain ambiguity. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendment No. 153 not moved.]

The Chairman of Committees

In calling Amendment No. 154, I remind the Committee that if this amendment is agreed to I cannot call Amendments Nos. 155 and 156.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom moved Amendment No. 154: Page 114, line 30, leave out paragraph 10.

The noble and learned Lord said: This amendment is consequential to Amendment 143. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendments Nos. 155 and 156 not moved.]

Lord Morton of Shuna moved Amendment 157: Page 114, line 35, leave out ("one-and-a-half times") and insert ("twice").

The noble Lord said: Once again this amendment comes at a very late hour. I hope that the usual channels will come to some result in a brief period because I hope to meet certain other engagements.

The scheme under which the board operates at present allows it to pay for loss of earnings up to a level of twice the national average wage. The working party has been influenced by the great generosity of the Treasury and that is now to be reduced to one-and-a-half times the wage. It seems an unnecessary meanness and the amendment seeks to restore the level to that under which the board has operated and continues to operate. I beg to move.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

Perhaps it is unfortunate that the noble Lord took a tilt at the Treasury. The working party gave clear reasons for its view. Not only victims but the public in general expect those who have suffered from criminal injuries to maintain a reasonable standard of living compared with their position before they were injured. However, the amount payable for loss of earnings under the scheme has always been limited on the basis that those with higher incomes are better able and more likely to have made some provision against loss of income, whether it be by accident, injury or illness. The scheme should not be seen to be paying disproportionately large sums in compensation for loss of earnings to those with high incomes while those who are on low incomes or who are out of work are paid small amounts or nothing at all.

The working party considered that the existing upper limit of twice the gross average industrial wage was too high. They recommended, as indeed had been recommended by a previous working party, that the appropriate limit for the net loss of earnings to be taken into account should be one and a half times the gross average industrial wage. The existing ceiling allows the board to award compensation to a maximum of £440 per week. That is equivalent to a gross salary of about £30,000 a year. Multiplied by one-and-a-half times, that would be equivalent to a gross salary of £23,000 per year, which would leave 70 per cent. of full-time workers unaffected by the change.

It seems to us that that is a reasonable level at which lost earnings should be fully compensated. I think the general public would find it hard to accept that someone earning more than that was likely to suffer hardship through having compensation through loss of earnings so limited. For these reasons I regret to say that I cannot accept this amendment.

Lord Irvine of Lairg

I should like to support the noble Lord, Lord Morton of Shuna. It appears to me that there must be many people who earn between one-and-a-half times and twice the average wage, but who can hardly be described as wealthy. Surely they will not be properly compensated if this large gap is opened between their actual lost earnings and the earnings for which they can be compensated.

I gather from what the noble and learned Lord said that the Government are not minded to withdraw this rather mean attempt to save money at the expense of victims of crime. I ask the noble and learned Lord for his assurances on two related matters. First, can he confirm that the power contained in paragraph 11(3) which allows the Secretary of State to vary the sum by which the average wage is multiplied for these purposes will only be exercised so as to increase the statutory multiplier or does he say that it may be used to reduce that multiplier below one and a half?

Secondly, can he assure us that the power in paragraph 11(3) to specify the average wage from time to time will be regularly—I emphasise "regularly"—exercised by the Secretary of State so that the maximum compensation which in this niggardly way is to be reduced in practice from twice to one-and-a-half times does not become eroded by inflation?

Lord Morton of Shuna

Having heard the noble and learned Lord's argument, I find it difficult to accept. The only real comment from the public about the inadequacies of the board's actions came in respect of those, and certainly not by those, who were injured at Brighton. In general I would not consider that the compensation would be below either level, either the one-and-a-half times or the twice times level.

I am very disappointed in the Government's attitude. I have not noticed a desire among the general public for parsimony in dealing with victims of violence. I ask leave to withdraw the amendment on the basis that I may have to return to it at a later stage. Unfortunately, I cannot return to anything else tonight.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom moved Amendment No. 158: Page 114, line 47, leave out ("payable under paragraph 5, 7, 8 or 9 above") and insert (", other than compensation for rape under paragraph 6 above or compensation in respect of funeral expenses.").

The noble and learned Lord said: These amendments are consequential upon earlier amendments. The reference to paragraph 7 has been removed because compensation will not now be payable under that paragraph. It is therefore preferable to specify two instances where the board will not reduce the award by the value of the benefits set out in paragraphs 12 and 13. Those are instances where compensation is paid for funeral expenses or in relation to a child born as the result of rape. In saying this, I should point out that I am speaking also to Amendment No. 163. I beg to move.

Lord Harris of Greenwich

I really hope that at some stage we shall get some guidance as to what is actually going to happen this evening. I think it is a great pity that the noble Lord, Lord Morton of Shuna, has had to leave us, given his expertise in this matter. It seems to me rather unfortunate that we are being placed in a position where one person who has a very substantial expertise has now had to leave us. Also there is the fact that we are now discussing some very sensitive issues involving many people who are the victims of violence. It does not seem to me that we are behaving in the most appropriate manner. Therefore, I very much hope that we are going to adjourn soon and come back to this on Monday.

Lord Denham

The difficulty is that there is a finite amount of time in each Session. We have already spent a great deal of time over this Bill and if we are going to have this measure, we must be prepared to sit late at night; otherwise the programme of any government will not get through this House. I am perfectly prepared to agree to adjourn at any time provided I have a guarantee that we get through the Bill in the time that has been allotted.

Lord Harris of Greenwich

Obviously I am not in a position to enter into any form of agreement at this moment. I heard what the noble Lord said. We are told, and the noble Lord will confirm it, that there is a tradition in this House that we do not sit late on Thursday evenings, but that is what we are now doing. We have certainly gone through a very substantial number of amendments and nobody could possibly suggest that there has been any time-wasting. I hope that we may reflect on this matter outside this Chamber. Certainly my colleagues and I have done nothing to delay the progress on this Bill. We have regarded many features of the Bill as nonpartisan matters. We heard what the noble Lord said and without entering into any form of bargaining, as I certainly could not do that this evening, I hope that he will also listen to what we have said and take appropriate action.

Lord Denham

The suggestion is that if we reach the end of Schedule 6, which will not take long, that will leave us a reasonable amount of what we had hoped to do tonight to finish in reasonable time on Monday.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom moved Amendment No. 159: Page 115, line 10, after ("benefits") insert ("including any return of premiums)").

The noble and learned Lord said: Again, this is a drafting amendment. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Irvine of Lairg moved Amendment No. 160: Page 115, line 12, after first ("arrangements") insert ("means").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Irvine of Lairg moved Amendment No. 161: Page 115, line 13, after ("for") insert ("wholly or partly").

The noble Lord said: This amendment is to be taken with Amendment No. 164 and I therefore propose to speak to both amendments. The two amendments make a simple point. The Bill rightly recognises that entitlements arising from private insurance and pension arrangements—that is, entitlements for which the victim has paid—should not be taken into account as reducing the compensation payable under the scheme. That is contained in paragraphs 12(2)(c) and 13(1). There is no such exemption if the payment does not come entirely from the victim's household. That must obviously exclude any arrangements to which an employer has contributed, no matter how small the contribution may be.

The fact is that a person receives a total package of remuneration and benefits from his employer, and in substance the employer's contribution is a concealed remuneration. If the employer is making contributions to a pension or insurance scheme, the chances are that his employees will receive that much less in their pay packets, and there is no merit in discriminating against them for the purposes of criminal injuries compensation by treating them less favourably than, say, the self employed. That is the reasoning behind both amendments. I beg to move Amendment No. 161.

11.15 p.m.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

The present scheme allows pension rights and insurance benefits to be disregarded only where they accrued solely as the result of payments by the victim or a dependant. We believe that the restriction is right and that the wording of the paragraphs achieves the intended result.

The inclusion of the words which this amendment suggests in both instances appears to allow the claimant or his dependant a greater opportunity to avoid a reduction being made by the board in respect of his private insurance or pension arrangements. We would not regard it as acceptable to allow for the reduction to be avoided where part (although perhaps a very large proportion) of the contributions to the pension or insurance had been made by some third party other than the injured person or his spouse, or someone living with him as his spouse subject to the limitations of sub-paragraph (2)(c), or in the case of an injured person under the age of 18, the parent or guardian.

There is, however, a question of joint subscription between the injured party and his spouse where the benefits exclusion would apply. I am not convinced that an amendment is necessary there. I do not think that the noble Lord touched upon this. However, I shall certainly read what the noble Lord said on the point to which I have just alluded to see whether there is anything in the matter. For the moment I cannot accept this amendment.

Lord Irvine of Lairg

I shall be interested to read whether the noble and learned Lord will say in answer to my question that the provisions in their amended form, without the words "wholly or partly" inserted in place of "for", would have the effect of excluding any arrangements to which an employer has contributed, no matter how small the employer's contribution may be. If he accepts that that is the consequence of the provisions as they stand, does he think it is just that that should be the position?

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

I made clear what the scheme at present has been. It is quite clear that the scheme allows only pension rights or insurance benefits to be disregarded where they accrued solely as a result of payments by the victim or a dependant. That would cover the payments to which the noble Lord has just referred. However, I shall look at this again in the light of what the noble Lord has said, although I cannot give any undertaking that we are persuaded by that argument.

Lord Irvine of Lairg

I am content that the noble and learned Lord will simply say, as he has done, without giving any undertakings whatever, that at least he will consider the specific point that I have raised.

Lord Harris of Greenwich

Perhaps I could be clear on this point. The noble and learned Lord has been good enough to say that he will reflect on a remarkably large number of issues between now and Report stage. Presumably we shall have the benefit of those views through correspondence before Report stage so that we can then consider ourselves whether it is appropriate for us to take any further action.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

I do not think that I can say that. I made quite clear in the other case that I would reflect upon what was said, and that for the present the Government's view was as stated by me at this Box. That remains the case so far as the present amendment is concerned. However, I shall look at what has been said.

Lord Harris of Greenwich

If we have to consider whether we shall put amendments down before Report stage it is obviously necessary to know whether the reflections of the noble and learned Lord will lead to any action on the part of the Government.

Lord Irvine of Lairg

I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 162 not moved.]

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom moved Amendment No. 163: Page 115, line 36, leave out ("under paragraph 5.7.8 or 9 above") and insert (". other than compensation for rape under paragraph 6 above or compensation in respect of funeral expenses.").

The noble and learned Lord said: This is consequential on Amendment No. 158. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Irvine of Lairg had given notice of his intention to move Amendment No. 164: Page 116, line 2, after ("for") insert ("wholly or partly").

The noble Lord said: In moving Amendment No. 161, I spoke to Amendment No. 164. What I therefore said in moving Amendment No. 161 applies to Amendment No. 164, but the position in relation to it is therefore not moved.

[Amendment No. 164 not moved.]

Lord Irvine of Lairg moved Amendment No. 165: Page 116, line 15, leave out ("and gratuities").

The noble Lord said: This is an important point and I look forward to hearing what the noble and learned Lord has to say about it. The effect of this amendment is that gratuities ought not to be included in the pension rights which go to reduce the compensation payable. If one asks why, the answer is plain. To do so can only discourage employers and others from making gratuitous extra payments. But surely it is in the public interest to encourage such payments to victims of crime.

I ask rhetorically, why should voluntary payments of this kind be discouraged? A good employer may want to make such payments. A good employer should be encouraged to do so. By this provision he is disabled from topping up the statutory compensation. All that he can do is to transfer some of the burden from the board to himself. For my part, I cannot see on any view how this can be regarded as sound policy and I should like to be told how it can be so regarded. I beg to move.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

The inclusion of gratuities arising from a person's employment reflects the position of the present non-statutory scheme. It was supported by the interdepartmental working party. They considered that benefits provided by an employer as a result of the applicant's injury, including gratuities, should properly lead to a corresponding reduction in the amount of award paid by the board. I concede that this provision may act as a disincentive to some employers who wish to act benevolently towards employees injured by criminal activity. Nevertheless it remains the case that in determining an applicant's loss of income it is relevant and reasonable for the board to take account of all payments which accrue from the applicant's employment. If gratuities were to be excluded, it would be very difficult for the board to have to differentiate between those payments from employers which were totally gratuitous and those which resulted from some legal or moral obligation. We have concluded that in the absence of a workable solution and to avoid the potential for abuse, there is only one practical means of dealing with gratuities paid by employers. That is to regard all such payments as benefits arising out of employment which should be taken into account by the board when assessing compensation.

It is for these reasons that I can give no comfort to the noble Lord opposite and I cannot accept this amendment.

Lord Harris of Greenwich

I hope that the noble and learned Lord will look at this matter again. I take his point that it is part of the present scheme. He is quite right. I know that because I am a director of a public company which had to consider exactly this issue where an employee was murdered and we had to consider what action to take to help the widow.

What worries me is that it seems most unfortunate to take any form of action to discourage, by applying these provisions, a conscientious employer who wishes to give reassurance to a widow, or to help her because of her husband's record of service to the company. I do not wish to say anything indiscreet, but we eventually discovered that by using subterfuge it was possible to take certain action which led to the widow not losing any of the benefits she secured from the company. It is sensible to look at this matter again rather than to rely upon subterfuge. I recognise that genuine problems are involved. I do not underestimate them. Given the fact that in certain circumstances it is possible to get round that provision it might be sensible to have another look at it.

Lord Irvine of Lairg

I am grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Harris. I must confess that I am distinctly unimpressed by the form of argument which says that because the provision is in the present scheme it is good and argument cannot be taken further in this place.

The Government do not hesistate to change a scheme when they think it wrong. Why should we assume that the scheme is right in any respect merely because the Government have not sought to change it? We should be concerned to debate these matters on their merits.

It has been plainly right that an employer should not be discouraged from making voluntary payments of a kind which would be socially approved. I cannot think that there is any real, practical difficulty in distinguishing what is purely gratuitous from what is a legal obligation. As for moral obligation, I should regard that as gratuitous. The board would have little difficulty in investigating the facts and identifying what is truly gratuitous. I repeat my point. I see no reason why the good employer should be discouraged, or indeed disabled, from topping up the statutory compensation.

I hope that the noble and learned Lord will consider the merits of the argument regardless of what the scheme happens to be at present, and will further consider whether the practical difficulties that he adumbrates are real obstacles or no more than the practical difficulties that every judicial body encounters in applying tests. I do not think the test of whether something is gratuitous is difficult to apply. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom moved Amendment No. 166: Page 116, line 17, leave out ("Subject to sub-paragraph (2) below.").

The noble and learned Lord said: This is purely a drafting amendment. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Irvine of Lairg moved Amendment No. 167: Page 116, line 26, leave out ("become entitled to") and insert ("received").

The noble Lord said: This amendment goes to Schedule 6(14). It leaves out the words "become entitled to" and inserts in their place the word "received". Paragraph 14 has as it object to avoid double compensation by providing that the payment made under the scheme is to be reduced by the amount of any damages or compensation order obtained in any civil or criminal proceedings.

The short and cogent point of this amendment is that it is one thing to become entitled to something and another to obtain it. Just because the victim sues the offender, or someone vicariously liable for him, and obtains a compromise of the action or a judgment in his favour, there is no guarantee that he will receive the full sum due, or indeed any sum. That point is obviously even more cogent in the case of a compensation order made by a criminal court.

The mandatory language of paragraph 14 is such that the board has no option but to reduce compensation, even in a case where it has already become clear that the entitlement to damages will be worthless. That cannot be just, therefore the idea of the amendment is that the reduction of compensation should be dependent upon receipt of the sums concerned.

Simply for the sake of the record, if the noble and learned Lord sees force in that and is minded to give serious thought to a change along these lines I would simply observe that there would then be a consequential amendment to Clause 104(6)(b). I shall simply read in what I think it ought to be and leave it there. It would be at page 78, line 45, Leave out ('such payment') and insert ('payment which had it been received before the making of the award would under any provision contained in Schedule 6 to this Act have led to any such reduction')". I simply say that for the sake of completeness. I think there is a good deal to be said for this amendment, but I just mention for the sake of completeness that it would have to be carried into that consequential amendment. I beg to move.

11.30 p.m.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

I recognise the force of the point that the noble Lord has put forward. At an earlier stage of this legislation before the general election there had been a government amendment to cover the circumstances to which the noble Lord alluded which was omitted in error from the current Bill. We would wish to consider this amendment with a view to improving the wording and look at any consequences that may have on the remaining provisions of the Bill. I hope with that undertaking that the noble Lord will see fit to withdraw this amendment.

Lord Irvine of Lairg

On that basis I am happy to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom moved Amendment No. 168:

Page 116, line 30, leave out from beginning to end of line 12 on page 117 and insert— ("15—

1. (a) a deceased person has become entitled to compensation under this Part of this Act: and
2. (b) a claim for such compensation for the same injury is made by one of his dependants,

the dependant's compensation shall be reduced by the amount of the deceased's compensation: and proportionate reductions shall be made if claims are made by two or more dependants.").

The noble and learned Lord said: This amendment considerably simplifies the complicated wording of the existing paragraph 15 in relation to the reduction of compensation on account of successive claims relating to the same injury. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Irvine of Lairg moved Amendment No. 169: Page 117, line 32, leave out second ("of") and insert ("for").

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

Perhaps to assist the noble Lord let me say that I would accept this amendment if he moved it.

Lord Irvine of Lairg

When I saw the nature of this amendment I anticipated that the noble and learned Lord might be about to say that, and therefore I was ready to move it to be blown off course if I was wrong. Happily I have not been blown off course. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom moved Amendment No. 170: Page 117, line 47, leave out ("the award") and insert ("payment").

The noble and learned Lord said: This amendment provides for rules to be made relating to the date of entitlement to payment of an award instead of entitlement to the award, thereby correcting an inaccuracy in the wording. The date is significant because if the person who sustained a qualifying injury dies otherwise than as a result of it before becoming entitled to payment, his dependants will be able to make an application for compensation. If he dies otherwise than as a result of the injury and after becoming entitled to payment, they will not. I beg to move.

Lord Harris of Greenwich

May I raise one question which is not directly related to this amendment, if I may reassure the noble and learned Lord. As the noble Earl and the government Chief Whip are with us let me say this in terms of the future progress of the Bill. I have been asked by my noble friends to indicate that they have understood through the usual channels that there is to be some suggestion of a discussion of some kind in relation to the debates we had earlier in the Committee stage dealing with extradition.

All that I have been asked to say is that, given the fact that there is a gap of only 13 days between next Tuesday, when we are due to finish the Committee stage of this Bill, and Monday fortnight, when we are supposed to take up the Report stage of the Bill, we very much hope that any such meeting will be arranged as early as possible. I am not asking for a response immediately; I am simply asking for the point to be noted so that this matter can be considered in good time, given the pressure of time that we shall all be experiencing.

Lord Denham

Certainly my noble friends and I will take good note of what the noble Lord says.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Schedule 6, as amended, agreed to.

Lord Denham

I think that we have arrived at the point which, through rather devious channels, we agreed to reach. I beg to move that the House do now resume.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

House resumed.